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Exemplarist moral theory
Abstract
This paper summarizes my new moral theory, which is based on direct reference to exemplars of goodness, identified through the emotion of admiration. Since a motivating emotion is at the root of the theory, it is intended to serve both the theoretical purpose of mapping the main moral terms by reference to features of exemplars, and the practical purpose of making us want to act morally and showing us how to do so through emulation of exemplars. The theory links the a priori side of ethics with empirical work in psychology and neuroscience, and it gives narratives a key function in the theory. Since it tracks a natural process of moral development in the emulation of exemplars, it also connects with moral education.
... Next, there are exemplarist views which take the whole excellent agent-the exemplar-to be basic. On these views, we are able to recognise if someone is excellent, and we admire and emulate their traits as virtues (Zagzebski 2017). Here, what counts as a virtue derives from the moral exemplar. ...
... Thus these dispositions need to be guided by their norm, but not necessarily reliably deliver them. (Baehr 2011) However, Zagzebski (1996) points out that if such dispositions do not succeed in realising the underlying good motivation then they hardly can be called virtuous. ...
... Some epistemologists argue that also responsibilist virtues can directly produce knowledge without the help of reliabilist virtues (Baehr 2011;Wright 2010;Zagzebski 1996). For a more full-blown account of artificial responsibilist virtue, something like the phronesis-based approaches mentioned above, where agents weigh reasons and evidence, would be required. ...
Virtue theory is a natural approach toward the design of artificially intelligent systems, given that the design of artificial intelligence essentially aims at designing agents with excellent dispositions. This has led to a lively research programme to develop artificial virtues. However, this research programme has until now had a narrow focus on moral virtues in an Aristotelian mould. While Aristotelian moral virtue has played a foundational role in the field, it unduly constrains the possibilities of virtue theory for artificial intelligence. This paper aims to remedy this limitation. Philosophers have developed a rich tradition investigating virtues, their normative domains and their structure. Drawing on this tradition, I propose a three-dimensional classification system of possible artificial virtues: virtues can be classified according to the domain in which virtue is an excellence, norm that makes a virtue an excellence, and mode of how the virtue delivers the excellence. With this framework, we can discern gaps in the current theorising about artificial virtues. Additionally, it gives us a tool to evaluate the competences of extant artificially intelligent systems.
... To use LLMs for virtue cultivation, defining the concept of virtue is crucial. We draw upon the theory of exemplarism, as articulated by Linda Zagzebski [28]. Exemplarism posits that understanding virtues, right actions, and duties requires direct reference to exemplary individuals. ...
... Mimesis, or imitation, precipitates virtuous behavior, and the basic human pleasure in mimesis provides the initial motivation to act as virtue requires. But mimesis leads to the performance of a virtuous act for its own sake because what is aimed at in the mimesis of an activity is just the activity [28]. (p. ...
... Moreover, even in current medical ethics education, exemplars extend beyond real human individuals. Zagzebski [28] notes that historical figures and fictional characters can also serve as effective models in contemplating ethical dilemmas. Teachers often utilise literature and cinema to illustrate complex ethical scenarios [36,37]. ...
Background
With artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly revolutionising medicine, this study critically evaluates the integration of large language models (LLMs), known for advanced text processing and generation capabilities, in medical ethics education, focusing on promoting virtue. Positing LLMs as central to mimicking nuanced human communication, it examines their use in medical education and the ethicality of embedding AI in such contexts.
Method
Using a hybrid approach that combines principlist and non-principlist methodologies, we position LLMs as exemplars and advisors.
Results
We discuss the imperative for including AI ethics in medical curricula and its utility as an educational tool, identify the lack of educational resources in medical ethics education, and advocate for future LLMs to mitigate this problem as a “second-best” tool. We also emphasise the critical importance of instilling virtue in medical ethics education and illustrate how LLMs can effectively impart moral knowledge and model virtue cultivation. We address expected counter-arguments to using LLMs in this area and explain their profound potential to enrich medical ethics education, including facilitating the acquisition of moral knowledge and developing ethically grounded practitioners.
Conclusions
The study involved a comprehensive exploration of the function of LLMs in medical ethics education, positing that tools such as ChatGPT can profoundly enhance the learning experience in the future. This is achieved through tailored, interactive educational encounters while addressing the ethical nuances of their use in educational settings.
... In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in modeling due to Linda Zagzebski's (2017) Exemplarist Moral Theory. Since then, considerable attention has been paid to the contribution that the theory of exemplarism can provide to virtue acquisition (Kristjánsson, 2017b). ...
... The first is that the teachers' character traits do not necessarily have to be admirable. So, if exemplarism is reduced to this classical image of perfection (Zagzebski, 2017), then the teacher's role would be limited to the presentation of external models through fiction. In other words, providing students with "the perfect" categorizations of exemplars -the phronimos or the saint-would mean that the teacher is no longer a model, and his role would be limited to the last potential of modeling which is the use of characters present in narratives or literature. ...
... In this classical view, practical wisdom is referred to the possession of all ethical virtues that orient the person towards the good. In this view, the image of the exemplar is identified with absolute perfection and with the accumulation of virtues such as Zagzebski's (2017) sage, saint or hero. ...
...No olvidemos que educar es un arte, un arte que trabaja con lo más sublime de la creación, la persona, y que el principio fundamental de todo gran arte es la imitación. Se aprende imitando a los sabios y reproduciendo lo bueno. ¿Y qué es lo que se podría imitar?... Confío en que este trabajo tenga continuidad y nos ayude a identificar y desarrollar en la Universidad las condiciones que faciliten a nuestros profesores el camino hacia la ejemplaridad, a fin de que lleguen a ser auténticos maestros, y siempre, en favor de nuestros jóvenes... del prólogo
... For example, the participants in Nagle's (2004) study were nominated by experts for having "attained Self-realization," and one of the selection criteria in Kilrea's (2013) study was "a body positive approach to the experience of spiritual enlightenment." A different approach to exemplar nomination, that was adopted in the present study, was implied by Algoe and Haidt's (2009) and Haidt's (2013) work on the "other-praising" emotions of elevation, gratitude, and admiration, and especially by Zagzebski's (2010Zagzebski's ( , 2015aZagzebski's ( , 2015bZagzebski's ( , 2017 "exemplarist moral theory". Both Haidt and Zagzebski suggest that we identify exemplars "readily and spontaneously" (Harrison & Gayle, 2020) by the emotional response they evoke in us, before we are able to explain the cause for those emotions. ...
... In this study, an innovative approach to exemplar methodology, inspired by Zagzebski's (2017) "exemplarist moral theory," is applied in a study of spiritual exemplars from multiple spiritual traditions and approaches. Its objective is to shed light on the recognition and perception of spiritual exemplars by those who regard them as such. ...
... The results of present study also underscore distinctiveness in the kinds of emotions related to spiritual exemplars. "Other-praising" emotions of elevation, gratitude, and admiration, had been indicated not only in spiritual exemplars in this study but also in relation to moral or virtue exemplars (Algoe & Haidt, 2009;Haidt, 2013;Zagzebski 2010Zagzebski , 2015aZagzebski , 2015bZagzebski , 2017. In relation to spiritual exemplars, however, love and awe were also indicated, while a motivation "to emulate the admired person" (Zagzebski, 2017: 32), which was emphasized by Oman et al. (2008) and Zagzebski (2017), was distinctly absent from the descriptions. ...
The aim of the study is to shed light on the perception of spiritual exemplars by those who consider them as such. The authors asked 300 experts in the religious-spiritual field from different traditions to nominate spiritual exemplars they knew and describe them "specifically indicating what it is that makes each of them exemplary." Seventy-seven expert informants provided descriptions of 180 spiritual exemplars. In thematic analysis of the descriptions, fifteen categories of exemplar characteristics were developed and organized into three themes: Concrete-Performative (e.g., practices, actions), Descriptive-Qualitative (e.g., presence, humility) and Relational-Impactive (e.g., love, gratitude). Salient features of spiritual exemplarity were its multifacetedness and elusiveness. The findings underscore the important role of relational feelings, subjective impressions and felt impact in the perception of spiritual exemplars. Through the eyes of many expert informants, a spiritual exemplar is an inspiring archetype of multifaceted wholeness, exemplifying the unity of the sacred and the mundane.
... A good life is thus a happy or flourishing life, and the practice of virtue not only enables but also constitutes (at least partly) such a life. This is the eudaimonistic view of VE, which is very influential among virtue ethicists though not without alternatives [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]. This article does not dismiss but will not discuss these alternatives; its subject is eudaimonistic VE 4 . ...
... EVE's evaluative focal point will be character traits, and its normative standards will be environmental virtues, that is, prudentially valuable character traits whose development and exercise involve responsiveness toward nonhuman entities and their values. It will provide a catalogue of such virtues and indications regarding which practices will enable and require the agent to develop and exercise them 16 . ...
... 6 On what makes an ethical position a genuine specimen of VE, see [26]. 7 See, among others, [16,30,31]; essays in [1,[10][11][12][13]32,33]; essays in [34]; essays in [14,35]; essays in [36]; essays in [37]; essays in [6,38,39]; essays in [40,41]; essays in [42,43]; essays in [44]; essays in [7,[45][46][47][48]; essays in [49]. 8 This classification of anthropocentrism(s) is in [55]. ...
This article discusses the encounter between virtue ethics and environmental ethics and the ways in which environmental virtue ethics confronts nonhuman axiology and the controversial theme of moral anthropocentrism. It provides a reasoned review of the relevant literature and a historical–conceptual rendition of how environmental and virtue ethics came to converge as well as the ways in which they diverge. It explains that contrary to important worries voiced by some non-anthropocentric environmental ethicists, environmental virtue ethics enables and requires a rich and nuanced engagement with nonhuman values of all sorts—intrinsic as well as extrinsic, moral as well as nonmoral, anthropocentric as well as non-anthropocentric—and neither presupposes nor implies moral anthropocentrism in its normativity. Finally, the article considers the fortunes of, and some challenges for, environmental virtue ethics in its application to the ethics of climate change, an increasingly central topic in environmental ethics. This article proceeds as follows: the first section introduces virtue ethics; the second section looks at axiological and normative themes in environmental ethics; the third section discusses environmental virtue ethics; and the fourth section considers its application to climate change. The fifth section draws some conclusions.
... During the past decade, there has been increasing interest in exemplarist moral theory as an approach to moral education (see Henderson, 2022;Nielsen, 2019;Osman, 2019;Szutta, 2019;Tachibana, 2019;Vaccarezza & Niccoli, 2018;Watson, 2019). Although the central ideas of exemplarism extend as far back as Aristotle, its recent revival builds on the work of Zagzebski (2010Zagzebski ( , 2017. For Zagzebski, exemplarism is a moral theory that aims at explaining the important grounds of morality as well as the motivation of acting morally. ...
... Moral theories aim to simplify, systematize and justify moral beliefs and practices (Zagzebski, 2010, p. 42). Exemplarist moral theory considers exemplary individuals to be a sort of anchor around which this systematization and justification can occur (Zagzebski, 2010(Zagzebski, , 2017. For Zagzebski (2010), exemplary persons are foundational to moral action. ...
... The emotional tone of admiration is present throughout the process of reflection and the reflection may intensify it. Zagzebski's (2017) approach can be fallibilist and context-sensitive. Our emotions may miss the mark, and we may admire the wrong person, and we can also strongly disagree about who to admire. ...
... I wish to revivify the notion of the moral saint as moral exemplar, both necromancing sainthood as a philosophical issue, and to revive its application to applied philosophy. Virtue theorist Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski claims that a comprehensive moral theory can be constructed by identifying "moral exemplars" and investigating their psychological constitution (Zagzebski 2017). 8 In her Exemplarist Moral Theory, exemplars are identified through the emotion of admiration. ...
... Zagzebski uses the Direct Reference Theory of semantics developed by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke to show that a moral theory can be built upon non-conceptual foundations. According to Direct Reference Theory, knowing the meaning of a word that picks out an object does not necessitate an adequate description of the object being referred to (unlike in Descriptivism) (Zagzebski 2017;196). Appealing to this theory, Zagzebski claims that we identify the morally exemplary, and moral exemplars, directly through the pre-theoretical emotion of admiration (Zagzebski 2017;25-26). ...
... According to Direct Reference Theory, knowing the meaning of a word that picks out an object does not necessitate an adequate description of the object being referred to (unlike in Descriptivism) (Zagzebski 2017;196). Appealing to this theory, Zagzebski claims that we identify the morally exemplary, and moral exemplars, directly through the pre-theoretical emotion of admiration (Zagzebski 2017;25-26). 9 By applying Exemplarist Moral Theory to moral saints, we can understand that saints are not the kind of people one should want to avoid, but the kinds of people one admires. ...
I defend the continuing importance, and attraction of, moral saints. The objective of this paper is twofold; firstly, to critique Wolf’s definition of sainthood, and secondly, to argue against her view that one should not desire to be a moral saint, nor emulate them. In section 1, I argue that moral saints are highly complex moral agents, and that Wolf’s definition does not capture this complexity. My second argument is that Wolf’s account that there are two kinds of saints, loving and rational, leads to a tension. Either: (1) the distinction between loving and rational saints is justifiable; but then arguments against the benefits of sainthood ought to be directed independently against each kind of saint which, Wolf does not do; or (2) the distinction is not justifiable, in which case the division is explanatorily impotent. In section 2, I will present Wolf’s argument for why one should not want to be a moral saint, nor even know one. I counter that Wolf over-emphasises non-moral values, to the point that these values have a monopoly on what constitutes a well-rounded life. Wolf must provide a more definitive scope for non-moral values, as the distinction between moral and non-moral values is ambiguous. Finally, I argue that moral saints can serve as moral exemplars and visionaries. By admiring and emulating them, we can adapt our own moral behavior, and by example, moral saints can discover new and better ways of pursuing moral goods.
... La propuesta de Zagzebski (2010;2017) denominada "exemplarist moral theory" (de ahora en adelante, EMT) ha suscitado un interesante debate sobre el papel de los modelos en el aprendizaje moral. Conforme a la EMT, el aprendizaje moral se realiza a partir de los ejemplares morales que admiramos y emulamos, tras reflexionar sobre ellos. ...
... Conforme a la EMT, el aprendizaje moral se realiza a partir de los ejemplares morales que admiramos y emulamos, tras reflexionar sobre ellos. Al observar en otras personas la vivencia de valores morales se suscitan sentimientos de elevación moral (Haidt, 2000;2003) y admiración que, tras una reflexión, pueden ayudar a la fundamentación ética de la persona (Zagzebski, 2010;2017). Las virtudes morales, según la EMT, son características que admiramos en una persona en cuanto modelo ejemplar. ...
...No olvidemos que educar es un arte, un arte que trabaja con lo más sublime de la creación, la persona, y que el principio fundamental de todo gran arte es la imitación. Se aprende imitando a los sabios y reproduciendo lo bueno. ¿Y qué es lo que se podría imitar?... Confío en que este trabajo tenga continuidad y nos ayude a identificar y desarrollar en la Universidad las condiciones que faciliten a nuestros profesores el camino hacia la ejemplaridad, a fin de que lleguen a ser auténticos maestros, y siempre, en favor de nuestros jóvenes... del prólogo
... En alguna medida, Esquirol comparte la visión de Arendt sobre el papel del maestro: "Ante el niño, el maestro es una especie de representante de todos los adultos que le muestra los detalles y le dice «este es nuestro mundo»" (2016, p. 291). Respecto al ejemplarismo moral, si bien Zagzebski (2017) no comenta el fenómeno del "acompañamiento" esbozado en la cita anterior, sí que acentúa para la educación moral la importancia de indicar o señalar al ejemplo digno de ser admirado, es decir, personas que a través de la belleza que transmiten, la coherencia e integridad, nos invitan a ser como ellos en ciertos aspectos. Así como el asombro tiene su papel en la curiosidad natural ayudando a la incorporación de contenidos fácticos, la admiración ayuda a la incorporación de criterios morales -criterios, que no normas. ...
... Así pues, las dinámicas en la ejemplaridad activan las disposiciones y facultades humanas para rastrear lo valioso. En este sentido, si los conceptos en una teoría ética formal están arraigados en una persona, esto implica un cambio de estrategia educativa que, desde luego, va más allá de la mera instrucción o del simple mandato: las narraciones y descripciones sobre esa persona son moralmente reveladoras (Zagzebski, 2017), puesto que estas son el vehículo principal de la educación moral de los jóvenes, y son una manera básica en la que los humanos de cualquier edad desarrollan y modifican su sensibilidad moral (Carr y Harrison, 2015;Carreira, 2020;Zagzebski, 2013). Las narraciones, las biografías y otros recursos artísticos describen al ejemplar, valorando la grandeza de las capacidades humanas que se ven, por lo general, en medio de escenarios adversos u hostiles. ...
...No olvidemos que educar es un arte, un arte que trabaja con lo más sublime de la creación, la persona, y que el principio fundamental de todo gran arte es la imitación. Se aprende imitando a los sabios y reproduciendo lo bueno. ¿Y qué es lo que se podría imitar?... Confío en que este trabajo tenga continuidad y nos ayude a identificar y desarrollar en la Universidad las condiciones que faciliten a nuestros profesores el camino hacia la ejemplaridad, a fin de que lleguen a ser auténticos maestros, y siempre, en favor de nuestros jóvenes... del prólogo
... On these views, we are able to recognise if someone is excellent, and we admire and emulate their traits as virtues. (Zagzebski, 2017) Here, what counts as a virtue derives from the moral exemplar. ...
... Agent-based Virtue-first (Driver, 2004) (Roberts, 2018) Exemplarist Energe6c (Ohlhorst, 2022) (Roberts, 2018) Value-based Platonist (Driver, 2004) (Ba9aly, 2015; Greco, 2010;Sosa, 2015) (Sosa, 2015) Eudaimonist Rela6onal Agent-based Virtue-first (Swanton, 2001) (Code, 1987;Montmarquet, 1987) (Kieran, 2012) Exemplarist (Zagzebski, 2017) (Zagzebski, 1996) Energe6c (Anscombe, 1958) (Lopes, 2008) 8 Eudaimonist (Annas, 2011;Hursthouse, 2001) (Goldie, 2007) Rela6onal (Confucius & Waley, 2010) (Fricker, 2007) (Stenseke, 2023), specifically designed for the purposes of describing excellent disposi6ons in AI systems. (Coleman, 2001) There are several kinds of virtue accounts that we need given the novel context that the presence of AI systems may create. ...
Virtue theory is a natural approach towards the design of ar6ficially intelligent systems, given that the design of ar6ficial intelligence essen6ally aims at designing agents with excellent disposi6ons. This has led to a lively research programme to develop ar6ficial virtues. However, this research programme has un6l now had a narrow focus on moral virtues in an Aristotelian mould. While Aristotelian moral virtue has played a founda6onal role for the field, it unduly constrains the possibili6es of virtue theory for ar6ficial intelligence. This paper aims to remedy this limita6on. Philosophers have developed a rich tradi6on inves6ga6ng virtues, their norma6ve domains and their structure. Drawing on this tradi6on, I propose a three-dimensional classifica6on system of possible ar6ficial virtues: virtues can be classified according to the domain in which virtue is an excellence, norm which makes a virtue an excellence, and mode how the virtue delivers the excellence. With this framework, we can discern gaps in the current theorising about ar6ficial virtues. Addi6onally, it gives us a tool to evaluate the competences of extant ar6ficially intelligent systems.
... This study adopted the exemplar methodology (Bronk et al., 2013) modified in accordance with Zagzebski's (2010Zagzebski's ( , 2015aZagzebski's ( , 2015bZagzebski's ( , 2017) "exemplarist moral theory," and the qualitative phenomenological approach (Giorgi, 1997). ...
... The basic strategy of exemplar nomination, used in all the above studies, was that researchers first design exemplar nomination criteria, which are then shared with nominators who use them to identify potential exemplars (Bronk et al., 2013b). The approach to exemplar nomination, adopted in this study, was inspired by Zagzebski's (2010Zagzebski's ( , 2015aZagzebski's ( , 2015bZagzebski's ( , 2017 suggestion, that exemplars are identified "readily and spontaneously" (Harrison & Gayle, 2020) by the emotional response they evoke in others. In this study, therefore, the nominators were asked to nominate spiritual exemplars with the term loosely defined and without providing them with specific nomination criteria. ...
The aim of this study is to shed light on the experience of Living Transcendence, a relatively stabilized spiritual state considered in many religious traditions the pinnacle and holy grail of the search for the sacred. It explores how Living Transcendence is experienced by individuals, identified by others as spiritual exemplars having and evincing that experience. Multiple in-depth phenomenological interviews were conducted with 32 such individuals of different traditions and spiritual paths. Based on their analysis, four qualities of this experience are described: noetic (preconceptual, nondiscursive, and nonsymbolic knowing/awareness/consciousness of ultimate reality or truth), affective (supremely positive affective qualities of joy, happiness or bliss, and love), embodied (somatic and/or energetic presence or sense of a spiritual essence), and relational (a sense of connectivity or “inter-being” with everything, God, or the Whole). A characteristic of the experience of Living Transcendence is its constancy over time, amid and through the fluctuations of normal life and various crises. An additional characteristic is its association with an unusual type of volitionality, that is, the will to obey, surrender to, or be in service of a “calling.” While the presence and prominence of each of these qualities and characteristics vary between individuals, they appear to be facets of one essence. The experience of Living Transcendence appears to be constantly and consistently unitive, connective, and supremely positive, and to inextricably permeate all other experiences and contextualize them.
... First, they show what competent behavior looks like and serve as a term of comparison for those who are learning the skills. Second, they can help one find the motivation to start or persist in the journey of acquiring a skill, which is a time-and energy-consuming endeavor (Zagzebski 2017). ...
... This competence does not seem to require theoretical knowledge at all; very often, these character traits are developed early in life, without the mediation of theoretical (let alone philosophical) knowledge. Virtues develop in various ways, one of which is the imitation of moral exemplars (Zagzebski 2017). This does not mean that the development of practical moral competence does not require reflection, but it is decidedly implausible that it requires sophisticated philosophical knowledge either. ...
This paper explores the concept of moral expertise in the contemporary philosophical debate, with a focus on three accounts discussed across moral epistemology, bioethics, and virtue ethics: an epistemic authority account, a skilled agent account, and a hybrid model sharing key features of the two. It is argued that there are no convincing reasons to defend a monistic approach that reduces moral expertise to only one of these models. A pluralist view is outlined in the attempt to reorient the discussion about moral expertise.
... Kohlberg's cognitive development theory, Noddings' care ethical approach to moral education and proponents of neo-Aristotelian character education have all called on teachers to be moral exemplars (Sanderse, 2013). However, modelling has received most attention as a moral educational method by neo-Aristotelian character educationalists (see e.g., Croce & Vaccarezza, 2017;Kristjánsson, 2006Kristjánsson, , 2017Sanderse, 2013;Vos, 2018), partly fuelled by the popularity of Zagzebski's (2017) recent work on an exemplarist moral theory. ...
... The notion of 'exemplarity' has a long history, dating back to the study of exemplars in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Warnick, 2008), and Zagzebski (2017) has recently reintroduced the term in moral philosophy. She defines exemplars as 'persons who are most imitable or most deserving of emulation ' (p. ...
This paper aims to offer a new perspective on role modelling by examining adolescents’ own efforts to lead a morally virtuous life. While traditional approaches to moral education emphasize the importance of teachers as role models, this study proposes a shift in focus towards adolescents’ own role models. Drawing on the philosophical concept of moral self-cultivation and psychological insights on identity development and social cognitive learning, it is argued that adolescents have the ability to cultivate their moral character by emulating others. However, empirical evidence suggests that adolescents often do not perceive teachers as their role models. Consequently, moral educational theories are advised to demand less of teachers as role models. Teachers could invest more time in understanding students’ personal role models and encourage them to compare these role models with their own behavior. By acknowledging and addressing students’ role models, teachers can facilitate the moral self-cultivation of adolescents.
... Kidd (2017) makes a compelling argument for an "aesthetics of spiritual exemplarity." Drawing on Zagzebski's (2017) moral exemplar theory, Kidd argues that major spiritual traditions-historically the institutions in which most would have cultivated aspiration-must serve two important aesthetic purposes to gain prominence. First, they must offer adherents opportunities to experience inner moral beauty-often embodied in particular exemplars. ...
Recently, psychology has begun to study increasingly value-laden subjects, such as wisdom (Sternberg & Glück, 2019) and moral education (Nucci et al., 2014), and to attempt to integrate these with educational programs. In reviewing this literature, we believe we have identified a notable lacuna: the topic of personal aspiration. We introduce aspiration as defined by Agnes Callard in the self-transformation literature in philosophy and observe that the discussion of aspiration as a core component of the development of wisdom and virtue appears to be currently limited to discussions of exemplars. We argue that this sidelining of aspiration in comparison to traditional spiritual and philosophical models is a direct consequence of the history of psychology. We end by arguing that reintegrating aspiration into psychological research will be imperative for these fields in the coming years.
... Recent interest in exemplarism is primarily due to Linda Zagzebski's pioneering work (see Zagzebski 2006Zagzebski , 2010Zagzebski , 2015Zagzebski , 2017, who has developed a systematic version of moral exemplarism that addresses what were often considered fatal objections. Zagzebski's version of exemplarism is modeled on Putnam's and Kripke's direct reference theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a natural kind term like "water" or "gold" is determined by tracing the term's history of use back to an initial dubbing event ("water is stuff like that"). ...
... The course features diverse stories of leadership, ranging from CEOs and former Olympic athletes to school teachers and refugee advocates. Exercises enable learners to engage in reflective admiration, critically analyzing the habits and principles exemplified by role models in order to discern how the virtues demonstrated by exemplars can be adapted to their unique contexts (Zagzebski, 2017). Beyond well-known figures, the course encourages participants to identify personal exemplars from their own experiences, recognizing that relatable role models often have the most profound influence (Han et al., 2022). ...
This article introduces Leading with Character, an innovative online course designed to cultivate virtues of character as the foundation of effective and ethical leadership. Developed collaboratively by the Oxford Character Project at the University of Oxford, the Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University, the Legatum Foundation, and leadership experts and educators from around the world, the course addresses the urgent need for leaders to cultivate virtues, such as purpose, courage, love, and hope in order to successfully navigate today’s complex challenges. The course is rooted in academic research in character and leadership development, combining academic rigor with practical application. It includes reflective exercises, real-world examples, and habit-forming practices through which participants develop the personal qualities and inner strength essential for leading positive change. The course is organized into four thematic modules, each focusing on a key leadership virtue. By blending theoretical insights with actionable exercises, the modules guide participants to reflect on personal values, enhance leadership qualities, and drive meaningful change in their communities. Leading with Character aspires to foster a global community of leaders dedicated to advancing the common good through character-based and purpose-driven leadership. By placing character at the heart of leadership development, the course offers a transformative framework that equips individuals to make a positive impact on their organizations and broader society.
... The recently emerging moral exemplar studies and the resurgence of rolemodel education in character education especially in the wake of Zagzebski's exemplarism (Campodonico et al., 2019;Kristjánsson, 2006;Osman, 2019;Sanderse, 2013;Zagzebski, 2017) show clearly that highly moral people are of great variety. We need to recognize that moral exemplars are of "irreducibly different types (some of which share features in common)" and acknowledging this very fact is the first step toward a realistic moral 7 Yi-Lin Chen Hindsight in Storytelling: Narrative, Moral Identity, and Character Education psychology of excellence (Blum, 1994, p. 66). ...
... This is not to say that instruction in such matters are irrelevant, they are not. Nonetheless, as Linda Zagzebski insists lessons on paradigmatic moral leaders serves as a beacon drawing student attention to moral ideals of cooperative behavior (Zagzebski, 2017;158-159). Still, it is what students see in their own teacher and other teacher and staff members' behavior at school that is likely to be most influential to them in the long run. ...
The Concept “I will gladly pay you on Tuesday for a hamburger today.” Saying this makes a promise under the right circumstances. If the vendor accepts, a contract arises from the exchange. Extending beyond this fragment of standard contract law, there are more basic elements of moral and communal survival at stake. Promising introduces the derived concept of obligation. Failure to live up to one’s obligation is a source of being ashamed of oneself and being the subject of shaming by others (Moffett, 2018; 228-30). Once a promise is accepted and service or good provided, a contract exists and is often enforceable by law. But, even without the law, failing to live up to one’s obligations subjects the promiser to sanctions such as shaming and even punishment. “Dad, you promised!” Is an oft heard challenge when a promise is broken to a child. Very young children intuit that in promising, a person becomes obligated to one or more others (Mercier, 2020; p.92). Failing to live up to a voluntarily created obligation on oneself is expected to result in guilt if that same person aborts the obligation others came to rely upon. Legitimate excuses are license to abort an otherwise obligatory commitment. But to be legitimate, the excuses must be recognized by most others as plausibly discounting the afore mentioned obligation.
... and therefore, it would be necessary to prevent youngsters timely about these possible difficulties. As regards the facilitation of youngsters' admiration for moral exemplars, scholars (Zagzebski, 2017;Szutta, 2019) have pointed to the pros and cons of an exemplarist moral theory view, explaining that admiration of moral exemplars can turn negative and lead to envy and resentment. Another possible setback when addressing this component of the model in education is that young people, in particular adolescents, may have a tendency to focus on the admiration that virtue provokes in others, which could lead to desire the appreciation associated to virtue rather than the virtue itself. ...
Moral development is crucial for a meaningful life. Many well-founded approaches and models are present in the moral development literature, which is a very diverse and populated field. The model of a ‘person of moral growth’ presented in this paper is a contribution to moral growth research based on personalist virtue ethics. Personalist virtue ethics puts the person at the centre of the moral reflection, addressing the holistic interplay of the person’s dimensions in the process of moral growth. The model is an operationalization of the person’s dimensions for educational and research purposes in the field of moral development. In this paper, the four components of the model are presented: emotional-cognitive, decisional (free commitment to moral growth), practical (moral growth through personal action), and self-understanding (the moral growth identity), and the process of the elaboration of the model is explained. For enhancing the construct validity of the model, its components and pedagogical implications are discussed in the light of recent moral education literature. This model is a contribution to a more cogent moral education and is helping to design and deliver moral educational experiences which address personal moral development in a clear, convincing, and well-structured way.
... Recientemente, el estudio de la función que cumplen los ejemplares en la educación en virtudes ha despertado un gran interés, estimulado en una medida importante por el trabajo de Linda Zagzebski. Véase Zagzebski (2017). 30 ...
Este volumen ofrece estudios alrededor de las emociones, sentimientos y afectaciones psicológicas a consecuencia de la contingencia sanitaria. Reúne aportaciones de la psicología y la filosofía, cuyo común denominador es la comprensión del fenómeno y la btención de lecciones útiles para el futuro. En principio, presenta los retos enfrentados en relación con la salud mental pública, las fuentes de estrés y las estrategias de afrontamiento, así como las formas de atención a distancia. Describe las contribuciones centradas en la salud mental de niñas y niños, los obstáculos en procesos educativos y las causas de malestar psicológico. Además, muestra un paisaje completo sobre el consumo de sustancias psicoactivas y un retrato del fenómeno del suicidio examinando definiciones, modelos explicativos, así como factores de riesgo y protección. Finalmente, ofrece una comprensión filosófica del tiempo en que alguien llega a saber que morirá y explica la forma en que la filosofía estoica de la Antigüedad daba respuesta al problema del mal. Analiza el miedo colectivo a partir de una concepción del sufrimiento desde las poblaciones y un análisis filosófico de las expresiones de solidaridad en tiempos de la emergencia sanitaria.
... Porque a fin de cuentas las emociones también son reactivas, los hábitos interpretativos se aprenden, se guían, pueden ser corregidos en el seno de la comunidad. Esto debe ser admirado, y aquello, no (Kvadsheim, 1992;Zagzebski, 2010Zagzebski, , 2017. Es un juego de espejos estético y moral en el que los distintos pueblos han querido responder a la cuestión fundamental acerca de su identidad. ...
... The role of modeling in moral learning is so important that the Exemplarist Moral Theory of Zagzebski vigorously corroborates the claim that moral exemplars are essential to moral theory and practice. [20] Considering the importance of modeling in the process of developing students' professional ethics, attention should be paid to the availability of correct behavioral models in the students' education system. Moreover, professors, midwives, and gynecologists in educational environments should be aware of their exemplary role and be familiar with the concept of indirect education or hidden curriculum. ...
Background
Midwives are faced with important ethical issues in their professional lives; therefore, becoming a midwife is not only the acquisition of knowledge and skills but also includes acquiring moral values that cause fundamental changes in their attitudes toward their professional responsibilities. The aim of this study was to explore the process of professional ethics development in midwifery students.
Materials and Methods
This grounded theory study was conducted from 2020 to 2022 at Mashhad University of Medical Sciences, Mashhad, Iran. The participants included 17 midwifery students and 14 key informants. They were selected through purposeful and theoretical sampling. Data were collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews, field notes, and theoretical notes until theoretical saturation was achieved. Data collection and data analysis were performed simultaneously. Data were analyzed based on the grounded theory presented by Corbin and Strauss (2014) using MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2020.
Results
The core category was “interactive-cognitive learning in a two-way reasoning path” which addressed the participants’ main issue of moral numbness. Moral distress, interactive-cognitive learning, moral reasoning, and moral hopelessness were the midwifery students’ strategies that led to a spectrum of moral internalization to moral burnout. The improper context of moral development was the context theme of this study.
Conclusions
The theory of “interactive-cognitive learning in the two-way path of reasoning” creates a deep understanding of the process of formation of professional ethics in midwifery students and it can be used in the effective training of students with the aim of promoting professional ethics in midwifery.
... O exemplarismo é o que recebe mais atenção na discussão teórica (Zagzebski, 2017;Annas, 2011). Isso não surpreende, devido ao papel normativo do exemplo do agente virtuoso visto acima. ...
A educação para as virtudes consiste na aplicação pedagógica da
teoria das virtudes, com foco especial na aquisição de virtudes intelectuais,
como humildade intelectual, coragem intelectual e cuidado na aquisição
de informações. Assim, a educação para as virtudes procura assegurar que
tais virtudes sejam adquiridas pelos estudantes. Vieses cognitivos, por
outro lado, são erros sistemáticos que acometem os agentes ao formar
suas opiniões. Exemplos são ater-se a informações que confirmam nossas
opiniões, o uso de estereótipos e autocondescendência. Experimentos em
psicologia cognitiva comprovam que evitar a recorrência de vieses é mais
difícil do que parece (Kahneman, Sibony & Sustein, 2021). Desse modo, eles
apresentam um desafio para qualquer projeto pedagógico e, em especial, a
educação para as virtudes. Neste capítulo, examinaremos a relação entre
os vieses e as virtudes intelectuais a partir de um caso aplicado da
educação para as virtudes no contexto educacional. O nosso objetivo é usar
um estudo de caso para sugerir que os métodos tradicionais da educação
para as virtudes têm potencial para melhorar a postura intelectual dos
estudantes, mas que ameaças como a dos vieses demandam o uso de
procedimentos adicionais. Estes podem ser emprestados de fontes
externas como a psicologia cognitiva e outras abordagens pedagógicas
como o pensamento crítico e a comunidade de investigação.
... How are the distinctions between mimicry, imitation and emulation related to students' moral development, understood through a virtue ethical lens? I have argued elsewhere that virtue ethical minded philosophers like Zagzebski (2017) assume that people start out mimicking other people's sounds, gestures, and skills when they are a child. Once people mature, they will think more about who deserves their imitation and why and they will learn less from mimicry and more from imitation and emulation (Sanderse, 2024a;Sanderse, 2024b). ...
The central question of this paper is whether and how, from a virtue ethical perspective, teacher modelling and student emulation hang together in moral education. This matters, because philosophers have often focussed either on the moral psychology of emulation or on modelling as a moral educational method, neglecting the interplay between the two. It starts by analysing the conceptual framework underlying the influential Manner in Teaching (MiT) and Moral Work of Teaching (MWT) projects. It reconstructs how modelling is understood as ‘teaching morally’ or ‘teaching morality’. These two interpretations of modelling are developed further by drawing on additional literature on teacher education and moral education. Then, the conceptual framework is extended by focusing on how students may learn from modelling through mimicry, imitation or emulation. This results in several conceptual relations that illuminate the complex dynamics between teacher modelling and student emulation. For example, teacher modelling does not guarantee student emulation, which challenges the common advocacy for teachers as role models. At the same time, students may emulate teachers without teachers being aware of their impact. This results in a more nuanced understanding of what it takes for teachers to be moral role models.
... Some of these approaches are provided in Table 2, along with example interventions aligned with each approach and effect sizes (although other information, such as contexts and procedures, are also important but nevertheless omitted for sake of space). (Schneider & Weber, 2022) Character and moral education help people develop a set of beliefs and values through pedagogical methods (Lamb et al., 2019(Lamb et al., , 2021Mark Halstead, 2010), such as guided reflection and the discussion of moral exemplars (Zagzebski, 2017) and moral dilemmas (Lind, 2016). ...
Metachangemaking refers to the cultivation of changemakers-people with the motivation and competence to tackle societal issues and promote collective wellbeing. It is not entirely clear how to effectively cultivate changemakers, and relevant research spans many disparate fields. The goals of this article are to introduce the concept of metachangemaking, synthesize and evaluate some relevant literature which may be less familiar to particular audiences, and identify open questions for future research. We identified a number of themes, including changemaker motivations and competencies, approaches to cultivating such motivations and competencies, and opportunities and challenges for metachangemaking in education systems. There are many important outstanding questions that suggest directions for future research, such as the efficacy of various approaches to cultivating changemaker motivations and competencies in particular circumstances. There is a need for evidence-based theoretical frameworks of metachangemaking, and for studies that address issues of replicability, causality, and transferability to various changemaking contexts.
... Admiration has both cognitive and affective aspects, and therefore it has a much stronger motivational effect than theoretical moral reasoning. Several moral psychology experiments support this theory (Algoe & Haidt 2009;Miller 2015:77-101;Zagzebski 2017). ...
Dissenter Protestantism, Pietist, and revivalist movements have played a crucial but often overlooked role in the emergence and development of democracy, the abolition of slavery and the struggle for women’s rights. The article focuses on the emergence of dissenter Protestantism in 17th century England, its continuation in the USA and similar movements in other parts of Europe. Drawing on theories from sociology, moral psychology and other behavioural sciences, the article argues that the social impact of dissenter Protestantism was the result of a complex combination of theology, practices, institutions and specific historical circumstances. While the theology of these movements was not unique, their emphasis on following Jesus Christ and sanctification was a significant aspect. Other factors contributing to their impact include the role of friendship and strong social networks, a relative egalitarianism, a certain distance and independence from dominant institutions and cultures and the creation of self-organised and relatively autonomous organisations. This combination of theological and social elements created free spaces that facilitated the development of new or different practices. Another crucial aspect was their ability to integrate reasoning and affective powers, uniting theory with metaphor and narrative. Finally, the specific practices and institutions within these movements allowed individuals to grow and enter into communities that shaped their lives.
... Examples are a key feature of understanding and education in that they illustrate general principles or rules by offering a particular instance that concretizes something abstract. Discussions of exemplarity-of the nature and purpose of examples-can be found within educational theory (Hållander, 2020;Korsgaard, 2024;Warnick, 2008;Zagzebski, 2017) as well as the disciplines underpinning RE (Cotter & Rpbertson, 2016;Smith, 2013). There is, however, little literature that brings together these approaches. ...
Calls for reframing the subject matter of Religious Education in schools include the tricky question of how to select from a world of potentially interesting and relevant material. Pedagogues have long questioned the educational logic that takes so-called substantive knowledge as its starting point and imagines education to follow a linear path from simple to complex. Scholars of Religious Studies have addressed similar questions of how to bring the subject matter to life through taking a more disciplinary orientation , though this approach is problematized by RE's multidisciplinary foundations This paper brings together pedagogical and disciplinary perspectives to the question of exemplification in the production of curricular subject matter. Taking as its context RE in schools, the paper assumes the didactic principle that there is considerable difference between putative disciplinary knowledge and school subject matter and that the production of school subject matter requires considered processes of pedagogical transformation and reduction. The paper explores the logic governing this transformation by drawing on the pedagogical analysis of exemplarity offered by Martin Wagenschein alongside the more disciplinary analyses of the place of examples from Jonathan Z. Smith. ARTICLE HISTORY
... The theoretical project was an attempt to use the exemplars' narratives and the resources of psychology to characterize the influences on moral action in the profession (Huff, Barnard, & Frey, 2008a, 2008b. Approaches that begin with moral exemplars assume that there is something about moral character that is central to the production of moral action (Damon & Colby, 2013; L. J. Walker & Hennig, 2004;Zagzebski, 2013Zagzebski, , 2017. However, we quickly found out from our interviewees that things were more complicated. ...
This book is for anyone who wants to think carefully about the psychology of morality. This includes, of course, scholars and students in philosophy, psychology, and religion. But it is also for those in the many allied disciplines (e.g. criminology, pastoral care, peace studies, political science, social work, etc.) that are taking and supporting moral action in the world. More widely, we have tried to write it to be accessible to any careful reader interested in the topic, regardless of background. We hope it will provide you with a feeling for the wide variety of things one needs to consider to achieve an adequate understanding of what is today called moral psychology.
This book is an attempt to understand: (1) why people take moral action; and (2) the individual’s experience of actually doing so. The first task requires us to gather many different empirical literatures on the contexts, influences, and processes that explain why people take moral action. These literatures are what has come to be called moral psychology. The second task requires us to reframe those literature reviews in terms of the experience of the individual taking moral action. This second task, then, leads us into existential, philosophical, and theological concerns. The tension between these two tasks, the general/scientific and the individual/existential, allows us to use conceptual and empirical techniques from each approach to illuminate the other, thereby helping us to understand both better.
We reject the idea that it is useful to restrict moral psychology to any singular definition of morality, and instead encourage opening up the scope of “the moral” to all the interesting places one might find it. Our approach to framing the field is more like what used to be called natural history:1 a wide-ranging approach to collecting the phenomena of interest wherever they are. It is not theory-driven science but it embraces and uses theory-driven science. Nor is it the amateur collection of occasional specimens – we try instead to systematically seek out naturally occurring variety and pattern in the phenomena of interest. Thus, this overview of moral psychology will be broader than others. We hope this breadth helps to heal some of the fragmentation in the field, placing often-isolated literatures in conversations with each other. Our goal is to expand the horizons of the field of moral psychology and to deepen and structure the complexities that one can find there.
... For a discussion of the importance of moral exemplars, see Exemplarist Moral Theory(Zagzebski, 2017). ...
I consider the applicability of Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) and computer simulations for ethical theories. Though agent-based modeling is already well established in the social sciences, it has not yet found acceptance in the field of philosophical ethics. Currently, there are only a few works explicitly connecting ethics with agent-based modeling. In this paper, I show that it is possible to build computer simulations of ethical theories and that there are also potential benefits in doing so: (1) the opportunity for virtual ethical experiments that are impossible to do in real life, and (2) an increased understanding and appreciation of an ethical theory either through the programming implementation or through the visual simulation. In the first part of the paper, I mention some social science simulations with ethical import that could encourage ethicists to work with ABM. Second, I list the few pioneering works that attempt to combine computer simulation with philosophical ethics, the most prominent being Evolving Ethics: The New Science of Good and Evil (2010) by Mascaro et al. Third, I give pointers for the computer simulation of the most prominent ethical theories: deontological ethics, utilitarianism, feminist care ethics, and virtue ethics. In the final part, I consider the potential of using an existing reference model for the simulation of human behavior, the PECS model, as the foundation for a computer simulation of virtue ethics.
... On the other hand, the absence and subsequent award of a research communication that omits IC or EC, when applicable, is morally questionable and leads to an exemplary negative scenario Zagzebski (2017). Ideally, it would be a moral advance if the publications presented respective ethical or moral aspects; however, given the space restriction, limiting it to highly valued elements already indicates a positive differential. ...
The inaugural meeting of the Workshop on Multimedia and Hypermedia Systems, now known as WebMedia, took place in 1995, one year after the founding of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). While the tram was still departing the station, Brazil boarded it. However, Tim Berners-Lee offers harsh criticism of the Web’s effects, applications, and uses three decades after he lay the Web’s conceptual cornerstone. Such as false information, widespread manipulation, the unethical use and exploitation of personal information, corporate monopolies, and dangers to democracy. He followed and kept abreast of the moral implications of the Web. However, did WebMedia also stay up in this context? We followed the Systematic Literature Review methodology with the aim to answer how WebMedia research published between 2005 and 2022 explicitly incorporates ethics. We analyzed 1331 papers, 52 (≈4%) presented ethical aspects, and, from these, one stood out. We concluded that the ethical aspects remained tiny, considering the time coverage. Less than 10% of the publications presented some ethical aspects, including the respective research. The occurrences of Ethics Committee, Informed Consent, or a combination of both did not reach 2% of the publications. Even though the Web and Multimedia are cross-cutting themes in technical and non-technical aspects, the first is dominant. In contrast, the deliberations related to the second are limited, as well as on Ethics or Morals. Therefore, we propose guidelines for community appreciation, embracing a culture of ethical aspects. Our main contribution is bringing a meta-research perspective on ethical aspects dedicated to WebMedia.
... More recently, philosopher Linda Zagzebski has provided a theoretical account of the role of moral exemplars in moral education and self-improvement. She argues that the emotion of admiration helps people recognize exemplars, who then provide a template for character development (Zagzebski, 2017). The results suggest that morally exceptional figures can be successfully embedded in character development interventions to the extent to which the moral enablers these exemplars use are clearly expressed and identified. ...
Objective:
What do people see as distinguishing the morally exceptional from others? To handle the problem that people may disagree about who qualifies as morally exceptional, we asked subjects to select and rate their own examples of morally exceptional, morally average, and immoral people.
Method:
Subjects rated each selected exemplar on several enablers of moral action and several directions of moral action. By applying the logic underlying stimulus sampling in experimental design, we evaluated perceivers' level of agreement about the characteristics of the morally exceptional, even though perceivers rated different targets.
Results:
Across three studies, there was strong subjective consensus on who is morally exceptional: those who are empathetic and prone to guilt, those who reflect on moral issues and identify with morality, those who have self-control and actually enact moral behaviors, and those who care about harm, compassion, fairness, and honesty. Deep controversies also existed about the moral directions pursued by those seen as morally exceptional: People evaluated those who pursued similar values and made similar decisions more favorably.
Conclusion:
Strong consensus suggests characteristics that may push a person to go beyond normal expectations, that the study of moral exceptionality is not overly hindered by disagreement over who is morally exceptional, and that there is some common ground between disagreeing camps.
... O CSBC é um evento com expressiva magnitude ética no cenário acadêmicocientífico computacional brasileiro, servindo como exemplo moral [Zagzebski 2017] aos demais. Como antecipado por [Moor 2005], o impacto social da computação aumentou, culminando no aumento e surgimento de novos dilemas éticos. ...
Com diversos eventos e temas, o Congresso da Sociedade Brasileira de Computação (CSBC) congrega acadêmicos-cientistas da computação brasileira. Precisamos incentivar a orientação do clima ético computacional a valores morais positivos e um pensar-fazer crítico no ciberespaço. No Brasil, o CSBC tem expressiva magnitude ética, sendo exemplo moral aos demais eventos. Por meio de uma Revisão Sistemática da Literatura, investigamos o panorama dos aspectos éticos nas publicações dos eventos mais longevos do CSBC pela última década. Concluímos que avanços éticos ou morais na computação são necessários e que a consolidação de alguns workshops, e.g., WIT, WASHES e WICS; indicam progresso nesta agenda, vinculando o físico, o digital e a ética.
... The explicit approach helped students cognitively by giving them theoretical knowledge about the meanings and aspects of certain characters (Lickona, 1997). Meanwhile, the modelling of desirable character traits by the participants could effectively motivate the students to adopt the exemplified characters (Szutta, 2019;Zagzebski, 2017). Finally, the integration of character education within other teaching methodologies gives students opportunities to act upon the instilled characters (Lickona, 1997). ...
The Indonesian national curriculum and educational policies mandate the integration of character education into every classroom learning activities in schools. This qualitative case study aims to investigate Indonesian subject teachers’ agency to enact character education, including how they plan, assess, and execute it, in their teaching practices. In addition, it also explores the ways they select the character traits as well as the challenges they encountered in character education. The data include in-depth semi-structured interviews with three experienced Indonesian senior high school teachers. The results delineate that the teachers enacted character education that covered cognitive, affective, and behavioural aspects. Nevertheless, these enactments were unplanned and unassessed. In the process of character selection, the teachers reflected on their contextual situations, past experiences, and future orientations. They encountered difficulties in character education due to the abundance of academic materials, and the lack of professional development programs and proactive involvement from other school members.
... They not only provide examples of how to perform particular tasks or actions but rather show us how to live our lives. Moral exemplars, specifically, those whom we focus on here, are those who excel in the moral domain and are thus admirable for moral reasons and capable of showing us the kind of moral beings we want to become (Zagzebski, 2017). According to Engelen et al. (2018, p. 348), moral exemplars exceed and transcend ordinary expectations in multiple ways. ...
In this paper, we argue that who one is and wants to become is closely related to whom one admires. Although the links between identity formation and exemplars have been largely neglected, we claim that integrating both literature studies provides interesting new insights. First, exemplars can play an important role in and constitute a powerful tool for people’s identity construction. Second, insights into identity formation processes can help better understand how people select, evaluate, and replace their exemplars. Third, we explore the ways in which external factors such as possible selves, social relationships, and emotions affect both exemplars and identity formation. Finally, we discuss how stigma, marginalization, and do-gooder derogation can prevent exemplars from playing a positive role in identity formation. By integrating existing perspectives on identity formation and exemplars, we explain how people obtain their personal commitments and what exactly can inspire their attempts to change or maintain their identity.
This paper proposes a function-first approach to understanding theoretical wisdom. Instead of analyzing an abstract concept, it focuses on specific epistemic agents—wise people—and examine their roles within society. While experts provide knowledge and understanding in specific domains, wise persons provide guidance, that is help novices be better epistemic agents and offer a broader picture of reality in the face of science atomization and epistemic flooding. Building on these insights, the paper explores how to combine the notion of theoretical wisdom so reconstructed with intuitions from epistemology of expertise and virtue epistemology. This approach leads to a unitarian, socially relevant concept of theoretical wisdom.
We find out what is right to do, both when the problem is a technical and when it is a moral one, by heeding what we or others did in similar situations and how we or they then fared. This is to say, we find out what is right to do by means of examples. This claim is contested by exemplarists who hold that it is specifically by way of admiring exemplary human beings and actions that we come to see what is morally right to do. It is also contested by those who hold that it is only through principles that we learn what is morally right in the case at hand. As regards exemplarism, however, it is doubtful that our feeling of admiration is a reliable guide in moral matters. Indeed, there is reason to think that admiration with its eye on what is higher than common humanity rests on unjustifiable assumptions. The friends of principles in turn need to explain why it should be important, not just to do what is right in the case at hand, but in so doing to be following a moral principle. This idea probably derives from a questionable Jewish, Christian and Stoic heritage. In sum, there is reason to hold on to the initial claim that through examples we learn what is right to do.
Ceteris paribus increasing one’s psychological resilience seems to be a good thing because resilience better allows one to cope with the world. However, increasing one’s resilience may come with a cost, namely sacrificing one’s virtue. This paper defends the claim that resilience and virtuous indignation may conflict with one another. Specifically, the person with virtuous indignation will exhibit a lower degree of a key component of psychological resilience, psychological acceptance, than someone who has a deficiency of indignation. To make this case, I investigate and circumscribe indignation as an emotion. Indignation includes an apparent epistemic paradox where one accepts the world, but one does not accept the world. To solve this paradox, I appeal to an epistemic distinction between belief and acceptance to show that indignation includes a belief that something has happened in the world but also resistance toward accepting this belief. After this, I construct a paradigm for evaluating virtuous emotions. I provide a framework to demonstrate how indignation qualifies as a virtuous emotion. Next, I explore representative examples of psychological resilience literature that outline psychological acceptance as a key component of cognitive flexibility and, thus, a key component of resilience. Lastly, I argue virtuous indignation and psychological acceptance may be opposed to one another because psychological acceptance requires one to diminish indignation’s accurate judgment, indignation’s virtuously motivating affect, or both. I conclude by considering the implications of the main thesis.
David Hume works with examples of excellent people in many passages of the “Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals” (1751), also offering explanations why these people are praised and what role their being praiseworthy plays for the practical function of morality. What is the purpose of these examples? Do they serve to illustrate a theory of virtues? Or are the examples of excellent people themselves the focus of attention, because it is only by looking at such examples that we can recognise which qualities in people are praiseworthy and why that is so? Linda Zagzebski champions moral exemplarism in her 2017 book “Exemplarist Moral Theory”. According to her, our fundamental value terms as well as our deontic terms are based on the observation of morally excellent people, whom she calls “exemplars”—a virtue, for example, is a trait we admire in an exemplar. Could it be that David Hume was a proponent of a kind of moral exemplarism avant la lettre? I examine the functions of examples of excellent people in the “Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals” in order to answer this question. Furthermore, by studying Hume’s moral philosophy, I hope to gain a better understanding of the nature of moral exemplarism as a theory.
Niniejszy artykuł skupia się na relacji prawa oraz literatury, przez analizę wpływu beletrystyki na sędziów stosujących prawo. Głównym celem jest pokazanie pozytywnego wpływu, jaki literatura piękna może mieć na stosowanie prawa przez sędziów poprzez ich edukację moralną, a także umożliwienie im rozwoju cnót sędziowskich. Punktem wyjścia rozważań jest problem tzw. trudnych przypadków oraz pokazanie przez ich pryzmat wymogu wiedzy wykraczającej poza tę bezpośrednio związaną z prawem. W tym zakresie odwołano się również do pojęcia „doświadczenia życiowego”, celem pokazania, że potrzeba wiedzy pozaprawnej wśród sędziów dotyczy również typowych sytuacji. Następnie od wołano się do nurtu filozoficznoprawnego jurysprudencji cnót. Dzięki odwołaniu się do instrumentów teoretycznych etyki cnót wskazano na metacnotę mądrości praktycznej jako dyspozycję niezbędną do dobrego pełnienia funkcji sędziego. Szczególny nacisk położono na składającą się na nią skromność epistemiczną, rozumianą jako świadomość ograniczeń swojej ekspertyzy oraz chęć jej poszerzania. Następnie opisano, w jaki sposób literatura jest użytecznym narzędziem promującym nabywanie tej cnoty. Na powyższej podstawie wysnuto wnioski dotyczące pozytywnego wpływu literatury na rozwój moralny sędziów, a przez to i stosowanie przez nich prawa. Naczelną metodą wykorzystywaną w niniejszym artykule jest metoda analityczna, dogmatycznoprawna oraz aplikacja teorii etyki cnót.
Moral exemplarity is a topic that has recently received increased attention from scholars in moral education, particularly since the work of Linda Zagzebski. In particular, the effectiveness and risks of role modeling have been discussed. Based on the discussion of Linda Zagzebski's ideas on admiration and exemplarity in the field of moral education, we introduce the notion of “testimony” as a complementary category alongside the notion of a “model”. Originating from the forensic domain, “testimony” is of relevance in theological discourse, referring to individuals who attest to known truths, typically based on firsthand experiences. Some classical biblical and theological texts shed light on the use of testimony in education.
This approach has a twofold educational value: first, it enables teachers to courageously transmit known truths despite their personal imperfections; second, it focuses students' attention critically from the character of the teacher to the truths and values implicit in the teachings.
Resumen: Abordaré en este capítulo una descripción crítica de lo que presupone el debate imparcialismo-parcialismo en su rama utilitarista. El utilitarismo asume que para que nuestras acciones sean justas deben ser imparciales. La imparcialidad en la toma de decisiones está sometida al concepto de "interés social". Las grietas de este modelo empiezan a entreverse cuando vemos que los intereses sociales no han sido siempre moralmente buenos, sino al contrario. Presentamos para ello dos estrategias argumentales. La primera es intentar desvincular la justicia del escenario parcial/imparcial puesto que su contexto filosófico presenta una antropología individualista que no cuenta en sus presupuestos con la natural interdependencia humana. La segunda es contraponer un modelo antropológico en el que nuestra capacidad de relación es intrínseca a nuestro crecimiento y pleno desarrollo personal a través de las críticas que elabora parte del pensamiento feminista y la ética de las virtudes. El aprendizaje moral llevado a cabo en nuestras experiencias de apego y vivencias tempranas en el núcleo familiar (vínculos amorosos) puede generar una experiencia de transformación moral hacia el otro desconocido en casos en los que incluso ese otro era literalmente el "enemigo"; y abrir así las capas más cerradas de la ideología que impiden reconocer al otro como un igual.
Abstract: I will address a critical description of what underlies in the partialist-impartialist debate, in its utilitarian branch. Utilitarianism assumes that for our actions to be fair they must be impartial. Impartiality is subject to the concept of "social interest". The cracks in this model begin to appear when we see that the social interests have not always been morally good, but on the contrary. We present two strategies in discussion. The first tries to decouple justice from the partial/impartial scenario since its philosophical context is an individualistic anthropology that does not have in its budgets the natural human interdependence. Following this line, the second, to oppose an anthropological model in which our relationship capacity is intrinsic to our growth and full personal development. The critique of feminist thought and virtue ethics is part of this argument. Moral learning occurs through our experiences of attachment in family nucleus (loving bonds). These experiences can generate a moral transformation towards the unknown other in cases where even that other was literally the "enemy"; and thus open the most closed layers of ideology that prevent recognizing the other as an equal.
The term “hero” brings to mind a figure who is excellent in one way or another. However, it remains unclear which characteristics make a person eligible as a hero because the term has been applied to various types of figures. This paper investigates the characteristics required for people to be justifiably labelled and, based on the investigation and as a case study, looks for the heroic figure of future astronauts. First, surveying the literature from ancient to modern on heroism, it analyses that heroes are considered to be exemplars from whom we can learn something to cultivate heroic characteristics within ourselves. Second, based on this survey, it proposes the five key characteristics of heroes: attempting to scale valuable new heights; challenging difficulty in the heights; risking one’s own life to scale the heights; achieving the scaling the heights; and expressing the virtue of phronesis. Third, as an application of this study, it examines a desirable, heroic figure of future astronauts. Classifying four classes of future astronauts: space tourists, space businesspersons, space soldiers, and space explorers, it argues that space explorers can mostly be called heroic if they express the five characteristics and among them, in particular, the characteristic of phronesis, a power of discerning what is good for the world. It concludes that future heroic astronauts must be thoughtful about the possible results of human space explorations because their missions may have adverse outcomes, such as intensified international conflict and environmental contamination. Such heroic astronauts are not a representative of their space agencies, companies, or nations, but an exemplar for humanity from whom we could learn virtuous characteristics as human beings.
The skill model of wisdom argues that practical wisdom can be best understood in terms of practical skill or expertise, and the model is thought to have the characteristic of focusing on how wise people think rather than how wise people feel. However, from the perspective of Kunzmann and Glück, “it is time for an ‘emotional revolution’ in wisdom research, which will contribute to a more balanced view on wisdom that considers emotional factors and processes as equally typical of wisdom as are cognitive and reflective factors” (Kunzmann U, Gluck J [2019] Wisdom and emotion. In: Sternberg R, Gluck J (eds) The cambridge handbook of wisdom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 575–601). Kunzmann and Glück’s appeal for this emotional revolution is significant and intriguing because the inclusion of an explanation of the role of emotion in wisdom can contribute to developing the skill model of wisdom into a more comprehensive framework that recognizes the intricate relation between wisdom and emotions. In this paper, I shall propose and develop a skill account of the emotions of the wise to serve as a supplement to the skill model of wisdom. According to this account, first, at the critical level, having emotions and emotional competence as elements is not essential to wisdom; second, at the theoretical level, a wise person feels an emotion E if and only if E is strategically rational for the wise person; and third, at the metatheoretical level, the primary aim of the skill account is to explain why wise people feel in a particular way rather than to describe how wise people feel.
This is a guest editorial introducing a special issue on ‘Exemplars and Emulation in Moral Education’ which contains contributions from 10 multidisciplinary authors. Representing the state of the art in the discourse, this editorial elucidates several new themes pertaining to it, before outlining each contribution in relation to said themes. In light of David Carr’s recent objections to role modelling, it is then argued that these contributions provide a possible collective response.
This essay explores the notion of moral exemplarity, positing that our morality is underpinned by moral exemplars – paradigmatic examples of virtuous individuals or actions. Theoretical precepts of moral exemplarity are explored across historical and contemporary contexts, including the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Stoic and Christian ethics, and recent works of Alexandro Ferrara and Linda Zagzebski. This essay debates the necessity of moral exemplars, the intrinsic moral and epistemic exemplarity, and the distinction between categorical and hypothetical exemplarity, as well as referencing the paradoxical Kantian dismissals of moral exemplarity. It critiques current accounts of moral exemplarity and proposes a transcendental explanation, culminating in an examination of the “exemplarist categorical imperative.”
p>This paper asks whether there is a moral virtue of hope, and if so, what it is. The enterprise is motivated by a historical asymmetry, namely, that while Christian thinkers have long classed hope as a theological virtue, it has not traditionally been classed as a moral one. But this is puzzling, for hoping well is not confined to the sphere of religion; and consequently, we might expect that if the theological virtue is structurally sound, there will be a secular, moral analogue. This paper proposes that there is such an analogue and that it is closely linked to the everyday notion of “having your priorities straight,” a phenomenon which is naturally understood in terms of the attitude of hope. It turns out that the priorities model provides an abstract way of characterizing a central but underexplored virtue, one which can be developed in secular or theological ways.
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Çağdaş ahlak felsefesinde “erdeme dönüş” düşüncesi farklı perspektiflerden değerlendirilmiş ve çeşitli erdem teorileri önerilmiştir. Söz konusu önerilerden biri hem erdem etiği hem de erdem epistemolojisi alanlarındaki çalışmalarıyla öne çıkan isimlerden Linda T. Zagzebski’ye aittir. Zagzebski, Zihnin Erdemleri eserinde ortaya koyduğu erdem teorisinde epistemolojiyi ahlakın bir alt alanı olarak konumlandırmayı, entelektüel erdemleri ahlakî erdemlerin bir türü olarak sınıflandırmayı önermiştir. Daha sonra kaleme aldığı erdem etiğine ilişkin eserlerinde ise o, eylem temelli deontolojik ve sonuççu ahlak teorilerine alternatif olarak duyguları esas alan, motivasyona, ahlakî iyilik örneklerine dayalı bir erdem teorisi teklif etmiştir. Bu çalışma Zagzebski’nin örneklere dayalı erdem etiğini ana hatlarıyla ortaya koymakta, bu teoride Zihnin Erdemleri eserindeki iddiasına ilişkin yansımaların olup olmadığı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Çalışma hususen Zagzebski’nin bir erdem etiği inşa ederken entelektüel erdemleri nasıl konumlandırdığına odaklanmaktadır.
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