Arising of Trade Disputes among the G20: Evaluation of US-China Trade Relations in the Context of World Trading System

Abstract

Trade policy among the G20 has emerged as one of the challenges the group faces during the last decade after the 2008 global financial crisis. This paper aims at analyzing the current trade disputes between China and the United States and the efforts the G20 has taken to settle these disputes. The fundamental questions this study attempts to answer are as follows: (1) what the US–China trade dispute means for the world trading system? (2) what the G20 can do to prevent destructive trade wars? We confront this view by critically examining a large body of evidence on the effects of trade policy on economically important outcomes. We begin with a discussion of the role of G20 in stabilizing world economy. We show the G20’s recent economic and trade development challenges and measurements of trade policy and identification of its causal effects. We present the trade balance between the United States and China. We also illustrate the efforts made by the G20 in promoting the development of China–US trade cooperation. Data were collected from different sources. Data are collected from the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) publications, and the G20 summits’ reports. The results show that the United States has a trade deficit with China, and the global growth would be notably curtailed as investment and consumer spending fall back. The G20 should focus on supporting the WTO, being upfront about the mixed effects of trade and investment, and improving G20 measures to tackle protectionism.

Full text

Yagoub Elrya
Arising of Trade Disputes among the
G20: Evaluation of US-China Trade
Relations in the Context of World
Trading System
HATASO, USA
E-ISSN: 2469-4339
Management and Economics Research Journal, Vol. 5, Iss./Yr. 2019, Pgs. 11
Review

Management and Economics Research Journal 1
Vol. 5, Iss./Yr. 2019, Pgs. 11 https://doi.org/10.18639/MERJ.2019.665796
Arising of Trade Disputes among the G20: Evaluation of US-China Trade
Relations in the Context of World Trading System
Yagoub Elryah*
Industrial Economies Research Institute, Industrial Research and
Consultancy Center (IRCC), Khartoum, Sudan.
*Correspondence: yagelryah@gmail.com
Received: Aug 1, 2018; Accepted: Jan 9, 2019
Copyright: Yagoub Elryah. This is an open-access article published under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
This permits anyone to copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the work provided the original work and source is appropriately cited.
Citation: Elryah Y. 2019. Arising of trade disputes among the G20: Evaluation of US-China trade relations in the context of world trading
system. Management and Economics Research Journal, Vol. 5, Article ID 665796, 11 pages. https://doi.org/10.18639/MERJ.2019.665796
Abstract
Trade policy among the G20 has emerged as one of the challenges the group faces during the last decade after the 2008
global financial crisis. This paper aims at analyzing the current trade disputes between China and the United States and
the efforts the G20 has taken to settle these disputes. The fundamental questions this study attempts to answer are as
follows: (1) what the US–China trade dispute means for the world trading system? (2) what the G20 can do to prevent
destructive trade wars? We confront this view by critically examining a large body of evidence on the effects of trade
policy on economically important outcomes. We begin with a discussion of the role of G20 in stabilizing world economy.
We show the G20’s recent economic and trade development challenges and measurements of trade policy and iden-
tification of its causal effects. We present the trade balance between the United States and China. We also illustrate
the efforts made by the G20 in promoting the development of China–US trade cooperation. Data were collected from
different sources. Data are collected from the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) publications, and the G20
summits’ reports. The results show that the United States has a trade deficit with China, and the global growth would be
notably curtailed as investment and consumer spending fall back. The G20 should focus on supporting the WTO, being
upfront about the mixed effects of trade and investment, and improving G20 measures to tackle protectionism.
Keywords: Trade policy; Retaliation; Trade escalation; Trade war; WTO.
1. INTRODUCTION
The study of trade policy is a matter of current interest for policy makers, regulators, and researchers; there-
fore, research on trade restriction among nations requires greater rigor and greater depth. On the basis of
recent studies, this paper evaluates the trade disputes between China and the United States and analyses
the trade policies adapted by the United States on some Chinese exports. The US goods trade decit with
China was $375.2 billion in 2017, an 8.1% increase ($28.2 billion) over 2016 (Ofce of the United States Trade
Representative, 2018). However, US exports of services to China were an estimated $56.0 billion in 2017
and US imports were $17.6 billion. Sales of services in China by majority US-owned afliates were $55.2
billion in 2015, while sales of services in the United States by majority China-owned rms were $5.7 billion.
US foreign direct investment (FDI) in China (stock) was $92.5 billion in 2016, a 9.4% increase from 2015.
US direct investment in China is led by manufacturing, wholesale trade, and nonbank holding companies
(Handley and Limao, 2015). For these reasons, trade policy change is a major focus for the US new admin-
istration in imposing antidumping (CD) and countervailing duties (CVDs) against Chinese imports. I rst
present the US trade measures implications to China and the rest of the world. I then consider what role
G20 can play to settle trade disputes between the United States and China, which would be an experience
for future challenges.

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Recently, the topic of trade balance has attracted considerable attention. Which wetness a shift in the
focus of international trade research from liberalization the trade-to-trade protection and balance trade.
Implicit in this development is the widespread view that trade policy no longer matters. The central scenario
that we are primarily concerned about is restrictive measures taken by the United States against China
that instigate a trade war. The United States has imposed tariffs on the import of solar cells and washing
machines, and has multiple ongoing investigations into dumping and theft of intellectual property by China.
There is a danger that these trade disputes will escalate into a full-blown trade war if China were to retaliate
disproportionately. So far China has been more measured, launching, for example, an investigation into US
sorghum imports.
In this paper, we aim to make several contributions. First, whereas previous research has focused on
the role of the United States in taking the lead in pressing for new free-trade agreements and shaping the
multilateral trade rules, we argue that researchers and policymakers should also consider what the G20 can
do to prevent destructive trade wars. Second, we investigate what the US–China trade dispute means for
the world trading system. Previous research has focused on the withdrawal of the United States from the
Trans-Pacic Partnership (e.g., Helble, 2017; Sacerdoti, 2015; and Ezeani, 2011). However, we argue that these
studies are narrowly focused and limited; research on evaluation and the trade agreement should consider
whether the United States would renegotiate or withdraw from existing arrangements, including the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and to impose new
tariffs on imports, particularly from China and Mexico.
Against this background, the questions that this study attempts to answer are follows: (1) what the
US–China trade dispute means for the world trading system? (2) what the G20 can do to prevent destructive
trade wars? This study is organized into ve sections to provide a comprehensive picture of trade disputes
between China and the United States. The following section discusses the recent economic and trade devel-
opment among the G20. Section 2 presents an overview of China–US trade relations and the benets they
received. The section illustrates the trade remedies and protection taken by the United States against China.
Section 3 discusses the trade war between the United States and China, and the US trade decit with China.
Section 4 illustrates the efforts made by the G20 in promoting strategy for global trade growth. Section 5
presents the conclusion and some policy recommendations. This section has focused on the background
of the study. The next part will discuss the recent economic and trade development among G20 countries.
2. G20’S RECENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Trade among G20
In a globalized world, stable trade relations and cross-border investment are of fundamental importance.
Trade has accordingly been a constant item on the G20 agenda since the rst summit took place in Wash-
ington in 2008. According to the data published by the WTO, 77.5% of all goods and services exported world-
wide in 2015 came from a G20 member and 76.5% of all goods and services imported were destined for
the G20. In 2015, the largest trading nations were China and the United States. The United States imported
merchandise and commercial services worth 2806 billion US$—representing a 13% of the global import
market. China followed with imports of 2148 billion US$ and a 10% share of the worldwide market. As far as
exports of goods and services are concerned, China was the country with the highest trade volume amount-
ing to 2560 billion US$, followed by the United States with a total of 2213 billion US$. China’s share of global
exports totaled 12%, and the US share was 10% (the US Department of Commerce, 2018).
In 2015, the volume of goods and services exported to non-EU countries by the EU Member States
amounted to 2900 billion US$, according to WTO gures. The imports into the EU totaled 2646 billion US$.
In 2015, Germany ranked third in terms of imports (1342 billion US$) and exports (1579 billion US$) followed
by the United Kingdom in the fourth place (Mistral, 2011; Ezeani, 2011).
However, if the 28 EU states are considered as a single trading partner and intra-EU trade ows are
discounted, the European Union’s trade exceeds that of China or the United States in terms of both imports
and exports.
Foreign trade is of particular economic relevance in Germany and the Republic of Korea. In these coun-
tries, total exports and imports that are expressed as a proportion of gross domestic product—also known

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Figure 1. Exports of Goods and Services, 2015 (in Billion US$).
Sources: World Trade Organization (WTO), 2018; and the Federal Statistical Office, G20 in Figures, 2017.
Figure 2. Imports of Goods and Services, 2015 (in Billion US$).
Sources: World Trade Organization (WTO), 2018; and the Federal Statistical Office, G20 in Figures, 2017.

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as the trade ratio—amounted to more than 80%. In the United States, the domestic market is of considerably
more economic importance. The foreign trade ratio here amounted to 28%. Foreign trade also played a far
less signicant role for the South American G20 economies: Brazil (26%) and Argentina (23%).
2.2. Trade Balance among G20
An economy’s trade balance represents the difference between exports and imports of goods and services.
The trade balance ratio expresses this balance in relation to an economy’s gross domestic product. If the
ratio is positive, this shows what proportion of a country’s gross domestic product is used neither for con-
sumer expenditure nor for investment within the domestic economy.
In 2015, the Russian Federation (8.2%), Germany (7.0%), the Republic of Korea (5.4%), China (3.7%),
and Italy (2.5%) registered a positive ratio. A negative ratio shows the percentage by which domestic con-
sumer expenditure and investment exceed domestic production. According to WTO data, the biggest trade
Figure 3. Worldwide Exports and Imports, 2015.
Sources: World Trade Organization (WTO), 2018; and the Federal Statistical Office, G20 in Figures, 2017.
Figure 4. Trade Balance: Goods and Services, 2015 (Exports Minus Imports as % of GDP).
Sources: World Trade Organization (WTO), 2018; and International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2018.

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balance decits among the G20 states were recorded by South Africa (−7.5%), Saudi Arabia (−7.2%), and
Turkey (−4.6%) in 2015. Thus far, this paper gas argued that the G20 should take different approach to trade
restriction. It is clear from the above that the current trade measures are inefcient and places a burden on
some member states. Let us now turn to discuss the trade relations between China and the United States.
3. AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA–US TRADE RELATIONS
China–US economic and trade relations are the bilateral ties between the largest developing country and the
largest developed country. China and the United States have different national conditions, and are at differ-
ent stages of development, market economy, and market maturity. They both have sensitive economic elds
and their own focuses of concern in economy and trade. Factors such as national conditions and stages of
development determine the status, division of labor, openness, and developing paths of the two countries
in globalization.
A correct view on their differences is important for accurately grasping the historical trend and promot-
ing the balanced development of the bilateral economic and trade relations. The US–China trade tensions
shifting with the new administration is likely to grow suggestive of responsiveness to public opinion.
The evidence, however, is only suggestive, as there may have been other reasons for change. For
example, US bilateral and global trade decits are likely to provoke protectionist response in run-up to US
midterm election in 2018. US merchandise trade decit with China accounts for almost half of the global
US decit and 58% of manufactures decit; US trade decit with China is entirely in manufactured goods.
Table 1 shows that the US trade decits with China represent the highest across the world, this has
encouraged the new administration of the United States to impose trade restrictions against imports from
China via AD/CVD, safeguards, and section 301; in addition, enforcement of US sanctions against North
Korea could hit Chinese rms. Figure 6 illustrates the share of US imports covered by barriers imposed
under US trade laws over the period from 1995 to 2016. It can be noted that at the end of 2016, the United
States had 292 AD and 82 CVD orders in place on imports. China is the major target of these trade laws: 102
AD and 27 CVD orders.
The gure also shows an estimated $44.3 billion, or 9.2% of Chinese imports, were covered by US trade
laws (AD, CVD, safeguards) in 2016. It also shows an estimated $5.8 billion, or 4.2% of US exports to China,
were covered by barriers imposed by China in 2016.
Source: USITC.
Figure 5. US Exports and Imports from China, 2013-2017.

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Table 1. US Trade Decits with Pacic Basin Economies, 2016, Billion US$.
US merchandise All manufacturing
World total −737 −637
China −347 −369
NAFTA −74 −46
Japan −69 −84
Korea −28 −34
Source: The United States Census Bureau (2018) US International Trade in Goods
and Services Annual Revision for 2016.
Source: Chad Bown, 2017. Steel, Aluminum, Lumber, Solar: Trump’s
Stealth Trade Protection.
Figure 6. Share of US Imports Covered by Barriers Imposed
under US Trade Laws, 1995-2016.
Source: Chad Bown, 2017. Steel, Aluminum, Lumber, Solar: Trump’s Stealth
Trade Protection.
Figure 7. US Imports from China and the Share Covered by US
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, 1995-2016.

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Figure 7 shows that the use of import restrictions against China spiked after China joined the WTO in
2001. The United States imposed CVDs of 6.3% of imports from China in 2016. This percentage expected to
increase as US started imposing further antidumping against China’s imports.
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the steelmaking capacity of China, the United States, and the world. For
instance, Figure 8 shows that Chinese crude steel capacity almost tripled over the past decade. China as
a share of the global steelmaking capacity increased from 34.5% in 2006 to 49.0% in 2016. Figure 9 dem-
onstrates the major exporting markets for Chinese steel products. ASEAN and Middle Eastern countries
accounted for 49% of total Chinese steel exports in 2016. Only 1% of Chinese steel exports went to the
United States due to existing AD/CVD measures.
3.1. Trade War between the United States and China
The new administration of the United States has been signing a high-prole trade protectionism action con-
sidering the imposition of tariffs on the importation of Chinese goods and restrict investment in domestic
companies in industries or technologies “deemed important” to the United States. Importantly, this memo-
randum does not implement tariffs, but rather directs the Ofce of the United States Trade Representative
(the Trade Representative) to consider whether any action should be adopted, including the increasing of
tariffs on goods from China. Furthermore, the memorandum also instigates a dispute settlement process
with China under the WTO, providing both parties time (in this case, 60 days) to seek a negotiated settle-
ment. Chinese government immediately responded to this proposal by announcing that should the poten-
tial escalation in trade restrictions by the United States materialize, China would impose a 15% tariff on 120
US products, including fresh fruit, dried fruit, nuts, wine, ginseng, and steel pipes worth just under $US1
billion in annual trade. Furthermore, China would impose a 25% tariff on eight products, including pork and
recycled aluminum, which would impact about $US2 billion in trade, and it would also remove existing tariff
concessions on US steel and aluminum.
The imposition of these tariffs has been justied on the grounds that steel and aluminum were being
imported into the United States in volumes that threatened to impair the national security. The introduction
of these tariffs has been viewed as “unjust” by countries that will be directly impacted by these measures,
with media reports highlighting “tit-for-tat” retaliatory proposals, including those already proposed by the
Chinese government and additional ones being considered by the European Union, being the imposition of
tariffs on US goods entering the EU including cranberries, orange juice, peanut butter, Kentucky bourbon,
Harley-Davidson motorcycles, and Levi’s jeans.
According toBrown (2017), the percentage of US imports subject to special tariffs may increase from
3.8% to 7.4% because of US trade cases against items such as aluminum imports, Canadian aircraft, and
Chinese solar cells. This rising protectionist sentiment from the United States will likely negatively affect
China’s economy. We argue that despite China’s calls to increase domestic consumption, the exports increased
a signicant proportion and account for about 20% of China’s GDP. However, according to the US Department
Figure 9. Chinese Steel Exports to Major
Economies in Quantities, 2016.
Figure 8. Steelmaking Capacity, 2006-2016,
Million Tons.
Source: USITC.

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of Commerce (2018), the Chinese steel and aluminum imports have been damaging the US national security.
As a result, the United States imposes additional special tariffs on these goods and it conducted an antidump-
ing probe against Chinese and Indian steel anges in response to investigations led by corporate interests.
China initiated a WTO dispute procedure against the US 301 tariff investigation, calling it a gross viola-
tion of the WTO’s fundamental principles. The United States argues that it cites that there is an exception that
threatens the “National security.” However, this exception is a justication for its tariffs on Chinese imports,
as well as its own section 232of the Trade Expansion Act on national security.
3.2. The Impact of Trade on Jobs, Wages, and Inequality
Researchers and policymakers have considered several methods for addressing the measures taken by the
United States. For instance, the manufacturing employment in the Rust Belt and elsewhere in the United
States has been decimated by the rise of China as an industrial power and export-driven economy (Crowley
et al., 2016). It often argues that the “bad” trade deals by previous administration have been killing manu-
facturing jobs at the United States and depressing the wages of American workers (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson,
2016). It also believed that the rise of China in the global economy since its accession to the WTO in 2001 has
been contributed to job losses in the United States. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016) found that the growth in
imports from China between 1999 and 2011 costs the United States up to 2.4 million jobs. About 985,000 of
those lost jobs were in manufacturing, accounting for some 17% of the 5.8 million manufacturing jobs lost
during that period.
Figure 10 illustrates the jobs lost in the United States. It can be noted that from late 1990s to 2010, the
United States lost nearly 20 million jobs. However, the US trade with other parts of the world has not been
as disruptive. For all the criticism ofNAFTA, Pierce and Schott (2016) assessthe impact ofNAFTA agree-
ment on American workers as modest. They found that the trade ows with Mexico were smaller and more
balanced than those with China. American manufacturing employment remained fairly stable in the years
after NAFTA came into force in 1994, which plummeted only afterChina entered the WTOin 2001 and gained
consistent access to markets in the United States.
The WTO insists that it is not an international court, with its focus on settling disputes through negotia-
tions. It can impose trade sanctions on countries that ignore its rulings, but it provides little detail on how
such sanctions can be applied.
4. G20 TRADE POLICY AND WTO
G20 has agreed to promote trade agreements to foster freer trade ows, encourage investments, promote
economic integration, address intellectual property, e-commerce, and government procurement, and create
stronger ties with trading partners.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 10. Total US Manufacturing Jobs, 2017.

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Having explained why G20 adopted trade restrictions, we need to explain how G20 supports the WTO.
Reforms in the world trading system have played a signicant role at the G20 summits, where the group
declared their commitments to strengthen the multilateral trading system, or commitments that bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral trade agreements should be complementary and in conformity with the rules of
the WTO. We argue that the G20 should assume a more proactive role with regard to the future of the WTO
and the reform of the world trading system. Such a reform is needed in light of the growing fragmentation
of the system. At the same time, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations calls
for sustainability to be the core principle of global cooperation, including the context of international trade.
Among other things, the 2030 Agenda calls for “a universal, rules-based, open, nondiscriminatory and equi-
table multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization.” Bridging the gap between the realities
of the international trading system and the aspirations of the 2030 Agenda is a formidable challenge that
cannot be tackled effectively either in the context of the WTO or the UN and the 2030 Agenda alone. The G20
is a suitable forum to bridge that gap.
4.1. G20 Measures and Protectionism
Over the past decades, the G20 policy has shifted from trade liberalization to trade restrictions. The WTO
reported that, during the past three years, G20 countries applied 85 new trade-restrictive measures (e.g.,
a tariff); on average, almost 16 new measures were adopted during the review period, which is from May
2017 to October 2017 (WTO, 2017). The new measures include increased tariffs, export restrictions, and
local content measures. Besides this, 28 measures were adopted with the aim to facilitate trade, elimi-
nate or reduce tariffs, and simplify customs procedures. The estimated trade coverage of import-facilitating
measures implemented by G20 economies (US$27 billion) is slightly lower than the estimated trade cov-
erage of import-restrictive measures ($32 billion). This is a reversal from the previous report where the
estimated trade coverage of import-facilitating measures was more than three times larger than that of
import-restrictive measures. The report also noted that some G20 countries have been eliminating trade
restrictions, while others caught up in a strong isolationist mood.
Trade protectionism approach is a serious issue in the G20 summits. Handley et al. (2018), Limao
(2015), and Bergsten (2012) argue that the United States imposed antidumping and countervailing tariffs
on imported steel and aluminum and threatened to impose broad tariffs against Chinese imports. These
unilateral protectionist measures have sparked widespread criticism and provoked threats of retaliation
from major trading partners, raising the prospect of escalating global trade conicts that threaten global
recovery, and it may encourage other countries to adopt trade measures.
G20 members play a fundamental role in advancing reform of the multilateral trade architecture. For
instance, China has worked hard to raise the prole of the G20’s trade agenda. The Chinese G20 Presidency
has encouraged a regular G20 Trade Ministers Meeting and established a Trade and Investment Working
Group (TIWG). As a result, the G20 trade ministers issued a joint statement and three annexes detailing the
terms of Reference of the TIWG, a general strategy on global trade growth, and guiding principles for global
investment policymaking (Sacerdoti, 2015).
Trade can play a central role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) relationship
between trade and development. As a result, the G20 members recognize the importance of initiatives
aimed at broadening the participation of low-income countries in regional trade agreements, supporting
sound agricultural policies and advancing and sharpening the Aid-for-Trade initiative.
On one hand, trade nancing gaps are highest among the poorest countries (Africa, Asia and Small
Island developing states). Therefore, the G20 members call for WTO and World Bank and trade nance facil-
ity programs of multilateral and regional developments to enhance trade nance. On the other hand, the
G20 members recognize that e-commerce constitutes an important tool to boost the participation of Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in global trade. It encourages dialogue among governments and busi-
nesses to identify the opportunities and challenges in developing e-commerce.
5. CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this paper is to lay out a research agenda on the current trade disputes between
China and the United States and what efforts G20 have taken to settle these disputes? It has attempted to

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investigate the key factors that contribute to the policies that are most powerful in tackling the protection-
ism, trade war, and retaliation. To accomplish this, I started this paper by posing questions: what the G20
can do to prevent destructive trade wars? And what the US–China trade dispute means for the world trading
system? Major ndings of this paper is that any ramp-up in protectionism would certainly have repercus-
sions beyond China. Prices and availability for the United States and Chinese products in the supply chains
of companies from other nations would be badly affected. Consequently, global growth would be notably
curtailed as investment and consumer spending fall back. These ndings have important implications for the
effects of protectionism, retaliation, and trade war on establishing the world economy and saving the world
trading system, suggesting that free trade system will tend to have benets for all countries.
Based on the earlier ndings, we suggest a further reform to trade and investment policy. The G20
should focus on supporting the WTO, being upfront about the mixed effects of trade and investment, and
improving G20 measures to tackle protectionism. Given these ndings, some policy recommendations that
emerge are as follows:
• Lowering protectionist barriers to trade in goods, while allowing “special and differentiated treat-
ment” to least developed countries;
• Strengthen an Open and Inclusive Trading System—The G20 should conrm its unconditional com-
mitment to open and inclusive trade that is underpinned by transparency and robust adjustment
assistance programs, resistance to protectionism in all forms, and a strong, nondiscriminatory
rules-based global trading system;
• Need to link trade to agenda that addresses interests of developing economies in upgrading (also
includes facilitation of structural adjustment in industrialized world);
• Eliminating unilaterally imposed environmental rules that are trade-restrictive or create barriers to
trade;
• Undermining regional integration (integration among neighboring countries) by over-emphasizing
the value of integrating with the world.
Nevertheless, such issues are important factors inuencing the impact of protectionism and trade war.
This special issue throws some light on this, but it also serves to highlight the need for further research on
this issue.
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