Critical theory and social inequality

Abstract

This paper argues that social inequality is possibly the core topic of any critical theory in the social sciences – for epistemological as well as ethical reasons. As the social scientist is part of the scientific object, namely society, the project of science is interdependent with its object. For this reason, the structure of society itself influences the shape of social science. At the same time, the processes and results of the scientific project have an impact on society. Science changes its own object. Epistemological issues are therefore tied to the ethical questions about the social organization of the scientific project, access to science, the structure of society and inequality. If access to science is unequal and if science contributes to inequality, this has to be legitimized scientifically.

Full text

Critical theory and social inequality
Boike Rehbein*
e relation between science and society has been discussed by all proponents of
critical theory. And all of them have linked it to inequality in a similar way. However,
most of them interpreted inequality as an economic issue, as an unequal distribution
of economic capital. is interpretation presupposes a full-edged capitalist society
and thereby implies a strong Western bias. And it also distorts the relation between
capitalism and inequality. According to the argument of this paper, inequality is
more fundamental than the economy and capitalism, not the other way around. e
misinterpretation of capitalism contributes to the persistence of inequality and capi-
talism itself. erefore, we have to critically review our interpretation of inequality.
e following argument is based on more than a decade of empirical research
on inequality in several countries around the world ( Jodhka et al, 2017). It includes
almost 2,000 qualitative interviews in twelve nation states on four continents. e
interviews were conducted in the local languages, transcribed and interpreted by
multicultural teams. A few quantitative surveys complemented the study. is pa-
per will not present the empirical ndings of our research on inequality but draws
some general conclusions relevant for critical theory. However, some results of that
research on Brazil, Germany and Laos will appear in the nal section of the paper.
e rst two sections deal with the relation between subject and object as well as
the relevance of inequality in the social sciences. e third section is devoted to
*Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany.

the relation between inequality and capitalism, while the nal part looks at the
reproduction of inequality.
Hermeneutic, critique and social sciences
Any social science has to be critical. In principle, even Karl Popper would agree with
that. A theory has to critically review its own presuppositions. And it develops a
tentative truth, which needs to be subjected to critical reasoning as well as empirical
tests. According to these standards, any science is critical, even in the natural sciences.
e social sciences need to go beyond this notion of critique, however. is is due
to the logical interdependence of subject and object, which does not exist to the
same degree in the natural sciences.
e interdependence of subject and object in the social sciences has three aspects.
First, the object inuences the subject. e natural scientist constructs his or her
concepts independently of the object – no natural object says, “I am an atom”. In the
social sciences, the concepts, the aims, the issues and the organization of science are
part of the object itself. Concepts like society, subject and science were created by
society, the scientic object itself. is is even true for some of the more technical
concepts. Science takes place in a society and cannot operate fully independently of it.
e second aspect of the logical interdependence is the inuence of the subject
on the object. Of course, this has already been discovered in the natural sciences
as well with the problem of measuring very small objects. However, the problem
is much more serious in the social sciences. Aer a theory is published, the object
can alter his or her behavior on the basis of this theory. Marxist revolutions are an
example of this. Is the revolution proof of the theory or caused by the theory? is
question cannot be answered, which illustrates the interdependence.
Finally, the scientic subject and the object oen change their own life because of
science. Any insight has consequences for the perspective on the world. One learns
new theories, discovers new facts, sees reality from a dierent angle and changes
one’s self-perception. Aer each discovery in the social sciences, one is not the same
person anymore. It is not possible to predict these changes.
ere is no way to neutralize these inuences. One would have to nd a language,
which is not inuenced by any existing language, and one would have to detach the
enterprise of science completely from society including the scientists themselves.
If this project were to succeed, however, one would miss a big part of the object,
i.e. society. In the social sciences, we know – at least to a certain degree – which
meaning the object gives to itself, what its goals and priorities are, how it views the
world, what its behavior means, what kind of emotions are attached to it and a lot
50 Tempo Social, revista de sociologia da USP, v. 30, n. 3
Critical theory and social inequality, pp. 49-65

more. And we know all of this because of the logical interdependence of subject
and object. We know very little or nothing of this with regard to the natural world.
If we model the social sciences according to the natural sciences, we would lose all
of this knowledge.
To discard this knowledge is not equivalent to become more objective or sci-
entic. It rather means to become more arbitrary and formalistic. A scientist who
is actually not inuenced by society and wishes to explain a social fact will have
to understand the meaning of this fact rst. e scientist approaches an animistic
ritual without knowing what it is and what it means. It could be a game, the elec-
tion of a president, the healing of a sick person or a bonding exercise. But actually,
this assumption presupposes that the scientist is member of a society and already
familiar with such concepts and actions. ereby, he or she would be inuenced by
society – and could inuence the object and change his or her own personality in
the process of scientic explanation.
For this reason, a completely objective scientist (an alien or a machine) would
have to assume that the observed animistic ritual could be anything. How would
the scientist nd out what it actually is? If he or she just explains the observed pro-
cesses, the explanation would read somewhat like this: if person  bangs a drum,
persons  and  move their heads forward. Of course, this movement could be just
a coincidence but how would the scientist be able to tell? He or she might be able to
observe many such rituals, then establish some similarities and statistically determine
correlations between certain movements.
Even if we grant that it is possible to correctly identify correlations on this basis
(which actually would be very dicult and uncertain), what would we have gained?
Who cares if people move their heads upon hearing a drum? What we actually want
to know is what the ritual means. In view of this goal, we rst have to have the concept
of a ritual. And this is social and connected to values and meanings. In the social
sciences, we do not know too little, we know too much. And the lack of neutrality
and objectivity is actually an asset. We know a lot and we want to know even more.
In contrast, we know comparatively little about the natural world.
ings get even more complicated when we look at the object itself. e object
is a human being or linked to a human being. is being is of a similar nature as
the scientist. He or she can change on the basis of science – or even alter his or her
behavior just to prove the scientist wrong. is means that it is not possible to test
an explanation in the social sciences in the strong sense of the natural sciences (Von
Wright, 1974). Did the Marxist revolution happen because of Marx or did he predict
it correctly? Does the absence of a Marxist revolution prove him wrong or are some
of the conditions lacking or did people develop the wrong consciousness – or did
51
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Boike Rehbein

they learn something Marx did not yet know? It is impossible to give a reasonable
answer to these questions.
If we assume that we understand the functioning of societies better some time
in the future and are able to reply to these questions, the problem will still persist.
Let us suppose that a social scientist is actually able to explain society. is would
mean that he or she can predict people’s actions. Since he or she is member of a
society as well, it implies that the scientist can predict his or her own life. ereby,
he or she would lose all personal autonomy. We could interpret this as a change of
the person on the basis of science: the self-interpretation as a completely determined
being. Or we interpret it as the full knowledge of the truth. We cannot exclude the
possibility that our behavior is predetermined or that we are controlled by a higher
force. However, this would not really change anything. It would mean that even our
scientic insights and the actions based on these insights are pre-determined. But
since everything would be pre-determined, we cannot do otherwise anyway. We
cannot quit doing science or making revolutions because no matter what we would
like to do it would have been predetermined before the fact. And if we actually
quit doing science, this would have been predetermined as well. So, we just go on.
From these considerations, we can draw some conclusions about the particulari-
ties of the social sciences as opposed to the natural sciences. e social scientist has
to understand the meaning of the object before entering into any kind of explana-
tion. At the same time, the scientist always has some kind of preunderstanding of
the object, which is the point Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960) made when postulat-
ing that the humanities pursue a hermeneutic approach rather than an explanation
modeled aer the natural sciences.
is preunderstanding of the object seems to be a functional equivalent of the
hypothesis in the natural sciences. e test of the hypothesis in the social sciences
would be the confrontation of the preunderstanding with the self-interpretation of
the object. e interdependence implies that the object can contradict the scientist.
e object can contradict the scientist’s interpretation. He or she can even contradict
the scientic theory itself. However, the relation between preunderstanding and
scientic hypothesis is only that of a resemblance since the preunderstanding and its
confrontation with the self-interpretation are just preparatory steps. e scientic
process itself is an explanation, which challenges both the preunderstanding and
the self-interpretation. e scientic preunderstanding of the ritual may be that of
a healing process, the self-interpretation that of a ritual but the tradition may have
started as a bonding exercise which was then reinterpreted by the community. All
interpretations explain an aspect of the observed action, (in this case) none is entirely
wrong, and none is true for itself.
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Critical theory and social inequality, pp. 49-65

Epistemology, ethics and inequality
e interdependence of subject and object in the social sciences has epistemological
and ethical implications. A neutral, value-free social science, as proposed by Max
Weber (1965), is impossible. Even a neutral description of the object is not feasible. It
makes a huge dierence if we describe an observed set of actions as an animistic ritual,
as a healing procedure or as a bonding exercise. ese practices pursue very dierent
goals. Even if we do not ask the question whether the practices are successful, we still
construct rather dierent objects depending on the interpretation. We do not look
at the same practices and meanings if we try to explain a ritual, a healing procedure
or a bonding exercise. And if we discard all value-imbued concepts and just describe
what we see, we miss the point entirely, as I have argued in the preceding section.
We need to know the meaning of the observed practices before explaining them.
e meaning is socially constructed. It does not matter, in this context, if we
rely on the meaning that the practices have for the agents or on scientic construc-
tions, such as the “subconscious” or “class interests”. Any meaning has its origin in
some social practice, i.e. in the object itself. And any scientic explanation alters
the object at some point. e explanation of a set of practices as a ritual, healing or
bonding will eventually reach the persons that carry out these practices and change
their self-interpretation and possibly the practices themselves. Even if they never
get in touch with the scientists and do not read their work, representatives of the
state or s will adjust their behavior to the scientic explanations and thereby
inuence the object.
is is hard to accept. We strive for objectivity and are inclined to say that a state-
ment is true or false. If we predict the result of an election, the prediction is true or
false or at least statistically correct (Hempel, 1962). However, it is well-known that
election predictions inuence the outcome. In order to actually scientically test a
prediction, it needs to be kept secret until the election is over. In such isolated cases,
some degree of objectivity is possible. ey remain isolated because the results of the
election prediction and their methodology will become known to some degree and
thereby inuence all other election research and the strategies of political parties.
An objective reproduction of the prediction is hardly possible since it will inuence
the object eventually.
Finally, the election prediction will inuence the scientist’s behavior. He or she
will adapt future voting behavior and possibly the interpretation of the meaning and
usefulness of elections to the research results. Even if the person is not member or
supporter of any political party (which he or she oen is, however), the behavior at the
polling station of this particular person will be inuenced by his or her own research.
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Boike Rehbein

e epistemological consequence of this interdependence is the necessity of
critically reviewing the underlying assumptions of society and social science and
tracing their impact. is is linked to values since society is not merely the attempt
of knowing the truth but also a network of lives. To a small but inextinguishable
degree, this is the case for science itself as well. is implies that social science can
never be fully dissociated from its own social conditions. erefore, it cannot be
universal in the strong sense, even if the relevant social conditions were shared by
all societies. ey may change in the future.
A social scientist has to critically reect on the social conditions of his or her own
science. He or she also has to clearly identify the social conditions of the object. Any
insight gained in the social sciences is only valid for the reection on the particular
social conditions of the object and the subject. e research has to include its theo-
retical, methodological and empirical grounds and limitations. It is not valid for all
instances but for those specied and to the degree that their social conditions have
been critically reviewed. is is more than relativism but less than a universal truth.
I would argue that this practice comes close to what we try to do in the social
sciences anyway. A true statement claries what can be known from a certain per-
spective for a dened period and object, including why and how. e statement
achieves more truth by including more empirical cases, more areas of research and
more methods, especially if it integrates similar research in dierent contexts and
theoretical traditions. is interaction leads to the discovery of limitations, blind
spots and aws and broadens the empirical reality, which the statement refers to. I
call this process of establishing a truth “conguration” (Adorno, 1975). I claim that
much empirical research actually proceeds by establishing congurations.
e idea of a congurational social science implies a hermeneutical approach to
research. ere is no basic truth that could serve as the starting point, no (formally
clear) result or endpoint and no recipe. All that is possible is to establish congura-
tions, contrast them with new empirical cases and conicting theories and improve
them by removing shortcomings and discovering blind spots from other perspec-
tives. I have elaborated on this process under the title of a “kaleidoscopic dialectic”
(Rehbein, 2015).
is dialectic resembles the approach proposed by Hegel (1986). More precisely,
it can be characterized as a sociological revision of Hegel. As a result, Hegel’s God
and his assumption that every theory is part of God’s universal truth disappear. A
history of social and intellectual standpoints replaces the notion of history as the
manifestation of truth (Haraway, 2008). at history contains the interaction of
standpoints along with their related conditions and consequences. ere is a great
variety of perspectives and theories, all of which cannot be integrated into one single
54 Tempo Social, revista de sociologia da USP, v. 30, n. 3
Critical theory and social inequality, pp. 49-65

approach. is does not entail relativism but is rather entirely empirical in nature:
we can only think within certain boundaries, which are expanded by constructing
congurations. In Hegel’s words, the development of the subject, of the perspective
and of knowledge takes place within a single context, and we cannot separate the one
from the other. Subsequent to the acquisition or discovery of new knowledge, one
becomes a new person and sees the world in a dierent light. Memory and criticism
are decisive factors in the process.
is idea of dialectical learning reminds of the “ideal speech situation” (Haber-
mas, 1984) and points to the ethical dimension of the problem. Social science has
to deal with dierent or even competing concepts, theories, perspectives, types of
society and values. From the outset, it is not evident whether a certain set of prac-
tices is an animistic ritual, a healing procedure or a bonding exercise. It may be all
of them at the same time – from dierent perspectives or for dierent actors. e
dierent perspectives may represent dierent theoretical schools, but they may also
represent dierent social groups or types of society. e interpretation implies a
value judgement about the arrangement of society.
It is necessary to critically review the social conditions of the subject and the
object because they are interdependent with social science itself. It is not sucient to
simply understand all standpoints and then contrast them to form a conguration.
First, not all perspectives are equal or have the possibility to enter the conguration.
Second, the conditions and the consequences of science may be negatively valued:
destructive, exploiting, oppressive, distorting or misleading.
Habermas is satised when an agreement is reached. Postcolonialism has chal-
lenged this conception by asking why and on what grounds the communicating part-
ners agree (Spivak, 1988). Most people and most approaches to truth do not have the
means to make themselves understood. ese means can be technological, economic,
intellectual, linguistic or academic (Alatas, 2001). As long as it was taken for granted
that none of those who did not belong to the European elite of scholars had anything
relevant to say because they were supposedly underdeveloped, this lack of means was
not an issue. But if we conceive of the hermeneutic dialectic as a process of learning,
we have to actively look for that which we do not know (Connell, 2007). One has
to understand those who speak another language in their language, those who have
a dierent idea of society within their society and those who have a dierent idea of
or even dismiss truth on their own grounds. Postcolonial critique not only points to
the issue of power relations within science. It also exposes parochial Eurocentrism in
philosophers like Gadamer or Hegel. As long as science is rooted in European tradi-
tions, divergences in epistemology and issues of power can easily be neglected. is
is impossible if one tries to include India into the “ideal speech situation”.
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Boike Rehbein

However, I disagree with postcolonialism on the interpretation of inequality.
Postcolonial scholars, who oen reside in Harvard or Oxford, claim that the sub-
altern cannot speak (Spivak, 1988). Of course, the subalterns have been deprived
of important symbolic and material means but they still have their social reality,
which they can express. Most postcolonial scholars simply do not bother to talk
to them. e approach outlined above comprises the necessity to go and learn
empirically, not just at the desk. If one does, it becomes evident that the social
world does not consist of two binary blocs, the (bad) dominating and the (good)
dominated.
Instead, I would propose a critical theory, which is sociologically applied phi-
losophy and not desk-study (Rehbein, 2015). It needs to be an empirical study of
inequality, domination and symbolic violence understood as “quasitranscendental
conditions” (Habermas, 1984) of learning. In order to move beyond provincial forms
of social science, this study has to be of global reach conducted by multicultural
teams, ideally consisting of all members of all societies. ey would not generate any
universal truth but expand the horizon of society and social science to the degree
that one could speak of the best possible knowledge.
Inequality and capitalism
Social inequality limits the scientic process of learning both on the level of social
conditions and on the level of practice. Arguably, it is the most signicant ethical
and epistemological problem of the social sciences. In terms of epistemology, the
postcolonial critique has already generated important insights that remind of the
arguments advanced by the decolonial critique developed in Latin America (e. g.
Mignolo, 2011). As argued in the preceding section, we need to apply the critique
of power not only to the organization of science but also to epistemology and the
organization of society itself. Against this background, the following paragraphs
will develop the claim that the core problem is domination and that domination is
structurally rooted in inequality.
Unequal access to science is a major issue connected with inequality. If the social
sciences are rooted in the limited perspective of only a fraction of the population,
they are neither correct in the sense of a conguration nor are they ethically accept-
able. What is worse, if the social sciences do not deal with the problem of inequality
with regard to society itself, they contribute to its persistence. is is also true if
they misinterpret it. A neutral description of inequality in society is not possible
since this description will inuence society and thereby either contribute to the
persistence or the reduction of inequality.
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Critical theory and social inequality, pp. 49-65

is issue lies at the origin of critical theory. e young Marx (Marx, 1953,
p. 385), in one of his earliest writings, characterized critical theory as one which
contributes to abolishing all conditions, under which the human is a “humiliated,
enslaved, lonely and despised” being. is idea was picked up by the Frankfurt School
(Adorno, 1975). And to a signicant degree, it still inspires recent critical theories,
such as those of Habermas and Honneth.
e power dierentials within science and with regard to access to science as well
as an inhumane society are linked to inequality. We tend to think that inequality is
an unequal distribution of resources, especially money. However, any inequality is
rooted in social structures that give some social groups more access to socially valued
goods, practices and positions than others. is is what I refer to as “domination”.
It is a structure generating dierences in power – or possibilities in a wide sense.
Critical theory so far has been limited by its Eurocentrism. But it is also distorted
by its focus on capitalism and the economy. All major critical theorists have claimed
that inequality is rooted in the unequal distribution of means of production or
economic capital. ey argue that the economy is more fundamental than other
aspects of society. I wish to dispute this claim. I argue that inequality is more fun-
damental than the economy. e economy is only the most important dimension
of inequality and its reproduction in capitalist societies. However, domination as
a structure is more fundamental than capitalism. Inequality in economic capital is
the result of structural inequality and not the other way around. And the abolish-
ment of capitalism would not abolish inequality, but the abolishment of inequality
would – almost logically – do away with capitalism.
If we pay attention to this issue, we discover that Marx developed two ap-
proaches to inequality and distinguished two dierent systems of class, which we
might call economic and social, following Max Weber (1972). In the Communist
manifesto (Marx and Engels, 1959), Marx distinguished between the capitalist
class, the laboring class, the petty bourgeoisie in between the two and the so-called
lumpenproletariat at the bottom. e capital (Marx, 1963), in contrast, mentioned
only two classes, capital and labor. Interpretations of Marx have neglected the earlier
interpretation of class in favor of e capital, which mainly deals with the economy
and ends with the notion of class in an economic sense. However, it is evident that
not every manager or actor, who makes a lot of money, has enough economic capital
to act as a capitalist or automatically becomes a member of the upper class. But it is
true that every family of the upper class that does not play the game of capitalism
will eventually lose its membership of the upper social class.
is illustrates the relationship but also the dierence between social and eco-
nomic class. Even the upper social class has to reproduce its position in a capitalist
57
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Boike Rehbein

society using the economy and economic capital. ey may go bankrupt, while
others may accumulate enough wealth to become members of the economic capi-
talist class. In either case, a change of social class may be the result of a change in
economic class. But more commonly, a member of the upper social class will have
enough economic as well as cultural, symbolic and social capital to be in a better
position in the capitalist market than any competitor from the lower classes and
therefore remain in the upper class (Bourdieu, 1984).
Membership in the upper social class opens up all options for becoming or
remaining a capitalist, while membership in the upper economic class without
other types of capital only qualies for being rich. erefore, social class is more
fundamental than economic class. is can be veried historically. Most people
occupy a similar relative social position as their ancestors. Oen, the social posi-
tion can even be traced back to a corresponding social position in the precapitalist
hierarchy (Jodhka et al., 2017). at is, the descendant of a peasant usually is a
member of the lower class today, while the descendant of a noble family is member
of the upper class. e introduction of capitalism was a revolution, but a revolution
is not a creation out of nothing. It entails socioeconomic mobility, separates social
structure from the division of labor and creates a whole new range of professions
for all social groups. But it does not abolish older inequalities, it only transforms
them and makes them invisible.
Edward P. ompson (1963) demonstrated the continuity and transformation
of a class with the advent of capitalism in England. He dened classes not merely on
the basis of capital but also interpreted them as cultures with a common practice. His
central argument was that practices are not created spontaneously but are passed on
through training from one generation to the next. On the one hand, these practices
are subject to constant change because they relate to and inuence each other, on the
other hand, they create and continue long traditions. erefore, we can characterize
social classes as “tradition lines” (Vester et al., 2001).
A social class or tradition line passes on core elements of habitus and capital from
one generation to the next and distinguishes itself actively and passively from other
classes. Hereby, it erects limits to social mobility and opportunities. On this basis, it
is possible to identify social classes empirically. e limits of social mobility and of
access to activities are the limits of a social class. An increase in one type of capital
is not equivalent to mobility. Gopal Guru (2012, p. 47) has demonstrated that a
Dalit (formerly classied as “untouchable”) in India may be able to accumulate all
kinds of capital on the free market but still remains excluded. A Dalit millionaire
remains a Dalit. Guru adds that a Dalit becoming a millionaire has one main eect,
namely the legitimation of capitalism. Most proponents of critical theory were un-
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Critical theory and social inequality, pp. 49-65

able to see this because of their focus on economic capital and labor. e successful
struggle for economic capital renders the mechanisms of social inequality invisible.
e notion of class proposed in this paper is related to Weber’s (1972) concept
of social class. I dene social class as a tradition line with a common culture which
reproduces itself from one generation to the next by passing on relevant capital and
symbolically delimiting itself from the other classes (Jodhka et al., 2017). is concept
can be operationalized by establishing the limits of social mobility. Where the itineraries
of social mobility typically end is the limit of the class. Economic capital is important
in a capitalist society but so are all other types of capital identied by Bourdieu (1984).
Reproduction of inequality
Michel Foucault (1977) has argued that the classes in a democratic society are
supposed to carry out dierent functions in the division of labor and have dierent
positions in the institutions. It is interesting to note that Foucault referred to the
prime specimen of a democratic society, France aer 1789. Foucault demonstrated the
persistence of classes and their transformation within a democratic state with regard
to the legal system. While civil law mainly concerned (bourgeois and noble) citizens
and their property, the system of accusation and punishment mainly concerned the
lower classes. Dierent courts were established to deal with dierent issues, which
concerned dierent classes.
Our empirical research shows that this division of classes in the legal system is still
largely valid for present-day Germany and Brazil ( Jodhka et al., 2017). is system
is probably not intentionally designed to oppress the lower classes. No malevolent
intention and no conscious action is necessary to reproduce the hierarchy of social
classes. e dierences are incorporated, contained in the meaning of the socially
accepted symbols and transmitted from one generation to the next. Formally, all in-
dividuals are equal, but their habitus and its evaluation dier according to social class.
In a capitalist democracy, inequality is legitimized by merit and the increase of
productivity (Foucault, 1977). e division of labor is no longer based on the or-
der of classes but on the maximum output. To this end, any labor has to be carried
out by the person most suitable for it, by the best. is is exactly what happens. In
capitalist societies, the “best” carry out the most important functions in the division
of activities. e best are those with the appropriate habitus and capital. ese are
distributed dierentially between the social classes. Members of the highest classes
occupy the highest functions in the division of activities and dene the character-
istics required to carry out such a function. ey recruit individuals on the basis of
these criteria. Unsurprisingly, other members of their class, who embody the same
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Boike Rehbein

characteristics because they grew up in the same environment, are those individuals
who meet the criteria best. ey are the best.
e reproduction of inequality in capitalist democracies is at the same time
riskier and more ecient than a feudal order or a monarchy. As all individuals are
formally equal and all institutions are open to everyone, the highest classes have to
enter competition. Upward mobility for the lower classes is possible. At the same
time, the invisibility of the reproduction of class makes this kind of reproduction
more ecient than any open inequality. Class position is also more secure because
state systems with visible inequality like the European feudal order are characterized
by constant struggles, assaults and even annihilation of ruling families. In a formally
democratic society, in contrast, a high social position is based on some kind of
achievement, a seemingly objective recruitment of the best. It is legitimized by merit.
e reproduction of inequality becomes even more opaque because of the
obvious individualization. ere are no visible classes anymore, just competing
individuals carrying out a great variety of activities, which they combine to rather
unique life courses. Socioeconomic parameters and social position no longer allow
for predictions of an individual’s lifestyle. Predictions of this kind are for the most
part empirically incorrect. What is worse, they contribute to the invisibility of the
mechanisms reproducing inequality. It is precisely the apparent individualization
that makes these mechanisms functional. It goes hand in hand with a recruitment
for important positions, which is apparently based on merit.
e criteria for recruitment are constantly transformed because the capitalist
division of activities is constantly revolutionized. However, the criteria applied by
those occupying the highest positions are precisely those which they teach their
children and which their children incorporate better than other persons (Jodhka
and Newman 2007). ose persons occupying the highest positions know best what
it takes. is is not taught in any kindergarten or school, simply because very few
people know what it takes to run the show.
Members of the highest class occupy the highest positions and have access to
the most valued positions, while members of the other classes formally have access
to them but are practically excluded because they do not meet the criteria. Which
activities are valued and reserved for members of the higher classes is a product of
history. It is somewhat irrational and arbitrary but intelligible and consequential.
Only the upper class has access to all markets, both for capital and labor. e other
classes may have money but actually no economic capital. e manager of a medium-
sized company or a university professor may own a house and a car and may even
have signicant savings in the bank. But nothing of this is used as capital in the strict
sense. It is used for consumption and for securing future consumption.
60 Tempo Social, revista de sociologia da USP, v. 30, n. 3
Critical theory and social inequality, pp. 49-65

e social classes in capitalist societies have dierent relations to capital and
labor. ere is only one, very small capitalist class, just as Marx has postulated. But
there seem to be several laboring classes in all societies. In an empirical study of Ger-
many, we identied four classes, which we called the marginalized, the ghters, the
established and the aloof (Rehbein et al., 2015). e marginalized remain excluded
from many sections of society, especially a stable and well-paid profession. e social
class of ghters forms the laboring population. It consists of two tradition lines, one
rooted in the old working class and one in the petty bourgeoisie. In our study, we call
them the aspiring and the defensive ghters, since the former traditionally acquire
skills and education, while the latter struggle against declassation. e established
carry out the leading functions and dispose of a large amount of all types of capital.
e aloof are aloof in the sense that they are separated from the rest of society and
morally as well as nancially exempt from labor. ey form the social class, which
I would classify as dominant.
Laos has a very dierent social structure even though social classes are emerging
(Jodhka et al., 2017). Here, colonial, socialist and even precolonial social structures
persist underneath the capitalist class structure. Within the rst, there is a hierarchy
of ethnic minorities, peasants in a dicult environment, well-o peasants, urban
population and nobility. Within the socialist structure, we can distinguish between
village cadres, administration, leading cadres and party leadership; within this struc-
ture, there is much more social mobility than in the other two structures since it is
possible to move up the ladder of party positions. e capitalist hierarchy comprises
the marginalized class, the working class, commercial farmers and traders, the new
urban middle class and the capitalists. e older structural layers slowly transform
into a capitalist class hierarchy, but the social groups tend to remain on the same
hierarchical level. Subsistence peasants, who do not remain peasants, either become
commercial farmers or agricultural laborers or they migrate into the towns. e small
urban group becomes the new urban middle class. e old elites begin to engage in
business and become capitalists. A structure of social classes emerges that is related
to the capitalist division of capital and labor.
Brazil, like Germany, has a long history of capitalism and a pronounced class
structure. However, it was constructed by colonial rule. Contrary to Laos, not the
entire population was declared equal with independence, but slaves, women and
ethnic minorities only gained full citizenship over time. ese inequalities persist up
to this day and inform the Brazilian social structure. We found four classes in Brazil
but not exactly the same as in Germany ( Jodhka et al., 2017). While dominant and
marginalized classes of Germany and Brazil can be compared to some degree, the
lower middle class in Brazil does not exist in Germany, while the Brazilian upper
61
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Boike Rehbein

middle class comprises both of the classes that form the ghters and established in
Germany. It is composed of two tradition lines, which are rooted in the colonial
administration and in the skilled working class.
While the Brazilian marginalized class comprises up to forty percent of the popu-
lation, the German marginalized class has a population share of twenty percent. e
Brazilian middle class comprises only around 25 percent of the population, while
the two German middle classes reach a total of almost eighty percent. We can trace
the two Brazilian lower classes to the descendants of the slaves, the middle class to
the administrators and immigrants and the dominant class to the colonial rulers
and landowners.
Since the Brazilian class structure emerged historically out of the hierarchy of
a slave-holding society, its internal conguration and composition diers greatly
from that of Germany and Laos. However, all three societies are developing similar
dividing lines between the classes. At the same time, the historical dierences will
not disappear entirely in the near future since they are part of the historical heritage
and are reproduced both by habitus and by the (international) division of labor.
In all societies, social scientists overwhelmingly belong to the established class – or
the social class below the dominant class. Postcolonialism and decoloniality criticize
the structure of international domination, which is rooted in colonialism. But they
do not reect upon the class structure of their own societies and tend to speak on
behalf of the lower classes instead of speaking with and listening to them. ose
critical theorists who emphasize inequality, such as Marx and Adorno, tend to focus
on economic inequality. ereby, they misunderstand the fundamental importance
of domination or social inequality.
Social inequality is reproduced from one generation to the next and becomes
invisible in capitalist societies. Everything seems to be about money. While liberals
claim that anyone can make it, Marxists postulate that the capitalist class has mo-
nopolized economic capital. I have argued that the surface of struggles for money
makes the reproduction of inequality at once more invisible and more ecient.
ose on the top seem to have earned their position and their money. e focus on
economic capital reinforces this myth.
Other forms of inequality function in a similar way as social inequality. In capital-
ism, they do not disappear, but they are shaped by class more than they shape class.
Each class has its own conguration of gender inequality but not each gender has its
own class hierarchy. e same is true for other dimensions of inequality. However,
for a full understanding of inequality, even in capitalist societies, the intersection
of all dimensions would have to be studied in more detail and with some precision.
62 Tempo Social, revista de sociologia da USP, v. 30, n. 3
Critical theory and social inequality, pp. 49-65

Conclusion
Arguably, inequality is the core issue for any critical theory, for epistemological
and ethical reasons. e ethical reasons refer to both science itself and society at
large. e main problem with inequality, of course, is not its distorting impact on
science but its impact on the real lives of real people. Leading life as member of the
dominant class is not the same as being a Dalit in India or living in a Brazilian favela.
ese dierences supposedly are due to dierential merit. In a capitalist society, we
are all equal and seem to have equal opportunities. Some make it, and some do not.
Whoever lives at the bottom of society is to bear at least part of the blame.
e focus on the economy contributes to this view of inequality. ose who
acquire a lot of wealth have made it. We engage in a struggle for money, which actu-
ally changes nothing about inequality. It rather cements inequality in the form of
social classes, which emerge in all capitalist society and become invisible. A social
science preaching the ideology of merit and economism contributes to invisibilizing
inequality. A critical theory has to take issue with that.
If social science does not study its own conditions and especially inequality, a
class perspective is proposed as the fountain of truth. Large sections of society are
excluded, not only as subjects of science but also as contributors of meaning and
of theoretical perspective. One cannot simply speak on their behalf, but one has
to speak with and listen to them. In the long run, critical theory has to become an
endeavor that comprises everyone.
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Critical theory and social inequality, pp. 49-65

Abstract
Critical theory and social inequality
is paper argues that social inequality is possibly the core topic of any critical theory in the
social sciences – for epistemological as well as ethical reasons. As the social scientist is part of
the scientic object, namely society, the project of science is interdependent with its object. For
this reason, the structure of society itself inuences the shape of social science. At the same time,
the processes and results of the scientic project have an impact on society. Science changes its
own object. Epistemological issues are therefore tied to the ethical questions about the social
organization of the scientic project, access to science, the structure of society and inequality.
If access to science is unequal and if science contributes to inequality, this has to be legitimized
scientically.
Keywords: Critical theory; Social inequality; Science; Ethics and epistemology; Capitalism.
Resumo
Teoria crítica e desigualdade social
Este artigo argumenta que, por motivos epistemológicos bem como éticos, a desigualdade social é,
possivelmente, um tema central de qualquer teoria crítica nas ciências sociais. Visto que cientistas
sociais são parte do objeto cientíco, isto é, a sociedade, o projeto da ciência é interdependente
com o seu objeto. Por essa razão, a estrutura da sociedade em si inuencia a forma da ciência
social. Ao mesmo tempo, os processos e resultados do projeto cientíco exercem um impacto
sobre a sociedade. A ciência transforma o seu próprio objeto. Essas questões epistemológicas
encontram-se, portanto, ligadas a questões éticas acerca da organização social do projeto cientíco,
do acesso à ciência, da estrutura da sociedade e da desigualdade. Se o acesso à ciência é desigual
e se a ciência contribui para a desigualdade, então isso precisa ser legitimado cienticamente.
Palavras-chave: Teoria crítica; Desigualdade social; Ciência; Ética e epistemologia; Capitalismo.
Texto recebido em 1/5/2018 e aprovado em 13/5/2018.
: 10.11606/0103-2070.ts.2018.145113.
  is professor for “Society and transformation in Asia and Africa” at Humboldt
Universität zu Berlim. E-mail: brehbein@gmx.de.
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