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Credible Commitments? Explaining IGO Suspensions to Sanction Political Backsliding
Abstract
Why do intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that espouse democratic commitments suspend the membership of some states that backslide on those commitments, while leaving that of others intact? We argue that a combination of geopolitical factors and institutional rules help explain this inconsistent pattern. Remaining member states insulate geopolitically important states—particularly those with large endowments of oil resources—from suspension. Institutional factors, such as voting rules and the size of the IGO, create veto points that reduce suspensions. Using an original global data set of IGO suspensions and charter commitments from 1980 to 2010, we find strong support for our argument. We test a key assumption of existing scholarship that claims IGOs serve as credible-commitment devices for political reform and democratization. We show that once a state becomes an IGO member, it can often remain in the IGO even after violating its democratic commitments.
... And the commitment to democracy, human rights, and good governance has become a typical condition for international trade agreements as well (Hafner-Burton, 2005). Even though these efforts have been applied and enforced rather inconsistently (Börzel, 2015;Bush, 2015;Kurlantzick, 2013;Tieku, 2009;Von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019), democracy promotion and other instruments of socialization contributed to democratization in a number of contexts (Börzel & Risse, 2009a, 2009bSchimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008;Vachudová, 2005), and at a minimum put pressure on illiberal leaders in both autocracies and democracies. 5 It was precisely these forms of democracy promotion which generated a more hopeful literature on what multilateral and regional organizations might accomplish. ...
... Similarly, backsliders are able to use unanimity and consensus rules as a way to veto decisions they dislike, including the sanctioning of like-minded leaders in the organization (Von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). Strategic incentives matter as well in the willingness of more liberal leaders to shield their illiberal counterparts from sanctions and increased pressures to democratize. ...
Illiberal regimes have become central players in international organizations. In this introduction to the special issue, we provide a unified framework for understanding their effects. We start by outlining the theoretical foundations of this work, focusing first on why regime type matters for international cooperation. We then show how differing memberships and decision-making processes within international organizations affect the influence illiberal regimes can wield, the activities they undertake, and the impact that they have on domestic political outcomes. Collectively and individually, the contributions to this special issue broaden the theoretical literature on illiberal regimes in international organizations and produce novel data about how they are implicated in the politics and operations of multilateral and regional IOs. This research has important implications for how democracies can and should cope with the challenges to global governance that arise from illiberal regimes.
... For example, a key explanation focuses on target state characteristics. ROs are less likely to punish member states for breaching democratic rules when they are powerful, especially when they are resource-rich (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019;Donno, 2010;Palestini 2021). Yet while this explanation captures variation across target countries, it is ill-suited to explain policy change towards the same country over time. ...
... Yet while this explanation captures variation across target countries, it is ill-suited to explain policy change towards the same country over time. Similarly, a complementary prominent explanation centres on the institutional design of an RO, such as its voting rules for the use of sanctions (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019) or the access of non-state actors to the RO (Hawkins 2008). Again, such differences in institutional design can explain variation in the use of sanctions across international institutions, but they are unsuitable to explain variation within the same institution, and, by extension changes over time within a given institution. ...
... IGOs are "established by signature of an agreement engendering obligations between governments" (Atouba & Shumate, 2010, p.301). In the global health realm, IGOs possess institutional power due to their global visibility, access to political resources, and ability to impose pressure on nation states (Von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). IGOs work with health organizations in several capacities, including funders and evaluators. ...
... This finding is likely due to their institutional power influencing norms surrounding partnerships and generating coercive pressure. Representing nation states, IGOs possess resources and legitimacy (Von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). Previous studies suggest that maintaining consultative status with IGOs (such as the UN and WHO) is an acknowledgment of an NGO's expertise in a given area, elevating the organization's social-cultural status (Atouba & Shumate, 2015;Liu & Shin, 2019). ...
Guided by institutional theory, this study examines how homophily and institutional power influence the tie formation and dissolution of interorganizational collaboration networks. The analysis focuses on longitudinal network data collected from 174 international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) whose mission and main activities revolved around HIV/AIDS and other related health topics such as substance use, alcohol use, and smoking. This study conceptualizes collaboration as an affinity communication network and uses the Separable Temporal Exponential Random Graph Modeling (STERGM) to investigate the effects of organizational and sector level attributes. The results reveal the important role that homophily plays in terms of geolocation and topic alignment. Furthermore, the results show IGOs’ role in driving these global partnerships. Implications on how to sustain global health alliances are discussed.
... In individual countries, for example, there is often competition and disagreement over policy direction and aid decisions between ministries and agencies responsible for development, foreign policy, and defense (Cheeseman, 2015). Moreover, the number of veto players can vary both across bilateral and multilateral donors (Swedlund, 2017b;Von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). ...
In this introduction to the special issue, “Foreign Aid Withdrawals and Suspensions: Why, When and Are They Effective,” we both summarize the current state of the literature and outline a robust new agenda for studying aid suspensions and withdrawals. A common contribution of the papers in this special issue is that they emphasize that donors and aid-recipient states have more options available to them than previous literature has allowed and that it is the creative ways in which aid recipient governments seek to discipline their donors that make the effective use of conditionality so challenging. In this introduction, we not only summarize what we know about aid suspensions and withdrawals but also begin to unpack the complex decision-making that underlies aid suspensions, providing a simplified decision tree that can guide future research. Overall, we emphasize that, far from being a niche issue, aid suspensions and withdrawals are a fundamental part of the political economy of foreign aid and that much more work is needed to understand how recipient governments make decisions about how to respond or not to respond to (threats of) aid suspensions and withdrawals and how donors factor such political calculations into their initial or subsequent decision-making. The article highlights both the challenges and the opportunities of unpacking the complex decision-making behind aid suspensions and withdrawals.
... However, this influence of IGOs beyond their core mandate need not always be negative (Tir and Karreth 2018). Lastly, our emphasize on institutional structures and the resulting leverage supplants other recent work on the role of IGOs in domestic political contention (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2017;Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2017;White, Cunningham, and Beardsley 2018;von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019). It also provides additional opportunities for examining how institutional structures can be linked to concrete mediation behavior and outcomes. ...
Recent research shows that comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are effective in ending civil wars and improving post-conflict conditions, but CPAs emerge in only a fraction of civil wars. This study provides systematic evidence about the origins of CPAs and the role of international actors in facilitating their signing. We argue that mediation is more likely to be successful and that CPAs are more likely to emerge in those civil war countries that are members in a higher number of IGOs with high economic leverage. Using their financial and institutional leverage, these IGOs can help the combatants overcome the credible commitment problems associated with entering into mediation, and with making sufficient concessions and compromises to reach and sign a CPA. Analyzing all intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2011, we find that a conflict country’s memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage increase the odds of (1) mediation occurring and (2) mediation subsequently leading to the signing of CPAs. This finding is robust to common sources of spurious relationships between international institutions and the behavior of conflict parties. Participating in IGOs with high economic leverage carries important positive consequences for civil war management and enhances the impact of mediation on getting conflict parties to sign CPAs.
... Others have paid attention to pre-existing trends absent from previous research. One of them is the growing practice of suspending voting rights applied by some organizations against its own members for unconstitutional changes of government ( Charron and Portela 2015 ;Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019 ). In the same vein, some scholars argue in favor of an enlargement of the universe of measures considered as sanctions beyond the economic restrictions prevalent in mainstream literature. ...
Databases constitute key research tools in sanctions scholarship. Over the past few years, we have witnessed a proliferation of sanctions databases: while only a single dataset was available until 2009, this number had increased to five by 2020; thus, the choice has more than doubled in less than a decade. This essay assesses the evolution observed. It reviews the five major datasets, comparing some of their basic choices, and evaluates them along two dimensions: the extent to which they capture targeted sanctions and the degree to which they brought innovations to the subfield. We find that targeted sanctions are not adequately reflected in databases, which remain state-centric in their approach. We conclude that the crafting of new databases does not entail an incremental refinement in which each iteration renders its predecessors obsolete. Rather, the evolution observed has resulted in a diverse set of options with different emphases. We nevertheless observe that a trend toward innovation has yielded to one toward consolidation, more focused on enlarging the empirical testing ground than in innovating. We conclude by discussing implications for the development of sanctions scholarship.
... Instead, outside the Goldilocks condition, these international actors typically have incentives to ignore their preferred partners' violations of domestic bargains, affecting their willingness to use their leverage. Outsiders' strong economic and even strategic interestsincluding trading partnerships providing needed natural resources, protection of major foreign business properties, or, as noted above, partnerships combating common security threats-can thus make threats to punish government violations of domestic political bargains less credible (e.g., Carothers 1999, p. 45;Girod 2012Girod , 2018Hafner-Burton et al. 2019;Karreth et al. 2019;Nielsen 2014;von Borzyskowski & Vabulas 2019). 21 The factors that shape these ties, and even that motivate intervention, are beyond the scope of this review but are an important and related topic (see Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2012). ...
International actors at times seek to help bring peace, democracy, and human rights. Studies of how international actors help enforce political bargains between incumbent governments and their domestic opponents are proliferating. They show that opposition groups have trouble trusting incumbents to adhere to the political bargains they strike because incumbents can use their familiarity with state institutions and can use their asymmetric hold on power during bargain implementation to violate terms by retaining more of the status quo than agreed. International actors can overcome these “reversion problems,” however, by using monitoring mechanisms (often focused on electoral campaigns) and incentives conditioned on compliance. Reversion problems, and enforcement by international actors as a solution, are common across issue areas—arising when domestic actors try to end civil conflict, open elections, and reduce repression—but the literatures in these issue areas have largely remained segregated. This review proposes advancing this research agenda by unifying them and (re)examining the conditions under which this solution works best.
... Prominent examples include the EU, the OAS, and the African Union. Figure 1 traces the proportion of democratically committed IOs over time (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2018). ...
Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations (IOs) have engaged in unprecedented levels of democracy promotion, and research overwhelmingly links them to positive democratic outcomes. However, this increased emphasis on democracy has more recently been accompanied by rampant illiberalism and a sharp rise in cases of democratic backsliding in new democracies. What explains democratic backsliding in an age of unparalleled international support for democracy? Backsliding occurs when democratic institutions are weakened or eroded by elected officials, resulting in an illiberal or diminished form of democracy. I argue that IOs that support democracy unintentionally make backsliding more likely by neglecting to promote democratic institutions other than executives and elections, increasing executive power, and limiting states’ domestic policy options, which stunts institutional development. I find membership in IOs associated with democracy promotion makes backsliding more likely, decreases checks on executive power, and limits domestic policy options and party development in new democracies.
... Social punishments such as shunning may result in a loss of status or prestige within a group (Johnston 2008), and this damaged social standing may affect a state's ability to enjoy the exclusivity and diplomatic platform that accompanies membership in an IGO (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2018). ...
We present an interdisciplinary theory that considers how loss of membership in international organizations affects states’ human rights practices. Drawing mostly from social psychology and international relations research, we argue that states are socialized into the international community through a process of social influence, whereby they are incentivized to comply with group norms by the promise (threat) of social rewards (punishments). Social influence occurs when states form social bonds through interactions with other states. When social bonds are severed, fewer opportunities for social influence occur due to lower information to both the remaining states and the state that lost those social bonds. Thus, we hypothesize that the loss of membership from IGOs reduces incentives to comply with group norms and adversely affects human rights practices at home. A combination of propensity score matching/regression and autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models on a global cross-section across the years 1978–2012 supports the theory. Specifically, losing at least one IGO membership leads to a long-run drop in human rights respect of about one quarter to one half standard deviation.
Recent research shows that comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are effective in ending civil wars and improving post-conflict conditions, but CPAs emerge in only a fraction of civil wars. This study provides systematic evidence about the origins of CPAs and the role of international actors in facilitating their signing. We argue that mediation is more likely to be successful and that CPAs are more likely to emerge in those civil war countries that are members in a higher number of IGOs with high economic leverage. Using their financial and institutional leverage, these IGOs can help the combatants overcome the credible commitment problems associated with entering into mediation, and with making sufficient concessions and compromises to reach and sign a CPA. Analyzing all intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2011, we find that a conflict country’s memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage increase the odds of (1) mediation occurring and (2) mediation subsequently leading to the signing of CPAs. This finding is robust to common sources of spurious relationships between international institutions and the behavior of conflict parties. Participating in IGOs with high economic leverage carries important positive consequences for civil war management and enhances the impact of mediation on getting conflict parties to sign CPAs.
How do international audiences perceive, and respond to, gender equality reforms in autocracies? For autocrats, the post-Cold War rewards associated with democracy create incentives to make reforms that will be viewed as democratic but not threaten their political survival. We theorize women’s rights as one such policy area, contrasting it with more politically costly reforms to increase electoral competition. A conjoint survey experiment with development and democracy promotion professionals demonstrates how autocracies enhance their reputations and prospects for foreign aid using this strategy. While increasing electoral competition significantly improves perceived democracy and support for aid, increasing women’s economic rights is also highly effective. Gender quotas exhibit a significant (though smaller) effect on perceived democracy. A follow-up survey of the public and elite interviews replicate and contextualize the findings. Relevant international elites espouse a broad, egalitarian conception of democracy, and autocrats accordingly enjoy considerable leeway in how to burnish their reputations.
Scholars contend that embedding human rights conditionality in trade agreements can improve human rights. We argue that human rights interests may collide with trade, investment, and security interests. We examine these claims in the context of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a unilateral trade preference program with robust human rights conditions, created in 2000 by the United States for up to 49 potentially eligible sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) states. US decisions to terminate AGOA beneficiary status are determined strongly by US trade, investment, and security interests. The country’s human rights record, including state-sponsored killings and other violations of physical integrity rights, has a less consistent and weaker effect.
Climate change, health pandemics, financial crises, military conflicts, trade barriers, and refugee flows. All manifest the transboundary nature of contemporary societal problems, and all underline the need for international cooperation. This insight has stimulated major growth of global governance over the past 75 years. Yet is this system of global governance fit for purpose? This report from the SNS Democracy Council examines this issue with attention to three preconditions for well-functioning global governance: power, effectiveness, and legitimacy. It specifically focuses on the classic international organizations that constitute core pillars of global governance and play frontline roles in combating transboundary problems. Do such international organizations hold the power required to develop, implement, and enforce global policies? Do these institutions wield this power with sufficient effectiveness to reduce transboundary problems? And do international organizations possess legitimacy as governing bodies in the eyes of citizens and elites? This report explores these three themes in a comparative perspective, mapping and analyzing patterns among a broad range of international organizations in areas such as development, finance, health, human rights, security, and trade. The report also offers an in-depth analysis of power, effectiveness, and legitimacy in respect of global climate governance, thereby illustrating these dynamics in an issue area of critical importance to human and ecological security.
DemocracyDemocracy is more central to NATO’s identity now than ever. President Joseph BidenBiden, Joseph R. Jr. has referred to the war in UkraineUkraine as part of ‘a battle between democracy and autocracy’.
The imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) is notoriously selective. Many crises have qualified for UNSC sanctions by endangering peace and security, yet the UN has imposed sanctions in only a few. Selectivity in UNSC sanctions is conventionally explained by conflict intensity or the interests of the Council’s permanent members. Complementing these accounts, we document a third explanation: pre-existing sanctions by regional organizations. We argue that the UNSC has incentives to sanction countries which are already under sanctions by regional organizations because regional sanctions embody neighborhood consensus on the legitimacy of these sanctions and reassure the Council about implementation. Statistical analyses of original data, text analyses, a case study, and interviews strongly support our argument: regional sanctions increase the likelihood of UNSC sanctions adoption, particularly when these are enacted by regional organizations composed of neighboring states. This study advances research on sanctions, conflict resolution, and regime complexity.
The Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) is the most comprehensive multilateral framework for dealing with democratic breakdowns and backslidings in the Western Hemisphere. In such cases, the Organisation of American States (OAS) is supposed to defend democracy by suspending states, imposing sanctions or taking other multilateral measures. Oftentimes, however, the OAS has looked the other way. The question, then, is what makes the difference. In this comparative case study, we use cross-cases comparisons and process-tracing to identify the actors and causal mechanisms that determine when and whether the IADC is actually enforced. We explain inconsistent enforcement by analysing interactions among three sets of actors – the governments of powerful member states, OAS secretaries general and civil society organisations – during coups, executive takeovers and electoral frauds in OAS member states between 2001 and 2020. Our analysis reveals that cooperation between an activist secretary general and civil society actors was neither sufficient nor necessary for IADC enforcement. By contrast, US support for enforcement was a necessary but insufficient condition for the OAS to act. To get it to do so, the United States required the support of two leading regional powers: Mexico and Brazil. These findings suggest that the ‘right to democracy’ enshrined in the IADC hinges upon the volatile preferences of the executives of the OAS’s three most powerful member states. The resulting lack of institutional autonomy leads to inconsistent enforcement of the IADC, jeopardising the credibility of the region’s formally declared right to democracy.
The Cambridge Companion to International Organizations Law illuminates, from a legal perspective, what international organizations are, what makes them 'tick' and how they affect the world around them. It critically discusses such classic issues as the concept of international organization and membership, as well as questions of internal relations, accountability and how they make law, set standards and otherwise affect both their member states and the world around them. The volume further discusses the role of international organizations in particular policy domains, zooming in on domains which are not often discussed through international organizations, including disarmament, energy, food security and health. Eventually, a picture emerges of international organizations as complex phenomena engaging in all sorts of activities and relationships, the operation and authority of which is underpinned by the rules and regulations of international law.
How do foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows affect democratic survival? No study has examined how FDI influences the likelihood of democratic survival, although many studies have studied the effect of regime type on FDI inflows. The previous finding that FDI contributes to authoritarian survival and decreases prospects for democratization does not answer this question since determinants of democratic transitions are clearly distinct from those of democratic survival. I argue that FDI in non-primary sectors is more likely than FDI in primary sectors to contribute to democratic survival since non-primary FDI is likely to produce growth-enhancing effects through upstream and downstream linkages in the host economy and facilitate the diffusion of democratic ideas and norms originating from the West. To overcome the problem of the sectoral FDI data's poor coverage, I exploit an exogenous variation in FDI inflows by utilizing a country's geographical distance from developed economies. Using a sample of democracies from 1970 to 2010, I find that inward FDI, instrumented by market proximity to developed economies, is associated with an increased likelihood of democratic survival. The analysis of primary and non-primary FDI also provides supporting evidence.
Comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are the most impactful negotiated settlements ending civil wars, but their implementation varies across post-conflict countries and over time. To explain varying implementation, this study identifies central challenges in CPA implementation and suggests that international third parties are uniquely positioned to overcome them. (1) IGOs with high economic leverage, and (2) prior foreign aid both set incentives that reduce domestic barriers to implementation. Quantitative evidence on the implementation of CPAs from 1989-2015 supports this argument. Both post-conflict countries' participation in IGOs with high economic leverage and higher volumes of prior foreign aid are associated with higher rates of CPA implementation. Multiple estimation approaches, including instrumental variables, support this finding. Case evidence from the 2007 CPA in Ivory Coast tracks the processes by which IGOs and donors help overcome stakeholder resistance and facilitate implementation. This finding encourages more concerted efforts by policymakers to advance CPA implementation.
Personal commitments are a ubiquitous but undertheorized phenomenon in the everyday wheels of world politics. While resonating with multiple threads in international relations theory, the role of individuals’ commitments in statecraft, diplomacy, and foreign policy has hardly been addressed in and of itself. Drawing on insights from symbolic interactionism and organizational psychology, this article conceptualizes the notion of commitment highlighting its omnipresence in foreign policy and diplomatic practice. Specifically, the article demonstrates the analytical cache of the notion of commitment by focusing on moments when state-agents deviated from their commitment to the national interest, acting on behalf of other foci of commitment. Relying on Israeli, French, and EU diplomatic archives, we examine three illustrative case studies that show how and why state-agents dedicate time, energy, and resources to advance interests other than those of the state.
The article provides a critical review of the book “Digital diplomacy and international organizations. Autonomy, Legitimacy and Contestation” [Zaiotti, Bjola (ed.) 2020]. The key feature of the book is the approach to the study of digital diplomacy, according to which international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and not only the foreign political departments of states, are considered as the main actors of communication. The authors highlight the features of the Internet communications of international organizations, look for new approaches to the study of online activity, consider the challenges and threats to the legitimacy and autonomy of international organizations in the context of information confrontation. The article also examines a number of controversial topics raised by the authors of the work under review, including the issue of the correctness and validity of the use of the terms disinformation and fake news on an unsubstantiated basis.
Nine regional international organisations (RIOs) have adopted suspension clauses to defend democracy since 1990, but we have a weak historical understanding of the conditions under which these clauses are designed. The literature has advanced numerous arguments about delegation, generally based on power, preferences and norms. This article asks under what conditions RIO member states support suspension clauses for democracy enforcement, and what shapes their preferences over the design of said clauses. Taking the lock-in hypothesis as a starting point, I offer an alternative explanation to that of regime type: the nature of a state’s anti-democratic experiences determines its preferences for expansive or restrictive multilateral democracy enforcement. States that suffered from external threats to their political regime will prefer a narrow scope and restricted use of suspension clauses, while those that suffered primarily from internal threats will be in favour of a broader role for RIOs and a more readily applicable suspension clause. I test the plausibility of this explanation in a case study which reconstructs the negotiations for the first such suspension clause in this era, the 1992 Washington Protocol amending the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS).
A growing literature examines democratic backsliding, but there is little consensus on when, where, and why it occurs. Reviewing more than 100 recent articles and working papers, this research note argues that inattention to the measurement of backsliding and the underlying concept of democracy drives this disagreement. We propose three remedies. First, we outline several questions that help researchers navigate common measurement challenges. Second, we argue that conceptual confusion around backsliding is driven in large part by inconsistent definitions of democracy. We show how outlining a comprehensive concept of democracy enables researchers to better account for the diversity of instances of democratic backsliding. Our third contribution is drawing attention to a previously overlooked form of backsliding: when governments lose the effective power to govern or voters and elites increasingly disagree about truths and facts. The research note urges scholars to pay closer attention to the conceptualization and measurement of backsliding prior to empirical analysis.
While resistance to international courts is not new, what is new, or at least newly conceptualized, is the politics of backlash against these institutions. Saving the International Justice Regime: Beyond Backlash against International Courts is at the forefront of this new conceptualization of backlash politics. It brings together theories, concepts and methods from the fields of international law, international relations, human rights and political science and case studies from around the globe to pose - and answer - three questions related to backlash against international courts: What is backlash and what forms does it take? Why do states and elites engage in backlash against international human rights and criminal courts? What can stakeholders and supporters of international justice do to meet these contemporary challenges?
Democracy and women’s rights are integrally “bundled” by the international community. This means that dictatorships can signal adherence to international norms by demonstrating progress on gender equality, often in a manner that is consistent with the perpetuation of authoritarian rule. Using a new dataset of de jure advances in women’s rights, we show that dictatorships have vigorously enacted gender-related legislation, at a rate that surpasses democracies in the developing world. This pattern is shaped by international (Western) pressure: Among autocracies, foreign aid dependence and international nongovernmental organization shaming are associated with legal advances in women’s rights, but not with reforms in other, more politically costly areas related to elections, political competition, and repression. Our account therefore highlights selective compliance as a form of adaptation to international pressure and underscores the role of international incentives as a complement to domestic “bottom-up” pressure for women’s rights in dictatorships.
Economic coercion is a threatened or actual imposition of economic costs on one state by another with the objective of extracting a policy concession. While the first wave of research on economic coercion focused primarily on its effectiveness, more recently scholars broadened the scope of inquiry to include states’ motivations for using economic coercion, their choice of coercive instruments, and the scale of coercive efforts. In addition, scholars have evaluated a broad range of indirect and unintended outcomes of economic coercion. Overall, this field of International Political Economy (IPE) research is problem-driven; consequently, the shared focus on the use and outcomes of economic coercion results in a significant degree of engagement and collaboration among sanction scholars.
In an era defined by shifting distributions of power, states are not only pushing for change in formal international organizations, they are increasingly using informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) to mediate change. Why and how do states use IIGOs – institutions without a treaty or secretariat – to manage global power shifts? IIGOs are useful for states on both sides of the power shift. Established powers use IIGOs for system management through ‘collaboration’ and strengthening the ‘hegemonic consensus’ to preserve their institutional privileges while adapting to changing power realities. Rising powers use IIGOs to redistribute through ‘power bargaining’ and ‘rhetorical coercion’ to strengthen their institutional roles without overly disrupting the current order. Established and rising powers also work together to use IIGOs for integrative strategies including ‘cooptation’ and ‘principled persuasion’, creating a mutually beneficial solution that accommodates both increased demands but also mounting responsibilities. IIGOs help states manage power transitions by providing flexible institutional arrangements that facilitate bargaining without freezing outcomes in permanent institutions while the power distribution evolves. We provide case vignettes of the G7 (system management) in the early phase of a power shift, BRICS (redistributive strategies) in the middle phase, and the G20 (integrative strategies) in the later phase.
This article aims to present a complex literature review of recent studies on the role of international institutions in democracy promotion. The articles analyzed were selected through a previous bibliometric study conducted on the Web of Science platform. Based on the considerations obtained through the literature raised, the main gaps and contradictions in the studies in question were identified, suggesting at the end a research agenda for future works.
The six major regional organizations (ROs) covered in this special issue all originated prior to the rise of liberal internationalism, and were repurposed by it. After 1989 they converged towards a common discourse on democratic conditionality, and developed a capacity to discipline and sanction non-compliance, preferring persuasion and appeals to regional norms rather than coercion. This concluding overview highlights the relevance of such metaphors as ecosystem, family resemblance, and peer review; and directs attention to the temporal and spatial scope conditions of the cases considered; and to the bargaining involved. As the ecosystem of liberal internationalism and regional democratic solidarity has faded, ‘pushbacks’ have appeared from regimes ‘targeted’ for sanctions and/or ‘shaming.’ Since states must coexist in permanent interaction with their neighbors, and because the democratic ‘like-mindedness’ of regions fluctuates, such RO stigmatization cannot be a one-shot game. Rather, it will be interactive, and contextually negotiated over time.
Under which conditions do regional organizations in the Americas impose sanctions on member states that violate democracy? To address this question, the article combines a qualitative comparative analysis applied to 55 presumed threats to democracy brought to the attention of regional organizations (ROs), and a process tracing analysis of two cases of the imposition of sanctions. The analysis reveals that ROs impose sanctions despite lack of support or even obstruction by the US, when the threats are committed against the incumbent in relatively weak member states. The unique case in which an RO suspended a relatively powerful state because of threats by the incumbent required the convergence of interests between ROs’ most powerful member states, and the support of the US. The article demonstrates that under specific conditions, ROs in the Americas can become relatively autonomous enforcers of democracy-protection norms.
Did NATO expansion foster democratic development in Eastern Europe? Past scholarship offers conflicting answers to this question. We seek to bring clarity by focusing on the 2004 NATO expansion to include the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We leverage the fact that we now as many years of data since NATO entry as we have between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 2004 NATO expansion. We also use newly available and highly refined data on regime type. We show that NATO membership and anticipation thereof had little to no influence on democratic development in Eastern Europe. However, anticipation of European Union membership appears to have bolstered democratic development. Although the results cannot fully rule out NATO playing a secondary role, they make clear that NATO membership was not a necessary condition for democratic survival in Eastern Europe.
Under what conditions do states withdraw from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)? Recent events such as Brexit, the US withdrawal from UNESCO, and US threats to withdraw from NAFTA, NATO, and the World Trade Organization have triggered widespread concern because they appear to signify a backlash against international organizations. Some observers attribute this recent surge to increasing nationalism. But does this explanation hold up as a more general explanation for IGO withdrawals across time and space? Despite many studies of why states join IGOs, we know surprisingly little about when and why states exit IGOs. We use research on IGO accession to derive potential explanations for IGO withdrawal related to domestic politics, IGO characteristics, and geo-politics. We quantitatively test these potential explanations for withdrawal using an original dataset of 493 IGOs since 1945, documenting about 200 cases of withdrawal. We find that nationalism is not the key driver of IGO withdrawals in the past. Instead, we show that geo-political factors – such as preference divergence and contagion – are the main factors linked to IGO withdrawals, followed by democracy levels in the country and organization. These findings have important implications for research on the vitality of international organizations, compliance, and the liberal world order.
The link between security and economic exchange is widely recognized. But when and how much do geopolitical interests matter for economic cooperation? While existing work focuses on bilateral trade and aid, we examine how geopolitics shapes membership in multilateral economic organizations. We demonstrate that substantial discrimination occurs as states welcome or exclude states based on foreign policy similarity. Biased selection of members can politicize economic cooperation despite multilateral norms of non-discrimination. We test the geopolitical origins of institutional membership by analyzing new data on membership patterns for 231 economic organizations from 1949 – 2014. Evidence shows that security ties shape which states join and remain in organizations at both the formation and enlargement stages. We use a finite mixture model to compare the relative power of economic and geopolitical considerations, finding that geopolitical alignment accounts for nearly half of the membership decisions in economic institutions.
Informal modes of cooperation are a central element of the complex institutional architecture of contemporary global governance. Collectively and individually, the contributions to this special issue broaden the emerging research on informal governance in world politics and provide novel empirical analyses based on unique data. In this introduction, we outline the research questions and puzzles that the special issue addresses. We then sketch three types of informality in world politics: Informality of institutions, within institutions, and around institutions. We discuss each type and provide examples from the contributions to the special issue and the existing literature. We consider how differentiating among these types of informality provides novel insights into the causes of informal global governance. We also identify candidate independent variables which, individually and in combination, should allow researchers to explain the striking variation in the growth and distribution of informal governance in world affairs. We summarize the main findings of the contributions and conclude by outlining an agenda for future research on informal governance in world politics.
Elections are in theory democratic means of resolving disputes and making collective decisions, yet too often force is employed to distort the electoral process. The post-Cold War increase in the number of electoral authoritarian and hybrid states has brought this problem into relief. In recent years the prevention of electoral violence has played an increasingly large role in the democratic assistance activities undertaken by international agencies, following increased awareness within the international community of the specific security challenges that elections entail. However, there has to date been little systematic evaluation of the success of different electoral violence prevention (EVP) strategies in reforming electoral institutions so as to enable them to maintain the peace during the electoral period. This article assesses the effectiveness of two common types of international EVP activity. Using a new global dataset of EVP strategies between 2003 and 2015, this article finds evidence that capacity-building strategies reduce violence by non-state actors, whereas attitude-transforming strategies are associated with a reduction in violence by state actors and their allies. The findings are relevant both for understanding the dynamics of electoral violence, and also for policymakers and electoral assistance providers in the international community who have responsibility for the design of democratic assistance projects in states at risk of electoral violence.
Under what conditions are foreign aid donors willing to suspend foreign aid to punish political transgressions, such as election fraud, corruption scandals or political repression? Prior scholarship has emphasized that political sanctions, including foreign aid suspensions, are constrained by the geostrategic considerations of donor countries. However, foreign aid suspensions often occur in strategically important countries, and donors respond differently to different types of political transgressions within the same county. To shed light on this puzzle, in this article, I present evidence from an original survey of top-level donor representatives in 20 African countries, including a list experiment designed to elicit truthful responses about the conditions under which donors are willing to suspend foreign aid. I argue that the likelihood of a foreign aid suspension depends not only on the strategic considerations of the donor government, but also on the institutional incentives of the donor agency. A donor agency's institutional incentives are shaped by the agency's organizational design, as well as by its foreign aid portfolio in the recipient country.
The citizens of wealthy, established democracies are less satisfied with their governments than they have been at any time since opinion polling began. Most scholars have interpreted this as a sign of dissatisfaction with particular governments rather than with the political system as a whole. Drawing on recent public opinion data, we suggest that this optimistic interpretation is no longer plausible. Across a wide sample of countries in North America and Western Europe, citizens of mature democracies have become markedly less satisfied with their form of government and surprisingly open to nondemocratic alternatives. A serious democratic disconnect has emerged. If it widens even further, it may begin to challenge the stability of seemingly consolidated democracies.
Sanctions are designed to reduce the amount of resources available to the targeted actor and have the potential to be an effective tool for bringing disputing sides in a civil conflict to the bargaining table by altering incentives for continued fighting. Thus, there is reason to believe that sanctions can shorten the duration of civil conflicts. However, once sides in a conflict have moved to the use of violence to settle their dispute, it is hard for sanctions, in isolation, to impose enough cost to convince warring factions that settling a conflict has greater value than what could be expected from continued fighting. In this article, we argue that sanctions, in isolation, are unlikely to affect the duration of civil conflicts. However, when sanctions are combined with military interventions they can contribute to conflict management strategies resulting in shorter civil conflicts. We test our expectations empirically using data on civil conflicts from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Armed Conflict Database and data on economic sanctions from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions Database. Our results suggest that the best hope for sanctions to shorten the duration of civil conflicts is if they are used as part of a comprehensive international response that includes institutional sanctions and military interventions.
Why are some developing countries less open to technical election assistance than to election observation? My argument about who seeks and receives technical election assistance is two-fold, taking into account the incentives of recipients and providers. On the recipient side, governments are less likely to request technical assistance when the political costs are high (autocracy) or the benefits low (strong electoral institutions). On the provider side, international organizations are less likely to provide such technical assistance when the government appears to lack political will for reform and full project implementation is unlikely. Statistical analyses of global data on technical election assistance by the United Nations covering 130 countries from 1990 to 2003 support this argument about political cost-benefit calculations in considering technical assistance. Case examples from Guyana, Indonesia, Haiti, and Venezuela illustrate some of these dynamics. My findings suggest that seemingly complementary international interventions (observation and technical support) can create different incentives for domestic and international actors. This helps explain why some countries tend to agree more often to election observation than to technical election assistance.
Although much research has examined how third parties might affect the success of economic sanctions, scant research has considered the extent to which potential—rather than realized—alternate markets affect strategic behavior between sanctioning (sender) and target states prior to sanction use. We argue that the sender is more likely to threaten or impose sanctions against a potential target with higher trade dependence on the sender, but only under the condition that the target’s ability to redirect lost trade to third parties is low. As the target’s ability to redirect lost trade increases, the sender is less likely to use sanctions because it expects that the target could mitigate the intended costs of the coercion more easily. We capture potential alternate markets using a measure of the total economic capabilities held by the target’s allies, finding support for our expectations in statistical tests using data on U.S. sanctions spanning 1950 to 2005. Our results affirm the importance of accounting for third parties and alternate markets as factors influencing the strategic behavior associated with the use of economic coercion.
Although voluminous research connects the neo-Kantian triad—democracy, economic interdependence, and intergovernmental organization membership—to amelioration of conflict processes, comparatively little is known about how these factors relate to economic coercion. We advance the relevant literature on neo-Kantianism and the determinants of sanction decisions by (1) analyzing the impact of all three neo-Kantian factors on economic coercion and (2) assessing the effects of these factors across both the onset of threat and imposition of sanctions. Results from the time-series, cross-national data analyses indicate a significant but complex connection between the neo-Kantian variables and sanctions. Specifically, we find that although democratic regimes are less likely to threaten each other with sanctions, once a threat is made, democracies are more likely to impose sanctions against each other. Economic interdependence and common IGO membership are likely to increase the probability of sanction threats. Yet, the results also suggest that common IGO membership decreases the probability of sanction imposition while economic interdependence has no statistically significant effect on the decision to impose sanctions. Overall, these results highlight the importance of a more nuanced study of sanction decisions for a better understanding of the factors that lead to sanction use.
Previous research has shown that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. This runs counter to substantive comparative literature on democratization which finds that economic stress is connected with regime collapse and democratic liberalization. To solve this puzzle, we focus on the effects of “democratic sanctions” (those that explicitly aim to promote democracy) which have become the most common type of sanction issued against authoritarian states. We introduce a new data set of imposed sanctions in the period 1990–2010 that clearly separates sanctions according to the explicit goal of the sender. Our cross-sectional time-series analysis demonstrates that although sanctions as a whole do not generally increase the level of democracy, there is in fact a significant correlation between democratic sanctions and increased levels of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. A fundamental mechanism leading to this outcome is the increased instability of authoritarian rule as democratic sanctions are significantly associated with a higher probability of regime and leadership change.
Why did election monitoring become an international norm? Why do pseudo-democrats invite international observers, even when they are likely to be caught manipulating elections? Is election observation an effective tool of democracy promotion, or is it simply a way to legitimize electoral autocracies? This book explains international election monitoring with a new theory of international norm formation. It argues that election observation was initiated by states seeking international support. International benefits tied to democracy give some governments an incentive to signal their commitment to democratization without having to give up power. Invitations to nonpartisan foreigners to monitor elections, and avoiding their criticism, became a widely recognized and imitated signal of a government's purported commitment to democratic elections. The book draws on cross-national data on the global spread of election observation between 1960 and 2006, detailed descriptions of the characteristics of countries that do and do not invite observers, and evidence of three ways that election monitoring is costly to pseudo-democrats: micro-level experimental tests from elections in Armenia and Indonesia showing that observers can deter election day fraud and otherwise improve the quality of elections; illustrative cases demonstrating that international benefits are contingent on democracy in countries like Haiti, Peru, Togo, and Zimbabwe; and qualitative evidence documenting the escalating game of strategic manipulation among pseudo-democrats, international monitors, and pro-democracy forces.
I examine if and how a superpower can use its asymmetric power to achieve favorable outcomes in multilateral bargaining between states that have conflicting interests and veto power. Using a game-theoretic framework, I show that the ability to act outside, either unilaterally or with an ally, helps the superpower to reach agreements that would be vetoed in the absence of the outside option. These agreements, however, are usually not at the superpower's ideal point. Under some conditions, uncertainty about the credibility of the outside option can lead to unilateral action that all actors prefer to avoid. In other circumstances, this uncertainty results in multilateral actions that the superpower (and the ally) would not initiate without multilateral authorization. The model provides useful insights that help explain patterns of decision-making in the United Nations Security Council in the 1990s, including the failed attempt to reach agreement over the Kosovo intervention.
Newspapers print alarming headlines when foreign governments hire U.S.-based lobbyists to promote their interests in Washington D.C. But does foreign lobbying systematically affect U.S. foreign policy? We provide an analysis of the influence of foreign lobbying on one important component of U.S. foreign policy: the evaluation of human rights practices abroad. U.S. human rights ratings can have a large impact on American foreign policy. They affect foreign aid, sanctions, and trade. Thus, we expect that many countries seek to tilt State Department Country Reports on Human Rights in their favor through information they provide to U.S.-based lobbyists. Our statistical analysis of these State Department reports and lobbying data from the Foreign Agent Registration Act between 1976‒2012 shows that, holding other factors equal, more foreign lobbying leads to more favorable U.S. human rights reports—when compared to both previous reports and Amnesty International reports. Furthermore, our findings contribute to the growing literature on performance indicators like human rights ratings by highlighting the politics of how those ratings are generated.
International sanctions have become the instrument of choice for policymakers dealing with a variety of different challenges to international peace and security. This is the first comprehensive and systematic analysis of all the targeted sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations since the end of the Cold War. Drawing on the collaboration of more than fifty scholars and policy practitioners from across the globe (the Targeted Sanctions Consortium), the book analyzes two new databases, one qualitative and one quantitative, to assess the different purposes of UN targeted sanctions, the Security Council dynamics behind their design, the relationship of sanctions with other policy instruments, implementation challenges, diverse impacts, unintended consequences, policy effectiveness, and institutional learning within the UN. The book is organized around comparisons across cases, rather than country case studies, and introduces two analytical innovations: case episodes within country sanctions regimes and systematic differentiation among different purposes of sanctions.
Rising powers often seek to reshape the world order, triggering confrontations with those who seek to defend the status quo. In recent years, as international institutions have grown in prevalence and influence, they have increasingly become central arenas for international contestation. Phillip Y. Lipscy examines how international institutions evolve as countries seek to renegotiate the international order. He offers a new theory of institutional change and explains why some institutions change flexibly while others successfully resist or fall to the wayside. The book uses a wealth of empirical evidence - quantitative and qualitative - to evaluate the theory from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union, League of Nations, United Nations, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. The book will be of particular interest to scholars interested in the historical and contemporary diplomacy of the United States, Japan, and China.
Today a general mood of pessimism surrounds Western efforts to strengthen elections and democracy abroad. If elections are often deeply flawed or even broken in many countries around the world, can anything be done to fix them? To counter the prevailing ethos, Pippa Norris presents new evidence for why programs of international electoral assistance work. She evaluates the effectiveness of several practical remedies, including efforts designed to reform electoral laws, strengthen women’s representation, build effective electoral management bodies, promote balanced campaign communications, regulate political money, and improve voter registration. Pippa Norris argues that it would be a tragedy to undermine progress by withdrawing from international engagement. Instead, the international community needs to learn the lessons of what works best to strengthen electoral integrity, to focus activities and resources upon the most effective programs, and to innovate after a quarter century of efforts to strengthen electoral integrity.
International-relations scholars tend to focus on the formation, design, and effects of international organizations (IOs). However, the vitality of IOs varies tremendously. I argue that IOs end up in one of three situations. They could die off altogether, though this happens infrequently. More commonly, many IOs become “zombies.” They continue to operate, but without any progress toward their mandates. A third category includes IOs that are alive and functioning. I develop a theory to explain an organization's vitality, hinging on the quality of the bureaucracy. In an environment where IOs with similar goals, and with many overlapping members, compete for bureaucrats, the ability of the secretariats to attract talented staff and to enact policy autonomously are associated with whether organizations truly stay active, simply endure, or die off. I demonstrate this proposition using a new measure of the vitality of international economic organizations from 1950 to the present. Around 52 percent of the organizations in the sample are alive and functioning, around 10 percent are essentially dead, and nearly 38 percent are zombies. Using these original data, tests of these propositions support the theory.
We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970-2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of World Bank projects a country receives, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects. The size of World Bank loans, however, is not affected by UN Security Council membership.
International Military Alliances, 1648-2008: This inaugural title in the Correlates of War series from CQ Press catalogs every official interstate alliance signed from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 through the early 21st century, ranking it among the most thorough and accessible reviews of formal military treaties ever published. Maps and introductions showcase the effects of alliances on the region or international system in century-specific chapters, while individual narratives and summaries of alliances simultaneously provide basic information, such as dates and member states, as well as essential insights on the conditions that prompted the agreement. Additionally, separate and/or secret articles are highlighted for additional context and interest.
Democratic backsliding (meaning the state-led debilitation or elimination of the political institutions sustaining an existing democracy) has changed dramatically since the Cold War. Open-ended coups d’état, executive coups, and blatant election-day vote fraud are declining while promissory coups, executive aggrandizement and strategic electoral manipulation and harassment are increasing. Contemporary forms of backsliding are especially vexing because they are legitimated by the very institutions democracy promoters prioritize but, overall, backsliding today reflects democracy’s advance and not its retreat. The current mix of backsliding is more easily reversible than the past mix and successor dictatorships are shorter-lived and less authoritarian.
International commitments pay’ could be the mantra of the current literature on international organisations: tying their hands at the international level is a means for governments to push through politically costly, but ultimately welfare-enhancing reforms. It is argued in this article that this logic has a limit, which can be empirically observed. Past a given point, further depth of integration increases odds of backsliding. This belief is tested in the context of accession to an institution whose rules have been heavily scrutinised: the World Trade Organization (WTO). Countries with low rule of law are imposed a risk premium in the form of demands for deeper concessions, making ‘over-committing’ possible. This relationship is used to assess the extent to which deeper commitments lead to backsliding. Industry-level analysis supports these beliefs: deep commitments lead to increased odds of backtracking through a range of legal and extra-legal mechanisms. Ambitious international commitments can backfire.
This book shows that the third wave of democracy has been accompanied by a worldwide wave of opposition-initiated, election-related protests. Such electoral protests result from a failure on the part of incumbent and opposition elites in the developing world to negotiate acceptable terms of electoral conduct, and their consequences for democracy depend on the context in which they occur. Where election boycotts receive international support, they increase the probability of democratic reform, but where support is primarily domestic, there is a higher probability of authoritarian backsliding. Based on an extensive new data set covering nearly thirty years of electoral protest and election-related reform in the developing world, this book explores the causes of different types of electoral protest and their consequences for democracy. Statistical analysis and case studies provide readers with a complete picture of the dynamics surrounding developing world elections, protest, and democratization.
The more that states depend on oil exports, the less cooperative they become: they grow less likely to join intergovernmental organizations, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and to agree to binding arbitration for investment disputes. This pattern is robust to the use of country and year fixed effects, to alternative measures of the key variables, and to the exclusion of all countries in the Middle East. To explain this pattern, we consider the economic incentives that foster participation in international institutions: the desire to attract foreign investment and to gain access to foreign markets. Oil-exporting states, we argue, find it relatively easy to achieve these aims without making costly commitments to international institutions. In other words, natural resource wealth liberates states from the economic pressures that would otherwise drive them toward cooperation.
Oil is the world's single most important commodity and its political effects are pervasive. Jeff Colgan extends the idea of the resource curse into the realm of international relations, exploring how countries form their foreign policy preferences and intentions. Why are some but not all oil-exporting 'petrostates' aggressive? To answer this question, a theory of aggressive foreign policy preferences is developed and then tested, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Petro-Aggression shows that oil creates incentives that increase a petrostate's aggression, but also incentives for the opposite. The net effect depends critically on its domestic politics, especially the preferences of its leader. Revolutionary leaders are especially significant. Using case studies including Iraq, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, this book offers new insight into why oil politics has a central role in global peace and conflict.
Has globalization diluted the power of national governments to regulate their own economies? Are international governmental and nongovernmental organizations weakening the hold of nation-states on global regulatory agendas? Many observers think so. But in All Politics Is Global, Daniel Drezner argues that this view is wrong. Despite globalization, states--especially the great powers--still dominate international regulatory regimes, and the regulatory goals of states are driven by their domestic interests. As Drezner shows, state size still matters. The great powers--the United States and the European Union--remain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. If they agree, there will be effective global governance. If they don't agree, governance will be fragmented or ineffective. And, paradoxically, the most powerful sources of great-power preferences are the least globalized elements of their economies.
Few scholars have systematically examined whether the world outside a state's borders can influence the prospects for democracy. Jon Pevehouse argues that regional organizations, such as the European Union and the Organization of American States, can have an important role in both the transition to, and the longevity of, democracy. Combining statistical analysis and case study evidence, Pevehouse finds that regional organizations can be a potent force for instilling and protecting democracy throughout the world.
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. This version of the data extends the temporal domain, corrects errors, updates cases that were ongoing as of the last release, and includes a few additional variables. We describe the dataset, paying special attention to the key differences in the new version, and we present descriptive statistics for some of the key variables, highlighting differences across versions. Since the major change in the dataset was to more than double the time period covered, we also present some simple statistics showing trends in sanctions use over time.
Democratization in the developing world is, according to Samuel Huntington, an important - perhaps the most important - global political development of the late twentieth century. While scholars of comparative politics have explored the domestic political economy of democratic transitions, they, along with scholars of international relations, also recognize that international actors, particularly international organizations (IOs), are crucial for successful political transformation.
Several contemporary international incidents suggest that the threat of expulsion from an international organization is believed to be an effective means of ensuring compliance with international obligations. Professor Sohn argues that the effectiveness of this sanction can be judged only in light of its history. After an exhaustive review of expulsion practices in the League of Nations, the United Nations, and various other international agencies, Professor Sohn concludes that outright expulsion is unlikely to achieve any useful long-range purpose. Professor Sohn goes on to suggest other, more promising techniques which may increase the likelihood of a nation's compliance with a particular obligation without necessitating the severance of all relations with the relevant international organization.
Much theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to the study of democratic consolidation. Most of this literature, however, ignores international influences on the consolidation process. This lack investigation is especially troublesome given assertions by policymakers that outside assistance, including membership in international organizations, can support the consolidation process. I develop and test a theory of how membership in regional organizations can influence the process of democratic consolidation. I contend that regional IOs are not an outside entity forcing their preferences upon new democratic regimes, but that regional IOs are used by young democratic regimes to consolidate reforms through multiple causal mechanisms. I discuss both the demand for regional organizations as well as supply-side factors. I test the argument using event history analysis to analyze a sample of democracies from 1950 to 1992. I find that the joining of certain regional organizations is associated with increased longevity for new democracies.
Debates about NATO's future usually focus on missions, capabilities, and expansion--but figuring out how to keep wayward members in line is at least as important.
The study of political institutions in general and international cooperation in particular has been beneficially influenced by the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game model, but there is a mistaken tendency to treat PD as representing the singular problem of collective action and cooperation. By relaxing the assumptions of 2 x 2 games and developing an alternate model of the coordination game, I show how some cooperation problems have very different properties from those found in PD. The analytical results of the two games are compared across several important dimensions: number of strategies available, number of iterations of the game, numbers of players, and the distribution of power among them. The discussion is illustrated with specific problems of international cooperation, and the implications of alternative cooperation problems for the formation and performance of international regimes are explored. The basic solutions for PD and coordination have divergent ramifications for the institutionalization, stability, and adaptability of regimes and for the role of hegemony in the international system. However, the coordination model does not replace the PD model but complements and supplements it as a way to understand the diversity of political institutions. These results are widely applicable to areas of politics beyond international relations.
This article presents a new data set on one of the most visible features of institutional design - voting rules. The data set covers 266 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that vary in size and substantive scope and includes data on IGO issue area and founding membership characteristics that complement the measures on voting rules. The article outlines the characteristics and categorization of voting rules in the data set and establishes the broader importance of voting rules by illustrating how they help states achieve four core institutional design objectives: control, compliance, responsiveness, and effective membership. The utility of the data set and patterns in the relationships between its variables are identified through the evaluation of preliminary propositions connecting institutional context and voting rule selection. The preliminary findings emerging from this analysis establish a platform for further analyses of voting rules in IGOs, as well as other dimensions of the design and function of IGOs.
Do intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) screen out conflict-prone states? We argue that IGOs have incentives to guard against admitting new members that pose significant security risks. Using a data set based on state–IGO pairings, we find clear evidence of screening: As security risk increases, the probability of IGO membership declines. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for possible selection bias when studying the effects of IGO membership on conflict. Indeed, the types of IGOs sometimes found to be most effective at promoting peace—namely highly institutionalized organizations and those with a security mandate—also prove particularly selective and sensitive to risk.
Chapman, Terrence L. and Stephen Chaudoin (2012) Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12005 © 2012 International Studies Association
What types of countries have ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court? Because the court relies on state cooperation, it is a good example of a regime facing a “participation problem.” In order to be effective, the regime requires active members, but states that fear regime effectiveness will therefore find it potentially costly to join. We analyze the extent to which this problem plagues the ICC. We find that countries for whom compliance is likely to be easiest—democracies with little internal violence—are the most likely countries to join the ICC. On the other hand, countries with the most to fear from ICC prosecution, nondemocracies with weak legal systems and a history of domestic political violence, tend to avoid ratification. We contrast our findings with those of a recent article by Simmons and Danner (2010), arguing that ratification patterns show evidence of credible commitments. Our analysis across a breadth of evidence, both descriptive and multivariate, suggests caution toward arguments about the impact of the ICC on global practices and provides support for the notion that states strategically select themselves into supranational judicial agreements.
When states with limited evidence in their history to suggest that they are committed to good governance join a democratic international organization (IO), to what extent do they respect IO requirements? Focusing on the European Union (EU) and its Central and Eastern European members, this contribution presents the first systematic analysis based on longitudinal data in the existing literature suggesting that control of corruption in these countries has significantly weakened after accession. The findings suggest that the EU's political leverage (i.e., its ability to offer electoral incentives to opposition parties in national legislatures and, hence, mobilize them to pressure governments to deliver reforms) is a key determinant of the change in state performance. As political leverage weakens substantially following accession, governments favoring economic policies prone to corruption help account for the negative change in control of corruption.
With the end of the Cold War, the International Monetary Fund emerged as the most powerful international institution in history. But how much influence can the IMF exert over fiercely contested issues in domestic politics that affect the lives of millions? In Lending Credibility, Randall Stone develops the first systematic approach to answering this question. Deploying an arsenal of methods from a range of social sciences rarely combined, he mounts a forceful challenge to conventional wisdom. Focusing on the former Soviet bloc, Stone finds that the IMF is neither as powerful as some critics fear, nor as weak as others believe, but that the answer hinges on the complex factor of how much credibility it can muster from country to country. Stone begins by building a formal, game-theoretic model of lending credibility, which he then subjects to sophisticated quantitative testing on original data from twenty-six countries over the 1990s. Next come detailed, interview-based case studies on negotiations between the IMF and Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and Bulgaria. Stone asserts that the IMF has exerted startling influence over economic policy in smaller countries, such as Poland and Bulgaria. However, where U.S. foreign policy interests come more heavily into play, as in Russia, the IMF cannot credibly commit to enforcing the loans-for-policy contract. This erodes its ability to facilitate enduring market reforms. Stone's context is the postcommunist transition in Europe and Asia, but his findings carry implications for IMF activities the world over.
How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17 per cent of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explain how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia and Argentina.
This article analyzes the European Union's reactions to breaches of liberal democratic practices in Hungary and Romania during 2012–13 in order to assess its capacity to lock in democracy in the Member States. The article finds that a combination of partisan politics and weak normative consensus thwarted the EU's ability to use the sanctioning mechanism of Article 7. The effectiveness of alternative instruments that EU institutions used – social pressure, infringement procedures and issue linkage – varied across issues and countries. In Hungary, changes to illiberal practices generally remained limited, but differences in the EU's material leverage explain cross-issue variation. The EU's relative success in Romania suggests that it is not necessarily powerless against democratic backsliding. It might require a demanding constellation of favourable conditions for both social and material pressure, but there are grounds for a more optimistic interpretation that material leverage might be unnecessary if the conditions for social pressure are favourable.
Does democratization make states join existing international organizations (IOs)? Previous research suggests that democratization increases a state’s propensity to join IOs capable of assisting in the distribution of public goods and establishing credibility for domestic reforms. We argue that this is not the case. Instead, recent democratization has a strong effect on a state’s propensity to form new IOs. Since democratizing states face different governance problems than established democracies, existing IOs may not be a good “fit.” Additionally, established democracies might hesitate to allow democratizing states membership in the most lucrative existing IOs, thereby making immediate accession to such IOs not “feasible.” Quantitative analysis shows that democratization has a strong and consistently positive effect on the probability of forming a new IO, but not on the probability of joining an existing IO. The findings suggest that international cooperation theorists should begin to analyze forming new and joining existing IOs as alternative strategies that states can use to achieve their policy goals.