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Rev Environ Health 2019; aop
Jose A. Martínez*
The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study,
40years on
https://doi.org/10.1515/reveh-2018-0061
Received October 1, 2018; accepted December 13, 2018
Abstract: Between 1953 and 1979, the USSR irradiated
the United States embassy in Moscow with microwaves.
This episode, a classic Cold War affair, has acquired
enormous importance in the discussions on the effect
of non-ionizing radiation on people’s health. In 2011,
the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
classified radiofrequency electromagnetic fields as
being a possible human carcinogen (Group 2B), but the
results of recent laboratory and epidemiological stud-
ies have led some researchers to conclude that radiofre-
quency electromagnetic fields should be reclassified as
a human carcinogen instead of merely a possible human
carcinogen. In 1978, the “Moscow signal” case was offi-
cially closed after the publication of the epidemiological
study of (Lilienfeld AM, Tonascia J, Tonascia S, Libauer
CA, Cauthen GM. Foreign Service health status study.
Evaluation of health status of foreign service and other
employees from selected Eastern European posts. Report
on Foreign Service Health Status Study, U.S. Department
of State 6025-619073, 1978.), showing no apparent evi-
dence of increased mortality rates and limited evidence
regarding general health status. However, several loose
ends still remain with respect to this epidemiological
study, as well as the affair as a whole. In this paper, we
summarize the available evidence concerning this case,
paying special attention to the epidemiological study
of Lilienfeld etal. After reviewing the available litera-
ture (including declassified documents), and after some
additional statistical analyses, we provide new insights
which do not complete the puzzle, but which may help
to better understand it.
Keywords: cancer; Cuban embassy; microwaves; Moscow
signal; radiofrequency.
Introduction
Between 1953 and 1979, the USSR irradiated the US
embassy in Moscow with microwaves. This episode, a
classic Cold War affair, has acquired enormous impor-
tance in the discussions on the effect of non-ionizing
radiation on people’s health. Both those who claim that
the negative biological effects of radiofrequency electro-
magnetic fields have been proven beyond doubt, as well
as those who refuse to accept the existing scientific evi-
dence, take this episode as proof of their arguments.
This apparent contradiction can be explained by the
authentic imbroglio of reports, official publications, press
articles, investigative revelations, lies and war games
which have accompanied this case since it came to light
in the early 1970s.
In this paper, I will summarize the available evidence
concerning this episode, paying special attention to the
epidemiological study of Lilienfeld etal. (1). Forty years
after its publication, many questions remain unanswered.
In 2011, the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (IARC) categorized radiofrequency electromag-
netic fields as a possible carcinogen (Group 2B), and the
debate over the safety of microwaves has raged ever since.
The recent findings on animal experiments published
by the National Program of Toxicology (2, 3) and the
Ramazzini Institute (4) seem to indicate that a re-evalu-
ation is needed, and that radiofrequency electromagnetic
fields should be reclassified as being probably carcino-
genic to humans (Group 2A), or even as being carcino-
genic to humans (Group 1).
Moreover, the recent review of epidemiological
studies published since the IARC 2011 categorization
shows an increased risk of brain, vestibular nerve and
salivary gland tumors associated with mobile phone use
(5, 6), which has also led these authors to reach the same
conclusions regarding reclassification.
In 2016, US government personnel serving in
Havana, Cuba, began experiencing unusual auditory
and/or sensory stimuli of varying intensity and char-
acter, along with a series of neurological symptoms
(7). Several acute and persistent signs and symptoms
were identified, in the absence of an associated history
of blunt head trauma. As Swanson etal. (7) indicated,
*Corresponding author: Jose A. Martínez, Technical University
of Cartagena, Calle Real 3, Cartagena 30201, Spain,
Phone: +34968325776, E-mail: josean.martinez@upct.es
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2Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on
patients experienced cognitive, vestibular and oculomo-
tor dysfunction, along with auditory symptoms, sleep
abnormalities and headaches. Although the etiology is
still unknown, as Broad (8) explains, some scientists
suspect that these symptoms were related to a micro-
wave attack. The “Moscow signal” case therefore needs
to be seriously reconsidered.
The facts
The 10-storey US embassy in Moscow was irradiated by
the Soviet government from 1953 to April, 1979 (9).
The Americans were aware of this attack practically
from the moment it began in 1953 (10), although other
sources, such as Guthrie (11), suggest that the first evi-
dence was obtained in 1959, when Vice President Nixon
visited the building. This radiation attack soon became
known as the “Moscow signal”.
However, the US government decided to keep it a
secret until 1972, when they began to inform some of the
embassy workers (12). The other members of staff at the
building were not informed of the facts until 1976 (13).
Indeed, it was not until the beginning of 1976 when the
event came to light, in an article published in Time maga-
zine, which reported that many members of the embassy
staff had returned to the US with severe health problems,
that two ambassadors had died of cancer, and that a
third, Walter Stoessel, was suffering from leukemia (10).
The Soviets had until then denied the use of micro-
waves and claimed that what the Americans had detected
in the embassy was the radiation of the city produced by
nearby industries (11).
After the publication of the article, both the Ameri-
can public and Congress (14) asked the US government
to inform them of the consequences of the incident, and
demanded that Moscow stop the “bombardment” imme-
diately. It was not, however, until April 1979, when the
attack finally ceased. Yet the facts of the matter remained
far from clear.
Radiation levels
There is some divergence, according to the sources con-
sulted, regarding the intensity and frequency of the radia-
tion. The most relevant are shown in the Table 1:
As can be seen, the intensities (power densities)
always lay below the Soviet maximum limit, except
during the period from June 1975 to February 1976, when
they were slightly higher. However, the limit for the US
was 1000 times higher. This huge divergence between the
limits of both countries is highly significant, due to the
legal (11) and socio-economic implications that we will
discuss later.
The most reliable sources of data shown in the table
are probably those of Lilienfeld etal. (1) and Wikileaks
(15), which are practically identical. The first is the epi-
demiological report prepared for the US government, and
the second is a secret internal document, dated July 3,
1976, addressed to the staff of the Soviet embassy by the
American government itself.
To get an idea of what these power levels would
mean in modern terms, a 300mW Wi-Fi router can have
an intensity of 0.0001mW/cm2 at a distance of 10cm (16).
In a school with 30 laptops and a router at a distance of
0.5m, there may be about 0.0016mW/cm2 (17). In addi-
tion, as Peyman etal. (18) found, 15 laptops in trans-
mission gave a maximum exposure of 0.0087mW/cm2
at a distance of 0.5m from an access point. Moreover,
Hardell etal. (19) measured radiofrequency radiation in
an apartment with a central location at Östermalm in
Stockholm, where a group of base stations was located
only 12 m from the balcony. The average exposure
on a balcony outside a living room was measured at
0.00248mW/cm2, with a maximum of 0.0112mW/cm2.
Table 1:Power density levels and radiation frequency.
Guthrie () Lilienfeld etal. () Wikileaks () Krishnan ()Limit in the URSSLimit in the US
From to May Up to .mW/cm.mW/cm
h per day
.mW/cm
h per day
Never above
mW/cm
.mW/cmmW/cm
From June, to
February,
.mW/cm.mW/cm
h per day
.mW/cm
–h per day
Never above
mW/cm
.mW/cmmW/cm
After February, –Fractions of μW/cm
h per day
Less than
.mW/cm
Never above
mW/cm
.mW/cmmW/cm
Frequency range –.– GHz .– GHz – GHz GHz GHz
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Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on3
When the embassy was shielded at the beginning
of 1976, levels inside the building dropped to less than
0.001mW/cm2.
The Soviet experience and the
American experiments
It is essential to understand the historical context in
which this episode occurred. On the one hand, the Soviets
had considerable experience in researching the biologi-
cal effects of radiofrequency electromagnetic fields, while
the Americans had experimented with microwaves as a
weapon of mind control. It is hardly surprising, therefore,
that with this background, the matter was considered to
be so significant.
That the USSR had extensively investigated the effects
of this type of radiation on humans was backed up by a
declassified report by Adams and Williams (20), written
for the US Navy.
As indicated by the Associated Press (21), referring to
this report, Soviet scientists were absolutely convinced
of the biological effects of microwaves at low intensities,
that radiation could be used as a weapon to disorient and
affect the behavior of military and diplomatic personnel,
and that it could also be used in interrogations. The report
also indicated that radiation could cause heart attacks
and affect the blood-brain barrier. As a result, a person
could develop severe neuropathological symptoms and
even die from the resulting neurological disorders. In
addition, Adams and Williams pointed out that reports
had emerged from communist countries claiming that
women who worked in industrial environments may have
suffered miscarriages due to exposure to microwaves.
The Soviet Union extensively investigated the effects
of microwaves on people, and found that those exposed
frequently developed headaches, loss of appetite, tired-
ness, difficulty in concentration, poor memory, emotional
instability and labile cardiovascular function. These
effects were found at lower intensities than those that
caused problems due to tissue heating (22).
The American public was so disturbed by the results
published in the Soviet literature that the president of the
American Foreign Service Association, John Hemenway,
said in May 1976 that the objective of the Soviet micro-
wave bombardment was not to interfere with communi-
cations but to harm the health of the Americans present
there. Hemenway asserted that it was well-known that
such waves could cause cataracts, damage to the nervous
system, circulatory problems, fatigue and headaches (23).
Congressman Edward I. Koch appeared before Con-
gress on August 2, 1976, in connection with this question,
and again alluded to the fact that the literature had shown
that microwaves had harmful side effects, and that meas-
ures therefore had to be taken in order to preserve the
health of the American staff (14).
It was certainly suspicious that the Soviets had a
maximum exposure level 1000 times lower than that
of the Americans. What did the USSR know about the
effects of microwaves that the US did not know? As
pointed out by Guthrie (11), the standards in the US
were approved in 1953 and were based on theoretical
considerations, under the assumption that microwave
radiation produced only thermal effects on biological
systems, and that these effects could not be cumulative
as microwaves are non-ionizing. Guthrie (11) recognized
that, by 1977, several medical studies had already cast
serious doubt on previous assumptions. For example,
Dr. Milton Zaret, Associate Professor of Ophthalmology
at the New York University-Bellevue Medical Center, who
had conducted several microwave investigations for the
US government, said, “The American National Standard
Institute’s standard is not a safe standard. Instead, it is
a statement defining the highest possible degree of occu-
pational risk. It was based solely on whole body thermal
burden calculations. It ignored the question of organ sen-
sitivity and delayed effects following chronic low-level
exposure” (11).
Professor Herman Schwan of the University of
Pennsylvania, one of the proponents of the 10mW/cm2
standard, stated “No one knows whether safe exposure
standards, which may be appropriate for adults, are so for
children” (11).
However, as Guthrie (11) explained, the Soviet bloc
also had other safety standards. At the Symposium on
the Biological Effects and Health Implications of Micro-
wave Radiation, held in 1970, Karel Marha of Czechoslo-
vakia explained that they had proposed a standard of
0.01mW/cm2, as it was recognized that there was evidence
of biological effects up to levels of 0.1mW/cm2, so a safety
factor of 10had been proposed until finally deciding on
the standard of 0.01 mW/cm2. These maximum levels
were introduced to prevent not only damage to the organ-
ism but also any unpleasant subjective feelings. In addi-
tion, the standard in Czechoslovakia was lowered to
0.001mW/cm2 when it was assumed that exposure did not
occur during a working day, but over a 24-h period.
The Soviets were, however, not the only ones deeply
interested in this issue; the Americans had, since the
1950s, been investigating the possible use of microwaves
as a weapon of mind control.
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4Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on
As Krishnan (10) explains, in the 1950s the CIA had
looked into the use of electromagnetic fields for mind
control purposes as part of its MK ULTRA project. MK
ULTRA was a top secret program first set up in the late
1940s to investigate behavioral modification and the
control of individual minds in the service of American
geopolitical and ideological interests (24).
Subproject 62 of MK ULTRA was run by the neurosur-
geon Maitland Baldwin, and aimed to analyze the effect
of electromagnetic waves on monkeys. This was one of
149subprojects designed by the CIA, and was entitled
“Effects of radio-frequency energy on primate cerebral
activity” (25). In one of these experiments, monkeys
were exposed to high-powered (100 V) frequencies of
388MHz, resulting in several changes in the electroen-
cephalogram, as well as arousal and drowsiness. In addi-
tion, he observed lethal effects after just a few minutes of
exposure (10).
Ewen Cameron, a psychiatrist who actively partici-
pated in the MK ULTRA project, carried out experiments
using personnel from the purpose-built Radio Telemetry
Laboratory, probably with the intention of finding out
more about the effects of the microwave bombardment
of the American embassy. In 1965, the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency (DARPA) commissioned the
Walter Reed Army Medical Center Research Institute and
the Johns Hopkins University to study the possible bio-
logical effects of microwave exposure on humans, in what
was dubbed the Pandora Project (10).
As Krishnan (10) also pointed out, Dr. Milton Zaret
acknowledged that effects on the nervous system due to
microwave exposure were possible, and Robert O. Becker,
twice nominated for the Nobel Prize in Medicine for his
work on the effects of electromagnetic fields on living
tissues, indicated in an interview to the BBC in 1984 that
he thought it was unquestionable that exposure could
produce disturbances in the central nervous system.
Becker did not believe that, with the technology avail-
able at the time, someone could be made to instantly fall
asleep, but that exposure to microwaves could possibly
interfere in an individual’s decision-making ability. This
could produce a situation of chronic stress resulting in the
embassy staff operating less efficiently than usual, to the
obvious advantage of the Soviets.
Weinberger (26) tells how the Americans themselves
deceived the embassy staff when, in 1965, doctors began
performing blood tests. The staff were told that the doctors
were looking for a new virus but, in reality, they wanted
to integrate the information obtained into the Pandora
Project. In October 1965, Richard Cesaro took over the
DARPA Program Plan 562, the technical name of the
Pandora Project. Cesaro had been responsible for trans-
lating dozens of Soviet investigations into this subject,
and realized that the neurological effects of microwaves
fascinated the enemy.
As Weinberger (26) continues, the Pandora project
involved experiments on monkeys carried out in govern-
ment laboratories rather than universities, due to the top-
secret nature of the project. The monkeys were exposed to
the same signal levels that the embassy received in Moscow.
The results were not subject to peer review but, in Decem-
ber of 1966, Cesaro reported that the first monkey involved
in the tests had shown erratic and repetitive behavior,
which led him to assert that it was unquestionable that
the signal had penetrated the central nervous system and
caused changes in the assigned work functions. He was
so convinced by the results that he recommended that
the Pentagon immediately begin to investigate potential
military applications, and requested that the project be
extended to include experiments on humans, something
that certain sections within the CIA viewed with suspi-
cion, as it was too reminiscent of the questionable prac-
tices of the MK ULTRA project. It was May of 1969 and the
scientific committee of Pandora was considering extend-
ing the study to include eight humans, but in the end this
did not occur as the results of experiments carried out on
primates were still being reviewed and there were doubts
over whether this behavioral change was in fact produced
by the microwave signals. In 1968, Dr. James McIlwain
took over the Pandora Project and, after reviewing the
results thus far obtained, concluded that the microwave
signals did not result in the ability to control the minds of
the monkeys.
As Weinberger (26) concludes, in 1969 DARPA ended
its support for Pandora, and Cesaro was fired. At the end
of the decade, the American intelligence services claimed
that the Soviets had used these waves not to control the
minds of diplomats, but to activate listening devices on
the walls of the building.
The Soviet objective
To activate listening devices on the walls? This may well
have been, as we have just indicated, one of the explana-
tions given by the Americans, but serious doubts had,
by this time, been cast on American institutional cred-
ibility. After all, the State Department had, for more than
15years, hidden from its own employees the fact that that
they were being irradiated, had lied to them about the
purpose of the blood tests, and had categorically denied
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Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on5
that some of the results were of concern to their health.
For example, the State Department had reported that
Ambassador Walter Stoessel was in good health and that
blood tests showing high levels of white blood cells were
unrelated to leukemia (13). Nevertheless, Stoessel died of
leukemia on December 9, 1986, aged 66 (27).
The mind control hypothesis was also considered by
the American government (28). The Americans themselves
had been experimenting on mind control as part of the MK
ULTRA project, and suspected that the Soviets might be
doing the same.
The former CIA agent Victor Marchetti claimed that
the microwave bombardment had nothing to do with a
threat to health, but with a strategy of confusion in order
to waste the time of the American government while it
studied and analyzed what it believed might be taking
place (13). Whether this is true or not, the reality is that the
American government had indeed devoted huge resources
and efforts to analyzing what had happened, especially
with the epidemiological study of Lilienfeld etal. (1).
The Soviets, on the other hand, finally admitted at
the beginning of 1976 to the use of microwaves, after
denying it for 15years. The official version until then
had been that the radiation detected by the Americans
at the embassy was caused by the industrial activity of
a large city such as Moscow. When they finally came
clean, they indicated that the purpose of the bombard-
ment had not been to damage the health of the Ameri-
can personnel, but to interfere in the communications of
the embassy (11).
In the end, both official versions concurred, which,
given the history of lies and deceit by the two sides
involved, may be equally suspect.
The epidemiological study of
Lilienfeld etal. (1)
On June 21, 1976, Dr. Lilienfeld and his team signed a con-
tract with the Government of the US to carry out what
would become the most ambitious epidemiological study
conducted to date on the effect of microwaves on human
health (1).
The report compared the embassy workers and their
relatives with their counterparts in other European embas-
sies (Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Leningrad, Prague,
Sofia, Warsaw and Zagreb). A retrospective cohort study
included all those people who had worked in these places
between January 1, 1953 and June 30, 1976.
After 2 years of work and the release of a 400-page
report, the conclusions were not as alarming as some may
have expected. O’Toole (29) summarized them as follows:
there was an increase in the number of white blood cells,
as well as complaints of headaches, memory loss and
sleep disorders among the workers, which the researchers
explained as being due to the high incidence of bacterial
infections in the USSR and the publicity given to the topic of
microwaves since 1976. There were no differences in terms
of mortality (including different types of cancer). Moreover,
mortality from all causes among Soviet workers and those
of the eight other embassies was smaller compared to that
of the population as a whole. This is known as the “healthy
worker effect”, something logical among employees who
are selected precisely for tasks involving a high degree of
responsibility and who generally have an above-average
level of health. Table 2 summarizes the main results of the
report, regarding mortality rates among employees.
Table 2:Mortality in employees (from table 5.6 of (1)).
Moscow Other embassies
Obs Exp SMR % CI Obs Exp SMR % CI
All causes . . (.; .) . . (.; .)
All malignant neoplasms . . (.; .) . . (.; .)
Arteriosclerotic heart disease . . (.; .) . . (.; .)
Selected malignant neoplasms
Digestive organs . . (.; .) . . (.; .)
Brain tumors . . . . (.; .)
Pancreas . . (.; .) . . (.; .)
Lung . . (.; .) . . (.; .)
Leukemia . . (.; .) . . (.; .)
Breast . . (.; .) . . (.; .)
Uterus . . (.; .) . .
Cervix . . (.; .) . .
Obs, observed; exp, expected based on US mortality data; SMR, standardized mortality ratio; CI, confidence interval.
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6Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on
Regarding morbidity, a large number of statistical
tests were conducted to search for significant differences
between the Moscow group and the comparison group, for
both males and females.
A disease history involving some 70 diseases or
medical conditions was abstracted from the medical
records of all employees. Only three of the 140 compari-
sons were 95% significant: appendicitis (males), sleep-
walking (males) and venereal disease (males). In addition,
higher occurrences of appendicitis and sleepwalking were
reported for the control group.
Clinical evaluations were also obtained in 19 organ
systems for males and females. No difference was found
after performing 38 comparisons.
Lilienfeld etal. (1) also analyzed the occurrence rates
for 44 additionally selected medical conditions reported
as part of routine or special medical examinations. Only
four of the 87 comparisons were significant: protozoal
intestinal disease (males), benign neoplasms (males), dis-
eases of the nerves and peripheral ganglia (males), and
complications during pregnancy, childbirth and puerper-
ium (females).
The medical history questionnaire provided
another source of information for obtaining compari-
sons. Researchers examined 20 symptoms for males
and females, obtaining six significant results out of 40:
depression (males), irritability (males), difficulty in con-
centration (males and females), memory loss (males) and
other symptoms (females). In addition, they examined
28 medical conditions, obtaining six significant results
out of 56: eye problems (males and females), psoriasis
(males), skin conditions (males), anemia (females) and
ulcers (females).
Although it is true that the results on cancer mortality
were not significant, the differences found in some mor-
bidity variables have led several authors (22, 30) to con-
clude that these symptoms are in line with those expected
after prolonged exposure to low intensity microwaves.
They are precisely those symptoms linked to electrohyper-
sensitivity (31).
Goldsmith’s response
The researcher J. R. Goldsmith harshly criticized the
results of the study of Lilienfeld etal. (1), claiming that
the findings had been massaged by the US Department of
State, and that the results had been toned down (32).
Goldsmith criticized the methodology of compar-
ing the staff of the Soviet embassy with that of the other
embassies. Why use the other embassies as a control
group? How could they be sure that these other embassies
had not also been irradiated?
As indicated by Carpenter (22), Goldsmith reinter-
preted the data from the original study by grouping the
cases of deaths among all the embassies and comparing
them with the reference population.
By presenting the data in this way, the results change
ostensibly. Goldsmith linked the cases of workers’ deaths
to those of their relatives (“dependents”), which resulted
in mortality due to leukemia becoming significant in
Moscow. He then added these results to those of the
other embassies (“both groups”) and found a statistically
higher-than-expected number of cases of leukemia, brain
tumors and breast cancer.
Goldsmith did not cease in his determination to show
that the conclusions derived from the study by Lilienfeld
etal. (1) were unconvincing. According to EMFacts (33),
an initial study carried out in Moscow in 1967 on a group
of 43workers (37 exposed and seven unexposed), found
abnormalities in the chromosomes of 20 of the 37 who
had been exposed to microwaves, compared to two of the
seven who had not. Subsequently, in 1976, another hema-
tological study found significant differences between
the embassy workers in Moscow and other employees
of the foreign affairs service. Larger numbers of white
blood cells were reported among the Moscow staff, but
these results were never published. However, Goldsmith
obtained them thanks to the Freedom of Information Act,
which allows American citizens to access official govern-
ment information.
According to Goldsmith, the conclusions of the study
by Lilienfeld etal. (1) were intentionally toned down by
the State Department. In addition, he assured that several
cases of cancer had been eliminated from the final analy-
sis, which had distorted the statistical analysis performed.
Finally, Goldsmith agreed with Lilienfeld etal. (1) in that
additional follow-up of the cohort of participants was nec-
essary, since certain cancers may not have manifested at
the time of study closure.
Loose ends
Why did the study carried out by Lilienfeld etal. (1) not
include a detailed report on cancer incidence instead of
just cancer mortality? This is very important for the final
interpretation of the results. In fact, Congressman Edward
I. Koch (14) had specified in his speech before Congress
that five women from the embassy had been subjected
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Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on7
to mastectomies. This would indicate that the number
of cases of breast cancer would be higher than the two
deaths reported as a main result in the study by Lilienfeld
etal. (1).
Another particularly disturbing fact is related to the
causes of death of several US ambassadors in Moscow,
who held this position during the period of analysis.
Charles Bohlen was ambassador from April 20, 1953 to
April 18, 1957 and died of cancer on January 1, 1974, aged
69 (34). Llewellyn Thompson was ambassador from July
16, 1957 to July 27, 1962, and later again from January 23,
1967 to January 14, 1969, and died of cancer on March 6,
1972, at 67years of age (35). Finally, Walter J. Stoessel, who
was ambassador from 1974 to 1976, died of leukemia on
December 9, 1986, at 66years of age (27). Three cancer
deaths among the ambassadors, whose offices were pre-
cisely those that received the greatest intensity of radia-
tion, as well as the Stoessel leukemia case, which was not
included in the analysis by Lilienfeld etal. (1).
In 1976, Dr. R.M. Tartell (36), of the Walter Reed Army
Medical Center, in a letter to the editor of the Washington
Post, indicated that “one need not be a physician to appre-
ciate the significance of the disproportionate incidence of
leukemia and other forms of cancer among past members
of the Moscow embassy staff”. What data did Tartell use
in order to claim a “disproportionate” incidence of leuke-
mia if the official epidemiological report published 2years
later only mentioned two cases of death from this disease?
In a recent interview with Dr. Tartell (Tartell, personal
communication, 2018, June 7), he indicated that he had
made the comment based on the material he had been
reading at the time.
In 1977, in an article published in the Los Angeles
Times (37), it was reported that an “authority” had told
President Carter that the first residents of the embassy had
the highest incidence of cancer of any group of people in
the world. The US public had, in fact, already begun to
question if living near antennas was safe, and several col-
lectives and lawyers were starting to take action. Accord-
ing to the article, the army knew that microwave weapons
could cause sudden death, estimating that the US popu-
lation at risk could number between 15 and 20 million
people.
Also, in 1977, Stevens (38) published that a third of the
diplomats and their families had shown abnormally high
levels of lymphocyte counts in recent months. Although at
first this was linked to microwaves, the medical authori-
ties soon abandoned this theory, claiming that it was
temporary and not a cause for alarm, and that this was
not indicative of the development of leukemia. These
levels of lymphocytes returned to normal 2 weeks after
the individuals left Moscow. The cause of this abnormal
level of lymphocytes was blamed on a possible parasite in
the drinking water, or on a respiratory infection. However,
as Stevens indicated in his article, there was no evidence
that the Soviet citizens of Moscow had such high anom-
alies in the incidence rate as those that existed in the
embassy. Stoessel’s death from leukemia a few years later
cast doubt on the official American version.
Controversial details of the
epidemiological study
After a detailed review of the study by Lilienfeld etal. (1),
several questions arise:
1. It is unclear why workers and relatives were chosen as
study subjects when some of these relatives, includ-
ing wives and children, obviously received much less
exposure to the microwave bombardment.
2. The authors admit that some medical records were
never found, as the investigation was stopped prema-
turely due to the urgent need to publish the results.
Recall that the investigators involved were under
pressure to finish the report by a given deadline, and
this led to relevant information not being included.
3. When responding to questions, many of the partici-
pants did not remember the exact location of their
workplace within the embassy, and were therefore
categorized as being of questionable exposure.
4. Only the population that could be followed in its
entirety was studied, i.e. all those for whom a medi-
cal history was available. The identified population
included 1827 people from the Moscow embassy and
2561 from the other embassies, but it was not possi-
ble to obtain information from all of these individu-
als. In the end, they entered cohorts of 1719 and 2460,
respectively. Despite this being a high percentage of
the population initially identified, given the low num-
ber of cancer cases reported, then, if some cases were
not identified, this could lead to the results changing
from being statistically insignificant to statistically
significant.
5. Of the 4179 employees who could finally be followed,
194 died during the period under consideration. How-
ever, 13 of these deaths (seven from Moscow and six
from the other embassies) were excluded from mor-
tality analysis for different reasons, so only 181were
finally counted instead of 194. Two of the seven deaths
excluded from the Moscow group were from cancer
(lung and kidney), and other two were unknown.
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8Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on
6. The authors themselves complained in the report
about the low response rate to the questionnaires,
even though the employees they were sent to were
supposed to have a high level of education.
7. Thirty-six percent of the causes of death were not
obtained from death certificates, but from other
sources. Thus, the authors indicate that the results
must be interpreted with caution, because more than
a third of the deaths were subject to coding errors.
8. There exists an apparent contradiction in that the
overall mortality rate is lower (healthy worker effect)
and that the same population reported higher-than-
expected incidences of certain health problems, such
as those already mentioned for morbidity.
9. In addition, due to the healthy worker effect, there was
another apparent contradiction between the stand-
ardized mortality rate (SMR) of all causes of mortality
(0.47) and the SMR of cancer mortality (0.89).
10. No control variable was used for the analyses. It is
only indicated that there was an equal number of
smokers among the Moscow staff and that of the other
embassies.
These limitations of the epidemiological study must be
taken into account when interpreting the results.
Simulations
Based on these limitations and some of the “loose ends”
discussed, simulations can be made with the data from
the original study by Lilienfeld etal. (1).
For example, what number of breast cancer cases
would have been necessary in order to consider that there
was, in fact, a significant effect? In 1977, the age-adjusted
Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) inci-
dence of breast cancer in the US was 100.8 cases per
100,000women (103.32 cases per 100,000women for the
White females). This is known as the incidence density
(Ir), and is defined as the number of new cases per unit of
person-time at risk. Therefore, Ir = 0.001.
The report by Lilienfeld et al. (1) does not provide
detailed information on the follow-up times of each
participant, but overall, for women, the exposure was
3131 person-years. Since there was a total of 410women
with 23 years of follow-up, the average exposure was
7.64years. In any case, this last detail is not very informa-
tive. However, if we take these 3131 person-years as the
denominator in the computation of incidence density,
then it would have been necessary to detect nine cases
of breast cancer for the incidence density to have been
statistically and significantly higher than that of the base
population. We would also assume the limitation of not
knowing the times of each individual person and the age
distribution of the Moscow embassy staff. With nine cases
of breast cancer, the Ir (study) would be 0.0028, but taking
into account the computation of the 95% error with the
assumption of normality, then the results would border
statistical significance.
Were there nine cases of breast cancer in the Moscow
embassy? The press mentioned five mastectomies, and
we know that two women died from breast cancer, but
we do not know if these two women were among the
five that the press included. Lilienfeld etal. (1) indicated
among the 17malignant neoplasms reported in women,
there were three breast cancers and three other with site
unspecified. As in 1977 the percentage of breast cancer
from all cancers was 26% in females (39), it is probable
that some of the unspecified cancer were also breast
cancer. However, even if those three unspecified cancers
were breast cancer, the mentioned threshold of nine
cases would not be reached.
We can perform even more simulations, e.g. with the
“SMR” given in the list of causes of mortality. Lilienfeld
etal. (1) only considered two deaths from leukemia but
we know that there were at least three deaths, as Walter
Stoessel died of this disease a few years later and the
American government tried to cover this up during the
study period (40). We could attempt to simulate a follow-
up of 10more years (up to 1986, when Stoessel died). To
achieve this simulation, we have computed the person-
year mean for the period 1953–1976 (18,106/24 = 754.4),
and then multiplied the result by 10 years, to obtain
7544.16 additional person-years. Therefore, the total
person-years for the period 1953–1986would be 25,650.17.
Lilienfeld et al. (1) reported 4.41 expected deaths per
100,000 persons. Considering that this only referred to
White people, and acknowledging that trends of mor-
tality from leukemia have been stabilized since the
1950s (41, 42), then the expected deaths would be 1.13
(4.41*25,650.17/100,000).
We can now compute the 95% confidence interval
(CI) using disparate methods (see (43)) and the OpenEpi
software (www.openepi.com). The results are shown in
Table 3.
Under this simulation, with three cases of leukemia,
95% CI does contain one and is therefore not significant.
However, with four cases, the interpretation of the results
would be different. Was there any other case of leukemia
(apart from Stoessel) that was not included in the original
study? Well, we simply do not know.
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Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on9
In any case, numbers must always be looked at with
statistics, but also beyond statistics; after all, the deter-
mination of type I error size is arbitrary. If we look at the
previous simulations with this broader perspective, we
find that, with five cases of breast cancer, the incidence
density in Moscow would have been 159.7 cases per
100,000 person-years, whereas in the US the figure was
103.32 cases per 100,000 person-years. If we now look at
the incidence of mortality from leukemia, the number of
confirmed cases would be three, when to the expected
figure would be (approximately) 1.13. If we then join these
two data (incidence of breast cancer and mortality from
leukemia), we see a trend, which could form a pattern. In
fact, Lilienfeld (44) indicated that because of the sample
size limitations, the Moscow study was not able to signifi-
cantly detect increased risks unless they were unusually
large.
As previously mentioned, there was another apparent
contradiction between the SMR of all causes of mortality
(0.47) and the SMR of cancer mortality (0.89). If we review
the data provided by the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention regarding the leading causes of death, the
average ratio between malignant neoplasm deaths and
total deaths (all causes) was 16.60% in the period 1953–
1976. However, in the study of Lilienfeld etal. (1) this ratio
was 34.69% (17 of 49 deaths). Therefore, the Poison exact
95% CI for this ratio was (20.21%; 55.55%), which does not
contain 16.60%. Consequently, the cancer mortality rate
was higher for the individuals working in the embassy
than for the general population.
Finally, we can aggregate the responses to the health
questionnaire regarding medical conditions and symp-
toms (Table 4). After applying several Fisher exact tests,
the results clearly show a significantly worse health status
for the Moscow group, for both males and females, as well
as for the overall sample.
Legal and social consequences
According to Guthrie (11), the Soviets committed a violation
of International Law (Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations – Article 29 on the inviolability of diplomatic
personnel), and therefore should have been held account-
able. Although the maximum exposure standards for the
US were not exceeded, those of the Soviets were, which
therefore constituted a crime.
The author indicated that there were reasonable
doubts concerning the safety of humans exposed to such
high levels of microwave intensity, with scientific evi-
dence supporting the possibility of bodily harm. In addi-
tion, given that there was a willingness to irradiate, on the
one hand, as well as a non-explicit consent, on the other
hand, then this also constituted an affront to the dignity of
the affected individuals.
Table 3:Simulation of SMR 95% confidence intervals for the
expanded period 1953–1986.
Method
Leukemia
cases=
Leukemia
cases=
SMR=. SMR=.
Mid-P exact test (.; .)(.; .)
Fisher’s exact test (.; .)(.; .)
Byar approximation (.; .)(.; .)
Rothman Greenland method(.; .)(.; .)
Ury and Wiggins method (.; .)(.; .)
Vandenbroucke method (.; .)(.; .)
Table 4:Aggregated analysis for medical conditions and symptoms (data from (1)).
Moscow group Control group p-Value
General medical conditions ( conditions examined)
Person-years= Person-years=
Males Observed .
Person-years= Person-years=
Females Observed <.
Person-years= Person-years=,
Males+females Observed <.
Symptoms ( examined)
Person-years= Person-years=
Males Observed <.
Person-years= Person-years=
Females Observed <.
Person-years= Person-years=,
Males+females Observed <.
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10Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on
It also highlighted the neglect of the US Department of
State towards its embassy staff, because it was fully aware
of what was happening and yet did not communicate the
facts until many years later. And, more importantly, pro-
testing about this would have meant accepting that the
limits of American security were fraudulent, which would
have cost hundreds of billions of dollars in military and
defense facilities that exceeded Soviet limits.
This legal and economic element is fundamental
for understanding the results and the evaluation of this
episode. What would the legal and economic conse-
quences have been if the conclusions had admitted carci-
nogenic effects? In fact, the standards for radiofrequency
electromagnetic fields in the US have remained virtually
unchanged over the last 70years. In 1992, a slight modifi-
cation was published as a function of frequency, where for
the general population the maximum values of exposure
were delimited as f/1500, f being the frequency measured
in MHz. Thus, for 3000 MHz, i.e. 3GHz, the limit value
would be 2mW/cm2, but for 10 GHz it would be 5mW/cm2;
in other words, several orders of magnitude above the
intensity measured at the embassy in Moscow.
Further research
Four decades on, the “Moscow signal” case has trans-
muted into “the Thing” or “the Havana syndrome” (45).
From December, 2016, to August, 2017, some State Depart-
ment personnel and other CIA employees began to suffer
a series of neurological symptoms, including headaches,
dizziness and sleep abnormalities, while working at the
Cuban embassy, or staying at other places in Havana, such
as the Capri and Nacional hotels.
Because of the political nature of this affair, many
details remain undisclosed, such as the names of the
CIA employees affected, who exactly was responsible for
the attack (the Cuban government continues to deny all
knowledge), or the specific “weapon” employed (some
scientists suspect a microwave attack). However, the pre-
liminary results of the study of Swanson etal. (7) on 21
individuals identified by the US Department of State as
having possibly been exposed, showed persistent cogni-
tive, vestibular, and oculomotor dysfunction, as well as
sleep impairment and headaches, along with reports of
directional audible and/or sensory phenomena of unclear
origin. As Swanson etal. (7) concluded, these individuals
appeared to have sustained injury to widespread brain
networks without an associated history of head trauma.
Therefore, there exist clear similitudes with the
Moscow embassy case; a (hypothesized) directional
weapon that produces several identifiable neurocognitive
symptoms and that leaves no detectable traces, contextu-
alized in a framework of secrecy and political tension. The
main difference is that, in the Cuban case, there is still no
confirmation of the use of microwaves.
In addition, another difference with respect to the
Moscow case is the advanced analyses conducted on the
participants in the investigation of Swanson et al. (7),
including magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Neverthe-
less, most of the participants showed normal imaging find-
ings, and only three had abnormalities which could not be
attributed to the specific exposure experienced. Advanced
structural and functional neuroimaging studies remain
unpublished, but could maybe shed light on some of the
concerns that other researchers have expressed regarding
possible alternative explanations (see (46, 47)), such as
mass psychogenic illness or functional neurological disor-
ders, which Hampton etal. (48) preliminarily discarded,
preferring to wait for confirmation in subsequent analyses.
Consequently, future research should be addressed
specifically toward the need for functional brain scans
[positron emission tomography (PET), Single-photon
emission computed tomography (SPECT) and functional
MRI]. Further investigations should also include neu-
ropsychological as well as ear, nose and throat (ENT) eval-
uations. The “Havana syndrome” presents, therefore, an
opportunity to carry out a thorough study of the exposed
participants in order to identify structural brain changes
that, as Hampton etal. (48) stated, may underlie the neu-
rological manifestations – something which was not done
with the workers at the Moscow embassy in the 1970s.
Conclusion
This event was just one of many that took place during the
Cold War, and must therefore be assessed in the context of
manipulation, political interests and classified informa-
tion typical of the time. With the data in hand, with what
we have been able to gather and what we have shown
in this article, we can approach the truth, possibly even
guess it, but not reveal it in its total dimension. And we
will probably never be able to do so.
Those who, in the published results we have men-
tioned, use this event to deny the harmful effects of micro-
wave radiation do not have enough evidence to support
their position. There are too many loose ends, unana-
lyzed information, methodological flaws, and debatable
interpretations.
However, on the opposite side of the debate, those
who take this case as incontestable evidence of the
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Martínez: The “Moscow signal” epidemiological study, 40years on11
harmful effects of microwaves on humans at low intensi-
ties, must also admit that there is a lack of statistical con-
sistency in the results. There is still too much imprecision.
A global vision of the whole event, including the
nuances and details that we have explained in this article,
show the latter to be closer to the truth than the former,
even more so when we consider non-carcinogenic effects
linked to what is now associated with electrohypersensi-
tivity. However, it must be recognized that the methodol-
ogy used by Lilienfeld etal. (1) also casts doubt on this
claim, as the health status symptom questionnaires were
filled in after the case was made public (nocebo effect).
In addition, the results of our simulations are also par-
tially dependent of the quality of data of Lilienfeld etal.
(1), which were not complete, having a different degree
of potential bias regarding mortality, cancer incidence
and health status. Further research on the personnel of
the Havana embassy who were recently subjected to a
similar attack, could indirectly help to better understand
what happened in Moscow more than 40years ago.
Power densities measured at the Moscow embassy
were higher than the average levels typically found nowa-
days in homes, schools and urban areas, and were of the
same order of magnitude as the more extreme case of
living just a few meters from a base station (see (19)) This
means that exposure at the embassy could have been high
in terms of today’s typical levels of exposure. Neverthe-
less, the exposure was several orders of magnitude lower
than those suggested by the ICNRIP guidelines, adopted
by many countries as legal limits. As Hardell et al. (19)
indicated, the BioInitiative Report (49) with updated refer-
ences defined the scientific benchmark for possible health
risks as 0.000003–0.000006mW/cm2. Consequently, the
exposure at the Moscow embassy was from 3 to 4 orders of
magnitude higher than this safety benchmark, but 3 orders
of magnitude lower than the legal limits of many countries.
In any case, and as Frentzle-Beyme (50) stated, “The
level of proof required to justify action for health protection
should be less than that required to constitute causality
as a scientific principle”. The “Moscow signal” remains a
“signal”; let us not reject it, but listen to it instead.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Martí
Casals and Klaus Langohr for their comments in the devel-
opment of this manuscript. The author would also like to
thank editor and the three anonymous reviewers for their
helpful suggestions.
Research funding: Fundación Séneca (Funder id:
10.13039/100007801, 19884/GERM/15); MINECO/FEDER
(ECO2015-65637-P).
Conflict of interest: Authors state no conflict of interest.
Informed consent: Not applicable.
Ethical approval: Not applicable.
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