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Canadian Journal of Law and Society / Revue Canadienne Droit et Société, 2019,
Volume 34, no. 1, pp. 121–143. doi:10.1017/cls.2019.4
Nudes are Forever: Judicial Interpretations
of Digital Technology’s Impact on “Revenge
Porn”
Alexa Dodge*
Abstract
In this article I explore judicial interpretations of the relationship between digital tech-
nology and non-consensual intimate image distribution (NCIID) (i.e., “revenge
porn”). Drawing on my analysis of forty-nine Canadian cases of NCIID, I show that
judicial interpretations of digital technology have important inuences on how NCIID
is understood and responded to in the law. I nd that the majority of judges perceive
digital technology as making NCIID easier to commit—with the simple “click of
a mouse”—and as increasing the amount of harm caused by this act—as digital nude/
sexual photos are seen as lasting “forever” and thus as resulting in ongoing and immea-
surable harm to victims. ese perceptions have substantive impacts on legal ratio-
nales and sentencing decisions, with the aordances of digital technology regularly
being treated as justifying harsher sentences to denounce and deter this act.
Keywords: digital technology, revenge porn, non-consensual intimate image
sharing, Canadian law, digital criminology, sentencing
Résumé
En me fondant sur la littérature existante, dans cet article, j’explore la manière dont la
relation entre la technologie numérique et la distribution non consensuelle d’images
intimes (DNCII) (c.-à-d. pornodivulgation) a été comprise dans la jurisprudence
canadienne. En m’appuyant sur mon analyse de quarante-neuf décisions canadiennes
en matière de DNCII, je montre que les interprétations judiciaires de la technologie
numérique inuencent largement la façon dont la DNCII est comprise et traitée dans
la loi. Je conclus que la majorité des juges perçoivent la technologie numérique comme
facilitant la perpétration d’infractions de DNCII et également comme ampliant les
torts causés par ces actes. Ces perceptions ont des incidences substantielles sur les rai-
sonnements juridiques et sur le processus de détermination de la peine, les moyens de
la technologie numérique étant régulièrement utilisés an de justier des peines plus
sévères, et ce, dans une optique de dissuasion et de dénonciation de cet acte.
Mots clés : technologie numérique, pornodivulgation, partage non consensuel
d’image intime, détermination de la peine, criminologie numérique
* I would like to thank the reviewers for their instrumental feedback on the rst dra of this article,
it was much improved by their challenging and detailed remarks. I would also like to thank Lara
Karaian, Ummni Khan, and Rena Bivens for their invaluable feedback on this work, this article is
deeply inuenced by their insights and critiques.
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122 Alexa Dodge
Nudes are Forever
Non-consensual intimate image distribution (NCIID)—oen colloquially referred
to as “revenge porn”—has increasingly become an issue of international and popu-
lar concern (Powell and Henry 2017; Yar 2013). Cases of NCIID are now fre-
quently featured in the media, and politicians from around the world are debating
potential responses to this issue. In jurisdictions such as Canada, the United States,
the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Israel, Australia, and Japan, the growing
attention to this issue has resulted in various criminal and civil law responses
(Powell and Henry 2017). While the issue of NCIID pre-dates the popularization
of digital/online technology, the increasingly widespread governmental and media
attention to and legal regulation of this act have been largely spurred by cases
involving digital sharing and have oen been connected to fears about the eects
of online technology (Hasino 2015; Salter and Cros 2015).
In Canada, government responses to NCIID have cast this issue as intimately
related to the advent of digital and online technology. e Canadian government’s
decision to create a specic criminal law to respond to NCIID was justied by the
need to address the “dark side” of new digital and online technologies, and this law
was passed via an act named the Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act (e
Act) (Puzic 2015; Canada 2013). In House of Commons debates on e Act, NCIID
was oen described by government ocials as tting under the umbrella term of
“cyberbullying,” with then Minister of Justice Peter MacKay describing NCIID as
a “particularly vile and invasive form of cyberbullying” (Canada 2013). is focus
on new technologies’ role in NCIID has also been common in Canadian media
coverage of NCIID cases, with e Act being commonly referred to as the “Anti-
Cyberbullying Bill” and the issue of NCIID being framed as the tech-specic act of
non-consensually posting intimate images online (Csanady 2016; Puzic 2015;
Tencer 2014). ese responses demonstrate the extent to which NCIID has been
understood as an issue deeply related to digital and online technology.
While a cohort of scholars have begun exploring how understandings of digi-
tal/online technology might broadly impact the legal and extra-legal regulation of
NCIID (Salter and Cros 2015; Hasino 2015; Karaian 2017), scholars have yet to
analyze the way digital/online technology is actually understood in NCIID case
law and how these understandings impact judicial reasoning and sentencing in
practice. us, in this article I undertake a critical discourse analysis (Wodack
2001) of NCIID cases to map the impacts of judicial interpretations of digital/
online technology in cases of NCIID. I nd that the majority of judges perceive
digital/online technology as making NCIID easier to commit—with the simple
“click of a mouse”—and as increasing the amount of harm caused by this act—as
digital nude/sexual photos are seen as lasting “forever” and thus as resulting in
ongoing and immeasurable harm to victims. I assert that these perceptions have
substantive impacts on legal rationales and sentencing decisions, with the aor-
dances1 of digital/online technology regularly being treated as justifying harsher
1 An aordance is a quality/property that inuences how something can be used. In terms of tech-
nologies, these qualities/properties inuence how users interact with the technology (Boyd 2011).
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Nudes are Forever 123
sentences to denounce and deter this act. us, I argue that judicial interpretations
of digital/online technology can signicantly inuence the way NCIID is under-
stood and responded to in law and, therefore, that more attention must be paid to
various judicial conceptions of new technologies’ impacts.
In this article, I draw on my analysis of forty-nine English-language2 Canadian
cases of NCIID to map the history of pre-digital cases of NCIID, to demonstrate
what exactly is new about NCIID in the digital age, and to analyze how legal
conceptions of digital/online technology inuence legal understandings of and
responses to NCIID. e forty-nine legal cases analyzed for this research were
located through a Boolean search of three prominent legal databases3. For the pur-
poses of this research, NCIID cases were dened as those wherein a person is
accused of non-consensually sharing/disseminating a photo or video4 that depicts
nudity, partial nudity, or explicit sexual acts5. To gain insight into the various ways
NCIID is responded to in law, this dataset includes both youth and adult cases of
NCIID and both civil and criminal law responses to this issue. While NCIID has
been specifically recognized as a criminal offence within Canadian law since
section 162.1 was added to the Criminal Code in 2015, my research is interested in
understanding how these cases have been responded to in both the past and pres-
ent, so database searches were not limited by any time period. e oldest cases
found were from 1993, and cases were collected up to and including April 2018.
My analysis of this case law dataset nds that legal interpretations of digital/online
technology signicantly impact what responses and sentences are seen as appro-
priate in these cases. As an increasing variety of legal cases now require an inter-
pretation and consideration of digital/online technology (Yar 2013), these ndings
spark important questions about the impacts of judicial anxieties regarding new
technologies and judicial conceptions of digital memory, digital dissemination,
online networks, and “cyber” harms.
A Pre-Digital History of NCIID
Despite much media and governmental discourse linking NCIID with the advent
of digital technology and the dangers of the digital age (e.g., Puzic 2015; Csanady
2016; Canada 2013; MSNBC 2013), this act pre-dates the development and popu-
larization of digital technology (Hasino 2015; Salter and Cros 2015). e his-
tory of nude and sexually explicit photographs is nearly as old as the history of
2 Only case law available in the English language is considered in this research due to my lack of
uency in the French language.
3 Additional details regarding the methodology for this project can be found in the appendix.
4 is denition includes images that were consensually created as well as those that were non-
consensually created.
5 While the parameters of this denition would include many cases of child pornography (due to
nude images of those under the age of 18 constituting child pornography in Canada), I have
only included cases where child pornography charges were used if the case involved youths non-
consensually sharing images of other youths or adults sharing images of close-in-age youths with
whom they had been in a consensual and legal sexual relationship. is choice is based on the
belief among a cohort of scholars that such cases should be treated as acts of NCIID and that the
label of child pornography should only be used in cases that include the power-imbalance of
adults victimizing children (Dodge and Spencer 2018; Shari and DeMartini 2015).
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124 Alexa Dodge
photography itself (Whitman 2004); however, the point at which these images
were rst non-consensually shared is dicult to determine. One potential begin-
ning is an incident in 1867 that draws parallels to the 2014 “Fappening” wherein
nude photographs of multiple female celebrities, such as Jennifer Lawrence, were
non-consensually shared online. According to Whitman (2004), in 1867 a photog-
rapher attempted to disseminate private “amorous” photographs he had taken of
e ree Musketeers author Alexandre Dumas posing with his mistress Adah
Isaac Menken. Aer a legal battle over the copyright versus privacy rights related
to these images, the photographer was forbidden from disseminating photographs
of Adah in her underwear but was allowed to share other photographs from the
session showing the couple in “amorous poses.” e dissemination of these photos
led to an “international scandal” for the couple (Whitman 2004, 1176). is dem-
onstrates that issues of privacy regarding intimate images certainly predate the
advent of digital technology.
While concerns about new technologies’ eects on privacy have “pervaded
personal photography from its inception” (Hand 2012, 11), Salter and Cros (2015)
describe the history of NCIID specically as related to the popularization of the
Polaroid camera. First on the market in 1948, the new technological abilities of the
Polaroid camera—that is self-developing lm that did not require professional
processing—were increasingly used to easily and condentially produce sexual
images. is technology’s use as a tool in sexual life was widely known by at least
the 1960s (Bonanos 2012), and by the 1970s, both the Polaroid6 and the home
video camera were known for allowing individuals to produce and share intimate
photographs and videos (Salter and Cros 2015). Unfortunately, along with this
new ability to easily and condentially create sexual images came more opportuni-
ties to misuse these materials by non-consensually sharing them or threatening to
do so (Salter and Cros 2015). e beginning of the trend of celebrity “sex tape”
leaks in the late 1980s—such as that experienced by Rob Lowe and Jayne Kennedy—
demonstrates public knowledge of the issue of NCIID before the popularization of
digital and online technology7 (Longsta 2018; Salter and Cros 2015).
As demonstrated by the case from 1867, cases at least partially analogous to
NCIID have a long legal history that predates the widespread adoption of digital
and online technology. In modern law, NCIID has been a documented issue at
least since the 1980s. e 1984 case of Wood v Hustler Magazine Inc. in the United
States was the result of Hustler magazine publishing an amateur nude photograph
of a woman named LaJuan Wood without her consent (Salter and Cros 2015).
Wood’s neighbour had broken into her house, stolen private nude photos her hus-
band had taken of her, and sent them to the magazine claiming to be Wood. Wood
was awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages based on a nding of the public
disclosure of private facts (Wood v Hustler Magazine Inc 1984).
6 Sturken holds that while the Kodak camera was marketed and understood as a tool for document-
ing the nuclear family, Polaroid was understood as being “about photography and parties, swing-
ing culture, sex, and hipsters” (Sturken 2016, 100–103).
7 See Gareth Longsta ’s (2018) “Celebrity Sex Tapes” in e Routledge Companion to Media, Sex
and Sexuality for additional information on the history of the celebrity sex tape.
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Nudes are Forever 125
My case law analysis nds that cases of NCIID have also existed in the Canadian
legal context for much longer than is oen implied by government and media
responses. For instance while the case of Doe v ND (2016), in which Jane Doe’s
ex-boyfriend non-consensually posted a sexually explicit video of her on a por-
nography site, is widely heralded as the rst Canadian civil suit against an act of
NCIID (Csanady 2016; Doe v ND 2016), the 1993 case of LaRose v Yavis predates
Doe by twenty-three years. In LaRose v Yavis, the defendant posted nude photo-
graphs of his ex-girlfriend in public washrooms along with her telephone number
and statements implying she would exchange sexual acts for cocaine. is case
resulted in an armative nding of defamation and violation of privacy and the
plainti was awarded $132,539 in damages (LaRose v Yavis 1993). While the
defence in Doe v ND argued that the precedent-setting nature of the case could
create a “new and dangerous area of tort law with respect to an invasion of privacy
in the new electronic era of ‘sexting’” (Csanady 2016), the case of LaRose v Yavis
demonstrates that there is precedent for civil responses to NCIID. e ruling in
Doe v ND of $141,708.03 in damages was recently set aside aer the defence suc-
cessfully argued that, because the defendant was not represented in the original
trial, a new trial was necessary due to the “precedent-setting” nature of the case
(Porter 2016). is nding demonstrates how the construction of NCIID as an
issue specic to the digital age can have important eects on the legal reasoning in
and responses to these cases.
Other non-digital Canadian cases dealing with NCIID include the 1993 case of
Milton v Savinko, wherein the plainti alleged that, aer she accidently le a top-
less vacation photo of herself in an acquaintance’s jacket she was borrowing, the
acquaintance refused to return the photo and showed it to one of their mutual
friends (Milton v Savinko 1993). e criminal case of R v Lepore (2001) demon-
strates another example of a case of NCIID that did not involve the use of digital
or online technology. R v Lepore describes a violent domestic relationship between
KG and Mr. Lepore that included Mr. Lepore distributing a sex tape the couple
consensually made together in 1997. Mr. Lepore distributed the VHS tapes by
placing them in the mailboxes of at least ten of the victim’s neighbours along with
a note providing the victim’s home and work numbers and suggesting that she
could be reached to provide sexual favours (R v Lepore 2001). Additionally,
although the 1994 case of R v JT is based on charges of assault unrelated to the act
of NCIID8, the facts of this case describe JT committing two acts of NCIID due to
being angry with the victim and wanting to control and punish her. In the rst
instance, he gave a nude photograph of her to a person near her work that she saw
daily, and in the second instance, he le nude photographs outside of her friend’s
apartment (R v JT 1994).
Additional evidence of the potential extent of NCIID prior to its widespread
online presence is demonstrated by the existence of multiple cases where,
although images were not actually distributed, the threat of distribution was made.
8 R v JT (1994) is not included in the dataset because the act of NCIID was not central to the case
or responded to in law.
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126 Alexa Dodge
For example, in the 1988 case of R v Guerrero, the complainant testied that she
only agreed to have sex with the accused because he threatened to send nude pho-
tographs of her to her school if she did not (R v Guerrero 1988).9 In the 1991 case
of R v DKP, a man was convicted of extortion for calling his ex-partner’s brother
and mother to tell them he was upset about the breakup and would disseminate
nude photographs of his ex-partner if he were not given $4,000 (R v DKP 1991).
ese cases show that the issue of having intimate images non-consensually
shared—or the threat of sharing—aected individuals long before the widespread
media and governmental attention to this issue.
Additionally, even in our current digital age, online and digital technologies
are not always a main component in cases of NCIID. For instance, in the 2010
custody case of FR v AKA it is noted that FR distributed photocopied yers pictur-
ing nude photographs of his ex-partner on car windshields and in mailboxes in the
neighbourhood where AKA’s mother lived (FR v AKA 2010)10. Such examples
demonstrate that NCIID not only pre-dates the digital age, but that the role digital
technology plays in contemporary cases also remains variable.
Law, New Technologies, and Techno Panics
It is important to understand the consequences of various interpretations of new
technologies in law because, as discussed further below, interpretations may be
used to support either more carceral or more lenient responses to oences involv-
ing new technologies. A focus on technology as creating new dangers and crimes
can elicit panicked social and legal reactions that argue for new, tougher regula-
tions to respond to the seemingly novel and daunting dangers of a given technol-
ogy. at is, oences involving new technology oen inspire moral panics (Baym
2010). Such responses to new technology, sometimes called techno panics (ierer
2012; Herrman 2017), rely on the age-old tendency to fear new technologies and
to blame them for social issues (Baym 2010; Bluett-Boyd et al. 2013; Hasino
2015).
While new technologies oen aggravate or modify pre-existing issues in
ways that must be accounted for, it is uncommon for them to actually create
wholly new concerns and oences (Ellison and Akdeniz 1998; Yar 2013; Baym
2010). ose working at the intersection of law and technology have warned that
legal actors must be careful to avoid techno panic type responses. Legal actors
mustn’t become so focused on the role of new technology in an oence that they
respond in ways that misconstrue or overblow the nature of the harm caused and
the extent to which the issue is new and in need of a novel regulatory response
(Calo 2015). e above history of NCIID demonstrates that digital technology
has not created the issue of NCIID and that the role digital and online technologies
9 As described in the appendix, those cases involving threats to distribute but no actual distribution
are not included in the dataset. However, this does provide additional context of NCIID’s history.
The use of NCIID as a threat within a case of sexual violence can also be seen in the cases of
R v Davis (1999) and R v S (2004).
10 is case is not included in the dataset as the act of NCIID was only used as evidence rather than
being responded to in law.
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Nudes are Forever 127
play in these cases varies. us developing a nuanced view of the variable role
that digital technology plays in these cases is necessary for ensuring measured
legal responses to this issue.
e potential for the presence of digital and online technologies to inuence
legal reasoning and responses can be seen in a number of NCIID cases. In a 2006
case of “cyber stalking”11 that included an act of NCIID, the judge asserted that
“a penitentiary term is very possible, particularly with resort to electronic devices
where the harassment and the harm far exceeds, or at least is a whole new dimen-
sion to […] harassment” (R v Barnes 2006, at para 35). Likewise, in a 2004 case
in which the oender secretly posted nude images of his girlfriend online, the
judge reasons that a harsher sentence—of six months imprisonment and two
years probation—is required to communicate the message that “we had better
pay some respect here to these computers that we’re dealing with” (R v MK 2004,
at para 8). As these comments demonstrate, interpretations of the role of digital
technology can have substantive eects on legal responses to cases. is high-
lights the need to analyze how digital technology is being understood and
wielded in law. In the following section I map legal interpretations of the impact
of digital technology in NCIID cases and trouble common legal understandings
of digital technology’s impact on NCIID.
Digital Technology’s Impact
While acts of NCIID have not—and do not—always involve the use of digital tech-
nology, the advent of digital technology has changed and amplied this issue in
notable ways. e frequency and notoriety of NCIID has surely increased in recent
years. Websites devoted to the posting of non-consensual intimate images (e.g.,
Hunter Moore’s 2010 creation of isanyoneup.com) and the trend of non-consensu-
ally posting intimate images on pornography sites (Tsoulis-Reay 2013; Bates 2017)
led to the 2010 coining of the term “revenge porn” to describe cases of NCIID
(Tsoulis-Reay 2013). e increasing ubiquity of cases of NCIID has been inu-
enced at least in part by the aordances of digital and online technologies that
make it much easier to create, copy, and share images (Boyd 2011). While the issue
of NCIID is not new and specic to the digital age, the particular features of digital
technology in conjunction with online/networked technologies have certainly
aected—at least—the ease and scope of many cases of non-consensual sharing.
Boyd (2011, 45) details how the aordances of digital technology—in conjunc-
tion with the capabilities of online and networked technology (e.g., social media)—
allow digital information to be easily copied (replicability), easily shared with
large audiences (scalability), easily recorded and archived (persistence), and eas-
ily accessed by others and found in the future (searchability). In the context of
NCIID, replicability and scalability have increased the ease with which an act
can be committed and the ease with which a nude/sexual image can be spread to
11 e judge in this case referred to Barnes’s oences as “cyber stalking.” e actual charge laid was
criminal harassment. Mr. Barnes was found guilty of criminal harassment and received a sentence
of twelve months’ imprisonment and three years’ probation.
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128 Alexa Dodge
a large audience. Additionally, persistence and searchability have increased/extended
the impact of this act in some cases by allowing nude/sexual images to be found by
others and to potentially reemerge and aect a victim in the future. In this section,
I will describe how these eects of digital technology are understood in law.
My analysis of forty-nine legal cases from across Canada found that the
aordances of digital technology were seen as having signicant impacts on the
nature of NCIID. e main points discussed in the case law reect the impacts
of scalability, replicability, persistence, and searchability described by Boyd. In
general, digital technology was seen as making NCIID easier to commit (via
replicability and scalability) and as increasing/extending the harm caused (via
scalability, persistence, and searchability). I nd that the role digital technology
is seen as playing in a case of NCIID oen inuences legal interpretations of the
level of harm caused and the extent to which denunciation and general and spe-
cic deterrence12 need to be emphasized. us, interpretations of digital technol-
ogy regularly inuence sentencing decisions in cases of NCIID. While recognition
of the impact of digital technology in these cases is necessary, I demonstrate that
legal interpretations of these impacts need to be further nuanced and that the
eects various interpretations of digital technology can have on legal responses to
NCIID need to be recognized.
Digital Dissemination: Scalability and Replicability
In response to a case of NCIID, Canadian criminal lawyer Deanne Gaar com-
mented, “in this day and age, with Internet and digital images which can be shared
in a millisecond, you lose control over [nude images] if you’re placing the trust in
someone else” (Zeidler 2014). is quote implies that the aordances of online and
digital technology make NCIID a bigger threat, as it is easier to commit and thus
more likely to occur. e ability to copy and disseminate non-digital nude or sex-
ual images is limited, at least in part, by the time and eort required to make copies
and to physically share them. For instance, when “sex tapes” were recorded on
VHS, an act of NCIID might require accessing two VHS players and blank tapes
and then individually recording each copy. And disseminating these copies would
require, for instance, driving to a victim’s neighbourhood to distribute the videos
door-to-door. e video could only be further spread by physically sharing the
tape with other individuals; as an Ebony magazine article discussing the above
noted victimization of Jayne Kennedy simply put it, before the Internet and digital
technology, videos and photographs had to be physically “passed from perv to
perv” (Bouboushian 2014). On the other hand, digital images are made of binary
digits, or bits, that allow information to be quickly shared with unprecedented ease
and on an unprecedented scale (Hand 2012; Boyd 2011). Although NCIID is not
a new phenomenon, in the digital age a wider distribution of nude/sexual images
12 Specic deterrence is focused on punishing the individual involved in the case in a way that will
deter them from committing future criminal acts, while general deterrence aims to send a mes-
sage about how such acts will be punished that eectively deters individuals in the community at
large from committing the same act. It should be noted that general deterrence cannot be used in
youth cases in Canada (Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002).
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Nudes are Forever 129
(to a victim’s family, friends, and coworkers) can now be accomplished with a few
clicks on a digital device (e.g., by posting an image on social media).
Digital technology is designed with the assumption that users want their infor-
mation shared, and thus “the design encourages the widespread distribution of
content” (Hasino 2015, 147). is has led some scholars to refer to digital tech-
nology as being “promiscuous” and “slutty” (Calo 2015; Chun and Friedland 2015).
is promiscuous digital technology works in tandem with the equally “promiscu-
ous” Internet to allow people from around the world to easily and cheaply access
information (Calo 2015). e aordances of digital replicability and scalability
“challenge people’s sense of control” by allowing for almost instant sharing to mul-
tiple people or to publicly available websites (Boyd 2011, 49). As a Winnipeg Police
ocer recently commented, “we all know as soon as you’ve uploaded an image
that it can be shared hundreds of times within minutes” (Winnipeg Free Press 2017).
Likewise, in the House of Commons debates on “cyberbullying” in November of
2013, Peter MacKay described digital and online technologies as making intimate
images “dicult to control” and as increasing the “speed and the scope in which
statements and images can be made and shared with many others” (Canada 2013).
ese alterations to scalability and replicability are now being grappled with by
victims of NCIID and by the government and legal ocials who are attempting to
respond to this issue.
In the Canadian case law, judges commonly expressed the belief that acts of
NCIID have been made easier to commit and more impactful due to the fact that
digital images are easier to copy (e.g., replicability) and to widely share (e.g., scal-
ability). In terms of the ease of replicability, multiple judges refer to the ability of
oenders to create impactful privacy violations through the simple click of a
mouse. Judges express that “with the single click of a mouse, information can be
circulated instantly and globally” (R v DaSilva 2011, at para 33, emphasis added)
and that “in this case the instant click of a mouse circulated harmful and damaging
material” (R v Fader, 2014, at para 25, emphasis added). ese and other cases
further hold that online forms of NCIID “can be particularly harmful because the
content can be spread widely [and] quickly” (R v NG & GG 2015).
While the ease of the “click of a mouse” could be used to argue that oenders
should receive more lenient sentences due to a lower level of intent/planning,
many judges argue that the ease of digital sharing requires a harsher response to
act as a deterrent to others who wish to commit this easy oence. For example,
in R v DaSilva (2011) the judge goes on to explain that a strong sentence is nec-
essary to act as a general deterrent to the “increasingly common” use of new
technologies in the commission of crime: “once [digital information is] circu-
lated, the ability to undue [sic] any harm caused, is very limited […] Given the
common use of social networking sites and their potential for enormous harm,
general deterrence plays a signicant principle in this sentencing. A clear mes-
sage to all users of social networking sites is a valuable sentencing objective in
this case” (at para 33–35).
In this case, a sentence of six months of incarceration is justied, in part, by the
need to emphasize general deterrence due to the ease with which this act can be
committed. Likewise, as part of the reasoning for a sentence of two years’
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130 Alexa Dodge
incarceration in R v Fader (2014),13 the judge argues that it is necessary for the
court to emphasize not only specic deterrence but also general deterrence due to
the fact that “harmful and damaging material” can be circulated with “the instant
click of a mouse” (at para 25). e judge asserts that this sentence will provide
general deterrence as it will “get […] the word out that if people send sexually
explicit photos and videos out into the stratosphere, periods of imprisonment are
likely” (R v Fader 2014, at para 25–26). It is important to note here that, under
Canadian sentencing principles, the use of general deterrence is not allowed in
youth cases (Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002); therefore this specic nding would
only apply in adult cases, though it may manifest in other—less explicit—ways
within youth court cases as well.
e legal rationale of “just one click” that I’ve identied in cases of NCIID can
also be found in child pornography case law. Some legal scholars argue that the
ability to “gather hundreds of [child pornography] images with the click of a
mouse” problematizes assessments of oender blameworthiness that are based on
the quantity of images downloaded (Rogers 2013, 1023). ey assert that the ease
of accessing large amounts of digital child pornography results in the need for
“a more nuanced approach that focuses on case specics […as a] measure of
harm” (Rogers 2013, 1027). However, in practice, despite attempts by defence law-
yers to use “one click” as a defence—as in R v CWF (2006), wherein the defence
argued that “vast quantities of material can be downloaded and saved with one
mouse click” (at para 10)—the ease of download and dissemination is oen used
as an argument for harsher sentences in child pornography case law (Rogers 2013;
also see R v TLB 2007 and R v Moen 2006). While possession of child pornography
was much more dicult to commit in the pre-digital age—requiring concerted
intention, eort, and funds to locate, purchase, and receive pricey magazines, pho-
tographs, and videos—the ability for “anyone [to] obtain it at the click of the inter-
net search engine” is oen used to argue for harsher sentences to send “a strongly
punitive and deterrent message” (R v Moen 2006). It seems that, in both child
pornography case law and NCIID case law, the perceived increase in ease caused
by “one click” digital aordances oen wins out over an interpretation of “one
click” as diminishing the need for forethought and thus as lowering oender cul-
pability. Harsher sentences aimed at general deterrence are oen utilized to com-
bat user-friendly digital devices that are perceived as making it far too easy for
us to share private images. Additionally, it is possible that “techno panic” type
thinking inuences these harsher responses, as the presence of online and digital
technologies in these cases could make them appear more dangerous in all
cases—precluding the possibility of considering the nuanced role of digital tech-
nology in dierent cases—and make the harms of image sharing appear novel
and in need of an enhanced reaction. e legal discourse seems to represent a
widespread, though not universal, argument for punishing cases more harshly
due to the aordances of digital technology.
13 Other considerations include the fact that Mr. Fader had committed an act of NCIID against a
previous partner in R v Fader (2009) and the fact that this act was carried out in the context of
ongoing acts of domestic abuse.
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Nudes are Forever 131
While the above examples show interpretations of the ease of digital sharing as
requiring longer sentences to act as a general deterrent, there is still the potential
for the user-friendly and tempting qualities of digital devices to support more
lenient sentences. For instance, in R v Warrington, Mr. Warrington’s court-ordered
apology letter seems to use the concept of “one click” to partially redeem his
actions by placing some of the blame on the aordances of digital and networked
technology (Port Coquitlam Provincial Court 2013). Mr. Warrington, who dis-
seminated images on social media of an alleged sexual assault that took place at a
rave in British Columbia (Stueck 2013), wrote in part:
To think that just the thoughtless push of a button could change so many
outcomes is hard to believe and yet so easily overlooked until the conse-
quences surface. As I am sure you are well aware, our generation has become
so reliant on social media […]. I am sorry to say that I was one of those
people, so dependent on this window into other people’s lives that I did not
realize the power it held until it was used irresponsibly. It was all too easy to
upload and share something that wasn’t mine to share. Just a few clicks and
it changed your life and how the world viewed the person you are. at ease
of access is not something to be taken as lightly as so many do and I hope
that they are able see that from what has happened here. (Port Coquitlam
Provincial Court 2013, emphasis added)
e technology-focused view of NCIID that Mr. Warrington describes allows the
aordances of technology to partially take the blame in this case. He describes the
technology as extremely easy to use, thus allowing him to share the images with-
out actually thinking about it—it was just the “thoughtless push of a button.” We
might call this the “just one click” defense. is defense deects blame from the
oender by relying on a perspective of technological determinism that sees new
technologies as “causal agents” that act on individuals in ways they have “little
power to resist” (Baym 2010, 24). e case of R v Zhou (2016) demonstrates both
the potential and limits of the “one click” defense, when the judge rejects the idea
that Zhou’s actions were a quick mistake: “ought and planning went into post-
ing the photos. Mr. Zhou would have to have chosen which photos he would post,
think about the comment he would post with them, and according to the agreed
statement of facts, he checked the comments of the viewers with some frequency.
is was not a momentary lapse of judgment or a thoughtless one-time mistake. It
was a continuing oence. For all of these reasons, I would rate the degree of
responsibility of the oender as high” (at para 25–27).
e reasons for sentencing in Zhou demonstrate that while this particular
oence was seen as requiring notable planning and revisiting, cases where the
posting was more akin to “a momentary lapse of judgment or a thoughtless one-
time mistake” (e.g., the few clicks required to share a single image to Instagram
without any comment and without returning to check for comments) could be
treated with more leniency due to understanding the ease of posting.
is potential for leniency due to the ease of digital copying and sharing is
arguably supported by conceptions of digital technology as implicitly “leaky” or
“promiscuous” (Calo 2015; Chun and Friedland 2015). is conception of tech-
nology has been used by police and “sexting experts” to argue that having nude
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132 Alexa Dodge
images non-consensually shared should be the assumed outcome of sending
images in the digital age (Zeidler 2014; Alex 2017). For instance, the under
Bay Police Service recently published a “reminder” to individuals that “anytime
they send nude images of themselves to other people there is always a risk of the
photo being uploaded to le sharing sites or social media pages without their
consent” (Alex 2017). Likewise, the defence in the case of Doe v ND (2016)
argued that the monetary award to Jane Doe was too high considering that Doe
sent the intimate video knowing that “there [was] always the risk of it becoming
public” (Csanady 2016). These responses may imply that sexual images are
bound to be disseminated—or that victims should have at least realized the
risk14—and therefore that offenders’ blameworthiness is diminished. Legal
interpretations of the affordance of digital replicability can have significant
impacts on understandings of offender culpability, as they influence the level
of intent attributed to oenders.
In addition to considering the ease of digital copying, judges also weighed the
level of digital dissemination (scalability) when justifying sentencing decisions
and determining the gravity of an oence. For example, in R v PSD (2016), the fact
that digital images were forwarded to two friends—rather than posted publicly
online—was seen as diminishing the gravity of the oence. e judge, here, argues
that the dierence in dissemination between this case and a case such as R v Zhou
(2016)—wherein intimate images were posted on a pornography site and viewed a
recorded 1,333 times—is signicant: “In the end, I conclude that, while the gravity
of the oence in general is signicant, the circumstances of this particular case
are less egregious than, for example, a case involving signicant planning and
forethought and resulting in a transmission of identiable intimate images
widely distributed on the internet. e sentence must be proportionate to those
considerations” (at para 15).
Likewise, in R v AC (2017)—wherein a woman’s nude photos were sent via
private Instagram message to her employer and to several friends from her
university—the judge notes “the absence of circumstances that would be even
more aggravating. Mr. A.C. posted the photographs once only. He circulated them
amongst a rather small number of people” (at para 85). In this case, the judge’s
perspective on limited digital dissemination contributes to his decision that
imprisonment is not required and that the oender should be given a conditional
discharge. However, while the judge in this case understands the workings of digi-
tal and networked technology in a way that leads to his perception that these pho-
tos were not widely shared, the victim perceived that Mr. A.C. “has shared my
body with [the] entire world. Friends, colleagues, classmates, people who I interact
with and see every day of my life” (R v AC 2017, at para 51). ese dierent inter-
pretations of the scalability of digital images shared via Instagram message clearly
reveals dierent understandings of digital distribution.
14 It is important to note that these responses oen do not account for the fact that not all images in
NCIID cases are created consensually at the outset. Some cases involve images that were taken
surreptitiously or received through coercion.
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Nudes are Forever 133
In both R v PSD and R v AC the fact that images were sent to a select few
people was seen as making the oences less egregious; however, these interpreta-
tions do not fully account for the ways these images could still be saved on vari-
ous devices and archives—and therefore be at risk for a later leak. Due to the
ease of spreading and the fact that digital images are easily saved and shared in
the future, an image that is shared with even just one person has the potential to
be disseminated or leaked in the future. e judge in R v Greene (2018) takes this
fact into account saying that, while Mr. Greene did not widely share the images,
“when Mr. Greene sent the video to X’s friend, he no longer had any control
over where it subsequently went. is increases his level of moral responsibility”
(at para 65)15. ese varying perspectives on the potential spread of a digital
image complicate legal rationales and sentencing decisions inuenced by the
extent an image has been shared.
e leaky nature of digital images and digital devices creates questions about
whether or not we think the law should account for the potential leak and for the
potential harm to the victim in the future (these questions will be discussed further
in the sub-section on digital memory). e importance of these questions becomes
even more pronounced in light of the fact that conceptions of digital spread were
even considered as an aggravating factor in a case where images were not actually
shared. In a 2017 case in Newfoundland, Kyle Hunt threatened to share intimate
photos of his ex-girlfriend on Facebook aer she broke up with him. e judge in
this case asserted that a strong sentence was required due to the fact that “a present
day threat to release intimate photographs through social media sites allows for
the dissemination of such photographs on a worldwide basis” and “technology
also makes it impossible for the victim to limit circulation or to retrieve the pho-
tographs. is modern day form of extortion is much dierent and more serious
than older forms of extortion. e sentencing for such oences must reect the
changes in the sharing of information and the impact upon victims” (CTV News
2017). Although the Crown requested a six-month prison sentence, the judge
imposed a nine-month sentence due to this interpretation of the seriousness of
digital spread and of crimes involving new technologies.
e responses in R v PSD and R v AC also do not fully account for the potential
greater impact of having nude photos shared with a few people that you see every
day versus hundreds of people that you may never meet. As the victim in R v AC
(2017) put it, her image was not just seen by a few random people, but by “people
who I interact with and see every day of my life” (at para 51). e case of R v MR
(2017) provides a salient example of the fact that the extent of an image’s dissemi-
nation may not be the most important factor for determining the extent of harm
caused or the malicious intent of the oender. Here, the images were only shared
with the victims’ family members (via email) and were not posted publicly online;
however, due to the fact that the victim came from a very traditional religious
family, the limited sharing of these images had what the judge describes as an
15 Mr. Greene received a sentence of ve months’ imprisonment for the Canadian Criminal Code
s.162.1 charge of disseminating an intimate image without consent.
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134 Alexa Dodge
“immeasurable” impact on both the victim and her family (R v MR 2017, n.p.).
us, judges must be careful when basing the impact of a given case of image shar-
ing on the extent of digital dissemination involved. e impact of a digital image
shared with a few people known to the victim will not necessarily cause less harm
than an image shared with hundreds of people on a pornography site. Judges in
NCIID cases also need to assess several other variables impacting levels of harm in
these cases, such as: whether image dissemination took place within a broader
context of domestic violence or harassment, whether images were shared along
with the victim’s contact information, and how explicit the images are (Dodge
2018).
While the aordances of digital technology make images easier to widely
share, it is also necessary to nuance discussions of exactly how much this changes
the impact of NCIID and the nature of dissemination in particular cases. For
instance, the case of R v Agoston (2017) involves a digital image, but the spread in
this case is very limited. In this case, the image is viewed by two people who are
shown the image on Mr. Agoston’s cellphone, but the image is never digitally cop-
ied or disseminated16. On the other hand, the spread of pre-digital images was
sometimes quite widespread. For example, in LaRose v Yavis (1993), images were
posted in public washrooms, and in FR v AKA (2010), yers were distributed
throughout a neighbourhood. e dierence here between showing an image and
then having it returned to you versus publishing or displaying an image to a wider
audience is therefore not one that is determined by the presence of digital technol-
ogy in a case. While the aordances of digital technology can allow images to be
shared more easily and widely, the substantive impact of these aordances is highly
case specic, and a nuanced understanding of digital technology and online plat-
forms to determine this impact.
Digital Memory: Persistence and Searchability
e eects that the aordances of digital technology have had on the persistence
and searchability of information have been at the forefront of popular understand-
ings of NCIID in the digital age, as NCIID is now seen as having potentially life-
long reputational impacts (Bailey 2015; Hasino 2015; Dodge 2016). For instance,
during a discussion about revenge porn on MSNBC, one of the hosts begins by
asking “how long will it be before we learn that, in this day and age, anything you
do in your digital life is forever” (MSNBC 2013). e huge capacity for digital stor-
age and the ease with which digital archives can be searched change both what and
how we remember in the digital age. Hand asserts that the aordances of online
digital archives are “reshaping individual and collective memories” as they allow
“previous thoughts, words, images, and deeds [to] be recalled, reworked, and
reected upon again” (Hand 2016, 270).
16 e particular dynamics of this case are used to justify a conditional discharge, supported by the
following factors: the “extremely limited” (Agoston 2017, at para 17) distribution of the images;
the fact that Mr. Agoston did not plan to obtain the images (his co-worker solicited the images
while using Mr. Agoston’s phone); the oender’s lack of criminal record and choice to plead guilty;
his remorse; and the fact that he adhered to stringent bail conditions for two years.
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Nudes are Forever 135
e impact of these changes on memory in the digital age is further amplied
by a changing relationship to photographs. Digital camera technology has become
ubiquitous, and the widespread inclusion of cameras as part of smartphones
means that, for many of us, our cameras are always with us (Battye 2014). As a
result of smartphones and social media sites that allow (and encourage) users to
share photos, both photo creation and sharing have become an extremely com-
mon and frequent activity for many people (Hand 2016; Sturken 2016). e fact
that 350 million photos are uploaded to Facebook per day demonstrates both the
ubiquity of digital photo-sharing and the ways that photography has become
“networked,” as photographs are now regularly created for the purpose of visual
communication rather than for memory preservation purposes (Venema and
Lobinger 2017; Hand 2012). Furthermore, while Sontag (2003, 174) once wrote
that “photographs are fragile objects, easily torn or mislaid”, digital photographs
are now seen as excessively persistent. In addition, where once most photos were
shown to only a few friends and family members, they now easily circulate on
social media platforms, websites, and via text and instant message (Battye 2014).
While the move towards “the structuring of life to create photographable
moments” has been underway at least since the introduction of the “Kodak
moment,” the social media focus on documenting and communicating our lives
through pictures has increased the ubiquity of photography in unprecedented
ways (Sturken 2016, 100).
The affordances of digital memory create an environment in which non-
consensually shared images have come to be seen by many victims as a perma-
nent blow to their reputation (Bailey 2015; Chun and Friedland 2015; Langlois
and Slane 2017). For instance, young women now commonly report fears that
the sharing of an “inappropriate” sexualized image “could expose them to per-
manent reputational harm and social ruin” (Bailey 2015, 29). And these fears are
encouraged by police and child protection agencies that advance this claim as a
scare tactic to dissuade youth from both consensual and non-consensual inti-
mate image sharing (Karaian 2014; Dodge and Spencer 2018). Scholars also
express concerns that digital memory increases the impact of NCIID, such as
Bates’ assertion that “once a photo is posted online, it is challenging to com-
pletely remove from the Internet, which means the harm is continuous and long
lasting” (Bates 2017, 23; Bailey 2015; Hasino 2015). e ability to manage our
identities and reputations is an old issue that is reinvigorated by the digital age,
wherein online proles are curated to represent our identities, and information
about who we are and what we’ve done can be saved and searched for online
(Boyd 2011; Handyside and Ringrose 2017; Wagman 2016; Langlois and Slane
2017).
While we oen think of the act of forgetting something as negative and remem-
bering as positive, in the digital age we hear expressions of nostalgic longing for
forgetting (Mayer-Schonberger 2009). ese dreams of deletion are spurred by
fears of information—such as intimate images—returning to haunt us (Wagman
2016; Bailey 2015). is fear of a digital haunting is strengthened by the assertion,
questionably supported yet increasingly common, that universities and prospec-
tive employers are regularly sleuthing online and disqualifying applicants who
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136 Alexa Dodge
have had nude photos shared17 (CBC News 2016; Bloom 2016; Maru 2018;
Angelides 2013). News articles and education campaigns regularly warn youth
that employers and university admissions sta will look at their online presence
and social media proles and that they could “miss out on an opportunity or never
achieve a goal of theirs” due to having nude photos leaked online (CBC News
2016; Maru 2018). e anxieties of digital memory are vividly expressed in the
Victim Impact Statement included in R v Zhou (2016): “ere was no way I could
erase the images o of the computers of the people who downloaded them. ere
was no way I could prevent these images from surfacing in the future and destroy-
ing my career and life that I have worked so hard to build. I have never felt more
violated, belittled, and vulnerable” (at para 3).
In response to fears such as these, sites like reputation.com and
reputationdefender.com oer to manage your online reputation as it is the “key to
success in our digital world” (Wagman 2016, 116), and individuals from around
the world have begun to demand—sometimes successfully—the “right to be for-
gotten” (Tirosh 2017). Scholarly and media discussions of digital memory oen
cite NCIID as the ultimate example of why we should be concerned about digital
archives, arming the digital intimate image’s role as a menace that will live on
forever (Wagman 2016; CBC News 2016; MSNBC 2013).
e ubiquity of photography coupled with the aordances of digital memory
creates anxieties that “the end of forgetting” (Mayer-Schonberger 2009) might indef-
initely extend the harm of having an image shared non-consensually (Dodge 2016;
Bailey 2015; Kitchen 2015). is understanding of digital memory’s eect on NCIID
is one that is commonly held in Canadian case law. Many judges assert that the harm
caused by NCIID is amplied by the fact that digital images can exist and continue
the violation of NCIID “forever.” In R v Schultz (2008), the judge comments that the
“violation of the complainant’s privacy rights may continue indenitely given the
nature of the Internet” (at para 45, emphasis added), and in R v W (2014), the judge
comments that “there is the potential that the video will be circulated in the future
and be available forever” (at para 20, emphasis added). ese quotes demonstrate
that many judges see digital memory as increasing the harm of NCIID, because
the impact of the act is seen as ongoing. From this perspective, as demonstrated in
R v Korbut (2012), the harm of NCIID can be seen as “unquantiable” (at para 17),
resulting in the need to consider not only the harm experienced thus far but also
the potential harm the victim could experience in the future.
is perspective is based on understandings of digital images as dicult—or
impossible—to control or delete. In R v Korbut (2012), the need to consider the
ongoing harm caused is based on the assertion that the images are “irretrievable and
may continue to be accessible on the internet in perpetuity—with the potential to
revictimize the complainant at some time in the future” (at para 17, emphasis added).
17 ese assertions, that oen come in the form of scare tactics aimed at dissuading consensual
youth sexting, fail to acknowledge that intimate images can only have this impact if they are
shared publicly online (rather than, for instance, shared via text messages among youths) and if
they are shared along with the individual’s name and in a way that results in search algorithms
prominently displaying the image.
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Nudes are Forever 137
Commenting on the inability to truly delete these photos, in R v CNT (2015) the
judge asserts that once an image is transmitted “its digital footprint is embedded
in binary cement” (at para 11). In Doe v ND (2016), the judge expresses concerns
that digital images are “out of the defendant’s (and the plainti’s—and the Court’s)
control” and that there is no way to know how many times an intimate image is
“viewed or downloaded or if and how many times it may have been copied onto
other media storage devices (where it may remain) or recirculate” (at para 10).
Likewise, the judge in R v Schultz (2008)18 comments that “the moment Mr. Schultz
posted the photographs to his web page, he lost control of them and their ultimate
destination” (at para 119). As these cases demonstrate, digital images are widely
regarded within Canadian case law as dicult to control and delete and, therefore,
as possessing the potential for innitely lasting harm.
As is the case with conceptions of “just one click” and digital spread, concep-
tions of digital memory are also inuential in judicial reasonings and sentencing
decisions. In many cases, digital memory is explicitly described as an aggravating
factor in determining the appropriate response to digital forms of NCIID. One
judge states that an aggravating factor in the case is the fact that the transmitted image
will “forever have a potential for further transmission” (R v PSD 2016, para 13).
Likewise, in R v KF (2015), it is reasoned that “the image of AK is forever available.
Its distribution through the anonymity of the Internet is an aggravating feature”
(at para 7). And in R v BH (2016) the judge nds that “the moral gravity of this
oence requires the imposition of a denunciatory sentence which will deter others
from such agrant breaches of privacy that have lifetime consequences. Neither
probation or a conditional sentence are appropriate in this matter, they do not
reect the proper principles of sentencing” (at para 27, emphasis added).
In Doe v ND (2016), the inuence of digital memory is taken to its extreme,
when the judge argues that digital memory not only extends the harm caused, but
is equivalent to multiple assaults: “[due to the] potential for the video still to be in
circulation, it is appropriate to regard this as tantamount to multiple assaults on
the plainti’s dignity” (at para 57). ese kinds of responses aim to punish oend-
ers based not only on the harm caused but on the potential future harm that could
be incurred in light of digital memory. R v Agoston (2017) demonstrates that a lack
of perceived digital memory can likewise inuence case outcomes as the judge
holds that—because images were only shown to others on a cellphone rather than
distributed online—the oence “falls on the less serious end of the spectrum”
because the images will not be available “forever” (at para 17). Mr. Agoston
received a sentence on the very low end of the spectrum for these cases, receiving
a conditional discharge and one year probation.
e above examples demonstrate that judicial understandings of digital mem-
ory have considerable eects on assessments of oender culpability and on ideas
of appropriate sentences in cases of NCIID. us, it is important to scrutinize how
judges may take up ideas about digital memory in ways that may not always get at
the nuances of digital and networked technology’s aordances (not to mention the
18 Received a sentence of twelve months’ incarceration followed by two years’ probation.
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138 Alexa Dodge
fact that non-digital photographs have the potential to be saved and redeployed in
the future as well). For instance, in the Agoston case, the images are seen as com-
pletely deleted from the cellphone and therefore as no longer a threat, but this does
not account for the ways our “promiscuous” (Calo 2015) devices tend to archive—
and sometimes leak—even those images we “delete.” On the other hand, common
assertions that a digital image will exist and be accessible “forever” may overstate
the potential future of an image in certain contexts, as images may eventually
disappear into the increasingly vast amount of digital data available online
(Hand 2016). e immortality of a digital image is oen at the mercy of algorith-
mic digital archives, and its persistence has the potential to become increasingly
irrelevant—resulting in its eective “disappearance” (Hand 2016). As Hand
describes, networked technology makes information “permanently accessible in
principle” but the reality is that some information remains “dormant” and is
vulnerable to “decay or deletion” (Hand 2016, 271). For instance, a nude image
non-consensually shared on a pornography site can quickly become like a drop
in the ocean of digital nudes. While the anxiety of being unaware of an image’s
future may persist, it is important to note that digital memory is not always as
functionally everlasting as it may feel (Karaian 2016; Hand 2016) and that the
particular future of an image will also be dependent on factors such as whether
it is able to be removed from search engine results. Regardless, it is clear that
various understandings of digital memory have signicant impacts on cases of
NCIID. While the increased harm of NCIID due to the aordances of digital
memory is oen treated as self-evident in both legal and governmental responses,
a more nuanced understanding of the role of digital technology demonstrates
the need to assess the impact of digital technology on a case-by-case basis.
Conclusion
In response to the infusion of digital technology into many cases of NCIID, I have
provided insight into the ways judges are grappling with the increasing need to con-
ceptualize digital technology and its various implications for law. My analysis nds
that the majority of judges see digital technology as having important impacts on the
nature and eects of NCIID. Judicial interpretations of digital technology are oen
used to argue that NCIID is now easier to commit—and therefore that sentences
must be harsh enough to deter others—and that the harm of NCIID has been ampli-
ed and extended—and therefore that this act requires serious civil and criminal law
responses. us, interpretations of digital technology have substantive impacts on
legal responses to NCIID. ese ndings demonstrate the need to better understand
the role played by digital/online technology in various cases of NCIID and the ways
this role is understood within law. While some scholars have expressed concern that
NCIID would not be taken seriously enough in law due to ideas about “cyber” forms
of harm as less “real” (Citron and Franks 2014; Powell and Henry 2017; Fairbairn
2015), Canadian legal interpretations have regularly reasoned that the harm of
NCIID is considerable and requires serious legal responses.
Recognition of the fact that these cases existed before digital technology is
helpful for teasing apart the impact of digital technology on experiences of and
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Nudes are Forever 139
responses to NCIID. What exactly is new about crime in the digital age—and how
this should aect the regulation of misconduct related to its use—remains a hotly
contested issue (Yar 2013; Calo 2015; Grabosky 2001). In this article I contribute
to existing eorts to map what is new about the crime of NCIID in the digital age
and complicate some of the assumptions about possible responses to this newness.
Calo (2015, 518) asserts that “an academic and policy-oriented community that
understands at the outset what challenges a technology poses stands a better
chance of fashioning a sensible theoretic, empirical, and (if indicated) regulatory
agenda.” is advice is equally pertinent for legal practitioners who may need to
take a step back from “common sense” assumptions about the eects of digital
technology to understand the nuances of its impact. While the aordances of scal-
ability, persistence, replicability, and searchability have had important impacts on
many cases of NCIID, social and legal responses to NCIID must make sure to
consider the specic role of digital technology on a case-by-case basis and to scru-
tinize common assumptions (and fears) about the impact of digital/online tech-
nology. As a result of the nuanced and variable inuence of digital technology in
these cases, policy makers and legal practitioners should be le with questions
regarding how their interpretations of digital technology may inuence their
understanding of and responses to cases of NCIID and to cases involving digital/
online technology more broadly. As digital technology is increasingly a factor in a
wider variety of civil and criminal cases (Yar 2013), it is necessary for policy mak-
ers and legal practitioners to possess a certain level of digital literacy. Additionally,
for those dedicated to challenging punitive responses to crime, it is necessary to
question the sentencing impacts of treating oences involving digital technology
as easier to commit and as creating unending harms. Legal interpretations of digi-
tal technology have implications not only for understandings of NCIID, but also
for other digitally related crimes that might be seen as easy-to-commit oences
resulting in harms without an expiry date.
Appendix: Methodology
Case law for this research was collected through three case law databases: CanLII,
WestlawNext Canada, and LexisNexis Quicklaw. Within each of these databases a
Boolean search was conducted for cases containing one or more of the following
search terms: nude photograph; nude picture; nude image; naked photograph;
naked picture; naked image; sexting; revenge porn; sex tape; intimate video; sexual
video; intimate image; 162.1. While 1,392 results were found, cases were selected
only if they involved all aspects of NCIID: Images had to be intimate in nature
(showing nudity, partial nudity, or explicit sexual acts) and they had to have actu-
ally been non-consensually distributed (cases were not included where the accused
only threatened the distribution of images). e selected search terms allowed for
cases to be found that pre-date the specic criminalization of NCIID in Canada
and the recent media and governmental attention to this issue.
In addition to this research being limited to English language cases only (due
to my lack of French language uency), an additional limitation of this methodol-
ogy is that not all cases are made available on legal databases (Best 2015). In order
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140 Alexa Dodge
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Alexa Dodge
Legal Studies
Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario
alexandra_dodge@carleton.ca
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