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Abstract
Derrida's idea of deconstruction stems from three phenomenological insights: (1) the insight into the experience of others; (2) the insight into the role of documentation for knowledge; and (3) the insight into temporalization. But the chapter argues that there is a fourth phenomenological insight, the insight in the endless expansion of reduction. It is this fourth insight that leads to the idea of power, an immense power. The repeatability of experience implies a potency that goes to infinity. The chapter looks at all of Derrida's major writings on Husserl: The Introduction to The Origin of Geometry; "Violence and Metaphysics"; Voice and Phenomenon; and Touching-Jean-Luc Nancy.
In this review essay, we look back at the evolution of the rhetoric of science by reviewing the Case Studies and Issues and Methods volumes edited by Randy Harris. We conclude by reflecting on the past, present, and future of the discipline.
El concepto de violencia trascendental fue propuesto por Jacques Derrida para dar cuenta de una violencia que empieza desde el momento en que el otro aparece. Esta violencia “originaria” va de la mano con cierta traición a la singularidad del otro toda vez que el lenguaje y lo fenoménico le imponen un sentido. Pese al esfuerzo de Derrida por problematizar la idea de la violencia como derivada de un estado originariamente pacífico, su descripción asume sin más la manera en que la violencia es vivida, y margina el modo en que el ego se constituye por la violencia. En este ensayo intentaré apropiarme del concepto de violencia trascendental a través del concepto de vergüenza, el cual definiré aquí como un mirar objetivante con repercusiones en el actuar del ego. El vínculo entre la violencia y la vergüenza se encuentra en la manera en que el ego asume su propia objetivación.
The kind of collective improvisation attained by the “free jazz” at the beginning of the sixties sets a challenge to analytic theories of collective intentionality, that emphasize the role played by future-directed plans in the interlocking and interdependent intentions (and attitudes) of the individual participants, because in the free jazz case the performers’ interdependence or [interplay] stems from an intuitive understanding between musicians. Otherwise said: what happens musically is not planned in advance, but arises from spontaneous interactions in the group. By looking at the way jazz improvisers take up the challenge of making music together without a pre-conceived notion as to what kind of effect they will achieve and without a pre-set code of agreements (related to theme, chord patterns and chorus lengths), my aim has been to clarify what kind of strategies — other than advanced action plans and joint commitments — are used by improvising musicians to integrate their improvisations into a unified shared activity. In developing this proposal I initially drawn pre-theoretically on one paradigmatic study case — Ornette Coleman’s double quartet Free Jazz, A collective Improvisation (1960) and brought it in conversation with Husserl’s phenomenology of time. In a final move, I brought this phenomenological frame into dialogue with some recent readings of the predictive coding model. All in all, what we learned from the Free Jazz case is that the interdependence and interlocking of attitudes among individual participants characteristic of shared intention is not determined by a future-directed plan and the rational pressure to be responsive to and coordinate with others, it typically engages. Rather, in the free jazz case, the performers’ connection and interplay depend on the players’ readiness to feel each other out, by listening to each other playing, in a way that no doubt presupposes the Husserlian retention-protention scheme.
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