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A Cloud-Based Crime Reporting System with Identity Protection

Abstract and Figures

Criminal activities have always been a part of human society, and even today, in a world of extremely advanced surveillance and policing capabilities, many different kinds of crimes are still committed in almost every social environment. However, since those who commit crimes are not representative of the majority of their community, members of these communities tend to wish to report crime when they see it; however, they are often reluctant to do so for fear of their own safety should the people they report identify them. Thus, a great deal of crime goes unreported, and investigations fail to gain key evidence from witnesses, which serves only to foster an environment in which criminal activity is more likely to occur. In order to address this problem, this paper proposes an online illegal event reporting scheme based on cloud technology, which combines digital certificates, symmetric keys, asymmetric keys, and digital signatures. The proposed scheme can process illegal activity reports from the reporting event to the issuing of a reward. The scheme not only ensures informers’ safety, anonymity and non-repudiation, but also prevents cases and reports being erased, and ensures data integrity. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is designed to be robust against abusive use, and is able to preclude false reports. Therefore, it provides a convenient and secure platform for reporting and fighting crime.
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symmetry
S
S
Article
A Cloud-Based Crime Reporting System with
Identity Protection
Tzay-Farn Shih 1, Chin-Ling Chen 1,2,3,*, Bo-Yan Syu 1and Yong-Yuan Deng 1,*
1Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Chaoyang University of Technology,
Taichung 41349, Taiwan; tfshih@cyut.edu.tw (T.-F.S.); s10327624@gm.cyut.edu.tw (B.-Y.S.)
2School of Information Engineering, Changchun Sci-Tech University, Changchun 130600, China
3
School of Computer and Information Engineering, Xiamen University of Technology, Xiamen 361005, China
*Correspondence: clc@mail.cyut.edu.tw (C.-L.C.); allen.nubi@gmail.com (Y.-Y.D.);
Tel.: +886-4-23323000 (ext. 4761) (C.-L.C.)
Received: 2 January 2019; Accepted: 13 February 2019; Published: 18 February 2019


Abstract:
Criminal activities have always been a part of human society, and even today, in a world
of extremely advanced surveillance and policing capabilities, many different kinds of crimes are
still committed in almost every social environment. However, since those who commit crimes
are not representative of the majority of their community, members of these communities tend
to wish to report crime when they see it; however, they are often reluctant to do so for fear of
their own safety should the people they report identify them. Thus, a great deal of crime goes
unreported, and investigations fail to gain key evidence from witnesses, which serves only to foster
an environment in which criminal activity is more likely to occur. In order to address this problem,
this paper proposes an online illegal event reporting scheme based on cloud technology, which
combines digital certificates, symmetric keys, asymmetric keys, and digital signatures. The proposed
scheme can process illegal activity reports from the reporting event to the issuing of a reward.
The scheme not only ensures informers’ safety, anonymity and non-repudiation, but also prevents
cases and reports being erased, and ensures data integrity. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is
designed to be robust against abusive use, and is able to preclude false reports. Therefore, it provides
a convenient and secure platform for reporting and fighting crime.
Keywords: citizen digital certificate; public key; private key; illegal event; crime; digital signature
1. Introduction
In today’s technologically advanced society, mechanisms for fighting crime are extremely
advanced, from remote, automatic surveillance to sophisticated dedicated laboratories and evidence
analysis, yet crime still has a significant presence in our world, both globally and in local communities,
including sexual assault, drugs and violent crimes, all of which endanger the public. While some
people may be willing to actively report illegal acts, others choose not to do so, as they are worried
about the fallibility of the policing, reporting and criminal justice systems, based on previous failings
in all three departments [
1
3
]. People are afraid for their own safety should those they report identify
them, or they are worried that law enforcement officials may simply erase any case they report.
Moreover, people afraid of intimidation may choose not to offer information, or stand as a witness to
criminal acts, despite a high reward being offered for such information. All of these concerns have,
in the past, contributed to an environment in which crime is more difficult to address, and in which
crime is more likely to be committed. However, recent years have seen rapid developments in Internet
technology, in particular cloud technology, which have made possible an online crime reporting system
with identity protection. In fact, the high degree of identity protection offered by these technological
advances is a necessity for any such online crime reporting system [4].
Symmetry 2019,11, 255; doi:10.3390/sym11020255 www.mdpi.com/journal/symmetry
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 2 of 29
User identities must be as secure as possible for any such reporting system, as informers are
required to use their real names; understandably, this information must be kept secret to ensure the
informer’s safety [
5
]. Informers are required to provide their real identities, as the use of pseudonyms
would make them difficult to contact, and cases may not be accepted as a result. However, an informer’s
real identity is always vulnerable to exposure through human error.
There are two primary requirements for an online crime reporting system: Informers must
provide their real identities, and their identities must be well protected. With these requirements in
mind, several online crime reporting systems have been proposed for different applications in recent
years [
1
,
2
,
6
,
7
]. In order to ensure that the informer’s identity is protected during reporting, anonymity
can effectively protect victims and witnesses; however, the security mechanisms involved in identity
verification and data transmission are important issues to be addressed.
As a result, this paper presents a novel reporting system using a cryptographic mechanism for
improved security and identity confidentiality. The proposed scheme also combines digital certificates,
symmetric keys, asymmetric keys, digital signatures and a design verification mechanism to achieve
integrity, privacy and un-falsification of transmitted data. In addition, the system not only ensures the
legitimacy of a user’s identity, but also protects informers’ privacy and security [
7
] in an anonymous
manner. Rewards can also automatically be remitted to informers. In addition, the proposed system
prevents administration problems, such as cases being deleted or lost, or malicious abuse of the
reporting system.
The proposed scheme uses a network online reporting mechanism to improve reporting and
reduce policing costs [
2
], combined with digital certificates for authentication [
8
10
] to ensure that
reports cannot be made anonymously. The proposed system is thus able to use an impartial third-party
organization to confirm an informer’s identity, and protect the informer’s privacy and security.
In addition, if cases reported are not accepted within a specified time, the system is equipped with
an automatic upward reporting mechanism to prevent late investigations or the erasure of cases.
If reported information leads to the successful resolution of a case, a reward will be automatically
remitted to the informers via the system, so that the process is completely hidden and safe, thus offering
complete informer identity protection, and preventing a variety of security threats.
Network service applications have increased rapidly with the recent rapid growth of information
technology, giving rise to the development of powerful, high-capacity cloud computing systems
that can satisfy various user demands and offer shared resources online [
11
,
12
]. According to the
literature [
13
], many enterprises employ cloud services and their applications provided through a
browser offering access to online programming applications, software and data. These computing
services can be implemented in the cloud platform. In addition, [
14
] noted that the cloud services are
an important future trend.
Many online reporting systems have been proposed to date, and research into such systems has
provided several requirements for such systems [
6
,
15
18
]. For example: trusted third-parties are used
to verify legitimate informer identities using digital certificate technology to prevent abuse of the
system by impostor attacks [15,16]; authentication mechanisms are crucial to such systems [1921].
Informers may wish to remain anonymous during the online reporting process [
6
] because they
are afraid for their own safety should their identity become known to those being reported [
17
].
Therefore, it is important to protect informer identity. In addition, as Martín et al. [
18
] noted, messages
must be secure against tampering during transmission. It is also important to ensure that the identity
of the informer is not even known to the auditor or the system in the event of a malicious digital attack.
Another important requirement is non-repudiation. The system server saves information signed
by all personnel; thus, if disputes occur, users cannot deny that the record has been signed [18].
Other concerns include:
(1) That reported cases may be erased or delayed due to external intervention. Therefore, if reported
cases have not been accepted within a specified time, the proposed scheme is equipped with an
automatic upward reporting mechanism to avoid reported cases being suppressed.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 3 of 29
(2) That informers’ identities may be disclosed in the reward procedure. The system must protect
the privacy of informers in any actions, so the proposed scheme includes a precautionary mechanism
to ensure that managers or databases are not leaked, as there is no record to track the identity of a
person making a report.
(3) That reported information may be intercepted or leaked, revealing the informer’s identity.
Therefore, it is essential to ensure complete transmission confidentiality.
To sum up, an online reporting system should meet the following requirements: authentication,
anonymity, integrity, and non-repudiation, preventing cases from being erased, avoiding the disclosure
of informer identity in the award procedure, protecting the privacy of informers, and preventing the
reported information from being intercepted.
2. Methodology
This section describes how the proposed online crime reporting system with identity protection
protects informer identity and privacy during the reporting process, how the proposed system prevents
cases being erased, and the automatic reward process.
2.1. Notations
Ux—user xis categorized as: informer Ui, investigator Ut, superior Us
Ui—informer
Ut—investigator
Us—superior
ServerPLA—reporting server
ServerCA—certificate authority server
TFGateway—cooperating payment server
IDx—the reporting system account of Ux
PWx—the reporting system password of Ux
PWHASH—the hash value of a password
SNevent—the serial number of a case
ACCi—the bank account of Ui
Cash—the reward amount
SN—the serial number of an IC (Integrated Circuit) card
IDNO—the ID number of an IC card (last four digits)
PUKUx—the public key of Ux
PRKUx—the private key of Ux
Msgevent—attached data for reporting (e.g., photos and related documents)
Msgsuc—success response from reporting server
Msgunsuc—unsuccessful response from reporting server
MsgCA—the result of verification from the CA (Certificate Authority) server
Msgver—the audit result of reporting case form Utor Us
MsgBANKsuc—notification of remit
Sigx—the signature of x
VPUKUx(Sigx)—use the public key PUKUx to verify signature Sigx
SPRKUx(M)—use the private key PRKUx to sign message M
EKEY(M)—encrypt message Mby symmetric key KEY
DKEY(C)—decrypt ciphertext Cby symmetric key KEY
EPUKSERVERPLA(M)—encrypt message Mby public key PUKSERVERPLA
DPRKSERVERPLA(C)—decrypt ciphertext Cby server’s private key PRKSERVERPLA
H(. )—one way hash function
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 4 of 29
XY—send a message from Xto Y
A
1
B—determine if Ais equal to B
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 33
PUKUx—the public key of Ux 131
PRKUx—the private key of Ux 132
Msgevent—attached data for reporting (e.g. photos and related documents) 133
Msgsuc—success response from reporting server 134
Msgunsuc—unsuccessful response from reporting server 135
MsgCA—the result of verification from the CA (Certificate Authority) server 136
Msgver—the audit result of reporting case form Ut or Us 137
MsgBANKsuc—notification of remit 138
Sigx —the signature of x 139
VPUKUx(Sigx)—use the public key PUKUx to verify signature Sigx 140
SPRKUx(M)—use the private key PRKUx to sign message M 141
EKEY(M)—encrypt message M by symmetric key KEY 142
DKEY(C) —decrypt ciphertext C by symmetric key KEY 143
EPUKSERVERPLA(M)—encrypt message M by public key PUKSERVERPLA 144
DPRKSERVERPLA(C)—decrypt ciphertext C by server’s private key PRKSERVERPLA 145
H() —one way hash function 146
X Y—send a message from X to Y 147
A B—determine if A is equal to B 148
—insecure channel 149
—secure channel 150
151
2.1. System Structure 152
The system structure and operation processes of the proposed system are shown in Figure 1. 153
The main interactive roles are informers, investigators and superiors. The servers include the 154
reporting server, the cooperating payment server, and the certificate authority server. The platform 155
uses digital certificates on personal identification IC (Integrated Circuit) cards, which verify the 156
identity of the user, thus preventing reports by impostors. The user (e.g. informer, investigator and 157
superior) must apply for a personal identification IC card in person at the digital certificate 158
management center. In all operations, the verification of a personal IC card is issued by the reporting 159
platform to the digital certificate management center. In the following descriptions, it is assumed 160
that the user has registered successfully and has logged in to the reporting platform. 161
—insecure channel
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 33
PUKUx—the public key of Ux 131
PRKUx—the private key of Ux 132
Msgevent—attached data for reporting (e.g. photos and related documents) 133
Msgsuc—success response from reporting server 134
Msgunsuc—unsuccessful response from reporting server 135
MsgCA—the result of verification from the CA (Certificate Authority) server 136
Msgver—the audit result of reporting case form Ut or Us 137
MsgBANKsuc—notification of remit 138
Sigx —the signature of x 139
VPUKUx(Sigx)—use the public key PUKUx to verify signature Sigx 140
SPRKUx(M)—use the private key PRKUx to sign message M 141
EKEY(M)—encrypt message M by symmetric key KEY 142
DKEY(C) —decrypt ciphertext C by symmetric key KEY 143
EPUKSERVERPLA(M)—encrypt message M by public key PUKSERVERPLA 144
DPRKSERVERPLA(C)—decrypt ciphertext C by server’s private key PRKSERVERPLA 145
H() —one way hash function 146
X Y—send a message from X to Y 147
A B—determine if A is equal to B 148
—insecure channel 149
—secure channel 150
151
2.1. System Structure 152
The system structure and operation processes of the proposed system are shown in Figure 1. 153
The main interactive roles are informers, investigators and superiors. The servers include the 154
reporting server, the cooperating payment server, and the certificate authority server. The platform 155
uses digital certificates on personal identification IC (Integrated Circuit) cards, which verify the 156
identity of the user, thus preventing reports by impostors. The user (e.g. informer, investigator and 157
superior) must apply for a personal identification IC card in person at the digital certificate 158
management center. In all operations, the verification of a personal IC card is issued by the reporting 159
platform to the digital certificate management center. In the following descriptions, it is assumed 160
that the user has registered successfully and has logged in to the reporting platform. 161
—secure channel
2.2. System Structure
The system structure and operation processes of the proposed system are shown in Figure 1.
The main interactive roles are informers, investigators and superiors. The servers include the reporting
server, the cooperating payment server, and the certificate authority server. The platform uses digital
certificates on personal identification IC (Integrated Circuit) cards, which verify the identity of the
user, thus preventing reports by impostors. The user (e.g., informer, investigator and superior) must
apply for a personal identification IC card in person at the digital certificate management center.
In all operations,
the verification of a personal IC card is issued by the reporting platform to the digital
certificate management center. In the following descriptions, it is assumed that the user has registered
successfully and has logged in to the reporting platform.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 33
162
Figure 1. System structure and operations of reporting cloud. 163
(1) Informer logs in to the system to make a report, or to process other related operations. 164
(2) The reporting server assigns an investigator to conduct an investigation, and the investigator 165
receives the report of a crime, and determines whether the preliminary evidence is sufficient 166
to open a case. 167
(3) The investigator transmits the result of the audited case to the reporting server. 168
(4) The reporting server transmits the reports audited by the investigator to a superior. In addition, 169
if the investigator does not receive or audit reports within a specified period, the system will 170
automatically notify the superior of the reports. If the upward notification confirms the reports 171
are sufficient to open cases, with a reward to be issued, the reports will be sent to the upper 172
superiors for confirmation. When all the superiors confirm that the details of the report are 173
sufficient for the reward, the financial system will automatically remit the reward to the 174
informer’s account. On the other hand, if the investigator determines that a report is abusing 175
the system, then the superior will re-confirm whether the case is rejected or must be 176
re-investigated to avoid a wrong judgment. 177
(5) Each superior sends the results of the case to the reporting server. 178
(6) When the reporting server receives a superior's determination that the case needs 179
re-investigating, the case will be reassigned to a new superior. 180
(7) When the reporting server receives the confirmation and agrees to issue the reward, the server 181
will notify the financial institution. 182
(8) The cooperating payment server of the financial institution will automatically remit the reward 183
to the informer’s account. 184
Figure 1. System structure and operations of reporting cloud.
(1)
Informer logs in to the system to make a report, or to process other related operations.
(2)
The reporting server assigns an investigator to conduct an investigation, and the investigator
receives the report of a crime, and determines whether the preliminary evidence is sufficient to
open a case.
(3)
The investigator transmits the result of the audited case to the reporting server.
(4)
The reporting server transmits the reports audited by the investigator to a superior. In addition,
if the investigator does not receive or audit reports within a specified period, the system will
automatically notify the superior of the reports. If the upward notification confirms the reports are
sufficient to open cases, with a reward to be issued, the reports will be sent to the upper superiors
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 5 of 29
for confirmation. When all the superiors confirm that the details of the report are sufficient for the
reward, the financial system will automatically remit the reward to the informer ’s account. On the
other hand, if the investigator determines that a report is abusing the system, then the superior
will re-confirm whether the case is rejected or must be re-investigated to avoid a wrong judgment.
(5)
Each superior sends the results of the case to the reporting server.
(6) When the reporting server receives a superior’s determination that the case needs re-investigating,
the case will be reassigned to a new superior.
(7)
When the reporting server receives the confirmation and agrees to issue the reward, the server
will notify the financial institution.
(8)
The cooperating payment server of the financial institution will automatically remit the reward
to the informer’s account.
(9)
When the cooperating payment server has remitted the reward, it will notify the reporting server.
(10)
The reporting server notifies the informer that the remittance has been completed.
2.2.1. Registration Phase
Before a user is granted access to the platform for the first time, they must go to the digital
certificate management center to get a personal identification IC card, which they will then use to
register and access the platform. Figure 2is the flow chart of the registration verification phase.
The steps of the registration phase are as follows:
Figure 2. The flow chart of the registration phase.
Step 1: UxServerPLA
User U
x
must first register and provide basic information, such as account ID
x
and password PW
x
.
The user Uxwill transmit IDxand PWxto the reporting server ServerPLA.
Step 2: ServerPLAUx
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 6 of 29
After receiving the ID
x
and PW
x
, the reporting server verifies the account ID
x
of the user U
x
.
If the user account ID
x
is approved by the server, then user U
x
will be asked to insert his/her personal
identification IC card to determine whether the IC card is valid.
Step 3: UxServerPLA
User U
x
must insert the personal identification IC card and enter the PIN code. If the PIN code is
correct, then user U
x
will receive the SN number of the IC card, the public key PUK
Ux
and his/her
personal data (for example, the last four digits of the ID card number IDNO) and the system will send
IDNO,SN, and PUKUx to the reporting server.
Step 1: ServerPLAServerCA
After receiving the the user’s IDNO,SN and public key PUK
Ux
, the reporting server will transmit
the SN and authentication data to the OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) service of the certificate
authority server ServerCA to check the validity of SN.
Step 2: ServerCAServerPLA
The certificate authority server Server
CA
will verify the SN sent by the reporting server Server
PLA
,
and send the result MsgCA back to the reporting server.
Step 3: ServerPLA
After receiving the Msg
CA
that Server
CA
has already sent back, the Server
PLA
can determine
whether Msg
CA
is valid. If it is valid, then user U
x
is a legal user. The reporting server will then convert
the user’s password PWxinto PWHASH with SHA-256:
PWHASH =H(PWx) (1)
Finally, the registration information ID
x
, encrypted PW
HASH
,IDNO and public key PUK
Ux
of the
user Uxare stored in the database, completing the registration process.
2.2.2. Login Verification Phase
Once a user passes the verification phase, s/he will be allowed to log into the system.
The following Steps (1) and (2) describe the login processes and verification steps. Figure 3shows the
flow chart of the login verification phase.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 33
The certificate authority server ServerCA will verify the SN sent by the reporting server ServerPLA, 212
and send the result MsgCA back to the reporting server. 213
Step 3: ServerPLA 214
After receiving the MsgCA that ServerCA has already sent back, the ServerPLA can determine 215
whether MsgCA is valid. If it is valid, then user Ux is a legal user. The reporting server will then 216
convert the user’s password PWx into PWHASH with SHA-256: 217
PWHASH= H(PWx) (1)
Finally, the registration information IDx, encrypted PWHASH, IDNO and public key PUKUx of the 218
user Ux are stored in the database, completing the registration process. 219
2.1.2. Login Verification Phase 220
Once a user passes the verification phase, s/he will be allowed to log into the system. The 221
following Steps (1) and (2) describe the login processes and verification steps. Figure 3 shows the 222
flow chart of the login verification phase. 223
224
Figure 3. The flow chart of the login verification phase. 225
Step 1: UxServerPLA 226
The user Ux logs into the reporting platform and enters the account IDx and password PWx, and 227
then sends this information. This will convert the password PWx into PWHASH: 228
PWHASH = H(PWx) (2)
Then the ServerPLA uses the public key PUKSERVERPLA to encrypt IDx and PWHASH. After this, the 229
encrypted message C1is transmitted to the reporting server: 230
C1 = EPUKSERVERPLA(IDx, PWHASH) (3)
Step 2: ServerPLAUx 231
When the reporting server receives the encrypted message C1, the server ServerPLA will use its 232
own private key PRKSERVERPLA to decrypt C3: 233
(IDx, PWHASH) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C1) (4)
The user Ux, account IDx and password PWHASH will be obtained, and then compared with the 234
data stored in the database. If IDx and PWHASH match the database, ServerPLA will respond with a 235
success message Msgsuc that the login is successful. 236
2.1.3. Reporting Phase 237
Figure 3. The flow chart of the login verification phase.
Step 1: UxServerPLA
The user U
x
logs into the reporting platform and enters the account ID
x
and password PW
x
, and
then sends this information. This will convert the password PWxinto PWHASH:
PWHASH =H(PWx) (2)
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 7 of 29
Then the Server
PLA
uses the public key PUK
SERVERPLA
to encrypt ID
x
and PW
HASH
. After this, the
encrypted message C1is transmitted to the reporting server:
C1=EPUKSERVERPLA(IDx,PWHASH) (3)
Step 2: ServerPLAUx
When the reporting server receives the encrypted message C
1
, the server Server
PLA
will use its
own private key PRKSERVERPLA to decrypt C3:
(IDx,PWHASH) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C1) (4)
The user U
x
, account ID
x
and password PW
HASH
will be obtained, and then compared with the
data stored in the database. If ID
x
and PW
HASH
match the database, Server
PLA
will respond with a
success message Msgsuc that the login is successful.
2.2.3. Reporting Phase
In the reporting phase, the informer can log into the system and fill in a crime report by entering
the identity of the offender, the related documents and the details of the violation. The informer’s
identity is not required. The informer simply needs to insert his/her IC card and verify his/her identity.
If the informer’s identity is correct, the system will allow him/her to submit a report. The flow chart
of the reporting phase is shown in Figure 4.
Step 1: UiServerPLA
The informer U
i
logs into the reporting platform, enters his/her account ID
i
and password PW
i
,
and then submits them. This will convert the PWiinto PWHASH :
PWHASH =H(PWi) (5)
After this, PUK
SERVERPLA
uses the public key to encrypt ID
i
and PW
HASH
and then send the
encrypted message C4to the reporting server:
C2=EPUKSERVERPLA(IDi,PWHASH) (6)
Step 2: ServerPLAUi
When the reporting server receives the encrypted message C
2
from the informer U
i
, the server
will use the private key PRKSERVERPLA to decrypt message C2:
(IDi,PWHASH) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C2) (7)
The informer U
i
account ID
i
and password PW
HASH
will be obtained and then compared with the
data stored in the database. If ID
i
and PW
HASH
match the related data in the database, Server
PLA
will
reply Msgsuc to inform Uithat they have successfully logged in.
Step 3: UiServerPLA
Then, the informer U
i
enters the report event Msg
event
and encrypts ID
i
and Msg
event
by public
key PUKSERVERPLA. The encrypted message C3will be sent to the reporting server:
C3=EPUKSERVERPLA(IDi,Msgevent) (8)
Step 4: ServerPLAUi
The reporting server Server
PLA
uses its own private key PRK
SERVERPLA
to decrypt C
3
, and then
gets the informer’s IDiand report event Msgevent :
(IDi,Msgevent) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C3) (9)
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 8 of 29
It then checks that the form is completed. If the information is completed, the Server
PLA
will
request the informer Uito insert his/her IC card.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 33
In the reporting phase, the informer can log into the system and fill in a crime report by 238
entering the identity of the offender, the related documents and the details of the violation. The 239
informer’s identity is not required. The informer simply needs to insert his/her IC card and verify 240
his/her identity. If the informer’s identity is correct, the system will allow him/her to submit a 241
report. The flow chart of the reporting phase is shown in Figure 4. 242
Step 1: UiServerPLA 243
The informer Ui logs into the reporting platform, enters his/her account IDi and password PWi, 244
and then submits them. This will convert the PWi into PWHASH: 245
PWHASH = H(PWi) (5)
(5)
After this, PUKSERVERPLA uses the public key to encrypt IDi and PWHASH and then send the 246
encrypted message C4 to the reporting server: 247
C2 = EPUKSERVERPLA(IDi, PWHASH) (6)
(6)
Step 2: ServerPLAUi 248
When the reporting server receives the encrypted message C2 from the informer Ui, the server 249
will use the private key PRKSERVERPLA to decrypt message C2: 250
(IDi, PWHASH) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C2) (7)
251
P
WHASH = H(PWi)
C2 = EPUKSERVERPLA(IDi, PWHASH)
S
N
M
s
g
CA
(IDi, Msgevent)VPUKUi(Sigi)
Check IDNO
C5 = EKEY(IDi)
Save (S
N
even
t
,
M
s
g
even
t
,
C
5, Si
g
i)
(IDi, PWHASH) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C2)
Check if
I
Di and PW
H
ASH exists in database
C
3 = EPUKSERVERPLA(
I
Di, Ms
g
even
t
)
(IDi, Msgevent)= DPRKSERVERPLA (C3)
Check
M
s
g
even
t
data inte
g
rit
y
M
s
g
s
uc
C
2
C
3
request Ui to inserts a IC card
Sigi=SPRKUi(IDi, Msgevent)
C
4 = EPUKSERVERPLA(
I
DNO,S
N
)
(
C
4, Si
g
i)
(
I
DNO,S
N
)= DPRKSERVERPLA(
C
4)
ServerPLA ServerCA
Ui
Figure 4. The flow chart of the reporting phase.
Step 5: UiServerPLA
After this, U
i
inserts his/her IC card and enters his/her PIN code. If the PIN code is correct, it will
use the informer’s private key PRKUi to sign the reported event Msgevent :
Sigi=SPRKUi(IDi,Msgevent ) (10)
Next, SN and IDNO are obtained from the informer U
i
’s IC card, and the public key PUK
SERVERPLA
is used to encrypt the SN and IDNO:
C4=EPUKSERVERPLA(IDNO,SN) (11)
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 9 of 29
Finally, Server
PLA
sends the encrypted message C
4
and the informer’s signature Sig
i
to the
reporting server.
Step 6: ServerPLAServerCA
The reporting server receives C
4
and Sig
i
of U
i
, and then uses the server ’s private key
PRKSERVERPLA to decrypt C4, and obtains the IDNO and SN of Ui..
(IDNO,SN) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C4) (12)
The reporting server will transmit the SN to the OCSP service of the certificate authority server through
a secure channel to check the validity of SN.
Step 7: ServerCAServerPLA
The certificate authority server Server
CA
will verify the SN from the reporting Server
PLA
and send
the result MsgCA back to ServerPLA.
Step 8: ServerPLA
When the reporting server receives the result of the certificate authority server ServerCA and it is
effective, it will then compare the information in signature Sigiand messages (IDi,Msgevent):
(IDi,Msgevent)
1
VPUKUi(Sigi) (13)
If the signature is correct, the server will compare the IDNO of the IC card with the IDNO stored
in the database. If the comparison is successful, the system will generate an event number SN
event
.
This event number SN
event
will be associated with the identity of the informer. Therefore, the system
will encrypt the IDiof the Uiwith symmetric key from ServerPLA:
C5=EKEY (IDi) (14)
Finally, the SNevent,Msgevent,C5and Sigiare saved in the database.
2.2.4. The Superior Verification Phase
Upon logging into the system, the investigator will conduct an investigation of reported crimes
randomly assigned by the system. If the reported case is illegal and has a reward, it will be forwarded
to the superior to issue the reward. On the other hand, if it is a non-reward case, the investigator will
indicate the case processing status as “closed”. This phase verifies individual identification of the IC
card as in the case reporting phase steps (6)–(7). The case before the superior will only receive and
display relevant documents and content, and does not contain the identity of the informer because
the identity of the informer was confirmed at the beginning of the reporting phase, which means
the informer is a legal user, and the whole process of the report is guaranteed to be anonymous.
The following steps (1)–(4) describe the auditing process and give an overview of verification, as shown
in Figure 5.
Step 1: UtServerPLA;UtUs
When the investigator U
t
receives the report event Msg
event
assigned by the system, the investigator
investigates that event. If the investigation shows that it is an illegal event with reward, the investigator
U
t
will be requested to insert his/her IC card and enter his/her PIN code. If the PIN code is correct,
the server will use the investigator U
t
’s private key PRK
Ut
to sign the case. The signature of the
investigator Sig
t
includes the identity of the investigator ID
t
, event number SN
event
, reporting event
Msgevent, event verification result Msgver and the reward amount Cash:
Sigt=SPRKUt(IDt,SNevent ,Msgevent,Msgver ,Cash) (15)
The investigator will close it, and the ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash and Sig
t
are stored directly
in the database.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 10 of 29
Symmetry 2019, 11, x; doi: FOR PEER REVIEW www.mdpi.com/journal/symmetry
308
Figure 5. The flow chart of the superior verifying phase.309
Si
g
t
=SPRKU
t
(
I
D
t
, S
N
even
t
,
M
s
g
even
t
,
M
s
g
ve
r
, Cash)
(
I
D
t
, S
N
even
t
,
M
s
g
even
t
,
M
s
g
ve
r
, Cash, Si
g
t
)
(
I
D
t
, S
N
even
t
,
M
s
g
even
t
,
M
s
g
ve
r
, Cash, Si
g
t
)
Si
g
s
=SPRKUs(
I
D
s
,
I
D
t
, S
N
even
t
,
M
s
g
even
t
,
M
s
g
ve
r
, Cash)
(IDs, IDt, SNevent,Msgevent,Msgver, Cash, Sigs)
(IDs, IDt, SNevent,Msgevent,Msgver, Cash, Sigs)
Save (IDs, IDt, SNevent,Msgevent,Msgver, Cash, Sigs)
(IDt, SNevent,Msgevent,Msgver, Cash) VPUKUt(Sigt)
(IDs, IDt, SNevent,Msgevent,Msgver, Cash) VPUKUs(Sigs)
Fill in the
A
C
C
i
Save (
I
D
t
, S
N
even
t
,
M
s
g
even
t
,
M
s
g
ve
r
, Cash, Si
g
t
)
S
erverPLA
Ui Us
Ut
(IDt, SNevent,Msgevent,Msgver, Cash)VPUKUt(Sigt)
Figure 5. The flow chart of the superior verifying phase.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 11 of 29
Step 2: ServerPLA
When the reporting server receives the signature of the undertaker, the ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,
Msgver,Cash and Sigtwill be stored in the database.
Step 3: UsServerPLA;UsUt
When the superior receives the signature of the investigator, the superior U
s
will use the public
key PUK
Ut
of the undertaker U
t
to check whether the signature is correct. If it is correct, then the illegal
event has passed the undertaker’s audit:
(IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,Msgver,Cash)
1
VPUKUt(Sigt) (16)
At this point, the superior U
s
audits the case checked by the investigator U
t
again. If the superior
agrees to issue the reward, then the case will be decided by signature. The reporting server will then
request that the superior U
s
insert the IC card and enter the PIN code. If the PIN code is correct,
the superior will use the IC card private key PRKUs to sign the case:
Sigs=SPRKUs(IDs,IDt,SNevent ,Msgevent,Msgver ,Cash) (17)
The superior then sends ID
s
,ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash and Sig
s
to the reporting server
and the investigator.
However, reward amounts differ from case to case. When the superior thinks the case requires
further evaluation, this means the reward amount is higher than the superior thought. The superior
thus sends ID
s
,ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash and Sig
s
to the upper superior to audit. The upper
superior will follow the above steps to audit the case.
Step 4: ServerPLAUi
When the reporting server receives the signature of the superior, it will store ID
s
,ID
t
,SN
event
,
Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash and Sig
s
in the database, and then check whether the audited case has been
signed one by one. The reporting server uses the investigator’s public key PUK
Ut
to verify the signature
Sigt. If it is correct, then the investigator has already audited the case:
(IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,Msgver,Cash)
1
VPUKUt(Sigt) (18)
The reporting server then verifies the signature of the superior U
s
using the superior’s public key
PUK
Us
to verify signature Sig
s
. If it is correct, then the reward has already been issued by the superior.
In addition, if the reporting server receives all superiors’ signatures Sig
s
, it will verify all signatures
Sigsby the following equation:
(IDs,IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,Msgver,Cash)
1
VPUKUs(Sigs) (19)
When the reporting server verifies the signature of the superior, it will automatically transmit a
notification to the informer. Therefore, when the informer U
i
logs into the platform, s/he will receive a
notification to enter his/her the banking details ACCi.
2.2.5. Reward Issuing Phase
When the informer logs into the system and receives a remittance notification from the reporting
server, the informer must fill in the remittance account within the effective period, beyond which the
reward will not be issued. The reporting server will remit the reward through the designated payment
server according to the existing remittance mechanism of the cooperating financial institution. Steps
(1)–(4) describe the reward issuing process. The flow chart of reward issuing is shown in Figure 6.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 12 of 29
Symmetry 2019, 11, x; doi: FOR PEER REVIEW www.mdpi.com/journal/symmetry
2.1.5. Reward Issuing Phase 339
When the informer logs into the system and receives a remittance notification from the reporting server, the informer must fill in the remittance account 340
within the effective period, beyond which the reward will not be issued. The reporting server will remit the reward through the designated payment server 341
according to the existing remittance mechanism of the cooperating financial institution. Steps (1)–(4) describe the reward issuing process. The flow chart of 342
reward issuing is shown in Figure 6. 343
344
Figure 6. The flow chart of the reward issuing phase. 345
Figure 6. The flow chart of the reward issuing phase.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 13 of 29
Step 1: UiServerPLA
The informer U
i
logs into the system and receives a remittance notification, and then enters the
bank account ACC
i
.Server
PLA
uses the public key PUK
SERVERPLA
to encrypt the bank account ACC
i
and sends the encrypted message C8to the reporting server:
C6=EPUKSERVERPLA(ACCi) (20)
Step 2: ServerPLATFGateway
The reporting server receives C
8
from the informer U
i
, then Server
PLA
uses the private key
PRKSERVERPLA to decrypt C8, and obtain the bank account ACCiof Ui:
ACCi=DPRKSERVERPLA(C6) (21)
The ServerPLA then uses its private key PRKSERVERPLA to sign the remittance information:
SigSERVERPLA =SPRKSERVERPLA(IDSERVERPLA,IDi,ACCi,Cash), (22)
and sends the remittance information and signature to the designated cooperating payment server
TFGateway, and starts the payment.
Step 3: TFGatewayServerPLA
When the payment server TF
Gateway
receives the remittance information and signature
SigSERVERPLA, it uses the server’s public key PUKSERVERPLA to verify the signature:
(IDSERVERPLA,IDi,ACCi,Cash)
1
VPUKSERVERPLA(SigSERVERPLA) (23)
If the verification is successful, the server will issue the reward to the informer U
i
, and send a
message MsgBANKsuc to the reporting server.
Step 4: ServerPLAUi
When the reporting server receives the reply message Msg
BANKsuc
of remittance from the cooperating
payment server TF
Gateway
, the server will verify the remittance information. If it is correct, then the
remittance has been successful. After this, the server will send a message to inform the informer
U
i
that the reward has been remitted to the designated account. Finally, the reporting server uses
the symmetric key KEY of Server
PLA
to encrypt ACC
i
and Msg
BANKsuc
, and then stores the encrypted
message C9in the database:
C7=EKEY(ACCi,MsgBANKsuc ) (24)
2.2.6. The Judgment of and Punishment for Abusing the System
If a report is judged by the investigator U
t
to be abuse of the system, the report will be sent
upward to the superior U
s
for further evaluation. When the reporting server receives confirmation
from all the superiors that the report is abuse, it will suspend the informer, denying them access to
the system for a period of time. If the user repeatedly abuses the system, and reaches the maximum
threshold of abuse instances, the informer will be permanently banned from the system. On the other
hand, as long as one superior U
s
confirms that the requires further evaluation, the reporting server will
assign it to another investigator to re-check. This not only prevents bad judgments, but also prevents
cases being erased.
3. System Implementation
3.1. Hardware and Software Environment
1. IC Reader, personal identity IC card
2. Apache
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 14 of 29
3. PHP (Personal Home Page)
4. Mysql
5. Microsoft Windows Server
3.2. Implementation
3.2.1. Registration Phase
In the registration phase, the user can click the register button and enter the registration page,
as shown in Figure 7. On this page the user must enter his/her account and password for registration.
The system will then ask the user to insert his/her personal identity IC card and enter his/her PIN
code, as shown in Figure 8. If the PIN code is correct, the system will send the SN to the certificate
authority center via SSL (Secure Socket Layer) secure channel, and verify the user’s identity. If the
verification result is correct, then the registration is complete.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 33
4. Mysql 382
5. Microsoft Windows Server 383
3.2. Implementation 384
3.2.1. Registration Phase 385
In the registration phase, the user can click the register button and enter the registration page, 386
as shown in Figure 7. On this page the user must enter his/her account and password for 387
registration. The system will then ask the user to insert his/her personal identity IC card and enter 388
his/her PIN code, as shown in Figure 8. If the PIN code is correct, the system will send the SN to the 389
certificate authority center via SSL (Secure Socket Layer) secure channel, and verify the user’s 390
identity. If the verification result is correct, then the registration is complete. 391
392
Figure 7. Resistration. 393
394
Figure 8. Integrated Circuit card verification. 395
3.2.2. Login Phase 396
After the user (informer, investigator, superior) completes the registration, s/he can log into the 397
reporting system by entering his/her account and password, as shown in Figure 9. 398
399
Figure 7. Resistration.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 33
4. Mysql 382
5. Microsoft Windows Server 383
3.2. Implementation 384
3.2.1. Registration Phase 385
In the registration phase, the user can click the register button and enter the registration page, 386
as shown in Figure 7. On this page the user must enter his/her account and password for 387
registration. The system will then ask the user to insert his/her personal identity IC card and enter 388
his/her PIN code, as shown in Figure 8. If the PIN code is correct, the system will send the SN to the 389
certificate authority center via SSL (Secure Socket Layer) secure channel, and verify the user’s 390
identity. If the verification result is correct, then the registration is complete. 391
392
Figure 7. Resistration. 393
394
Figure 8. Integrated Circuit card verification. 395
3.2.2. Login Phase 396
After the user (informer, investigator, superior) completes the registration, s/he can log into the 397
reporting system by entering his/her account and password, as shown in Figure 9. 398
399
Figure 8. Integrated Circuit card verification.
3.2.2. Login Phase
After the user (informer, investigator, superior) completes the registration, s/he can log into the
reporting system by entering his/her account and password, as shown in Figure 9.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 33
4. Mysql 382
5. Microsoft Windows Server 383
3.2. Implementation 384
3.2.1. Registration Phase 385
In the registration phase, the user can click the register button and enter the registration page, 386
as shown in Figure 7. On this page the user must enter his/her account and password for 387
registration. The system will then ask the user to insert his/her personal identity IC card and enter 388
his/her PIN code, as shown in Figure 8. If the PIN code is correct, the system will send the SN to the 389
certificate authority center via SSL (Secure Socket Layer) secure channel, and verify the user’s 390
identity. If the verification result is correct, then the registration is complete. 391
392
Figure 7. Resistration. 393
394
Figure 8. Integrated Circuit card verification. 395
3.2.2. Login Phase 396
After the user (informer, investigator, superior) completes the registration, s/he can log into the 397
reporting system by entering his/her account and password, as shown in Figure 9. 398
399
Figure 9. Login page.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 15 of 29
3.2.3. Reporting Phase
The informer can fill in the crime report form, inquire about the progress of cases, or modify
personal data when logged into in the system. Figure 10 shows the flowchart of the reporting process.
To report a crime, the informer selects the “Report” option, as shown in Figure 11 and fills out the
form, as shown in Figure 12. When the informer submits the report form, the system asks the informer
to insert his/her identity IC card (as shown in Figure 13) to verify his/her identity. If his/her identity
is verified, the reporting procedure is completed.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 33
408
Figure 10. Flowchart of informer’s reporting Figure 7 Registration process form. 409
The reporting system
checks if the case is
suitable for the rules or
not
Start
Informer fills in the report form
Is certificate valid?
The audited report is
saved to the database End
Is IC card PIN code
correct?
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
Figure 10. Flowchart of informer ’s reporting Figure 7Registration process form.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 16 of 29
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 33
410
Figure 11. Informer menu page. 411
412
Figure 12. Report form. 413
414
Figure 13. Informer IC card verification page. 415
3.2.4. Contracting the Events 416
The flowchart of the investigator’s auditing process is shown in figure. 14. Figure 15 shows the 417
main investigator page. The investigator can click the “pending” button in the menu of Figure 16 to 418
check all cases pending investigation. All the pending cases are randomly assigned by the system to 419
investigators. Figure 17 shows the list of pending cases. Clicking the last column of each case will 420
open the auditing page, which shows the details for each case (see Figure 18). There are three 421
Figure 11. Informer menu page.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 33
410
Figure 11. Informer menu page. 411
412
Figure 12. Report form. 413
414
Figure 13. Informer IC card verification page. 415
3.2.4. Contracting the Events 416
The flowchart of the investigator’s auditing process is shown in figure. 14. Figure 15 shows the 417
main investigator page. The investigator can click the “pending” button in the menu of Figure 16 to 418
check all cases pending investigation. All the pending cases are randomly assigned by the system to 419
investigators. Figure 17 shows the list of pending cases. Clicking the last column of each case will 420
open the auditing page, which shows the details for each case (see Figure 18). There are three 421
Figure 12. Report form.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 33
410
Figure 11. Informer menu page. 411
412
Figure 12. Report form. 413
414
Figure 13. Informer IC card verification page. 415
3.2.4. Contracting the Events 416
The flowchart of the investigator’s auditing process is shown in figure. 14. Figure 15 shows the 417
main investigator page. The investigator can click the “pending” button in the menu of Figure 16 to 418
check all cases pending investigation. All the pending cases are randomly assigned by the system to 419
investigators. Figure 17 shows the list of pending cases. Clicking the last column of each case will 420
open the auditing page, which shows the details for each case (see Figure 18). There are three 421
Figure 13. Informer IC card verification page.
3.2.4. Contracting the Events
The flowchart of the investigator’s auditing process is shown in Figure 14. Figure 15 shows the
main investigator page. The investigator can click the “pending” button in the menu of Figure 16 to
check all cases pending investigation. All the pending cases are randomly assigned by the system to
investigators. Figure 17 shows the list of pending cases. Clicking the last column of each case will open
the auditing page, which shows the details for each case (see Figure 18). There are three notification
choices in Figure 18 to indicate the auditing result. The meanings of these three choices are detailed
as follows:
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 17 of 29
(1)
Abuse
button: If the reported case is not within the scope of contracting, or the reported
content is not real, this choice will be used to report it to the system.
(2)
Reward
button: If the reported case is verified as real and must be rewarded, clicking the
button will authorize the reward being issued.
(3)
Closed
button: If the reported case is verified as real and without reward, then clicking this
button closes the case.
When the auditing result is submitted, the system will verify the IC card of the investigator,
as shown in Figure 19.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 33
notification choices in Figure 18 to indicate the auditing result. The meanings of these three choices 422
are detailed as follows: 423
(1) Abusebutton: If the reported case is not within the scope of contracting, or the reported 424
content is not real, this choice will be used to report it to the system. 425
(2) Rewardbutton: If the reported case is verified as real and must be rewarded, clicking the 426
button will authorize the reward being issued. 427
(3) Closedbutton: If the reported case is verified as real and without reward, then clicking this 428
button closes the case. 429
430
Figure 14. Flowchart of investigator’s auditing process. 431
Start
Assigns the case to the investigator
randomly
Is the certificate
valid?
Saving case data to
database
End
Is the IC card PIN
code correct?
YES
YES
NO
NO
The investigator judges if the case is
abusing system or can release the reward
Figure 14. Flowchart of investigator ’s auditing process.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 18 of 29
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 33
When the auditing result is submitted, the system will verify the IC card of the investigator, as 432
shown in Figure 19. 433
434
Figure 15. The main investigator page. 435
436
Figure 16. Investigator menu page. 437
438
Figure 17. List of the pending cases for investigators. 439
Figure 15. The main investigator page.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 33
When the auditing result is submitted, the system will verify the IC card of the investigator, as 432
shown in Figure 19. 433
434
Figure 15. The main investigator page. 435
436
Figure 16. Investigator menu page. 437
438
Figure 17. List of the pending cases for investigators. 439
Figure 16. Investigator menu page.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 33
When the auditing result is submitted, the system will verify the IC card of the investigator, as 432
shown in Figure 19. 433
434
Figure 15. The main investigator page. 435
436
Figure 16. Investigator menu page. 437
438
Figure 17. List of the pending cases for investigators. 439
Figure 17. List of the pending cases for investigators.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 33
440
Figure 18. Auditing page of pending case for investigator. 441
442
Figure 19. Investigator IC card verification page. 443
3.2.5. Upper Superior 444
Figure 20 shows the flowchart of the superior’s auditing process. The flowchart of the reward 445
issuing process is shown in Figure 21. Figure 22 shows the main page when the superior logs into 446
the system. On this page, the superior can check audited cases, and whether the cases are over time. 447
If a case has not been audited by an investigator within the specified time, the system will 448
automatically report it to the upper superior. The superior can select the “Expired” item in Figure 23 449
to recheck or reassign the expired case. In addition, the superior can click the “Pending” button to 450
review audited abuse or reward cases, as shown in Figure 24. 451
The Reward button is on the reward page, and the Abuse and Retrial buttons are on the abuse 452
page. The functions of the three items are as follows: 453
1. Reward: When the reward has been confirmed for issue, the superior clicks the Reward454
button, as shown in Figure 25. 455
2. Abuse: When the superior clicks the Abuse button in Figure 26, this means the case is 456
an abusive reporting case. 457
Figure 18. Auditing page of pending case for investigator.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 19 of 29
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 33
440
Figure 18. Auditing page of pending case for investigator. 441
442
Figure 19. Investigator IC card verification page. 443
3.2.5. Upper Superior 444
Figure 20 shows the flowchart of the superior’s auditing process. The flowchart of the reward 445
issuing process is shown in Figure 21. Figure 22 shows the main page when the superior logs into 446
the system. On this page, the superior can check audited cases, and whether the cases are over time. 447
If a case has not been audited by an investigator within the specified time, the system will 448
automatically report it to the upper superior. The superior can select the “Expired” item in Figure 23 449
to recheck or reassign the expired case. In addition, the superior can click the “Pending” button to 450
review audited abuse or reward cases, as shown in Figure 24. 451
The Reward button is on the reward page, and the Abuse and Retrial buttons are on the abuse 452
page. The functions of the three items are as follows: 453
1. Reward: When the reward has been confirmed for issue, the superior clicks the Reward454
button, as shown in Figure 25. 455
2. Abuse: When the superior clicks the Abuse button in Figure 26, this means the case is 456
an abusive reporting case. 457
Figure 19. Investigator IC card verification page.
3.2.5. Upper Superior
Figure 20 shows the flowchart of the superior’s auditing process. The flowchart of the reward
issuing process is shown in Figure 21. Figure 22 shows the main page when the superior logs into the
system. On this page, the superior can check audited cases, and whether the cases are over time. If a
case has not been audited by an investigator within the specified time, the system will automatically
report it to the upper superior. The superior can select the “Expired” item in Figure 23 to recheck or
reassign the expired case. In addition, the superior can click the “Pending” button to review audited
abuse or reward cases, as shown in Figure 24.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 33
3. Retrial: When a case is in doubt, it must be re-investigated. Such cases are called "retrial 458
cases" and will be randomly assigned to a new investigator. The upper superior can designate 459
a case in which there is cause for doubt as a retrial case by pressing the Retrial button, 460
shown in Figure 26. The system will automatically reassign the retrial case to another 461
investigator. 462
463
Figure 20. Flowchart of superior’s auditing process. 464
465
Start
Superior rechecks the case that the
investigator has checked
Save the audited case to database
Is the IC card PIN code
correct?
Is the certificate valid?
YES
YES
NO
NO
B
Figure 20. Flowchart of superior ’s auditing process.
The Reward button is on the reward page, and the Abuse and Retrial buttons are on the abuse
page. The functions of the three items are as follows:
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 20 of 29
1.
Reward
: When the reward has been confirmed for issue, the superior clicks the
Rewardbutton, as shown in Figure 25.
2.
Abuse
: When the superior clicks the
Abuse
button in Figure 26, this means the case is
an abusive reporting case.
3.
Retrial
: When a case is in doubt, it must be re-investigated. Such cases are called “retrial
cases” and will be randomly assigned to a new investigator. The upper superior can designate a
case in which there is cause for doubt as a retrial case by pressing the
Retrial
button, shown
in Figure 26. The system will automatically reassign the retrial case to another investigator.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 33
466
Figure 21. Flowchart of reward issuing process. 467
Noting the informer fills in the
remittance information
Is signature of the
superior correct?
Is remittance
complete?
YES
NO
NO
B
Is the response of the
remittance correct?
Save the remittance information to
database
End
NO
YES
YES
Figure 21. Flowchart of reward issuing process.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 21 of 29
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 33
468
Figure 22. The main page of the superior. 469
470
Figure 23. Menu of the superior page. 471
472
Figure 22. The main page of the superior.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 33
468
Figure 22. The main page of the superior. 469
470
Figure 23. Menu of the superior page. 471
472
Figure 23. Menu of the superior page.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 33
468
Figure 22. The main page of the superior. 469
470
Figure 23. Menu of the superior page. 471
472
Figure 24. List of pending cases for superior.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 22 of 29
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 33
Figure 24. List of pending cases for superior. 473
474
Figure 25. Reward audit page of superior. 475
476
Figure 26. Abuse and retrial audit page of superior. 477
4. Discussion 478
4.1. The Identity of the Informer 479
Figure 25. Reward audit page of superior.
Symmetry 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 33
Figure 24. List of pending cases for superior. 473
474
Figure 25. Reward audit page of superior. 475
476
Figure 26. Abuse and retrial audit page of superior. 477
4. Discussion 478
4.1. The Identity of the Informer 479
Figure 26. Abuse and retrial audit page of superior.
4. Discussion
4.1. The Identity of the Informer
To ensure the legality of the user’ identity, the system will verify the informer ’s account ID
i
and
password PWHASH when the informer logs into the system:
C2=EPUKSERVERPLA(IDi,PWHASH) (25)
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 23 of 29
(IDi,PWHASH) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C2) (26)
Moreover, when the informer reports a crime, the informer must have an IC card. The system will
obtain the SN and the last four digits of IDNO from the informer’s IC card. The SN will then be sent to
ServerCA via SSL secure channel for verification:
C4=EPUKSERVERPLA(IDNO,SN) (27)
(IDNO,SN) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C4) (28)
Scenario
: Malicious users may continue to make false reports in an attempt to crash the reporting
system’s server.
Analysis
: The attack will fail because when an informer reports a crime; s/he must use their
physical ID card, which includes the serial number SN and the ID number IDNO of the IC card.
When the number of malicious reports exceeds the system threshold, the user’s reporting permission
will be suspended. The proposed scheme can thus protect legal users’ identities from being abused,
and can also prevent malicious reporting behavior.
4.2. Anonymous Reporting
In the reporting procedure, the system verifies the informer’s identity by certificate authority
center so that the informer does not have to fill in personal information. When the center has
checked the identity, it generates a case number. The content and ID
i
will be encrypted and stored in
the database:
C5=EKEY(IDi) (29)
Therefore, the crime reports are stored in the database in such a way that the identity of informers
is protected.
Scenario
: If an informer ’s true identity is leaked during the reporting process, his/her safety may
be at risk as a result.
Analysis
: Any attempt to obtain an informer’s the true identity will fail, as in the proposed
scheme, the key message is encrypted with the asymmetric key of the reporting server. Only the legal
reporting server can know the true identity of the informer. Therefore, malicious users will not be able
to obtain the true identity of the informer and threaten their safety.
4.3. The Integrity of the Data
1. The reporting server uses the following formula to confirm whether the case has been reported
by the informer him/herself:
(IDi,Msgevent)
1
VPUKUi(Sigi) (30)
Scenario: Malicious users may try to intercept the report in order to modify its content.
Analysis
: The attack will fail because the message is encrypted with the public key of the
reporting server C
3
=E
PUKSERVERPLA
(ID
i
,Msg
event
), and signed with the private key of the informer
Sigi=SPRKUi(IDi,Msgevent ). Thus, malicious users cannot modify report content.
2. An investigator attaches their signature when a case has been audited. The following formula
can then be used to verify the signature to ensure the case is signed by the investigator correctly:
(IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,Msgver)
1
VPUKUt(Sigt) (31)
Scenario
: Malicious users may try to intercept the investigator’s audit results in order to
modify them.
Analysis
: The attack will fail because the message is signed with the private key of the investigator
Sigt=SPRKUt(IDt,SNevent ,Msgevent,Msgver ,Cash). Thus, malicious users cannot modify audit results.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 24 of 29
3. The reporting server can ensure that the reward is issued by the superior using the
following equation:
(IDs,IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,Msgver)
1
VPUKUs(Sigs) (32)
Scenario
: Malicious users may try to intercept the reward information from the superior in order
to modify it.
Analysis
: The attack will fail because the message is signed with the private key of the superior
Sig
s
=S
PRKUs
(ID
s
,ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash). Thus, malicious users cannot modify the
reward information.
4.4. Non-Repudiation
In order to ensure non-repudiation, the proposed system has a completion verification mechanism,
as shown in Table 1, which achieves non-repudiation as follows:
The reporting server will verify the informer’s signature Sig
i
; therefore, the informer cannot deny
the signature.
The reporting server will verify the investigator’s signature Sig
t
; therefore, the investigator cannot
deny the signature.
The superior receives the Sig
t
of a reward case form an investigator, and the superior will verify
the Sigt; therefore, the investigator cannot deny the signature.
The reporting server receives the Sig
s
, which means the superior agrees to issue the reward;
therefore, the superior cannot deny that they confirmed the reward.
The cooperating payment server will receive the Sig
SERVERPLA
issued by the reporting server;
therefore, the reporting server cannot deny that it confirmed the reward.
Table 1. The verifiable proofs of non-repudiation.
Evidence Evidence Issuer Evidence Holder Verification Equation
(C3,Sigi)UiServerPLA
(IDi,Msgevent) = DPRKSERVERPLA(C3)
(IDi,Msgevent)
1
VPUKUi(Sigi)
(IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,
Msgver,Cash,Sigt)UtServerPLA
(ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash)
1
VPUKUt(Sigt)
(IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,
Msgver,Cash,Sigt)UtUs
(ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash)
1
VPUKUt(Sigt)
(IDs,IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,
Msgver,Cash,Sigs)UsServerPLA
(IDs,IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,Msgver,
Cash)
1
VPUKUs(Sigs)
(IDSERVERPLA,IDi,ACCi,
Cash,SigSERVERPLA)ServerPLA TFGateway (IDSERVERPLA,IDi,ACCi,Cash)
1
VPUKSERVERPLA(SigSERVERPLA)
4.5. Preventing the Case Being Erased
The proposed system is equipped with an automatic notification mechanism to prevent
investigators ignoring cases. If an investigator does not audit a case within a default period of
time, the reporting server will automatically send the case to an upper superior.
4.6. Secure Reward Issuing
The secure issuing of the reward is shown in Figure 27, and the processes are as follows:
(1) Auditing phase:
The Utand USsend Sigtand Sigsto ServerPLA, respectively:
Sigt=SPRKUt(IDt,SNevent ,Msgevent,Msgver ,Cash) (33)
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 25 of 29
Sigs=SPRKUs(IDs,IDt,SNevent ,Msgevent,Msgver ,Cash) (34)
ServerPLA can verify each signature of the superior by the following equations:
(IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,Msgver,Cash)
1
VPUKUt(Sigt) (35)
(IDs,IDt,SNevent,Msgevent ,Msgver,Cash)
1
VPUKUs(Sigs) (36)
According to Formulae (39) and (40), only if the signature verification is successful will the
ServerPLA instruct the Uito enter the remittance account.
Scenario
: The informer attempts to modify the survey results, change the survey failure to success,
or change the reward amount.
Analysis
: The attack will fail to modify the survey results or reward information because the
message is signed with the private key of the investigator Sig
t
=S
PRKUt
(ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,
Cash) and superior Sig
s
=S
PRKUs
(ID
s
,ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash). The reporting server will
verify (ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash)
1
V
KUt
(Sig
t
) and (ID
s
,ID
t
,SN
event
,Msg
event
,Msg
ver
,Cash)
1
VKUs(Sigs). Thus, the informer cannot modify the survey results or reward information.
(2) Remitting phase:
When U
i
receives the notice from Server
PLA
,U
i
provides the remittance account ACC
i
. Then,
the account ACC
i
is encrypted by Formula (41) and the encryption C
8
is sent to Server
PLA
. When the
reporting server ServerPLA receives C8, it decrypts C8by Formula (42) to obtain the ACCiof the Ui:
C6=EPUKSERVERPLA(ACCi) (37)
ACCi=DPRKSERVERPLA(C6) (38)
Then, Server
PLA
signs the remittance information by Formula (43) and sends it to the TF
Gateway
via
SSL, and begins the payment:
SigSERVERPLA =SPRKSERVERPLA(IDSERVERPLA,IDi,ACCi,Cash) (39)
(IDSERVERPLA,IDi,ACCi,Cash)
1
VPUKSERVERPLA(SigSERVERPLA) (40)
The server uses Formula (44) to verify the signature. If the signature is correct, the cooperating
payment server will remit to the U
i
, and then send the completed message to the Server
PLA
, thus
preventing an incorrect amount being paid, or payment being made to the wrong person.
From the above analysis, the reward mechanism cannot be corrupted or altered. Therefore,
it ensures the security of the identity of the informer. In addition, the system uses an automatic
remittance mechanism. The signature mechanism ensures the identity of the superior, and this
mechanism therefore not only ensures the identity, but also the confirmation of the reward. This shows
that the system uses digital signatures, asymmetric key, and SSL to achieve the remittance operations.
Scenario
: Malicious users attempt to modify the bank account information, and try to get the
rewards of the informer.
Analysis
: The attack will fail because the message is signed with the private key of the reporting
server Sig
SERVERPLA
=S
PRKSERVERPLA
(ID
SERVERPLA
,ID
i
,ACC
i
,Cash). After the designated cooperating
payment server TF
Gateway
receives the message via secure channel, it will verify (ID
SERVERPLA
,ID
i
,ACC
i
,
Cash)
1
V
PUKSERVERPLA
(Sig
SERVERPLA
). Thus, the attacker cannot modify the bank account information
to get the rewards.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 26 of 29
Symmetry 2019, 11, x; doi: FOR PEER REVIEW www.mdpi.com/journal/symmetry
584
Figure 27. The flowchart of the reward payment phase. 585
586
Superior Signature
U
S
U
i
TFGateway
ServerPLA
Review
Phase
Payment
Phase
Fill in the remittance account
Verif
y
the remittance information
U
t
Si
g
nature Verification
Investi
g
ato
r
Si
g
nature
Remittance notice
Account Encryption
SSL Channel
SSL Channel
Decrypt account
Si
g
nature of remittance information
SSL Channel
Verification reporting system
si
g
nature and remittance
Figure 27. The flowchart of the reward payment phase.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 27 of 29
4.7. Untraceability
In order to protect the privacy of informers in any actions, the proposed system uses a symmetric
key algorithm to encrypt its database, further protecting the identity of the informer:
C5=EKEY(IDi) (41)
4.8. Confidentiality
(1)
The reporting server uses the SSL security protocol to ensure secure data transmission. In the
registration phase, a one-way hash function is used to convert PW
x
into PW
HASH
, which prevent
user passwords being leaked:
PWHASH =H(PWx) (42)
(2)
The system encrypts the ID
i
of the U
i
with the symmetric key of Server
PLA
to protect the identity
of the informer in the event of a database security breach:
C5=EKEY(IDi) (43)
(3)
In the auditing and reward phases, the server uses the asymmetric key of Server
PLA
to encrypt
ACCi, and MsgBANKsuc to protect sensitive informer information:
C7=EKEY(ACCi,MsgBANKsuc ) (44)
4.9. Comparison
The following compares the work in this study with the literature relating to online crime reporting
systems with identity protection, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. The comparison of related works.
Ku et al. [1] Iriberri and Leroy [2] Sakpere et al. [6] Eugene [7] The Proposed Scheme
Authenticity N/A N/A N/A N/A YES
Anonymous
reporting YES YES YES YES YES
Data integrity N/A N/A YES YES YES
Non-repudiation
N/A N/A NO N/A YES
Smother a
reported case
prevention
NO NO N/A NO YES
Untraceable NO NO NO NO YES
Reward
mechanism NO NO N/A NO YES
Confidentiality N/A N/A N/A N/A YES
Preclude false
reports NO NO NO NO YES
Theoretical
analysis NO NO NO NO YES
Implementation
YES NO YES YES YES
Table 2shows that [
1
,
2
,
6
,
7
] respectively proposed an anonymous on-line crime reporting system.
However, these systems mostly do not support authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation,
prevention of case deletion, untraceability, the reward mechanism, confidentiality, preclusion of
false reports and theoretical analysis etc. Thus, the proposed scheme is a more secure and practical
reporting system based on cryptography.
Symmetry 2019,11, 255 28 of 29
5. Conclusions
Despite its continued presence in many (if not all) communities, some people are still afraid to
report crimes, as they fear for their own safety should their identities become known to those they
report. This results in an environment in which it is difficult to combat crime, and in which crime
is even more likely to occur. In order to address this problem, this study proposes a cloud-based
online crime reporting system with identity protection. The system not only addresses the concern
that an informer’s identity may be revealed, but in doing so unites communities in combating crime.
The proposed system combines digital certificates, encryption and decryption technology, and the
credibility of a third party with the necessary certification. Thus it is able to verify informer identities,
prevent the exposure of those identities, as well as preventing reports being erased. Using this simple
and safe online reporting system, people can safely report criminal activity, thus improving and
protecting the quality of life in their communities. The proposed scheme addresses all the security
requirements to allow the reporting of crimes, while ensuring informers’ safety, security, anonymity
and convenience. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is designed to be robust against abusive use, and
is able to preclude false reports. Table 2shows that the proposed method outperforms other related
schemes. This study developed the reporting system for testing, and future work will collect data
and evaluate its performance for system improvement. Finally, the authors hope that the proposed
reporting system will be an effective and widely used tool in the ongoing fight against crime.
Author Contributions:
Conceptualization, T.-F.S. and B.-Y.S.; validation, C.-L.C. and Y.-Y.D.; writing—original
draft preparation, B.-Y.S.; writing—review and editing, T.-F.S., C.-L.C.; supervision, T.-F.S., C.-L.C.
Acknowledgments:
This research was supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan, R.O.C., under
contract numbers MOST 106-2221-E-324-013, MOST 106-2622-E-305-001-CC2 and MOST 103-2632-E-324-001-MY3.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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©
2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Chapter
Digital identity is needed to guarantee that the Internet infrastructure is strong enough to meet basic expectations such as security and privacy. In this ambient, intelligent world, the choice of the identity management mechanisms will have a large impact on social, cultural, business, and political aspects: privacy is a human need and the all of society would suffer from the demise of privacy; people have hectic lives and cannot spend their whole time administering their digital identities. The choice of identity mechanisms will change the social, cultural, business, and political environment. Furthermore, identity management is also a promising topic for modern society. In the first version of this chapter, it seemed that identity management would be based on the paradigm of federated identity management and user-centric identity management. The first one empowers the management of identity, and the second, the users, to actively manage their identity information and profiles. At the time of writing this second edition of the chapter, although the technical building blocks detailed in this chapter remain and are improved, they are hidden under a number of major online social networks providers (Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.) where users have already created their account and use this account to automatically log into less well-known online websites and services. First, we provide an overview of identity management from Identity 1.0 to 2.0 and higher, with emphasis on user centric approaches. Also, we survey how the requirements for user-centric identity management and their associated technologies have evolved, with emphasis on the federated approaches and user-centricity. Second, we will focus on related standards eXtensible resource identifier (XRI) and Light-Weight Identity (LID) issued from the Yadis project, and platforms such as ID-WSF, OpenID, InfoCard, Simple eXtensible Identity Protocol (SXIP), and Higgins. Third, we discuss user management through “social login” that seems to be the only approach that has won large user adoption and that was not expected at time of writing the first edition of this book chapter. At the end, we cover identity management for mobile settings and focus on the future of mobile identity management (MIDM).
Chapter
Digital identity is the ground necessary to guarantee that the Internet infrastructure is strong enough to meet basic expectations such as security and privacy. Anywhere anytime mobile computing is becoming true. In this ambient intelligent world, the choice of the identity management mechanisms will have a large impact on social, cultural, business and political aspects: privacy is a human need and the all of society would suffer from the demise of privacy; people have hectic life and cannot spend their whole time administering their digital identities. The choice of identity mechanisms will change the social, cultural, business and political environment. Furthermore, the identity management is also a promising topic for modern society. In the first version of this book chapter, it seemed that identity management would be based on the paradigm of federated identity management and user-centric identity management. The first one empowers the management of identity and the second the users to actively manage their identity information and profiles. A time of writing this second edition of the chapter, although the technical building blocks detailed in this chapter remains and are improved, they are hidden under a number of major online social networks providers (Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter..) where users have already created their account and use this account to automatically log into less well-known online Web sites and services. Firstly, we provide an overview of identity management from identity 1.0 to identity 2.0 and higher, with emphasis on user centric approaches. Also we survey how have evolved the requirements for user-centric identity management and their associated technologies with emphasis on the federated approaches and user-centricity. Secondly, we will focus on related standards XRI and LID issued from Yadis project, and platforms mainly ID-WSF, OpenID, InfoCard, Sxip and Higgins. Thirdly, we discuss user management through "social login" that seems to be the only approach that has won large user adoption and that was not expected at time of writing the first edition of this book chapter. At the end, we cover identity management for mobile settings and focus on the future of mobile identity management.
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Authentication thwarts unauthorised users from accessing resources in insecure network environments. Password authentication based on smart cards is one of the simplest and most efficient authentication methods and is commonly deployed to authenticate the legitimacy of remote users. Based on cryptographic techniques, several password authentication schemes have previously been implemented. However, all of these schemes are vulnerable to various malicious attacks that are discussed below. In this paper, we propose a secure remote user mutual authentication scheme using smart cards that achieves all security requirements. Furthermore, we show that our proposed scheme can withstand various malicious attacks and is more suitable for practical applications than other related schemes.
Chapter
Cloud computing is defined as delivering of computing resources as a service. Discovery of reliable resource provider and access control are key components of cloud computing. Service level agreements are negotiated between the service provider and enterprise. This paper proposes authentication interface to access a cloud service. User authentication token is required to validate whether the user is registered employee of enterprise or not. Service authentication token is required to validate the access right of a user for service. Service selection is acquired via monitoring of security measures of services provided by a service provider through security service level agreements at enterprise end. Thereby, completely relieving end user from the nitty-gritty of service providers in comparison to approaches proposed in past. Single sign on mechanisms for user and services is used. Features like Denial of service, man in the middle attack and access control rights of employees are also handled.