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EUROPE A N IDE N T ITY A ND IDE N TITAR I ANS
IN EUR O PE
HE I N Z HA N D L E R
31.1.2019
Abstract
The following remarks are concerned with social identity, particularly with the antagonism between
―European identity‖, which reflects the achievements of the integration process of the European
Union, and the xenophobic ―Identitarian Movement‖, which strives for disintegration of any
supranational entity. The financial crisis of 2008 and the migration wave of 2015 have resulted in
rapid structural changes and spreading uncertainty about future living standards in the EU. Extreme
right-wing populist movements have capitalized on the anxieties emanating from these changes.
They propagate a retreat from globalization and from the EU while advocating an inward-oriented
policy with national borders against migration and cultural diversification. To forego a relapse into
insular nationalism, the EU needs a revamped narrative which rests on the established liberal
democracy and takes seriously the EU‘s motto ―United in Diversity‖. The upcoming elections to the
European Parliament provide a chance to rebuff anti-EU populism while strengthening forces
attempting a democratic regeneration and further development of the European integration
process.
The social identity theory of group behavior, originally formulated by Tajfel – Turner (1985),
pertains that part of an individual‘s selfhood can be explained by membership in specific groups.
Such groups might include the family, the neighborhood, the country of nationality, and possibly
also transnational entities like the European Union. According to Turner – Oakes (1986), social
identity ―describes those aspects of a person‘s self-concept based upon their group memberships
together with their emotional, evaluative and other psychological correlates.‖
Since the 1960s and 1970s, ―identity politics‖ has been applied to political activities concerning
groups who identified themselves with their own individual cases, such as workers, women, or
peasants, and there were only limited linkages between the various groups and across national
borders. Identity politics ―emerged originally as a way of consciousness-raising among marginalized
groups and as a means to empower these groups who felt oppressed by the society around them‖
(Wiarda 2014). In its further development, identity politics was associated with rather radical left-
wing causes. Public group activities raised the interest of the media, the groups themselves tended
to establish links with similar groups in other countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, mainstream
politicians became slowly aware of these activities, when already some political observers felt that
they were detracting politics from the more fundamental issues of society such as class conflict and
capitalism. According to Wiarda, identity politics is currently ―a part of contemporary political
discourse, used in the media and at the popular level as well as by political operatives and
academic specialists.‖
The following overview is notably devoted to disentangling the mainstream inclusive view of
―European identity‖ from the radical right-wing opinions of the exclusive ―Identitarian Movement‖.
POLICY CROSSOVER CENTER: VIENNA-EUROPE
FLASH PAPER NO. 1/2019
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LI V I N G UP T O EU R O P E AN ID E N T ITY
An application of the social identity concept in the context of identity politics is the notion of
collective "European identity". In the post-WWII era, the idea of cooperation between major
countries of Europe has evolved to mark an alternative to the interwar dominance of national
primacy and to inhibit any reoccurrence of war between European nations. As an outgrowth of this
desire, the project of economic integration was launched early on, starting with the ―European Coal
and Steel Community‖ in 1951, continuing with the Treaties of Rome in 1957, and being largely
completed with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The economic integration process has been
accompanied by a debate on ―European identity‖ which first appeared, as an official technical term,
in the Council documents of Copenhagen in 1973. At that time, defining the European identity by
the nine EU Member States involved the following aspects (European Commission 1973):
―Reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the
degree of unity so far achieved within the Community.
Assessing the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the
world and the responsibilities which result from this.
Taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification.‖
Based on these aspects, the motto of the EU (introduced in 2000) was derived: "United in
Diversity". European identity was subsequently circumscribed by the intrinsic values of the
Community including freedom, democracy, rule of law, solidarity and respect for human dignity.
The collective European identity is not supposed to replace existing identities on the national and
local levels but to serve as a complementary and overarching set of values. In this sense, European
identity is a multi-layered narrative, which also includes horizontal elements, such as language,
religion, and education.
As a precondition for transnational cooperation, the importance of national identity is emphasized
by Fukuyama (2012) when he writes that "national identity and nation-building are absolutely
critical for the success of any society." The often-diverging national identities are not lost if an all-
embracing transnational one becomes superimposed. The potential conflict of European versus
national identity is not about repressing the latter. Rather, and as a general rule, any local identity
should be embedded in the national identity and this in turn in the European identity, analogous to
the subsidiarity principle. After all, national identities are often hard to establish – as one may be
reminded of the arduous process of identification which Austria as an independent republic had to
endure in the decades following World War One.
According to Nissen (2004), European identity means the cognitive and emotional affinity of people
with Europe as a bordered space. Belonging to Europe thus requires empathy as a basis for
solidarity and loyalty. However, Nissen considers such an emotional bond as a fragile basis,
competing with established subordinate identities. In the case of collective identities, emotional and
irrational fluctuations may occur in the wake of serious changes, such as the EU's Eastern
enlargement.
In order to further advance the integration of Europe, Walkenhorst (2009) calls for an unambiguous
and publicly accepted understanding of European identity. Such an understanding would not only
promote concrete integration steps but could also contribute to a political vision of a future Europe.
Walkenhorst examines five perceptions to substantiate the concept of identity in general, but also
with regard to the EU:
Historical-cultural identity
refers to a perceived common European past with cultural roots and
common values.
Political-legal identity
is based on citizenship, representation, and participation.
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Social identity
focuses on solidarity for the benefit of all citizens.
International identity
seeks to achieve a unified image of Europe in the world.
Post-identity commonness
renounces the concept of identity and most closely corresponds to
the EU motto of being "united in diversity".
European identity arises only from a meaningful combination of these perceptions, which are not
fixed but constantly evolve with the circumstances of the time. Temporary adaptions cannot be
ruled out if, for example, an established stance in favor of more tolerance for ethnic and cultural
minorities is reversed in the event of massive immigration from alien cultures.
Critics of the term ―European identity‖ invoke that, among other deficiencies, people in Europe only
exude diffuse feelings of sympathy towards others as Europeans. White (2012) uses a more direct
language when he says that ―European identity is an illusion, and some would say a foolish one‖,
but it may have proven useful in practical politics. Instead of the singular view conjured by the term
―identity‖, he would prefer a ―narrative diversity‖ which is an already existing reality for Europe‘s
intellectual elites. Another option would be to look at non-territorial forms of subjecthood, such as
distinguishing between the political Left and Right or between professions. ―‗Europe‘ and its political
arenas are best seen as a terrain on which events, actions, and diverse experiences unfold – the
stage rather than the heroic actor.‖
Many of the identity problems in Europe are based on the obvious design flaws of the EU (and
especially of the Eurozone) that weaken acceptance among populations (Hartleb 2011). This applies
to the democratic deficit, which still clings to the EU's established institutions. And it also applies to
the austerity policy towards Greece and its deplorable consequences for that nation‘s people and
economy. Just as Greece obviously joined the eurozone too early, any ambition for further EU
enlargement should meet with utmost skepticism. The EU is also held responsible for perceived
overregulation, even if the drivers behind are often located in the Member States. Many other
weaknesses, such as the rather inefficient approache to foreign and security policy and the
prosecution of crime, complete this picture.
How difficult it is to achieve progress in deepening the European identity is shown by many fruitless
attempts to attain solidarity among the Member States. Often, instead of supranational solutions,
only intergovernmental agreements are reached that build parallel structures to the core EU
project. Several attempts have not even come that far, such as the European Social Union, with the
central aim of community-wide unemployment insurance. As the EU membership becomes more
heterogeneous, prospects for the integration progress in the social sector are fading. The financial
crisis of 2008 as well as the refugee and migration crisis of 2015 eventually approached the
displacement of any European identity by national identities.
Although originally the European identity was associated with the positive values of a common
society, this concept has gradually evaporated into a defense construct against alien religious and
other cultural influences. The basic idea of the EU as a ―liberal democracy‖ has been put into
question by elements of an ―illiberal democracy‖ and of autocracy, as advanced by political parties
of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland, Matteo Salvini of Italy, Marine Le Pen of
France, just to name a few on the European continent (see Lloyd 2018).
The bundle of liberal-democratic values that form the basis of the collective "European identity" as
pursued by the European Union and its representatives must be strictly distinguished from the
populist "Identitarian Movements" operating at the extreme right of the political spectrum (White
2012, Kaina et al. 2013, 2016, Hafeneger 2014, Ciaglia et al. 2018). While European identity is
supposed to function as a common substantive envelope over diverse national and local identities,
Identitarians battle for denouncing any step toward, and destroying any existing evidence of, such
an envelope.
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SP E C T R UM OF P O L I T I C AL P O S I T I O NS
While the dominating tone of identity politics was originally radical left-wing, it has moved since to
the extreme right and to positions such as ultra-nationalism, racism, and xenophobia, resulting also
in strong opposition to European integration. Considering the whole spectrum of political parties
and organizations, left-wing to right-wing, a non-linear order can be established where the extreme
left and extreme right positions are closer to each other than either is to the political center (Figure
1). This ―horseshoe theory‖ (attributed to Faye 2002) is just a somewhat more elaborate version of
a simple linear presentation of political positions. A still more comprehensive form would be a
―circular theory‖ where the ends of the horseshoe actually meet (Bottrell 2016), a more
sophisticated presentation would include a second axis ranging from libertarian to authoritarian
regimes.
Figure 1"Horseshoe theory" of political movements
Source: Based on Muscato (2018).
The horseshoe theory has been criticized by Choat (2017) as ―nonsense‖, given the meagre
common ground in the substance of the extreme positions. However, some more recent governing
coalitions (think of Greece and Italy) seem to corroborate the model at least with respect to
methods of agitation and vis-à-vis the liberal democratic programs of the center. The political
positions making up the horseshoe are just examples which may differ from country to country.
Looking at the right-wing axis of the horseshoe, radical positions are maintained by the
Identitarians and the neo-Nazis, either of which can be considered a populist movement.
As far as
national populism
is concerned, there is little difference in methods between left-wing and
right-wing groups, and this contributes to the very shape of the horseshoe. There is also
accordance in the disgust of the EU in its current shape, while no common ground can be discerned
in most other substantive issues.
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TH E RI S E OF ID E N T I T A RIAN MO V E M E N T S
A particular variant of right-wing groupings is now forming the populist Identitarian Movement (IM).
It has its origins in the French "Génération Identitaire", the youth section of the anti-immigrant
"Bloc Identitaire", which is the successor organization of the right-wing extremist organization
―Unité Radicale‖. The Unité Radicale was banned in 2002, following an assassination attempt of one
of its members on French President Jacques Chirac. The Génération Identitaire received public
attention in October 2012 through a video designed to discredit the liberal movement of 1968 and
multi-culturalism in general. A parallel public action by an identitarian group was the occupation of
a mosque roof in Poitiers where they enrolled a banner showing ―732 generation identity‖ in
reference to the year 732 A.D., when in that area the Frankish mayor of the palace of Austrasia,
Charles Martel, stopped the advance of Muslim invaders. Among other recent activities, European
identitarians made headlines when they rented a C-star boat to stop NGOs transporting migrants
rescued in the Mediterranean to Europe.
The French roots of the IM are visible in their leading intellectual figures, among whom are the
essayists Renaud Camus (*1946), Alain de Benoist (*1943), and Guillaume Faye (*1949). De
Benoist is regarded the founder in 1968 of the Nouvelle Droite with its distinctive transnational and
ecological spirit, Faye as one of its major theorists, and Camus as a warner against the ―Grand
Remplacement‖ via immigration. Generation Identity denies platforms to both fascists and national
socialists, it shares however positions that are in favor of ending politically correct orthodoxy,
halting mass immigration, and defending an exclusive aberration of European identity.
Zúquete (2018) summarizes the sociocultural trends that feed IMs as ―the perception of an ongoing
multicultural and multiethnic transformation of traditional European societies and the related ‗sense
of threat‘ to traditional European values and identities that it provokes‖. Identitarians feel that a
once great civilization is ravaged from inside by the Western model of civilization and from outside
by foreign peoples. In that situation, radicalism is seen as the only possibility to stop the ―Great
Replacement‖ of ―indigenous Europeans‖ and revive most of the fading old values. One of the
biggest concerns is to become a minority in one‘s country. Therefore, IMs strive for ―a reset of the
system … toward a rebooting of Europe‘s ethnocultural tradition‖.
Since the turn of the century, the network of Identitarians has quickly spread over European and
American countries. Although national movements may differ in targets and methods, most of them
abhor globalization, liberal markets, consumerism, immigration, and treacherous elites. According to
Bocci (2017), the leading force of European identitarianism is the youth-based pan-European
―Generation Identity‖ movement which is active in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom. American identitarianism is represented by the Alternative Right (―Alt-Right‖), a loosely
defined movement mainly lead by white nationalists. It includes a range of people who reject the
mainstream liberal conservatism in favor of conservative ideas that embrace implicit or explicit
racism and white supremacy (https://en.wikipedare ia.org/wiki/Alt-right). The alt-right is described
as ―a weird mix of old-school neo-Nazis, conspiracy theorists, anti-globalists, and young right-wing
internet trolls—all united in the belief that white male identity is under attack by multicultural,
‗politically correct‘ forces.‖ (https://theweek.com/articles/651929/rise-altright)
Today the ―Generation Identity‖ defines itself as a ―Europe-wide patriotic youth movement that
promotes the values of homeland, freedom, and tradition through peaceful activism, political
education, and community & cultural activities‖ (https://www.generation-identity.org.uk/). The
actual emphasis seems to lie just on homeland, tradition, and activism. The latter can be rather
rude, and it is often hard to distinguish it from criminal assault.
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It is a general attitude of IM groupings to resort to historical symbols. The overarching symbol is
the Greek letter lambda in commemoration of the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC where the
Persian army successfully fought against the outnumbered but heroic Spartan forces who carried a
yellow lambda sign on their shields – as an abbreviation for Lacedaemon, the historic name of
Sparta (Pella 2013).
The programmatic texts of IMs contain xenophobic and especially anti-Islamic statements as well as
conspiracy theories which consider ethnic groups to be threatened by the mingling of different
cultures. Every ethnic group should live exclusively on its own territory and thus preserve its
identity. As immigration is perceived as a threat, IMs demand "remigration", i.e. the reversal of
migration movements. Mulhall (2019) pertains that there are ―direct ideological parallels with
classical fascism and the historical continuity from then, through post-war neo-fascism until the
emergence of the Nouvelle Droite‖. The ideas of the New Right are to some extent transnational as
they long for the recovery of a mythical European Identity. This includes a fundamental rejection of
the ideals of Enlightenment as well as Christianity and extends to a fight against the materialist
ideologies from liberalism to socialism. The preferred result is a pan-European nationalism and a
world of ethnically homogeneous communities. According to the Austrian IM activist, Martin
Sellner, the ―European heritage‖ should be understood to cover the last 30,000 years.
Although the IM is a conglomerate of various national groups, a few characteristics are common to
all of them (see, e.g., HopeNotHate 2019):
The self-image of Identitarians is to be the ―indigenous youth of Europe‖ which defends an
alleged common European heritage.
In essence, the IM is a reaction to the ‗68ers and their perceived left-liberal dominance of
society (Mulhall 2019).
Identitarians have established networks among supporters and sympathizers preferably via
social media.
Identitarians are affine to extreme right-wing positions and ethnopluralism which strives for
ethnic cleansing to result in a separate territory for each ethnic group.
The IM ideology includes a chauvinistic exaggeration of "national self-esteem," which often
manifests itself in an authoritarian elitism and vilification of outsiders.
The IM has also been described as part of the Alternative Right, a far-right anti-globalist grouping
which offers a radical ―alternative‖ to traditional/establishment conservatism
(https://alternativeright.hopenothate.com/what-is-the-alternative-right). Hope Not Hate (HNH)
distinguishes identitarianism and the alt-right as "ostensibly separate" in origin, but with "huge
areas of ideological crossover". Many white nationalists and alt-right leaders have described
themselves as identitarians. American alt-right influence is evident in European identitarian groups
and events, forming an amalgamated "International Alternative Right". Figures within the IMs and
the alt-right often quote Nouvelle Droite founder Alain de Benoist as a reference. However, de
Benoist rejects any alt-right affiliation and states, "Maybe people consider me their spiritual father,
but I don‘t consider them my spiritual sons" (HNH 2017, 2019a).
On a country-by-country basis, the following IMs and related groupings, representing a spectrum
from right-wing parties to neo-Nazi organizations, may be mentioned (see, e.g., Hope Not Hate and
Wikipedia, Identitarian Movement):
In
Germany
, the IM emerged from earlier groups, connected to the magazine ―Blaue Narzisse‖
and its founder Felix Menzel. Drawing upon thinkers of the Nouvelle Droite and the
Conservative Revolutionary movement such as Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, it contributed to
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the rise of the PEGIDA
1
marches in the city of Dresden in 2014/15. Even more to the right, the
National Democratic Party (NPD) is described (by the Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution) as a neo-Nazi organization which uses racist, antisemitic, homophobic, revisionist
agitation and intends to disparage the democratic and lawful order of the constitution.
In
Austria
, the ―Identitäre Bewegung Österreichs‖ (IBÖ) was founded in 2012 by Martin
Sellner, Patrick Lenart, and Alexander Markovics. Markus Willinger in 2013 published a booklet
entitled "Generation Identity: A Declaration of War Against the '68ers". It is now considered
the manifesto of the IBÖ. The group has become publicly known through its activism, such as
an attempt in February 2013 to counter-occupy the Viennese Votive Church that had
previously been seized by refugees, and the interruption in April 2016 of a play at the
University of Vienna authored by Nobel-Prize winning Elfriede Jelinek and performed by
refugee actors. Martin Sellner has evolved leading spokesman of IBÖ who frequently also
contributes to IM activities in Germany.
In
Italy
, an ―identitarian-legalitarian turn‖ happened when the humanitarian Turco-Napolitano
law on immigration (1998) was replaced by the Bossi-Fini law of 2002 which, under the
auspices of the Lega Nord (now Lega, chaired by Matteo Salvini), also replaced the ―logic of
amnesties‖ with a strategy of ―prevention‖ (Garau 2015). Currently, the campaign ―Safe
Borders, Safe Cities‖ is intended to draw attention to the link between terrorism, crime, and
open borders. Matteo Salvini, now also the Minister of the Interior, attempts to build an
alliance of his Lega with the PiS of Poland. The origin of the ―Generazione Identitaria‖ proper
dates back to 2012. This group is now advertising that ―Lampedusa is the European gateway
to terror … What is happening in Lampedusa ruins not only Italy, but also endangers Austria,
Germany and the whole of Europe‖ (https://www.generation-identity.co/identitarian-
resistance-in-italy/). The ―CasaPound Italia-International‖ which started in 2015 by setting up a
Facebook page is considered by some other Identitarians as ―post-fascist‖ and therefore
deviating from Identitarian philosophy. However, many commonalities with Identitarian
thought exist, the major difference being the rather close connection of the post-fascists with
their historic ideal.
Identitarian activities in the
United Kingdom
and the
Republic of Ireland
were originally
confined to online exchanges. In October 2017, key figures of the IM (among them Martin
Sellner of Austria) met in London to initiate a British chapter as a "bridge" to radical
movements in continental Europe and the US. At that occasion, activists made a public
appearance by unfolding a large banner on Westminster Bridge reading ―Defend London –
Stop Islamisation‖ (HNH 2019b).
In the
United States
, the Traditionalist Youth Network/Traditionalist Worker Party is modeled
after the European IM. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Anti-Defamation
League, American Alt-Right groups like ―Identity Evropa‖ use almost identical self-definitions as
those of Generation Identity in Europe. Richard Spencer's National Policy Institute is also a
white nationalist movement, which advocates a version of identitarianism. In 2012 Stephen K.
Bannon took control of Breitbart News, an alt-right news outlet, engaged in the election
campaign of Donald Trump and for a short period served as an advisor to President Trump.
Bannon has since extended his alt-right campaign to Europe where he assists in unifying far-
right national parties to form a faction for the 2019 elections to the European Parliament. The
largest neo-Nazi organization in the US is the National Socialist Movement (NSM) with about
400 members in 32 states (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Nazism#Germany).
1
―Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes‖, founded 2014 in Dresden, is a populist
right-wing organization with extreme xenophobic attitudes.
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In
Sweden
, neo-Nazi activities have previously been limited to white supremacist groups, few
of which have won a membership over a few hundred individuals. The main neo-Nazi
organization as of 2017 is the Nordic Resistance Movement. It identifies itself as a National
Socialist political movement with a parliamentary branch; it is also active in Norway, Finland,
and Denmark.
The IM has now become a global phenomenon, with organized representation in many countries
and international networks. Identitarian personalities and their activities are often close to those of
neo-Nazi groups which are obsessed with their nationalistic ideology. They borrow elements from
Nazi doctrine, including ultra-nationalism, racism, antisemitism, and anti-communism. Holocaust
denial is a common feature, as is the incorporation of Nazi symbols. Neo-Nazis promote hatred,
attack minorities and in some cases strive for creating a fascist political state. Identitarians have
many a time emphasized to differ from neo-Nazism by deploring racism and violence, although
Martin Sellner concedes that he was involved with neo-Nazis when he was younger
(Cox-Meisel 2018).
The basic concept of IMs is, of course, in stark contrast to the liberal version of ―European identity‖
as espoused by the European Commission and most of the Member States of the European Union.
Gemmingen (2013) maintains, however, that thanks to the IMs‘ anti-EU activities the attention to
―European identity‖ proper has been revived in the European Union.
A N E W EU RO PE A N N A R R A TIVE
For Europe, after being covered by a wave of nationalism and populism as a result of the financial
crisis, the subsequent austerity policy and the migration crisis, there is possibly no way of return to
earlier liberal visions. Ben-Ami (2018) emphasizes that Europe needs a new narrative that exudes
more social competence than it currently does, but above all must lead (in the words of Winston
Churchill) to a "European family" based on patriotism and European citizenship and built on the
diversity of its history and political structures. As an example, the "American dream" comes in one‘s
mind, with the promise of shared individual freedom which could be strong enough to survive the
attacks of the Trump Administration. However, as Eatwell – Gordon (2018) emphasize, a new
European narrative must seriously engage with the supporters and ideas of national populism in
order to understand their positions. Approaching their constituencies and working out solutions to
their problems may alleviate the appeal of non-democratic developments.
The upcoming vote for the European Parliament (EP) will decide on the future course of
European integration, including a new structure and personal composition of the European
Commission.
Box 1
summarizes the current EP factions and their relative voting power and provides
some clue as to the future composition of the EP. The decision will be between continuity of the
integration process, though with slow and only step-by-step improvements, on the one hand, and a
radical step backward to exclusive nationalism with a lack of common positions concerning
economic, social, ecological and migration issues on the other. This would manifest the resurrection
of an allegedly overcome ominous nationalism.
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Box 1: Composition of the European Parliament as of year-end 2018
The following groups are currently represented in the European Parliament (Lamy et al. 2018,
European Union 2019, and European Parliament http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/home):
Group Seats Countries
represented
The European People‘s Party (Christian Democrats) Group (EPP) 217 28
The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats European
Parliamentary Group (S&D) 187 28
European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR) 75 16
The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group (ALDE) 68 22
Greens–European Free Alliance group (Greens/EFA) 52 18
The European United Left–Nordic Green Left group (GUE/NGL) 52 14
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (EFDD) 41 9
Europe of Nations and Freedom group (ENF) 37 8
Non-attached Members (NA) 22 8
Total 751 28
In case of Brexit, the UK MEPs (now 73) will drop out and the future EP which will consist (adjusted
for demographic changes) of 705 seats. None of the remaining Member States will lose seats.
The EPP (chaired by Manfred Weber), S&D (Udo Bullmann) and ALDE (Guy Verhofstadt) are all pro-
European groups, although the EPP also includes the euro-skeptic Hungarian FIDESZ of Viktor
Orbán. The right-of-traditional-right parties are split into ECR (Syed Kamall), EFDD (Nigel Farage)
and ENF (Nicolas Bay, Marcel de Graaff). The ECR is a Euroskeptic and anti-federalist group that
includes the Conservative Party of the UK and the Law and Justice Party (PiS) of Poland; they want
to reform the EU, but do not reject it outright. The EFDD consists of the British UKIP and the Italian
Five Star Movement, and the ENF is composed of Marine Le Pen‘s National Rally party, Matteo
Salvini‘s Lega party, and the Austrian FPÖ. Environmental programs are represented by Greens/EFA
(Ska Keller, Philippe Lamberts) and GUE/NGL (Gabriele Zimmer). Among the NA group, the
following extreme right-wing groups are represented: the Alliance of European National Movements
(AENM) with 3 seats and the Alliance For Peace And Freedom (APF) with 2 seats. The Hungarian
Jobbik avails of 2 seats. On the left wing, the European Communist Initiative (ECI) also holds
2 seats.
According to projections published in ―Der (europäische) Föderalist‖,
https://www.foederalist.eu/p/europawahl-umfragen.html (retrieved 28 January 2019), the majority
currently held by EPP and S&D could be lost to the advantage of Euroskeptic groups. In a dynamic
forecast, the EPP is estimated at 185 seats and the S&D at 130 seats. A majority could still be
conceived in a coalition including the liberal ALDE faction. The populist ENF could progress to 86
members, and the ECR to 91 members, while the EFDD, because of Brexit, would lose its status as
a separate faction. As a result, the populist right-wing could end-up with a total of 177 seats, up
from 153.
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RE F E R E N C E S
Bocci, Alessandra (2017), ―Identitarianism in Europe versus the United States‖, 8 October.
https://medium.com/@alessabocchi/identitarianism-in-europe-versus-the-united-states-
5ce959aa3898
Bottrell, John (2016), ―The political spectrum should be a circle, not a line‖, blog, 24 August.
http://articulatingideas.blogspot.com/2016/08/the-political-spectrum-should-be-circle.html
Choat, Simon (2017), ―‗Horseshoe theory‘ is nonsense – the far right and far left have little in
common‖, The Conversation, 12 May. https://theconversation.com/horseshoe-theory-is-
nonsense-the-far-right-and-far-left-have-little-in-common-77588
Ciaglia, Sarah, Clemens Fuest, Friedrich Heinemann (2018), ―What a feeling?! How to promote
‗European Identity‘―, EconPol, Policy Report 09, October.
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AB O U T THE AU T H O R
HE I N Z HA N D L E R is a retired staff member of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research
(WIFO), now serving as Emeritus Consultant. Doctoral degree in laws and economics of the
University of Vienna, postgraduate studies at the Vienna Institute of Advanced Studies (IHS),
habilitation at the Vienna University of Technology (1989). Handler was a staff member of the
International Monetary Fund (1973-76), Deputy Head of WIFO (1987-93), Director General with the
Austrian Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (1993-2003), member of the EU‘s Economic
Policy Committee (1994-2004) and Chair of the Statistics Council of Statistics Austria (2010-2015).
Some 200 publications on monetary, fiscal and structural policies.