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Who governs the globe?
... The concept of authority understood as the ability to exercise power with legitimacy is central to agency theory (Dellas, Pattberg, & Betsill, 2011). As defined by Avant et al. (2010), "Authority is a social relation, not a commodity, it does not exist in a vacuum" (Avant et al., 2010, p. 9). These scholars posit that authority works by deference which confers power to actors resulting in the acceptance of that authority by others, which finally provides the ability to influence them. ...
... In an attempt to understand the consequences of the exercise of authority in the context of global governance, Avant et al. (2010) examined different sources of authority that agents draw upon to obtain deference from the ones they govern: Institutional-based authority derives from holding an office in some established organizational structure. Similarly, Delegation-based authority refers to the one "on loan" from other set of authoritative actors considering that the nature of delegation arrangements can vary greatly. ...
... By exploring different features determining relations of authority in the Bioeconomy agent network, the five authority sources defined by Avant et al. (2010) were carefully analysed complementing the network perspective of agency. Several considerations on agency can be derived from the results: ...
Following global policy development trends attached to the growing popularity of the concept of Bioeconomy, recent initiatives in the Colombian context evidence a process in which a national policy framework for this topic is being defined. Nevertheless, the variety of perspectives emerging in this context brings up the need to focus on actors shaping these developments and the outcome for the country. The present master thesis aims to explain the process of the emerging Colombian Bioeconomy through a theoretical approach comprising conceptual elements of agency theory and social network analysis (SNA).
The first section of this document provides an introduction to the global trends on Bioeconomy and then focuses on the Colombian context by describing the recent developments as well as actors involved in this process. It concludes by presenting the research objective and questions for the problem of study. The theoretical approach for the described context explores the role of actors in Bioeconomy by describing elements from agency theory and SNA applicable to the studied problem. A conceptual model including elements from these theories is defined to address the research questions. Results provide an overview of the Colombian Bioeconomy actor and agent networks in terms of composition and structural indices. Agency in this context is examined from a network perspective by outlining different sources of authority providing actors with legitimacy. Finally, four existing visions for a Colombian Bioeconomy are described along with their distribution among actors and agents’ structural positions.
The findings of this research are discussed by combining considerations about structural position and aspects contributing to the different types of authority recognized among the actors within the network. These evidence the variety of global and individual structural features that enable or constraint certain roles identified among actors in the Colombian process. Implications of visions with respect to potential for visibility or diffusion in the network responding to position and authority features of actors sharing them are outlined. Referring to possible outcomes for the Colombian Bioeconomy Policy Framework, dominant visions, common interests as well as contested topics are highlighted. Conclusions draw upon the variety of agents and the roles of different social sectors in the governance of social transitions such as the one presented by scenarios of Bioeconomy. The relevance of establishing shared visions among different groups of actors in order to move forward in policy processes is highlighted together with the need for context-specific considerations on priorities, concerns and transition paths in defining national Bioeconomy strategies which offer sustainable alternatives to current economic models.
... We are not the very fi rst to address these questions. Over the past ten years, a steadily increasing but still small body of studies on the authority of international organizations (IOs) and IPAs has been produced above all by IR scholars, for example, Avant et al. ( 2010 ), , Cronin and Hurd ( 2008 ), Ecker-Ehrhardt ( 2012 ), , Koppell ( 2008), or Zürn et al. ( 2012. Yet, when consulting this literature, we soon realized that it is diffi cult to derive clear-cut and persuasive answers to all our questions from that literature. ...
... Second, the literature on authority in IR is 'characterized by a lack of clarity in the defi nition of the basic concept' (Hurd 2008 , 23). This lack of clarity persists in the few studies that have devoted their attention to conceptualizing authority in international relations or authority of IOs, IPAs, and/or international bureaucracies and that we reviewed, namely, Avant et al. ( 2010 ), , Ecker-Ehrhardt ( 2007 ), , Hurd ( 2008Hurd ( , 1999, Lake ( 2013Lake ( , 2010Lake ( , 2007, Zürn et al. ( 2012 ), and Zürn ( 2015 ). This is not to say that the individual studies lack a clear conception of authority. ...
... We propose a conception and classifi cation of authority which reduces the plurality of labels and forms of authority currently out in the literature, introduces categories along which types of authority can be clearly and easily distinguished, and apply it to the analysis of IPAs (and, for clarity, to intergovernmental bodies of IOs). We do so by drawing above all on existing conceptions of authority in IR scholarship in general and in the study of IOs and IPAs in particular, namely, Lake ( 2013Lake ( , 2010Lake ( , 2007, Hurd ( 2008Hurd ( , 1999, Zürn et al. ( 2012 ), Zürn ( 2015 ), , Avant et al. ( 2010), and Ecker-Ehrhardt ( 2007. We compare and relate these conceptions to those that have been proposed in sociology, political philosophy, and the broader political science literature, including comprehensive conceptual treatises (above all Day 1963 ;Weber 1980 ;Arendt 1961 ;Raz 1990 ). ...
... The article suggests that global cultural governance can be understood as a political process for organising the relations of power and of regulation with respect to activities of IOs and other actors involved at multiple levels -local, national, regional and global one (Weiss and Wilkinson 2019). Global cultural governance is composed of informal and formal ideas, norms, procedures and institutions (Karns and Mingst 2015, 2), affecting several aspects in the activities of the actors involved and allowing them to seek to coordinate their practices in a context of polyarchic authority (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010) and of absence of global government (Rosenau 1997). ...
... Firstly, the emergence of inter-organisational cooperation arrangements is by its very nature a contested process and one that is a long-term endeavour (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010;Tallberg and Zürn 2019). The IOs are meaningful actors, which seek to ensure their legitimacy and strengthen their credibility in a competitive international environment. ...
This article provides an empirical investigation of the cooperation among intergovernmental organisations (IOs) in global cultural governance. The existing scientific literature has not yet taken up the inter-organisational cooperation as a serious topic of research and the present contribution aims to fill this gap. Based on an actor-centred constructivism, the article seeks to address inter-organisational cooperation as an observable empirical phenomenon, to explore when and why the cooperation between IOs risks not lasting and to understand why the dynamics of inter-organisational cooperation in cultural affairs have a specific-time limit. The focus will be on two cases: the European Union-Mercosur audiovisual programme and the United Nations interagency group on creative industries. As such, the article is more concerned with analysing the political micro-foundations through which the cooperation among IOs takes place and with exploring the factors, which contribute to not establish sustainable cooperative arrangements.
... In the words of Oliver Williamson, 'Governance is an effort to craft order, mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains' (Williamson, 2000). Still others are more concerned decision makers within these complex systems -asking, for example, 'Who governs the globe?' (Avant et al., 2010) Many of these divergent approaches are relevant to questions of resource governance and those related to the challenges of governing the resource nexus. So, where does resource governance happen? ...
... They should be implemented and enforced at the highest possible standards. Together they may well establish new hybrid forms of governance (Avant et al., 2010) and are beginning to overlap on agendas such as poverty eradication, corruption and conflicts. Being pushed by NGOs such as Global Witness, Oxfam and Publish What You Pay (PWYP), they involve a number of stakeholders or 'governors' 9 with some power in bargaining and shaming, thus going beyond the more traditional voluntary agreements (Johnstone and Bishop, 2007) that almost exclusively establish informal and nontransparent clubs between industry and governments. ...
... As a "service" usually provided by the state, security can for instance be provided in such ALS under different forms and by a variety of state and nonstate actors, domestic or foreign (Schröder, 2018). Violent and criminal nonstate actors can even be considered as "governors" of security in ALS (as defined by Avant et al., 2010) and be legitimized by part of the population. One illustration of this is the rules and mapping of security-provision actors in ALS and conflict zones (Chojnacki & Branovic, 2011): actors perceived as illegitimate from a state-based or Western-based point of view may be perceived as at least partly legitimate in the eyes of the local population or the international community if they take on a governing role (Berti, 2018). ...
... This conflict has since resulted in some 500,000 victims and the exile of 5 to 6 million people according to the United Nations. 1 In the context of northern Syria from 2011 to 2014, no actor, state-based or otherwise, was able to continuously and completely secure the entire national territory. The context was one of fluctuation and volatility in terms of the governors (as defined in Avant et al., 2010), who could potentially provide security for the company or constitute a security threat, sometimes both at the same time. However, the Syrian conflict had a particular spatial grammar (Korf et al., 2018, in Börzel et al., 2018 in terms of ALS, because different levels of statehood were found in different places within the Syrian territory and at different times during this conflict. ...
This article analyzes the operations of the French group Lafarge in Syria during the civil war between 2011 and 2014, to understand the conflict-sensitive practices of a multinational company (MNC) in an area of limited statehood (ALS). We examine how and why the company decided to continue operating its plant in Syria during this intrastate conflict, resulting in financing terrorist groups like ISIS. We highlight the key operational and managerial decisions made by headquarters and local operations and relate them to the conflict situation in the ALS in question. We contribute, with the idea of the firm’s “organization of short-sightedness,” to the understanding of how strategic decisions may lead to a structural inability to fully comprehend the local dangers and the implications for the employees, and how this may lead to a redefinition of legitimate and illegitimate stakeholders in conflict zones. A drawn-out process, stemming from a willingness to stay at all cost in an ALS environment, leads to misinterpretation of the danger and an acute dependency on local stakeholders.
... From an IR perspective, our framework blurs the distinction between external and internal, or the domestic and international levels, established by neorealism (Waltz 1979;Mearsheimer 2001). Governance processes include the establishment of agendas, making, implementing, and adjudicating rules, and setting goals and programs of action (Young 2000; Biermann et al. 2009;Avant et al. 2010) to deal with global collective issues. ...
Until the 1980s, Brazilian industrialization was oriented toward the domestic market. Although competitive pressure was weak, exporting companies and local subsidiaries of multinationals deployed the Japanese quality control model, which was considered the hallmark of the Japanese industry’s competitiveness. Individual companies and local business associations were the leading promoters of quality control, with the collaboration of JUSE. The first boom fell short of expectations because of the lack of understanding from corporate managers and some inter-cultural problems for workers in introducing Total Quality Control. The market liberalization since the 1990s set new ground for competitiveness-seeking quality control, supported by the government. The second boom did not materialize because of the industrial paradigm change for machine-based productivity gains, while Japanese style quality control is human-based. Still, we find that Japanese style quality control has been effectively used in non-industrial sectors such as public administration and healthcare. We argue that Japanese technical cooperation capitalizing on quality control methods will enhance Brazil’s labor productivity and social well-being.
... From an IR perspective, our framework blurs the distinction between external and internal, or the domestic and international levels, established by neorealism (Waltz 1979;Mearsheimer 2001). Governance processes include the establishment of agendas, making, implementing, and adjudicating rules, and setting goals and programs of action (Young 2000; Biermann et al. 2009;Avant et al. 2010) to deal with global collective issues. ...
Japan and Brazil have built a partnership not only in bilateral and multilateral framework but also in triangular cooperation. In recent years, the term FOIP (Free and Open Indo–Pacific) has been used as the philosophy of Japanese diplomacy. FOIP vision means to achieve peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and African region. Brazil itself is not a direct region for FOIP. But considering the African region is included in FOIP, and for Brazil, Africa is a continent historically and strategically important, Japan’s diplomatic concept, FOIP is not irrelevant to Brazil. To think about the future of Japan–Brazil relations, it is necessary to consider Japan’s African diplomacy in the era of FOIP in order to compare it with Brazil’s African diplomacy. In this article we will especially focus on the Portuguese-speaking African countries. The structure of the article is as follows. First, regarding Japan’s diplomacy with Africa, the philosophy and achievements of TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development) started under the initiative of Japanese government since 1993 will be explained. In considering the future cooperation between Japan and Brazil in Africa, it is also necessary to understand Brazil’s African diplomacy. To that ends, the second part of the article will be the Brazilian diplomatic relations with Africa from the postwar period to the present day. In contrast to the active relations with Africa during the Lula governments, some major setbacks can be seen in the current Bolsonaro administration’s diplomatic relations with Africa. After the characteristics of Japan and Brazil’s diplomacy with Africa have been clarified, in the third part of this article, we will inquire the possibility of further cooperation of Japan and Brazil while looking back on the history and achievements of triangular cooperation between Japan–Brazil, and African countries, especially Mozambique. And we will put some comments as a concluding remark.
... From an IR perspective, our framework blurs the distinction between external and internal, or the domestic and international levels, established by neorealism (Waltz 1979;Mearsheimer 2001). Governance processes include the establishment of agendas, making, implementing, and adjudicating rules, and setting goals and programs of action (Young 2000; Biermann et al. 2009;Avant et al. 2010) to deal with global collective issues. ...
Both Brazil and Japan have been active in global environmental governance, have signed important multilateral environmental agreements, and both have committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The two countries have been historical partners in development cooperation/assistance since 1959. Starting with a broad concept of development cooperation (assistance), this study aims at assessing the contributions and impacts of this specific type of cooperative relationship between the two countries. Using a global environmental governance analytical framework, the research assesses the Japanese official development assistance (ODA) and interrogates its contribution to and impacts on environmental protection and sustainable development in Brazil. Through literature review, document analysis, and interviews, we identify development cooperation programs and projects implemented in the period of 1981–2020 and present two cases, one in the Cerrado (PRODECER) and the other in the Amazon (SAF—Tomé-Açu), to analyze how global environmental commitments guide (or not) the provision of ODA. Such analysis is relevant to understanding global trends of environmental governance at the subnational and local levels. We argue that the environmental dimension has been incorporated into ODA projects, according to global commitments. However, more must be achieved to meet global environmental challenges.
... From an IR perspective, our framework blurs the distinction between external and internal, or the domestic and international levels, established by neorealism (Waltz 1979;Mearsheimer 2001). Governance processes include the establishment of agendas, making, implementing, and adjudicating rules, and setting goals and programs of action (Young 2000; Biermann et al. 2009;Avant et al. 2010) to deal with global collective issues. ...
This chapter aims to reassess the Brazil–Japan relationship, with emphasis on the post-Cold War era, and including brief comments on their previous relations. To comprehend their relationship’s meaning and mutual expectations, this reinterpretation focuses on strategies, characteristics, and means of cooperation in the political, economic, commercial, and technological dimensions. Initially, we will discuss the concept of strategic partnership and the Brazil–Japan relationship during the Cold War in three moments with differing emphases. Then, we will analyze the first attempts to resume the bilateral relationship in the 1990s, highlighting the role played by the Asian financial crisis in the rapprochement during the twenty-first century, with the landmark moments of the formation of the G4 in 2004, the adoption of the Japanese Digital TV system in 2006, and the celebration of 100 years of Japanese immigration in Brazil in 2008. Finally, we will comment on the former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to consolidate the partnership after the global financial crisis (2008) and the effects of China’s growing presence in Latin America.
... From an IR perspective, our framework blurs the distinction between external and internal, or the domestic and international levels, established by neorealism (Waltz 1979;Mearsheimer 2001). Governance processes include the establishment of agendas, making, implementing, and adjudicating rules, and setting goals and programs of action (Young 2000; Biermann et al. 2009;Avant et al. 2010) to deal with global collective issues. ...
The main objective of this research is to find an efficient way to improve the educational environment for the children of Brazilian residents in Japan. The secondary objective is to identify a better way to improve the social and economic positions of these residents through further integration into Japanese society. We believe that the potential for them to become a vital bridge between the two countries in the near future is significant, but that potential is not yet being tapped sufficiently. Therefore, the goal of this analysis is more than simply improving working and living conditions, but of promoting career development in Japanese society. To that end, educational background is highly important, especially education and acquisition of the Japanese language beginning in primary school is of utmost importance. For this reason, our paper focuses on the basic education (especially Japanese language education) of Brazilian children in Japan. We conclude that the style of “afterschool” is most efficient as well as socially equitable. We propose a public policy to be adopted by the Japanese government to induce Brazilian families to adopt the hybrid afterschool education system.
... From an IR perspective, our framework blurs the distinction between external and internal, or the domestic and international levels, established by neorealism (Waltz 1979;Mearsheimer 2001). Governance processes include the establishment of agendas, making, implementing, and adjudicating rules, and setting goals and programs of action (Young 2000; Biermann et al. 2009;Avant et al. 2010) to deal with global collective issues. ...
This chapter summarizes findings and arguments of previous chapters. We conclude that Brazil–Japan cooperation has a strategic relevance in general, global, and bilateral context. The cooperation will be motivated by economic complementarity, human bonds, and mutual interests in exploiting shared value.
... From an IR perspective, our framework blurs the distinction between external and internal, or the domestic and international levels, established by neorealism (Waltz 1979;Mearsheimer 2001). Governance processes include the establishment of agendas, making, implementing, and adjudicating rules, and setting goals and programs of action (Young 2000; Biermann et al. 2009;Avant et al. 2010) to deal with global collective issues. ...
This chapter identifies the overall trends in Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) policies for the health sector in developing countries from 1990 to 2020 and its future post-COVID-19 prospects. Since the end of the Cold War, watershed events have repeatedly changed the landscape of international cooperation in the health sector. Like other international aid donors, Japan has devised priorities and strategies for ODA based on a set of international and domestic factors in a constantly changing world. Numerous studies on Japan’s ODA have examined international and domestic factors that impact the formulation of the country’s aid policy. This chapter aims to add to those studies by combining recent debates on international cooperation and foreign aid, the right to health, and world health system reforms to explore and analyze Japan’s ODA for health in developing countries. The guiding research questions were as follows: What were the major trends in Japan’s ODA policies in the health sector from 1990 to 2020? Which international health debates and international cooperation factors exerted influence on those trends? What are the prospects of Japan’s ODA given the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts? The research relied on primary sources, specifically Japan’s ODA official documents and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) ODA quantitative databases, as well as secondary sources, such as academic literature on international cooperation and foreign aid for health. Our preliminary findings revealed that Japan’s ODA in the health sector from 1990 to 2020 centered on two main axes: infectious diseases and maternal and child health, both of which are oriented toward strengthening the healthcare system. Given this goal, it seems relevant to consider that Japan’s health system is based on the assumption of the need to provide universal health coverage, a concept currently supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), in contrast to the universal health system, and that the implications of this choice on Japan’s ODA and developing countries’ health policies are yet to be fully understood. The COVID-19 pandemic has put substantial pressure on health systems globally and international cooperation for health; thus, it has the potential to affect and even change Japan’s ODA for the health sector in developing countries.
... But it was still state-centric in the sense that the "target" of domestic change was the state and national government. While I worked on transnational relations, I did not consider non-state actors as "governors" (for this term see Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010) either in the transnational or in the domestic realms. ...
... Agent-based approaches take into account that authority can emerge and disappear but conceptualize the sources of authority as fixed. Constructivist studies, such as Barnett and Finnemore (2004) and Avant et al. (2010), acknowledge that authority can draw on a variety of sources, but anchor the sources to specific institutions. Yet who has authority in IR and under what terms are not immutable characteristics. ...
This book brings together the key scholars in the international practice debate to demonstrate its strengths as an innovative research perspective. The contributions show the benefit of practice theories in the study of phenomena in international security, international political economy and international organisation, by directing attention to concrete and observable everyday practices that shape international outcomes. The chapters exemplify the cross-overs and relations to other theoretical approaches, and thereby establish practice theories as a distinct IR perspective. Each chapter investigates a key concept that plays an important role in international relations theory, such as power, norms, knowledge, change or cognition. Taken together, the authors make a strong case that practice theories allow to ask new questions, direct attention to uncommon empirical material, and reach different conclusions about international relations phenomena. The book is a must read for anyone interested in recent international relations theory and the actual practices of doing global politics.
... It argues that platform governance is a dynamic development linked to power relations and can be understood as a political process for organizing the relations of power and of regulation with respect to activities of online platforms at multiple levels (Weiss and Wilkinson 2019). Platform governance is composed of informal and formal ideas, norms, procedures and institutions (Karns et al. 2015: 2), allowing the actors involved to identify and address problems related to the activities of online platforms, as well as to coordinate their practices in a context of polyarchic authority (Avant et al. 2010) and of absence of global government (Rosenau 1997). As such, the platform governance is seen as a continuous political process within which a constant game of bargaining, exchanges and confrontations is made (Puppis 2010). ...
The rapid expansion of video-on-demand platforms, such as Netflix or Disney Plus, associated with the advance of digital capitalism makes the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) adopted by the European Union a particularly relevant case for understanding the politics of the digital media policy. Based on an actor-centred constructivism, the article seeks to propose a conceptual approach to explore platform governance and highlight the key dynamics through which platform governance related to the media sector is formulated in light of the actors involved. As such, it provides an ‘in situ and in action’ view on normative building, introducing politics into the analysis of platform governance. The study focuses on the political framing of two key issues related to the crystallization of AVMSD: (1) the financial contribution of online platforms to European and national audio-visual content creation and (2) the presence and prominence of European and national audio-visual works in the online catalogues.
... Boege et al. (2006) observe that it has become common wisdom that the private sector has to be included in efforts aimed at crisis prevention and conflict management. Governments, international organizations and parts of civil society alike appeal to firms to engage as 'global governors' (Avant et al. 2010) of security in 'weak governance zones' (OECD 2006). This is true for the DRC as well. ...
Multinational companies are increasingly promoted as peacebuilders. Major arguments in support of such a position emphasise both interest-based and norm/socialisation-based factors. This article uses research on large mining MNCs in eastern DRC – those that, arguably, should be most likely to build peace according to the above positions – to engage critically with the business for peace agenda. First it demonstrates the limited peacemaking, as well as active peacebuilding, activities in broader society that companies undertake. Second, it finds that even those companies deemed most likely to build peace continue relying on hybrid (in)security practice. Third, this article calls for more reflexivity concerning the implications of the business for peace research agenda. While the latter might contribute to socialising businesses into contributions to peacebuilding, it also produces companies as legitimate authorities, despite their limitations as peacebuilders. As a result, new conflict and insecurity are produced, especially for/with those displaced from land and artisanal mining pits and left with no alternative livelihood options.
... To recall, I conceptualize IOs generally, and MDBs in particular as partially autonomous actors (see Chapter 1.1). To sketch the level playing field, I briefly address the increase of IO power (with a special focus on MDB bureaucracies) along stages of the policy cycle, including: (a) knowledge-creation and agenda setting, (b) decision-making, (c) monitoring and rule interpretation, (d) rule enforcement, and (e) evaluation (Avant et al., 2010). 4 First, international organizations play an increasingly important role in creating knowledge (e.g., shaping core concepts of the respective policy field) and agenda setting. ...
... 43 Also, the reconceptualisation of the notion of security from state to human security coupled with the changes in the nature of threats from states-only to include non-state threats plus the attendant multi-actor response mechanisms have generated intense theoretical discourse on who actually governs the globe. 44 As Krahamann puts it, the changing nature of security threats and actors has not only transformed the making and implementation of security policies, it has also had serious implications for the theoretical analysis of security by broadening the concept of security beyond the state as the unit of analysis. 45 Specifically, the question of whether the state still holds monopoly over the control of means of violence and generally over contemporary security policy decision making and implementation in view of the profuse non-state security threats and activities has been widely debated. ...
... 43 Also, the reconceptualisation of the notion of security from state to human security coupled with the changes in the nature of threats from states-only to include non-state threats plus the attendant multi-actor response mechanisms have generated intense theoretical discourse on who actually governs the globe. 44 As Krahamann puts it, the changing nature of security threats and actors has not only transformed the making and implementation of security policies, it has also had serious implications for the theoretical analysis of security by broadening the concept of security beyond the state as the unit of analysis. 45 Specifically, the question of whether the state still holds monopoly over the control of means of violence and generally over contemporary security policy decision making and implementation in view of the profuse non-state security threats and activities has been widely debated. ...
Micro-disarmament, which refers to the removal of small arms and light weapons (SALW) from the civilian population, is one of the recent international policy frameworks through which the global challenge of illicit gun proliferation has been approached. Although Africa still grapples with this challenge, a number of successful micro-disarmament programmes have been implemented from which important lessons can be drawn. One such success story has been the disarmament of pastoral communities in the Karamoja region of north-eastern Uganda under the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP). This paper argues that even though micro-disarmament success may be context specific, there are generic conceptual and practical lessons that should be learned from the KIDDP. Particularly, the paper argues that a human security approach anchored on a well-coordinated multi-actor structural framework is an essential lesson from the KIDDP which can benefit the rest of the African communities still grappling with the management of small arms infiltration.
... Two characteristics are identified in the effectiveness of public actions: the investiture of an authority (perceived from different typologies that distinguish between legally recognized authorities and authorities that have not passed this formal process, but have social recognition) (Avant et al. 2010, Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Lake 2010, Zürn et al. 2012) and, legitimacy. However, the literature suggests that initiatives that promote mitigation and/or adaptation actions lack these characteristics, such as the 2015 Paris Agreement (Bäckstrand and Kuyper 2017, Bulkeley et al. 2014, Koppell 2008. ...
At the international level, the REDD+ mechanism has been promoted through public policies and financial incentives to improve forest conditions and reduce climate change. Given the dynamics of deforestation and forest degradation in Mexico, REDD+ has been implemented as a strategy that can be analyzed under indicators of legality, legitimacy and legitimation to understand its acceptance in the community and the achievement of the effects of policies planned, formulated, implemented and evaluated as forest governance schemes. The objective of this study is to identify in the scientific literature the main indicators of legality, legitimacy and legitimation in public policies and to propose a framework for analyzing forest governance in Mexico, using REDD+ as an example of an emerging international public policy. To achieve an approach to legality, legitimacy and legitimation, an exploration, review and description of various studies that have identified these indicators has been carried out. Some of the studies are associated with forest governance schemes and propose models to determine their presence in government actions, public policies and forestry legislation. The main findings suggest that the construction of normative, sociological and institutional indicators, mainly for forest legitimacy, as well as the knowledge of the normativity (legality) and the effect caused (legitimation) must be understood in an interrelated way, even though, in the literature, some authors identify legitimacy as synonymous with legitimation.
Keywords: indicators, forest governance, REDD+, public policies, climate change
... In political leadership, Sell (2018) notes the growing importance of transnational networks that are displacing traditional state-centric modes of governance, allowing for indirect modes of influence and advocacy, both challenging and correcting institutional authority. The operation of networks beyond national lines and at all levels of power has created new power circuits (Edwards, 2016) with amorphous leadership systems and flows of illicit activity in the form of transnational organized crime and terrorist organizations. ...
This qualitative, grounded theory study focused on the exploration of leadership arising within
the Asia region. While enduring leadership qualities like strength, humility, resolve, and trust have been foundational in leadership practice globally, scholars have demonstrated that leadership does not exist in absolute terms; it is shaped by the values of local culture, which set expectations for leadership behaviors. This study explored the conceptualization of a more collective and connected form of leadership in the context of a region leading the world with highly networked digital social practices. The question the study explored was, if, and to what extent, leaders and teams in the Asia region are shifting their understanding and practices of leadership, from a process led primarily by an individual to a system of shared and digitally connected relationships. The literature review provided the opportunity to go beyond the mere transferability of heroic Western-centric leadership theories and investigated emerging leadership models in Asia, learning theories in the digital age, and the evolution of leadership theory and organization design. Data collection comprised of forty-two interviews: twenty-nine one-on-one in-depth interviews with research participants based in the Asia region and thirteen global leading experts in networked learning, leadership, and Asian studies. The findings were harnessed in support of the development of a grounded theory, which shifts the heroic leadership paradigm in favor of the discovery of a new leadership model called “Connectivist Leadership.”
Keywords: Leadership, collective leadership, connectivism, digital connectivity, cross- cultural, Asia
... It seems self-evident that states are more concerned, in terms of security, about nearby states than those located at a distance. Even as technological advances and 'the forces of globalization' (see Avant et al., 2010) shrink the perceived distance between states, immediate security concerns are still a product of geography. The problem for IR scholars has been how to operationalize this. ...
The security interests of Arctic states are increasingly described as intertwined. The Arctic is seen either as a region where great power rivalries or resource wars are likely, or as a part of the world defined by cooperative traits and shared security interests. These depictions often implicitly lean on notions of a security region and regionalism, albeit without utilizing such frameworks to unpack security interactions in the Arctic. An increasing number of Arctic-focused scholars refer to the Arctic as a region in terms of security interests, but is this really the case if we make use of the different ways a security region has been outlined as an analytical tool? Leaning on different levels of analysis, this article questions several assumptions underpinning recent work on military security in the Arctic, advancing our understanding of security dynamics in the north and adding to our knowledge of security regions as a concept within international studies. It is argued that descriptions of the Arctic as a new security region are based on mixing and equating two distinct features of the region: the changing climate and related increases in economic ventures; and Russia’s military build-up and regional hegemony.
... We contend in this article that developing knowledge on HQ cities could help to better understand IOs themselves and global governance more broadly. In a nutshell, we argue that beyond the questions of who governs the world (Avant et al., 2010), who are the globally governed (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2018), or why global governance is necessary (Acharya, 2016), it is essential to understand where global governance takes place. ...
The objective of this article is to explore the spatial and temporal dynamics of an important but often neglected space of global governance: the cities in which the headquarters of international organizations (IOs) are located. For this purpose, this article proposes a conceptualization and an empirical application of the concept of "ecosystem". This conceptualization builds on classic sociological ideas and organization theory to develop an innovative understanding of these cities which are more than mere hubs. We use this metaphor to describe an HQ city where one or several IOs have their seats. As a result, it is a space characterized by specific geographical and temporal features that can be qualified as spatial and temporal proximity between the elements composing the ecosystem. Based on original empirical sources, we apply this concept to the so-called International Geneva. We argue that conceptualizing headquarters as ecosystems helps to consider how HQs' location influences the daily work of IOs.
... It has become a truism within this scholarship that contemporary capitalism is fragmented and decentralized. Scholars have drawn attention to the way responsibilities of governance once contained in the public sector are distributed or shared among numerous public and private actors (Avant et al., 2010;Risse, 2011;Strange, 1996). Business operations are similarly spread across disaggregated global supply chains (Locke, 2013), contributing to 'the great fragmentation of the firm' (Reurink & Garcia-Bernardo, 2020). ...
In recent years, the power of large technology corporations has become a focus of public debate in both developed and developing countries. This growing chorus brings together complaints about breaches of privacy and data protection, competition and market consolidation, and electoral and other political interference. The most powerful of these companies have grown into behemoths by establishing themselves both as purveyors of their own products, and as the hosts of “platforms” that circumscribe, and profit from, the activities of other organizations. This platform function gives these companies substantial power over their commercial rivals, who depend upon these platforms to operate. More fundamentally, this article argues, the dual function of these “platform companies” allows them to straddle the very categories that we use to organize our understanding of the political and economic world. They are at once product companies, service companies and infrastructure companies; players in the market and markets of the marketplace; private platforms and public spheres. The straddling of these categories places these companies in the institutional cracks of the regulatory system. Moreover, companies consciously exploit this regulatory straddling to thwart challenges to their power. This article argues that such deliberate shape-shifting has allowed these companies to control the political and economic stage on which their own power must be contested, and compromised the ability of scholars, the public and ultimately states to see clearly, and therefore constrain, that power.
... Rational action can be directed through the use of material incentives and legal enforcement. Much IR research has focused on how to achieve the latter on the international level, either through apex structures with direct binding authority (UN Security Council and supranational judicial bodies) or indirect authority relationships based on legal, procedural, and substantive grounds (Avant et al. 2010). Theories of legalization suggest that rational end-goals can be achieved through rules-based supranational governing frameworks and the toggling of strategic mechanisms (e.g. ...
Why are existing global governance structures “not fit for purpose” when it comes to addressing complex global catastrophic risks (CGCRs) such as climate breakdown, ecosystem collapse, or parasitic artificial general intelligence? This article argues that a deeper appreciation of these risks as complex—as opposed to complicated—is vital to an effective global governance response. It joins other IR scholarship seeking to invigorate a rigorous research agenda on complex system dynamics within world politics, highlighting the value of complexity theory, not simply as a contextual descriptor, but as a conceptual toolkit to inform CGCR governance research and action. Taking seriously the implications of “restricted complexity,” it interrogates why the legacy governing toolkit—the assumptions, heuristics, models, and practices conventionally employed to solve international collective action problems—are unlikely to suffice. It further draws laterally upon design science to offer a novel design model for governing complex systems, with broad application across global policy domains. A case study of the COVID-19 pandemic response illustrates the importance of supplementing inherited “complicated” governance system design and practices with design principles explicitly oriented to working with complexity, rather than against it. We contend that IR scholars and practitioners must update old ways of thinking in light of a complexification of the discipline. Such a shift involves both revisiting the design logics underlying how we build global governance structures, as well as pursuing a generative research agenda more capable of responding adequately to instability, surprise, and extraordinary change.
... The fact that Xi Jinping is attempting to 24 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 25 On different ways in which transnational elite networks can produce or reproduce authority relations, see for example Strange (1996); Slaughter (2003); Owen (2010); and Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010). ...
Do international systems tend to remain anarchic because of recurring balances of power, or do they tend toward imbalances and hierarchy? Leading structural theories posit competing predictions about systemic outcomes, and the historical record offers evidence to support both claims. This suggests the need to theorize conditions under which one tendency or another is likely to dominate and what factors lead systems to transition from one state to another. We draw on constructivist and English School insights about international authority and legitimacy to develop such a framework. We conceive of patterns of international authority as structures independent from, and interacting with, mechanisms usually associated with international anarchy, such as the balance of power. We propose that international authority systems vary along two dimensions: particularist cosmopolitan and substitutable nonsubstitutable. Both are emergent properties of ideas and institutions located at the unit level. We argue that certain authority systems—particularist and nonsubstitutable—reinforce, and are reinforced by, anarchy and balanced distributions of capabilities. Others—cosmopolitan substitutable—facilitate rollup and domination and are likely to emerge or be maintained in hierarchic and highly asymmetric systems. By offering a structural account of international authority, we hope to contribute to the global turn in international relations, offering a framework for comparing systems across time and space. We also aim to help make sense of contemporary struggles over norms and values, their structural causes and consequences, and their potential implications for the future of global power politics.
... Private programs such as the MSC use audit organizations and individual assessors to perform the rule verification and we expect these agents' prior experience will affect verification duration. Assessing rule compliance is highly technical and demands expert knowledge, which in itself is considered a form of authority in a governance relationship (Avant et al. 2010). Work on credit rating agencies, financial audits, codes governing labor practices, and certification for responsible forest management and organic agriculture has shed some light on the importance of auditors' and assessors' epistemic authority and level of training. ...
Private regulatory programs, such as certification schemes, seek to control market access by providing greater certainty about products' credence attributes, including sustainability features of production processes. This article contributes to the literature that assesses the verification processes that determine whether private rules are being followed sufficiently by applicant rule‐targets (usually companies), and the regulatory intermediaries (auditors, assessors) that perform verification functions. By examining variation in the duration of verification processes of applicant rule‐targets, we question the assumption that within the context of a given program's design the efficiency of the verification process is invariant across time and space. We argue that the verification process can impose hurdles that are independent of rule‐targets' sustainability and their adherence to a private program's rules. Our analysis of 312 fisheries seeking Marine Stewardship Council certification shows that variation among intermediaries and objections to their certification decisions explain differences in the time it takes fisheries to receive market access.
... They effectively raise awareness of global problems, publicly shame governments for noncompliance with international commitments, and teach norms and knowledge to nonstate audiences. Hence, research has come to understand IOs as eminent "governors" of significant epistemic, moral, or political authority that are widely recognized as competent and legitimate (Barnett and Finnemore 2004;Avant et al. 2010). ...
Massive instances of organizational failure may seriously affect the social legitimacy of international organizations (IO), i.e. stakeholders' recognition of IOs as capable and rightful agents of global governance. However, we lack systematic research of how IOs handle public "blame games" in which failure becomes a salient topic of public debate. The paper theorizes blame games as framing contests, negotiating the nature of organizational failure as well as its political implications. Empirically, the paper assesses the case of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) during peacekeeping missions, in which the UN Secretariat changed from initial neglect to claiming a new leadership role of advocacy for "zero tolerance." From the vantage point of classical accounts on crisis communication the UN Secretariat had a peculiar take on failure in the SEA case: apart from uttering excuses and justifications for what went wrong, they set in motion an impressive flow of speech that heralds the decision for or execution of policies aiming at SEA. In this way, the UN secretariat arguably sought to (re)frame SEA in the global public realm-from a pinnacle of organizational failure to an area of legitimate political intervention by the UN.
The idea of 'hybrid sovereignty' describes overlapping relations between public and private actors in important areas of global power, such as contractors fighting international wars, corporations regulating global markets, or governments collaborating with nongovernmental entities to influence foreign elections. This innovative study shows that these connections – sometimes hidden and often poorly understood – underpin the global order, in which power flows without regard to public and private boundaries. Drawing on extensive original archival research, Swati Srivastava reveals the little-known stories of how this hybrid power operated at some of the most important turning points in world history: spreading the British empire, founding the United States, establishing free trade, realizing transnational human rights, and conducting twenty-first century wars. In order to sustain meaningful dialogues about the future of global power and political authority, it is crucial that we begin to understand how hybrid sovereignty emerged and continues to shape international relations.
Objective:
The roles of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in regulating harmful commodity industries (HCIs) are understudied. The aim of this paper is to identify the NGOs and the roles that they play in the governance of the ultra-processed food and alcohol industries in Australia.
Methods:
We undertook an exploratory descriptive analysis of NGOs identified from an online search based on the typology we developed of type, issue area and governance function.
Results:
A total of 134 relevant Australian NGOs were identified: 38 work on food issues, 61 with alcohol issues and 35 are active in both. In the food domain, 90% of NGOs engage in agenda setting, 88% in capacity building, 15% in implementation and 12% in monitoring. In the alcohol domain, 92% of NGOs are active in agenda setting, 72% in capacity building, 35% in implementation and 8% in monitoring.
Conclusions:
Australian NGOs are active actors in the food and alcohol governance system.
Implications for public health:
There are many opportunities for NGOs to regulate HCI practices, building on their relative strengths in agenda setting and capacity building, and expanding their activities in monitoring and implementation. A more detailed examination is needed of strategies that can be used by NGOs to be effective regulators in the governance system.
Multisectoral governance has been recognized to be vital to regulate harmful commodity industries, yet countries struggle with reaching policy coherence due to government agencies' conflicting mandates and industry interference. Limited empirical evidence is available on how interests, ideas, and institutions intersect and influence multisectoral governance in low‐ and middle‐income countries, particularly in Pacific small island developing states (PSIDS), often exploited by vested industry interests and whose non‐communicable disease crisis commands urgent action to regulate harmful commodities. This study assessed the ways interests, ideas, and institutions intersect and shape multisectoral tobacco governance in PSIDS. Interviewee data collected in Fiji and Vanuatu show that the idea of individual responsibility, the limited recognition of commercial determinants of health, the centralization of authority, and the vulnerabilities of small island developing states, (including small population, land, economy, geographic isolation, and status as a developing economy), prevent these states from achieving policy coherence in multisectoral tobacco governance.
Intergovernmental, regional, and international organizations play an active role in the governance of transnational crises. In the context of the COVID -19 pandemic in Latin America, the World Health Organization and the Pan-American Health Organization have been linked with multiple actors and levels of decision-making, putting into practice what the literature on global governance refers to as indirect governance by orchestration . This article shows that, in practice, the mechanisms of orchestration have established heterogeneous models of coordination and action that, in situations of transnational crisis, allow these organizations to bring together resources, capacities, and authority.
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always challenged traditional regulatory regimes
[1]
. This is not new nor is this tension likely to change anytime soon given the increasing speed at which embryonic technologies are emerging into the market
[2]
. Some of these technologies, such as autonomous vehicles or drones, can be effectively regulated at the national level due to clearly defined jurisdictional boundaries and the existence of relevant national and state/provincial regulatory agencies that oversee their conventional counterparts. While the entry of these technologies into the market will challenge regulators and policymakers and may require tweaking of existing regimes, we argue that these technologies, and the products that they enable, will not require a sui generis response at the national and supranational levels. The same cannot be said for artificial intelligence (AI) and the myriad of interconnected and interwoven applications made possible by AI.
Following the considerable interest in practice theory, this Collective Discussion interrogates what it means to practice and, ultimately, to think with diplomacy. In asking how empirical, methodological, and axiological disagreements over what constitutes diplomatic practice can be productively employed to develop or revise practice theory, the Discussion engages the historically and culturally contingent practices of diplomacy. In doing so, it goes beyond the conventional interactions that assume a fixed and singular identity for diplomacy. The Discussion aims, on the one hand, to pluralize the notion of diplomatic practice, and, on the other, to reflexively retrieve “theory” from the everyday and alternative practices of diplomacy that are often missed by the radar of practice theory. It thus seeks to reassess practice theory using insights from the very terrain of action it employs to develop its distinctive viewpoint. The Discussion contributes, moreover, to the rapidly changing field of Diplomatic Studies that has recently opened up to cross- and trans-disciplinary conversations with political geography, social anthropology, digital studies, visual studies, and new materialism.
Participatory approaches to humanitarianism, peacebuilding, and international development promise to listen to the voices of local aid beneficiaries. However, aid workers often listen to these voices through reductive narratives of aid beneficiaries, ventriloquizing their voice and inhibiting meaningful participation. Why do aid workers – despite humane intentions – continue to rely on reductive narratives? This paper inquires how the everyday emotional lives of aid workers make reductive narratives persist. Based on 65 semi-structured interviews in Singapore, Jakarta, and Aceh, and 40 aid worker books and blogs, I show how aid workers regularly experience emotional anxieties that question their complicity in the suffering of others and their powerlessness to do anything about it. Reductive narratives resonate and persist because they allow aid workers to cope with these anxieties. I illustrate the emotional resonance of three reductive narratives – civilizing; romanticized; and impersonal narratives – in three common practices of local participation in aid work: professionalized standards; visiting the field; and hiring locals. Given the emotional origins of reductive narratives, rational critique is insufficient for reforming or decolonizing aid work. Rather, change must also involve engaging the underlying emotions of aid workers.
El Panel Intergubernamental de Cambio Climático en 2018 previno que, si no actuamos hoy, no vamos a lograr el objetivo de 1,5 °C, que es el límite para evitar un futuro no viable para la humanidad. En 2019 la revista Nature previno que ese umbral es el que podría evitar los puntos de inflexión en el Sistema de la Tierra, tales como la pérdida de la selva amazónica o el colapso de las capas de hielo; lo que sugiere un estado de emergencia planetaria: tanto el riesgo como la urgencia de la situación son agudas. En 2020 la Organización Meteorológica Mundial advirtió que entre 2020 y 2024 la temperatura media mundial podría elevarse a 1,5°. Es urgente actuar ahora, máxime porque los compromisos actuales son insuficientes, pues de cumplirse el Acuerdo de París, el mundo se dirigirá a un aumento de temperatura de 3,2 °C. Se requieren medidas más ambiciosas dirigidas a un compromiso mundial que ahora limite la temperatura mundial a 1,5 °C. Hay que superar la inacción climática de la década pasada y conformar una masa crítica de países que asuman este compromiso. Con base en lo anterior, se argumenta que la investigación académica debe propiciar nuevas transformaciones desde la gobernanza global, la coproducción de políticas y la “bioeconomía ecológica”.
The present investigation explored if the World Bank could effectively promote and protect the needs of water-stricken Andean communities through the implementation of bottom-up environmental resilience building and community political empowerment efforts in the context of technical cooperation programmes on climate change adaptation (CCA). The investigation was motivated by the fact that while World Bank CCA programmes have received relatively less attention by the mainstream literature compared to structural adjustment programmes, they have become one of the fastest growing catalysts for support to vulnerable people worldwide. The dissertation adopted a qualitative research approach through a single-country deviant case study, which was selected on the assumption that it would provide the most relevant data. Information was gathered through forty semi-structured key informant interviews with representatives of sixteen institutions, across six cities and towns, spanning three countries. The study found that the Bank enhanced local community resilience to climate change. At the same time, the study also found that the Bank did not facilitate the shifting of deeper lying power structures necessary to empower the local community vis-à-vis long term natural resource management decision making. However, what set apart the case study from traditional Bank programmes was the effort to mediate social conflict by attempting to empower local communities through the implementation of capacity development activities. This unexpected role is defined as that of a buffer institution, which is a concept that is used in a novel fashion in the present investigation. The study contributes to the literature on international development aid by helping to understand if the Bank may be pursuing a different type of engagement with poor communities compared to its past interventions, and whose interests this type engagement might best serve. The findings disclose avenues for future research into the extent to which the Bank may embrace new approaches to development assistance.
NATO represents one of the cornerstones of the global liberal order and a manifestation of American hegemony. The Trump Administration was characterized by ambivalence, if not open hostility, toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the beginning of its term. Yet, even though the Trump Administration did not miss any opportunity to weaken NATO, at the same time it strengthened it through substantial material and strategic reinforcements. This chapter takes this puzzle as a point of departure to evaluate the state of the liberal normative order in the North Atlantic area during four years of Trump. Using the concept of a security community, it identifies significant deficits on three levels: a value level, a practice level, and a communication level. Even though the threat to NATO was real, this chapter finds little evidence that the Trump Administration was actually interested in disbanding NATO altogether. Instead, it is argued that the Trump Administration viewed NATO primarily as a military defense alliance, causing NATO’s normative foundation as a security community to fade into the background. As a consequence, this did not mean the end of NATO, but the end of NATO as we know it: the degeneration from a liberal security community based on shared norms and mutual trust to an alliance based solely on shared interests and mutual threats.
Building on previous research on the relations between the European Union (EU) and the World Bank, this paper contributes to the debate on the World Bank focality in the regime complex for multilateral development finance. Adopting a historical-institutionalist perspective, the analysis focuses on the determinants and mechanisms of micro-institutional changes that have occurred in the context of EU-World Bank's interaction in non-core lending, particularly in World Bank trust funds and EU blending facilities. Most of the existing literature has focused on the ascendancy of new regional development banks outside the Bretton Woods camp, qualifying it as mostly conflicting or mostly cooperative. In contrast, this paper contends that a challenge has arisen also from within the group of core Bretton Woods-inspired institutions. In addition, it shows how the EU has both competed and cooperated with the World Bank in the area of fiduciary funding, across three broad phases, and in response to specific critical junctures and tipping points. The EU’s innovation and quest for leadership in blended finance has replicated the World Bank’s good practices on some counts, yet it has also challenged its focality in non-core lending.
There is increasing agreement that states and other political actors on the world stage sometimes achieve international authority. However, there is less agreement about the nature and functioning of international authority relations. What determines whether an actor will be recognized as an authoritative actor? And what are the effects thereof? In this essay, we identify four distinct conceptions of authority in the study of international relations: authority as contract , authority as domination , authority as impression , and authority as consecration . Consideration of the typology leads to two important insights. First, the phenomenon of authority has an essentially experiential dimension. Subordinate actors’ emotional experience of authority determines their response to authority and thus also has a fundamental impact on the stability of authority. Second, the emergence of forms of international authority does not entail, at least not necessarily, the weakening of the sovereignty of states, but can equally be argued to strengthen it.
Expert authority is regarded as the heart of international bureaucracies’ power. To measure whether international bureaucracies’ expert authority is indeed recognised and deferred to, we draw on novel data from a survey of a key audience: officials in the policy units of national ministries in 121 countries. Respondents were asked to what extent they recognised the expert authority of nine international bureaucracies in various thematic areas of agricultural and financial policy. The results show wide variance. To explain this variation, we test well-established assumptions on the sources of de facto expert authority. Specifically, we look at ministry officials’ perceptions of these sources and, thus, focus on a less-studied aspect of the authority relationship. We examine the role of international bureaucracies’ perceived impartiality, objectivity, global impact, and the role of knowledge asymmetries. Contrary to common assumptions, we find that de facto expert authority does not rest on impartiality perceptions, and that perceived objectivity plays the smallest role of all factors considered. We find some indications that knowledge asymmetries are associated with more expert authority. Still, and robust to various alternative specifications, the perception that international bureaucracies are effectively addressing global challenges is the most important factor.
The recent debate on administrative bodies in international organizations has brought forward multiple theoretical perspectives, analytical frameworks, and methodological approaches. Despite these efforts to advance knowledge on these actors, the research program on international public administrations (IPAs) has missed out on two important opportunities: reflection on scholarship in international relations (IR) and public administration and synergies between these disciplinary perspectives. Against this backdrop, the essay is a discussion of the literature on IPAs in IR and public administration. We found influence, authority, and autonomy of international bureaucracies have been widely addressed and helped to better understand the agency of such non-state actors in global policy-making. Less attention has been given to the crucial macro-level context of politics for administrative bodies, despite the importance in IR and public administration scholarship. We propose a focus on agency and politics as future avenues for a comprehensive, joint research agenda for international bureaucracies.
A prominent argument in the politicisation literature links the degree of politicisation of international institutions to the extent of their delegated political authority. I criticise the authority-politicisation thesis as theoretically myopic and falling short of adequately explaining many empirically observable instances of politicisation. Instead, I argue that politicisation is driven by the (expected) consequences of particular governance arrangements and that the perceived significance and magnitude of such consequences need not correlate with formally delegated or recognised authority. I illustrate the argument with discussions of three types of institutions—the UN General Assembly, the G7/8/20 summits, and coalitions of the willing—each of which can be factually consequential and has triggered substantial politicisation without possessing, as an institution, much recognised political authority in its own right.
The concept of responsibility has emerged as central to the study of international politics. This book explores the integral role of responsibility within the context of global crises such as the responsibility to address climate change, manage financial crises, and intervene with political conflicts. Vetterlein and Hansen-Magnusson address responsibility as a conceptual tool in its own right, existing at the intersection of accountability and legitimacy and spanning across governance sectors of the environment, business, and security. This practice-based approach to the study of responsibility maps similarities and difference across policy fields and reveals the diverse moral actors responsible for negotiating responsibility. The emergence of responsibility further implicates underlying moral values and policy-making within the context of global politics. The Rise of Responsibility in World Politics addresses not only individual agency, but also how questions of community play a role in broader negotiations around the meaning of responsibility.
The purpose of this article is to substantiate the determinants of contemporary changes in military security policy, which is reflexive management. Military security is considered as a function of political attitudes and strategic decisions, and its governmental potential is a changing mechanism designed to meet regional and global demands and tendencies of society development. The author substantiates the assumption that today, the system of ensuring military security requires radical governmental transformation, and the key mechanism of this transformation is reflexive governance. The theoretical research method is a conceptual transformation of the governmental aspect of the military security policy through the prism of the theory of reflexive governance. The concept of reflexive governance has not yet been properly developed in Russian academic investigations, but its relevance is determined by a substantial change in the existing prospects for the analysis, development, and implementation of the military security policy in times of peace: (1) shifting the attention of civil cervants to the mechanisms of transformation of military security institutions to global challenges; (2) activation of discussions about “open” and “closed” spaces in politics; (3) development of the potential of governance based on continuous education and network management; and (4) development of a network governance system. Within the framework of reflexive governance, cognitive and normative beliefs form the political-administrative hierarchy and economic incentives as mechanisms for coordinating military security. At the same time, the mechanism of ensuring military security consists of such components as (1) subjects and (2) objects of military security; (1) normative and regulatory, (2) theoretical and research, and (3) activity components of military security. Reflexive governance, while becoming the basis of the military security in a modern state, implies that in the arms race countries should not forget about deeper, fundamental goals of state management. Any action both within the framework of direct provision of military security and within the framework of diplomatic regulation of relations in the international arena should be devoted to collective and individual-administrative reflexing of decision makers. A key role in military security policy should be played not by the theory of warfare, but by the development of tools to help resolve emerging conflicts peacefully.
The ecology of governance organizations (GOs) matters for what is or is not governed, what legitimate powers any governor may hold, and whose political preferences are instantiated in rules. The array of actors who comprise the current system of global governance has grown dramatically in recent decades. Especially notable has been the growth of private governance organizations (PGOs). Drawing on organizational ecology, I posit that the rise of PGOs is both required and facilitated by disagreements between states that block the creation of what might be otherwise effective intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In a form of “double-negative regulation,” states block IGOs, which in turn leave open niches that are then filled by PGOs, which then both complement and sometimes substitute for state law. The organizational ecology approach outlined here extends and refocuses inquiry in systematic ways that give us a fuller understanding of how and why PGOs have emerged as one of the most striking features of the contemporary world order. The key innovations in this paper are to (a) shift the level of analysis from single agents or populations of agents to the entire field of GOs, including states, IGOs, and PGOs and (b) draw on principles of ecology to understand the composition and dynamics of systems of governance.
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