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Sense of agency is modulated by interactions between action choice,
outcome valence, and predictability
Takumi Tanaka
1
&Hideaki Kawabata
2
#Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019
Abstract
Sense of agency is a feeling of control over one’s actions to cause sensory events in one’s environment. While previous studies
investigated the role of action choice and emotional valence of action outcome in forming implicit agency, the results were not
consistent and the relationship between these factors remains unclear. We manipulated both action alternatives available and
emotional valences of sounds (either positive or negative) as action outcomes and measured the resultant intentional binding
effects in two experiments that differed in predictability of outcome valence. When participants could not predict the valence of
action outcomes, they showed stronger sense of agency for negative outcomes determined by their free choice (Experiment 1).
Conversely, when participants’actions caused only outcomes with specific valence, this interaction was not observed
(Experiment 2). These findings imply that the implicit processes of agency reflect an integrative context-dependent cognition
of consequence of action choice, prior to explicit attribution judgments.
Keywords Sense of agency .Intentional binding .Action choice .Emotional valence .Action-outcome predictability
Introduction
Based on environmental perception, humans consistently
choose their actions and then perceive sensory outcomes as
potential cues for the next action choice. This cycle is mediated
by Bsense of agency,^which is the feeling that one’s intentional
actions cause specific events in the outside world (Gallagher
2000). This experience of agency makes a person realize the
causal relationship between one’s actions and outcomes associ-
ated with reward or punishment and evokes cognitive, emotion-
al reactions to one’sown action outcomes. In particular, agency
over a negative outcome is linked to feelings of guilt, regret, or
responsibility and plays a critical role in the modification of
inappropriate behavior (Gentsch and Synofzik 2014).
However, like the case of learned helplessness (Seligman
1968), a perception of the close causal relationship between
actions and negative outcomes might only foment negative
emotional reaction, and cannot improve future behavior unless
one realizes a possibility to avoid them by their action choice.
Especially, when someone only obeys another’sordersorhasno
other action choices, people find it difficult to attribute the neg-
ative outcome to themselves and to feel agency or any negative
emotion, even for one’s voluntary actions (Mezulis et al. 2004).
Milgram’s(1963) famous study implied that this tendency could
distort emotional reactions to negative action outcomes and al-
low one to behave highly immorally in specific situations. It is
important to mention that agency is subject to the process of
action choice as well as the actual cause of action outcome (Frith
2014); thus, this process can contribute to the arousal of regret
and changing the choice of behavior (Bossuyt et al. 2014).
In previous studies, participants reported they had a keen
sense of agency over actions chosen by themselves, where
agency was measured by self-report (e.g., Lepron et al.
2015). However, since a sense of agency is naturally a vague
experience that is not consciously accessed in the usual situa-
tion, participants can have difficulty in quantifying the degree
of agency (Haggard and Chambon 2012). Moreover, partici-
pants’reports can be distorted to meet the demand character-
istics (Woolfolk et al. 2006). To avoid these problems, many
*Takumi Tanaka
kino31513@gmail.com
Hideaki Kawabata
kawabata@flet.keio.ac.jp
1
Department of Psychology, Graduate School of Human Relations,
Keio University, Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
2
Department of Psychology, Keio University, Mita, Minato-ku,
Tokyo, Japan
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-018-0121-3
Published online: 5 January 2019
Current Psychology (2021) 40:1795–1806
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