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Sense of agency is modulated by interactions between action choice, outcome valence, and predictability

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Sense of agency is a feeling of control over one’s actions to cause sensory events in one’s environment. While previous studies investigated the role of action choice and emotional valence of action outcome in forming implicit agency, the results were not consistent and the relationship between these factors remains unclear. We manipulated both action alternatives available and emotional valences of sounds (either positive or negative) as action outcomes and measured the resultant intentional binding effects in two experiments that differed in predictability of outcome valence. When participants could not predict the valence of action outcomes, they showed stronger sense of agency for negative outcomes determined by their free choice (Experiment 1). Conversely, when participants’ actions caused only outcomes with specific valence, this interaction was not observed (Experiment 2). These findings imply that the implicit processes of agency reflect an integrative context-dependent cognition of consequence of action choice, prior to explicit attribution judgments.
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Sense of agency is modulated by interactions between action choice,
outcome valence, and predictability
Takumi Tanaka
1
&Hideaki Kawabata
2
#Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019
Abstract
Sense of agency is a feeling of control over ones actions to cause sensory events in ones environment. While previous studies
investigated the role of action choice and emotional valence of action outcome in forming implicit agency, the results were not
consistent and the relationship between these factors remains unclear. We manipulated both action alternatives available and
emotional valences of sounds (either positive or negative) as action outcomes and measured the resultant intentional binding
effects in two experiments that differed in predictability of outcome valence. When participants could not predict the valence of
action outcomes, they showed stronger sense of agency for negative outcomes determined by their free choice (Experiment 1).
Conversely, when participantsactions caused only outcomes with specific valence, this interaction was not observed
(Experiment 2). These findings imply that the implicit processes of agency reflect an integrative context-dependent cognition
of consequence of action choice, prior to explicit attribution judgments.
Keywords Sense of agency .Intentional binding .Action choice .Emotional valence .Action-outcome predictability
Introduction
Based on environmental perception, humans consistently
choose their actions and then perceive sensory outcomes as
potential cues for the next action choice. This cycle is mediated
by Bsense of agency,^which is the feeling that ones intentional
actions cause specific events in the outside world (Gallagher
2000). This experience of agency makes a person realize the
causal relationship between ones actions and outcomes associ-
ated with reward or punishment and evokes cognitive, emotion-
al reactions to onesown action outcomes. In particular, agency
over a negative outcome is linked to feelings of guilt, regret, or
responsibility and plays a critical role in the modification of
inappropriate behavior (Gentsch and Synofzik 2014).
However, like the case of learned helplessness (Seligman
1968), a perception of the close causal relationship between
actions and negative outcomes might only foment negative
emotional reaction, and cannot improve future behavior unless
one realizes a possibility to avoid them by their action choice.
Especially, when someone only obeys anothersordersorhasno
other action choices, people find it difficult to attribute the neg-
ative outcome to themselves and to feel agency or any negative
emotion, even for ones voluntary actions (Mezulis et al. 2004).
Milgrams(1963) famous study implied that this tendency could
distort emotional reactions to negative action outcomes and al-
low one to behave highly immorally in specific situations. It is
important to mention that agency is subject to the process of
action choice as well as the actual cause of action outcome (Frith
2014); thus, this process can contribute to the arousal of regret
and changing the choice of behavior (Bossuyt et al. 2014).
In previous studies, participants reported they had a keen
sense of agency over actions chosen by themselves, where
agency was measured by self-report (e.g., Lepron et al.
2015). However, since a sense of agency is naturally a vague
experience that is not consciously accessed in the usual situa-
tion, participants can have difficulty in quantifying the degree
of agency (Haggard and Chambon 2012). Moreover, partici-
pantsreports can be distorted to meet the demand character-
istics (Woolfolk et al. 2006). To avoid these problems, many
*Takumi Tanaka
kino31513@gmail.com
Hideaki Kawabata
kawabata@flet.keio.ac.jp
1
Department of Psychology, Graduate School of Human Relations,
Keio University, Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
2
Department of Psychology, Keio University, Mita, Minato-ku,
Tokyo, Japan
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-018-0121-3
Published online: 5 January 2019
Current Psychology (2021) 40:1795–1806
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
... The mistake-appraisal process might be why the larger negative-outcome-enhancement effect in the operant block was found. Previous research has shown that when participants are given the freedom to select their actions, unexpectedly negative outcomes heightened TB (Tanaka & Kawabata, 2021). However, this effect vanished when outcome valence became entirely predictable. ...
... This attempt to learn from negative outcomes may not be necessary in the update and observational blocks. In summary, the attempt to learn from errors appears to underlie the negative-outcome enhancement effect, sharing a similar mechanism with previous studies (Di Costa et al., 2018;Majchrowicz et al., 2020;Tanaka & Kawabata, 2021). Alternatively, the differences observed among the three blocks could be attributed to differences in perceived arousal. ...
... As we discussed above, the negative-outcome-enhancement effect in the operant block might be related to mistake-appraisal processes and the attempt to learn from negative outcomes. When negative outcomes are coupled with negative social feedback, as opposed to positive social feedback, it likely amplifies participants' perception of their actions as mistakes (Jenkins & Obhi, 2022) and motivates them to learn from these negative outcomes (Di Costa et al., 2018;Majchrowicz et al., 2020;Tanaka & Kawabata, 2021), leading to a more substantial contrast between the two types of outcomes. Likewise, positive social feedback may signal to participants that the values of negative and positive outcomes are similar, thereby diminishing the inclination of participants to perceive their actions as mistakes and to endeavor to learn from negative outcomes. ...
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... Furthermore, when the patient group was divided into two subgroups based on the severity of current OCD symptoms, we found that the more severe the current OCD symptoms of the patients, the more they relied on the strongly rotated visual feedback at the expense of their internal movement information in the other block. In contrast to previous studies however, we found no evidence thatapart from the influence of the social contextthe manipulation of valence through monetary gains vs. losses additionally affects the SoA (Takahata, Takahashi et al. 2012, Wilke, Synofzik et al. 2012, Yoshie and Haggard 2013, Tanaka and Kawabata 2019. Previous studies manipulating outcome valence have arrived at conflicting results, with reports suggesting both increased SoA for positive as well as negative outcomes. ...
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... Second, considering valence outcome, predictability, and occurrence, Christensen et al. (2016) found stronger IB when neutral outcome was expected but did not occur. Third, evaluating action selection by giving participants the possibility to choose between several keyboards to perform a voluntary action, Tanaka and Kawabata (2021) found that temporal compression was stronger with negative than with positive outcomes when unpredictable. Finally, evaluating the effect of intended outcome in binding, with participants themselves choosing the emotional valence of outcomes, Sarma and Srinivasan (2021) also showed that the intentional binding effect was larger for negative than for positive facial expressions, when they were both intended. ...
... Furthermore, Tanaka et al. (2021) found a stronger IB effect for negative than for positive outcomes only when stimuli were unpredictable, yielding null results when predictable. In one condition participants had the possibility of choosing one key to perform voluntary action, and in other they only could press several. ...
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