Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations

Abstract

Humor fundamentally trivializes its topic and invites people to think about it playfully and non-seriously. Intergroup humor, humor that disparages a social group or its representatives thus disguises expressions of prejudice in a cloak of fun and frivolity, affording it the appearance of social acceptability. As a result, disparagement humor
represents a pervasive mechanism for communicating prejudice particularly since society has become increasingly sensitive to expressions of prejudice and other forms of offensive speech. Indeed, disparagement humor is perhaps more readily available to us now in the
digital age than ever before. Because of its disguise of social acceptability, disparagement humor serves uniqueparadoxical functions in intergroup settings. It can function as a social “lubricant” and as a social “abrasive.” Disparagement humor directed at social out-groups functions as a social abrasive by threatening the social identity of members of the targeted group, by transmitting negative stereotypes and prejudice, by intensifying prejudice in the service of social dominance motives, and by fostering the release of prejudice against targeted
out-groups. It simultaneously serves as a social lubricant for members of the in-group (the non-disparaged group) by enhancing personal and social identities. Finally, it can be co-opted by members of oppressed groups to serve social lubricant functions, including the subversion of prejudice, provided audiences understand and appreciate the subversive intent.

Full text

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 1 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
Subject: Intergroup Communication Online Publication Date: Sep 2017
DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.013.431
Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Thomas E. Ford, Christopher J. Breeden, Emma C. O'Connor, and Noely C.
Banos

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication
Summary and Keywords
Humor fundamentally trivializes its topic and invites people to think about it playfully and
non-seriously. Intergroup humor, humor that disparages a social group or its
representatives thus disguises expressions of prejudice in a cloak of fun and frivolity,
affording it the appearance of social acceptability. As a result, disparagement humor
represents a pervasive mechanism for communicating prejudice particularly since society
has become increasingly sensitive to expressions of prejudice and other forms of offensive
speech. Indeed, disparagement humor is perhaps more readily available to us now in the
digital age than ever before.
Because of its disguise of social acceptability, disparagement humor serves unique
paradoxical functions in intergroup settings. It can function as a social “lubricant” and as
a social “abrasive.” Disparagement humor directed at social out-groups functions as a
social abrasive by threatening the social identity of members of the targeted group, by
transmitting negative stereotypes and prejudice, by intensifying prejudice in the service
of social dominance motives, and by fostering the release of prejudice against targeted
out-groups. It simultaneously serves as a social lubricant for members of the in-group
(the non-disparaged group) by enhancing personal and social identities. Finally, it can be
co-opted by members of oppressed groups to serve social lubricant functions, including
the subversion of prejudice, provided audiences understand and appreciate the
subversive intent.
Keywords: disparagement humor, prejudice, intergroup relations, social identity, identity threat, self-
enhancement, prejudiced norm theory, subversive humor, social dominance, social psychology, intergroup
communication, jokes
Introduction
Intergroup humor, humor that disparages a social group or its representatives, is
pervasive and readily available to us, perhaps more now in the digital age, than ever
before. Indeed, recent Google searches yielded 4,240,000 hits for “racist jokes,”

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 2 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
2,080,000 hits for “anti-gay jokes,” 5,380,000 hits for “Jewish jokes,” and a mind-boggling
10,400,000 hits for “sexist jokes.” There appear to be literally millions of jokes and other
forms of comedy available at our fingertips that disparage or malign social groups or
individual representatives of social groups.
Martineau (1972) noted that such disparagement humor could shape intergroup relations
in both positive and negative ways. He suggested that it could function either as a
“lubricant” or as an “abrasive” for social relationships. Disparagement humor directed at
social out-groups functions as a social lubricant for members of the in-group by serving
self-enhancement motives and by increasing solidarity or in-group cohesion. It
simultaneously serves as a social abrasive for intergroup relations by fostering a “hostile
disposition” toward the disparaged out-group (Martineau, 1972, p. 119). Lyman (1987),
for instance, reported that fraternity men used sexist and racist humor to reaffirm bonds
of friendship and to foster a hostile disposition toward the development of romantic bonds
with women. Also, Martineau (1972) noted that disparagement in the form of gallows
humor serves both lubricating and abrasive functions. For instance, Obrdlik (1942)
reported that Czechs, under Nazi occupation during World War II, used humorous
disparagement of Germans to simultaneously maintain in-group cohesion and build
resistance against the Nazis.
Disparagement humor can also have lubricating and abrasive social consequences for
members of a social group targeted by the humor. As a social lubricant, disparagement
humor might increase solidarity or cohesion among in-group members as they rally
together against a common antagonist. Indeed, Martineau suggested that minority
groups in the United States have bonded and rallied together in response to
disparagement humor perpetrated by members of the dominant group. On the other
hand, disparagement humor could also have detrimental (abrasive) consequences when
experienced in intergroup settings, fostering demoralization and a sense of diminishment.
Hearing sexist jokes, for instance, could have adverse emotional effects on women,
making them feel disgusted, angry, and humiliated (LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1998). In
addition, sexist humor could negatively affect how women perceive themselves,
threatening their social identity and triggering a state of self-objectification, wherein
women feel diminished and reduced to objects (Ford, Woodzicka, Petit, Richardson, &
Lappi, 2015).
This chapter reviews contemporary theory and empirical research on the social functions
of disparagement humor for intergroup relations. The discussion is organized into two
major sections. In the first major section, theories of amusement with disparagement
humor are reviewed, delineating how disparagement humor can function as a social
lubricant by serving self-enhancement motives. Abrasive consequences of disparagement
humor are also considered, as a source of identity threat for people who belong to
targeted groups. The second major section explores the complex relationship between
disparagement humor and prejudice against the targeted group. This section addresses
the abrasive functions of disparagement humor as an initiator of prejudice and also as a

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 3 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
releaser of prejudice. Finally, the potential lubricating function of disparagement humor
for subverting prejudice is discussed.
Disparagement Humor: Self-Enhancement and
Identity Threat
Disparagement Humor and Self-Enhancement
The earliest considerations of amusement with disparagement humor were guided by
superiority theory, a meta-theory or broad theoretical framework that incorporates more
specific theories. The origins of superiority theory date back to writings of the ancient
Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, who argued that people find humor in the
failings, infirmities, and weaknesses of others, and that laughter is an expression of
derision directed at the less fortunate (Halliwell, 1998). However, it was English
philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, who provided the central proposition upon which
contemporary superiority theories are based. Hobbes (1651) proposed that people are
amused by and laugh at the disparagement of others because it makes them suddenly feel
superior or triumphant by comparison (see Hobbes & Tuck, 1996). Gruner (1997)
elaborated on Hobbes’ proposition stating that:
When we find humor in something, we laugh at the misfortune, stupidity,
clumsiness, moral, or cultural defect, suddenly revealed in someone else, to whom
we instantly and momentarily feel ‘‘superior’’ since we are not, at that moment,
unfortunate, stupid, clumsy, morally, or culturally defective, and so on. To feel
superior in this way is ‘‘to feel good’’; it is to ‘‘get what you want.’’ It is to win!
(Gruner, 1997, p. 6)
Essentially, superiority theories are founded on the idea that people are amused by
disparagement humor because it enhances their own self-esteem through a “downward
social comparison” (Wills, 1981).
The two most influential superiority theories are La Fave’s vicarious superiority theory
(La Fave, 1972; La Fave, Haddad, & Maesen, 1996) and Zillmann and Cantor’s (1996)
disposition theory. Like Hobbes and Tuck’s (1996) original conceptualization, both
theories propose that amusement with out-group disparagement humor is mediated by
self-esteem enhancement resulting from social comparison. Further, each theory has
expanded upon and refined Hobbes’ initial theory in unique ways.
La Fave and colleagues introduced the concept of identification class (IC) to explain
amusement with disparagement humor (e.g., La Fave, 1972; La Fave et al., 1996). An IC is
defined in terms of affiliation (group membership) and attitude toward a class or category
of persons. La Fave et al. (1996) defined a positive IC as one for which the person
believes he or she is a member or has a positive attitude—the person identifies with a

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 4 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
positive IC. A negative IC is one for which the person does not believe he or she is a
member or has a negative attitude—the person does not identify with a negative IC.
La Fave’s model proposes that one experiences self-esteem enhancement vicariously,
through humor that disparages a negative IC and/or esteems a positive IC. Therefore,
such humor should amuse people more than humor that esteems a negative IC or
disparages a positive IC. A number of empirical studies have supported this general
hypothesis. La Fave (1972) for instance, found that Christians were more amused by jokes
that esteemed Christian groups (a positive IC) and disparaged agnostics (a negative IC)
than by jokes that disparaged Christian groups and esteemed agnostics.
In contrast to vicarious superiority theory, Zillmann and Cantor’s (1996) disposition
theory de-emphasizes the role of membership in an esteemed or disparaged group, and
explains amusement with disparagement humor based only on attitudes toward the
disparaged target. Zillmann and Cantor (1996) proposed that “humor appreciation varies
inversely with the favorableness of the disposition toward the agent or entity being
disparaged” (pp. 100–101). A considerable amount of research has supported this
hypothesis (e.g., Cantor & Zillmann, 1973; La Fave, McCarthy, & Haddad, 1973; McGhee
& Duffey, 1983; Wicker, Barron, & Willis, 1980). In the context of sexist humor, for
instance, there is substantial evidence suggesting that, regardless of sex, people enjoy
sexist humor insofar as they have negative (sexist) attitudes toward women (e.g., Ford,
2000; Greenwood & Isbell, 2002; LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1998; Thomas & Esses, 2004).
Although the prominence of disposition theory may have eclipsed that of vicarious
superiority theory, a simultaneous test of these theories revealed their mutual importance
in predicting amusement with disparagement humor. Gallois and Callan (1985) found that
attitudes toward the generic social categories of the source and target of disparagement
humor, as well as attitudes toward the specific source and target, are important for
predicting amusement. Thus, it seems the concept of identification class does contribute
to amusement beyond attitudes toward the specific source and target of disparagement
humor.
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) extends superiority theories by explaining
the self-enhancement resulting from disparagement humor in terms of one’s social group
membership and by more fully delineating the psychological mechanisms by which
disparagement humor enhances in-group cohesion (Abrams, Bippus, & McGaughey, 2015;
Ferguson & Ford, 2008; Thomae & Pina, 2015). Social identity refers to the part of an
individual’s self-concept that is based on social group membership (Tajfel & Turner,
1986). One’s social identity becomes salient in intergroup settings where people
categorize themselves and others according to salient social group memberships. A
central tenet of social identity theory is that, in intergroup settings, people are motivated
to achieve or maintain a positive social identity—that is, to feel pride in belonging to the
in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Consequently, people try to distinguish their in-group as
superior to relevant out-groups. Disparagement humor provides such a positive
distinction. Indeed, Bourhis, Gadfield, Giles, and Tajfel (1977) proposed that, “anti-out-

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 5 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
group humour can, through out-group devaluation and denigration, be a creative and
potent way of asserting in-group pride and distinctiveness from a dominant out-group” (p.
261).
Disparagement humor, then, is amusing because it enhances social identity or in-group
pride (e.g., Abrams et al., 2015; Bourhis et al., 1977; Ferguson & Ford, 2008; Thomae &
Pina, 2015) and thus functions as a social lubricant enhancing in-group cohesion (Lyman,
1987). Consistent with this hypothesis, people initiate disparagement humor when they
experience a threat to their social identity, that is, when they perceive that their in-group
is at risk of being judged as inferior to a relevant out-group (Angelone, Hirschman,
Suniga, Armey, & Armelie, 2005; Hunt & Gonsalkorale, 2014; Siebler, Saskia, & Bohner,
2008). Hunt and Gonsalkorale (2014), for instance, found that men were more likely to
send sexist jokes to a female confederate in a computer-simulated interaction following a
threat to their gender identity.
In summary, superiority theories and social identity theory explain amusement with
disparagement humor through self-enhancement motives, although differentially
emphasizing the enhancement of personal versus social identity. Superiority theories
emphasize enhancement of one’s personal identity; social identity theory emphasizes
enhancement of one’s social identity. Finally, by conceptualizing self-enhancement in
terms of one’s relation to his or her social group, social identity theory more directly
accounts for how disparagement humor functions as a social lubricant for members of the
(non-disparaged) in-group, enhancing in-group cohesion.
Disparagement Humor and Identity Threat
As described, disparagement humor can function to boost either personal or social
identity for people whose groups are not targeted by the humor. It can have the opposite
effect, however, on people who belong to targeted groups. Disparagement humor
targeting one’s in-group negatively distinguishes the in-group from relevant out-groups
and thus threatens one’s social identity. Accordingly, empirical research has
demonstrated that sexist humor can create social identity threat for women in the form of
self-objectification (Ford et al., 2015).
Objectification theory proposes that Western societies sexually objectify women through
media images and other cultural portrayals of feminine beauty (Fredrickson & Roberts,
1997). Exposure to such messages encourages women to self-objectify, to view
themselves as mere objects meant for judgment based on physical appearance
(Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) proposed that women
could experience self-objectification as a stable personality trait or as an emotional state.
Trait self-objectification refers to the extent to which individuals chronically view
themselves as objects from a third-person perspective across situations. In contrast, state
self-objectification refers to a temporary response to contextual cues (Calogero & Pina,
2011; Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 1998).

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 6 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
Importantly, it appears that sexist humor can trigger state self-objectification. Ford et al.
(2015) found that women (but not men) reported greater state self-objectification and
engaged in more self-monitoring of their appearance following exposure to sexist comedy
clips than neutral comedy clips. Women viewed themselves as objects through the
demeaning and trivializing lens of the sexist humor. Sexist humor functioned as a social
abrasive, communicating to women that they are devalued for being women.
Breeden and Ford (2017) further addressed whether identity threat triggered by sexist
humor is experienced intrinsically—as a threat to one’s stable definition of self, or
contextually—as a threat to one’s definition of self in the context of a specific relationship
or setting (Brown, 1998). Following Brown’s (1998) procedures, female participants
imagined they had enrolled in a college course. Then they watched a video in which a
male teaching assistant (TA) either did or did not make humorous sexist remarks as he
described his teaching style. Finally, participants believed they were assigned to the TA
depicted in the video or to a different one. Breeden and Ford found that participants
perceived themselves more negatively (e.g., less qualified, less competent, less confident)
when the TA told sexist versus neutral jokes, but only when they believed they were
assigned to the TA who told the sexist jokes. It appears that sexist humor did not threaten
women’s self-concepts in general; it only threatened their self-concepts in the context of
the specific relationship in which they were diminished by sexist humor.
Disparagement Humor and Prejudice
Disparagement humor represents a paradox as it simultaneously communicates two
conflicting messages. It communicates an explicit message of denigration of a target,
along with an implicit message that the denigration is free of prejudice motives or
malicious intentions—it’s “just a joke,” meant to amuse and not to be taken seriously
(Attardo, 1993; Gray & Ford, 2013; Hodson & MacInnis, 2016; Zillmann, 1983). Thus,
humor provides a unique vehicle for expressing prejudice as well as a unique social
challenge. It disguises expressions of prejudice in a cloak of fun and frivolity, allowing it
to avert the standard challenges or opposition that non-humorous disparagement likely
would incur (Bill & Naus, 1992; Johnson, 1990).
Although expressed under a cover of social acceptability, disparagement humor
represents an expression of prejudice (e.g., Husband, 1977; Montemurro, 2003;
Montemurro & Benfield, 2015). Hodson and MacInnis (2016) argued that disparagement
humor delegitimizes social groups by declaring them socially acceptable targets for
denigration. Furthermore, it affirms that demeaning stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes
are collectively shared within a given culture. Indeed, in order to “get” a disparaging
joke, one has to share knowledge of certain demeaning stereotypes with the joke teller.
By transmitting or communicating negative stereotypes and prejudiced sentiments in a
way that eludes criticism, disparagement humor represents a powerful vehicle for
shaping the ways people think about and respond to one another in intergroup settings.
Thus, researchers have addressed questions related to how disparagement humor relates

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 7 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
to prejudice. Specifically, research has focused on the role of disparagement humor as an
initiator of prejudice, as well as a releaser of prejudice. In addition, recent research has
raised the possibility that disparagement humor can serve a positive intergroup function
of subverting prejudice.
Disparagement Humor as an Initiator of Prejudice
Humor theorists historically have argued that disparagement humor creates and
reinforces negative stereotypes and prejudice toward the targeted group (e.g., Berger,
1993; Freud, 1960; La Fave & Mannell, 1976; Meyer, 2001; Ruscher, 2001; Stephenson,
1951; Zenner, 1970). By reinforcing negative stereotypes and prejudice in individuals,
disparagement humor is thought to maintain cultural or societal prejudice at a macro-
sociological level. Husband (1977) proposed that racist humor depicted on television
reinforces stereotypes and prejudice and thus functions to perpetuate a racist society.
Similarly, Montemurro (2003) argued that sexist humor depicted in television shows
strengthens a social system that trivializes women and promotes sexism. Sev’er and
Ungar (1997) likewise suggested that sexist humor perpetuates power imbalances
between men and women.
Consistent with such theoretical positions, instigating disparagement humor can have a
negative effect on the humorist’s attitudes and stereotypes of the targeted group. Hobden
and Olson (1994), for instance, asked participants individually to recite a number of anti-
lawyer jokes under conditions of either high or low free choice. Participants who freely
chose to recite the anti-lawyer jokes reported more negative attitudes toward lawyers.
Hobden and Olson suggested that cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) could
explain these findings. Participants adopted more negative attitudes toward lawyers as a
way of reducing cognitive dissonance associated with telling jokes that disparaged
lawyers.
Maio, Olson, and Bush (1997) found similar effects of reciting disparagement humor on
stereotypes people held about the targeted group. Specifically, Canadian participants who
recited jokes that disparaged Newfoundlanders reported more negative stereotypes of
Newfoundlanders than those who recited non-disparaging jokes. Maio et al. suggested
that reciting jokes that disparaged Newfoundlanders made participants feel that it was
more acceptable to express their negative stereotypes of Newfoundlanders.
Collectively, the studies by Hobden and Olson (1994) and Maio et al. (1997) suggest that
reciting disparagement humor can function to initiate prejudice and negative stereotypes.
However, it is not clear from these studies whether humor, as a medium of
communication, uniquely initiates prejudice and negative stereotypes apart from
disparaging content more generally.
Researchers also have investigated the prejudice-initiating effects of exposure to
disparagement humor, which has revealed more complex and counterintuitive findings.
Initial studies by Weston and Thomsen (1993) and Ford (1997) suggested that exposing
individuals to disparagement humor activates negative stereotypes leading to biases in

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 8 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
social judgment. Weston and Thomsen (1993) found that participants made more
stereotypical evaluations of men and women after watching sexist comedy skits than after
watching neutral comedy skits. Neither of these studies, however, included a non-
humorous control condition necessary to discern the unique effects of humor as a
medium for communicating disparagement. Indeed, both Weston and Thomsen (1993)
and Ford (1997) explained their findings as priming effects.
Addressing this limitation, Olson et al. (1999) conducted three experiments that were
better designed to test the unique effects of exposure to disparagement humor on
attitudes and stereotypes toward the targeted group. In one experiment, individual
female participants read either cartoons that disparaged men, non-disparaging cartoons,
non-humorous statements that disparaged men, or nothing at all. They found no effects of
their manipulation on the accessibility of participants’ attitudes toward men, or the
degree to which participants made stereotype-based judgments of men. In a conceptual
replication, Olson et al. exposed male and female participants to anti-lawyer jokes, non-
humorous anti-lawyer statements, non-disparaging jokes, or non-disparaging statements.
Again, they found no effects of their manipulation on the extremity or accessibility of
participants’ attitudes toward and stereotypes of lawyers.
In addition, Ford, Wentzel, and Lorion (2001) investigated the effect of sexist humor on
men’s stereotypes about women. Participants read sexist jokes, neutral (non-sexist) jokes,
or sexist statements. They found that even men high in hostile sexism—antagonism
against women (Glick & Fiske, 1996)—did not report more negative stereotypes of women
following exposure to sexist jokes versus neutral jokes or non-humorous sexist
statements. Taken together, then, the studies by Olson et al. (1999) and Ford et al. (2001)
provide no evidence that exposure to disparagement humor uniquely introduces or fosters
a negative disposition (stereotypes or prejudice) toward the targeted group.
Hodson, Rush, and MacInnis (2010) contributed to this line of research by addressing
personality characteristics other than level of prejudice that might make an audience
more vulnerable to prejudice-reinforcing effects of disparagement humor. Specifically,
Hodson et al. (2010) examined the effect of exposure to disparagement humor from the
perspective of social dominance theory (SDT). According to SDT, societies inevitably are
structured hierarchically so that there exists an imbalance in power and resources among
high- versus low-status groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Further, individuals differ in
their social dominance orientation (SDO), that is, the degree to which they support the
status quo of existing hierarchies and power imbalances. People high in SDO express
greater intergroup bias toward lower status groups because they possess legitimizing
myths—beliefs that validate the status quo of inequality and mistreatment (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999, p. 45). Hodson et al. (2010) proposed that cavalier humor beliefs (CHB)
represent a legitimizing myth. People high in CHB strongly endorse the viewpoint that a
disparaging joke is “just a joke,” and that any disparagement of a group or an individual
merits a “pass” or a pardon if it is intended to be humorous.

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 9 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
Hodson et al. (2010) hypothesized that people high in SDO would become even more
prejudiced against a low-status out-group upon exposure to disparagement humor
because of their cavalier beliefs about the humor. Hodson et al. tested their hypothesis in
a pre-post experimental design. First, they measured the attitudes of Canadian
participants toward Mexicans (pretest), SDO, and degree of endorsement of CHB. Then,
they exposed participants to jokes that disparaged Mexicans or to non-disparaging
“neutral” jokes. Finally, they measured participants’ reactions to the jokes and their
attitudes toward Mexicans (posttest). They found that people higher in SDO reported
more negative posttest attitudes toward Mexicans following exposure to anti-Mexican
jokes. This effect was mediated by CHB in a two-stage sequence. First, because
participants high in SDO and CHB view disparagement humor in general as benign
horseplay, they were not offended by the anti-Mexican jokes in particular. In turn, their
trivialization of the anti-Mexican jokes intensified their prejudiced attitudes. These
findings suggest that CHB are responsible for a circular relationship between exposure to
disparagement humor (targeting a low-status group) and prejudice: People high in SDO
and prejudice tend to appreciate disparagement humor (because of their CHB), which
further fuels their prejudice.
In summary, recent empirical research has not supported the hypothesis that
disparagement humor uniquely initiates prejudice. However, disparagement humor can
intensify existing prejudice by appealing to social dominance motives.
Disparagement Humor as a Releaser of Prejudice
Research suggests that exposure to disparagement humor relates to prejudice in another
way that humor theorists traditionally have not considered. Rather than initiating or
intensifying prejudice, disparagement humor functions as a situational event that allows
people to express their existing prejudice without fears of social reprisal. For example,
Ford (2000, Exp. 1) exposed male and female participants to sexist jokes, sexist
statements, or neutral jokes in an imagined group context. Participants then read a
vignette in which a male supervisor treated a new female employee in a patronizing
manner and addressed her using a pet name, which suggests a level of romantic intimacy
that is inappropriate and potentially threatening in the workplace. Participants high in
hostile sexism reported greater tolerance of the supervisor’s sexist behavior after
exposure to sexist jokes compared to neutral jokes or comparable non-humorous
disparagement. Mallett, Ford, and Woodzicka (2016) likewise found that women higher in
hostile sexism reported greater tolerance of an individual sexist incident as well as sexual
harassment in general following exposure to sexist humor. Finally, in a study by Ryan and
Kanjorski (1998), men reported greater acceptance of rape myths after exposure to sexist
humor that they found enjoyable or amusing.
Ford and Ferguson’s (2004) prejudiced norm theory explains these findings and provides
a framework for understanding the process by which disparagement humor fosters the
outward expression of prejudice. The theory is grounded in research on the way people
manage the conflict between their prejudice against a social group and external non-

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 10 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
prejudiced norms. Highly prejudiced people tend to respond to targets of prejudice in
accordance with prevailing social norms (Plant & Devine, 1998). They suppress prejudice
when the norms in a given context dictate restraint; they express prejudice when the
norms communicate approval to do so (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Dovidio, 2001;
Paluck, 2011; Pearson, Dovido, & Gaertner, 2009; Wittenbrink & Henly, 1996). Crandall
and Eshleman (2003) refer to events that socially sanction or justify the expression of
prejudice as releasers of prejudice. According to prejudiced norm theory, disparagement
humor acts as a releaser of prejudice.
Prejudiced norm theory consists of four propositions related to the interpretation of
disparagement humor, emergent social norms about the acceptability of prejudice against
the targeted group, and personal expressions of prejudice against the targeted group.
First, the theory proposes that humorous messages are accompanied by cues (e.g.,
identification of message as a joke) that signal to recipients that a message is not to be
subjected to the usual conversational rule of literality, logical thinking, and critical
scrutiny (e.g., Attardo, 1993; Berlyne, 1972; Mannell, 1977; Mulkay, 1988; Zillmann, 1983,
2000). Rather, humor invites us to treat a message as non-literal and outside the realm of
logical and moral scrutiny. As Mulkay (1988) suggested, humor encourages us to abandon
the usual (serious) ways of thinking.
By making light of discrimination, disparagement humor diminishes and trivializes its
target, communicating an implicit message that, in this context, one should adopt a
playful, non-critical humor mindset to interpret the message (Gollob & Levine, 1967;
Greenwood & Isbell, 2002; Montemurro, 2003; Mutuma, La Fave, Mannell, & Guilmette,
1977). Consistent with this idea, Hemmasi and Graf (1998) reported that the more
frequently people hear sexist jokes the less inappropriate they judge them to be. As they
put it, “apparently, greater exposure to such materials in the workplace (a) desensitizes
employees to the question of material inappropriateness; it must be alright if everyone
else is doing it, and/or (b) sends the signal to them that the behavior is condoned by the
organization” (p. 456). In contrast, non-humorous disparagement does not activate a
conversational rule of levity and thus does not communicate an implicit message that it is
acceptable to make light of discrimination.
Second, disparagement humor evokes a shared understanding of its implicit message
only for recipients who approve of it, that is, switch to a non-critical humor mindset to
interpret it (Emerson, 1969; Fine, 1983; Kane et al., 1977; Khoury,1985; Meyer, 2001).
Emerson (1969) proposed that a joke teller and recipient form an implicit contract to
suspend the usual serious or critical ways of thinking about socially unacceptable or
“taboo” topics. By approving of the humor, the recipient tacitly agrees to this social
contract. Thus, recipients who switch to a non-serious humor mindset to interpret
disparagement humor tacitly assent to a shared agreement (a social norm) that it is
acceptable in this particular context to make light of discrimination. They essentially re-
define the situation as one in which they need not suppress their prejudice out of fear of
social reprisal. Supporting this proposition, Ford (2000) found that sexist humor
increased tolerance of a sexist event, and this effect was attenuated when participants

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 11 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
were instructed to interpret the humor as they would a serious, non-humorous message.
Also, Bill and Naus (1992) found that men viewed incidents of sex discrimination as
harmless and acceptable insofar as they perceived them as humorous.
Third, like vicarious superiority theory (La Fave et al., 1996) and disposition theory
(Zillmann & Cantor, 1996), prejudiced norm theory proposes that people interpret
disparagement humor in a non-critical humor mindset to the extent they are prejudiced
against the disparaged group. Finally, because prejudiced people are inclined to interpret
disparagement humor in a non-critical humor mindset, they should perceive and assent to
an emergent prejudiced norm in the immediate context, and use that norm to guide their
own responses toward members of the targeted group (Ford & Ferguson, 2004). That is,
upon exposure to disparagement humor, prejudiced people tend to perceive the
immediate context as permissive of expressions of prejudice and thus feel comfortable
expressing or releasing their own prejudice.
A growing body of empirical research has supported prejudiced norm theory showing that
exposure to disparagement humor fosters a social climate that allows prejudiced
individuals to freely and openly express their prejudice against the targeted group. Ford
et al. (2001) found that men high in hostile sexism reported greater tolerance of a sexist
event upon exposure to sexist humor. This effect was mediated by an emergent
prejudiced norm—the perception that others in the immediate context viewed the sexist
event as acceptable.
Similarly, Ford, Woodzicka, Triplett, Kochersberger, and Holden (2014, Exp. 1) examined
whether exposure to anti-Muslim jokes promotes greater tolerance of discrimination
against Muslims and whether that effect is mediated by perceptions of a prejudiced norm
against Muslims. Participants imagined that they were a manager of a retail store who
discriminated against a new Muslim employee by prohibiting her from waiting on
customers because she was wearing a burqa. Furthermore, the manager asked the
employee to, “please try to dress more American, not so … ethnic.” Participants reported
feeling less badly about themselves for their imagined discrimination after reading anti-
Muslim jokes versus neutral jokes or non-humorous anti-Muslim statements exchanged
among (non-Muslim) employees in a small work group setting. Furthermore, this effect
was mediated by a perception that others in the immediate context approved of the
manager’s discrimination against the Muslim employee.
Recent research has expanded these investigations, showing that disparagement humor
frees people to express their approval of broader, societal level discrimination against the
targeted group. In a study by Ford, Woodzicka, Triplett, and Kochersberger (2013), male
participants first completed Glick and Fiske’s (1996) hostile sexism scale, and then read
either a series of sexist jokes, sexist statements that communicated the content of the
sexist jokes but in a non-humorous manner, or neutral jokes. Finally, participants
completed Jost and Kay’s (2005) measure of gender-specific system justification under
the guise of a survey about the current state of gender relations. The results showed that
men higher in hostile sexism reported greater tolerance of societal sexism (acceptance of

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 12 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
the gender status quo) after reading sexist jokes versus neutral jokes or non-humorous
sexist statements.
In addition, disparagement humor appears to affect people’s willingness to actually
discriminate against the targeted group (e.g., Ford, Boxer, Armstrong, & Edel, 2008; Ford
et al., 2014; Romero-Sanchez, Duran, Carretero-Dios, Megias, & Moya, 2010; Thomae &
Viki, 2013; Viki, Thomae, Cullen, & Fernandez, 2007). Ford et al. (2008) examined the
effect of sexist humor on men’s willingness to discriminate against women by presenting
either sexist or neutral comedy skits to small groups of male participants. They found that
hostile sexism predicted subsequent discrimination against women in the sexist comedy
skit condition. Men higher in hostile sexism cut more money from the budget of a
women’s organization relative to four other student organizations upon exposure to sexist
comedy skits but not neutral comedy skits. Further, a perceived norm of approval of
funding cuts for the women’s organization among other men in that context mediated the
effect; sexist humor created a social norm in which hostile sexist men felt comfortable
expressing their prejudice against women.
Ford et al. (2014) further demonstrated that social groups are differentially vulnerable to
the prejudice-releasing effects of disparagement humor depending on the position they
occupy in society. According to Crandall, Ferguson, and Bahns (2013), some groups
occupy a unique social position of shifting acceptability characterized by a state change in
the way society views discrimination against them. Prejudice against these groups is
shifting from being completely justified to being completely unjustified. Although society
is becoming increasingly accepting, many people still have mixed feelings about them.
Ford et al. (2014) found that disparagement humor fosters discrimination against groups
that occupy this social position of shifting acceptability but not against groups for whom
prejudice is already socially acceptable or justified. In their study, disparagement humor
promoted discrimination against Muslims and gay men. However, it did not foster
discrimination against two justified prejudice groups: terrorists and racists. Expressions
of prejudice against those groups did not depend on disparagement humor for
justification.
An important implication of these findings is that some instances of disparagement humor
are more detrimental than others because of the social position occupied by the groups
they target. Movies, television programs or YouTube comedy clips that humorously
disparage groups such as gays, Muslims, or women can potentially foster discrimination
and social injustice, whereas those that target groups such as racists will have little social
consequence.
Research by Romero-Sanchez et al. (2010) and Thomae and Viki (2013) extended the
application of prejudice norm theory by showing that disparagement humor stretches the
boundaries of acceptable conduct to include not only mild or subtle expressions of
prejudice but also the propensity to commit violence against the targeted group. In both
studies men reported a greater willingness to rape a woman upon exposure to sexist
versus non-sexist humor. Consistent with prejudiced norm theory, Thomae and Viki (2013)

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 13 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
found that only men high in hostile sexism reported greater rape proclivity upon exposure
to sexist versus neutral humor.
Finally, Woodzicka, Mallett, Hendricks, and Pruitt (2015) and Mallet et al. (2016)
expanded this line of research to address confrontation of sexist humor. Woodzicka et al.
(2015) found that people are less likely to label disparaging jokes as discrimination
compared to serious statements communicating the same underlying message.
Consequently, people are less likely to deem humorous disparagement as “confrontation-
worthy.” Mallett et al. (2016) further demonstrated that people do not confront sexist
jokes because they do not ascribe sexist motives to the joke teller. By communicating that
sexist sentiments should not be taken seriously, sexist humor makes ambiguous the
intention of the joke teller (e.g., “Was that an expression of sexism or just an attempt to
be funny?”), making the appropriateness of confrontation uncertain.
Mallett et al. (2016) further demonstrated that people do not confront sexist jokes
because of the “disparagement humor paradox” described earlier. By disguising the
denigration of women in a cloak of fun and amusement, sexist humor makes the intention
of the joke teller ambiguous (e.g., “Was that an expression of sexism or just an attempt to
be funny?”), and thus the appropriateness of confrontation uncertain. Indeed,
participants were less likely to ascribe sexist motives when a person told sexist jokes
versus non-humorous sexist remarks.
In sum, by denigrating an out-group in a socially acceptable manner, disparagement
humor functions as a releaser of prejudice, fostering social conditions that encourage
discrimination. Prejudiced norm theory provides a useful framework for understanding
these findings.
Gutiérrez, Carretero-Dios, Willis, and Moya (2016) expanded upon these findings in three
experiments that examined the effect of disparagement humor on in-group stereotyping.
In each of their experiments, they exposed college students either to humor that
disparaged their university (in-group disparagement humor), to non-humorous
disparagement of their university, or to neutral humor. Next, all participants wrote down
four characteristics they considered typical of students at their university, and then they
rated the favorability of each characteristic.
In Experiment 1, participants wrote more stereotypical descriptions of their university
following exposure to in-group disparagement humor versus non-humorous
disparagement of their university or neutral humor. However, participants did not differ
across conditions in how favorably they rated the in-group (typical students at their
university).
Experiments 2 and 3 expanded upon these findings by examining the role of in-group
identification. Gutierrez et al. (2016) found that in-group disparagement humor increased
stereotyping only among students who weakly identified with their university (low-
identifiers). Specifically, only low-identifiers wrote more stereotypical descriptions of the

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 14 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
in-group after exposure to in-group disparagement humor versus non-humorous
disparagement or neutral humor.
Gutiérrez et al. (2016) explained these findings from the framework of prejudice norm
theory. By communicating in-group stereotypes in a socially acceptable way,
disparagement humor created a norm about how in-groupers “should” be seen that
participants tacitly accepted.
Intergroup Humor as Subversion of Prejudice
As the discussion thus far suggests, disparagement humor can have detrimental effects
on intergroup relations by reinforcing and releasing prejudice. However, if initiated with
the positive intention to expose the absurdity and ugliness of prejudice, disparagement
humor could ironically have beneficial intergroup consequences (e.g., Rappoport, 2005;
Saucier, O’Dea, & Strain, 2016; Strain, Martens, & Saucier, 2016). Members of oppressed
groups may appropriate disparagement humor in service of a number of positive
intergroup functions: to dissociate the in-group from the derogatory content of the humor
(Bianchi, 2014), to affirm in-group pride or solidarity (e.g., Bianchi, 2014; Boskin &
Dorinson, 1985; Hom, 2008), to take a critical stance against the usual derogatory uses of
stereotypes and slurs (Hom, 2008; Hornsby, 2001), and to remind people of the status quo
of inequality and discrimination (Hom, 2008). Holmes and Marra (2002) referred to
disparagement humor that has such constructive, status-quo-challenging social
consequences as subversive humor.
Believing it has the potential to expose and subvert prejudice, many comedians (e.g.,
Lenny Bruce, Dick Gregory, Richard Pryor, Wanda Sykes, Louis C. K., Chris Rock, Dave
Chappelle, and Russell Peters) have incorporated subversive disparagement humor into
their routines. Russell Peters, for instance, impersonates accents of different racial
groups and pokes fun at racial stereotypes. His goal is not to offend members of targeted
groups, but to affirm them through humor. Chris Rock similarly uses subversive
disparagement humor to challenge the status quo of racial inequality and hierarchical
race relations in the United States (Strain et al., 2016). The following excerpt from his
opening monologue for the 2016 Academy Awards illustrates how he used humor to call
attention to racism in the film industry and hierarchical race relations more generally:
I’m here at the Academy Awards, otherwise known as the White People’s Choice
Awards. You realize if they nominated hosts, I wouldn’t even get this job. So y’all
would be watching Neil Patrick Harris right now. It’s the 88th Academy Awards.
It’s the 88th Academy Awards, which means this whole no black nominees thing
has happened at least 71 other times. O.K.? You gotta figure that it happened in
the 50s, in the 60s—you know, in the 60s, one of those years Sidney didn’t put out
a movie. I’m sure there were no black nominees some of those years. Say ‘62 or
‘63, and black people did not protest. Why? Because we had real things to protest
at the time, you know? We had real things to protest; you know, we’re too busy
being raped and lynched to care about who won best cinematographer. You know,

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 15 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
when your grandmother’s swinging from a tree, it’s really hard to care about best
documentary foreign short. (Hollywoodreporter.com, Oscars: Read Chris Rock's
Opening Monologue.)
The problem is that, for subversive humor to realize its goal of undermining prejudice,
the audience must understand and appreciate its true intention, and there is no
guarantee that they will (Saucier et al., 2016). The following excerpt from comedian Dave
Chappelle’s interview with Oprah Winfrey in 2006 illustrates the interpretation problem
with subversive humor. Chappelle discussed a skit about a pixie (played by Dave), which
appeared in black face:
“There was a good-spirited intention behind it,” Dave says. “So then when I'm on
the set, and we’re finally taping the sketch, somebody on the set [who] was white
laughed in such a way—I know the difference of people laughing with me and
people laughing at me—and it was the first time I had ever gotten a laugh that I
was uncomfortable with. Not just uncomfortable, but like, should I fire this
person?” Dave says some people understood exactly what he was trying to say
with his racially charged comedy … while others got the wrong idea. (Oprah.com,
Chappelle’s Story)
Vidmar and Rokeach (1974) found that people higher in prejudice are particularly prone
to misinterpreting subversive humor. Vidmar and Rokeach studied amusement with the
television show All in the Family, which focused on the bigoted character, Archie Bunker.
They found that low-prejudiced people perceived All in the Family as a satire on bigotry
and that Archie Bunker was the target of the humor. They “got” the true subversive intent
of the show. In contrast, high-prejudiced people enjoyed the show for satirizing the
targets of Archie’s prejudice. Thus, for high-prejudice people, the subversive
disparagement humor of the show backfired. Rather than calling attention to the
absurdity of prejudice, the show communicated an implicit prejudiced norm, a norm of
tolerance of discrimination.
Conclusion
Humor fundamentally trivializes its topic and invites people to think about it playfully and
non-seriously. Intergroup humor, humor that disparages a social group or its
representatives thus disguises expressions of prejudice in a cloak of fun and frivolity,
affording it the appearance of social acceptability. As a result, disparagement represents
a pervasive mechanism for communicating prejudice as society has become increasingly
sensitive to expressions of prejudice and other forms of offensive speech. Indeed,
disparagement humor is pervasive and perhaps more readily available to us now in the
digital age than ever before. The prevalence of intergroup disparagement humor in
popular culture and its disguise as benign amusement or “just a joke” give it potential to
have pervasive and complex social consequences in intergroup contexts. Indeed, a
number of ways have been described where disparagement humor serves both as a social
lubricant and as a social abrasive in intergroup settings. Disparagement humor is far

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 16 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
more than “just a joke.” Thus, understanding and raising awareness of its potential
consequences represents a critical project of social importance.
Further Reading
There are a number of excellent books and edited volumes that address intergroup
humor. Goldstein and McGhee’s (1972) The Psychology of Humor is an edited volume that
includes a chapter written by William H. Martineau entitled, “A Model of the Social
Functions of Humor.” In this seminal work, Martineau delineated a broad theoretical
model for deriving hypotheses about the ways that disparagement humor shapes social
relationships. Martineau’s model has appealed to and inspired scholars in many
disciplines and has guided a wealth of empirical research for over 40 years. Also,
Chapman and Foot’s (1996) edited book entitled Humor and Laughter: Theory, Research
and Applications is essential reading for those interested in intergroup humor. It includes
critically important chapters by Dolf Zillmann and Joanne R. Cantor on disposition theory,
and by Lawrence La Fave, Jay Haddad, and William A Maesen on vicarious superiority
theory.
Martin’s (2007) The Psychology of Humor provides the most comprehensive review of the
theoretical and empirical research on humor in psychology and related disciplines. The
Psychology of Humor covers the central theories that lay the groundwork for our
understanding of intergroup humor.
In contrast to Martin’s (2007) broad coverage of humor, Leon Rappoport’s (2005)
Punchlines provides a very focused, but essential coverage of intergroup humor.
Rappoport, a social psychologist, examines the appeal and functions of racial, ethnic, and
gender humor. Rappoport’s stated purpose for the book is to provide a defense for such
humor, arguing that it should not be dismissed as an expression of prejudice, but rather
that it sometimes can function to subvert prejudice. Similarly, Michael Billig’s (2005)
Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Laughter offers a narrowly focused
critical analysis of laugher and intergroup humor. Billig provides a historical and critical
review of theories of ridicule (disparagement humor) and attempts to demonstrate that
ridicule is central to social life. This book was intended for the more advanced student of
humor, primarily psychologists and other social scientists.
In addition to these books, HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research (HUMOR)
is an essential resource for students of humor, and intergroup humor more specifically. In
2015, HUMOR published a special issue entitled “The Social Consequences of
Disparagement Humor” (Vol. 28, Issue 2). The special issue includes eight articles that
offer theoretical reviews or present new empirical findings on the effects of intergroup
humor.

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 17 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
References
Abrams, J. R., Bippus, A. M., & McGaughey, K. J. (2015). Gender disparaging jokes: An
investigation of sexist-nonstereotypical jokes on funniness, typicality, and the moderating
role of ingroup identification. HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research, 28(2),
311–326.
Angelone, D. J., Hirschman, R., Suniga, S., Armey, M., & Armelie, A. (2005). The influence
of peer interactions on sexually oriented joke telling. Sex Roles, 52(3–4), 187–199.
Attardo, S. (1993). Violation of conversational maxims and cooperation: The case of jokes.
Journal of Pragmatics, 19, 537–558.
Berger, A. A. (1993). An anatomy of humor. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Berlyne, D. E. (1972). Humor and its kin. In J. H. Goldstein & P. E. McGhee (Eds.), The
psychology of humor (pp. 43–60). New York: Academic.
Bianchi, C. (2014). Slurs and appropriation: An echoic account. Journal of Pragmatics, 66,
35–44.
Bill, B., & Naus, P. (1992). The role of humor in the interpretation of sexist incidents. Sex
Roles, 27, 645–664.
Billig, M. (2005). Laughter and ridicule: Towards a social critique of laughter. Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Boskin, J., & Dorinson, J. (1985). Ethnic humor: Subversion and survival. American
Quarterly, 37, 81–97.
Bourhis, R. Y., Gadfield, N. J., Giles, H., & Tajfel, H. (1977). Context and ethnic humour in
intergroup relations. In A. J. Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), It’s a Funny Thing, Humor (pp.
261–265). Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.
Breeden, C. J., & Ford, T. E. (2017). The effect of sexist humor on women’s sense of
possible-selves (Master’s thesis) Western Carolina University.
Brown, L. M. (1998). Ethnic stigma as a contextual experience: A possible selves
perspective. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(2), 163–172.
Cantor, J. R., & Zillmann, D. (1973). Resentment toward victimized protagonists and
severity of misfortunes they suffer as factors in humor appreciation. Journal of
Experimental Research in Personality, 6, 321–329.
Calogero, R. M., & Pina, A. (2011). Body guilt preliminary evidence for a further
subjective experience of self-objectification. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 35(3), 428–
440.

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 18 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
Chapman, A. J., & Foot, H. C. (1996). Humor and laughter: Theory, research, and
applications. London: Transaction. Original work was published in 1976.
Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the
expression and experience of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 414–446.
Crandall, C. S., Ferguson, M. A., & Bahns, A. J. (2013). When we see prejudice: The
normative window and social change. In C. Stangor & C. S. Crandall (Eds.), Stereotyping
and Prejudice (pp. 53–70). New York: Psychology Press.
Dovidio, J. F. (2001). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The third wave. Journal of
Social Issues, 57(4), 829–849.
Emerson, J. P. (1969). Negotiating the serious import of humor. Sociometry, 32, 169–181.
Ferguson, M. A., & Ford, T. E. (2008). Disparagement humor: A theoretical and empirical
review of psychoanalytic, superiority, and social identity theories. Humor: International
Journal of Humor Research, 21(3), 283–312.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Fine, G. A. (1983). Sociological approaches to the study of humor. In P. E. McGhee & J. H.
Goldstein (Eds.), Handbook of humor research (pp. 159–181). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Ford, T. E. (1997). Effects of stereotypical television portrayals of African-Americans on
person perception. Social Psychology Quarterly, 60, 266–278.
Ford, T. E. (2000). Effects of sexist humor on tolerance of sexist events. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(9), 1094–1107.
Ford, T. E., Boxer, C. F., Armstrong, J. A., & Edel, J. R. (2008). More than just a joke: The
prejudice-releasing function of sexist humor. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
34, 159–170.
Ford, T. E., & Ferguson, M. A. (2004). Social consequences of disparagement humor: A
prejudiced norm theory. Personality and Social Psychology, 8, 79–94.
Ford, T. E., Wentzel, E. R., & Lorion, J. (2001). Effects of exposure to sexist humor on
perceptions of normative tolerance of sexism. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31,
677–691.
Ford, T. E., Woodzicka, J. A., Petit, W. E., Richardson, K., & Lappi, S. K. (2015). Sexist
humor as a trigger of state self-objectification in women. HUMOR: International Journal
of Humor Research, 28(2), 253–269.
Ford, T. E., Woodzicka, J. A., Triplett, S. R., & Kochersberger, A. O. (2013). Sexist humor
and beliefs that justify societal sexism. Current Research in Social Psychology, 21, 64–81.

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 19 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
Ford, T. E., Woodzicka, J. A., Triplett, S. R., Kochersberger, A. O., & Holden, C. J. (2014).
Not all groups are equal: Differential vulnerability of social groups to the prejudice-
releasing effects of disparagement humor. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 17,
178–199.
Fredrickson, B. L., & Roberts, T. A. (1997). Objectification theory. Psychology of Women
Quarterly, 21(2), 173–206.
Fredrickson, B. L., Roberts, T. A., Noll, S. M., Quinn, D. M., & Twenge, J. M. (1998). That
swimsuit becomes you: Sex differences in self-objectification, restrained eating, and math
performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1), 269–284. An erratum for
this article was reported in Vol. 75(5).
Freud, S. (1960). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. New York: Norton. The
original work was published in 1905.
Gallois, C., & Callan, V. (1985). The influence of ethnocentrism and ethnic label on the
appreciation of disparagement jokes. International Journal of Psychology, 20(1), 63–76.
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996). The ambivalent sexism inventory: Differentiating hostile
and benevolent sexism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 269–284.
Gollob, H. F., & Levine, J. (1967). Distraction as a factor in the enjoyment of aggressive
humor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 368–372.
Gray, J. A., & Ford, T. E. (2013). The role of social context in the interpretation of sexist
humor. HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research, 26(2), 277–293.
Greenwood, D., & Isbell, L. M. (2002). Ambivalent sexism and the dumb blonde: Men’s
and women’s reactions to sexist jokes. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 26, 341–350.
Gruner, C. R. (1997). The game of humor: A comprehensive theory of why we laugh. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Gutierrez, C. A., Carretero-Dios, H., Willis, G. B., & Moya, M. (2016). Joking about
ourselves: Effects of disparaging humor on ingroup stereotyping. Group Processes
& Intergroup Relations Online First.
Halliwell, S. (1998). Aristotle’s poetics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Hemmasi, M., & Graf, L. (1998). Sexual and sexist humor in the workplace: Just “good
fun” or sexual harassment? Decision Sciences Institute: Proceedings (pp. 455–457).
Atlanta, GA: Decision Sciences Institute.
Hobbes, T., & Tuck, R. (1996). Leviathan. New York: Oxford University Press. The original
work was published 1651.

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 20 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
Hobden, K. L., & Olson, J. M. (1994). From jest to antipathy: Disparagement humor as a
source of dissonance-motivated attitude change. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 15,
239–249.
Hodson, G., & MacInnis, C. C. (2016). Derogating humor as a delegitimization strategy in
intergroup contexts. Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 2, 63–74.
Hodson, G., Rush, J., & MacInnis, C. C. (2010). A joke is just a joke (except when it isn’t):
Cavalier humor beliefs facilitate the expression of group dominance motives. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 660–682.
Holmes, J., & Marra, M. (2002). Over the edge? Subversive humor between colleagues
and friends. Humor: International Journal of Humor Research, 15, 65–87.
Hom, C. (2008). The semantics of racial epithets. Journal of Philosophy, 105, 416–440.
Hornsby, J. (2001). Meaning and uselessness: How to think about derogatory words.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 25, 128–141.
Hunt, C. J., & Gonsalkorale, K. (2014). Who cares what she thinks, what does he say?
Links between masculinity, in-group bonding, and gender harassment. Sex Roles, 70, 14–
27.
Husband, C. (1977). The mass media and the functions of ethnic humor in a racist society.
In A. J. Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), It’s a funny thing, humor (pp. 267–272). Elmsford,
NY: Pergamon.
Johnson, A.M. (1990). The “only joking” defense: Attribution bias or impression
management? Psychological Reports, 67, 1051–1056.
Jost, J. T., & Kay, A. C. (2005). Exposure to benevolent sexism and complementary gender
stereotypes: Consequences for specific and diffuse forms of system justification. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 1051–1056.
Kane, T. R., Suls, J., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1977). Humour as a tool of social interaction. In A. J.
Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), It’ s a funny thing, humor (pp. 13–16). Elmsford, NY:
Pergamon.
Khoury, R. M. (1985). Norm formation, social conformity, and the confederating function
of humor. Social Behavior and Personality, 13, 159–165.
La Fave, L. (1972). Humor judgments as a function of reference groups and identification
classes. In J. H. Goldstein & P. E. McGhee (Eds.), The Psychology of Humor (pp. 195–210).
New York: Academic.
La Fave, L., Haddad, J., & Maesen, W. A. (1996). Superiority, enhanced self-esteem, and
perceived incongruity humor theory. In A. J. Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), Humor and

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 21 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
laughter: Theory, research, and applications (pp. 63–91). New York: Wiley. The original
work was published in 1976.
La Fave, L., & Mannell, R. (1976). Does ethnic humor serve prejudice? Journal of
Communication, 26, 116–123.
La Fave, L., McCarthy, K., & Haddad, J. (1973). Humor judgments as a function of
identification classes: Canadian vs. American. Journal of Psychology, 85, 53–59.
LaFrance, M., & Woodzicka, J. A. (1998). No laughing matter: Women’s verbal and
nonverbal reactions to sexist humor. In J. Swim & C. Stangor (Eds.), Prejudice: The
target’s perspective (pp. 61–80). San Diego, CA: Academic.
Lyman, P. (1987). The fraternal bond as a joking relationship: A case study of the role of
sexist jokes in male group bonding. In Michael S. Kimmel (Ed.), Changing Men: New
Directions in Research on Men and Masculinity (pp. 148–163). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Maio, G. R., Olson, J. M., & Bush, J. (1997). Telling jokes that disparage social groups:
Effects on the joke-teller’s stereotypes. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27, 1986–
2000.
Mallet, R., Ford, T. E., & Woodzicka, J. A. (2016). Humor decreases attributions of sexism,
reduces confrontation, and increases tolerance of sexism. Psychology of Women
Quarterly, 75, 272–284.
Mannell, R. C. (1977). Vicarious superiority, injustice, and aggression in humor: The role
of the playful judgmental set. In A. J. Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), It’s a funny thing,
humor (pp. 273–276). Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.
Martin, R. A. (2007). The Psychology of Humor: An Integrative Approach. Burlington, MA:
Elsevier Academic.
Martineau, W. H. (1972). A model of the social functions of humor. In J. H. Goldstein & P.
E. McGhee (Eds.), The psychology of humor (pp. 101–125). New York: Academic.
McGhee, P. E. (1972). On the cognitive origins of incongruity humor: Fantasy assimilation
versus reality assimilation. In J. H. Goldstein & P. E. McGhee (Eds.), The psychology of
humor (pp. 61–79). New York: Academic.
McGhee, P. E., & Duffey, N. S. (1983). The role of identity of the victim in the development
of disparagement humor. The Journal of General Psychology, 108(2), 257–270.
Meyer, J. C. (2001). Humor as a double-edged sword: Four functions of humor in
communication. Communication Theory, 10, 310–331.
Montemurro, B. (2003). Not a laughing matter Sexual harassment as “material” on
workplace-based situation comedies. Sex Roles, 48(9–10), 443–445.

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 22 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
Montemurro, B., & Benfield, J. A. (2015). Hung out to dry: Use and consequences of
disparagement humor on American idol. International Journal of Humor Research, 28(2),
229–252.
Mulkay, M. (1988). On humor: Its nature and its place in modern society. New York:
Blackwell.
Mutuma, H., La Fave, L., Mannell, R., & Guilmette, A. M. (1977). Ethnic humour is no
joke. In A. J. Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), It’s a funny thing, humor (pp. 277–280).
Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.
Obrdlik, A. J. (1942). Gallows humor: A sociological phenomenon. American Journal of
Sociology, 47, 709–716.
Olson, J. M., Maio, G. R., & Hobden, K. L. (1999). The (null) effects of exposure to
disparagement humor on stereotypes and attitudes. Humor: International Journal of
Humor Research, 12, 195–219.
Paluck, E. L. (2011). Peer pressure against prejudice: A high school field experiment
examining social network change. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 350–
358.
Pearson, A. R., Dovido, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2009). The nature of contemporary
prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3,
1–25.
Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to respond without
prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 811–832.
Rappoport, L. (2005). Punchlines: The case for racial, ethnic, and gender humor.
Westport, CT: Praeger.
Romero-Sanchez, M., Duran, M., Carretero-Dios, H., Megias, J. L., & Moya, M. (2010).
Exposure to sexist humor and rape proclivity: The moderator effect of aversiveness
ratings. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 25(12), 2339–2350.
Ruscher, J. B. (2001). Prejudiced communication: A social psychological perspective. New
York: Guilford.
Ryan, K. M., & Kanjorski, J. (1998). The enjoyment of sexist humor, rape attitudes, and
relationship aggression in college students. Sex Roles, 38, 743–756.
Saucier, D. A., O’Dea, C. J., & Strain, M. L. (2016). The bad, the good, the misunderstood:
The social effects of racial humor. Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 2(1), 75–
85.
Sev’er, A., & Ungar, S. (1997). No laughing matter: Boundaries of gender-based humor in
the classroom. Journal of Higher Education, 68, 87–105.

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 23 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social
hierarchy and oppression. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Siebler, F., Saskia, S., & Bohner, G. (2008). A refined computer harassment paradigm:
Validation, and test of hypotheses about target characteristics. Psychology of Women
Quarterly, 32(1), 22–35.
Stephenson, R. M. (1951). Conflict and control functions of humor. American Journal of
Sociology, 56, 569–574.
Strain, M. L., Martens, A. L., & Saucier, D. A. (2016). “Rape is the new black”: Humor’s
potential for reinforcing and subverting rape culture. Translational Issues in
Psychological Science, 2(1), 86–95.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In W.
G. Austin & S. Worcheland (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago:
Nelson-Hall.
Thomae, M., & Pina, A. (2015). Sexist humor and social identity: The role of sexist humor
in men’s in-group cohesion, sexual harassment, rape proclivity, and victim blame.
HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research, 28(2), 187–204.
Thomae, M., & Viki, G. T. (2013). Why did the woman cross the road? The effect of sexist
humor on men’s rape proclivity. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology,
7(3), 250.
Thomas, C. A., & Esses, V. M. (2004). Individual differences in reactions to sexist humor.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 7(1), 89–100.
Viki, G.T., Thomae, M., Cullen, A., & Fernandez, H. (2007). The effect of sexist humor and
type of rape on men’s self-reported rape proclivity and victim blame. Current Research in
Social Psychology, 13(10), 122–132.
Vidmar, N., & Rokeach, M. (1974). Archie Bunker’s bigotry: A study in selective
perception and exposure. Journal of Communication, 74, 36–48.
Weston, C. M., & Thomsen, C. J. (1993). No joking matter. Sex-typed comedy perpetuates
traditional views of women. Paper presented at the American Psychological Association
Conference, Toronto, Canada.
Wicker, F. W., Barron, W. L., III, & Willis, A. C. (1980). Disparagement humor: Dispositions
and resolutions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 701–709.󰜬
Wills, T. A. (1981). Downward comparison principles in social psychology. Psychological
Bulletin, 90, 245–271.

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 24 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019
Wittenbrink, B., & Henly, J. R. (1996). Creating social reality: Informational social
influence and content of stereotypic beliefs. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
22, 598–610.
Woodzicka, J. A., Mallett, R. K., Hendricks, S., & Pruitt, A. V. (2015). It’s just a (sexist)
joke: Comparing reactions to sexist versus racist communications. HUMOR: International
Journal of Humor Research, 28(2), 289–309.
Zenner, W. P. (1970). Joking and ethnic stereotyping. Anthropological Quarterly, 2, 93–
113.
Zillmann, D. (1983). Disparagement humor. In P. E. McGhee & J. H. Goldstein (Eds.),
Handbook of humor research: Vol. 1. Basic issues (pp. 85–107). New York: Springer-
Verlag.
Zillmann, D. (2000). Humor and comedy. In D. Zillmann & P. Vorderer (Eds.), Media
entertainment: The psychology of its appeal (pp. 37–57). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Zillmann, D., & Cantor, J. R. (1972). Directionality of transitory dominance as a
communication variable affecting humor appreciation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 24, 191–198.
Zillmann, D., & Cantor, J. R. (1996). A disposition theory of humor and mirth. In A. J.
Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), Humor and laughter: Theory, research, and applications
(pp. 93–116). New York: Wiley. Original work was published in 1976.
Thomas E. Ford
Department of Psychology, Western Carolina University
Christopher J. Breeden
Department of Psychology, Western Carolina University
Emma C. O'Connor
Department of Psychology, Western Carolina University
Noely C. Banos
Department of Psychology, Western Carolina University

Jokes and Humor in Intergroup Relations
Page 25 of 25
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford
University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 February 2019