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Man Bites Blue Dog: Are Moderates Really More Electable than Ideologues?

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Abstract

Are ideologically moderate candidates more electable than ideologically extreme candidates? Historically, both research in political science and conventional wisdom answer yes to this question. However, given the rise of ideologues on both the right and the left in recent years, it is important to consider whether this assumption is still accurate. I find that, while moderates have historically enjoyed an advantage over ideologically extreme candidates in Congressional elections, this gap has disappeared in recent years, where moderates and ideologically extreme candidates are equally likely to be elected. This change persists for both Democratic and Republican candidates.
Man Bites Blue Dog: Are Moderates
Really More Electable than Ideologues?




Abstract: 
 !
""# "!
!
"$%
!"&
'!
!"
#()
*+
Keywords,$!!-!
Running header: *
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$*./012
(",$(134.
"
56!"
"!($(
"(

+%57*
*8,99999&:
3
'"
            !  !  

'!
!"
!          "        8*"
4;20: "!!
          !    )    
  +        *!       
  !"  "
        *      *  
( +!
2<133.1=1343!"&4<134<
$!!+>
!"*>
8'!+133=:
"!"
 (       )  
',
            
8"-!    ?  @  1332:!      (  
        87"    @  133=:!  
8! 
4
    1330:!  !          !      
   - 8A( 134=:  
          
!      B    "(        
""
How Ideology Can Inuence Electoral Success
        (          
  C     
 $! "(   
!
"    (          8*"  4;20:   D  
    "            
8133<: "!
!
!8! 1330:! 
    (         8  1342:  E
 !"
      8    : E
    "  !              
        "    !      
8 1342:6>
"                  

5
"!      "   
>    )!            
!  "                  
  "
       >  
  "  B  8@
4;;.:)
!            >    @  8133<:
!"(
 $!
!        
!85
1342:  )      "  "          
!                  

EF7
")"
+  !  "              
* )         
+8+1342:G!
!
""
  C      (  "      
6
            B  8  1340:
!                  )  
HIC"
+  8*:        !      
*  8+:          )   
!
              
8!@134=:

    -      
E
8  !      (        
          :!          
    -      4;.3          8"-
1343: 7         
  -!              -  !
86133<:$
     !    
"   7 !
candidates >  !
"
)                    
          $      
7

 !      "   
8A(  133;J  K  134<:  $!          
  "  4;01    1341  8A(  134=:   )        
      "        8"-  
E  134=:  !  >  -!    (      B
! " 8A( 134=J
134.:  E                "      
  -!          -        
!

KB              #
  "            !    "
(*K'H
I +!   * )! ) '-!  
'!      134=    !  "  "  "    
8134=:+"
!
believe       )              C    !
            (   "
!"("*
("(!!
8
    !          !  

Methods and Results
        *    $!      !  
G8*$G:8134/:4;.3B1341!$>
              8134/:L    
                )
!(*EBK7$K)G!
        #           '  

)">
 (   "  4 $   8134<:L
'61   ! "     
1 !$
 $"
+*!
"(>
&
2)'6!"
"8134<:
!"
6
!'68r M;1:B
9
!"$
!!!$
      B  ! Ideological Extremity!  "  
33348 : <;.48: )
  3.1=!"   3/.. $ 
! Year, "384;.3:/181341:!
      "        )        
        (          !  $
Ideological Extremity Year.
$    "              8134/:
)% ! Winning Election!"(
4"!-"$
                  ! Vote
Share!)3433!"
2/<413//$!$
      !  "            
!  "            !      
10
!       /  
B  %  >!              
' B  +     
64
)        L  >        
"                $  %  
   ( " 
! " 
 (  "$ %      
("!>
    )     
("!
" "# ( " C  "
13N (" 4;.3! "
 "  .3N (  " "!  133.!
     
    (    "   !  "      
"      23N      )        
(
" 
+L>
61!"$4;.3!
""<3N
11
!"""=3N)
   23N   !    133. 
1341!                  
8:
"!
  !                
+ 6 '! "  1.N  ! A
O(84.N:D810N:$1343
  1341!  "              "!  
*)"E+
5@@
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Probability of Winning
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
Strength of Ideology = 0 Strength of Ideology = 3
Figure 1. Ideology and Electability 1980-2012
30 40 50 60 70
Vote Share
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
Strength of Ideology = 0 Strength of Ideology = 3
Figure 2. Ideology and Vote Share 1980-2012
12
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Probability of Winning
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
Strength of Ideology = 0 Strength of Ideology = 3
Figure 3. Ideology and Electability 1980-2012 - Repub licans
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Probability of Winning
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
Strength of Ideology = 0 Strength of Ideology = 3
Figure 4. Ideology and Electability 1980-2012 - Democrats
13
6  /    <<             
"! ("  
%!>+*8
        *:  $            
!"(!"
"(1343!>"
"!
    " #(  
 )  
    !      *    +  "  
&

Discussion and conclusion
$!"
!!(!
""
#(')
#$
"
"(""

7!
""
14
("
$
advantaged!
disadvantaged)
*
!
!("
!!"
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References
"-!$4;.;D!G!''
G,)'Journal of
Politics248<:,;00C;;1
"-!$1343The disappearing center: Engaged citizens,
polarization, and American democracy. K" ,O

"-!$!"@1332
H$!+!*'
GIJournal of Politics =.84:,02B..
15
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politics 118<:,<<3B<24
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GIBritish Journal of Political Science/<81:,144C110
*"!4;20An Economic Theory of DemocracyK"O(,
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war? The myth of polarized America. K"O(,
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organization 4<81:,/3<B/1<
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16
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American Political Science Review 43;84:,4.B<1
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008/:,.=4B.0/
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A(!"133;The partisan sort: How liberals became
Democrats and conservatives became Republicans. ',
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America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches'!,
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<20B<04
K! 134<Political ideologies and political parties in America.
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... Manchin's eventual support for the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 illustrated the power and sway that a moderate lawmaker can have in a tightly matched political environment. While moderate candidates used to hold an advantage over those more extreme candidates in a general election in the USA, the increasing political polarisation has rendered the moderates' electoral advantage largely non-existent or favoured the more extreme candidates in both the Democratic and Republican party (Harrison, 2020;Utych, 2020). Therefore, the election of the Joe Manchin in both political parties in the USA has increasingly become a rarity rather than a norm in recent years. ...
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Purpose Drawing on research in the social psychology and political science literatures, this research aims to examine how political moderates perceive, and are perceived by, their co-workers with differing political ideologies in an organisational context, with a focus on the perceptions of social status. Design/methodology/approach To test the hypotheses regarding the social status perceptions of and by political moderates in the workplace, the authors conducted an online experiment in which working adults read a hypothetical workplace scenario and then assessed the social status of a co-worker based on the political ideology of that co-worker. Findings The results largely supported the two hypothesised asymmetries of social perceptions of and by political moderates in an organisational context. Specifically, political moderates were perceived to have higher social status by their moderate and conservative co-workers than by their liberal co-workers. In addition, political moderates perceived moderate co-workers to have higher social status than conservative ones. Originality/value This research investigates the influence of political ideology on social status perceptions in organisations by focusing on the previously underexamined political moderates. The findings illustrate the importance of political moderates, who tend to espouse a moderate level of resistance to social change, in the process of developing a functional hierarchy and balancing change and stability in organisations.
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Purpose This paper aims to investigates the use of internal communications to foster workforce resilience in the cruise industry during a crisis. Drawing on the regulatory focus theory, this study explores how internal communication strategies can build employee resilience particularly at a time of difficulty. The regulatory focus theory explores the employee’s rationale for goal pursuit. Prevention-focused individuals are concerned with safety and responsibility while promotion-focused individuals focus on goal advancement. The authors seek to broaden the existing understanding of the application of the regulatory focus theory as a lens to inform internal communications crisis strategies. Design/methodology/approach Qualitative research using 15-semi structured interviews with cruise industry experts was undertaken during the pandemic. Applying a sensemaking and sense giving approach the researchers thematically analyzed the data in three stages, allowing for new theoretical insights to be uncovered. Findings The findings suggest that internal communication strategies should include prevention-focused messages emphasizing the cruise companies’ responsibility to employees, and promotion-focused communications, to include social interaction and individual growth opportunities. Originality/value This study’s contribution is three-fold. First, the authors extend the theoretical application of the regulatory focus theory to internal communication and identify a novel concurrent application of both prevention- and promotion-focused messages for developing a resilient workforce. Second, the authors introduce a preliminary conceptualization of an internal crisis communication strategy, emphasizing the concurrent application of prevention- and promotion-focused messages. Finally, the author offer practical suggestions for managing crisis communication strategies.
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Previous research finds that nominating more centrist candidates increases vote share and win probability in congressional general elections. Yet party primary elections often nominate non‐centrist candidates, increasing polarization between the American parties. We develop a model of choice in nomination politics that shows when and how actors respond to incentives of the general election. We then combine 200 million contribution records with data on 22,400 candidates in 7100 House primary elections from 1980 through 2016. We find that potential candidates and primary voters respond to general election incentives but do not find clear evidence for contributors or the winnowing process. Connecting these results back to our model, this implies that actors in the invisible primary either place higher value on in‐party candidate ideology or have different beliefs about the general election than do primary voters. Our evidence adds to a body of research that suggests primary voters are a larger moderating force than elites in American party politics.
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“Electability” received considerable attention during the 2020 Democratic primary campaign, with some critics claiming that the term was code for sexism. From a rational choice perspective, “electability” could affect voting in multiple ways, including via expected utility; previous scholarship suggests that many voters consider it as such. Yet this scholarship ignores the role that salience plays in decision making, and is silent on which sorts of candidate might benefit from the effects of priming electability. To address these issues, we conducted a survey experiment during the 2020 primary season, measuring Democratic primary voters’ preferences for candidates, electability estimates, and candidate rankings. Our experiment manipulated salience by randomizing the order in which preferences and electability were elicited. We show that electability salience caused a substantial increase in the probability that a respondent made decisions based only on electability.
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We study an election between two office-seeking candidates who are polarized along a partisan issue dimension when one candidate has a valence advantage. The candidates compete by choosing policy on a second issue dimension about which voters’ preferences are uncertain. Existing work predicts that the low-valence candidate “gambles for resurrection” by adopting non-centrist policies in order to differentiate from a stronger opponent. We show that this prediction is reversed in a highly polarized environment: the strong candidate chooses policies less aligned with the electorate but nonetheless wins the election with higher probability. (JEL D11, D72)
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Although there is clear evidence of growing ideological divides between the Democratic and Republican Parties, there is a lack of consensus about how this polarization impacts political participation. Using data from the 2010–2018 election cycles, we test how candidates’ distances from each other and distances from constituents are related to both voting and non-voting behavior. We fail to find evidence that the distance between candidates in and of itself depresses activity. Distance from a copartisan candidate can lower the likelihood of participation, but this is often offset by the greater likelihood of participation that comes with increased distance from an outparty candidate. Together, these results suggest that rather than demobilizing potential voters, polarization is instead motivating individuals by clarifying which candidate they do not want. Such findings are consistent with evidence of significant levels of negative partisanship and offer further insight into how candidate positioning impacts the electorate.
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Though extremism generally carries a negative connotation, ideological extremity can also send positive signals about a candidate’s personal characteristics. Data from the 2010 US House elections show that among a candidate’s copartisans, ideological extremity is associated with higher ratings of his or her competence and integrity. These findings hold even when accounting for distance from the respondent, distance from the district, and party unity. In addition, experimental evidence that better speaks to the causal relationship between ideology and quality shows that these results generalize beyond the 2010 contest. Overall, these findings add to understanding of how individuals form impressions of candidate traits and speak to continued extremity at the elite level, as they suggest that voters may still find value in positions even if they do not match their own.
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This research investigates the roles of issues, traits, and electability in the 2020 U.S. presidential nominating contest. These analyses utilize survey data gathered at political rallies in Iowa leading up to the caucuses and state and national news coverage. First, we identified the traits and issues respondents used to describe their support for a particular Democratic candidate over others. Next, we determined how issues, traits, and electability differed among the candidates. Finally, an analysis of news coverage uncovered how each candidate’s electability was framed. We found supporters of moderate candidates were more likely to mention candidate traits as reasons for their support, whereas supporters of progressive candidates were more likely to mention issues. Despite the media focus on electability, respondents did not indicate that as a primary reason for supporting a candidate. State and national news coverage treated the electability of Democrats vying for the party nomination quite differently, depending on the candidate’s gender and ideology.
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We know that most House seats remain within the same party over the course of a redistricting decade. For example, over 75% did so in the last decade. This gives rise to the question: “Why do some seats change hands and others not?” We seek to go beneath the standard answers (such as extent of electoral vulnerability as indicated by the previous victory margin, challenger qualifications, relative spending of challenger and incumbent, midterm loss affecting districts newly won by the president’s party, realignment effects that made Democrats in the South vulnerable) to examine the conditions of ideological competition that affect each of these factors and the concomitant probability of electoral defeat. We offer a general model of unidimensional party competition across multiple constituencies, where a party “chases the outliers” of the other party that are closest to its own ideological mean, thus eliminating “anomalous” districts which should be vulnerable to change in party control, and we test that model with data from the U.S. House of Representatives 1980–2006. Over time, Democrats capture liberal and moderately liberal districts held by Republicans, while Republicans capture conservative and moderately conservative districts held by Democrats. In a neo-Downsian world where candidates do not locate at the preferences of the median voter in the district but, rather, are shifted in the direction of their own party mean, we show that this outlier-chasing dynamic can be expected, in the long run, to “empty” out the center. This results in an equilibrium of ideologically distinct parties and a high level of polarization, involving a self-reinforcing dynamic in which the seats that become vulnerable change as the parties become more distinct. Indeed, rather than puzzling about why so much polarization exists, our work suggests that the real puzzle is why it has taken so long to get to the level of polarization we presently enjoy. We suggest that the combination of incumbency advantage, and multidimensionality of political competition might be the answer, with the Civil War role of race as an independent dimension slowly wearing off.
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With little fanfare, the electoral advantage enjoyed by US representatives has fallen over the past several elections to levels not seen since the 1950s. The incumbency advantage has diminished in conjunction with an increase in party loyalty, straight-ticket voting, and president-centered electoral nationalization, products of the widening and increasingly coherent partisan divisions in the American electorate. Consequently, House incumbents now have a much harder time retaining districts that lean toward the rival party. Democrats had been the main beneficiaries of the denationalization of electoral politics that had enabled the incumbency advantage to grow, and they have thus been the main victims of the reemergence of a more party-centered electoral process. Republicans enjoy a long-standing structural advantage in the distribution of partisans across districts, so this trend has strengthened their grip on the House even as they have become less competitive in contests for the presidency.
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▪ Abstract We take as our starting point the insights of Downs (1957) into two-party competition. A careful reading of Downs offers a much more sophisticated and nuanced portrait of the factors affecting party differentiation than the simplistic notion that, in plurality elections, we ought to expect party convergence to the views of the median voter. Later scholars have built on Downsian ideas to see what happens vis-à-vis party differentiation when we modify key assumptions found in the basic Downsian spatial model. Recent work allows us to turn what is taken to be the Downsian view on its head: Although there are pressures in two-party competition for the two parties to converge, in general we should expect nonconvergence. Moreover, contra the negative portrait offered by Green & Shapiro (1994) of the limited or nonexistent value of research on party competition models in the Downsian tradition, we argue that, when viewed as a whole, neo-Downsian models—especially those of the past decade—do allow us t...
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The debate on mass polarization is itself polarized. Some argue that the United States is in the midst of a culture war; others argue that the claims are exaggerated. As polarization is a multifaceted concept, both sides can be correct. I review four distinct manifestations of polarization that have appeared in the public opinion literature—ideological consistency, ideological divergence, perceived polarization, and affective polarization—and discuss ways in which each has been measured. Then, using longitudinal data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), I update past analyses in order to more clearly show the ways in which Americans have or have not polarized: Americans at the mass level have not diverged, nor have they become more consistent ideologically, but partisans have; perceptions of polarization have increased, but this change is driven by partisans, who increasingly dislike one another.
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One of the most important developments affecting electoral competition in the United States has been the increasingly partisan behavior of the American electorate. Yet more voters than ever claim to be independents. We argue that the explanation for these seemingly contradictory trends is the rise of negative partisanship. Using data from the American National Election Studies, we show that as partisan identities have become more closely aligned with social, cultural and ideological divisions in American society, party supporters including leaning independents have developed increasingly negative feelings about the opposing party and its candidates. This has led to dramatic increases in party loyalty and straight-ticket voting, a steep decline in the advantage of incumbency and growing consistency between the results of presidential elections and the results of House, Senate and even state legislative elections. The rise of negative partisanship has had profound consequences for electoral competition, democratic representation and governance.
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This paper presents a spatial model of primary election to analyze strategic voting and its effect on the policy outcome. Primary voters care for the electability of the candidates as well as their offered policies. The trade off between these two factors might make the preferences of the primary voters non-single-peaked. I show the median voter is still decisive when the preferences are quadratic. Moreover, I use comparative statics and numerical analysis to evaluate the conditions under which the position of the Condorcet winner in the primary election shifts toward the center. Among the conditions that contribute to such a shift are radical policies by the incumbent, public opinion shift toward the incumbent party, and accurate information about the population median.
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This article studies the interplay of U.S. primary and general elections. I examine how the nomination of an extremist changes general-election outcomes and legislative behavior in the U.S. House, 1980-2010, using a regression discontinuity design in primary elections. When an extremist-as measured by primary-election campaign receipt patterns-wins a "coin-flip" election over a more moderate candidate, the party's general-election vote share decreases on average by approximately 9-13 percentage points, and the probability that the party wins the seat decreases by 35-54 percentage points. This electoral penalty is so large that nominating the more extreme primary candidate causes the district's subsequent roll-call representation to reverse, on average, becoming more liberal when an extreme Republican is nominated and more conservative when an extreme Democrat is nominated. Overall, the findings show how general-election voters act as a moderating filter in response to primary nominations.
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Analysis of Tea Party activists within the Republican Party illustrates the “good-news, bad-news” aspects of intra-party factionalism. The good news is that nomination contests between Tea Party and establishment Republicans, divisive as they appear, do not necessarily undermine support for the party’s nominees in the general election. Support for Tea Party candidates among its activists in the 2012 presidential nomination fight produced increased support for Romney-Ryan in the general election. At the same time, however, activism for Tea Party candidates contributed to increased negativity towards the Republican Party among Tea Party activists, suggesting that the factionalism within the party is unlikely to be soon resolved. Finally we find that negativity towards the Republican establishment is playing an even greater role than negativity towards President Obama in producing continuing or increased Tea Party movement activity. This suggests that the movement has the potential to survive beyond Obama’s presidency.
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Theory suggests that three factors – the importance of ideology to primary voters, costly movement due to candidate reputations and lack of competition – all contribute to candidate divergence in US congressional elections. These predictions are analysed with new data from a 2000 mail survey that asked congressional candidates to place themselves on a left–right ideological scale. The data reveal that candidates often diverge, but that the degree of candidate polarization is variable and may be explained by factors in the theory. Candidates with firm public reputations, those who face weak general election competition, and those who experience stiff primary competition are all more likely to deviate from the median voter's position. Perhaps more importantly, the locations that candidates adopt have clear effects on their vote shares.