Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia
... As a result, the situation threatened to escalate into open conflict, with localized clashes risking escalating into a wider regional war involving NATO and Russian forces. The high readiness of military forces and the availability of advanced weapons only increased the risk of rapid escalation, making a total Russian victory a scenario with far-reaching and profound consequences (Kofman & Lee, 2023;Charap & Colton, 2016). ...
... Since the Russian missiles raining down on Ukraine are being launched from Russian territory, the implication is that the attacks can continue with impunity. Although aimed at preventing a wider conflict, this decision by the leaders of the escalation has significant moral and humanitarian consequences, suggesting that the associated loss of life and material destruction is acceptable (Charap & Colton, 2016). ...
... This coalition, if successful, could lead to the partition of a significant part of Ukraine under NATO's de facto protection. Although uncertain, the potential inclusion of Crimea in this buffer zone would represent a substantial obstacle for Russia, indicating a losing war (Charap & Colton, 2016). Such a scenario would introduce an element of strategic ambiguity, complicating the task for Russian military planners. ...
This article elaborates on the theoretical framework of the security dilemma concept through the lenses of regionalism by applying it to the geopolitical dynamics of the Black Sea region. The overall purpose of this study is to examine the strategic perceptions of the major regional actors and their impact on Eastern European security architecture. It explains how the parties' behavior, indirectly involved in strategic competition and seeking to maximize their own security, unintentionally exacerbates regional tensions. Through empirical evidence and theoretical analysis, the research provides a deep understanding of the balance of power and the security challenges in this strategically significant area.
... Together with Georgia and Moldova, Ukraine signed the AAs with the EU on 27 June 2014. Meanwhile, the US Treasury Department imposed more sanctions on Russia in the following areas: financial, defence, and energy sectors (Charap & Colton, 2017). Even at those times, although Moscow denied its involvement, Ukraine and NATO were informed of the construction of troops and military equipment by Russia near Donetsk and Luhansk and Russian cross-border shelling. ...
... On 5 September 2014, the Minsk Agreement (Minsk-I) was signed between representatives of Russia, Ukraine and separatists (Donetsk People's Republic-DNR and Luhansk People's Republic-LNR) and a ceasefire was signed in Minsk City of Belarus. From time to time, repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement took place between both sides, which sometimes turned into a 'trench war' (Charap & Colton, 2017;Chadwick, 2022). ...
... The negotiations went through the night 'between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, French President Francois Hollande, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel'. The Minsk II agreement included the following key points: 1) immediate and full bilateral ceasefire, 2) withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides, 3) release of all hostages and other illegally detained people, 3) full Ukrainian government control over the state border would be restored, and 4) withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, weapons, and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory (BBC, 2015;Charap & Colton, 2017). After this entire 2014 Ukraine crisis, Wilson (2014) stated that 'Russia's action was really Putin's action". ...
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has highlighted Poland's significant geopolitical role in Eastern Europe. Despite ongoing conflicts since 2014, the recent escalation has increased regional security volatility, particularly for countries like Poland. This study examines Poland's strategic position and role in the Ukraine conflict by analysing its geopolitical and geostrategic implications within the broader Eastern European framework. The research, employing qualitative content analysis and a phenomenological approach, investigates how Poland's geopolitical stance both influences and is influenced by the evolving dynamics of the Ukraine war and Eastern European geopolitics. Our findings indicate that Poland has not only reinforced its strategic importance in the area, but also shaped its role as a key player in the ongoing conflict. This engagement reflects a broader strategy to counter Russian aggression while strengthening ties with NATO and the EU, thereby enhancing its sway in the region.
... Together with Georgia and Moldova, Ukraine signed the AAs with the EU on 27 June 2014. Meanwhile, the US Treasury Department imposed more sanctions on Russia in the following areas: financial, defence, and energy sectors (Charap & Colton, 2017). Even at those times, although Moscow denied its involvement, Ukraine and NATO were informed of the construction of troops and military equipment by Russia near Donetsk and Luhansk and Russian cross-border shelling. ...
... On 5 September 2014, the Minsk Agreement (Minsk-I) was signed between representatives of Russia, Ukraine and separatists (Donetsk People's Republic-DNR and Luhansk People's Republic-LNR) and a ceasefire was signed in Minsk City of Belarus. From time to time, repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement took place between both sides, which sometimes turned into a 'trench war' (Charap & Colton, 2017;Chadwick, 2022). ...
... The negotiations went through the night 'between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, French President Francois Hollande, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel'. The Minsk II agreement included the following key points: 1) immediate and full bilateral ceasefire, 2) withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides, 3) release of all hostages and other illegally detained people, 3) full Ukrainian government control over the state border would be restored, and 4) withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, weapons, and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory (BBC, 2015;Charap & Colton, 2017). After this entire 2014 Ukraine crisis, Wilson (2014) stated that 'Russia's action was really Putin's action". ...
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has highlighted Poland's significant geopolitical role in Eastern Europe. Despite ongoing conflicts since 2014, the recent escalation has increased regional security volatility, particularly for countries like Poland. This study examines Poland's strategic position and role in the Ukraine conflict by analysing its geopolitical and geostrategic implications within the broader Eastern European framework. The research, employing qualitative content analysis and a phenomenological approach, investigates how Poland's geopolitical stance both influences and is influenced by the evolving dynamics of the Ukraine war and Eastern European geopolitics. Our findings indicate that Poland has not only reinforced its strategic importance in the area, but also shaped its role as a key player in the ongoing conflict. This engagement reflects a broader strategy to counter Russian aggression while strengthening ties with NATO and the EU, thereby enhancing its sway in the region.
... As the world enters the 21st century, Russia has positioned itself as a significant player in strategic power competition. It seeks to regain its global influence and challenge existing power structures, particularly in realms such as military advancements, energy dominance, and assertive foreign policies (Charap & Colton, 2017). Russia's strategic power competition in the 21st century is explored by its policy actors through deliberate and specific endeavors in today's global politics (Gregory, 2017). ...
... Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and Syria further demonstrates its willingness to wield military power to secure its interests (Ibid). Charap and Colton (2017) contend that Russia holds significant leverage in the global energy sector, particularly through its vast natural gas reserves and extensive pipeline infrastructure. ...
... Examples such as military interventions, energy control through pipelines, state-sponsored cyber activities, and assertive actions in neighboring regions illustrate Russia's strategic power competition (Gregory, 2017;Charap & Colton, 2017). ...
Strategic power competition has emerged as a key feature of 21st-century international politics. This article aims to explore the dynamics of strategic power competition, its implications, and the strategies employed by major global players. The methodology involves an extensive review of scholarly articles, policy papers, and relevant literature. The aim is to provide a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of strategic power competition in 21st-century international politics. Terminologies such as strategic power, competition, and international politics are defined to establish a common understanding. The theoretical framework employed is realism, which highlights the role of states as rational actors pursuing their self-interests. Recommendations for navigating this complex landscape are provided, emphasizing the importance of multilateralism, diplomatic engagement, and the pursuit of win-win outcomes. In conclusion, this article highlights the need for proactive and nuanced approaches in managing strategic power competition to ensure global stability and cooperation.
... Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO evolved from a traditional defensive pact into an expanding politico-military alliance, fundamentally altering the region's security architecture (Goldgeier, 1999;Sarotte, 2014). From Moscow's perspective, NATO's eastward enlargement in 1999NATO's eastward enlargement in , 2004, and subsequent years constituted the institutional and military projection of Western influence eastward-an act directly targeting Russia's strategic sphere of influence (Charap & Colton, 2017;Kanet & Piet, 2014;Menon & Rumer, 2015). Despite Western narratives emphasizing the "benevolent" and liberal nature of this expansion, Russian foreign policy elites and realist scholars had long warned that such a trajectory would provoke a strategic recalibration and defensive response from Russia (Averre, 2010;Cadier & Light, 2015;Mearsheimer, 2014;Tsygankov, 2013). ...
... In the anarchic international system, states are compelled to adopt defensive and balancing measures in response to unstable security environments (Grieco, 1988;Kazharski, 2017;Waltz, 1979). Ukraine's dual geopolitical position-as a potential member of NATO and the European Union on the one hand, and historically linked to Russia's strategic sphere on the other-has rendered it a strategic fault line in the post-Cold War order (Charap & Colton, 2017;Menon & Rumer, 2015). This contradiction was exacerbated by repeated Western support for pro-European movements in Kyiv, such as the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013-2014 Euromaidan uprising-both of which were viewed in Moscow as Western-sponsored coups (Grycak, 2022;Kyrydon et al., 2022;Sakwa, 2015). ...
This study, drawing on a structural realist analytical approach, investigates the systemic drivers of the NATO–Russia confrontation and its ultimate outcome in the form of the Ukraine War in 2022. Through a combination of comparative historical analysis, process tracing, and discourse analysis, it reconstructs the evolution of threat construction, strategic misperceptions, and entrapment in alliance patterns from the post–Cold War period to the present. The findings indicate that the gradual expansion of NATO, the collapse of geopolitical buffer zones, and the ontological insecurity of Russian elites have intensified a mutually reinforcing security dilemma. By analyzing military doctrines, elite speeches, and strategic documents, this research demonstrates how the erosion of deterrence transparency, the resurgence of securitization, and civilizational discourse have transformed a structural conflict into a military confrontation. In this context, Ukraine, as a patterned buffer state, has become entangled in the spiral of alliance ambiguity and the logic of strategic isolation. Contrary to liberal or constructivist interpretations, this war is not viewed as the result of miscalculations or ideological divergences, but rather as the inevitable outcome of structural transformations in power polarization and the institutional consolidation of alliances. This study highlights the limitations of diplomatic crisis management without structural recalibration of the international system and offers new theoretical insights into civilizational realism and ontological insecurity during periods of multipolar transition.
... While Russian strategic culture can be seen as universal, it is also important to recognise the special place of Ukraine in particular in Russian thinking. This is given both by its size and economic importance (Götz & Staun 2022: 486-7), making it the most important of the in-between countries between the Western alliances and Russia (Charap & Colton 2018) but also by their emotional and ideological relationship (Kazharski 2022). All these motivations point, albeit pos-On-line first sibly to different degrees, to the Russian desire to keep and dominate Ukraine within its sphere of influence. ...
... In this central goal, the goals toward Ukraine are deeply intertwined with the relationship with the West, as Ukraine was an (active) subject of years of increasingly escalated competition between Russia and the West (Charap & Colton 2018;Stanovaya 2022). Dominating Ukraine within its sphere of influence is clearly seen as incompatible with Ukraine's aspirations to become a member of both NATO and the EU, which was long and loudly opposed by Russia and often reiterated both publicly and privately (e.g. ...
The debate on the failure of the efforts to avert the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is dominated by two narratives presented as mutually exclusive. On the one hand, 'hawks' chastise the West for failing to forcefully confront Russian adventurism earlier. On the other hand, 'realists' criticise the West's overreach in efforts to incorporate Ukraine into the Western structures. Both views implicitly contend that there was only one way to prevent the war. This paper argues that those positions are, in fact, not incompatible and failure to prevent war lies in the habitual mismatch between strategic goals and resources, implicitly recognised by both sides of the debate. Ambitious goals and meagre resources constituted a middle-of-the-road compromise, inadvertently increasing the risk of the war by encouraging Russia to take the opportunity to challenge the West's weakly backed ambitions. In an attempt to draw some tentative lessons, the paper concludes by exploring some hypotheses on why such mismatches between goals and resources occur and persist.
... This approach started to gradually change as the Russian economy rapidly developed due to the exploding energy prices and military reforms in the course of the 2000s (cf. Charap and Colton 2018). As the Kremlin believed that the power balance was swiftly changing in its favour, Russian diplomats were instructed by the political leadership to demand the stronger inclusion of its interests into the European security architecture according to Moscow's improved material standings (Interview 5, May 2022). ...
Russia's first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 marked the culmination of Russia's dissociation from the project of institutionalised pan-European security and from the global liberal order more generally. While not denying the relevance of studying the causes of Russia's attacks on Ukraine, this study focuses on Russia's progressing dissociation from Western institutions that preceded the escalation of military tensions. Processes of dissociation-defined as the intentional distancing from the core rules and norms of institutions-occur rather often and might even become a dominant feature of world politics as deglobalisation proceeds. However, this phenomenon has rarely been tackled in academic research. What has been overlooked in the scholarly debate is the specific forms and underlying causes of dissociations from multilateral arrangements. Delving into the controversial history of Russia's drifting away from the European security regime complex after the end of the Cold War this paper demonstrates why Russia's leadership felt so estranged from the order whose creation it actively endorsed. Based on more than 30 interviews with experts of Russian foreign policy as well as Russian and Western diplomats and policymakers, this paper demonstrates how Moscow's disenchantment with European security institutions intensified as these institutions appeared in the Kremlin's eyes structurally unresponsive to evolving dynamics in Russian-Western relations.
... However, analyzing a broader geopolitical implication of the expansion, Charap (2017) argued that it has led to a security dilemma in Europe. In other words, NATO has expanded, Russia has felt increasingly threatened, leading to a militarized response. ...
This paper investigates the multifaceted nature of U.S.-Russia relations, spanning from the Cold War era to contemporary time. Through an analysis of historical legacies and critical insights, the study explores the enduring influence of Cold War dynamics on bilateral relations and the complexities of strategic competition amidst mutual distrust between Russia and the United States of America. Key historical events, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO expansion, are examined to elucidate their continued impact on contemporary policies and attitudes. Guided by the realist theory, the study adopted a descriptive and analytical research design. While utilizing data collected largely from secondary sources, the research delves into contemporary challenges including cybersecurity threats, economic interdependencies, and proxy conflicts, underscoring the intricacies of navigating U.S.-Russia relationship in the 21st century. The study concludes that while Cold War legacies present significant challenges to U.S.-Russia relations, there is room for constructive engagement and cooperation. Both countries possess agency and the capacity to transcend historical grievances through dialogue, diplomacy, and mutual understanding. It is recommended that policymakers prioritize diplomacy and strategic communication in addressing mutual grievances and fostering greater cooperation between the two countries.
... This was seen as a breach of Russia's security thresholds. The loss of Ukraine to NATO would severely impede Russia's military access to the Black Sea, an area of considerable strategic and economic significance (Charap & Colton, 2017). ...
The 2022 Russian incursion into Ukraine marks a turning point in global geopolitics, destabilizing the post-Cold War international framework and reshaping European security. This study highlights the invasion as a consequential reaction to NATO's eastward expansion, viewed by Russia as an existential threat. For over two decades, Russia has underscored Ukraine's NATO membership as a critical red line, perceiving it as a direct challenge to its territorial integrity and strategic depth. The research problem centers on understanding whether Russia's actions reflect unprovoked aggression or a defensive strategy necessitated by perceived encroachments on its sphere of influence. The study seeks to unravel the motivations behind Russia's intervention and the implications for global stability. The study employs Mackinder's Heartland Theory and Spykman's Rimland Theory to contextualize the invasion as part of great power competition, illustrating Russia's attempts to preserve its influence in Eurasia. The findings suggest that the West's failure to address Russia's legitimate security concerns has exacerbated global instability. Policy recommendations advocate a balanced European security framework that accommodates the interests of all stakeholders.
... The war has fundamentally reshaped global security paradigms, highlighting the critical role of logistics in sustaining modern military operations [8]. Russia's aggression was driven by historical, geopolitical, and ideological motives, including attempts to reassert influence over former Soviet territories and counter Ukraine's aspirations toward European integration [9]. ...
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has underscored the critical role of efficient military supply chains in sustaining defense operations. This study examines the pivotal contributions of NATO in strengthening Ukraine's military logistics, focusing on the alliance's material, technical, and financial support. NATO's involvement has facilitated the delivery of modern equipment, the establishment of logistical hubs in neighboring countries, and the enhancement of supply chain interoperability through standardization and technological integration. The research explores how NATO's logistical support has enabled Ukraine to mitigate vulnerabilities, adapt to disrupted supply routes, and sustain its operational readiness despite challenges such as infrastructure damage and geopolitical risks. Additionally, the study highlights the strategic importance of regional coordination, including the role of Poland, Romania, and Slovakia as transit hubs for military supplies. By analyzing case studies and official reports, this paper identifies key lessons learned from NATO's logistical interventions, offering insights into the future of alliance-based support in military operations. The findings underscore the significance of robust international partnerships in maintaining resilient supply chains during high-intensity conflicts, with implications for regional security and NATO's strategic preparedness.
... The crisis was mitigated through sustained diplomatic efforts, which included several rounds of talks between Russia, the United States, NATO, and other European powers. At stake were the differing positions regarding security guarantees that Russia required-the withdrawal of NATO forces in Eastern Europe and the commitment that Ukraine would not join the alliance (Charap & Colton, 2017). The hardest issues facing them were the security guarantees demanded by Russia, which included the withdrawal of NATO forces from Eastern Europe and an undertaking that Ukraine would not join the alliance. ...
Among the dramatic events of the Russo-Ukrainian War was the Siege of Mariupol in 2022, with the use of human shield tactics and resulting human casualties among civilian populations. This study will therefore assess the extent of human shielding the Ukrainian and Russian forces to ascertain the effects on the civilian population, and zero in on the legal implications under international humanitarian law. A descriptive qualitative research approach was used in this research, whereby information was obtained through wide-scale literature research, specifically reports by international bodies, educational material, and journalistic information by trusted sources. Both parties have done much to bring war closer to civilians and deny humanitarian groups access to them: deploying military infrastructure near residential areas and refusing access and evacuations. Like in most conflicts, civilians have accounted for most of the casualties; destroyed structures in cities or other critical parts were not spared, which has serious humanitarian effects. The study concludes that the use of human shield tactics in Mariupol involves grave violations of IHL and, in this respect, underlines an urgent need for strict adherence to legal norms in the protection of civilians during hostilities.
... This reliance on Russian energy leaves such countries vulnerable as Russia has been known to cut off supplies during disputes or conflicts (Zachmann et al. 2022). Favourable energy deals were used to leveraging energy dependencies, enabling Russia to broker indirect alliances with a number of EU member states, undermining the cohesion of the union, whilst ensuring the establishment of a strong buffer preventing NATO expansion into former Soviet territory (Colton and Charap 2017). The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is another clear example of these geostrategic machinations (Goldthau 2016). ...
The post-Soviet period has seen dramatic political upheaval across Eastern Europe and the Caucuses. The shadow cast by centuries of Russian influence on Eurasia still affects political tensions in the region. Previous studies have examined both Russian foreign policy in the twenty-first century and the implications of parastates on Russia's periphery. This study focuses on the intersection of these issues, identifying parastates as a political wedge used by Moscow to maintain buffer states between its borders and NATO. It presents a comparative analysis of three parastates that are supported by Russia: Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. The study finds that Russia supports post-Soviet parastates to perpetuate political stalemates that undermine stability in countries that act as buffers between Russian and NATO borders. This highlights opportunities for further research on a foreign policy tool that can be used to significantly influence regional security.
... In other words, Putin had no time for the lofty-sounding aspirations that followed on the heels of "the end of history," particularly when pitched in terms of 'universal' values that were indistinguishable from Western national interests. To believe that being told by US President Bush that "democracies are good things to have on your border" (quoted in Charap andColton 2017, 1794) would alleviate Putin's concerns about NATO enlargement is a striking example of misreading Russia. ...
A key part of the contemporary Russia challenge is the West’s tendency to misread that country, both its capacity for reform and the West’s own impact on the choices that have shaped its trajectory. Excess faith in the power of the market and the applicability of social science theories skewed Western policy toward Russia in the 1990s, fuelling the xenophobic and nationalistic narratives that laid the foundations of Putinism. Misreading Russia’s historical insecurities after the collapse of the USSR ensured that US triumphalism would play badly in Moscow, contributing to the toxic environment in which Putin ultimately opted to invade Ukraine. None of this justifies the recent excesses of the Putin regime, but it does help to make them intelligible. Appreciating how the West has misread and mismanaged Russia in the past should contribute to more realistic and more effective approaches in the future. La Russie incomprise Un élément capital de l’« énigme russe » repose dans la tendance occidentale à mal interpréter la Russie, tant dans sa capacité pour la réforme que dans l’impact que l’Occident lui-même a pu avoir sur les décisions qui ont déterminé sa trajectoire. Durant les années 1990, une foi excessive en le pouvoir de l’économie de marché et en l’application des théories des sciences sociales a biaisé la politique occidentale vis-à-vis de la Russie, alimentant les courants xénophobes et nationalistes qui sont à la source du poutinisme. L’incompréhension des insécurités historiques de la Russie après la chute de l’URSS a fait en sorte que le triomphalisme américain a été mal reçu à Moscou, ce qui a contribué à la création de l’environnement toxique qui entourait Poutine et a, ultimement, participé à l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine. Rien de cela ne justifie les récents excès du régime de Poutine, mais cela permet de les rendre plus intelligibles. Décortiquer comment l’Occident a échoué à comprendre et à gérer le cas de la Russie par le passé devrait permettre d’établir des approches plus réalistes et efficaces pour le futur.
... Looking at the literature on the annexation of Crimea, I found that one group of scholars see the conflict as a product of the EU's penetration into Russia's traditional "near abroad" and a misunderstanding of Russia's interests, which, in their eyes, pushed Russia into protecting its security (Mearsheimer 2014;Sakwa 2015;Charap and Colton 2017). On the other hand, some scholars stress illegality of Russian annexation of Crimea (R. Allison 2014; Averre and Wolczuk 2016) and hold that Russia damaged security on the European continent (Haukkala 2016;Gehring, Urbanski, and Oberthür 2017). ...
What shapes a country’s foreign policy formation in times of crisis? This article explores the factors that were behind the response of Ukrainian decision makers in their relations with Russia and the European Union during the annexation of Crimea between February 21 and March 26, 2014. I view Ukraine’s foreign policy through the lenses of an analytical framework inspired by game theory, where the decision-making process is divided into four parts—information about others’ preferences, trust in interlocutors, everyone’s payoffs, and resources. This article employs a rigorous qualitative thematic analysis of 38 elite interviews, numerous primary documents, and media reports. The core finding suggests that the uncertain times and unpreparedness of Ukrainian decision makers obstructed them from a comprehensive analysis of the environment and formation of the country’s foreign policy strategy, which, consequently, facilitated Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
... Despite substantial scholarly attention and important advances in explaining Georgia's foreign policy (see, for example, Jones 2003, Jones and Kakhishvili 2013, Kakachia and Minesashvili 2015, Coene 2016, Minesashvili 2021, German, Jones and Kakachia 2022, such analyses are often framed through the prism of Russian or European Union (EU) policies -or in terms of the accelerating conflict between Russia and the EU/the collective West. In academic works as well as public debate, Georgia is frequently referred to as one of the states "in-between" Russia and the EU (Charap and Colton 2017, Toal 2017, Dembińska and Smith 2021, as part of a "contested neighbourhood" between these two geopolitical heavyweights (Delcour 2018). Ever since Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and not least, its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, there have been growing concerns that Georgia might become the next battlefield in Russia-West rivalry. ...
In scholarly debates as well as in public discourse, Georgia is often reduced to being one of the states “in-between” Russia and the European Union (EU), and part of a “contested neighbourhood”. The breakaway region of Abkhazia is usually not even credited with that, being treated as a mere appendage to Russia. In this special issue we challenge such approaches by analyzing the forging of Georgia’s and Abkhazia’s strategic paths as much more complex processes than are often assumed. In a context defined by the crisis in Russia–West relations, we explore actorness and agency – in the case of Georgia, within the strategic triangle of Georgia, the EU and Russia; in the case of Abkhazia, within the Abkhazia–Georgia–Russia triangle. Our aim is to expand the scope of analysis in two directions: first, by exploring what actors are shaping Georgia’s and Abkhazia’s strategic orientation, and second, by examining how these actors operate and interact in forging these entities’ strategic paths.
... februarja 2022 sprožila kopensko, zračno in pomorsko ofenzivo na ozemlje Ukrajine. 1 Od izbruha rusko-ukrajinskega konflikta leta 2014 se v strokovni znanstveni literaturi pojavljata dve prevladujoči razlagi motivov delovanja (angl. behaviour) RF v rusko-ukrajinskem konfliktu, ki si nasprotujeta (Felgenhauer, 2016;Monaghan, 2016;Cecire, 2017;Charap in Colton, 2017;Panell, 2019;Hunter, 2022). Skladno s prvo je RF revanšistična država, ki poskuša pridobiti v devetdesetih izgubljen mednarodni položaj velike sile ter priključiti ozemlja nekdanje Sovjetske zveze (SZ) ali ohraniti geopolitični vpliv na teh območjih. ...
The paper examines Russia’s strategic culture and its behaviour in Russia Ukraine conflict between February 2014 and February 2023. It identifies and examines traditional elements of Russian strategic culture, such as territorial expansionism, a tendency towards offensive military action, the perception of the use of military force as an appropriate means to achieve political goals, a paranoid threat perception - the image of the besieged fortress and distrust of the West, fear of coloured revolutions, and the idea of Russia’s greatness and pursuit of international great power status. As the article shows, traditional elements of Russian strategic culture are reflected in and explain Russian Federation’s behaviour in the Russia Ukraine conflict. This pattern confirms the continuity within Russian strategic culture, as its traditional elements are still present and define the contemporary strategic culture of the Russian Federation.
... См. в частности:[Sakwa, 2015;Charap, Colton, 2017]. ...
... But at the same time it has to be noticed that Russia still keeps its military presence and levers of political pressure in these regions. 6 See more in detail in "World Court orders Azerbaijan to ensure free movement to Nagorno-Karabakh". Retrieved 21 March 2023 from: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/world-court-orders-azerbaijan-ensure-free-passage-through-lachincorridor-2023-02-22/ ...
The research paper explores the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on post-Soviet space. Since 2014 the Russian aggression on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is considered as an act of obvious violation of international law as well as an attempt to change the current world order established after the Soviet Union collapse when former Soviet republics gained full independence. But the new situation emerged by Russia's invasion of Ukraine threatens not only the existence of Ukraine as an independent state but it also creates similar threats to other post-Soviet republics that are located in Russia’s so called “near abroad”.
The paper explores Russia's geopolitical interests in post-Soviet era and space towards the former Soviet republics. It emphasizes the peculiarities and impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on ongoing processes in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia. The concept of “Russian world” and its geopolitical provisions are also observed and analyzed. It is argued that this concept has no more potential to be advanced with the use of "soft power" tools. The paper also forecasts a strategic retreat for Russia in post-Soviet space as a probable consequence of the Ukrainian war because of losing by Russia the global information warfare and the lack of international support. It is concluded that Russia's aggression has a real potential to be copied and reproduced by other authoritarian leaders which will aggravate the situation in other post-Soviet conflict zones. At the same time, this war is also considered a struggle between democracy and autocratic rule expansion when the latter has less chance to succeed.
... The various regions of Ukraine were unified after the outbreak of the Second World War. "The historical features of the regions are very different, resulting in extremely complex ethnic and cultural components in various regions of Ukraine and lack of real cultural identity" (Charap & Colton, 2018). ...
This paper aims to conduct an analytical review of the features of the BRI implementation in Ukraine and to give the author’s suggestions on promoting people-to-people and cultural exchanges between China and Ukraine under the Belt and Road Initiative. As a European country, Ukraine has its own unique history and culture. Analysing the roots of Ukrainian philosophy can help us better carry out cultural exchanges between China and Ukraine and promote the development of the Belt and Road Initiative.
... To what extent was invasion a response to provocations by Ukraine or the West? Some analysts hold the West partially responsible for what has happened (Charap and Colton 2017;Taylor 2018, 170-9;Breslauer 2022). The most extreme version of this argument, and the one to receive the widest attention in the media, is made by John Mearsheimer (2014;Chotiner 2022). ...
Steve Fuller has replied to my critique of his endorsement of a post-truth epistemology. I trace the divergence in our approach to social epistemology by examining our distinct responses to the principle of symmetry in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Fuller has extended the concept of symmetry and challenged the field to embrace a post-truth condition that flattens the difference between experts and the public. By contrast, I have criticized the concept of symmetry for policing the field to rule ideology critique out of court. I argue that a focus on post-truth populism obscures the role of counter-elites and ideologies that restrict political choice. A better way to promote democracy would be to support minority positions within science that promise to open up suppressed political possibilities and to seek the coordinated use of different disciplines to address significant public problems.
... To what extent was invasion a response to provocations by Ukraine or the West? Some analysts hold the West partially responsible for what has happened (Charap and Colton 2017;Taylor 2018, 170-9;Breslauer 2022). The most extreme version of this argument, and the one to receive the widest attention in the media, is made by John Mearsheimer (2014;Chotiner 2022). ...
Drawing on my qualitative and quantitative research I show that the motives for war have changed in the course of the last four centuries, and that the causes of war and the responses of others to the use of force are shaped by society. Leaders who start wars rarely behave with the substantive and instrumental rationality assumed by realist and rationalist approaches. For this reason, historically they lose more than half wars than they start. After 1945, the frequency of failure rises to over 80 percent. Rationalists allow for miscalculation but attribute it to lack of information. In most wars, information was available beforehand that indicated, or certainly suggested, that the venture would not succeed militarily or fail to achieve its political goals. The war in Ukraine is a case in point.
Este artículo es fruto de una lectura de la guerra de Ucrania a través de la aportación teórica de Huntington y otros autores. Con el objetivo de determinar cuáles son los elementos más útiles para entender el mencionado conflicto y qué elementos son los que lo explican de una manera más adecuada. Hace también énfasis en la teoría producida por autores rusos, que explica muy bien la posición práctica de su país. Su análisis podría haber impedido o limitado las consecuencias negativas de la guerra. Ignorar la producción científica y la capacidad bélica de un Estado fuerte no suele ser una buena idea. Ya que una de las funciones de la Academia es poder tener la capacidad de entendimiento y explicación de la realidad, que permita también unas relaciones dinámicas entre teoría y práctica, para permitir que se retroalimenten y complementen.
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine marks one of the maximum widespread geopolitical shifts in Europe since the cease of the cold battle, reflecting a complex interplay of strategic, historical, and ideological motivations. This paper investigates whether or not the invasion become by and large a defensive reaction to NATO expansion or part of a broader plan to reassert Russian have an effect on under the idea of a "extra Russia." Drawing on worldwide members of the family theories which includes realism, the safety predicament, and spheres of have an impact on, this look at argues that Russia's moves increase past immediate safety concerns. Moscow has publicly emphasized NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alignment with Western establishments as existential threats, deeper motivations reveal a strategic desire to reestablish dominance over former Soviet territories. The idea of "greater Russia," based on shared old stories and a sense of belonging, shows how important Ukraine is to Russia's foreign policy in both a symbolic and geopolitical way. Russia's modern perspective has been formed by the history of Kievan Rus, the agony of the Soviet Union's breakup, and the lack of strategic depth following the Cold War. In addition, the Kremlin sees Western-backed efforts to bring democracy to Ukraine and navy cooperation there as direct challenges to the stability of its government and local authority. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and guide for separatist movements in eastern Ukraine acted as prelude to the total-scale invasion, demonstrating a slow but decided endeavor to rebuild neighboring hegemony. With the aid of reading respectable rhetoric, coverage shifts, and historical context, this studies demonstrates that the invasion is a calculated assertion of power and identification, not simply a defensive maneuver. Ultimately, the warfare reflects Russia's enduring conflict to redefine its position within the publish-Soviet area and undertaking the Western-led global order. The findings advice a multidimensional motivation, wherein strategic imperatives and nationalistic ideology are deeply intertwined. Introduction:
This chapter critically examines the factors leading to the Russia-Ukraine war, focusing on Western actions and policies. It evaluates whether the West bears primary responsibility for escalating tensions or if accountability is shared. Key issues analyzed include NATO's eastward expansion, Western support for pro-democracy movements in Ukraine, arms control stagnation, and economic sanctions on Russia. It also explores Western involvement in the 2014 Euromaidan protests, the annexation of Crimea, and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. By situating these factors within a broader historical and political context, the paper assesses whether Western actions were provocations or necessary responses to Russian aggression. It aims to contribute to international relations discourse by offering a balanced analysis of the war's causes, informing conflict prevention strategies, and highlighting the unintended consequences of foreign policy decisions in a globalized world.
The article examines the current state and development trends of bilateral relations and strategic partnership between Ukraine and the United States of America in the 21st century. The main aspects of cooperation, including political, security, defense, economic, and humanitarian spheres, are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the role of the U.S. in supporting Ukraine amid Russian aggression, as well as the impact of international agreements, such as the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, on deepening bilateral ties. Based on an analysis of modern geopolitical processes, the prospects for further strengthening of this partnership are forecasted, emphasizing its significance for ensuring regional and global security. The goal of the article is to explore the dynamics of Ukraine-U.S. bilateral relations and strategic partnership at the present stage. The research methodology is based on the principles of scientific rigor, systematicity, and objectivity, employing general scientific methods: analysis and synthesis, systemic analysis, generalization, and comparison. The scientific novelty lies in the comprehensive analysis of contemporary Ukraine-U.S. relations, highlighting key trends and challenges in the context of global security threats and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations. Conclusions. The study identifies the strengthening of strategic partnership between Ukraine and the U.S. as a critical factor in countering modern security challenges, particularly Russian aggression. Prospects for further cooperation include enhanced defense collaboration, economic support, and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. A comprehensive approach, encompassing political, military, and economic dimensions, is essential for the sustainable development of this partnership.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shocked the member states of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and led to the reconsideration of its Strategic Concept as regards “mission”, “capacity”, and “role-share”. In 2014 NATO started facing the “Ukrainian Dilemma” through the “hybrid warfare”. Since then, NATO has been struggling to support Ukraine without directly confronting Russia. This is a fundamental challenge to the concept of the alliance. There are critical implications in the efforts of NATO for the future of Japan and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
This study evaluates the impact of information sources on public engagement in social actions related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Data were collected through an online questionnaire distributed across Albania, achieving a response rate of 83.8% from 500 distributed questionnaires. The survey ensured anonymity and confidentiality of respondents, enhancing the reliability of the data collected. The analysis began with an assessment of the internal consistency of the questionnaire using Cronbach's alpha, which resulted in a value of 0.723, indicating reliable measures. Factor analysis identified five key components influencing opinions on the Russia-Ukraine conflict: information sources and perception of reality, views on external stances and support, concerns about peace and sovereignty, military intervention and neutrality, and influences on Albania’s stance. Multiple regression analysis demonstrated that these factors significantly predict social action participation related to the conflict, with an overall model R² of 0.727. The analysis revealed that well-informed individuals are more likely to engage in social actions, while concerns about Albania's stance have a negative influence. This research underscores the importance of reliable information and external support views in shaping public engagement in social actions. The findings provide a structured understanding of how various factors influence public perceptions and actions, offering valuable insights for policymakers and researchers in conflict and social behavior studies. This paper has some limitation as; inclusiveness of all groups in society equally and psychological biases can affect our observations. Received: 3 November 2024 / Accepted: 31 December 2024 / Published: 05 January 2025
This article examines the development of knowledge about Russia in U.S. academia since the end of the Cold War. American knowledge about Russia, which they view as a threat and challenge to US interests and values, reflects national assumptions, preferences, beliefs, and emotions. Compared to the Cold War era, knowledge about Russia in America has lost its former status of priority and privilege. It has become more politicized, especially in issues affecting international security and the politics of values. In addition, this knowledge is now grounded in the generally accepted theories of international relations and comparative politics in the West. These changes reflect the decline of Russia's status in the global hierarchy compared with the U.S. and the increased conviction of U.S. social scientists in the universal significance of their approaches and theories. Since the second half of the 2000s, Russia has been perceived as developing in the "wrong direction," threatening Western "liberal democratic" values and security, and with its desire to be an "empire" - the very structures of modern society. Although not all American researchers share such concepts and theories, the latter expresses the mainstream's mood in politics and academia.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered numerous assumptions about the drivers of Russian foreign policy, posing a fundamental challenge to the Russia studies community. Against this backdrop, the article centers on the imperative to reflect how we think and examine Russian foreign policy amid considerable transformations in the country’s international as well as domestic realities. This contribution does so by reviewing and critically reassessing past accomplishments and shortcomings within the field of Russian foreign policy research, evaluating their pertinence in a post-2022 context. Focusing on the scholarly work done with regard to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the study demonstrates that the literature suffers from the inertial tendency of offering old answers to new questions, suggesting potential avenues for further scholarly work on this topic.
How will the ongoing war end? Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, multiple unlikely endings are part of extensive public and academic debates: victory/defeat, an armistice/durable cease-fire, or a political settlement/peace deal. By stepping up to the challenge, this study examines war diplomacy in Ukraine and how it relates to the causes and endings of this war. A closer exploration of how Ukraine employs diplomacy in conducting war validates Tarak Barkawi's earlier statement: diplomacy is not the opposite of war. Diplomacy is not to be aligned with peace against war. The main objective is to advance scholarship on war diplomacy by outlining a basic explanatory framework to clarify how war diplomacy links with the causes and endings of war. The central question is: why is war diplomacy showing restraint towards ending the war that followed the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and what would it imply for explaining the causes of this war? The findings break new ground and trigger some novel inquiries.
Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election intensifi ed the divide within American society and the political climate in Washington, causing a signifi cant impact on the relationship between Moscow and Washington. Despite the US political system overcoming the challenges faced during Trump’s presidency, there was also a surge in tensions between the US and Russia. The deterioration of bilateral relations can be attributed to the dysfunctional interagency communication channels and the tightening of sanctions through the CAATSA law. Moscow ultimately shifted its stance from aspiring to normalization to recognizing the likelihood of military-political confrontation. This article presents a hypothesis that comprehensively explains the factors contributing to this shift. The hypothesis underscores the lack of coherence among American political leaders, as four unique interest groups – President Trump, Republican hawks, oppositional bureaucrats, and Democratic Congress members – all contribute to shaping US policy toward Russia. Each group advances its specifi c objectives, sometimes joining forces to bypass the president’s policies. Consequently, a “split subject” phenomenon emerges in US-Russian aff airs. The author concludes that the lack of constructive dialogue with Washington during Trump’s presidency was due to the “split subject.” The victory of J. Biden in the 2020 elections and the alignment of American bipartisan elites amid the Russian-Ukrainian confl ict temporarily shifted this phenomenon to the background. Nevertheless, the author raises the question of whether this “cleavage” might reemerge if Trump or his close associates win the 2024 US presidential election.
Despite the reputation of being non-partisan, experts frequently validate concepts and ideas popular within the dominant elite circles. To support this argument, we have taken a closer look into the Atlantic Council (AC), an American think tank with clear preferences for the US-centered international order and NATO as the foundation of security in Europe. We argue that these preferences have translated into anti-Russian bias in AC publications. This is evident in the organization’s reliance on the concept of global hybrid war in describing the goals and means of Russian foreign policy since 2014. We base our analysis on a sample of articles on Russia and “hybrid war” published by the AC’s experts. In establishing the AC’s pro-NATO and anti-Russian biases, we analyze the articles’ frames as well as the political and institutional preferences held by the organization.KeywordsRussiaExpertsHybrid warAtlantic CouncilWorld order
Decades before Trump, US grand strategy was characterized by a strong continuity of what we call Open Door Globalism consisting of the following: (1) a constant drive for economic expansionism and the (dogmatic) belief that this expansionism is indispensable for US prosperity; (2) a commitment to open markets, and (as since 1945) the promotion of liberal world order (often embedded in a discourse of “democracy promotion”), as the best means of serving this goal of economic expansionism; (3) an ideological commitment to American exceptionalism legitimating the pursuit of the global Open Door. This chapter examines the historical origins of Open Door Globalism and how it evolved from the end of the nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War. We then focus on the three presidencies of the post-Cold War era by briefly describing how all held on the Open Door world view both in theory and in practice. The chapter concludes that despite some variation in means there is much continuity up and until Trump in US grand strategy in terms of its ends.KeywordsUS grand strategyOpen Door GlobalismEconomic expansionismOpen DoorLiberal world orderAmerican exceptionalism
The purpose of this article is to analyze the United States’ support to Ukraine during the war with Russia, as well as in the months leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This issue remains relevant to conceptualizing US assistance to Ukraine to expel Russian forces from its territory. In particular, we claim that among other policy alternatives, the Biden administration deliberately chose to support Ukraine «for as long as it takes». Thus, we analyze the amount and comprehensiveness of support to Ukraine, which we consider to be in Washington’s core interests, as well as US efforts in terms of policy-making. The methodological design of the study is based on discourse analysis as a major method, which allowed us to examine the policy choice of the Biden administration to provide massive and comprehensive support to Ukraine in a critical time of need. When describing US assistance, we apply historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism as the major theoretical paradigms, as there are features of both used by the United States in its bilateral relations with Ukraine. We operate within a confirmatory research design, where the major method is hypothesis testing. The scientific novelty consists of an attempt to conceptualize the so-called Biden doctrine in the context of American assistance to Ukraine in order to sustain it in the war against Russia. We test our hypothesis on three major dimensions: the President’s authority, Congress and the U.S. leadership of NATO, and the Defense Contact Group. The authors conclude that the amount of US support to Ukraine and its comprehensiveness, particularly economic and military aid, indicate that the Biden administration viewed Ukraine as a test of its vision of foreign policy, namely that democracies should prevail over autocracies. Therefore, the unprecedented amount of aid allocated to Ukraine suggests that the support will last as long as it takes.
This article examines how the European Union (EU) reacted to the protests that erupted in Belarus against the re-election of Alyaksandr Lukashenka in 2020 and the repressive measures he took against his political adversaries, using the conceptual lens of resilience and pragmatism, two concepts endorsed in the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) that seem most appropriate for our analysis. However, while resilience is less demanding than the promotion of democracy, it can face obstacles created by a political leadership hostile to external influences, repressive measures against opposition forces and the support of a powerful external actor, in this case, Russia. The EU has thus designed a three-level strategy targeting the current leadership, the leaders of the opposition and the people. This tripartite approach may confer various different meanings on resilience, including resistance. The article reflects critically on resilience in complex situations, highlighting its features, advantages and limitations.
Russia has been a longstanding and time-tested partner for India. Development of India-Russia relations has been a key pillar of India’s Foreign policy. India and Russia have enjoyed good relations since 1947 wherein Russia helped India in attaining its goal of economic self-sufficiency through investment in areas of heavy machine-building , mining, energy production and steel plants. Later India and Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in august 1971 which was the manifestation of shared goals of the two nations as well as blueprint for the strengthening of regional and global peace and security. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, India and Russia entered into a new Treaty of Friendship and cooperation in January 1993 and a bilateral Military-Technical Cooperation agreement in 1994. As the Indian government’s response to the Russian-Ukrainian crisis received a mixed reaction, it puts a serious introspective question to Indian lawmakers: is Indian foreign policy still dependent upon the big superpowers or are we moving towards Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India)? After abstaining in UN Security Council, New Delhi again abstained from voting in United Nations General Assembly on a resolution condemning “in the strongest terms” Russia’s belligerence against Ukraine and calling on Moscow to “immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from Ukraine’s territory within its internationally recognised borders.” In the current crisis, India has strived to maintain a non-aligned collinear, avoiding pointing a finger or naming names. This has proven to be challenging in the present predicament. It has done so by reiterating fundamental principles enshrined in the UN Charter and international law, but also appeals for a halt to violence and to return for dialogue as “the only response to addressing disagreements and conflicts, however daunting that may sound at this time.”
Russia’s ideology concerning the invasion of Ukraine mainly comprises five components: the criticism of the “West,” historical unity of the East Slavs, self-portrait as a great multi-national/multi-religious nation, staging of the “Great Patriotic War” redux, and traditional gender and religious norms.
Based on the three presidential speeches that officially explained the “special military operation” (February 21, February 24, and September 30), this study examines the origins and development of the five components of the Putinesque ideological construction, which is characterized by its haphazardness.
The main body of the alleged motivation of the “operation” is the security threat posed by the “West.” In this context, Russia repeatedly criticized the double standard of the “West” as well as its neo-colonialism. More broadly, the September 30 speech expanded the accusation into a criticism of the so-called liberal international order, implying that Russia recognizes the cleavage between the “North” and the Global South and is attempting to use it as a wedge issue.
The idea that the East Slavs were originally single “narod” long before the modern notion of “nation-state” emerged from Western Europe was popular in the imperial period and continues to affect parts of the contemporary Russian society. With Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as an intellectual reference point, it was revived in post-Soviet Russia and developed with the “Russkii mir” ideology. The present administration recycled it as a justification of Russia-Ukraine “historical unity.”
Despite emphasizing its Slavic element, Russia still holds a multi-national nature. Its self-portrait as a huge multi-national/multi-religious state grew along with its Eurasian identity. In the 1990s, the newly born Russia rediscovered the legacy of classic Eurasianism. Since then, groups of diplomats and practitioners, as well as influential public intellectuals such as Aleksandr Panarin, have contributed to its spread in the political circle. Given the present situation of an increasing number of ethnic minorities being sent to the frontlines in Ukraine, it is essential for the Putin administration to emphasize its pride of the multi-national identity.
On one hand, President Putin severely criticized the Soviet nationalities policy. On the other hand, the administration devoted much energy to choreographing the redux of the Second World War. The historical memory and family story of the “Great Patriotic War” is a valuable asset shared by the Russian society, which can unite the nation and create a patriotic atmosphere. Moreover, a considerable number of political elites maintain continuity with the Soviet period―it is no wonder the administration attempts to appeal to the Soviet nostalgia.
The final ideological element comprises the traditional values of gender and religion. Since its third term, Putin administration has adopted it both as a tool to obtain support from the conservatives as well as the Orthodox Church and as an outreach strategy abroad.
With anti-liberalism as the core based on strong antagonism toward the “West,” which behaves as “the winner of Cold War,” these ideological branches have been bound together in an eclectic manner. As a result, the current ideological production contains contradictions and seems complex at first glance.
The Ukrainian economic crisis began with the start of the war and grew over time. This is because trade between countries was spread out because of problems with the supply chain. However, the energy sector in Ukraine is largely disturbed by this armed conflict. The purpose of this study was to test the impact of infrastructure damage, trade sanctions, the economic crisis, and energy investments in green energy in Ukraine through the lens of sustainable development goals (SGDs). The data is collected from the Ukrainian public, and the sample size for this research is 384. This research has used the structural equation modeling method by using Smart PLS 3 for data analysis. The findings of the study suggest that a green energy transition is possible when the Ukrainian government works on SDGs to manage the economic crisis and increases investments in the energy sector. The moderation of SGDs is considered a way forward for development in Ukraine. The novelty of this research is based on its framework, which is a new addition to a piece of knowledge. This research has extended knowledge by presenting new relationships related to the green energy transition. The limitations of this research are presented in conjunction with future directions that are a reliable way for scholars to contribute further to this area of research.
In this fully revised and updated in-depth analysis of the war in Ukraine, Paul D'Anieri explores the dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually resulted in Russia's invasion in 2022. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a 'civilized divorce,' led to Europe's most violent conflict since WWII. It argues the conflict came about because of three underlying factors-the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the prospects of resolution of the Ukraine conflict.
This chapter adds to the debate on NATO expansion in two ways that depart from standard practice. First, it makes explicit the theoretical models that the debate relies upon. Second, it carefully traces Russian discourse and behavior over time. The results show that NATO centrality rather than simply NATO expansion is the root issue. It best captures the historical origins of the problem and is most consistent with the Russian evidence. Indeed, the findings demonstrate that Russia’s cooperative moves vis-à-vis NATO were premised upon Moscow’s strongly revisionist preferences regarding the European security architecture. Extending the point, it argues that the US–NATO–Russia spiral is best understood as an offensive-realist tragedy as opposed to a security dilemma or a standoff between one pure security-seeking state and one greedy expansionist. The key protagonists were both revisionists whose preferences and grand strategies brought them into conflict. Central to the whole story is not classical territorial security threats, but much broader conceptions of security.
How are foreign policies developed during times of conflict? This question is often approached by scholars. Here I focus on individual policymakers’ decisions and employ a novel game-theory-inspired analytical framework in foreign policy analysis. The article studies Ukrainian leaders’ decision-making in relations with Russia and the European Union in the first turbulent months of the war in Donbas (April–August 2014). Understanding the beginning of this war holds high relevance in light of the current full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. This research is based on analysis of 38 interviews with EU, Ukrainian, and Russian policymakers, and analysis of documents.
The military conflict between Russia and Ukraine that is also a conflict between Russia and the United States and its NATO allies is fundamentally a result of two interconnected factors. The first is the threat to the security of Russia posed by the enlargement of NATO in violation of commitments made at the time of the reunification of Germany and of the principle of indivisible security. The second is deeply rooted internal divisions in Ukraine that were exacerbated by ethnic nationalism and the imposition of divisive national identity that led to demands for a degree of regional autonomy and a civil war that successive governments and external parties did not or did not want to resolve. In these years Ukraine served as an instrument in a US strategy to weaken a strategic rival, prevent Eurasian integration and preserve the unipolar order that had emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union. On present trends the losers will be Ukraine as it existed until February 2022, Europe and Germany although, depending on the outcome, it may also accelerate the transition to a new multipolar world order.
The "Russian Idea" in International Relations identifies different approaches within Russian Civilizational tradition — Russia’s nationally distinctive way of thinking — by situating them within IR literature and connecting them to practices of the country’s international relations.
Civilizational ideas in IR theory express states’ cultural identification and stress religious traditions, social customs, and economic and political values. This book defines Russian civilizational ideas by two criteria: the values they stress and their global ambitions. The author identifies leading voices among those positioning Russia as an exceptional and globally significant system of values and traces their arguments across several centuries of the country’s development. In addition, the author explains how and why Russian civilizational ideas rise, fall, and are replaced by alternative ideas. The book identifies three schools of Russian civilizational thinking about international relations – Slavophiles, Communists, and Eurasianists. Each school focuses on Russia’s distinctive spiritual, social, and geographic roots, respectively. Each one is internally divided between those claiming Russia’s exceptionalism, potentially resulting in regional autarchy or imperial expansion, and those advocating the Russian Idea as global in its appeal. Those favoring the latter perspective have stressed Russia’s unique capacity for understanding different cultures and guarding the world against extremes of nationalism and hegemony in international relations.
This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Russian foreign policy, Russia–Western relations, IR theory, diplomatic studies, political science, and European history, including the history of ideas.
Advancing a new approach to the study of international order, this book highlights the stakes disguised by traditional theoretical languages of power transitions and hegemonic wars. Rather than direct challenges to US military power, the most consequential undermining of hegemony is routine, bottom-up processes of international goods substitution: a slow hollowing out of the existing order through competition to seek or offer alternative sources for economic, military, or social goods. Studying how actors gain access to alternative suppliers of these public goods, this volume shows how states consequently move away from the liberal international order. Examining unfamiliar – but crucial – cases, it takes the reader on a journey from local Faroese politics, to Russian election observers in Central Asia, to South American drug lords. Broadening the debate about the role of public goods in international politics, this book offers a new perspective of one of the key issues of our time.
The essay analyses Russia’s historical goals in Eurasia and argues that the geopolitical meaning of Russia’s annexation of Crimea is closely related to the Kremlin’s ambition to play a key role in structuring the region. Russia’s determination to remain a major power, along with the global power transition from the West-centred to an increasingly regionalised world, make Russia’s return to Eurasia important. The return to Eurasia has demonstrated its promise to facilitate increased commercial relations within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as well as with China and other Asian countries. The future of Eurasia and Russia’s role in the region remain uncertain, however, because major participants are yet to align their visions of Eurasia, while Russia itself has yet to consolidate its internal economic and state capabilities.
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