Public Religions in the Modern World
... An aspect of the public sphere that has particularly been presented as in need to be "freed" from religion is the economy, thereby allowing it to function solely according to a capitalist logic (Asad, 2003;Casanova, 1994). A small stream of organization studies has shown that organizations in the Global North tend to be infused with secular ideals, which results in the regulation of religion and the reproduction of religious inequalities at work (Ashforth & Vaidyanath, 2002;Gebert et al., 2014;Gümüsay, 2020;Héliot et al., 2020). ...
... However, this can also involve resisting the regulation of religion by work practice through performances such as creating time for religious practice, introducing objects for religious practice, claiming spaces for religious practice, or embodying religious practice through the way they look or interact with other bodies. These performances blur the imposed boundaries between the secular public sphere and the private religious sphere (Asad, 2003;Casanova, 1994;Mahmood, 2016). ...
... However, performing religion visibly might over time potentially contribute to normalizing alternative practice (Ammerman, 2021;Gherardi, 2009;Janssens & Steyaert, 2019;Nicolini & Monteiro, 2017;Reckwitz, 2002), thereby fundamentally altering work practice and opening up alternative ways to perform work. Meanwhile, invisible performances of religious practice, just like conforming to work practice, do not challenge the dominant order and the boundaries it imposes (Asad, 2003;Casanova, 1994;Mahmood, 2016). ...
Adopting a practice lens, this study contributes to debates on the reproduction of religious inequalities in the workplace by going beyond the literature's dominant focus on the role of discourse in the regulation of employees’ religion. Drawing on interviews with Muslim employees in Belgium, this study offers a practice-based theorization of religious inequality at work, focusing on the role of the rhythms, objects, spaces, and bodies of work practice in the regulation of religion and on religious employees’ different performances directly negotiating these aspects of work practice. Based on this practice-based understanding, we identify contributions to several debates on religion at work. First, we show the role of work practice in imposing a secular order that selectively embraces cultural and religious practices that have historically dominated the Global North. Second, we add to studies on Muslim employees by showing how solely focusing on Islamophobic discourses and discursive practices overlooks the interplay between these discourses and work practice in the regulation of religion and Muslim employees’ negotiation of the rhythms, objects, spaces, and bodies of work practice. Third, contributing to debates on (in)visibility, we expose that the (in)visibility of religion is shaped by its relation to work practice and that religious employees can negotiate work practice through invisibly performing religious practice. Fourth, adding to our understanding of the inclusion of religious employees, we emphasize the importance of the flexibility of work practice and the role of other employees in enabling religious employees to better align work and religious practice.
... In recent decades sociologists of religion have debated whether modern societies are secularizing (Bruce 2002;2011;Norris and Inglehart 2004;Pollack and Rosta 2017;Voas 2008;Voas and Chaves 2016;Voas and Crockett 2005;Voas and Doebler 2011), encountering return, resurgence, or increased visibility of religion (Berger 1999;Butler et al. 2011;Casanova 1994;Herbert 2011;Hjelm 2015;Kepel 1994;Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2009;Ward and Hoelzl 2008), moving towards new forms of religion beyond national churches (Hunt 2005;Lyon 2000), transforming religion into a provider of welfare services (Bäckström et al. 2010;2011), or facing religious diversity (Martikainen 2013;Stringer 2013;Weller 2008). In some cases the role of the media has not been theorized (or even mentioned) as part of these developments, but it has become increasingly obvious that there is a need to consider how religion-related media discourses and portrayals and the almost ubiquitous media outlets are entangled with social changes in their capacity to direct and reflect the public presence and boundaries of the groups and practices conventionally named 'religious'. ...
... Further, it does not necessarily mean the return of religion or its resurgence in a sense that would contribute to something like a reversal of secularization. Nor does it necessarily mean that religion is 'deprivatized' in the sense José Casanova (1994) suggests (i.e. that religions have increasingly become public conversation partners on societal norms and the common good). This is because religion -as a discourse, tradition, and practice -may be visible in the media both in 'private' and 'public' forms, where 'private' religion is understood as a form not extended or imposed on 'secular' domains of life such as economics, politics, and the state or as a form located in the 'sphere of life from which public authorities choose to exclude themselves in certain conditions' (Beckford 2003, 87). ...
This article introduces the topic of this special issue: religion in Nordic
newspapers. It provides a general framework for the following four
articles based on a longitudinal study of religion in Danish, Finnish,
Norwegian, and Swedish newspapers by clarifying what characterizes
selected ‘Nordic’ countries, their media spheres, and their religious
landscapes. Furthermore, this article suggests that despite significant
changes in the media sphere, including factual media production and
consumption, there are good reasons to study religion-related media
content produced by the dominant and conventional media outlets,
including newspapers. However, this should not be done by isolating
newspapers from society and the rest of the media. This introduction
and the following articles therefore propose that the selected key
concepts and debates among sociologists of religion are particularly
useful in thinking about religion-related newspaper content.
... Consequently, secularism was a trend in world politics until the mid-1960s (Shah & Toft 2009: 134). However, it is better understood as the result of social negotiations and political struggles, i.e., as a non-teleological historical development that produces side effects, resistances, and countertrends, including the return and de-privatization of religion (Casanova 1994). The connection between the development of secular faith and the loss of religion, the inability of secular movements and doctrines to answer practical and metaphysical questions (the crisis of modernity), the collapse of the ideological imaginary of the Cold War, and the mutations produced during globalization, have led in the last two decades to the return of religion which takes a variety of different forms: Islamic fundamentalism, Evangelical churches, or new age movements. ...
... No longer limited only to the pastoral care, religious institutions begin to challenge the dominant social and political forces more, questioning their neutrality and furthering the traditional links between public and private morality. Casanova (1994) emphasizes, in this context, four Catholic and Protestant countries -Spain and Poland, Brazil and the US -and how they, as well as Islamic fundamentalism, have challenged postwar secular expectations and even, going back further in the past, the principles of the Enlightenment. ...
This research focuses geographically on the West (Europe and North America) and Islam (Middle East and North Africa) since this regional dichotomy allows us to isolate two subtypes of religious populism – modernophobia and Islamophobia – close to right-wing populism and to its ideas of culture and identity. We conclude that these types of religious populism derive from the deprivatization of religion, thus promoting a (negative) reaction to modernization, namely in the form of anti-secularism, and a deepening of populist-religious discourses and practices, respectively.
... (Ngadino Surip et al., 2015) Namun Indonesia juga bukanlah negara yang berdasarkan atas satu agama saja, melalui sila pertama Teori sekularisasi dari José Casanova mengidentifikasi ada tiga macam pengertian dari sekularisasi: (1) secularization as religious decline, mengklaim bahwa agama akan seterusnya mengalami kemerosotan di dunia modern sampai pada akhirnya punah; (2) secularization as privatization, menjaga keberadaan agama namun dimarginalkan ke lingkup privat; (3) secularization as differentiation, merujuk pada pembedaan fungsi dari institusi agama dengan lingkup yang lain dalam masyarakat modern, terkhusus negara, ekonomi, dan ilmu pengetahuan. (José Casanova, 1994) ...
Christians in Indonesia continue to struggle with their role and involvement in the public sphere, especially politics, on Indonesian soil. Abraham Kuyper is one of the Reformed theologians who is considered authoritative when it comes to the role of Christians in the public sphere. This article presents how Kuyper addresses plurality and establishes inter-religious cooperation, without compromising. This article shows that Kuyper's thinking has a wealth that corresponds to Pancasila which is the ideal foundation and basis of the Indonesian state. facilitating data collection through books that are already available, then the author describes the book's data, namely through the concept of thinking from Abraham Kuyper and Pancasila ideology, because both Kuyper's thinking and Pancasila ideology are equally able to accommodate diversity so that it can be an important input for Christian public involvement in Indonesia. ABSTRAK BAHASA INDOENSIA Orang Kristen di Indonesia terus menerus menggumulkan akan peran dan keterlibatannya di ranah publik, khususnya politik, di bumi Indonesia. Abraham Kuyper adalah salah satu teolog dari kalangan Reformed yang dianggap otoritatif ketika berbicara mengenai peranan orang Kristen dalam ranah publik. Artikel ini menyajikan bagaimana Kuyper menyikapi pluralitas dan menjalin kerjasama antar umat beragama, tanpa menjadi bersifat kompromistis. Artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa pemikiran Kuyper memiliki kekayaan yang berpadanan dengan Pancasila yang adalah landasan idiil dan dasar negara Indonesia dalam penulisan artikel ini, penulis menggunakan jenis penelitian kepustakaan (library research) yaitu serangkaian kegiatan yang berkenaan dengan metode pengumpulan data pustaka, penulis menggukan metode ini untuk mempermudah pengumpulan data melalui buku yang sudah tersedia kemudian penulis memaparkan data buku tersebut yaitu melalui konsep berpikir dari Abraham Kuyper dan ideologi Pancasila, karena baik pemikiran Kuyper maupun ideologi Pancasila sama-sama mampu mengakomodasi keberagaman, sehingga dapat menjadi masukan yang penting bagi keterlibatan publik orang Kristen di Indonesia.
... In a first reading, it is possible to oppose the analysis of Linda Woodhead (2008) and her reading from the idea of privatization of religion, especially if we take as true, the return of religion to the modern public scene (Casanova 1994(Casanova , 2008. In fact, the author seems to leave open the female agency itself in the publicization and institutionalization of religion that is also happening in the modern world. ...
In this article, I discuss the experience of two daimista female leaders located in The Netherlands and in Japan. The reason why their stories are here is because of the prominence of Santo Daime in these countries per world region (Europe and Asia), where the leadership of these women have great projection in the daimista transnational field. The data discussed here were collected through in-depth interviews by using the life history technique. The objective was to analyze how these women experience this religion outside its context of origin. Their religious background appeared as something very important to their lived religion, showing cultural elements with which Santo Daime ends up having to negotiate in the religious global flows. Also, it seems that the feminization of Santo Daime is not only about women’s entrance in this religion, more than that, it is about a feminized way to live and experience religion. Over all, there is a reflexive relationship between Santo Daime and these women because their lives are changed by this religion just as their agency contributes to changes in the core of it and its transnationalization process.
... Many religion reporters, we found, resist depicting diverse cultures and belief as a monolith that is rooted in a Christian, Western-centric lens. Casanova (1994) directly critiqued Durkheim's division of the sacred from the profane (p. 13), challenging the longstanding assumption that religion would become increasingly privatized, or pushed to the "private" sphere, with the rise of modernity (p. ...
The present study explores how religion reporters in the United States (n=20) define religion and privilege religious identities, at times also working to combat dominant hegemonic narratives about some of these religious groups. We find that some religion reporters covered religion in ways that reflect the institutional power of religious traditions, whereas others aimed to combat the hegemonic power structures of dominant religious identities by covering less prominent groups or usurping stereotypical framings of other groups. This paper (1) provides a window into the evolving landscape of religious news in the United States, tracing how many of these journalists aim or at least recognize the need to overcome White, Protestant hegemonic lenses for understanding religion in the United States through their reporting, and (2) demonstrates how religion reporters' approaches to covering religion, even while drawing from secular principles and values of journalism, are a byproduct of religion itself. NOTE: This is the ACCEPTED, preprint manuscript and hence may not reflect all changes in the final version.
... 6 The interim constitution of 2007 first declared Nepal a secular, democratic state, a status that became official in the constitution promulgated in September 2015. While differentiation, privatisation or the eventual decline of religion are core tenets of many secularism theories (Casanova 1994, but see Cannell 2010, Chiara Letizia states that most political movements in Nepal since the 1990s have framed secularism as a way not to 'banish religion from public life but…recognise religious diversity and bring an end to Hindu high caste domination ' (2012: 72). During the time of Nepal's interim constitution (2007 to 2015), alongside reports on ethnic minorities' demands for equality, the newspapers ran stories on the Christian Nepali community asserting their rights to publicly practise their religion too. ...
... Alongside the research on institutional secularisation, and the typically North American strand of studies on the religious market, starting from Berger's (1967) and Wilson's (1977Wilson's ( , 1966 works on the privatisation of religious experience and Luckmann's (1967) studies on the invisible religion, progressively in Europe, and also in Italy, greater attention has been paid to the micro dimensions of religiosity (Cipriani, 1989;Davie, 1994;Heelas, Woodhead, 2005;Hervieu-Léger, 1999). Theories on de-secularisation (Berger, 1999), post-secularisation (Habermas, 2008;Rosati, 2015;Taylor, 2007) or multiple secularities (Beckford, 2012;Burchardt et al., 2015;Stepan, 2011;Stoltz, 2016) have followed one another, wondering whether those processes will eventually lead to the revenge of God (Kepel, 1991), or to a re-emergence of the public relevance of religion (Casanova, 1994), maybe only in the sphere of scientific debate (Pollack, 2006), in a time still characterised by an undeniable ongoing process of secularisation (Köhrsen, 2012;Marzano, 2012). ...
Research shows that Italians’ religiosity is in constant decline. Religious literacy, individual and collective practice, participation in rituals, faith’s transmission and symbols’ sharing seem to be following a slow but inexorable downward trend. Catholic communities are being depopulated and churches are emptying out. These phenomena, already emerging in those generations born during the economic boom, seem to have a greater impact on younger generations: the decline of Catholicism as a socio‐cultural phenomenon is characterising our era. Despite those general trends, young generations are not merely abandoning their faith. Even if faith has lost its social function, young Catholics in Italy often cultivate it on an individual level, between the autonomous search for their own spiritual path and the reproduction of forms of high religiosity derived from the family. In some cases, the younger generations show a renewed religiosity, stronger and more secure than that of their parents, which may sometimes involve them in a path of Catholicism’s rediscovery. The article presents and discusses results on highly religious young Catholics deriving from empirical research on intergenerational religious transmission in Italian families, which has been conducted through focus groups and in‐depth interviews between 2020 and 2022.
... Moral traditionalism-progressiveness is, in fact, central to the religious cleavage, as it forms a divide between the religious and the secular that gives motivation to vote for religious versus secular political parties (Bartolini and Mair 1990;Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Drawing from secularization theory (e.g. Bruce 2002;Casanova 2011), empirical studies on the expected decline of the religious cleavage suggest specific conditions under which it is likely to happen, namely religious decline in the West, but do not yet make the step to test this proposition empirically. ...
This article tests two contrasting hypotheses about changes in the electoral relevance of moral traditionalism-progressiveness, which pertains to attitudes toward matters of procreation, sexuality, and family and gender roles. While the ‘cultural turn’ literature expects the electoral relevance of moral traditionalism to increase over time alongside that of all other cultural issues, studies inspired by secularization theory rather predict a decrease in its relevance – due to religious decline. Analyzing the data from the European Values Study (1981-2017) for twenty West European countries, we find empirical evidence for a decrease and no indication of an increase in the electoral relevance of moral traditionalism. Religious decline weakened the effect of moral traditionalism on religious and conservative voting over time due to the most traditionalist voters shifting away from these parties. Our findings, therefore, highlight the need to differentiate between different types of cultural motives behind voting choice in Western Europe.
... Th e frame of universality put forward in establishing the meaning of Saint Martin does not stand on its own, but is-as is typical of many heritage formations-connected to a secular gaze. Th is gaze, viewed as a political and social neutrality rather than as anti-religious (Engelke 2012: 161), is grounded in the European post-Enlightenment separation of church and state, which seeks to confi ne religion to a private realm (in this case "the church") and views the public domain (in this case "the city") as the realm of the secular Casanova 1994;Salemink 2009). Th is is most apparent in the prominent connections between the Utrecht Saint Martin celebrations and secular initiatives and institutions. ...
What happens when religious sites, objects and practices become cultural heritage? What are —religious or secular—sources of expertise and authority that validate and regulate heritage sites, objects and practices? As cultural heritage becomes an increasingly popular and influential frame, these questions arise in diverse and challenging manners. The question who controls, manages, and frames religious heritage, and how, arises with particular urgency. Case studies from Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom present an analysis of the paradoxes and challenges that arise when religious sites are transformed into heritage.
... Numerous academics have noted that Asian nations share similar civilizations minima in 1972, vol. [4][5]. Just one variation of the vast group of immanentist faiths is represented by Japanese traditional religions. ...
... The expression was popularized by Casanova in his now-classic Public Religions in the Modern World (1994). I expand on his views (Casanova 1994(Casanova , 2012 to argue that religious publicization or politicization, in a world of sharp inequalities, self-assertive differences, and uncontrollable pluralization, structurally changes the status of religions, bringing their views, doctrines, ethos, and public engagement intentions into the limelight, and makes them liable to being debated and contested in public by internal dissenters, other religions, and secular actors (Burity 2015(Burity , 2018. ...
This chapter explores what happens when ecumenical and interfaith mobilizations generate or participate in efforts to enhance global cooperation. I seek to address two related questions in this context: (1) How can one think of cooperation within situations in which conflict and disagreement thrive and uncertainty regarding the future looms large? (2) What resources can be found within religious traditions that point towards a cooperative future without a pre-established blueprint? This is done by exploring cases drawn from comparative research on transnational, specifically glocal, ecumenical social activism between Europe and Latin America. This ecumenical activism was originally Christian social activism that has, over many decades, taken on an interfaith outlook by seeking to embrace difference, engage with development and conflict issues, and offer a vision of the future that is open, pluralistic, just, and cooperative. The focus is on several forms of interaction between Argentine, Brazilian, and British ecumenical organizations and their participation in interfaith and secular networks that seek to set agendas and mobilize change and cooperation at regional and global levels.
... Факты активности, популярности и авторитета подобных мусульманских молодежных организаций, большинство из которых существуют на неформальной основе, подтверждают мысль социолога Хосе Казановы о деприватизации религии в современном мире. Он пишет, что религия отказывается принимать маргинальную и приватную роли (которые ей отводят теории модерности и секуляризации) и выходит в публичное пространство [Casanova, 1994;Casanova, 2008]. ...
This issue on the Islamic identity of Tatar youth based on the data of sociological research of 2008-2011 in the Republic of Tatarstan, Russia. This study of religiousness is analyzed within two basic parameters: religious conscience and religious behaviour. The research data reveals that the growth of Islamic identity has increasingly affected young people, and their degree of religiosity does not depend on their level of education or place of residence (there is even more rapid Islamization among the youth of big cities, especially of Kazan). Furthermore, the paper deals with methodological questions on the peculiarities of religious analysis during the period of religious revival.
... The 'resurgence' of religion (see Taira 2019) is not therefore the best term to describe the situation: it does not describe Christianity in the Finnish media and society accurately, and although the discussion of Islamic fundamentalism plays a prominent role in the media, it is debated primarily in the context of world politics rather than that of local and national issues. Moreover, while Lutheran leaders especially are valued public voices in the media, visibility is not the same as 'public religion' (Casanova 1994). Religious voices may be rational conversation partners and remain acknowledged resources in times of crisis, and they can enliven the debate concerning the public good, but such cases are exceptions and such voices are limited to liberal Lutheran leaders. ...
This article examines religion in Finnish newspapers, arguing that
religion-related discourses have changed from one of Lutheran dominance to one of diversity. The main data consists of a longitudinal
sample (1946–2016) of the most popular Finnish newspaper, Helsingin
Sanomat, and especially of its editorials and readers’ letters. Additional
data covers a wider variety of newspapers from the 1990s to 2018. The
data is analysed using quantitative content analysis and a discursive
approach. It will be suggested that it is possible to discuss diversity
both as an emergent discourse and a theme in the Finnish media since
the mid-1990s, thereby overcoming earlier frameworks that took Lutheranism for granted or gave it a special role in the private sphere.
The analysis shows that these shifts do not provide clear support for
the idea that newspapers and journalism are anti-religious; rather, it
suggests that they may be understood as having a ‘liberalizing’ effect,
especially when religious values are not seen as compatible with those
of journalists and newspapers.
... The avoidance of communal religious life and the consequent tendency to take care of one's own spiritual needs privately is a form of secularisation labelled in the sociology of religion as 'individualisation of faith' (Davie 1994;Hervieu-Leger 1999). By contrast to other secular contexts in Europe, where this subset of the privatisation of religion (Casanova 1994; goes hand in hand with a growing secular normativity that delimits religious symbols in the public space (Engelke 2012), the last three decades in Romania have seen an impressive growth in terms of religious visibility: about ten thousand houses of worship, including over thirty cathedrals and several religious monuments installed in the capital. As I detail elsewhere, this church-building industry-which draws mainly on the public coffers-benefits from a benevolent legal framework mostly set up in the mid-2000s (Tateo 2020). ...
Based on ethnographic research conducted in a number of Orthodox parishes in Bucharest, this article discusses different conceptions of har among Bucharest Orthodox believers, practitioners, and clerics. Har stands for ‘grace’, ‘charisma’ or ‘gift’ depending on the context. An ethnographically grounded analysis of this emic concept, I argue, is essential for two main reasons. First, understanding grace through gratuity allows us to grasp diverse forms of religious change, such as committed church attendance and the detachment from communal religious life, in contemporary Romania. Second, seeing through the looking glass of Orthodox practice allows for unexplored insights into the workings of charismatic authority. The article ends with a seeming paradox: grace is ‘something extra’, an addition which is best grasped apophatically, that is, through subtraction.
The youth sector in Australia has secularized considerably over the past five decades, yet many active Christians choose to work within it. Despite Australia’s increasingly multi-faith society, little Australian youth work research exists that would explain how these Christians understand the relationship between their personal faith and their professional role, nor how they integrate the two in practice. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 29 Christian youth workers, this article seeks to remedy this gap. It asks: (1) How do Christians in the secular youth work sector understand the place of their faith within their professional role?; and (2) how do they practice “care” and “dialogical evangelism” as practical expressions of their faith? The article finds that Christians in secular youth work tend to view the nexus between faith and youth work through the theological motif of imago Dei. They see the practical expression of their faith, first, as one of “care” which flows from their theological belief of imago Dei. Second, they value conversation about faith with young people, but place the agency of young people at the center of these discussions, in a practice of “dialogical evangelism.” The article concludes by discussing the implications for educators and academics.
Do religious commitments hinder support for gender equality and contribute to the stalled gender revolution as a social problem? Answering this question requires specifying what kinds of religious commitments affect what specific gendered attitudes. Using a cultural approach to the study of religion, we distinguish personal religious commitments (piety and practice) from public religious commitments (preferences for religious order in social life). Using a large national survey, we demonstrate (1) that support for public religious authority has a stronger positive relationship with support for separate gender roles and ambivalent sexism than does personal piety; (2) that these relationships do not hold for gender identity salience; and (3) that support for separate gender roles mediates the relationship between support for public religious order and support for a gender-equitable policy: paid family leave. We argue that public religious commitments in the United States are semi-autonomous from personal religiosity, and we identify one specific public religious repertoire that provides support for a public order based on a binary and complementary understanding of gender.
This contribution examines recent developments in the activism of a Russian religious minority community in the United States. After fleeing persecution in Russia to Manchuria, Turkey, and Brazil, since the 1960s 10,000 Old Believers have settled in the Williamette Valley, Oregon. The contribution describes how and why this paradigmatically ‘closed’ religious group, which has eschewed active political engagement for centuries, made a sudden and effective entry into Oregon politics in 2019–20. Initial political mobilisation was provoked by Oregon State Legislature’s attempt to pass a law to eliminate exemptions on religious or philosophical grounds for children’s vaccinations. Following the theorising of Rawls, I argue that the Old Believers formed with other Americans opposed to mandatory vaccinations an ‘overlapping consensus’ of political liberalism. Their exclusive reliance on political arguments grounded in the secular American tradition of liberal rights and freedoms conflicts with the influential thesis of ‘public religion’, articulated prominently by Casanova and Habermas, who highlight the spiritual and theological character of interventions by religious groups into modern politics. Notwithstanding the secular tenor of their political intervention, I argue that it constitutes a form of ‘religious activism’ motivated by the pursuit of values at the heart of their centuries-old religious project.
Most analyses of secularisation and desecularisation in Russia focus on the growing political role of institutionalised religion in the form of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), or on informal religious activism and the meaning of religiosity for the people. However, the faith-based activism of Orthodox believers in post-Soviet society is the most serious challenge for the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church. The heterogeneity of this activism questions the Church’s self-perception as a unified community balancing a hierarchical authority and a mission to affect worldly reality. Within Russian Orthodox clerical discourse, ‘activism’ has become an instrument to either appropriate activities as official ’Orthodox activism’ or to discredit dissent as ‘political activism’. The analytical frame of ‘religious activism’ thus impacts on the relationship between the hierarchy and the faithful, potentially strengthening the term’s pejorative implications. Based on official statements and media monitoring, this contribution makes a first attempt to analyse how believers, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and theology negotiate the social role of the Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) in the post-Soviet region, specifically in the Russian Federation and Belarus. Exploring the concept of ‘religious activism’ from a theological perspective, the contribution also highlights a necessary interdisciplinary dialogue between anthropology and theology.
Uskonto ei ole katoamassa nykymaailmasta vaikka sen merkitys on muuttumassa. Teemu Tairan Notkea uskonto tarkastelee uskontoon liittyviä käsitteellistyksiä nykykulttuurin ilmiönä. Se ei tarkastele mitään tiettyä uskontoperinnettä tai suuntausta vaan uskonnon ja uskontojen muodonmuutoksia notkeassa modernisaatiossa. Uskontoa ei teoksessa ymmärretä muusta kulttuurista irrallisiksi opillisiksi järjestelmiksi tai instituutioiksi. Uskonto hahmottuu esimerkkeinä toimivien ilmiöiden ja käsitteiden kautta osaksi modernia nykykulttuuria. Siinä uskonto irtoaa perinteisistä liitoksistaan ja kiinnittyy uusiin ja vaihtuviin yhteyksiin. Tätä lähestytään kriittisen kulttuurintutkimuksen, uskontotieteen ja uskontososiologian työkalujen avulla. Notkea uskonto vastaa kysymykseen, millaisista uskontokulttuureja koskevista muutoksista nykyajassa on kysymys ja miten niitä tulisi tarkastella kriittisesti sosiokulttuuristen muutosten osana. Notkea uskonto kartoittaa uskonnon arkisia ja yhteiskunnallisia ulottuvuuksia osana modernisaatiota koskevia muutoksia.
Shiʿa Muslims constitute 10–15% of Danish Muslims, but until recently they lacked public visibility. Within the last decade, the number of Shiʿa mosques and other places of worship in Denmark has doubled, but the change in terms of the group’s public presence is even more significant than this. This article compares Denmark’s leading Shiʿa organisation with its Sunni counterpart in terms of the physical presence of places of worship and participation in public life. It discusses based on the concept of public religion (Casanova 1994) how Shiʿa Muslims have become the most visible representative of Islam in Denmark due to a mix of factors.
This book brings together new thinking and research on religious education’s complex and evolving role in the multicultural, diverse post-modern era. Religious education occupies a contested space whether in different contexts around the world, at different levels of education, and from different theoretical lenses. The book analyzes data from five continents: Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia, and America and from three different religious perspectives: Christian, Muslim, and Jewish.
The Totalitarian Imagination Revisited examines the origins and ends of religion in education at the ‘worldviews’ watershed. It does so against a personal academic life journey which has assessed state religious education in the light of modern autocracy, dictatorship and totalitarianism. Drawing on the specific context of developments in the United Kingdom, the chapter shows this watershed epistemological and linguistic shift—from a subject defined by the study of religious traditions to the designation of that of teaching and learning about ‘worldviews’, a putatively inclusive approach framed in its thinking to incorporate religious and secular outlooks—through an etiology which has its pathogenic roots in a range religiously sceptical, secular epistemologies. This epistemological-philosophical trajectory, with its modern beginnings in the Eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the revolutions of that period, is, it is shown, rooted in an outplaying of a centuries-long, specific historical-political context which has now made itself manifest in contemporary state religious education.
Si bien las cúpulas eclesiales han protagonizado la reacción contra las demandas feministas y LGBTI en Latinoamérica, desde el campo de la sociedad civil se han organizado diversas agrupaciones que complementan el accionar de las iglesias. En muchos contextos han logrado incluso liderar los procesos de movilización contra los derechos sexuales y reproductivos (DDSSRR). Este trabajo analiza las principales formas de organización, identidades públicas y tipos de acción colectiva que privilegian las agrupaciones neoconservadoras de la sociedad civil para oponerse a los DDSSRR, en cuatro países que abarcan a la subregión Andina: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú. En cada uno se identificaron y caracterizaron agrupaciones neoconservadoras de la sociedad civil mediante un rastreo en línea de organizaciones, relevando datos vinculados con sus formas de presentarse en el espacio público y sus acciones estratégicas. La información recabada permitió mostrar la complejidad de perfiles, identidades y tipologías de acciones del activismo neoconservador en la subregión Andina. Entre los principales hallazgos se destaca la mixtura de organizaciones religiosas y seculares, la fuerte presencia de agrupaciones de jóvenes y de padres/madres, y el trabajo significativo de incidencia que realizan tanto en la arena estatal como en la de la sociedad civil.
Secularization theory allows for transitory religious revivals under certain conditions, such as extreme societal crises or state weakness. The country of Georgia has witnessed the largest religious revival of Orthodox countries and one of the most striking religious resurgences worldwide. This paper gives both a statistical and historical description of this revival and asks whether it is a counterexample to secularization theory. We show that the main thrust of the religious revival in Georgia lasted 25 years and seized the entire society in what was mainly a period effect. The most significant cause for the revival was a major societal and economic crisis starting in 1985 combined with a very weak state, creating massive individual insecurity. In these circumstances, the Georgian Orthodox Church was able to provide identity for individuals and legitimacy for governments. Other possible causes of the revival-state funding, too rapid modernization, or emigration-can be excluded as primary drivers of the process. The Georgian case shows a situation in which secularization theory expects transitory revivals and is thus not a counterexample.
In the classical notion of secularism, privatization of religion is an essential component of freedom and equality between citizens, so that rights are granted to individuals rather than to communities. The currently dominant objections to this notion in the literature are the multiculturalist thesis, primarily expounded by Tariq Modood, and the critique of secularism through the “genealogical” method, associated with Talal Asad and his followers. This article critically assesses these objections and defends the classical notion of secularism from a liberal cosmopolitan perspective. The argument that the classical notion perfectly addresses the questions of freedom of conscience and diversity of belief is further supported by reference to an ignored source, Thomas More's Utopia.
Los movimientos antigénero —o contra la “ideología de género— se configuran por medio de un proyecto de conocimiento que se legitima en un esencialismo de la diferencia sexual. En consecuencia, validan como única forma de organización y estructuración de la sociedad la que se sustenta en una concepción biológica del sexo, a partir de la complementariedad entre la mujer y el hombre, en función de un conjunto de roles de género tradicionales.
Con esto pretenden refutar una de las premisas más importantes de las teorías de género contemporáneas: que el sistema sexo-género es parte de una construcción sociocultural con fines patriarcales. Parten de dicho proyecto de conocimiento para accionar diversas estrategias de disciplinamiento social a través del pánico moral, la desinformación y el reconocimiento de libertades y derechos, como el de los padres a educar a sus hijos.
Este libro presenta una cartografía que busca situar el avance de los movimientos antigénero en América Latina utilizando coordenadas que van del internet a las calles y los parlamentos en Argentina, Brasil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, México, Panamá y Perú, pero sin descuidar las conexiones que tienen con otras regiones del mundo, donde también se instituyen las lógicas de un neoconservadurismo global afines a un modo de producción capitalista neoliberal.
Arvestades, et religiooni tagasihoidlik roll ülejäänud lääneriikides on maailma kontekstis pigem erandiks kui reegliks, on pea võimatu leida mõõdupuud, mille järgi saaks anda Ameerika Ühendriikide poliitikas ja ühiskonnas esinevale religioonile kas positiivset või negatiivset hinnangut. Religioon lihtsalt on Ameerika Ühendriikides olulisem kui mujal läänemaailmas. Religioon täidab ameeriklaste ühiskonnas ja poliitikas mitmeid erinevaid funktsioone: nii ameeriklastele endile kui ka mitmetele nende riigijuhtidest on religioon olnud oluline eelkõige isiklikus elus, Ameerika tsiviilreligioon on aidanud rahvast ühendada, kujundada ühist identiteeti ja seotust uue kodumaaga, välispoliitiliselt on usulis-poliitilised hoiakud ja veendumused edendanud nii rahu kui ka konflikte. Riike ja riikide poliitikaid ei tee heaks või halvaks see, kas need on usuga seotud või mitte. Igat otsust ja poliitikat tuleks hinnata tagajärgede, mitte usulise või sekulaarse maailmanägemise järgi.
In Africa, a cultural distinctive of what is generally conceptualised as religion is its embeddedness in the quest for wholeness and harmony. Under the conditions of the coronavirus (and COVID-19, the disease it causes) pandemic, this harmony and wholeness are the primary targets of the virus. The conditions of illness, disharmony, and unwholesomeness characterise every aspect of the COVID-19 human condition: community, society, religious gathering, social solidarity as well as economic well-being. The disruptiveness stabs at the very heart and logic of African Pentecostal claims to make believers healthy, wealthy and reborn with supernatural vigour and resilience. In effect, COVID-19 effectively—it seems—quarantines the power and resources of the Holy Spirit, the core energy of Pentecostalism and the presumptive worker of signs, miracles, and wonder. This chapter beams a critical searchlight on Pentecostal responses, explanations, and discourses of the COVID-19 pandemic and its lasting legacies in African societies. It examines what “doing church” at a distance and socially distancing the power of the Holy Spirit means to African Pentecostal Christians and organisations under the conditions of COVID-19 era.
Thinking about the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, Slavoj Zizek (Pandemic: Covid-19 Shakes the World. New York and London: Or Books, 2020: 3) says: “It is only now, when I have to avoid many of those who are close to me, that I fully experience their presence, their importance to me.” The outbreak of the COVID-19 and its global spread have continued to have diverse effects on humanity. Some literature, commentaries, policies and preliminary studies have since been had focusing on different dimensions of the pandemic at global levels. Although a few theological and religious commentaries have emerged, this present work focuses on the polemic undergirding food and freedom (to worship) discourse, which is in turn defining the relationship between the church and state in Nigeria. Why would the government place higher premium on food by allowing the markets to open and shut down religious houses? When is food more important than freedom or freedom more important than food? These questions and more others become pertinent in the sudden awareness that COVID-19 has placed on humanity. Using historical and theological approaches, I will analyze how the sharp realization of the importance of food and freedom during COVID-19 is affecting the secularity of Nigeria.
This paper critically discusses the pioneering formulation of secularity and secularism in the Arab-Islamicate world(s) found in Butrus al-Bustani’s The Clarion of Syria (1860–1861). This discussion is conceptually based on the distinction between ‘secularity’ as an analytical concept, and ‘secularism’ as a normative and ideological concept. Here, secularity is understood to refer to (structural) distinctions, whether practical or theoretical or cognitive, between the religious and the non-religious. Secularism refers to the ideological promotion of such a differentiation and distinction between religion and, in particular, politics or the state. This paper provides a conceptual analysis of secularity, secularism, and secularization, highlighting the differences between them, as well as the epistemological and methodological requirements for drawing a distinction between them in modern and contemporary Arab thought. It also reflects on the linguistic and historical context, looking at the concepts of secularity and secularism in Arab thought prior to al-Bustani’s The Clarion of Syria.
Political secularism can be defined as a kind of political philosophy that sees the secular state as setting the terms of encounter between the secular and the religious. However, religion and religious organisations are not necessarily seen as oppositional to the secular state; there can be myriad forms of coexistence between secular and religious authorities. The argument forwarded in this article is based on ethnographic research focussing on the presence and social significance of religious materiality in the region considered to be one of the most secularised worldwide—the north-eastern part of contemporary Germany. I investigate the strategies of actors socially recognised as either religious or secular towards each other, looking at how secular actors assign a place to religious symbols, materiality, theological concepts, organisations, and communities; on the other hand I investigate strategies that religious actors adopt in a context of political secularism. Even if political secularism presupposes supremacy of the secular state over religious actors and the right of the former to make legally binding decisions concerning the latter, those religious actors are not passive—they react to secular initiatives and they try to carve for themselves a space in a public sphere, while at the same time the secular or rather nonreligious actors mobilize religious elements for a variety of reasons.
In den Debatten um sozio-ökologische Gesellschaftstransformationen erfährt Religion zunehmend Aufmerksamkeit. Dies hängt mit den Potentialen zusammen, die Religion zugeschrieben werden (z. B. Einfluss auf Moralvorstellungen und Weltbilder). Dieser Beitrag beschreibt anhand aktueller Studien, inwieweit diese Potentiale genutzt werden. Dabei unterscheidet der Beitrag zwischen organisierter Religion (Religionsgemeinschaften) und nichtorganisierter Religion (moderne Spiritualitätsformen).
Este libro aborda una temática muy relevante en dos sentidos. Primero, en un sentido histórico y epistemológico —por ejemplo, en las ciencias jurídicas, la antropología, la sociología o las ciencias políticas— y, segundo, en un sentido social, ya que también está dirigido a un público amplio y diverso (no especialista) que, en el México actual, se ha percatado de que el tema de la religión y el estado laico se ha posicionado y escenificado desde el centro del poder político. Esto último ha acontecido desde la campaña presidencial de Andrés Manuel López Obrador y el comienzo del gobierno de la 4T. De esta forma, se ha abierto una arena de debate muy compleja, detonada desde la política mexicana contemporánea que, como ya se mencionó, no involucra solamente a los especialistas sino también a diversos sectores de la población que se interesan en esta temática. El libro se publicó en un momento crucial, juntando algunas de las piezas más importantes de un rompecabezas que se vislumbraba como imposible de armar
Based on a review of research published over the past decade on media, piety, and religious identity, this chapter argues that secularization does not manifest uniformly in the media but, rather, that it is a multidimensional condition. It identifies two distinct dimensions of secularization in the media: media content that illustrates the weakening of religious identities, and content that illustrates individuals' agency to determine their religious identities. The chapter describes how different approaches to the study of religion and spirituality have opened up understanding of their role in communication and media. Secularization theory constitutes a prominent lens through which researchers today understand the cultural place of religion and, by extension, piety and religious identity. Social media can reinforce religious orthodoxy while mimicking the organizing processes of socially progressive collective action. Digital media facilitate the development and dissemination of unorthodox religious identities, expressions, and spaces, including ones that intentionally position themselves outside of religious institutions.
This article examines the case of Israeli Jews who choose to marry in ceremonies outside the state-authorized rabbinical establishment. Formally speaking, these private marriages are not recognized by the State. We focus on the ways in which these marriages become legitimate. The study is based on interviews with forty such couples. Our findings show that these couples tend to attach far more weight to achieving social legitimacy for their marriage than legal recognition and legitimacy. While most sociological and legal analyses of these concepts do not distinguish between the two types of legitimacy, our study reveals a more nuanced and complex interplay in which these processes are perceived as separate (by the couples) while, in fact, they are interconnected. We show that couples are able to experience their weddings as socially legitimate due to the social recognition of their weddings as “traditional.” Additionally, their de facto relations as cohabitant partners grant them similar rights to those of formally married couples in the eyes of the State. Thus, our study demonstrates that, ironically, those who challenge the State’s marriage establishment rely on the very same elements that constitute formal Jewish marriages in Israel.
This article reviews Wiliam Bains book and places it in the wider discussion of seciularization vs. secularism taking place in the social science. in general.
This contribution aims to analyze Italian prison life of Muslim inmates, focusing on the relationship between the prison crisis and the problems posed by religious plurality and by the Muslim presence, in particular for a prison’s organizational setup and for the penitentiary ideologies. The chapter explores how the conditions and behaviors of Muslims in prison are affected by the still hesitant approach of public policies and state administrations to see Islam acknowledged on a par with other religions. Muslim communities are depicted as a security issue and the presence of Muslims in prisons is perceived as a source of radicalization processes by a large proportion of public opinion in Europe and in Italy too. This belief is spreading, despite the scientific literature has demonstrated that attributing the phenomenon of radicalization to any single cause is untenable and that, on the contrary, an effective way to deal with the risk of radicalization is precisely to stop criminalizing and stereotyping Muslims. This chapter looks at the strategies used by the security apparatus to prevent and combat radicalization in prison, revealing the growing importance of collaboration between prison administrations and Islamic communities and organizations.
This article examines the situation of religion in the context of contemporary neoliberalism. I argue that neoliberalism is a symptom of a fatal crisis in modern liberalism, which is brought about by geophysical planetary limits to growth. The concept of religion is a modern one that emerges from a secularized Christianity, and as liberalism declines, religion as a category is also declining. This phenomenon can be analyzed in terms of what I call postsecularism. Postsecularism indicates the breakdown of the modern divide within liberalism that assigns religion to a private sphere of belief that is separate from political-civil reason. Postsecularism attends to the ways that what we call religion exceed their modern frames and become deprivatized and politicized. In this process, spiritual-political forces are liberated from the modern framework of religion. Recent movements called New Materialism and New Animism can be seen as attempts to conceptualize this development. Finally, as an example, I turn to a recent book by Elizabeth Povinelli called Geontopower to show how religion fails to capture a profound entanglement of spiritual and political phenomena in neoliberalism, or what she calls late liberalism.
Nei paesi democratici, l’ordine giuridico in genere riconosce diritti soggettivi religiosi, prima di tutti la libertà religiosa. Dalla Guerra dei Trent’anni, un’ esperienza storicamente e geograficamente abbastanza specIfica, la libertà religiosa è presentata come soluzione universale alla sfida della coesistenza di differenti credenze religiose nello stesso spazio politico. Di conseguenza, si osserva come questi diritti promuovano determinati tipi di soggettività e di organizzazione religiosa. Dato che tale critica è già stata rivolta alla categoria dei diritti soggettivi, così come a quella dei diritti umani, questo articolo investiga se le risposte fornite a queste critiche – nell’ambito dei studi sociogiuridici, dell’analisi culturale del diritto e della filosofia e sociologia dei diritti umani – possono contribuire a riflettere sull’utilità dei diritti soggettivi religiosi per le persone di fede non egemonica. Si conclude che l’analisi culturale permette identificare possibili reinvenzioni della strategia politica dei diritti soggettivI religiosi.
Dalam melihat hubungan antara perang dan agama, setidaknya terdapat tiga posisi etis yang populer, yaitu perang suci, pasifisme, dan perang yang adil. Ketiga posisi etis ini sama-sama memiliki perwujudannya, baik dalam Kitab Suci dan sejarah gereja, bersandar pada logika tersendiri, serta menghasilkan ketidakcukupan pada dirinya sendiri. Artikel ini berusaha mengupas ketiga posisi etis tersebut untuk memberi wawasan bagi orang Kristen mengenai pemikiran kristiani terhadap perang. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan etika normatif, artikel ini menyimpulkan bahwa posisi pasifisme dan perang yang adil merupakan opsi yang dapat diambil. Lebih jauh lagi, kedua posisi tersebut tidak saling menegasi satu dengan yang lain, melainkan secara komplementer mengisi ketidakcukupan atas pertanyaan etis mengenai perang pada kedua posisi etis tersebut.
En este artículo se sostiene como argumento central que el movimiento constitucionalista de derechos humanos y el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos (DIDH) han jugado un papel crucial en el proceso de secularización en América Latina. Su objetivo es analizar cómo la región ha mantenido en su proceso de secularización una trayectoria significativamente convergente respecto a sus estándares normativos en materia religiosa y cómo, sobre la base de esa experiencia histórica regional, se ha desarrollado un constitucionalismo transformador en la ponderación judicial de casos conflictivos entre libertades religiosas y otros derechos humanos. Pese a las particularidades nacionales y a los diferentes niveles de implementación del DIDH a nivel interno, la constitucionalización del DIDH en varios países latinoamericanos ha producido un significativo acercamiento basado en estándares internacionales mínimos. Ello es especialmente destacable porque esta convergencia de reglas se ha producido en un contexto internacional adverso, dominado por tendencias autoritarias ultraconservadoras y nacionalistas que han generado retrocesos evidenciados en la intensificación del odio y la intolerancia religiosa. Considerando esta trayectoria tan disímil frente al resto del mundo, el artículo sugiere que América Latina sea analizada teóricamente desde sus especificidades, para lo cual se propone la aplicación de un enfoque de secularidades entrelazadas.
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