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President XI's Surveillance State
... The acquisition of digital skills is also connected to understanding the impacts of technology use and surveillance, which is integral to the disciplinary governmentality of the Chinese government. In 2017, a policy plan revealed the government's intention to make the country a global leader in AI by 2030 and employ AI to support and maintain social stability (Qiang, 2019). The Chinese approach has increasingly used digital technologies to monitor and control society by increasing, for example, Internet providers' responsibilities of removing and reporting offending content. ...
... This phenomenon is evident in regions like western Xinjiang, where the consequences of data-driven processes are evident. An illustrative case is a practice initiated in September 2016, where individuals applying for passports in Xinjiang were compelled to surrender their biometric data and even provide blood samples for DNA information collection (Qiang, 2019). This exemplifies how emerging technologies can be wielded in ways that accentuate disparities and subject certain populations to sorting and discrimination (Lyon, 2007). ...
... President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 and decided to continue the large-scale monitoring of the people. He tried to tackle corruption, eliminate political rivals, and bring social stability by gradually incrementing surveillance in the country (23). The keyword here is "gradually". ...
... China created this plan in 2015, and its goal is to become the best in the field of technology (25). In 2017, the Chinese government released another plan to reach global leadership in AI, and in that document, they stated that AI is crucial to keep social stability (23). ...
... Muchas de las formas actuales de vigilancia, censura y manipulación política estatal de las redes sociales fueron aplicadas inicialmente por el Partido Comunista de China, que creó el modelo arquetípico de autoritarismo digital (Qiang 2019;Nyst y Monaco 2018;Megiddo 2020). A fines de la década de 1990, China implementó su proyecto Escudo Dorado, integrando bases de datos sobre población, seguimiento de identificaciones, cámaras de vigilancia en las calles y programas de reconocimiento facial, además de herramientas de vigilancia digital (Xu 2020). ...
... A fines de la década de 1990, China implementó su proyecto Escudo Dorado, integrando bases de datos sobre población, seguimiento de identificaciones, cámaras de vigilancia en las calles y programas de reconocimiento facial, además de herramientas de vigilancia digital (Xu 2020). El -tristemente-célebre "gran cortafuegos" de China bloquea contenidos extranjeros, censura la expresión y restringe el acceso a determinados sitios o a Internet en su totalidad (Qiang 2019;Lorentzen 2014;bbc News 2010;Goldsmith y Wu 2006). Países del Medio Oriente y otras latitudes adoptaron pronto estas técnicas (Noman y York 2011). ...
Este artículo analiza los efectos del autoritarismo digital —ataques virtuales gubernamentales dirigidos contra personas que defienden los derechos humanos— en Colombia y Guatemala. Para ello, combina el modelo político y el modelo de minorías en un marco teórico que abarca los impactos del discurso virtual antiderechos humanos. También documenta dichos impactos mediante la sistematización de ataques en redes sociales a activistas y entrevistas a los agentes involucrados. Analiza los efectos no letales del discurso de odio en redes sociales y la adopción de medidas de protección como la autocensura, el abandono de las labores de defensa y la emigración. Finalmente propone un nuevo Código de Conducta Digital avalado por la ONU para que los Estados adopten políticas digitales transparentes, para que no inciten ataques y abandonen la vigilancia ilegal de quienes defienden los derechos humanos.
... These measures also emphasize the need of subjecting AI to acceptable oversight. To achieve a more harmonious alignment between technology advancements and regulatory requirements, Article 21 of the legislation eliminates the rigorous provisions included in the Draft Measures, such as the imposition of penalties and termination of services in cases of noncompliance or violation 14 . Article 20 of the Interim Measures grants the Chinese authorities the authority to regulate the use of foreign generative AI platforms inside China same as domestic providers. ...
... Available at: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/generative-ai-interim/ (accessed: 29.10.2023)14 Ibid. ...
Any regulation, law, or legal order enforced by the lawful authority of a territory to maintain, control, and regulate the characteristics, development, and public interaction of an artificial entity developed in a digital manner can be called AI legislation. The paper presents a comparative analysis of the regulatory landscape for artificial intelligence in the South Asian countries in relation to other selective countries and organizations globally, in light of the challenges encountered in regulating AI in the region. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that South Asian nations have experienced a significant and persistent legal disparity in comparison to other global regions, which has been both involuntary and inequitable. The paper presents an argument for the regulation of artificial intelligence and offers suggestions for South Asian countries to effectively regulate AI despite challenges related to its design and economic limitations.
... On the one hand, the internet and other social media platforms have contributed to creating forums for discussion, new manifestations of citizenship and new means of resistance and criticism of the party-state. On the other hand, thanks to the new digital means of surveillance at their disposal, authorities have been able to remain ahead of the curve, tightly managing society and even pre-empting most of its potentially destabilising moves, particularly since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 (Qiang, 2019). Since its outbreak in late 2019, the COVID-19 health crisis has both confirmed and enhanced this ability. ...
... These are not the only systems in place to manage Chinese citizens and managing them is not their sole purpose-the fight against COVID-19 has demonstrated that they can help keep this new virus in check. However, these systems have also been rightly seen as part of an ambitious Orwellian project to microcontrol every move of the Chinese public and normalise the behaviour of its citizens (Qiang, 2019). As in Foucault's panopticon, these new technologies and institutions have turned Chinese citizens into both inmates and guards, as they have been given the means to check constantly on other inmates. ...
... Zbiera się w nim takie dane, jak: obraz twarzy, odciski palców, próbki głosu, DNA, informacje o podróżach, zakupach, działalności w Internecie itd. (Qiang, 2019 związanych z rozwojem technologii wynika, że 41% konsumentów zgadza się ze stwierdzeniem, że fi rmy w Internecie dzielą klientów na "lepszych" i "gorszych", i różnie podchodzą do każdej grupy, co może mieć swoje źródło w śledzeniu ich wcześniejszej aktywności w sieci (Kantar, 2020). Na zagrożenia płynące z tego rodzaju praktyk zwrócił uwagę także PE, który wyraził obawę związaną z wykorzystywaniem SI w systemach monitorowania emocjonalnego i kredytu społecznego 9 . ...
Wobec intensyfikacji rozwoju sztucznej inteligencji Unia Europejska uregulowała zasady jej wykorzystywania w akcie w sprawie sztucznej inteligencji. Rozporządzenie opiera się na analizie ryzyka, jakie wywołują poszczególne systemy sztucznej inteligencji, w tym w stosunku do praw podstawowych. Autorzy analizują art. 5 rozporządzenia dotyczący zakazanych praktyk związanych z identyfikacją biometryczną, koncentrując się na ich wpływie na ochronę praw podstawowych jednostek, w szczególności konsumentów. Celem artykułu jest ocena, czy przyjęte rozwiązania skutecznie realizują powyższe założenie, leżące u podstaw aktu w sprawie sztucznej inteligencji, i zaproponowanie rozwiązań zaobserwowanych problemów. Autorzy charakteryzują poszczególne technologie i badają treść regulujących je przepisów. W ramach analizy odwołują się do stanowisk doktryny, instytucji unijnych i organizacji społecznych oraz konsumenckich, wskazując na sygnalizowane problemy związane z kształtem przepisów. Ostateczna forma regulacji wywołuje istotne wątpliwości i prowadzi autorów do wniosku, że nie jest ona w stanie zapewnić w pełni skutecznej ochrony, co mogłoby zostać osiągnięte przez ścisłą interpretację art. 5 rozporządzenia w świetle praw podstawowych. W artykule wskazano aktualne wyzwania związane z dynamicznym rozwojem sztucznej inteligencji i technologii biometrycznych, podkreślając kluczowe znaczenie praw podstawowych jako punktu wyjścia dla dalszych dyskusji, prób regulacji oraz stosowania rozporządzenia.
... Authoritarian governments, with their lack of accountability, could also leverage AI to erode individual freedoms and suppress dissent. China's implementation of AI-driven surveillance systems, such as facial recognition and predictive policing, exemplifies how these tools can be used to monitor and control populations (Qiang, 2019;Zeng, 2022). The same AI technologies that enable economic growth and public safety in democracies are weaponized in authoritarian regimes to silence opposition, manipulate public opinion, and entrench authoritarian rule. ...
The global landscape is undergoing a profound transformation driven by artificial intelligence (AI), a technology that has the potential to reshape global power dynamics, economies, and societies. The United States (U.S.) has historically played a central role in guiding technological advancements, offering leadership that has prioritized ethical governance and global stability. Drawing a parallel to the U.S. leadership during the development of atomic weapons, this study emphasizes the necessity for the U.S. to take a proactive and responsible role in the governance of AI. Without U.S. leadership, the proliferation of AI risks falling into the hands of authoritarian regimes, such as China and Russia, whose use of AI for surveillance, censorship, disinformation, and military purposes could destabilize international norms and threaten democratic values. The study uses agency theory to argue that the global community must rely on the U.S. as a responsible agent to ensure AI technologies are used ethically and for the collective benefit of humanity. The paper also incorporates social comparison theory, technological determinism, and international relations realism to further illustrate the strategic and moral imperative of U.S. leadership in AI governance. By examining the historical context of U.S. leadership in managing disruptive technologies, this study highlights the urgent need for the U.S. to establish global AI governance frameworks that prioritize human rights, equity, and democratic values, countering the risks posed by authoritarian misuse of AI.
... Simultaneously, the CCP built a facial database that encompassed every adult citizen (Chin and Lin 2017) and a DNA database that encompassed 54 million citizens and, by 2020, will reportedly reach 100 million (Qiang 2019). The CCP's facial recognition technology is employed for check-in and security at airports (Dai 2018;Yang 2018), train stations (Chen, Jing and Dai 2018), and hotels (Chan 2018). ...
The Chinese government is revolutionizing digital surveillance at home and exporting these technologies abroad. Do these technology transfers help recipient governments expand digital surveillance, impose internet shutdowns, filter the internet, and target repression for online content? We focus on Huawei, the world’s largest telecommunications provider, which is partly state-owned and increasingly regarded as an instrument of its foreign policy. Using a global sample and an identification strategy based on generalized synthetic controls, we show that the effect of Huawei transfers depends on preexisting political institutions in recipient countries. In the world’s autocracies, Huawei technology facilitates digital repression. We find no effect in the world’s democracies, which are more likely to have laws that regulate digital privacy, institutions that punish government violations, and vibrant civil societies that step in when institutions come under strain. Most broadly, this article advances a large literature about the geopolitical implications of China’s rise.
... China is an excellent example that leverages high state capacity to construct what researcher Xiao Qiang has called a "surveillance state". 44 Any effort to understand democratic resilience should therefore include an assessment of a state's ability to ground a project of sustainable democratisation. Externally supported resilience, without attention to the right investments in state capacity, is bound to fail in time. ...
This report aims to enable activists, civil society groups, policymakers, international donors, and researchers to better understand democratic resilience by:
1. explaining what democratic resilience is and why it matters;
2. providing guidance on the most effective ways to strengthen resilience;
3. communicating recent academic research findings to a broader audience; and
4. highlighting important areas for future research.
Taking an in-depth look at autocratisation and its remedies, the report offers five main lessons about how to reconceptualise and defend democratic resilience. These lessons are particularly relevant for civil society groups and the global democracy community.
... China is an excellent example that leverages high state capacity to construct what researcher Xiao Qiang has called a "surveillance state". 44 Any effort to understand democratic resilience should therefore include an assessment of a state's ability to ground a project of sustainable democratisation. Externally supported resilience, without attention to the right investments in state capacity, is bound to fail in time. ...
... Rühlig and Brink [49] analyzed China's persistent efforts in international standardization of 5G from a techno-nationalist perspective, highlighting China's potential to reshape global technology standards. Some studies criticized China's 5G [52,53], which reached the conclusion that the Chinese government may use 5G networks for spying on other countries. On the other hand, some scholars argued that the U.S. sees China as a threat to its national interests and hegemonic position [3,19]. ...
Spillover effect refers to the phenomenon that when an economic entity, industry or market encounters a change or shock, its impact is transmitted to other entities, industries or markets. In recent years, 5G, semiconductors and rare earths have successively become geopolitical battlegrounds. In this paper, sparrow search algorithm was used to optimize the parameters of variational mode decomposition (VMD), then use the optimized VMD to decompose the geopolitical risk (GPR), 5G, semiconductor and rare earth time series data, and exploit fuzzy c-means clustering algorithm to obtain low-frequency and high-frequency time series. Finally we investigated the connectedness between GPR and China's 5G, semiconductor, and rare earth industries based on TVP-VAR model in different cycles, as well as between these industries. The findings reveal that there exists risk spillover between GPR and the three industries, which is significantly enhanced under the impact of geopolitical events. In addition, there is heterogeneity in the risk spillover between GPR and these three industries in different cycles. Notably, in the short term, the GPR is the main source of risk, and in the long term, the semiconductor industry has the great impact on GPR, 5G and rare earth industries, indicating that the semiconductor industry has very important geopolitical significance.
... Significant control of the waters provides not only economic gains and prestige but also immense political power that China will likely deploy to influence the region and seek to limit the impact of western liberal norms and values that are important components of the current order. The West assesses China to already working to wash away western value framework using emerging technological capabilities especially artificial intelligence, information communications, and surveillance to interfere in liberal domestic processes such as free and fair elections [58]. ...
To what extent do the major trends, perceptions, and narratives in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic discourse influence the great-power rivalry? The multipolar international order is characterized with intense rivalry of great and emerging powers in a technological environment. Ambitious powers seeking domination and control, innovate geostrategic institutional frameworks and alliances. Security perceptions and discourses including; normative strands, operational frames, proximate movements, military maneuvers, technological optimism, and duality of domestic-international strategies continue to shape the strategies of the rival powers especially in the Indo-Pacific Region. AUKUS geostrategic security innovation is embedded in the Indo-Pacific security-threat perceptions and discourses to complicate China’s ambiguous long-wait geo-strategy in the regional and international order rivalry.
... The substantial volume of research from China reflects its prioritization of understanding and addressing the implications of digital technologies for national security. China's dominance of publication trends by region is proof of the Chinese government's seriousness in responding to national security threats in the digital era (Lindsay, 2014;Lindsay et al., 2015;Qiang, 2019). The seriousness of the Chinese government can be seen from the government's strong and coordinated policies in supporting the digital transformation process as part of the national development strategy (He et al., 2020;Y. ...
Digital transformation has profoundly impacted numerous sectors, with national security no exception. This article undertakes a thorough analysis of how digital transformation influences strategies in national security. Employing a bibliometric approach, the study explores the proliferation of digital technologies and their implications for security policies and frameworks. The research identifies key trends, thematic developments, and emerging research fronts at the intersection of digital transformation and national security. It becomes evident that digital technologies such as artificial intelligence, blockchain, and cybersecurity measures play crucial roles in enhancing national defence capabilities and addressing contemporary security threats. These technologies offer unprecedented opportunities for efficiency and effectiveness in security operations. However, alongside these benefits come new challenges, prominently cybersecurity risks and the necessity for robust regulatory frameworks. Integrating advanced technologies into national security strategies demands vigilant management to mitigate potential vulnerabilities and safeguard sensitive information. The article concludes by offering strategic recommendations for policymakers to navigate the complexities of the digital landscape while effectively bolstering national security. These recommendations emphasise the importance of adaptive policies that foster innovation while ensuring resilience against evolving threats. Overall, this research contributes significantly to the expanding literature on digital transformation by providing insights into its profound implications for national security. It sets the stage for future studies to delve deeper into specific technological impacts and policy responses necessary to maintain a secure digital environment.
... The arsenal now includes extensive mass videosurveillance initiatives incorporating facial-recognition technology, voicerecognition software, and a comprehensive DNA collection program. These initiatives are complemented by the nationwide Social Credit System, designed to assess the behavior of every Chinese citizen (Cabestan 2020;Qiang 2019). Surveillance technologies originally intended to support more "service-oriented" governance in China's "smart city" projects are now perceived as intrusive tools of political control (Arcesati 2022;Hoffman 2022). ...
This article examines the evolution of the authoritarian developmental state model in the digital era amid intensified global power dynamics, focusing empirically on China. It introduces the concept of the techno-developmental state to illustrate how this evolved state emphasizes digital technologies for both economic growth and social governance. I assert that this evolution is driven by the state’s enhanced capacity to foster high-tech industries amid heightened competition among major powers, alongside bolstered social governance through advanced digital tools. Emphasizing its crucial role in sustaining authoritarian developmentalism, the article analyzes the emergence of the Chinese techno-developmental state amid escalating US–China technological rivalry. It also scrutinizes the New Infrastructure initiative of the early 2020s as the state’s key initiative to drive its economic and governance agendas.
... Third, it encourages a variety of information in Vietnamese society, despite government restrictions. One-party states frequently involve the restriction of information (Miletello 2011, King et al. 2013, Qiang 2019, Tai & Fu 2020. On June 12, 2018, the Cyber Security Law was also issued by the Vietnamese government. ...
This article delves into the complex dynamics of Vietnam’s democratization process, highlighting the simultaneous influences of international integration and advancements in science and technology. This study investigates the impact of Vietnam’s increasing involvement in the global economy and international community, as well as its adoption of technological advancements, on the country’s path toward democratization. The study utilizes a mixed approach, blending qualitative analysis of scientific documents, Vietnamese government policies, and quantitative data on the democracy index from international organizations. It identifies international integration as a doubleedged sword: on one hand, it boosts economic growth and development, driving the democratic transition process forward; on the other hand, it also leads to economic dependence and inequality, potentially impeding democratic reform. The findings of this study show that the rapid progress of science and technology, especially information and communication technology, presents both opportunities and difficulties for Vietnam’s democratic process. It provides unparalleled opportunities for widespread involvement in political activities and the spread of democratic principles, but it also carries the risk of social unrest and the potential for the authoritarian state to control and manipulate information.
... Xu, 2021). Such developments help convince many that China has turned into a "surveillance state" headed toward digital unfreedom (Chin & Lin, 2022;Xiao, 2019). ...
The article aims at offering a bird’s-eye overview of the evolution of cyber politics in China in the past 30 years, tracking real-world developments while surveying the main trends in the scholarly field. It periodizes the past three decades into three phases with a focus on the changing state–society relations. It reveals that cyber politics in China has evolved from the period of an empowering Internet with the state adapting to catch up to one of authoritarian resilience when social participation and state control reached a balance, and ultimately to the “authoritarian dominance” phase with the state attempting to dominate the society and platforms. The article concludes by discussing the future trends of cyber politics in China, arguing that “authoritarian dominance” is detrimental to the Party-state’s rule, thus will hardly be sustainable despite the state’s strong capacity and will to control the Internet.
... The GDPR requires explicit consent for the processing of biometric data and grants individuals the right to object to such processing (Veale et al., 2018). Other countries, such as China, have embraced FRT as a tool for public security and surveillance, with fewer restrictions on its use (Qiang, 2019). ...
Facial recognition technology (FRT) has emerged as a powerful tool for public governance and security, but its rapid adoption has also raised significant concerns about privacy, civil liberties, and ethical implications. This paper critically examines the current rules and policies governing FRT, highlighting the tensions between state and corporate interests on one hand, and individual rights and ethical considerations on the other. The study also investigates international legal frameworks aimed at protecting individual rights and privacy, arguing that current legislative measures often fall short of robust scholarly standards and international human rights norms. The paper concludes with recommendations for developing principled and adaptable governance frameworks that harness the benefits of FRT while mitigating its risks and negative impacts, underscoring the importance of placing human rights and ethics at the center of regulating this transformative technology.
... One could further argue that cognitive data need to be protected even more thoroughly than medical data currently, for example, by the GDPR [17]. It is yet unclear what can be deduced from cognitive data in the future, and non-democratic states are already using technology to oppress various stakeholders with different technologies [26,27,30], which is also known as digital authoritarianism [9,16]. One possible scenario could be establishing premium systems that reward or penalize individuals based on their health behavior. ...
This Paper explores how emergent technologies such as 6G and tactile Internet can potentially enhance cognitive, personal informatics (CPI) in participatory healthcare, promoting patient-centered healthcare models through high-speed, reliable communication networks. It highlights the transition to improved patient engagement and better health outcomes facilitated by these technologies, underscoring the importance of ultra-reliable, low-latency communications (URLLC) and realizing the tactile Internet’s potential in healthcare. This innovation could dramatically transform telemedicine and mobile health (mHealth) by enabling remote healthcare delivery while providing a better understanding of the inner workings of the patient. While generating many advantages, these developments have disadvantages and risks. Therefore, this study addresses the critical security and privacy concerns related to the digital transformation of healthcare. Our work focuses on the challenges of managing and understanding cognitive data within the CPI and the potential threats from analyzing such data. It proposed a comprehensive analysis of potential vulnerabilities and cyber threats, emphasizing the need for robust security frameworks designed with resilience in mind to protect sensitive cognitive data. We present scenarios for reward and punishment systems and their impacts on users. In conclusion, we outline a vision for the future of secure, resilient, and patient-centric digital healthcare systems that leverage 6G and the tactile Internet to enhance the CPI. We offer policy recommendations and strategic directions for stakeholders to create a secure, empowering environment for patients to manage their cognitive health information.
... (2) Is the government provided with the right to assess the morality aspect of all people's economic, social, and political actions under its ruling standards? (3) Is the government provided with the right to punish people in forms not currently regulated by law? (See AHO e DUFFIELD, 2020;BANNISTER e CONNOLLY, 2011;DAWES, 2010;HOU, 2017;LIANG e colab., 2018;QIANG, 2019) "No" is the answer that should be given to all these three questions so that a State may still be considered as a genuine democracy. Provided within its Constitution, China upholds "the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system" as one of its basic fundamental principles. ...
[Purpose] To examine the origin and evolution of China’s social credit system. [Methodology/Approach/Design] A doctrinal approach is employed with secondary sources. [Findings] China’s social credit system has some adverse effects on the fundamental principles of international human rights law.
... Therefore, the research method covers the supporting details of the data collection as the variable of observation done in this research (Chou & Lu, 2022). Therefore to elaborate on the condition of China, the data has been collected through legitimate sources of news and articles, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency's official website (Qiang, 2019). At the same time, the explanation of COVID-19 historical and progression data have been retrieved from news articles that directly report and become society's first source of information (Late & Kumpulainen, 2022). ...
Pandemi COVID-19 yang pertama kali ditemukan di Wuhan, China, berdampak signifikan terhadap kondisi sosial ekonomi China. Penelitian telah menunjukkan bahwa pengaruh luas dari virus yang ditularkan manusia ini membawa respons penting terhadap perilaku China, termasuk aktivitas domestik dan internasional. Republik Rakyat Tiongkok tidak hanya dianggap mempunyai virus karena perilaku masyarakatnya yang terbiasa memakan daging mentah, tetapi juga meningkatkan sentimen terhadap masyarakat Republik Rakyat Tiongkok. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui kondisi Republik Rakyat Tiongkok pada masa pandemi tahun 2020, tanggapannya, dan capaian yang diperoleh. Berdasarkan tinjauan literatur dan bukti dari data primer, termasuk namun tidak terbatas pada Organisasi Kesehatan Dunia, penilaian dilakukan untuk menjawab tujuan penelitian. Analisis kasus implikasi sosial politik dan ekonomi Republik Rakyat Tiongkok dari pandemi COVID-19 menunjukkan bahwa dalam situasi yang menantang, pemerintah Tiongkok yang dipimpin oleh Partai Komunis Tiongkok, CPC telah memberikan upaya yang besar dengan segera memberikan perbekalan alat kesehatan, fasilitas, dan pencegahan penyebaran untuk menghentikan penurunan kerugian sosial ekonomi yang dialami RRT. Melalui kerja sama dan lockdown pemerintah, RRT berencana memberantas penyebaran virus tersebut ke seluruh dunia.
... In contrast with the US, China promotes policies that focus both on digital sovereignty and digital expansionism. Regarding digital sovereignty, China has created a digital infrastructure based on control, surveillance, and repression of its citizens through programs focused on media control, digital social credit systems, and massive social surveillance structures in big cities (Jiang and Fu 2018;Lee 2018;Qiang 2019). In order to make this infrastructure happen, China has boosted the growth of big national tech companies that are strongly interfered with by the Chinese government, such as Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, ZTE or Huawei. ...
Big digital companies have become key elements in economy, communication, education, and politics in 21st century societies. The neutral ideology in their digital platforms, applications, and services, as well as the exponential growth in their activities can be used by world superpowers —especially the United States and China— to implement geostrategical operations, massive social manipulation or influence democratic processes with the objective of increasing their power and dominance over other nations. The aim of this paper is to state the different strategies of digital expansionism performed by the United States and China, and, additionally, to showcase the negative consequences of these strategies on the population and democracies of the European Union. The first section of this paper will define the concepts of digital sovereignty and digital expansionism as well as their importance in 21st century geopolitics. Next, the important role that big digital companies have on digital expansionism will be analysed, and the usage of digital authoritarianism and digital instrumentarianism performed by the United States and China will be further examined. Finally, the negative consequences of the implementation of these methods in the democratic systems of the European Union will be analysed, as well as what possible solutions there might be for said consequences.
... Techniques such as facial recognition, biometric surveillance, and smartphone forensics are integrated into platforms that process massive data streams for public control and predictive policing. The Covid-19 pandemic with its lockdowns and contact tracing further accelerated the state's reliance on such practices (Batke and Ohlberg 2020;Qiang 2019). In the Uyghur region in northwestern China, government monitoring creates a dystopian "digital enclosure" to control and discipline entire ethnic minorities (Byler 2021). ...
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... Even considering the sizable population of China, that comes out to about one camera for every seven people, with a goal perhaps to double or even triple that surveillance (Economy 2019). The state is not only talking with you online; it is following you home offline (Xiao 2019). ...
In this book, we use the case of China to examine how state actors can transform the internet and online discourse into a key strategic element for maintaining the government and relieving domestic pressure on national institutions. Although scholars have long known that the democratizing influence of the internet can be blunted by autocratic states, in this book, we show that the online sphere can effectively be co-opted by states like China and transformed into a supporting institution. Our theory, directed digital dissidence, explains how autocracies manage critical online information flows and what impact this management has on mass opinion and behavior. While the expansion of the internet may stimulate dissidence, it also provides the central government an avenue to direct that dissent away from themself and toward selected targets. Under the strategy of directed digital dissidence, the Internet becomes a mechanism to dissipate threats by serving as a targeted relief valve rather than a building pressure cooker. We consider the process and impact of this evolving state-led manipulation of the political internet using data and examples from China. We employed an original large-scale random survey of Chinese citizens to measure Internet use, social media use, and political attitudes. We also consider the impact of the state firewall. Beyond simply identifying it, we focus on testing the effectiveness of the government strategy with empirical data. We also consider how dissent can be redirected across a broader range of targets, including nonstate actors and other nations.
Political humor is rarely found in the public political discourse or used to depict the political circumstances in China. This does not mean, however, that political humor is absent or irrelevant. From a political sociology perspective, Ding (2017) argues that it is an opportune moment for high-quality political humor to emerge in China; meanwhile, there is a growing perception that China is becoming increasingly authoritarian, particularly under the leadership of President Xi. Therefore, this paper will explore the relationship between political humor and political authority in China, by asking: How do political authorities in China respond to humor, and in what ways do they utilize or instrumentalize political humor, and for what purposes? The existing literature on political humor in China tends to overlook the multifaceted functions it serves and the diverse responses of citizens to political authority. By adopting a communicative, discursive rather than empowerment approach, the paper views political humor as a form of popular rhetoric and investigates its interaction with authority. It posits that political humor in China serves as both a political communication tool and a public discourse mode. The government strategically deploys it to shape public opinion in a manner that upholds the existing social order and legitimizes its governance and also fosters a nationalistic identity that aligns with its objectives. Relying on a qualitative content analysis, the article is structured as follows: first, the literature on political humor in China is reviewed; second, the concept of political legitimacy is discussed, and an analytical framework that employs a communicative and discursive approach are discussed; third, two empirical cases of political humor in China are explored (namely, the Li Haoshi incident in 2023, and the Trump–Clinton duet in 2016); and, finally, conclusions are offered to reflect the significance of political humor in Chinese politics.
China's approach to Internet governance is increasingly perceived as a Party‐centric model, aligning the state under the Chinese Communist Party's (the Party) leadership. The division of labor between the Party and the state in the context of political centralization and Party centrality remains unclear. This study aims to address this knowledge gap by examining the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), a central player in Internet governance, which also functions as a Party organ under the name of the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (OCCAC). Utilizing a novel data set of policy documents, this study explores how CAC's dual Party‐state status plays out in China's Internet governance. The findings indicate that policies on Internet development are predominantly issued under the Party's name (OCCAC), while regulatory policies concerning the Internet industry are primarily issued under the state's name (CAC). Nevertheless, the Party's nameplate (OCCAC) is increasingly utilized for social regulations related to the Internet sector. These findings present nuanced insights into the practices of China's Internet governance, suggesting a conceptual need to differentiate the roles played by the Party and the state in shaping Internet governance under authoritarianism.
Over the last two decades, views regarding cyberspace and the usage of digital means by governments shifted from hopes of cyber-utopias to fears of cyber dystopias, fuelled by increasingly heavy limitations imposed on Internet freedoms and online privacy rights worldwide, a tightening grip of authoritarian regimes on cyberspace, disinformation campaigns, censorship, internet shutdowns, digitally-enabled mass surveillance both online and offline and so on. Thus, the discussion will be centred on Russia’s and China’s usage and export of digital authoritarianism, while also considering steps taken by liberal democracies to counter such actions, focusing on the role of the US and of the EU and its member-states. This paper will start with a literature review regarding digital authoritarianism and an exploration of how Russia and China are using and exporting it. States such as Russia and China are using digital means to bolster and expand their authoritarian regimes, while also exporting digital authoritarianism to other like-minded governments around the world, creating an unignorable challenge for liberal democracies and civil society groups everywhere. Finally, the paper will also address potential courses of action and policies that liberal democracies and international organisations can take for countering digital authoritarianism. For instance, they should promote an alternative model for digital governance and governance through digital means, starting by promoting digital liberties and privacy rights instead of trying to limit them for national security purposes (e.g., the case of encryption). Thus, liberal democracies should respond to digital authoritarianism by further bolstering democracy.
Understanding AI and information bubbles' effects on political decision-making is essential because they have the power to amplify polarization and alter public perceptions. In order to promote democratic processes and promote informed decision-making, it is critical to address the ways in which these technologies impede political decision-making in the digital age, as this essay explores. The finding found that the impact of artificial intelligence on information bubbles presents noteworthy obstacles to democratic institutions, public discourse, and political decision-making. Artificial intelligence algorithms that create and maintain these bubbles have the potential to worsen political division, undermine confidence, and aid in the dissemination of false information. A multifaceted strategy is needed to address AI risks, including adaptable legislation, moral AI development, improved media literacy, and proactive public participation. The public, tech companies, and policymakers must work together to reduce AI-driven information bubbles and advance an informed, democratic future.
Sustainable development and green economy have become a big concern in the Chinese context. Since 2022, environmental credit evaluation has been disclosed as an important indicator to assess the enterprise social credit ranking. Chinese Social Credit System (SCS) integrates with enterprise environmental credit records and shares credit information on different platforms to impose environmental dishonesty. This chapter discusses the sustainability of SCS from different perspectives.
Automatic Face Emotion Recognition (FER) technologies have become widespread in various applications, including surveillance, human–computer interaction, and health care. However, these systems are built on the basis of controversial psychological models that claim facial expressions are universally linked to specific emotions—a concept often referred to as the “universality hypothesis”. Recent research highlights significant variability in how emotions are expressed and perceived across different cultures and contexts. This paper identifies a gap in evaluating the reliability and ethical implications of these systems, given their potential biases and privacy concerns. Here, we report a comprehensive review of the current debates surrounding FER, with a focus on cultural and social biases, the ethical implications of their application, and their technical reliability. Moreover, we propose a classification that organizes these perspectives into a three-part taxonomy. Key findings show that FER systems are built with limited datasets with potential annotation biases, in addition to lacking cultural context and exhibiting significant unreliability, with misclassification rates influenced by race and background. In some cases, the systems’ errors lead to significant ethical concerns, particularly in sensitive settings such as law enforcement and surveillance. This study calls for more rigorous evaluation frameworks and regulatory oversight, ensuring that the deployment of FER systems does not infringe on individual rights or perpetuate biases.
This article introduces the concept of “topic territoriality,” a mechanism that governs participation in conversational spaces. When a discussion becomes prone to territorialization, individuals are more likely to claim topics (participating in discussions about topics they own as “stakeholders”) and defer (reducing participation in topics owned by others). They are also more likely to patrol topic boundaries (monitoring who is participating and confronting topic “intruders”). We document the operation of topic territoriality by analyzing 112,278 conversational turns on Weibo before and after a policy that reveals users’ broad geographic locations. We find that revealing these locations increased territorial behaviors, leading to more homogenous participation in conversations. Although the display of locations has improved the overall civility in language, the confrontations between stakeholders and intruders became more toxic. Our research emphasizes the impact of topic territoriality in online conversations and sheds light on the unintended consequences of social media policies.
Why do authoritarian regimes utilize online subcultures that contradict mainstream ideology in their propaganda? This paper argues that subcultural discourse is employed by these regimes to persuade younger generations to increase their support (persuasion proposition). Additionally, it can be used to mobilize supporters to provide favorable comments, countering criticism (mobilization proposition). To test these theories, a survey experiment with over 2800 respondents in China was conducted, supplemented by content analysis of government-run Weibo posts from January 2019 to March 2022. The survey experiment supports the persuasion proposition, as subculture-oriented propaganda strengthens pro-regime attitudes through emotional triggers. However, it does not encourage pro-regime behaviors. Content analysis confirms that subcultural discourse fails to mobilize a larger number of comments and reposts. These findings reveal the impact of subcultural propaganda, a relatively new form of propaganda that has gained popularity in recent years. This finding indicates that even subculture, which is typically seen as subversive and challenging to the regime's authority, can be utilized as a tool to reinforce the regime's control.
The dual-track system of judicial and administrative protection has always been a distinct feature of copyright protection in China over the past three decades. A detailed historical retrospective shows the predominant role of administrative enforcement for safeguarding copyright and the significant role of path dependence in the creation of the Chinese copyright administrative enforcement system. TRIPS, domestic copyright legislation and various policy documents laid the legal basis for copyright administrative enforcement in China. This paper reveals that there is a notable lack of focus on the infrequent use of administrative dispute resolution procedures for copyright disputes and extra-judicial enforcement measures carried out by copyright administrations, namely regulatory talks (yuetan) and campaigns, to address copyright infringements on online platforms. In particular, extra-judicial regulatory approaches are often accompanied by fundamental flaws such as the lack of proportionality, legal certainty, and due procedures, undermining the expected predictability and stability of copyright regulations. This paper argues that open and transparent rules and procedures should be implemented to halt such aggressive expansion of administrative intervention; a platform-oriented co-regulatory framework would reconcile the collaboration between state intervention and industry expertise, thereby shifting the governance paradigm from centralized dispute resolution to diverse alternative mechanisms; the focus of copyright administration should shift from law enforcement to the development of serviced-oriented copyright administrative protection. Although this paper focuses primarily on the Chinese perspective, the Chinese experience with copyright governance could offer some lessons to inform the global policy debate.
For thirty years, the Chinese internet has been characterized by engagement between citizens and the government, and between the Chinese internet and the global internet. In this commentary, we formalize the concept of disengagement: the unwillingness to participate in digital activity. We review the origins of disengagement, its association with other social trends, and evaluate the possibility of its emergence. We argue that disengagement may have profound social, political, and economic consequences for the country. Finally, we call for future scholarship with renewed focus on disengagement and its consequences.
This chapter reflects on the salient aspects that emerged throughout the analysis of both digital and environmental policy frameworks, as well as existing practices, to provide some recommendations for interventions aimed at addressing digital-environmental poverty as dimensions of the same social challenge. In so doing, it contextualizes policies and examples proposed throughout the book, encompassing models from Western and non-Western countries. The review aligns with the Action Plan developed by the Coalition for Digital Environmental Sustainability—CODES (“Sustainable Planet in the Digital Age,” CODES, 2022). This plan offers a framework for advancing digital sustainability through collaborative efforts between private and public sectors. Moreover, in light of the empirical study and the practices presented in the previous chapters, it provides some recommendations toward mixed approaches based on interpreting poverty as multidimensional (including its monetary, social, digital, and environmental dimensions).
Citizenship emerges from the arduous battles waged by working people against various manifestations of oppression, including feudalism, capitalism, colonialism and imperialism. Throughout history, anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements have played crucial roles in advancing democracy and expanding citizenship rights, even within colonial nations in Europe. Today, the landscape of citizenship is evolving rapidly alongside the technological revolution and the widespread digitalisation of society. These developments are integral to the democratisation of both societies and states, granting citizens unprecedented access to information and empowering them to hold those in power accountable. However, this era also witnesses the ascent of the surveillance state and governments increasingly resembling techno-feudal entities accelerated by the platform companies. In this age, technology, including AI, poses a grave threat to the very foundations of democratisation and the deepening of citizenship rights. The pervasiveness of surveillance and the consolidation of power through technological means undermine the principles of accountability and freedom that are essential for a truly participatory democratic society and digital citizenship.
To examine the origin and evolution of China’s social credit system.
A doctrinal approach is employed with secondary sources.
China’s social credit system has some adverse effects on the fundamental principles of international human rights law.
"Digital Hostages: Internet Freedom in North Korea" explores the severe restrictions and control over internet access in North Korea. It examines how the government monopolizes information, using technology to maintain strict surveillance and censorship, isolating citizens from the global digital community. The report delves into the implications for human rights, the strategies used by the regime to enforce digital isolation, and the impact on the everyday lives of North Koreans.
Many recent AI policies have been structured under labels that follow a particular trend: national or international guidelines, policies or regulations, such as the EU’s and USA’s ‘Trustworthy AI’ and China’s and India’s adoption of ‘Responsible AI’, use a label that follows the recipe of [agentially loaded notion + ‘AI’]. A result of this branding, even if implicit, is to encourage the application by laypeople of these agentially loaded notions to the AI technologies themselves. Yet, these notions are appropriate only when applied to agents, which current AI technologies are not; and the concern is that this misapplication creates an incentive to inappropriately attribute trustworthiness or responsibility to AI technologies. We endeavour to show that we have good reason to avoid any general AI policy that uses agentially loaded labelling. We suggest labelling these policies not in terms of some qualification of AI, but rather in terms of our approach to the technology and its wider development and use context – focusing on being trustworthy and responsible about AI, rather than on trustworthy or responsible AI.
To govern, states collect and evaluate information about citizens. This paper examines a social credit system (SCS) in China, a state initiative aimed at governing trust through the quantification of social behavior. Our analysis opens the ‘black box’ of an SCS metric, investigating how trust is translated into numbers and the implications of this translation. We reveal that the SCS is deeply relational and embedded in specific interests, biases, and logics of governance. The system has the potential to reinforce structural injustices and inequalities as it particularly disadvantages rural residents. Meanwhile, it subjects government employees to stricter surveillance, indicating its multifaceted objectives. Our finding uncovers the nuanced ways the system interacts with social stratification in Chinese society and the administrative structure inside the state. We problematize the individualistic, decontextualized, and behavioral assumptions undergirding the metric, and advocate for a critical reassessment of the sociopolitical dimensions of such quantitative governance infrastructures.
The relationship between new technologies and security is well established in the fields of defence, law enforcement, communications and public health. This has been highlighted by recent public debate about the security implications of data held by companies operating in social media and information technology (such as TikTok and Huawei). While genomic technology had been less high profile in the context of security, this changed following the COVID-19 pandemic, which focused attention on the significant implications of this form of data. This article discusses commercial genomic technology, related government interests and the growing implications for data security and regulation, such as through the example of the Beijing Genomics Institute, a large company providing genomic testing services to consumers worldwide. We suggest that commercial genomic data has growing implications for countries such as the United States and Australia and argue for greater attention to be directed to this form of technology and associated data security and regulation, including security assessment to address the risks associated with international transfer via corporate entities.
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