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In the early 1990s, a scandalous story about what became known as the
Belgian Billionaire Gang running one of the biggest women trafficking
rings in Western Europe (De Stoop, 1992) roused the nation. The ensuing
public outrage promptly gave rise to a parliamentary committee of inquiry,
set with the task of scrutinising the prevalent criminal policy on trafficking
in persons (BE-E2; BE-E5) (Boels & Ponsaers, 2011). The multidisciplinary
policy direction that to date typifies the Belgian response to the issue of
human trafficking has its origin in the work of this committee of inquiry
(BE-E2). On account of this early awareness of the issue, Belgium has
taken on a pioneering role in dealing with this transgression (Boels &
Ponsaers, 2011).
Following the law of 13 April 1995 on trafficking in human beings (THB),
the legal framework on this type of misconduct has gone through
a number of developments (DSB, 2015; GRETA, 2016). Contrary to
the definition introduced by the UN Palermo Protocol (Efrat, 2016),
the method of operation is not part of the Belgian delineation of
human trafficking. Only the act and intent of exploitation are constituent
elements of the crime, whereas the means of exploitation are considered
as an aggravating factor (CGKRB, 2011). Using a relatively open concept
in preference to an exhaustive list of illicit behaviours, the Belgian
definition of human trafficking hinges on the exploitation itself rather
than on the methods of exploitation (GRETA, 2016). Another point of
divergence is the demarcation of labour exploitation. Labour exploitation
is defined in a much broader sense than the term ”forced labour,” as
labour exploitation is described in terms of working below the level
of human dignity (GRETA, 2016; Leman & Janssens, 2015). As a matter
of course, the qualification of inhumane circumstances leaves a broad
margin of interpretation (CGKRB, 2011). Consequently, the distinction
between bad employment practices and labour exploitation is at times
far from clear-cut (de Jager, Hassani, & Pennings, 2016). Similarly, seeing
that prostitution offences are generally de facto tolerated, an ambivalent
legal situation is intrinsic to the matter of sexual exploitation as well
(BE-E6; BE-E13).
As mentioned before, Belgium has broken ground in terms of implementing
a multidisciplinary approach towards trafficking in persons (BE-E2; BE-E5)
(OSCE, 2013). As a general rule, sexual exploitation is handled by the
public prosecutor and the police forces. Conversely, the social inspection
services and the labour prosecutor, a specialised branch of the public
prosecution office, cover labour exploitation cases (BE-E2; BE-E3; BE-E11;
BE-E13). As follows, social and labour inspectorates play an important
role in tackling the issue of human trafficking, notably because they carry
far-reaching investigative powers and significant expertise and experience
130 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
in this matter (de Jager et al., 2016; Leman & Janssens, 2015). The
substantial involvement of these actors is indicative of Belgium’s distinct
focus on labour exploitation (BE-E2; BE-E5). Going beyond pure law
enforcement, a noteworthy materialisation of Belgium’s multidisciplinary
approach is the Interdepartmental Coordination Cell embracing all actors
involved in the fight against trafficking in persons, which is entrusted with
the coordination of the policy on human trafficking (DSB, 2015).
Belgium is primarily known as a destination country and, to a lesser
extent, as a transit country for human trafficking operations (Akee et
al., 2014). As a source country, Belgium plays a minimal part (Shelley,
2010), but on the whole is widely regarded as one of the most targeted
countries by human traffickers (Balarezo, 2013; Europol, 2016). Conversely,
Belgium also stands among the countries taking most action against
human trafficking (Walk Free Foundation, 2016).
Trafficking in persons is an issue that has been brought into focus
over twenty years ago, yet our understanding of the subject is far
from complete. One facet that has been largely neglected is the
financial dimension of human trafficking operations. In response to
this knowledge gap, the present research report explores the financial
management of trafficking in human beings in Belgium on the basis of
a literature review, a document analysis of the human trafficking cases
described by the Federal Migration Centre, which functions as the
National Reporter on trafficking in human beings for Belgium, and face-
to-face interviews with both professionals who are well-informed on the
subject of trafficking in persons and perpetrators convicted of trafficking
offences.1 As regards the latter method, respondents were selected
with a view to reflecting the diversity of the frontline practitioners,
who are confronted with human trafficking cases on a day-to-day basis.
The interviews were conducted by aid of a standardized interview
protocol and subsequently analysed using computer-assisted qualitative
data analysis software.
Like most forms of organised crime, trafficking in human beings crops
up against a backdrop of envisioned profitability (Petrunov, 2011;
Wheaton et al., 2010). To illustrate this point, the federal judicial police
has estimated that the proceeds of human trafficking in Belgium writ
large amount to nearly a billion euros per year (Delepière et al., 2013).
In a related manner, sexual exploitation is deeply rooted in the sex
industry, which has an estimated overall value of between €617 and
€688 million (Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Labour exploitation, on the
other hand, is intrinsic to a wide variety of economic sectors. Table 1
1 The sources have been coded in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of
the code indicate the country, “E” indicates an expert, while “C” means criminal entrepreneur.
The description of the background of the individual sources referenced can be found in the
list of interviewees in the references section.
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 131
indicates the most prominent sectors uncovered by the social inspection
services in Belgium. Generally, industries that are on the nether side of
the so called “three Ds’” touchstone, meaning they involve work that
is dirty, difficult, or dangerous, and industries that are less regulated
are more exposed to labour exploitation (Davies, 2017; Europol, 2017).
The sectors most serviceable for the purpose of exploitation are the
logistics business (e.g. transportation), labour intensive businesses (e.g.
agriculture), and the hospitality, entertainment, services, and retail
sector (e.g. menial work) (Finance Against Trafficking, 2014). Having
said that, labour exploitation is virtually ubiquitous in the licit economy
(ILO, 2014; Kara, 2011). Consequently, labour trafficking manifests itself
in many different ways (Efrat, 2016).
By the same token, a number
of business sectors are highly
functional for the commis-
sion of human trafficking of-
fences. Generally speaking,
the ties between the human
trafficking business and the le-
gitimate market are wide-rang-
ing (Bravo, 2008; Parmentier,
2010). This nexus between the
shadow and legitimate econo-
my reflects a general trend of
increasing proximity between
organised crime operations
and legal business structures
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015; Van
Duyne, 1993, 1993b). As for
the purpose of this proximity,
legitimate ventures provide the
means for the fabrication of a
legal façade (Aronowitz et al.,
2010). By definition, corporate
structures are utilized more in labour trafficking than in sex trafficking
operations2 (BE-E1). Tucking away criminal activities within a legal busi-
ness scheme by dint of opaque, non-transparent corporate structures
and empty shell or fictitious companies is a common practice in the
human trafficking industry (BE-E2; BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E9; BE-E10). As a
consequence, human trafficking operations routinely cut across the
divide between upper world and underground economy, blending the
boundary between legal and illegal ventures (Europol, 2015). As such,
a strict distinction between mala fide and bona fide entrepreneurship
is at variance with the brass tacks of the trafficking business (BE-E5).
In addition to harbouring human trafficking activities, legal business
structures facilitate various aspects of the criminal process, such as
transportation and money laundering (Aronowitz et al., 2010; Finance
Against Trafficking, 2014; Leman & Janssens, 2015).
2 Although there are legal establishment s in which sexual and labour exploitation of women
takes place simultaneously.
Таble 1. Number of iNitial recorded r eports of traffickiNg iN huma N
beiNgs iN belgium iN 2016 by ecoNomic sector
Source: Myria (2017).
Hospitality/Horeca 9
Construction 5
Service stations 5
Retail 5
Domestic help 2
Cleaning services 1
Wholesale 1
Other 4
132 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
As follows, human trafficking operations mostly hide in plain sight or, in
rare instances such as household service, are fully sequestered (Bravo,
2008). The masking of exploitative practices, among other things, renders
detecting and identifying human trafficking cases notoriously difficult
(DSB, 2015; Kleemans & Smit, 2014). Seeing that human trafficking is
a gravely underreported phenomenon (Goodey, 2008; Guia, 2015), any
claims regarding the incidence of trafficking in human beings cannot be
substantiated (Kopp, 2012; Parmentier, 2010; Weitzer, 2014a). Consequently,
the figures presented hereafter are more suggestive of law enforcement
activity than they reflect criminal activity (Kleemans & Smit, 2014; Levi et
al., 2013). As Table 2 reveals, the number of human trafficking offences
identified by Belgian police forces has steadily decreased over the last
few years. About two thirds of these registered infractions relate to
sexual exploitation, whereas labour exploitation makes up roughly one
third of all recorded infringements. The UNODC (2016) has reported
similar findings among registered victims. This is in stark contrast to the
assertion made by Europol (2016) that a striking 90% of organised crime
networks associated with human trafficking activities are involved in
sexual exploitation. Accordingly, estimates regarding the type of human
trafficking that is most prevalent are manifestly conflicting (Weitzer,
2014a). As territory is of very little concern in the human trafficking
business (BE-E4) (Kopp, 2012), the reports on human trafficking cases
do not point to the presence of hotspots, with the exception of certain
forms of prostitution (Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007; Mancuso, 2014). For
instance, window prostitution is limited to certain areas (Adriaenssens et
al., 2015), which can spark a power struggle between competing crime
groups over those vice districts (BE-E11).
Таble 2. Number of traffickiNg iN hum aN beiNgs iNfractioNs, orga Nized
by type of exploitatioN iN belgium, 2012 – 2016
Source: Myria (2017).
Sexual exploitation 466 586 460 467 396
Economic exploitation 321 273 166 160 168
Forced begging 44 33 38 33 13
Forced criminality 13 14 15 9 11
Organ harvesting 1 1 1 0 1
Whereas the number of reported infractions has dwindled, Table 3
shows that the number of convictions is clearly on the rise. In fact,
Belgium has a relatively high number of convictions in comparison
to other countries (DSB, 2015). Consistent with international findings
(Eurostat, 2015; UNODC, 2016), one in five persons convicted of human
trafficking offences in Belgium is a woman. The involvement of women
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 133
in the human trafficking trade is thus comparatively large (Kleemans &
Smit, 2014). The gendered dimension of trafficking in human beings is
particularly pervasive with respect to the victims of exploitation (Guia,
2015; Hughes, 2014; Shelley, 2010), as illustrated by Table 4. In essence,
the greater part of victims of sexual exploitation are female, whereas
victims of labour exploitation are predominantly male (Eurostat, 2015).
As regards sexual exploitation, the registered victims are scattered across
different age categories. Labour exploitation, on the other hand, seems
to affect an older target group. On the whole, minors appear to be an
exception among registered victims (Eurostat, 2015).
Таble 3. Number of coNvictioNs for humaN traffickiNg offeNces
iN belgium, orgaNized by geNder, 2009 – 2016
Source: DSB (2017).
Unknown 2 5 5 6 7 2 2 0
Male 111 75 76 71 59 59 63 37
Female 28 20 21 14 17 23 19 10
Таble 4. Number of registered victims of humaN traffickiNg iN belgium,
orgaNized by geNder, age aNd ty pe of exploitatioN, 2013 – 2016
Source: Myria (2017).
<18 4 1 5 4 0 1 3 2 0 3 6 0 4 5 14 6
18-25 15 19 22 23 19 18 9 9 0 1 1 2 34 38 32 34
26-30 8 12 7 7 13 26 6 13 0 0 0 3 21 38 13 23
>30 10 11 10 14 47 41 43 38 0 5 5 4 57 57 58 56
Male 1 5 2 0 67 74 52 51 0 5 9 8 68 84 63 59
Female 36 38 42 48 12 12 9 11 0 4 3 1 48 54 54 60
Aside from a distinctive gender profile, human traffickers make for a
diversified group in many other respects (Viukho, 2017). Perpetrators of
human trafficking offences range from the very rich (BE-E2; BE-E8; BE-E10)
down to the very poor (BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E8). Strictly speaking, those who
know their way around the sex trade (BE-E6) or any other implicated sector
are in the capacity to take advantage of their pre-existing knowledge,
134 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
contacts, or even resources. A
case in point is the involvement
of business operators with a
military, state security, or law
enforcement background in
human trafficking operations
(BE-E13) (Leman & Janssens,
2015; Shelley, 2010). Moving
individuals from point A to point
B in order to exploit them at
their journey’s end is the sum
and substance of any human
trafficking operation (Efrat, 2016;
Kleemans & Smit, 2014). As a
result, the human trafficking
business relies on people who
are capable of bridging the
gap between a certain country
of origin and the country of
destination (BE-E13) (Kleemans,
2012). In essence, members of
certain diaspora communities
are in a position to capitalize on
their transnational connections
by means of human trafficking
schemes (Arhin, 2016; Shelley,
2010). Nationality is thus an important connecting thread in the
phenomenon of trafficking in human beings. In this respect, Table 5 reveals
a variegated picture of perpetrators of human trafficking. EU-nationals,
by and large, make up the greater part of human trafficking offenders
(Europol, 2016; Eurostat, 2015; Savona & Riccardi, 2015; UNODC, 2016;
Walk Free Foundation, 2016). In addition, the main organised crime groups
implicated in human trafficking activities are east European, Nigerian
and Chinese networks (Europol, 2016; OSCE, 2013; Savona & Riccardi,
2015). In sum, human traffickers are part of a remarkably heterogeneous
whole (Aronowitz, 2009; Feingold, 2005). Attempting to delineate a profile
would therefore negate the vast diversity of human trafficking operations
(Weitzer, 2014a).
Much like the profile of human traffickers, the level of organisation
in human trafficking operations varies widely (Aronowitz, 2001).
Human trafficking rings are largely part of a continuum ranging from
single perpetrators over loose, self-supporting networks to complex,
multinational conglomerates (Aronowitz et al., 2010; Campana, 2015;
Kleemans & Smit, 2014). As the logistics for trafficking in persons
are fairly straightforward, there is no need for the instalment of a
Таble 5. top 10 of the most importaNt NatioNalities of persoNs
coNvicted for humaN tr affickiNg offeNces iN belgium iN 2016
Source: Myria (2017).
Belgium 37
Romania 11
Unknown/unregistered 8
Albania 8
Bulgaria 8
France 6
The Netherlands 6
China 5
Portugal 4
United Kingdom 3
Other 29
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 135
colossal organised crime syndicate (BE-E15) (Bruinsma & Bernasco,
2004; Tripp & McMahon-Howard, 2016). Alternatively, groups formed
on an ad hoc basis (BE-E4) (Kopp, 2012), networks built on familial or
clan ties (Europol, 2015; OSCE, 2013) (BE-C2; BE-C3) or even one-man
operations (BE-C1) seem to get the job done without the encumbrance
of a monolithic corporate structure. In essence, human trafficking
operations are generally more organised in terms of their activities
than they are organised in terms of structure (Leman & Janssens, 2008;
Tripp & McMahon-Howard, 2016). Human trafficking operations can thus
be surprisingly disorganised (Feingold, 2005). At any rate, less organised
does not necessarily mean less serious (BE-E2; BE-E9; BE-E10). On the
whole, human trafficking operations tend to be rather small scale. That
is, exponentially increasing the volume of trafficked persons poses the
network for the organisational challenge of effectively monitoring this
mass of people. Consequently, economies of scale are practically non-
existent in the human trafficking business (Campana, 2015). Moreover,
it is in the interest of criminal entrepreneurs to curb the number
of associates who have compromising knowledge of the criminal
undertaking as to keep the lid on the whole trafficking operation
(Schloenhardt, 1999; Van Duyne et al., 2007). Not only are trafficking
networks typically limited in size (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Kopp,
2012), these organisations are further marked by their flexible structure
(Aronowitz, 2001; Europol, 2016). The decentralized business structure
of human trafficking groups reminds one, perhaps unsurprisingly, of the
loosely tied business structure of human smuggling rings (BE-E5) (Europol,
2016). This high degree of decentralization and flexibility allows for
the continuous optimisation of their business model (BE-E13). By their
very nature, human trafficking networks are learning organisations, able
and willing to adapt their business to ever-changing circumstances
(Aronowitz et al., 2010; Leman & Janssens, 2008). Those who fail to do
so are inevitably headed for failure.
As mentioned before, the arrangement of relations between the different
nodes of a human trafficking operation favours functionality over unduly
complicated forms of organisation. Depending on the nationality and
size of the group, some networks bear great resemblance to a pyramidal
organisation structure (BE-E4; BE-E5). Human trafficking operations
often incorporate a rudimental form of hierarchy, which is essentially a
crystallization of any present division of roles (Aronowitz, 2001). Central to
the human trafficking business structure is the creation of an intermediate
level between the organizers and the victims of exploitation (BE-E10)
(Leman & Janssens, 2015). In larger, multinational organisations, this
principle takes the form of a management unit and smaller, specialised
subunits (Aronowitz et al., 2010). Notwithstanding the wide variety of
human trafficking operations and the wide variety of actors involved
(Vermeulen et al., 2010), a number of roles seem to be inherent to
the trafficking trade. At the top are the organisers or coordinators, who
function as the brain of the human trafficking operation (BE-E4; BE-E5;
BE-E10; BE-E12). Organizers are assisted by their right-hand men, also
known as lieutenants (BE-E4) (Leman & Janssens, 2015). Business operators
(Wheaton et al., 2010) tasked with the day-to-day management of human
trafficking activities can fulfil a variety of functions, including the roles of
136 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
recruiter (BE-E7; BE-E10; BE-E11), transporter (BE-E6; BE-E7), and enforcer
or supervisor (BE-E12; BE-E13). Women often play a special part in
human trafficking schemes. One notable example is the role of dame de
compagnie or big sister companion (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E7), who serves as
an intermediary between the victim and the exploiter (Leman & Janssens,
2015). Supplementary to the roles fulfilled by the core group, certain tasks
that require specific knowledge or skills can be outsourced to service
providers or facilitators (Leman & Janssens, 2008; Soudijn, 2014; Tijhuis,
2006). Notable examples are accountants (BE-E1; BE-E3; BE-E5; BE-E11),
employment agencies (BE-E1; BE-E13) (BE-C2), and professional money
launderers (BE-E3; BE-E5).
As regards the workings of human trafficking operations, trafficking in
persons unfolds itself as a cycle of actions rather than a single offence
(Guia, 2015). The process of human trafficking spans the consecutive
phases of recruitment, transportation, and exploitation (Aronowitz et al.,
2010; Salt & Stein, 1997). Before anything else, one needs to find people
that are going to fuel the trafficking business (BE-E10; BE-10). To this end,
a prospective workforce is round up, in most cases through traditional
forms of recruitment (BE-E10) such as classified ads or word-of-mouth
marketing (BE-E4; BE-E11; BE-E13). Recruitment almost always involves
a certain level of deceit (Shelley, 2010). Most are recruited under false
pretences (BE-E6; BE-E9; BE-E11), but in exceptional cases the victims
are forced from the very beginning to go to Western Europe (BE-E6).
For the recruitment to succeed, the recruiter should be someone who
seems to inspire trust, possibly an acquaintance of the victim (Korsell
et al., 2011; Shelley, 2010). Occasionally, the recruitment process can
run in two directions, seeing that individuals who “view (…) prostitution
as a logical option compared to other work alternatives” (García, 2016,
p. 149) at times deliberately look for intermediaries or souteneurs in
the interest of easing their debut into the sex trade (BE-C1). Once a
person is won over by hook or by crook, the victim is transferred to
the country of destination by any means conceivable (Shelley, 2010).
Planes, trains, buses and cars are all recurrent forms of transportation
(BE-E1; BE-E9; BE-E11). If possible, legal documents are used as not
to arouse suspicion (BE-E1) (Kleemans & Smit, 2014). Intercontinental
trafficking, on the contrary, often calls for smuggling practices (BE-E7;
BE-E9). After arrival, the actual exploitation can take place. Victims are
usually accommodated in small houses or flats (BE-E11), more often
than not in substandard living conditions (BE-E1; BE-E9; BE-E10; BE-E13).
Imposing some form of control and forcing victims into a position of
utter dependency is central to the practice of exploitation (BE-E2; BE-E11;
BE-E13). To this end, human traffickers frequently make use of the system
of debt bondage. In essence, victims are coerced to repay large sums of
money for their transportation, accommodation, and so on (BE-E5; BE-E7;
BE-E9; BE-E11). After a while, the cycle repeats itself with new victims
(BE-E1; BE-E11). Previous victims either get out, move up the criminal
ladder or become an object of barter between the initial group and
other trafficking networks (BE-E1; BE-E6). Human trafficking operations
are principally characterised by rotation, dislocation, and a high rate
of victim replacement (Europol, 2016; Kleemans & Smit, 2014). More
sophisticated, transnational organisations are able to set up carousel
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 137
structures, which allow them to transfer victims from country to country
(BE-E5; BE-E6; BE-E7).
For the most part, the archetypal equation of human trafficking with
coerced prostitution or forced labour is somewhat misguided. At
present, downright coercion seems to be the exception rather than the
rule in trafficking operations (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014; García,
2016; Guia, 2015). As it happens, keeping a crowd of resentful victims
under one’s thumb is nothing short of a logistical nightmare (Zhang,
2011). Conversely, by offering victims a win-win situation in the spirit
of professionalisation (BE-E3; BE-E5; BE-E6) (Leman & Janssens, 2015),
perpetrators avoid the major level of commitment intrinsic to extracting
forced services. Lastly, the abuse of traditional cultural practices at one’s
discretion is central to many international trafficking rings, notably in
Albanian, Romanian, Nigerian, Chinese or even Indian circles (BE-E5;
BE-E12) (Leman & Janssens, 2015).
Over and above this general method of operating, there are countless ways
of carrying out human trafficking activities (OSCE, 2013). In the matter
of sexual exploitation, two specific modi operandi are highlighted. First
off, Nigerian networks are specialised in criminal exchange programmes
or carousel setups (BE-E5) (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014). Nigerian
human trafficking operations are by definition intercontinental. Victims
are smuggled via the Libya route to Italy, where they are picked up and
brought to Western Europe (BE-E5; BE-E6; BE-E7). The debt incurred by
this journey can be as much as €60,000 per trafficked victim (BE-E5). In
conjunction with debt bondage, victims are controlled through voodoo
rituals and violence (BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E12). Some victims manage to
move up the ranks and assume the position of “madam” (BE-E5; BE-E7)
(Europol, 2016). In this way, the system of exploitation preserves itself
(BE-E7) (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014). The lover-boy method, on the
other hand, revolves around emotional manipulation and the perversion
of social relationships (Kleemans, 2012; OSCE, 2013). Lover-boys prey on
vulnerable girls or women (BE-E5; BE-E12). In the case of respondent
BE-C3, for example, teenage runaways from juvenile institutions were
deliberately targeted (Myria, 2016). By means of an intense grooming
process, the perpetrators isolate their victims, bind them to themselves
and subsequently pressure them into doing sex work (BE-E12) (Federaal
Migratiecentrum, 2014; OSCE, 2013). As regards labour trafficking, the
workings of economic exploitation are quite diverse. The whole idea
of labour trafficking is to keep labour costs at a minimum with a view
to maximising profits (Kara, 2011; Wheaton et al., 2010). The posting of
workers from low-wage in high-wage countries lends itself well to that
purpose (Delepière et al., 2013), as it enables the entrepreneur to employ
workers in the country of destination under the conditions of the country
of origin (BE-E1; BE-E9). These types of secondment schemes or social
dumping practices (BE-E9; BE-E10) are frequently accompanied by bogus
self-employment ploys (BE-E2; BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E9; BE-E13). By falsely
declaring workers as self-employed, the enterprise is no longer bound by
regular terms of employment (CGKRB, 2011) and, in turn, manages to evade
certain social security contributions (BE-E2). Additionally, subcontracting
arrangements, sometimes in the form of elaborate subcontracting cascades,
138 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
can be put into place as a way to distance the organiser from the actual
exploitation (Delepière et al., 2013). Moreover, operating from within the
framework of a legitimate corporate structure provides opportunities for
coating exploitative practices with a veneer of legality (Leman & Janssens,
2015). In order to sustain this pretence of legitimacy, entrepreneurs can
for instance declare a minimal amount of work hours (BE-E4). In the
same vein, victims of sexual exploitation working in bars or windows
are sometimes registered under horeca contracts for tax purposes, yet
worked hours and earnings are routinely under-declared (Boels, 2015;
Weitzer, 2014b; Weitzer & Boels, 2015). Another avenue is to simply take
advantage of legislative loopholes (BE-E5). On this point, perpetrators use
the ambiguity of the legal framework on human trafficking for their own
ends by deliberately framing the work of their victims in such a way that
is possible to denounce the charge of human trafficking (Europol, 2017;
Leman & Janssens, 2015). In this context, human trafficking for labour
exploitation has more to do with structural labour market vulnerabilities
than it bears upon the “aberrant criminal actions of deviant traffickers”
(Davies, 2017; Shamir, 2012, p. 112).
That being said, trafficking in human beings often coincides with plenty
of other transgressions. Depending on the modus operandi concerned,
human trafficking operations regularly draw on a string of ancillary or
instrumental offences (Vermeulen et al., 2010). Evidently, human trafficking
and human smuggling activities can be very much interconnected
(Kleemans & Smit, 2014). In order to move victims to where they are
needed, some networks resort to the ticket of document forgery (Europol,
2017) or corruption (BE-E5). One illustrative example is an elaborate
human trafficking case involving Thai massage parlours. With the help of
an employee of the Thai embassy in Brussels, the criminal organisation
managed to obtain residence permits for all the girls. The staff member
concerned charged no less than €6,000 per person for her services.
As for the transportation of Thai girls, airport staff was bribed into
turning a blind eye to their false documents (CGKRB, 2012). Parallel to
transferring victims, the accommodation of victims quite often backslides
to rack-renting practices (BE-E4; BE-E8; BE-E9; BE-E10). The extent to
which organisations engage in criminal activities that do not add to the
commission of the human trafficking offence, on the other hand, widely
differs from profile to profile (BE-E5). In respect to other organised
criminal activities, trafficking in human beings is often associated with
drug trafficking (Dank et al., 2014). However, a connection to the drug
trade can also be contributory to the commission of human trafficking,
as drugging victims of sexual exploitation is a tried and tested method
of inducing compliance (BE-E7; BE-E11) (Boels, 2015; Leman & Janssens,
2015). In other instances, human trafficking is linked to other criminal
activities by the use of victims in other criminal activities (Europol,
2015), such as the case of Vietnamese labourers working on cannabis
plantations (BE-E11). To all appearances, human trafficking operations
verge on specialisation, as the perpetrators generally do not expand
their criminal portfolio beyond their core business (BE-E1; BE-E10; BE-E13).
Holding the reins over a human trafficking business is a time-consuming
engagement that leaves little room for diversion. Moreover, having the
means and opportunities to set up a human trafficking ring does not
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 139
necessarily mean that one also has access to alternative illicit trades
(Kleemans, 2012).
It follows that interfaces between trafficking in human beings and other
empirical manifestations of organised crime are far from systematic
(BE-E1; BE-E12). To be accurate, some interconnections have in fact
been uncovered, as in mutual connections between organised human
trafficking rings (BE-E1; BE-E7; BE-E11), links with human smuggling rings
(BE-E4) or links with the Chinese Triads (BE-E3) (Federaal Migratiecen-
trum, 2014) and motorcycle gangs (BE-E11) (Myria, 2017). Most of these
relationships are based on either kinship and friendship (BE-E1) or on
the principle of reciprocity (Tijhuis, 2006). The system of compensation
between drug trafficking and human trafficking networks to launder
money is a remarkable example of this type of symbiotic collusion (see
section 3.4).
Much like the aforementioned cross-criminal collaborations, trafficking in
human beings is firmly rooted in blatant opportunism. On the whole,
the initial investments put into setting up human trafficking activities are
minimal. As a matter of fact, criminal entrepreneurs deliberately search
for ways to start up their business with as little capital as possible (BE-E3).
In actuality, very little is needed to set up a human trafficking business,
though this can depend on the particular method of operation. Concerning
the business model of lover-boys, no launch capital whatsoever is needed
(BE-E5). In entering the human trafficking business, having the necessary
knowledge and the right connections takes precedence over sitting on a
sizable reserve of money (BE-E4; BE-E6; BE-C3).
As law enforcement agencies rarely trouble themselves over the question
of start-up capital (BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E13), not much is known about
the source of financing. In view of the fact that one can get a human
trafficking operation off the ground with limited funds, own resources
are a major source of financing (BE-E10). A case in point are former
victims, who use the little money they have earned to set up their
own business (BE-E4). Additionally, human trafficking operations can be
funded by pooling resources together (BE-E3; BE-E4) or by turning to
relatives (BE-E3). To illustrate, respondent BE-C2 claimed that €5,000
was all it took to establish his car wash venture, a sum which he easily
secured by taking out a business loan.
By the same token, keeping a human trafficking business up and
running in the face of critical moments is more of a challenge than
launching said operation. Pivotal moments, such as apprehension by
law enforcement authorities, put the offenders in what is essentially
140 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
a sink-or-swim situation. One way of dealing with this adversity is by
maintaining control over victims in one way or another, even from
behind bars (BE-E6; BE-E12). Victims who willingly bear the litigation
expenses of their alleged exploiters are a grim example of this type
of boundless manipulation (BE-E12). Related to this survival strategy,
respondent BE-C2’s family members willingly stepped in to take care of
business while he served his prison sentence, thus ensuring the continuity
of his undertaking. Yet, in preference to responding to crises, criminal
entrepreneurs principally act in advance of law enforcement interventions.
To this end, human traffickers have a whole range of counterstrategies
at their disposal. If push comes to shove, human trafficking operations
are quite easily uprooted and relocated elsewhere (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E6;
BE-E7). In lieu of dislodging their entire operation, human trafficking
organisations usually opt for moving their criminal assets as far as
possible from the spot where the exploitation takes place (FATF &
MENAFATF, 2015; Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014; Kopp, 2012). In order
to mitigate the risk of losing everything, criminal proceeds should be
translocated as soon as possible (BE-E4; BE-E5). Considering the deep-
seated familial and international dimension of human trafficking, it is
not uncommon to hide one’s revenues with relatives (BE-E1; Dank et
al., 2014), both in the country of origin and in third countries (BE-E5).
Spreading the risk of confiscation (Aronowitz et al., 2010), for instance
through various investments abroad (BE-E10), also occurs. In addition
to hauling the proceeds a long way from their illicit origins, corporate
structures embroiled in human trafficking activities have recourse to
bankruptcy abuse and fraud (BE-E10) (Leman & Janssens, 2015). In this
sense, implicated companies are suddenly insolvent on the occasion of
a conviction (BE-E5; BE-E7). Furthermore, criminal entrepreneurs often
go to great lengths to avoid leaving incriminating trails (BE-E5; BE-E13;
Aronowitz et al., 2010), to which end various strategies are suitable.
Straw men schemes (BE-E5), using the internet to sidestep wiretapping or
even adopting nicknames (BE-E9) all answer this purpose.
On account of the fact that hardly any start-up capital is needed,
it follows that human trafficking operations do rebound after critical
episodes (BE-E4; BE-E12). However, this low market entry threshold
also means that competitors eager to fill the market void are abundant
(BE-E1; Leman & Janssens, 2015). In case of such a criminal coup d’état,
the complete lack of territoriality in the human trafficking business
means that the opportunities to reinstate one’s business elsewhere
are abundant (BE-E4). Whereas some organisations inevitably crumble,
others manage to pull through. Consequently, the latter category
is in a position to learn from its mistakes and adapt accordingly
(BE-E5). Moreover, because of the rather modest initial investment,
stripping a human trafficking networks of its assets is not enough to
permanently incapacitate the operation (BE-E4). On the contrary, a
convicted human trafficker is still endowed with relevant experience
and the right connections. A loss of reserves or revenue might not
leave one much choice but to simply take up where one previously
left off (Naylor, 1999).
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 141
Aside from the occasional moment of crisis, human trafficking organisations
have to deal with the everyday issue of working out a payment system.
As concerns sexual exploitation, the sex trade is conventionally a cash-
up-front business (BE-E1; Europol Financial Intelligence Group, 2015;
Finance Against Trafficking, 2014; Korsell et al., 2011). Besides cash
transactions, only a few venues accept credit card payments (BE-E1;
BE-E13). Most often, the client pays to an intermediary who is present
at the spot (Petrunov, 2011), such as a “big sister” companion (BE-E5;
Leman & Janssens, 2015) or the local manager of the venue. Alternatively,
the customer pays directly to the victim (BE-E1; BE-E7), who either
immediately hands over the payment to the intermediary (BE-E11) or,
more infrequently, compliantly brings the earnings to the exploiters
(BE-E1; BE-E6; BE-E12; BE-E13). These types of settlements permit the
criminal organisation to sever the cash flow from their commodity, in
this case trafficked human beings (Kopp, 2012). As a matter of course,
the organiser of the human trafficking operation sees to the redistribution
of the takings among the different ranks of the organisation (BE-E11).
Ordinarily, this allotment involves a fifty-fifty arrangement between the
victim and the exploiter. However, one should bear in mind that all
expenses are subtracted from the victim’s share (BE-E1; BE-E11; Leman &
Janssens, 2015).
As for labour exploitation, a different pattern emerges. As a rule, the
customer pays the employer for the work that has been done. The
method of payment is largely subject to the sector of operation (BE-E1;
BE-E4; BE-E11). Bank transfers are a common payment system in a number
of businesses, whereas other undertakings such as carwashes are primarily
cash-based. Wire transfers are usually quickly followed by a withdrawal
in cash (BE-E4; Delepière et al., 2013). The employer gives money to the
intermediary, who in turn pays the workers (BE-E1). For the most part,
workers are paid in cash (BE-E3; BE-E4; BE-E12; Delepière et al., 2013).
Again, all incurred expenses are deducted from the victims’ wages (BE-E11).
In essence, the exploiter receives the payments and subsequently handles
the apportionment of the organisation’s revenues (BE-E11).
Incidentally, control is of critical importance in ensuring payments from
victims (BE-E5; BE-E13; Campana, 2015). Moreover, it is in the interest
of the exploiter to have a clear picture of the earnings of his or her
victims (BE-E13). To that end, the ways and means to keep a tight rein
on trafficked victims are virtually limitless. As a matter of usual practice,
victims are forced into a position of financial dependence (BE-E11).
The system of debt bondage, as pointed out before, compels people
to work off their debt burden (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E12). Accumulating
wage arrears or withholding money further (BE-E2) binds the victim
to the trafficking network, for fear of suffering the loss of these due
payments. Likewise, exploiters sometimes hold on to the victims’ first
earnings as a sort of security deposit (BE-E11). In distinction to keeping
back victims’ payments, some human trafficking operations implement
a crude penalty system, basically imposing a fine on all types of minor
transgressions (BE-E1; BE-E10). Another aspect of control is restricting
142 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
and supervising every movement of trafficking victims. Isolating or even
sequestrating workers principally corresponds to this need (BE-E1; BE-E7;
BE-E9; BE-E11). Under other conditions, human trafficking networks make
use of technological developments such as cameras (BE-E1; BE-E13),
mobile phones (BE-E5; BE-E6; BE-E7) or tachographs in lorries (BE-E10)
in conjunction with ”low-tech” surveillance in the form of on-the-spot
supervisors (BE-E13). By taking away identity papers (BE-E6; BE-E11) or
abusing the person’s illegal status (BE-E4; BE-E10; BE-E12) exploiters
effectively limit their victim’s freedom of movement to the confines of
the human trafficking operation.
In the case of a sham marriage (BE-E1) or domestic servitude, one’s
mobility rarely extends beyond the front door. Alongside physical
restraints, psychological terror is a favoured method of control. In this
respect, branding victims by means of tattoos (BE-E1; BE-E6) or outright
mutilation (BE-E9) conveys an unequivocal message. On the subject of
instilling fear, violence or threats thereof towards both the victim and his
or her relatives are ever-present (BE-E1; BE-E7; BE-E9). Or rather, violence
is not as common as more subtle means of control such as extortion, as
the use of violence implies less profit and harsher punishment (Englund
et al., 2008; Leman & Janssens, 2008; Vermeulen et al., 2007).
By its very nature, trafficking in human beings is a cost-saving exercise
(BE-E3; BE-E4; BE-E5). From a business point of view, human trafficking
makes for a relatively inexpensive undertaking considering that a trafficked
individual is a remarkably low-cost ”commodity” (Europol, 2015; Wheaton
et al., 2010). As one would expect, the operating costs of a human
trafficking organisation vary widely according to the network’s method
of operation (BE-E5). Ultimately, exploiters recoup any costs or expenses
incurred during the operation directly from their victims (BE-E4; BE-E9;
BE-E10; BE-E11).
Each stage in the process of human trafficking entails different costs.
Before anything else, exploitation requires people. Getting a hold of
those people mainly involves advertisement costs (BE-E1; Portnoff et
al., 2017). Accordingly, the costs of recruitment are in effect next to
nothing (Leman & Janssens, 2008). After ensnaring one or several victims,
the prospective labour force needs to be transferred to their country
of destination. Evidently, the cost of transportation is commensurate
with the distance that is covered by the operation. As far as trafficking
within Europe is concerned, transportation costs generally consist of
plane, train, or bus fees (BE-E1; BE-E11) or, as an alternative, the price
of a second-hand car or mini-van and fuel (BE-E1), as well as obtaining
travel documents, whether counterfeit or not (BE-E3; BE-E13). So, in
spite of appearance, transporting victims is generally a minimal cost of
doing business (Kara, 2011). On the contrary, the expenditure item of
transportation is conveniently turned into a source of profit. By way of
illustration, a trip from Eastern Europe usually costs about €40 or roughly
the price of low-budget flight (BE-E1; BE-E11). Victims, on the other
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 143
hand, are ordered to repay the traffickers upwards of €800 for their
travel expenses (BE-E11). The same goes for human trafficking operations
involving long-distance smuggling. Trafficked individuals incur a debt of
€15,000, €30,000, or even €60,000 (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014),
a sum that is eagerly inflated in light of perceived risks of traversing
borders but is in no way proportional to the real costs of transportation
(BE-E5; BE-E9; BE-E11). Hence, the system of debt bondage or coerced
indebtedness is a patently overblown contract (Kara, 2011).
Next, as concerns the accommodation of victims, networks frequently
pay around €800 in monthly rent for a small house or apartment (BE-E1;
BE-E11). In order to secure a lease agreement, human traffickers often
turn to their web of contacts (Korsell et al., 2011). In preference to
paying rent, in exceptional cases the cost of accommodation is avoided
altogether by housing labourers in their respective workplace (BE-E10;
BE-E16). Contrarily, accommodation is a cost item that is increasingly
remodelled into a money-spinning scheme through the practice of rack-
renting (BE-E10). If the monthly rent is €800, the exploiter simply
harbours five to ten victims in the same place and charges each of them
a fee of roughly €250 (BE-E11).
Furthermore, exploitation necessitates a certain infrastructure, such
as a workplace, working clothes and all kinds of implements (BE-C2;
BE-E1; BE-E13; Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Setting up basic organisational
structures can be a substantial investment. It would, therefore, be
worthwhile to look into such cases from a money laundering angle.
On the other hand, if the infrastructure is pre-existent to the human
trafficking activities, as is often the case with labour exploitation (BE-
E4), then no investment whatsoever is required. In addition to the
infrastructure of trafficking in human beings, criminal organisations
are confronted with a number of operating expenses. These costs
are primarily connected to the everyday management of a trafficking
venture. Mobile communication and internet access are, of course,
rather unexceptional business expenses (BE-E1; BE-E7). A more atypical
cost item is the repatriation of criminal assets (Soudijn & Reuter, 2016),
as for instance money transfer services charge a ten percent commission
on transactions (BE-E13) (Brenig et al., 2015).
Other costs related to exploitation include the rent for windows, which
is specific to red light districts3 (BE-E1; BE-E5) (Adriaenssens et al.,
2015). Window fees normally fluctuate between €100 and €200 per
shift (Adriaenssens et al., 2015; Boels, 2016), though there are large
regional differences (BE-E6; BE-E12; BE-E13). Advertising sexual services
on-line is typically free of charge. Bumping these ads in order to draw
in more customers, on the other hand, requires payment, for instance
via text message (BE-E6) (Portnoff et al., 2017). As for wage costs, since
3 While on the subject of renting windows for sex work, the means of gaining access to these
venues, incidental to the involvement of third parties in window prostitution, vary from place
to place. As Weitzer and Boels (2015, p. 252) note: “In Antwerp, the sex workers rent window
space directly from a building owner. In Brussels, madams rent a window unit from the building
owner and supervise the prostitutes who work for them. In Ghent, prostitution café managers/
barkeepers rent space from the building owner, and sex workers typically enter into written
contract s with managers in order to occupy the space for a specific period of time.”
144 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
trafficked workers are axiomatically paid well below the legal minima,
labour exploitation represents an immense saving in labour costs.
Labour trafficking implies a saving of at least fifty percent, and in the
worst case this cost-item is eliminated altogether (BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E9;
BE-E10). Lastly, control has an evident decisive relevance to the matter
of exploitation. Monitoring or control-related costs are considerable, as
keeping people in check takes a lot of time and resources (Campana,
2015; Korsell et al., 2011).
Proceeding from this low-cost business model perspective, trafficking
in human beings is often believed to generate immense profits. On
average, the overall revenues of a human trafficking operation easily
add up to several tens or even hundreds of thousands of euros (BE-E2;
BE-E5; BE-E12; BE-E14), not to mention the outliers who rake up millions
of euros in profit (BE-E1; BE-E10). Throughout the human trafficking
business, profits are subject to large fluctuations (Englund et al., 2008;
OSCE, 2013). As a matter of course, trafficking in persons involves
services that are provided on a continuous basis. Subsequently, the
proceeds of human trafficking are patterned by a steady flow of
relatively small takings (FinCen, 2014; Korsell et al., 2011). Weighed
against the nominal investment required to get a human trafficking
operation up and running, trafficking in human beings yields a quick
and considerable profit (Kara, 2011; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010;
Petrunov, 2011). In point of fact, a criminal entrepreneur can normally
regain his initial investments in a matter of days (Leman & Janssens,
2015). Trafficking in persons is nevertheless far from the limitless source
of profit it is commonly made out to be (Campana, 2015; Marcus et
al., 2016). On the whole, human trafficking seems to be less profitable
than other criminal undertakings, such as drug trafficking (Bruinsma &
Bernasco, 2004; Levi & Reuter, 2006). Adding to that, the relative
absence of economies of scale significantly limits the profit potential
(Campana, 2015).
Trafficking in persons can be financially rewarding in several different
ways. That is, exploiters either extort services from their victims or
trade in trafficked persons (Bravo, 2008; OSCE, 2013). The latter option
appears to be more and more exceptional nowadays (BE-E5; Leman &
Janssens, 2008), as renting out or selling individuals is less lucrative
than exploiting them over a longer period of time (Leman & Janssens,
2015). Deducting travel and living expenses, imposing fines, and wielding
extortionate interest rates (Kara, 2011) increases the margin of profit
as well. Concerning sexual exploitation, estimates on the proceeds
vary considerably. One victim is reckoned to yield somewhere in the
ballpark of €2,000 to €8,000 a week (BE-E1; BE-E6; BE-E11; Boels, 2015;
Roudaut, 2011). Similarly, the number of trafficked persons stretches
from a single individual (BE-E13) up to dozens of victims (BE-E5). In order
to keep the operation at a manageable scale, the number of victims rarely
exceeds that of a handful (BE-E1). The estimated number of clients for
window workers clusters around five a day, give or take a few (BE-E6;
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 145
BE-E7; BE-E11), though sex workers can expand their clientele by engaging
in other prostitution segments such as internet-based or private services
(BE-E6). As for the price range of sexual services, rates are mainly
contingent on the type of prostitution (BE-E6; BE-E7; BE-E12). The average
price for window prostitution is €50 (BE-E6; Boels, 2015), whereas escort
services are usually paid €150 (BE-E1; BE-E6). On the whole, sex workers
charge somewhere around €50 to €100 for their services (Adriaenssens et
al., 2015; Boels, 2015). Victims of human trafficking, however, are prone
to working at a cut-rate as they are in no position to refuse clients
(BE-E6; BE-E12). Specifically, victims oftentimes procure services below
the standard rate in order to meet revenue quotas imposed by their
exploiters (Boels, 2015). In this connection, sex workers who have no
say in their working conditions also have little control over the number
of clients they receive (García, 2016), let alone the prices they charge.
Offering services at a cut-price nonetheless affects the market for sex
work and, as a consequence, creates tensions with other prostitutes
(Boels, 2015). With reference to economic exploitation, the term profit
takes on various meanings. By way of explanation, profits can be
regarded as all direct gains from human trafficking activities. Contrarily,
the profit can also be equated to all wages, social contributions, and
other expenses that have been evaded in the process (BE-E9; BE-E11). In
other words, the issue of sizing up profit in labour trafficking is rather
muddled. The proceeds of labour trafficking largely depend on the
duration and gravity of the exploitative practices (BE-E2). Moreover, low
labour costs increase profits as they allow for more competitive pricing
(BE-E4; BE-E11).
When it comes to divvying up the proceeds, shares are generally in
accordance with the respective contribution of that member to the
human trafficking operation (BE-E1; BE-E4; Petrunov, 2011). As mentioned
earlier, the organiser is the one who is responsible for the redistribution
of profits. This apportionment is seemingly reflective of the hierarchy
present in a criminal organisation, provided that a certain degree of
organisation is in fact existent in the trafficking operation. Principally, the
organiser takes the lion’s share of the profit, his lieutenants get a smaller
piece of the pie, and so on (BE-E4; BE-E11). Interestingly, respondent
BE-C3, as a more peripheral member of the operation, considered going
out with the girls along with casual sexual encounters to be a form
of payment in kind. In fact, he declared that he had no real financial
motive to take part in these activities because he was already employed
on a full time basis somewhere else and, in consequence, did not view
the pin money he received for his services as the group’s driver as the
main perquisite of this job. On the occasion that trafficking networks
externalize some of their activities, service providers or brokers are paid
on a freelance basis (Leman & Janssens, 2008). As one might imagine,
the trafficked workers are quite literally at the bottom of the “food
chain.”
By and large, offending and spending are closely connected. The greater
part of criminal proceeds is blown on luxury goods as to keep up a
lavish lifestyle (CGKRB, 2012). Prodigal spending sprees and conspicuous
wealth are, of course, flagrant measures of the economic power one has
146 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
managed to accumulate (Petrunov, 2011). Remaining assets, if any, are
usually invested (FATF, 2011; Kopp, 2012; Korsell et al., 2011; Leman &
Janssens, 2015; Petrunov, 2011). Investments are predominantly made in
the real estate sector, both domestically and in other countries (BE-E3;
BE-E7; BE-E12). In turn, investments mostly involve legal opportunities.
Respondent BE-C2, for one, dipped into the proceeds of his car
wash business to set up two supplementary convenience stores. The
revenues from human trafficking operations, however, can also be used
to embark upon other criminal enterprises, such as drug trafficking
(BE-E4). Depending on the profile and background of the offender,
investments can take place in Belgium as well as abroad (BE-E4; BE-E7;
BE-E8; BE-E10). Investment choices are thus marked by their notable
proximity to the criminal entrepreneur. In general, investments stay close
to home (Kruisbergen et al., 2015; Levi & Reuter, 2006). Lastly, part of
the profits flows right back into the trafficking business with a view to
sustaining subsequent cycles of operation (BE-E1; BE-E9; BE-E11; BE-E13)
or, on rare occasions, to increase the scale of the illicit undertaking
(BE-E1; BE-E11).
In a related manner, investing abroad points to the cross-border move-
ment of human trafficking proceeds. As mentioned before, offenders
primarily send criminal proceeds to their country of origin (Europol,
2016; Europol Financial Intelligence Group, 2015) in a bid to safeguard
their financial assets. Transferring illicit earnings on a regular basis would
be a sensible strategy (Korsell et al., 2011), as letting large sums of
money accumulate in the country of operation runs the risk of losing
the full amount of criminal proceedings at the hand of law enforcement
interventions. The physical transportation of cash by cash couriers is a
prevalent way of moving assets abroad which, perhaps, could be expected
given the finding that trafficking in human beings, for a great part, is
a cash-based economy (BE-E5; BE-E12; Europol, 2015). An illustrative
example is the case of the white van courier, who was assigned the
task of collecting the sex trafficking scene’s filthy lucre along a set
route, crossing Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany before delivering
the stacks of cash to Bulgaria. The cash courier did not only move
human trafficking profits in exchange for a certain commission fee, but
worked for the entire Bulgarian criminal circuit in Western Europe (BE-E5;
Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014). Secondly, wire transfers are increasingly
avoided as a cross-border conduit for criminal assets on account of their
traceability (BE-E6; Europol, 2015; Petrunov, 2011). On the off-chance that
bank transfers are being used, this is usually realised by breaking down
the funds into smaller transactions, by wiring money through third-party
bank accounts, by having victims transfer the assets (BE-E1) or through the
medium of money mules (BE-E4). Outside the traditional banking system,
money service businesses such as Western Union, MoneyGram and
Moneytrans are frequently used by non-Belgian offenders to repatriate
profits (BE-E1; BE-E3; BE-E15). Yet again, these financial transactions are
carried out under a different name with the aim of bypassing any active
identification systems (BE-E5; BE-E13; Leman & Janssens, 2015). On the
subject of underground banking, hawala money transfers are restricted to
certain nationalities (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E10; Europol, 2015), such as Afghani
and Pakistani ethnic groups (Soudijn, 2015). Similar to the method of
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 147
hawala banking is the Black Western Union system specific to Nigerian
networks (BE-E5). In essence, criminal assets are send to Nigeria by
means of parallel money transfers run through grocery stores or other
retailers (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014).
Transferring profits and subsequently reinserting criminal capital in the
regular circuit can be considered as the most prominent method of
money laundering in human trafficking operations (BE-E4; BE-E5; BE-E12;
BE-E13) (FATF, 2011). It stands to reason that this method is a rampant
approach to criminal money management as it is a very easy way
to integrate illicit funds into the legal economy (Europol Financial
Intelligence Group, 2015). However, the laundering of trafficking profits
does not necessarily follow the same fixed pattern. Rather, offenders
launder their illicit profits by any means possible (BE-E13), for example
through purchasing alcohol cheaply and reselling it at inflated prices
(BE-E4). In as much as human trafficking operations are principally
clandestine enterprises (Weitzer, 2014a), the incidence of money
laundering is largely uncharted territory. However, the figures presented
by the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (FIU) are, to a
certain degree, indicative of the scale of this issue. Between 2010 and
2015, a total of 866 cases of money laundering connected to human
trafficking activities were reported to the public prosecutor’s office
(CTIF-CFI, 2015). As Table 6 reveals, substantial amounts of money are
involved.
The bottom line of any money
laundering scheme is to provide
criminal proceeds with a legal
façade (BE-E14; Levi & Reuter,
2006). As explained above, hu-
man trafficking operations, and
labour trafficking operations in
particular, routinely take advan-
tage of legitimate companies.
For this reason, trafficking in
persons lends itself particu-
larly well to money laundering
(Delepière et al., 2013; Europol,
2015; Levi, 2015). Provided that
a human trafficking network operates within a bona fide business struc-
ture, the comingling of legitimate and illegitimate assets is inherent to
the workings of the criminal enterprise (BE-E1; BE-E14; Europol Financial
Intelligence Group, 2015). As a further laundering procedure, corporate
structures easily allow for trade-based money laundering (BE-E3; BE-E5),
for instance through invoice fraud (BE-E4; BE-E7; BE-E10) or bogus con-
sultancy fees (BE-E10). A striking example is the compensation system
between drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings. Essentially,
human trafficking organisations need hard cash to pay their workers,
whereas drug traffickers need to get rid of their cash supplies. This
cross-criminal exchange between two front companies is subsequently
covered by false invoices (BE-E3; BE-E15; CTIF-CFI, 2016). More generally,
profits are passed from one transit bank account to another (BE-E9). Not
Таble 6. scale of files liNked to tr affickiNg iN humaN beiNgs
aNd forwarded to judicial authorities by the belgiaN fiu
(2014 – 2016)
Source: CTIF-CFI (2016).
29 17.69
17 13.22
20 14.63
148 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
only are obfuscated business structures consisting of many interconnect-
ing firms conducive to the harbouring of trafficking activities, they also
enable offenders to let the proceedings circle between several accounts
of their own companies. Similarly, chains of subcontractors can double
as pipelines for criminal assets (BE-E4). Alternatively, the accounts of
victims or money mules are put to use as transit bank accounts (BE-
E13; BE-E14). After passing the proceeds around, the rule of thumb is
to break the paper trail by turning the profits into cash, often through
smurfing techniques4 (BE-E3; BE-E4; BE-E15; CTIF-CFI, 2016; Delepière
et al., 2013). As a consequence, the last steps of the money laundering
process take effect outside the regular banking system (Delepière et al.,
2013; Shelley, 2010). Overall, money laundering schemes tied to human
trafficking operations rarely get more complex than this (Petrunov, 2011).
In fact, the methods by which human traffickers launder their earnings
are markedly similar to those used for other criminal activities (CGKRB,
2011; OSCE, 2014).
Likewise, the internet and accompanying technological advancements
constitute powerful drivers for all manner of illicit trades (Europol, 2017;
Lavorgna, 2015). As regards trafficking in human beings, the Internet
fulfils three main functions (Myria, 2017). First off, online classified
ads, social networking sites, and dating sites all serve as recruitment
hubs for trafficking victims (Hughes, 2014; Latonero, 2011; Myria,
2017). Next, the Internet is of great use to the management of human
trafficking rings (BE-E5) (Myria, 2017), as it facilitates communication
(BE-E1; BE-E10; BE-E13) and capacitates organisers to coordinate
trafficking activities from a distance (BE-E10). Moreover, concerning
the management of victims in particular, recent technologies have
significantly expanded the arsenal of methods of control (BE-E1; BE-E5;
BE-E7), for instance through so-called sextortion practices (Di Nicola et
al., 2017; Lavorgna, 2015) or by remotely monitoring trafficked persons
(Hughes, 2014). Lastly, sex trafficking victims are increasingly advertised
online (Korsell et al., 2011; Myria, 2017).
Hitherto, the use of digital communication technologies has been
reported more for sexual exploitation than for cases of labour trafficking
(Hughes, 2014; Latonero, 2011). It appears that more traditional methods
of recruitment are preferred for select target audiences, such as
labourers who are located in rural areas (Latonero, 2011). The internet
has nevertheless left its mark on the recruitment process of human
traffickers. Above all, ICTs lower the threshold for making contact with
4 By way of explanation: “One of the ways that criminals can overcome some of the transaction
regulation is by using external allies to circumvent restrictions on deposit amounts or add
confusion to the financial trail. The classic method is to take a large cash sum, for example
100,000, and to break this down into smaller sums of between 8,000 and 9,000. A number of
members of the gang or outside members such as family or friends are given batches of the
money and ordered to deposit it from different banks locally to arrive at the same destination
bank. This process is known as smur fing and it was devised to avoid detection when large
sums of cash needed to be deposited” (Naheem, 2015, p. 518).
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 149
potential victims (BE-E1; BE-E17; Myria, 2017). In this regard, detailed
social networking profiles provide the means for victim selection, social
engineering, and tailored deceit (Lavorgna, 2015; Myria, 2017; Watson
et al., 2015). Correspondingly, a calculated employment of ICTs can
potentially replace the position of recruiter or transporter abroad in
specific cases, notably one-to-one exploitation and sham marriages
(BE-E4; BE-E7). Hence, social media and other technologies present an
unparalleled opportunity for individual traffickers to set up their own
operation (Tripp & McMahon-Howard, 2016). Furthermore, technological
developments have left a marked impact on the working conditions
and areas of activity of sex work in general (García, 2016). After all,
online classified ads and specialised websites provide a relatively covert
and discrete way of advertising sexual services and accessing clients
compared to the alternative of publicly displaying prostitutes in red
light districts (BE-E11). Sex trafficking networks have accordingly shifted
their main fields of operation from bars and windows to private and
clandestine soliciting (BE-E4; BE-E11; Di Nicola et al., 2017). Against this
background, the present surge of private forms of prostitution in the
wake of the ongoing digital revolution is something of a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, web-based soliciting grants sex workers a
certain level of freedom, independence, and concealment from the
public view. From the opposed point of view, this clandestineness could
lead to precarious situations (García, 2016). For example, the presence
of police officers in Belgian vice districts serves as a tool to enhance
social control (Weitzer, 2014b). Yet, when sexual encounters take place
in apartments or disreputable hotel rooms, this type of external oversight
is virtually absent. On top of promoting anonymity, new communication
technologies have drastically cut the transaction costs of private prostitution
and escort services, in particular by cutting back the expenditure on
accommodation (Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Conversely, the impact of
cryptocurrencies on the human trafficking business model has been far
less extensive (BE-E3; Europol, 2015). As bearer negotiable instruments,
decentralised and encrypted virtual currencies such as bitcoin can be
regarded as perfectly legal facilitators of money laundering (BE-E14;
Brenig et al., 2015). What has kept this inexpensive system of transferring
from taking off, is the limited acceptability of cryptocurrencies and the
fact that cashing outside the system is still a problem (Brenig et al., 2015).
Cryptocurrencies nevertheless embody an insidious trend in managing
criminal finances (BE-E14). Law enforcement agencies should therefore be
alert to the possibility of recent technological advancements gaining a
firmer foothold in the human trafficking business model.
Notwithstanding the glaring advantages set out above, the use of internet
and assorted technologies bears a number of drawbacks for human
trafficking organisations. As the online outposts of human trafficking
activities form a rare instance where criminal operations do actually
surface, websites such as redlights.be (BE-E5; BE-E6) or backpage.com
(Portnoff et al., 2017) provide an interesting avenue to identify human
trafficking cases (Di Nicola et al., 2017; Latonero, 2011; Myria, 2017;
Watson et al., 2015). By and of itself, online classified ads selling sex
are rife with potentially inculpatory information (Portnoff et al., 2017).
Tracing back these ads to the exploiters behind them constitutes a major
150 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
step in countering human trafficking for sexual exploitation and, more
importantly, this same alertness is gradually seeping through the law
enforcement spectrum (BE-E5; BE-E6; Myria, 2017). Additionally, websites
where clients discuss the sex workers they have visited can be used to
single out trafficking cases (Adriaenssens et al., 2015; Korsell et al., 2011).
Moreover, through the use of digital communication technologies, all
kinds of transactions and communications are registered (Hughes, 2014).
Antithetically to the deceptive opportunities of the internet, websites (e.g.
Etransport.pl) where truck drivers exchange experiences and information
about their employers enable potential victims to warn each other for
trafficking practices (BE-E10; Myria, 2017).
Going from “digital smoke signals” (Latonero, 2011, p. 37) to the financial
footprints of human trafficking offences, financial investigations are widely
regarded as an essential tool of an effective response to the criminal
threat of trafficking in persons. In Belgium, financial investigations can be
categorised as either minimal or maximal (BE-E1). Financial investigations
adhering to the minimal approach are essentially a matter of calculating
or tracing criminally obtained assets with a view to confiscation (BE-
E2; BE-E4; BE-E10; BE-E11). In this sense, minimal financial investigations
are quasi standard practice in human trafficking cases (BE-E1; BE-E6;
BE-E12; BE-E13). More profound financial investigations that go beyond
the purpose of sheer confiscation, on the contrary, are relatively
infrequent and seem to be limited to bigger cases (BE-E1; BE-E7; BE-
E8). Whichever option is deemed suitable in a concrete case is at the
consideration of the prosecutor’s office (BE-E1; BE-E4). In spite of this
fractional application, profound financial investigations are paramount
to laying bare the structure of trafficking organisations (CGKRB, 2012;
FATF, 2012; Shelley, 2010). Likewise, an effective financial investigation
mirrors the findings of the principal criminal investigation (BE-E10).
Accordingly, thorough financial inquiries are highly relevant to the issue
of providing evidence (BE-E5; BE-E14; Brown et al., 2012). As yet, this
case building potential is clearly underused (Kruisbergen et al., 2016). In
effect, financial investigations have demonstrated their added value in
supporting the charge of criminal conspiracy or criminal organisation
(BE-E5; CGKRB, 2012; Leman & Janssens, 2015). As specified above,
money is what ties the different parts of a human trafficking operation
together. Consequently, delving into those finances is one of the few
ways to take hold of the elusive men behind the curtain or top tiers
of the human trafficking business when dealing with more sophisticated
trafficking rings (BE-E5). Ultimately, knowing where the funds come from
and where they go sheds a different light on a traffic that is difficult to
chart directly (Kopp, 2012).
With regard to the purpose of confiscation, two methods can be used
to determine the size of a trafficker’s illicit fortune (BE-E14). The method
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 151
of asset evaluation consists of stacking up the capital one has amassed
over a suspicious period of time against the defendant’s legal income in
pursuance of demonstrating unexplained wealth (Brown, 2013). Alternatively,
investigators turn to the direct calculation of criminally obtained assets.
As far as sexual exploitation is concerned, the asset investigation and
recovery unit of the Belgian Federal police is disposed to working out
the total of criminal earnings or assisting human trafficking investigators
in this calculation. Though conventionally, the calculation of criminal
proceeds is seen as a standard investigative practice (BE-E6; BE-E14).
The overall takings of a sex trafficking operation typically correspond
to the sum of the number of identified victims, how much the victims
have earned, and how much these trafficked individuals had to hand
over to their exploiters (BE-E6). In the case of labour exploitation, social
inspection services are usually entrusted with calculating the proceeds
(BE-E1; BE-E2; BE-E4). The criminal financial gain in labour trafficking
rests on two key elements, namely unpaid wages and unpaid social
contributions (BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E9). The total proceeds of a labour
trafficking business are further shaped by factors such as the duration
of employment, working hours, the type of labour involved, and so on
(BE-E9). Parenthetically, the calculation of criminal proceeds is a telling
way of quantifying the infraction (BE-E4). As a rule, operating costs are
not brought into the equation (BE-E3), for the reason that confiscation is
the first and foremost reason for calculating criminal assets.
Although invaluable to disrupting human trafficking operations, financial
investigations are bound by considerable challenges and numerous practical
problems. Going down the rabbit hole of criminal finances is an inherently
time-consuming endeavour (BE-E4; BE-E7; BE-E8; BE-E14). However, lengthy
investigations run counter to the principle of reasonable delay and the
fact that a lot of non-resident defendants are held in temporary custody
implies that human trafficking investigations are regularly conducted under
pressure of time (BE-E4; BE-E7). In a similar vein, financial investigations are
hampered by a general lack of resources (BE-E4; BE-E8; BE-E10; Delepière
et al., 2013). This problem is exacerbated by the oftentimes complicated
nature of human trafficking cases (BE-E1; BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E5; BE-E7),
which require the involvement of specialised investigators (BE-E1; BE-E4;
BE-E7) and by the extensive use of counter-strategies. Whereas financial
investigations move slow, the flow of financial transactions is immensely
faster than the ability of investigative authorities to track them (BE-E4;
OSCE, 2014).
The international aspect integral to most human trafficking operations
complicates matters even more (Brown et al., 2012; Delepière et al., 2013;
Soudijn, 2014). Over the years, the response to human trafficking has
been raised to an transnational level in order to meet this complexity (de
Jager et al., 2016; Goodey, 2008). Traditionally, international cooperation
takes the form of written requests for mutual legal assistance or letters
rogatory. However, this approach is virtually impracticable in the face
of complex cross-border cases (Spapens, 2011). That is, requests for
judicial assistance tend to be rather laborious (BE-E11; BE-E13). Parallel
investigations and joined investigation teams (JITs), on the contrary, are
intended to cut back on this tedious to-ing and fro-ing. The added value
152 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
of JITs in particular lies in the facilitation of exchanging information and
expertise (BE-E12) (OSCE, 2013). In addition, JITs enable investigators
to follow the money trail beyond national borders, thus expediting the
confiscation of criminal assets abroad (BE-E5; BE-E11). The last few years
have shown a marked increase in the use of JITs in human trafficking
cases (Eurojust, 2017). In turn, the use of JITs is only gradually gaining
foothold in Belgium (BE-E1). On the whole, international collaboration
in human trafficking investigations has known widely varying degrees of
success (BE-E10; BE-E11; BE-E12). Even so, transnational cooperation is
of vital importance, as one could seriously question the effectiveness of
tackling a phenomenon that essentially drifts between nations on a local
level (BE-E5; BE-E9; BE-E13). Besides, increasing international collaboration
advances a better understanding of the transnational dimension of the
human trafficking business (Leman & Janssens, 2015).
All things considered, the adage that trafficking in human beings is a
low risk, high pay-off crime still stands (FATF, 2011; Finance Against
Trafficking, 2014; OSCE, 2013). In the first place, the human trafficking
business is set apart by a remarkably low market entry barrier (Kopp,
2012; Wheaton et al., 2010). Whereas exploitative practices yield
considerable profits, the associated risks are close to negligible. Seeing
that trafficking in human beings offences are notoriously difficult to
prove (Balarezo, 2013; Eurojust, 2015; UNODC, 2016), the conviction
rates for this type of transgression are relatively low (Kara, 2011; OSCE,
2013; Wheaton et al., 2010). Furthermore, those who are convicted
for trafficking offences are usually met with rather feeble prison terms
(Balarezo, 2013; Kara, 2011). In general, the bulk of human trafficking
convicts received no prison time or a partially or fully suspended
prison sentence (U.S. Department of State, 2017). As for Belgium, half
of the prison sentences for human trafficking offences in 2016 ranged
between one and three years (Myria, 2017). Accordingly, increasing the
risks should be regarded as a fundamental policy direction (Bouché &
Shady, 2017). Per contra, raising the costs of human trafficking would
be to no avail, as passing on expenditures to victims and clients is
ingrained in the trafficking business model. Related to the low risk
nature of this criminal enterprise is the fact that human trafficking is a
severely under-detected offence (Goodey, 2008; Guia, 2015; Kleemans
& Smit, 2014). There are a number of conceivable ways to counteract
this problem. Raising awareness, educating frontline practitioners, and
building expertise among investigative authorities is pivotal in uncovering
a crime that hides in plain sight (BE-E2; BE-E6; Aronowitz et al., 2010).
Bearing in mind that a number of trafficking modalities rely on public
venues, such as bars and massage parlours, which require a permit
from the local municipality (Weitzer, 2014b), an administrative approach
to trafficking in human beings would undoubtedly reinforce efforts to
expose exploitative practices (BE-E11; Aronowitz et al., 2010). Against
this background, it is important to note that, under the influence
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 153
of technological advancements, the market of sex trafficking has
broadly shifted from public to more private forms of prostitution. This
displacement evidently broadens the issue of detection from patrolling
red light districts to monitoring websites and private venues. More
generally, advancements in communication and technology have shaped
the current human trafficking business model to a certain extent and
will continue to do so in the future. In this irrevocable evolution lies
a considerable challenge for investigative authorities and policy makers
(BE-E13; BE-E14).
On the subject of investigating human trafficking offences, law enforcement
agencies often lack the incentive to peg away at financial data, whereas
financial investigators are generally pressed for knowledge of human
trafficking operations (OSCE, 2014). Traditionally, investigators have been
more interested in the criminal activity itself rather than its financial
bearings (Kruisbergen et al., 2016; Soudijn, 2014). The two are nevertheless
inherently linked. As a consequence, creating synergies between human
trafficking investigators and financial investigators is crucial in terms of
assuring a comprehensive response (BE-E12; BE-E14). Efforts to combat
human trafficking should not only transcend law enforcement bounds,
but also national borders where needed (BE-E3; BE-E9). International
cooperation is pivotal in connection with preventing displacement effects
(Aronowitz, 2001) and confiscating criminal assets abroad (Kruisbergen et
al., 2016; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). One should, however, bear in mind
that, even though depriving a trafficking ring from its criminal proceedings
can have a disrupting or disheartening effect, the low monetary threshold
associated with starting a human trafficking operation implies that taking
away financial resources does not necessarily serve the purpose of taking
out these criminal organisations indefinitely.
The issue of trafficking in persons is in fact a composite of multifarious
networks and manners of operating. Turning the tables on human
traffickers, therefore, requires a tailored response (Efrat, 2016). Knowing
when to wield the scalpel and when the elephant gun lies at the very
heart of posing multifaceted solutions to an equally diversified problem
(Shelley, 2010). Accordingly, the response to human trafficking should
cover more of a nuanced approach than mere criminal prosecution
(Davies, 2017; Efrat, 2016). In this context, a convenient point of entry is
the interlacing between upper- and underworld. By means of dislodging
criminal infiltration of the licit economy, financial investigations present
opportunities for disrupting criminal organisations beyond asset recovery
(Brown, 2013; Roudaut, 2011).
154 Financing oF organised crime: human traFFicking in Focus
Head of Central Human
Trafficking Unit
Belgian Federal Police
Head of Human Trafficking
Directorate
Inspectorate of the National Social Security
Office, Belgium
Strategic Analyst Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit
(CTIF-CFI)
Head of Human Trafficking Unit Inspectorate of the National Social Security
Office, Belgium
Policy Analyst Federal Migration Centre Myria, Belgium
Head of Prostitution Unit Belgian Local Police
Legal Expert Specialized Reception Centre for Victims
of Human Trafficking, Belgium
Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
Public Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
Head of Human Trafficking Unit Belgian Federal Police
Public Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
Head of Asset Investigation
and Recovery Unit
Belgian Federal Police
Strategic Analyst Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit
(CTIF-CFI)
Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
Criminal Entrepreneur Souteneur
Criminal Entrepreneur Employer
Criminal Entrepreneur Souteneur
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