Book

Interests and integration: Market liberalization, public opinion, and European Union

Authors:

Abstract

Integration in Europe has been a slow incremental process focusing largely on economic matters. Policy makers have tried to develop greater support for the European Union by such steps as creating pan-European political institutions. Yet significant opposition remains to policies such as the creation of a single currency. What explains continued support for the European Union as well as opposition among some to the loss of national control on some questions? Has the incremental process of integration and the development of institutions and symbols of a united Europe transformed public attitudes towards the European Union? In this book, Matthew Gabel probes the attitudes of the citizens of Europe toward the European Union. He argues that differences in attitudes toward integration are grounded in the different perceptions of how economic integration will affect individuals’ economic welfare and how perceptions of economic welfare effect political attitudes. Basing his argument on Easton’s idea that where affective support for institutions is low, citizens will base their support for institutions on their utilitarian appraisal of how well the institutions work for them, Gabel contends that in the European Union, citizens’ appraisal of the impact of the Union on their individual welfare is crucial because their affective support is quite low. This book will be of interest to scholars studying European integration as well as scholars interested in the impact of public opinion on economic policymaking.
... Also, during education, students are exposed to cosmopolitan values through school curricula emphasizing norms of tolerance and postnational models of society (Gaasholt & Togeby, 1995;Keating, 2009). A third explanation is that low-educated individuals are more Euroskeptic because they are the "losers" of European integration and are less competitive in an integrated labor market (Anderson & Reichert, 1995;Gabel, 1998;Hobolt & de Vries, 2016;Hooghe & Marks, 2005). ...
... A third explanation for why higher educated people are less skeptical about European integration refers to material self-interest (Gabel, 1998;Kriesi et al., 2008;Walter, 2017), an argument also demonstrated in studies on attitudes toward immigrants or ethnic minorities (Wagner & Zick, 1995). The cost-benefit explanation posits that low-educated individuals are more likely to be Euroskeptic because, compared to high-educated individuals, they benefit less from the EU (Anderson & Reichert, 1995;Gabel, 1998). ...
... A third explanation for why higher educated people are less skeptical about European integration refers to material self-interest (Gabel, 1998;Kriesi et al., 2008;Walter, 2017), an argument also demonstrated in studies on attitudes toward immigrants or ethnic minorities (Wagner & Zick, 1995). The cost-benefit explanation posits that low-educated individuals are more likely to be Euroskeptic because, compared to high-educated individuals, they benefit less from the EU (Anderson & Reichert, 1995;Gabel, 1998). Not everyone benefits equally from free movement and an integrated labor market. ...
Article
Full-text available
Research consistently shows that individuals with higher levels of education express lower levels of Euroskepticism. This relationship has been explained by values and skills acquired in education and by higher labor‐market competitiveness. While these explanations assume a causal impact of education, previous research uses cross‐sectional data. This is problematic, as students self‐select into education. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it provides a better test of the causal effect of education on Euroskepticism by using data from the Swiss Household Panel (1999–2011) that allow analyzing how Euroskepticism changes as students move through education from the age of 13 years onwards. Second, it advances theory by highlighting the role of parental socialization in explaining Euroskepticism. We argue that children of higher educated parents select into higher education and take over the pro‐European attitudes of their parents. We find a strong educational divide in Euroskepticism. However, longitudinal analyses show no change in Euroskepticism as individuals pass through education. Supporting the parental‐socialization hypothesis, parental Euroskeptic attitudes and education explain changes in youngsters' Euroskepticism. The results suggest that, rather than a genuine education effect, differences between educational groups are mostly a result of self‐selection due to family background.
... To understand the impact of welfare generosity, expectations and perceived welfare state performance, we rely on a long-standing research tradition stressing that individuals' support for European integration is fundamentally driven by economic self-interest (Anderson and Reichert, 1996;Gabel, 1998;Gabel and Whitten, 1997). The rationale for this is that European integration profoundly affects citizens' economic life chances (Marks and Hooghe, 2003). ...
... Subjective evaluations and experiences do not develop independently from the wider social structure, but are embedded within social-structural factors that can in turn shape support for an EMI. Self-interest theory traditionally considers individuals with higher levels of income, education and occupational skills as the so-called winners from European integration (Brinegar et al., 2004;Gabel, 1998). These people can easily use their skills, knowledge and capital to benefit from the opportunities offered by Europeanization, and see their life chances as enhanced in an integrated European market (Kriesi et al., 2008). ...
... Our results reveal that citizens' expectations, welfare state generosity and subjective welfare state performance evaluations are crucial factors in explaining the conditions under which Europeans would support the establishment of a European minimum income. The findings resonate with economic self-interest theory (Gabel, 1998) in three different ways. First, subjective expectations about the EU's impact on social protection levels are a major driver of public support. ...
Article
Full-text available
The economic crisis and the unequal degree to which it has affected EU member states have fuelled the debate on whether the EU should take responsibility for the living standards of European citizens. The current article contributes to this debate by investigating for the first time public support for an EU-wide minimum income benefit scheme. Through an analysis of data from the European Social Survey 2016, our results reveal that diverging national experiences and expectations are crucial in understanding why Europeans are widely divided on the implementation of such a benefit scheme. The analysis shows that (1) welfare state generosity and perceived welfare state performance dampen support, (2) those expecting that 'more Europe' will increase social protection levels are much more supportive, (3) the stronger support for a European minimum income benefit in less generous welfare states is explained by more-optimistic expectations about the EU's domestic impact, and (4) lower socioeconomic status groups are more supportive of this policy proposal. These findings can be interpreted in terms of sociotropic and egocentric self-interests, and illustrate how (perceived) performance of the national welfare state and expectations about the EU's impact on social protection levels shape support for supranational social policymaking.
... De utilitaire benadering verbindt de publieke steun voor Europese integratie met economische effecten, belangen en motieven. Matthew Gabel (1998a;1998b) argumenteert dat Euroscepticisme best verklaard wordt door de sociaal-economische positie van individuen en door de kosten en baten die burgers ervaren bij verdergaande Europese integratie en uitbreiding. De these van de objectieve verliezers stelt dat het proces van Europese integratie een centrum-periferie conflict creëert tussen sociale groepen wiens belangen bedreigd worden door het Europese beleid en diegenen die er de voordelen van plukken. ...
... Hierdoor beschouwen zij de Europese integratie waarschijnlijk eerder als een kans. Arbeiders, laaggeschoolden en uitkeringsafhankelijken zullen hetzelfde fenomeen allicht eerder als een probleem zien omdat ze de open grenzen als een gevaar van de nationale welvaartsstaat ervaren en omdat het Europese beleid hen dwingt om de competitie aan te gaan met minder beschermde EUburgers, wat hun job, levensstandaard en verworven sociale rechten bedreigt (Gabel & Palmer, 1995;Gabel, 1998aGabel, , 1998bTucker, Pacek & Berinsky, 2002;Hix, 2005). De stelling dat de objectieve verliezers automatisch tegenstanders van het Europese project zijn, is echter betwijfelbaar. ...
... De stelling dat de objectieve verliezers automatisch tegenstanders van het Europese project zijn, is echter betwijfelbaar. De these van de subjectieve verliezers gaat er daarom van uit dat niet de sociaal-economische positie van burgers als dusdanig de voornaamste voedingsbodem van Euroscepticisme is, maar dat vooral de perceptie van de economische evolutie, de gevoelens van relatieve deprivatie en de subjectieve beoordeling van de kosten en baten van de Europese integratie de determinanten van Euroscepticisme vormen (Anderson & Kalthenthaler, 1996;Gabel & Whitten, 1997;Gabel, 1998b). Mensen die de eigen economische evolutie en die van het land gunstiger beoordelen, zullen zich minder door de sociale veranderingen bedreigd voelen en daarom wellicht meer geneigd zijn om het Europese integratieproces te steunen. ...
Article
Full-text available
This article tries to analyse and improve the individual-level approaches to the study of public Euroscepticism in Belgium. In recent literature, three approaches focusing on instrumental, cultural and political cues can be distinguished. First, the utilitarian approach associates Euroscepticism with economic interests. Second, the cultural approach draws on cultural attitudes and affective identities. Third, the political approach associates support for European integration with political efficacy and institutional trust. Drawing upon Belgian data from the IntUne Project 2007, the results show that negative evaluations of the benefits of European membership, social distrust in European fellow citizens and institutional distrust in the EU are the most important determinants of Euroscepticism, while education, national attachment, exclusive identity and political powerlessness have a minor impact. Sinds begin jaren '90 is het optimisme omtrent het Europese project getemperd en staat een substantieel deel van de Europese publieke opinie weigerachtig tegenover een versneld proces van Europese integratie. In Nederland en Frankrijk beleefde het Euroscepticisme haar momentum in 2005, toen een ruime meerderheid van de kiezers zich tegen de ratificatie van de Europese grondwet uitsprak. In België lijkt het met de Euroscepsis wel mee te vallen. Alhoewel de publieke steun voor het EU-lidmaatschap in België in de jaren '90 een opmerkelijke daling kende, herstelt de steun zich vanaf de eeuwwende. Uit de recente Eurobarometer blijkt dat Belgen in het algemeen het lidmaatschap van hun land tot de EU als een goede zaak beschouwen en optimistisch zijn over het Europese integratieproces, maar dat een meerderheid van de Belgen zich verzet tegen een nieuwe uitbreiding van de EU in de komende jaren (Eurobarometer 67, 2007). Deze vaststellingen roepen twee onderzoeksvragen op. Ten eerste, wat dient onder Euroscepticisme verstaan te worden en hoe kan deze houding het best gemeten worden. Ten tweede, hoe kunnen de diverse houdingen tegenover de EU en de Europese integratie verklaard worden. In de literatuur worden economische, culturele en politieke verklaringen onderscheiden. De utilitaire benadering stelt dat de houding tegenover Europa de uitkomst is van een economische kosten-batenafweging; de culturele identiteitstheorie poneert dat Euroscepsis samenhangt met nationale identiteitsgevoelens en percepties van culturele bedreiging; en de politieke benadering veronderstelt dat de afkeer van Europese integratie gevoed wordt door politieke ontevredenheid en institutioneel wantrouwen. Voortbouwend op eerder onderzoek gaat dit artikel na op welke wijze en in welke mate economische belangen, culturele identiteit en politieke attitudes een rol spelen in de verklaring van Euroscepticisme bij Belgische burgers. Daartoe wordt eerst een overzicht van de drie belangrijkste benaderingen gegeven en worden enkele hypothesen gepresenteerd. Vervolgens wordt kort ingegaan op de definitie en meting van Euroscepticisme alsook de gebruikte gegevens. Ten slotte worden de verschillende hypothesen getoetst aan de hand van Belgische gegevens die verzameld werden in het kader van het IntUne project 2007.
... These resulting scores, with a wider range than those based on the four common items, provide more reliable measures of integration support. 9 In Table 2 we incorporate religious variables along with those tapping alternative hypotheses, which we have categorized under the rubrics of Cognitive Mobilization (Inglehart, 1970), Economic Utility (Gabel, 1998), and Political Assessments (Anderson, 1998;Hobolt, 2012;Hooghe and Marks, 2012). If religious variables remain significant predictors of attitudes under these controls, we can be confident that confessional culture persists as an influence, albeit perhaps a diminished one. ...
... These findings confirm perspectives arguing that greater understanding and political engagement are still predictors of pro-integration attitudes. Economic utility theories stress that those best situated to take advantage of the economic opportunities presented by integration are most likely to support it (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2013;Gabel, 1998;Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Whitten, 1997;Hooghe and Marks, 2005;McLaren, 2002McLaren, , 2006. And the data support these hypotheses: those claiming a higher subjective social class, those who can pay their bills without trouble, city dwellers, men (in 2009), younger people and students, professionals and white collar employees-but not manual workers-all are more positive about the EU. ...
... Whether to use such a variable in assessing public support is a conceptual issue going back to the beginning of the literature, when 'national tradition' often served to capture unmeasured influences on citizen attitudes. We have used such a control at various times, as have many other scholars (cf., Eichenberg and Dalton, 2013;Gabel, 1998), but prefer to rely on clearly specified variables, rather than a 'catch-all' designed to tap unmeasured influences (Keulman and Koós, 2014). As we think that religion is largely endogenous to 'national tradition,' incorporating the latter in the analysis splits the variance rightly explained by religious influences. ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper explores the changing role of religion in forming public attitudes toward integration. We first outline the complex relationship of religion to the development of the European Union, and then use the 2009 and 2014 European Parliamentary Election Studies to examine the changes taking place in those historic patterns. In 2009 traditional religious patterns persisted, with Catholics more positive toward the EU than Protestants, with religiosity reinforcing the respective tendencies. By 2014, however, traditional divisions had virtually disappeared, as the economic crisis (and perhaps the growing refugee problem) had a powerful effect on Catholic majorities in EU countries. Nevertheless, when economic and other assessments are accounted for, Catholic confessional culture still provides ‘deep’ support for the EU. Finally, we discover that EU expansion has not changed old religious patterns as much as we expected, but find those traditional relationships to be virtually absent among millennials.
... This vector of support depends on subjective socio-economic appraisals (Carey 2002;Gabel and Whitten 1997;Hooghe and Marks 2005). It also hinges on objective personal socio-economic circumstances (Gabel 1998;Hix 1999;Hooghe, Huo and Marks 2007) and the objective national socio-economic context (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000;Gabel 1998). Yet, the great majority of existing research relies on two dependent variables to draw these conclusions, namely 'EU membership as a good thing' and 'EU benefit' variables 1 . ...
... This vector of support depends on subjective socio-economic appraisals (Carey 2002;Gabel and Whitten 1997;Hooghe and Marks 2005). It also hinges on objective personal socio-economic circumstances (Gabel 1998;Hix 1999;Hooghe, Huo and Marks 2007) and the objective national socio-economic context (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000;Gabel 1998). Yet, the great majority of existing research relies on two dependent variables to draw these conclusions, namely 'EU membership as a good thing' and 'EU benefit' variables 1 . ...
... The perspective of real or potential citizen gains may help to strengthen EU citizen cohesion. Thus, consistent with earlier research (Gabel 1998;Hix 1999;Hooghe et al. 2007), individuals who have human and financial capital are more likely to take advantage of opportunities stemming from market liberalisation pertaining to integration. These opportunities may help to create links with other EU citizens which can successively enhance public support for integration. ...
Article
Full-text available
There is a growing body of literature on EU public opinion. Yet the feelings of connection between Europeans and how these influence EU model type preferences are an unexplored area. The present article addresses this gap in the research. Using Eurobarometer data, our results demonstrate that while being in a more favourable personal situation helps cement bonds between EU citizens and in turn stimulate public support for the EU, perceived EU policy contribution to unemployment, immigration and crime tend to damage the related bonds and successively boost public opposition to the EU. Terrorism management, multiculturalism, economic deprivation or ‘putting aside’ Europe´s Christian identity are also not found to help EU citizen cohesion. The article then discusses the implications of these findings.
... While on one hand public support for EU membership may provide significant contributions to the accession process, on the other hand, lack of such kind of a support might hinder the membership efforts. Politicians have come to realize this significant role of public opinion in determining the nature of European integration particularly with the rejection of EU constitution and EU membership in various circumstances such as the Maastricht referenda in France and Denmark and the rejection of membership in Norway 1972, 1994, and in Switzerland 1992(Gabel, 1998Cichowski, 2000Cichowski, , p.1244Slomczynski and Shabad, 2003, p.504;Ehin, 2001, p.31-32). ...
... In this section, among those arguments, not all but some of the most known approaches will be cited. Gabel (1998) is one of the authors, whose arguments are mostly being referred to with regard to the determinants of public support. He found that utilitarian economic concerns were the primary factor in determining the support level of public toward the EU integration. ...
... He found that utilitarian economic concerns were the primary factor in determining the support level of public toward the EU integration. This perspective suggests that public attitudes come out of a cost-benefit calculation with respect to the expected losses and gains associated with the EU membership (Gabel, 1998). With Palmer, he argued that people in different socioeconomic positions were likely to experience various costs and benefits from EU membership and these variances with respect to economic gains and losses would affect these people's attitudes toward integration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). ...
... El análisis de los procesos de integración ha ido conformando un notable cuerpo teórico, aunque más centrado en los esquemas más avanzados, como es el europeo (Hix, 1995;Sandholtz y Stone, 1998;Gabel, 1998;Ray, 1998;Hooghe y Marks, 2001;Marks y Steenbergen, 2004, entre otros). Este hecho se ha señalado como limitación a la hora de explicar los factores de la integración en otras regiones. ...
... En este sentido, al igual que ocurre con otros esquemas de integración más desarrollados, y específicamente el caso europeo, el análisis de las actitudes y opiniones actores políticos y sociales, ha generado numerosa literatura sobre los patrones de opinión existentes en torno al debate de la integración regional, y las explicaciones a la variabilidad de tales modelos de opinión. 1 Si bien la trascendencia y las transformaciones acaecidas en el seno de los Estados Europeos tienen características únicas, y con ello el ámbito de estudio sigue siendo uno de los más estudiados, el análisis del acontecer de la integración subregional latinoamericana desde la perspectiva de sus elites políticas o desde la ciudadanía ha sido limitado. 2 1. Un ejemplo serían todas aquellos trabajos sobre el apoyo o rechazo de la opinión pública ante el proceso integrador europeo, explicadas a partir de la percepción de beneficios (o costes) del la integración (Gabel, 1998), la orientación ideológica (Anderson 1998), por la satisfacción de las instituciones nacionales (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000), o las argumentaciones basadas en marcos culturales (Diez Medrano, 2004) entre otras. 2. Como excepciones se pueden citar los trabajos de Selingson (1993Selingson ( y 1999; Selingson y Pia Scarfo (1998) centrados en la región centroamericana; Alcántara (2000) Por un lado, porque la reactivación de los proyectos de integración, la creación de otros nuevos, así como la profusión de acuerdos comerciales entre países, son procesos que han involucrado a diferentes tipos de actores. ...
... The early utilitarian research, which focused on the macroeconomic dimension (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993;Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996), gave way to a more predictive micro-level approach emphasizing the role of individual experience with the effects of EU integration. This model assumes that EU-induced market liberalization increases competitiveness and places certain segments of the population in a more favourable position than others based on their capacity to adapt to the new opportunity structures deriving from the EU market (Gabel and Palmer 1995;Gabel 1998aGabel , 1998b. In addition, this correlation could go beyond egoistic self-assessment and adopt a sociotropic approach that links support for EU membership with individual expectations of overall country-level economic gain from EU integration. ...
... Occupational status and income have been considered as among the most powerful utilitarian predictors of support for EU integration (Hooghe et al. 2007;Herzog and Tucker 2010;Gabel 1998aGabel , 1998b. They rely on the assumption that the integration of the EU market, which is based on greater mobility, favours the more skilled individuals who are better equipped to adjust to market demands, while the less-skilled workers who face higher labour competition anticipate losses from integration with the EU market and are more likely not to be supportive of EU membership for their country (Mau 2005). ...
Based on a combination of national representative surveys and semi-structured interviews conducted in six Western Balkan countries, the study represents a pioneering attempt at a systematic, comparative analysis of Euroscepticism in the Western Balkans. By employing a theoretical framework that tests the effects of utilitarian, political and cultural factors, the study identifies and interprets the strongest socio-demographical and attitudinal predictors of Euroscepticism. The study demonstrates that all three theoretical models have some explanatory power regarding Eurosceptical attitudes in the Western Balkans, albeit to different degrees. While utilitarian predictors have limited effects, domestic proxies and especially cultural factors such as traditional values, authoritarian orientations and particularly religious affiliation appear as the strongest predictors of Euroscepticism. Link to full text: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/2ZINBX4IUTKEC3YI4C6X/full?target=10.1080/14683857.2020.1744091
... Drawing on the literature on Euroscepticism, we identify various social dispositions-in particular, economic concerns, socio-economic attitudes and identity-that are expected to influence support for Social Europe. First, following the utilitarian approach, support for Social Europe can be primordially seen as a matter of economic interests and concerns (Abts, Heerwegh, & Swyngedouw, 2009;Gabel, 1998;McLaren, 2007). In this view, the legitimacy of European integration hinges on the cost-benefit appraisals citizens make about the economic impact of the European project on themselves and their social environment. ...
... Egocentric economic concerns relate to the experience that the individual economic and financial situation is unfavourable or might become so in the near future. The sociotropic variant refers to concerns that the economic situation of the collective (e.g. the interest of the own social group or the nation) is being threatened (Gabel, 1998). We hypothesise that egocentric (H2a) as well as sociotropic economic concerns (H2b) decrease support for Social Europe, although previous research indicates that sociotropic concerns have a more decisive impact on attitudes towards European integration than egocentric perceptions (McLaren, 2002). ...
Chapter
Technological progress disrupted the organisation of solidarity for ages, and today’s fourth industrial revolution is no different. The widespread use of digital technology is changing the organisation of the post-war welfare state and affecting its potential to ensure a decent living standard for everyone. In this chapter, I focus on two understudied ways in which solidarities are shifting in the welfare state: how new digital technologies undermine the potential of social insurance techniques to organise social protection and how the use of predictive statistical tools instead of human discretion is changing the way social rights and benefits are granted. The consequences of these trends towards automation can be profound. The chapter concludes by highlighting some challenges for the future organisation of welfare state solidarity.
... Drawing on the literature on Euroscepticism, we identify various social dispositions-in particular, economic concerns, socio-economic attitudes and identity-that are expected to influence support for Social Europe. First, following the utilitarian approach, support for Social Europe can be primordially seen as a matter of economic interests and concerns (Abts, Heerwegh, & Swyngedouw, 2009;Gabel, 1998;McLaren, 2007). In this view, the legitimacy of European integration hinges on the cost-benefit appraisals citizens make about the economic impact of the European project on themselves and their social environment. ...
... Egocentric economic concerns relate to the experience that the individual economic and financial situation is unfavourable or might become so in the near future. The sociotropic variant refers to concerns that the economic situation of the collective (e.g. the interest of the own social group or the nation) is being threatened (Gabel, 1998). We hypothesise that egocentric (H2a) as well as sociotropic economic concerns (H2b) decrease support for Social Europe, although previous research indicates that sociotropic concerns have a more decisive impact on attitudes towards European integration than egocentric perceptions (McLaren, 2002). ...
Chapter
Full-text available
The European Union has gradually assumed increasing authority in the domain of social policy. This increasing importance of Social Europe fundamentally redraws the boundaries of existing solidarity arrangements. This chapter investigates whether the Europeanisation of social policy creates new structural conflicts between winners (benefiting from the expansion of individual mobility options) and losers (having far less exit options while being exposed to international competition) of European integration. Using data of the Belgian National Election Survey 2014, we investigate citizens’ preferences regarding various dimensions of the role of the European Union in social policy. Our results show that attitudes towards Social Europe are not strongly embedded in social structural characteristics. Rather than objective positions, subjective experiences and social dispositions shape one’s stance on Social Europe.
... Drawing on extant literature on euroscepticism, we derive the multivariate model to test the impact of the economic crisis. One of the most comprehensive analyses on popular euroscepticism was elaborated by Gabel (1998), who highlights five main factors explaining European preferences. The first is based on the theory of cognitive mobilisation, according to which the higher the level of political interest and/or political information, the more likely the citizens are to display positive attitudes towards the EU. ...
... According to a number of studies (e.g. Gabel 1998;Krouwel & Abts 2007), the evaluation of regime performance (output and outcomes) is likely to influence eurosceptic attitudes. In particular, a positive evaluation is expected to increase EU support, and this was found to have a significant effect in Portugal (Magalhães 2012;Freire, Teperoglou & Moury 2015). ...
Article
During the Great Recession, radical left parties in Portugal intensified their opposition to Europe and public opinion became increasingly eurosceptic. Nevertheless, the cooperation among leftist parties following the 2015 elections, which brought eurosceptic parties into power, coincided with a rise in positive attitudes towards the EU. This paper aims to explain this puzzle by examining party stances and citizens’ views on Europe before and after the crisis. It will be argued that the economic crisis had mainly a temporary impact on party and popular euroscepticism. Both ideological and strategic considerations help explain euroscepticism, but the Great Recession did not structurally alter party-voter alignments and the dynamics of the party system.
... In this article, we mainly focus on utilitarian calculation under the assumption that its influence may accrue in crisis situations such as the ones faced by the EU (and by Italy, in particular) in recent years. Some authors argue that citizens are able to make their own calculations about the costs and benefits stemming from EU membership based upon their personal interests and those of their community (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993;Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1995;Gabel 1998;Gabel and Palmer 1995;Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011) in close connection with the state of the national economy and of social welfare (Beaudonnet 2015). In general, some of the most classical studies in the field emphasize that high-income individuals and those with high-status occupations tend to be more pro-European because of their different economic calculus of the gains stemming from the Common Market (Gabel 1998;Gabel and Palmer 1995). ...
... Some authors argue that citizens are able to make their own calculations about the costs and benefits stemming from EU membership based upon their personal interests and those of their community (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993;Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1995;Gabel 1998;Gabel and Palmer 1995;Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011) in close connection with the state of the national economy and of social welfare (Beaudonnet 2015). In general, some of the most classical studies in the field emphasize that high-income individuals and those with high-status occupations tend to be more pro-European because of their different economic calculus of the gains stemming from the Common Market (Gabel 1998;Gabel and Palmer 1995). Beyond personal gains, support for the EU is explained by benefits for one's own country. ...
Article
This article aims to explore the conditions under which Italian citizens would be ready to support a greater role for the EU in matters currently subject to the authority of its member states. We examine how citizens perceive the role of the EU in managing the currently pressing problems induced by the most recent crises. Through the analysis of original data collected as part of the EUENGAGE survey of public opinion in 2016, we show that the disproportionate costs of transnational crises on member states, especially in countries that are most exposed such as Italy, produce public demand for EU intervention. In a crisis context, even in countries like Italy, where support for the EU is at a minimum, a sense of insecurity and grievance among citizens may turn into demands for EU initiatives.
... Drawing on the literature on Euroscepticism, we identify various social dispositions-in particular, economic concerns, socio-economic attitudes and identity-that are expected to influence support for Social Europe. First, following the utilitarian approach, support for Social Europe can be primordially seen as a matter of economic interests and concerns (Abts, Heerwegh, & Swyngedouw, 2009;Gabel, 1998;McLaren, 2007). In this view, the legitimacy of European integration hinges on the cost-benefit appraisals citizens make about the economic impact of the European project on themselves and their social environment. ...
... Egocentric economic concerns relate to the experience that the individual economic and financial situation is unfavourable or might become so in the near future. The sociotropic variant refers to concerns that the economic situation of the collective (e.g. the interest of the own social group or the nation) is being threatened (Gabel, 1998). We hypothesise that egocentric (H2a) as well as sociotropic economic concerns (H2b) decrease support for Social Europe, although previous research indicates that sociotropic concerns have a more decisive impact on attitudes towards European integration than egocentric perceptions (McLaren, 2002). ...
Book
Solidarity has been a pivotal concept for European societies in the past centuries. However, taking into account many of the societal transformations of the 21st century (e.g., individualization, Europeanization, marketization, globalization), concerns about ‘the end of solidarity’ ring alarmingly true. At the same time, new actors have entered the social landscape deploying novel manifestations and visions of solidarity, such as those of a ‘human solidarity’. The main scope of the book is to illustrate theoretically and empirically that contemporary societies are experiencing a shift in the spaces, temporalities and sites of today’s enactments of solidarity rather than the fading of it. The book examines how the aforementioned ‘shifting solidarities’ takes place and explore the outcomes in European societies.
... These developments further shape economic interests and influence attitudes towards international cooperation. Under a utilitarian framework (Ehin, 2001;Gabel, 1998Gabel, , 2009, it is a cost-benefit analysis that drives voting behaviour in referendums where further integration efforts are at stake. In this sense, voters take into account their 'individual competitiveness', which is a proxy for their ability to derive benefits (or losses) from further integration or membership (Gabel, 2009). ...
... Under a utilitarian framework (Ehin, 2001;Gabel, 1998Gabel, , 2009, it is a cost-benefit analysis that drives voting behaviour in referendums where further integration efforts are at stake. In this sense, voters take into account their 'individual competitiveness', which is a proxy for their ability to derive benefits (or losses) from further integration or membership (Gabel, 2009). Richer, highly educated people, and those with marketable and exportable skills and occupations who stand to gain more from international cooperation are expected to cast 'cooperative' votes, whereas individuals with lower education and/or skills are expected to see themselves as 'losers' and therefore cast noncooperative votes (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). ...
Article
Full-text available
Much like Brexit, the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 could have been a watershed event that significantly affected the European Economic and Monetary Union and possibly the European Union as a whole. While the referendum did not live up to the hype, the fact remains that the Greek people decided to risk ‘exit’ and reject their international creditors’ bailout terms. In this article, we explore how the cycle of sovereign debt crisis, the externally imposed austerity and the resulting recession affected the outcome of that referendum. We further provide a limited test for the ‘left-behind’ hypothesis, which has been a prominent explanation for recent ‘unexpected’ or ‘surprising’ choices that have been made at the polls. Using municipality data and novel data sources, such as night-time light transmission, we provide aggregate-level support for our expectations.
... For example; Gabel (1998) in "Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union" argues that the present and the future of the European Union cannot be understood without a theory of public support or opposition. ...
... In other words, if actors' preferred policy outcomes are closer to the actual policies, they will be more likely to support European policies, and the contrary will decrease the support. In an earlier study Gabel (1998) also states that support for European integration is driven in part by the anticipated benefits of European integration to individuals. Hix's analysis (2007) and Gabel's arguments (1998) In order to answer those questions, institutional and policy level data should be compared with the public opinion data about those specific policies. ...
Thesis
Full-text available
One of the most significant decisions of the EU, after the Maastricht Treaty, was its enlargement decision to accept new members as they fulfill the economic and political criteria. As a result of enlargement decision, in May 2004 10 new members, mostly East European countries, and in January 2007 Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union. Enlargement is still a working policy process for the EU, in which accession negotiations with formal candidate countries (Turkey and Croatia) are still proceeding and further expansion to the Western Balkans are being considered as a possibility. Despite its success, the EU enlargement has not been free from skepticism. Among several other reasons opposition to Turkey's EU membership played an important role to explain the skepticism toward the EU enlargement. Especially after the latest round of enlargement process Turkey's accession negotiation became a critical topic for the future of Europe. In this framework, this study attempts to understand the dynamics of sociopolitical structure of the European opposition to Turkish EU membership. Recent literature indicates four major issues and concerns regarding the Turkey's EU membership; identity related concerns, general concerns about future enlargement, individual economic expectations, and the concerns about immigration and crime. The first phase of this study considers each issue area as a separate topic and measure the effect of Turkey related variables independently. The second phase measure the level of opposition to Turkey's membership using all issue areas and other explanatory variables in a single model.
... Do people's perceptions of the European Union (EU) membership conditionality's role in their country's democratization affect their support for their country's EU membership? If so, this would be an indicator that people view the EU as a democratization factor, an argument often overlooked by literature that links support for EU membership primarily with economic expectations (Tucker et al. 2002;Palmer and Whitten 1999;Gabel 1998). Thus far, the existing elite-centered approach in designing, applying and studying EU membership conditionality has failed to understand and account for the powerful attraction that the EU represents to the masses in EU membership aspiring countries from the former communist Eastern Europe. ...
... We control for a number of socioeconomic variables derived from the extant literature on attitudes toward EU membership in both EU member countries and EU membership-aspiring countries. Variables such as age, gender and education derive from Schlenker (2012/3), Nelsen et al. (2011), Kentmen (2008), de Vreese et al. (2008, Elgün and Tillman (2007), Nelsen and Guth (2003), Carey (2002), and Gabel (1998); religion and attachment to religion derive from Nelsen et al. (2011) Çarkoğlu andKentmen (2008), and Kentmen (2008); incomes and economic optimism, although differently operationalized and measured, derive from Nelsen et al. (2011), Kentmen (2008, and Elgün and Tillman (2007); and different occupation categories derive from Nelsen et al. (2011), and Elgün and Tillman (2007). Also, we added two sets of control variables, one of them measuring respondents' policy preferences, and the other measuring respondents' expectations from EU membership, which arguably affect people's attitudes toward their country's EU membership (Hooghe and Marks 2005;McLaren 2004). ...
Article
EU membership conditionality has been conceptualized as a dialogue between the EU and power elites of countries that aspire to join the Union. Research that inquire into the association between support for EU membership and conditions that the EU imposes on countries that aspire to join the Union remains scarce. Relying on data from a simple random sample of cellphone random digit dialing collected in summer 2015 in Albania, we found that people's view of EU membership conditionality as helping country's democratization firmly predicts support for their country's EU membership. Such a relationship outweighs respondents' concerns of EU conditions encroachment upon country's sovereignty as well as their prioritizing of economic development, even though they might expect economic benefits from country's EU membership. Our findings suggest people's concerns over country's democratization to be the primary force behind their support for EU membership.
... A minor percentage of commentators based their EU arguments on "necessity" and "culture" as criteria of evaluation, whereas the number of references to "safety" was negligible. This finding confirms the already existing arguments in the literature on Euroscepticism [67,68] that sustain the idea of the decreasing explanatory power of economic/utilitarian calculations, which were a dominant hypothesis on the causes of popular Euroscepticism for years [69,70]. ...
... As Table 2 shows, economic prosperity as an underlying justification for the evaluations of EU polity worth was rather uniformly distributed among various categories of This finding confirms the already existing arguments in the literature on Euroscepticism [67,68] that sustain the idea of the decreasing explanatory power of economic/utilitarian calculations, which were a dominant hypothesis on the causes of popular Euroscepticism for years [69,70]. ...
Article
Full-text available
Crises, as critical moments in the process of European integration, are particularly conducive to the increased politicisation of the European Union (EU) and its contestation. The year 2015 saw the peaks of the Greek and the refugee crises, the two crises that put the two flagships of the European project—the Euro and the Schengen zone—into imminent peril, causing a prolonged EU legitimacy crisis. Building on the literature that considers Euroscepticism as a context-dependent and discursive phenomenon, this study analyses Facebook debates that emerged in response to the Greek and refugee crises, trying to identify how the EU was evaluated and how these evaluations were justified. To answer this question, this study involved the qualitative content analysis of over 7000 Facebook comments related to the Greek and migration crises published in 2015 on the pages of the European Parliament and the European Commission. Contrary to the literature that explains popular Euroscepticism by utilitarian or cultural factors, the findings of this study show that the most recurrent justification for negative EU polity evaluations is the lack of democratic credentials. Furthermore, the commentators mostly assessed the EU’s current set-up and, to a much lesser extent, the principle and the future of European integration. Moreover, the Facebook public extensively commented on the level of inclusiveness, particularly bemoaning the lack of inclusiveness of “ordinary” people in EU decision making. Nevertheless, the commentators frequently referred to themselves as “we Europeans” or “we people”, opposing themselves to EU, national, or financial “elites”. Despite its populist elements, this sense of “we-ness” incepted in social media suggests the capacity of transnational online discussion to foster European digital demos.
... Do personality and political trust affect support for country's EU membership? The extant literature on people's attitudes toward EU membership focuses mainly on respondents' socioeconomic conditions and social identities as key explanatory variables (Arikan, 2012;Carey, 2002;Çarkoğlu & Kentmen, 2001;Elgün & Tillman, 2007;Gabel, 1998aGabel, , 1998bHooghe & Marks, 2005;Kentmen, 2008;McLaren, 2004;Nelsen & Guth, 2003;Nelsen, Guth, & Highsmith, 2011;Risse, 2004;Schlenker, 2012/3;Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2008). Other research has placed its focus on citizens' political sophistication and attitudes toward national governments (Franklin, van der Eijk, & Marsh, 1995;Ray, 2003;Tillman, 2012). ...
Article
Whereas the role of personality traits and political trust have long been argued to impact people's political attitudes, only recently have scholars of the European Union (EU) integration begun to take them into consideration while trying to explain people's attitudes toward the EU. In an effort to explain the support for EU membership among citizens of Albania and Kosovo, we build a series of ordered probit models using as key independent variables two core personality characteristics, self-reported Optimism and Extraversion, and one surface characteristic, political trust. We found evidence that Optimism, Extraversion, trust in EU politicians and the judiciary, as well as trust in domestic politicians positively impact people's support for EU membership. However, we found no evidence that people's trust in the domestic judiciary associates their attitudes toward EU membership. We tested our hypotheses with a probability simple sample of public opinion data gathered in Albania and Kosovo in 2017.
... Citizens of higher social classes generally support globalisation, European integration and immigration as they feel less threatened by them than citizens of lower social classes (Gabel 1998;Balestrini 2014Balestrini , 2015Balestrini and 2016a. 8 However, in a less favourable national economic, societal and political environment, individual differences between social classes on these matters tend to diminish significantly. ...
Article
Full-text available
For national publics, terrorism is today one of the key policy challenges facing European governments. Yet little is known about whether and how the objective national economic, societal and political context influences public opinion about terrorism. The present article addresses this gap in the current research. Using Eurobarometer data, it is demonstrated that excluding a nation’s level of terrorism, no other objective national economic, societal or political indicator sways public attitudes towards terrorism. Objective national economic, societal and political factors are also found not to impact on the relationship between citizens’ economic conditions and public attitudes towards the same. Our results finally demonstrate that people’s perceived economic, cultural and physical (safety) insecurities tend to be a stronger predictor of these attitudes than the objective national context or (social) class differences. The article then discusses the implications of these findings.
... However, empirical research suggests that European identity and support for European integration have become increasingly correlated. While earlier research on EU support mainly explained it as a question of utilitarian costbenefit calculations (Gabel 1998), more recent studies highlight the important role of collective identities in structuring support for European integration (Citrin and Sides 2004;Hooghe and Marks 2005; but see Hobolt and Wratil 2015). ...
Article
Full-text available
In the early days of European integration, identity politics played a marginal role in what was an isolated, elite-driven, and unpoliticised integration process. Things have changed dramatically, however. European integration has entered the area of mass politics, and against the backdrop of the recent crises and the Brexit referendum, people’s self-understanding as (also) European or exclusively national has the potential to determine the speed and direction of European integration. This development is also reflected in theory building. While neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism paid little attention to public opinion, the conflict between collective identities and functionality is at the heart of postfunctionalist theory. This article assesses the use value of these grand theories of European integration for understanding identity politics in the European Union, and embeds them in a wider discussion of scholarly research on the causes and consequences of European identity.
... At the same time, environmental standards also belong to the class of broader social and environmental rights (Lechner 2018). Following numerous studies, we argue that high-skilled constituents in the Global North are most likely to hold supranational cosmopolitan values, viewing themselves as global citizens (Gabel 1998). These individuals are therefore likely to have great concerns over labor conditions and the environment in the Global South. ...
Article
Full-text available
Free trade generates macroeconomic gains but also creates winners and losers. Historically, to reconcile this tension, governments compensated globalization losers with social spending in exchange for support for free trade, known as the embedded liberalism compromise. In the neoliberal era, what other policies can governments pursue to strengthen support for globalization? We assess the effect of social standards in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on individual preferences for free trade. We analyze data from an original survey experiment and find that respondents in advanced industrialized countries have greater support for free trade when PTAs include social standards. Differences do exist in how these social standards are perceived: while we do find evidence of an embedded liberalism compromise recast, fair trade norms have the most salience. An external validity check using the PEW global attitudes survey confirms the hypothesis. Our analysis has serious implications for the legitimacy of the global trading system suffering from neo-mercantilist creep.
... There is, of course, an extensive research program on attitudes concerning the European Union (Hobolt and De Vries 2016), including a lively debate about whether EU support is driven more by economic interests (e.g. Gabel 1998) or by cultural identities (e.g., Carey 2002;McLaren 2002). Despite what is known about EU attitudes, it remains unclear how much one can generalize from this specific regional IO. ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper investigates popular non-support for international organizations (IO), asking two questions. First, are attitudes within the mass public becoming less supportive of IOs? Second, how can we explain these IO attitudes, especially when the mass public appears to know relatively little about specific international institutions? Using survey data from the International Social Survey Programme’s National Identity module, fielded across multiple countries in 1995, 2003, and 2013, it reports that on average and within most countries, citizen attitudes about IOs have become less positive over time. To explain these attitudes, this paper argues that citizens tend to group things that appear as “international” such as cross-border economic flows and IOs. While citizens might feel positively or negatively about these international factors, this grouping implies that they view them similarly, based on what they can feel from the international level related to their job and income. Thus, less (more) skilled citizens who are hurt by (who benefit from) economic globalization should express more negative (positive) views about IOs. Controlling for cultural attitudes socialized through education, we find that skill is a statistically significant and substantively strong predictor of IO attitudes. We also show how this individual-level skill difference gets larger in countries that are more and/or less-favorably exposed to economic globalization.
... At the same time, environmental standards also belong to the class of broader social and environmental rights (Lechner 2018). Following numerous studies, we argue that high-skilled constituents in the Global North are most likely to hold supranational cosmopolitan values, viewing themselves as global citizens (Gabel 1998). These individuals are therefore likely to have great concerns over labor conditions and the environment in the Global South. ...
Article
North–South preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have proliferated rapidly in the past decades. Despite a common focus on trade liberalisation, these preferential trade agreements differ greatly in their inclusion of labour and environmental provisions. A difference in the enforcement of these social standards is also puzzling: some preferential trade agreements envision sanctions for non-compliance while others do not. What explains this variation? We argue that Northern governments have their hands tied by domestic constituents demanding social standards as a key protectionist instrument. However, different electoral rules moderate the success of these demands. Because majoritarian systems provide a more efficient channel for the mobilisation of protectionist interests, they are more prone to social protectionist bias than their proportional representation counterparts. We assess our hypotheses using panel regressions of all North–South preferential trade agreements. Our analysis refines previous findings on tariff and non-tariff protectionist bias in majoritarian systems and shows how it is manifested in the design of preferential trade agreements.
... We assume that the relevant fault lines concerning European integration run along income levels and work security. European integration has driven a process of market liberalization opening opportunities for individuals with high levels of financial and human capital and closing opportunities for those lacking those resources (Gabel 1998). Accordingly economic class interests should shape attitudes towards the integration process and treaties such as the TCE that deepen this process, despite the limited direct policy-making powers of the union in this area. ...
Article
Full-text available
The European Union and especially European political integration have increasingly become subject to public contestation. The need to build consensus across different national polities severely limits elites’ policy options. In this article we investigate the potential to build cross-national coalitions among the European public using data on the referendums on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). We argue that existing cleavage structures should create both opportunities and hurdles for cross-national cooperation and investigate these patterns in all countries where referendums took place (Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Using binary logistic regressions we find that strong common patterns, especially along party-political lines, co-exist with country-specific factors. These results demonstrate some potential for a supra-national European political space and discourse and that political parties could play a central part in that process.
... The utilitarian model, initially formulated by Gabel (1998, Gabel andPalmer, 1995), argues that education is relevant because it determines the personal cost-benefit balance of the opening of national markets. More educated workers are better able to transfer their scarce skills to higher-wage economies, or use those talents to bargain for better conditions in their home countries, which creates incentives to support European integration ( Koehn and Rosenau, 2002;Margalit, 2012). ...
Article
The fact that highly educated individuals are significantly more likely to self-identify as Europeans than those with lower levels of educational attainment is one of the most robust findings in the scholarship on individual Europeanization. Previous work also shows that this cleavage in supranational identification varies cross-nationally and over time. We contribute to the existing literature by examining the country-level, socio-structural conditions that influence the education cleavage. Focusing on how the educational environment influences identity formation, we test two divergent predictions of how societal education—i.e. the average national level of educational attainment—shapes the cleavage between individuals of differing education levels with respect to their self-identification as European. According to Welzel’s (2013) ‘cross-fertilization approach’, societal education should widen the education divide. By contrast, our alternative ‘cross-attenuating approach’ posits that societal education should instead help to close it. Using a cross-national time-series dataset that includes 28 EU member states and 28 Eurobarometers covering 1992–2015, as well as between–within multilevel models, we find a significantly narrower education cleavage in countries where societal education increased the most during the period of our study. This result provides strong support for the cross-attenuating approach presented here. We theorize that societal education helps to narrow the individual-level education cleavage through a discursive and a network mechanism. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
... In economic theories, supportive attitudes are related to how GGIs impact an individual's pocketbook, either in terms of personal wellbeing ("ego-tropic considerations") or the relative economic performance of their sub-national region or country ("socio-tropic considerations"). That economic considerations have explanatory power has been theorized and convincingly shown in the context of the EU (Anderson & Reichert 1995;Anderson 1998;Christin 2005;Eichenberg & Dalton 1993;Gabel & Palmer 1995;Gabel 1998aGabel , 1998bGabel , 1998c. Economic theories are based on the assumption people are affected differentially by globalization. ...
... This probably derives from a combination of purely utilitarian reasons and a more cosmopolitan mentality. Individuals with higher educational levels are likely to find more employment-related opportunities in both organizations (Gabel, 1998;, while a cosmopolitan mentality could help these citizens to better understand the EU's ideals and values without becoming totally detached from Soviet legacies (Hakhverdian et al., 2013;. Likewise, showed that expecting that one's own salary would increase after joining the EU negatively affected the chances of being an Isolationist. ...
Thesis
Access the full thesis here: http://hdl.handle.net/10803/675034. Abstract This dissertation focuses on exploring the factors that influence individual geopolitical preferences in post-Soviet Europe, using the Association Agreement (AA) countries (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) as case studies. Individual geopolitical preferences, or the public's opinions regarding what international organisation their country should join, have been extremely relevant for the national politics of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. It can be argued that signing the AAs with the European Union (EU) positioned the three countries closer to the EU, moving them away from their prevailing Eastern frame of reference. The deteriorating relationship between the governments of the AA countries and the Russian government does not mean, however, that the population of the AA countries unanimously supports the idea of joining the EU and rejects the possibility of joining the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Instead, all the AA countries have sizeable parts of their populations that support joining the EAEU, or hold other kinds of ambivalent positions regarding the future geopolitical slant of their country. What are the factors that influence individual geopolitical preferences in the AA countries? This dissertation seeks to answer this question by building on the literature on support for membership of international organisations, specific works on geopolitical preferences in the AA countries, and the use of survey-based empirical analyses. The process of answering the proposed research question has led to the development of four articles, which, together, make up this dissertation. The first article uses Moldova as a case study, and tests the relationship between institutional trust, party cues, and individual geopolitical preferences. The second article focuses on Georgia, and explores the effects of linguistic and ideological factors on the existing ethnic gap in geopolitical preferences. The third article, based on data from Ukraine, provides an empirical test of the relationship between personal links with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and support for EU and NATO membership. Finally, the fourth article, which uses data from the three AA countries simultaneously, tests the influence of the winners and losers theory, values, future migration preferences, and political engagement over a recently developed extended categorisation of geopolitical preferences that includes citizens who reject joining both the EU and the EAEU (Isolationists) and others who support joining both organisations (Balancers). All in all, this dissertation serves as a test for several theories that are posed by the literature regarding the AA countries. Furthermore, its results serve both to corroborate previous theories and to support further research in an area where understanding the complex mechanisms that influence individual geopolitical preferences is a vital topic.
... Most research on the issue of European legitimacy has treated it as a question of 'European identity' to be measured in public opinion terms (Gabel 1998;Bruter 2005;McLaren 2005). Such research now typically concludes that the EU thereby failed (Polyakova and Fligstein 2016) -even if in the wider world of international relations and international political economy it had in fact helped rescue the 'natural' unit of society (the nation state) it was allegedly meant to replace (Milward 1992). ...
... Readers interested in more detail of the regression models and full output tables can find more information in the Appendix. 2 These control variables were selected on the basis of important variables for explaining Euroscepticism identified in the academic literature: see Clarke et al. (2017), Fox and Pearce (2018), Curtice (2017), Ford and Goodwin (2017), McLaren (2003, Gabel (1998) and Hooghe and Marks (2005). It would have been preferable to have included other variables representing ethnicity and national identity, but such data unavailable in the BES. 3 The details of these effects can be found in the regression outputs in the Appendix. ...
... The literature on public opinion and regionalism is most extensive in Europe, driven by the prominence of the European Union, the funding it provides, and the related richness of data provided by the Eurobarometer and other major surveys. The most prominent debates focus on how "democratic deficits," partisan divides, national identities, pocketbook and political economic concerns, elite "frames," and generational cohorts have influenced attitudes toward regionalism ( Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002 ;Rohrschneider 2002 ;Brinegar and Jolly 2005 ;Hooghe and Marks 2005 ;Gabel 2009 ;Hobolt and de Vries 2016 ). While these studies have identified several key correlates of support or opposition toward European regionalism, regional cooperation in Europe is almost inextricably linked with the European Union (EU). ...
Article
Full-text available
Studies of public opinion toward regionalism tend to rely on questions regarding trade integration and specific regional organizations. This narrow focus overlooks dimensions of regionalism that sit at the heart of international relations research on regions today. Instead, we argue that research should explore public preferences with respect to regional cooperation in different issue-areas. We find that people's views of regional cooperation in North America diverge from their attitudes toward trade integration alone. Using data from Rethinking North America, an untapped public opinion survey conducted in Mexico, Canada, and the United States in 2013, we show that although country-level attitudes toward trade integration in North America were similar, preferences for regional cooperation varied by country depending on the issue at hand. We propose that attitudes are shaped by citizens' perceptions of the asymmetric patterns of national-level benefits and vulnerabilities created by regional cooperation. Generally, respondents favor cooperation where their state stands to gain greater capacity benefits and oppose it where cooperation imposes greater costs on national autonomy. For policymakers, this multifaceted approach to regionalism sheds light on areas where public preferences for regional cooperation might converge. Future research that disaggregates various aspects of support for regional cooperation should help integrate the study of public opinion with "new" and comparative regional approaches that emphasize the aspects of regionalism beyond trade and formal institutions. Les études de l'opinion publique envers le régionalisme tendent à reposer sur des questions relatives à l'intégration com-merciale et à des organisations régionales spécifiques. Ce point de vue étroit néglige des dimensions du régionalisme qui sont aujourd'hui au coeur des recherches en relations internationales qui portent sur les régions. Nous soutenons que ces recherches devraient plutôt explorer les préférences publiques concernant la coopération régionale dans différents domaines d'intérêt. Nous constatons que les opinions de la population sur la coopération régionale en Amérique du Nord diffèrent de leur attitude envers l'intégration commerciale à elle seule. Nous nous appuyons sur des données issues de Rethinking North America, une enquête d'opinion publique inexploitée qui a été menée en 2013 au Mexique, au Canada et aux États-Unis, et nous montrons que bien que les attitudes nationales envers l'intégration commerciale en Amérique du Nord étaient sim-ilaires, les préférences pour la coopération régionale variaient par pays selon la question concernée. Nous proposons l'idée selon laquelle les attitudes des citoyens seraient façonnées par la manière dont ils perçoivent les schémas asymétriques entre les avantages nationaux et les vulnérabilités créées par la coopération régionale. En règle générale, les personnes interrogées étaient favorables à la coopération lorsque leur État était susceptible d'en tirer des avantages en termes de capacité et s'y oppo-saient lorsque la coopération imposait des coûts plus élevés en termes d'autonomie nationale. Pour les décideurs politiques, cette approche multifacette du régionalisme apporte un éclairage sur les domaines dans lesquels les préférences publiques pour la coopération régionale risquent de converger. De futures recherches désagrégeant les divers aspects du soutien à la coopération régionale devraient aider à intégrer l'étude de l'opinion publique à de « nouvelles » approches régionales com-paratives mettant l'accent sur des aspects du régionalisme allant au-delà du commerce et des institutions formelles. Los estudios sobre la opinión pública en relación con el regionalismo tienden a centrarse en cuestiones relativas a la in-tegración comercial y a organizaciones regionales específicas. Este enfoque limitado pasa por alto las dimensiones del re-gionalismo que se encuentran en el centro de las investigaciones de las Relaciones Internacionales sobre las regiones en la actualidad. En cambio, sostenemos que en las investigaciones se deberían explorar las preferencias del público con respecto a la cooperación regional en diferentes áreas temáticas. Descubrimos que las opiniones de las personas sobre la cooperación regional en América del Norte divergen de sus actitudes respecto a la integración comercial por sí sola. A partir de los datos de Rethinking North America, una encuesta de opinión pública sin precedentes realizada en México, Canadá y Estados Unidos en 2013, demostramos que, aunque las actitudes a nivel de país respecto a la integración comercial en América del Norte eran similares, las preferencias por la cooperación regional variaban por país en función del tema en cuestión. Proponemos que las actitudes se forman en función de las percepciones de los ciudadanos sobre los patrones asimétricos de beneficios y vulnerabilidades a nivel nacional creados por la cooperación regional. En general, las personas encuestadas están a favor de la cooperación cuando el Estado puede obtener mayores beneficios en materia de capacidad y se oponen a ella cuando la cooperación impone mayores costos a la autonomía nacional. En el caso de las personas encargadas de elaborar las políticas, este enfoque polifacético del regionalismo brinda claridad sobre las áreas en las que podrían converger las preferencias de los ciudadanos por la cooperación regional. Las investigaciones futuras en las que se desglosen los distintos aspectos del apoyo a Fairbrother, Malcolm et al. (2022) Issue-Areas, Sovereignty Costs, and North Americans' Attitudes Toward Regional Cooperation. Global Studies Quarterly , https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac011 la cooperación regional deberían contribuir a integrar el estudio de la opinión pública con los enfoques regionales "nuevos" y comparativos que hacen hincapié en los aspectos del regionalismo más allá del comercio y las instituciones formales.
... The same authors mention that a different approach conceives support for European integration as a result of a cost-benefit analysis perceived by citizens. Scholars in this tradition have developed several models mainly using pure or subjective economic variables to represent the benefits as determinants for citizens' support for European integration (Gabel, 1998a(Gabel, , 1998bHooghe & Marks, 2005). Gabel's argument, which supports the importance of economic benefits as an outcome of EU integration, centers on the low affective identification citizens have with EU institutions. ...
... The same authors mention that a different approach conceives support for European integration as a result of a cost-benefit analysis perceived by citizens. Scholars in this tradition have developed several models mainly using pure or subjective economic variables to represent the benefits as determinants for citizens' support for European integration (Gabel, 1998a(Gabel, , 1998bHooghe & Marks, 2005). Gabel's argument, which supports the importance of economic benefits as an outcome of EU integration, centers on the low affective identification citizens have with EU institutions. ...
... First, especially older research has highlighted the relevance of utilitarian factors in explaining attitudes toward international cooperation. Citizens favor the EU or free trade if they personally profit (egotropic) or if they perceive their country to profit from European integration or trade cooperation (sociotropic motivation) (Fordham & Kleinberg, 2012;Gabel, 1998;Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). ...
Article
Full-text available
What effects do international crises have on the public legitimacy of International Organizations (IOs)? Deviating from previous research, we argue that such crises make those international organizations more salient that are mandated to solve the respective crisis. This results in two main effects. First, the public legitimacy of those IOs becomes more dependent on citizens' crisis-induced worries, leading to a more positive view of those IOs. Second, as the higher salience also leads to higher levels of elite communication regarding IOs, elite blaming of the IOs during crises results in direct negative effects on public legitimacy beliefs on IOs. Finally, both the valence and content of the elite discourse additionally moderate the positive effects of crisis-induced worries. Implementing survey experiments on public legitimacy beliefs on the WHO during the COVID-19 crisis with about 4400 respondents in Austria, Germany and Turkey, we find preliminary evidence for the expectations derived from our salience argument. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of these findings for future research on IO legitimacy and IO legitimation. Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11558-021-09452-y.
... Within this body of research, the 'utilitarian' and the 'cue-taking and benchmarking' approaches are particularly instructive. 1 The utilitarian approach views support for the EU as the result of an individual cost-benefit analysis of membership. The basic idea is that European trade liberalization will favour citizens with higher levels of human capital (education and occupational skills) and income, and as a consequence such individuals will be more supportive of European integration (Anderson and Reichert, 1995;Gabel, 1998;Gabel and Palmer, 1995;Tucker et al., 2002). The removal of barriers to trade allows firms to shift production across borders and increases job insecurity for low-skilled workers whereas highskilled workers and those with capital can take advantage of the opportunities resulting from a liberalized European market. ...
Article
Full-text available
What are the effects on public support for the European Union (EU) when a member state exits? We examine this question in the context of Britain's momentous decision to leave the EU. Combining analyses of the European Election Study 2019 and a unique survey-embedded experiment conducted in all member states, we analyse the effect of Brexit on support for membership among citizens in the EU-27. The experimental evidence shows that while information about the negative economic consequences of Brexit had no significant effect, positive information about Britain's sovereignty significantly increased optimism about leaving the EU. Our findings suggest that Brexit acts as a benchmark for citizens’ evaluations of EU membership across EU-27, and that it may not continue to act as a deterrent in the future.
... Studies in the 1990s, in which individual cost-benefits encouraged explanations that depend on strong links between support for EU integration and greater affluence, focused on a utilitarian interpretation (Anderson and Reichert 1995;Gabel 1998). The EU was generally not seen as a major risk to each country's national and cultural identity, underlining how the economic costs and benefits were vital in forming public opinion towards the European integration process (McLaren 2002(McLaren , 2007. ...
Article
Full-text available
The European Union is an unprecedented unification project that successfully preserves political peace and integrates Europe’s countries into a supra-national model. However, recent economic and political crises have shown that there are institutional problems that have undermined the EU and lost the trust of many citizens. In Italy after the ‘political earthquake’ of the 2013 national elections, the party system suffered a further shock in 2018 with the consolidation of the centre-right and Five Star Movement as the main competing political actors. In this context, the relationship with the EU has undergone numerous tensions, impacting directly on Italian public opinion and its perception of European institutions. This paper investigates whether and how the ‘exit’ issue from the EU affects Italian citizens, particularly how they react to a UK-style hypothetical referendum on leaving the EU. By analysing a 2019 voter study, it tries to identify clusters of Italian citizens by their attitude to European policies and a possible EU referendum.
... This probably derives from a combination of purely utilitarian reasons and a more cosmopolitan mentality. Individuals with higher educational levels are likely to find more employment-related opportunities under both organizations (Gabel 1998;Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002), while a cosmopolitan mentality could help these citizens to better understand the EU's ideals and values without becoming totally detached from Soviet legacies (Müller 2011;Hakhverdian et al. 2013). Likewise, Buzogány (2019) showed that expecting that one's own salary would increase after joining the EU negatively affected the chances of being an Isolationist. ...
Article
This paper assesses some of the factors that influence the public's geopolitical preferences in the Association Agreement countries. Specifically, I test the winners and losers theory, according to which individuals with higher chances of success in a particular society (winners) tend to support EU membership than those with lower chances (losers). In addition, I explore the influence of political engagement, future migration preferences and political values on this support. Departing from the conception of geopolitical preferences in the AA countries as a dichotomy between supporters of the EAEU (Easternizers) and supporters of the EU (Westernizers), I adopt a four-fold classification that also considers the individuals who support both (Balancers) and neither (Isolationists). Drawing on survey data from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (2015-2019), I find similar patterns of effects for the winners and losers variables across the three countries, with winners more likely to be Westernizers and losers more likely to be Easternizers or Isolationists. Moreover, politically engaged individuals tend to be Balancers and Westernizers, while disengaged individuals show support for the Isolationist option. Values are a significant predictor for Balancers and Westernizers, since preferring liberal values has a positive effect on being a Westernizer and negative on being a Balancer.
... Moreover, preferences for the euro should vary with individual-level differences. Existing research has highlighted the role of both material interest (Banducci et al., 2009;Gabel, 1998;Hobolt and Wratil, 2015) and political preferences (Bansak et al., 2020;Stoeckel and Kuhn, 2018) in shaping attitudes. Such variables may also moderate the impact of frames due to 'motivated reasoning' (Taber and Lodge, 2006). ...
Article
Full-text available
The COVID-19 pandemic worsened Italy’s fiscal outlook by increasing public debt. If interest rates were to rise, it would become more likely that Italy experiences a financial crisis and requires a European bailout. How does making EU funds conditional on austerity and structural reforms affect Italians’ support for the euro? Based on a novel survey experiment, this article shows that a majority of voters chooses to remain in the euro if a bailout does not involve conditionality, but the pro-euro majority turns into a relative majority for ‘Italexit’ if the bailout is contingent on austerity policies. Blaming different actors for the fiscal crisis has little effect on support. These results suggest that conditionality may turn Italian voters against the euro.
... Studies on public support mainly apply frameworks to understand citizens' attitudes towards the EU, with a focus on different aspects of the relationship between public opinion and domestic politics. A changing political Union, with the Treaty of Maastricht, brought to the study of rational utilitarian and affective dimensions of attitudes (Gabel 1998). In Gabel's study, emerging from the determinant role that public opinion was currently playing, the utilitarian changes according to the benefits and is shaped by domestic politics. ...
Article
Full-text available
Euroscepticism has become more and more embedded both at the EU and national levels (Usherwood et al. 2013) and persistent across domestic debates (Usherwood and Startin 2013). This study presents an in-depth analysis of contemporary narratives of Euroscepticism. It first introduces its question related to understanding public Euroscepticism, following the British EU referendum campaign and outcome, to then present the established literature, and the analysis of the British case study. A survey run in Britain in May 2019 shows that, as already noted by Oliver Daddow (2006, 2011), Euroscepticism is very much identifiable in the traditional narratives of Europe as the Other. Context accountability (Daddow 2006) is still cause for concern in Britain and by assuming a more positive view of a European Britain (Daddow 2006) does not make the debate more informed. Images, narratives and specific issues to reform the Eurosceptic toolbox into a more neutral, but informative, instrument could be applied at the grassroots level, as the post-referendum demonstrations and manifestations have shown. British citizens are reclaiming their own European citizenship, and deconstructing existing Euromyths can be a first small step forward.
... With respect to utilitarian calculation, the proposition is that elites are more likely to regard an IO as legitimate when they perceive it to bring advantages for their country. This explanation draws on earlier research that emphasises cost-benefit calculation as central to the formation of opinions on international issues and institutions (e.g., Anderson and Reichert, 1995;Curtis et al., 2014;Gabel, 1998;Lake, 2009;Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). The utilitarian calculation explanation is distinct from our institutional argument, as the latter involves satisfaction with general governance norms rather than specific impacts on one's own country. ...
Article
Full-text available
Elites are central in creating, operating, defending and contesting international organisations (IOs), but little research is available about their attitudes toward these bodies. To address this gap, this article offers the first systematic and comparative analysis of elite perceptions of IO legitimacy. Building on a unique multi-country and multi-sector survey of 860 elites undertaken in 2017–19, we map and explain elite legitimacy beliefs toward three key IOs in different issue-areas: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Integrating public opinion research and international relations theory, the article advances an explanation of elites’ legitimacy beliefs that emphasises their satisfaction with the institutional qualities of IOs. We contrast this argument with three common alternative explanations, which respectively highlight utilitarian calculation, global orientation and domestic cues. The analyses show that elites’ satisfaction with institutional qualities of IOs is most consistently related to legitimacy beliefs: when elites are more satisfied with democracy, effectiveness and fairness in IOs, they also regard these IOs as more legitimate. These findings suggest that the prevailing debate between utilitarian calculation, global orientation and domestic cues approaches neglects the importance of institutional satisfaction as an explanation of attitudes toward IOs.
... Second, we include two variables to evaluate the alternative that elites form legitimacy beliefs based on utilitarian calculation regarding costs and benefits from globalization (Anderson and Reichert, 1995;Curtis et al., 2014;Gabel, 1998). We include education based on the assumption that more educated elites are better positioned to reap the gains of globalization. ...
Article
Full-text available
The expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academic scholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel and unique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in six countries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state’s voice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are only partly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individual level that assessments of state voice shape elites’ perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governance best predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggest that only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands for state voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy.
... On the other hand, there is also little agreement on the different connotations of public support or opposition to the European Union (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016;De Vries, 2018). Cost-benefit and utilitarian dimensions (Gabel, 1998;McLaren, 2005), identitarian values (Hooghe and Marks, 2004;McLaren, 2005;Lubbers, 2008), social and policy-specific considerations (Hobolt and Brouard, 2011) are all elements that have been showed to characterise EU support, although their relative importance might differ from country to country. Other studies showed that support for EU integration entails five "genuinely distinct and independent" dimensions of performance, identity, affection, strengthening and utilitarianism (Boomgaarden et al., 2011, 259). ...
Preprint
This study proposes the use of Bayesian item response theory (IRT) models to measure public preferences towards Europe. IRT models address the limitations of single-question indicators and produce valid estimates of public latent attitudes over long time periods, even when available indicators change over time or present interruptions. The approach is compared with an alternative technique recently introduced in the study of EU public opinion, the Dyad Ratios algorithm. It shows that IRT models can both incorporate a more theoretically grounded individual-level model of response and produce more accurate estimates of latent public support for Europe. The measure is validated by showing its association both to alternative measures of EU support and to the vote share of Eurosceptic parties across Europe.
Article
This article analyses the influence that political parties exert upon citizens’ opinions about European Union issues. By measuring at the same time the content and source effects on political attitudes, the article considers the possibility that voters pay less attention to the arguments used in a political message than to its source. Results from an online survey experiment in Spain show that partisan voters use a heuristic model of processing when taking positions on an unfamiliar EU issue, even though the prevalence of the source effect is moderated by the respondent’s political sophistication and party attachment. The results also indicate that some respondents tend to pay less attention to a message’s content when the message comes from their preferred party. Such findings raise concerns about the possibility for EU issue voting to guarantee the accountability of political elites and party–voter linkages.
Article
Purpose of the study: The main objective of the study was the analysis of key labor market request content for the secondary education system, the level of employers' expectations compliance and actual learning outcomes, the research of resources and partnership interaction limitations of all interesting subjects in the process of an educational order development. Methodology: The main method was the questionnaire survey of experts (individual entrepreneurs, the heads of industrial and structural divisions) of Moscow (N = 316). The results of the expert survey showed the interest of employers in close cooperation with school in order to reflect the interests of the labor market in the educational order adequately. Results: The most motivated group is a small business, the leaders of the lowest level in the sphere of trade and service, who directly interact with the school graduates in the process of their early start of labor activity. The experts noted the problems in the development of the social competencies among schoolchildren: excessive self-esteem, an excessive level of claims, low level of willingness to work in a team, the lack of such qualities as responsiveness and responsibility. The cooperation between school and employers is limited to traditional sponsorship practices. The interaction of employers and educational institutions is quite fragmentary, it depends on a variety of random factors (personal and situational motives), which does not ensure the stability and the effectiveness of social partnership. Applications of this study: This research can be used for the universities, teachers, and students. Novelty/Originality of this study: In this research, the model of Reflection of Labor Market Interests and Expectations in Educational Order for Contemporary School is presented in a comprehensive and complete manner.
Article
Full-text available
Existing research has primarily focused on the role of utility and identity in shaping individuals’ European Union (EU) preferences. This article argues that macroeconomic context is a crucial predictor of attitudes towards transnational financial assistance, which has been omitted from previous analyses. Using data from the 2014 European Election Studies (EES) Voter Study for 28 EU member states, we demonstrate that citizens living in poorer EU countries are less willing to support fiscal solidarity than their counterparts in more affluent countries. Country affluence serves as a heuristic moderating the relationship between individual-level utility and identity considerations and willingness to show solidarity to member states with economic difficulties. When a country does not fare well economically, citizens’ views on providing help to others remain negative, irrespective of individual-level utilitarian and identity considerations. Our findings have implications for understanding the decision-making calculus underlying preference formation.
Chapter
This chapter delivers a composition of relevant theoretical models and concepts that serve as the fundament of the empirical analyses of the book. The central concept linking the persistence of the political system of the EU to the citizens’ attitudes is political support. In tradition of research on political culture, the chapter traces the theoretical development of the support concept from its original application to the transfer to supranational regimes such as the EU. The key postulate within this strand of research is that the persistence of a political system depends on the congruence between citizens’ political culture and the regime’s structure. The decision to embed the study of the citizens’ perspective on the Euro crisis into this framework is suitable since an acute crisis resembles a real test for the citizens’ support of a political regime and thereby its ultimate persistence. Ultimately, this chapter delivers a further conceptualization of the idea of a critical event that has the potential to fundamentally change citizens’ political attitudes.
Chapter
Die zentrale Annahme der Mehrebenenanalyse (Kontextanalyse) ist, dass Einstellungen und Verhalten nicht nur eine Folge von individuellen Merkmalen sind, sondern auch das Resultat des sozialen Umfelds. Bei der Mehrebenenanalyse handelt es sich um ein regressionsanalytisches Verfahren, bei dem die abhängige Variable auf der Mikroebene, die unabhängigen Variablen auf der Mikro- und Makroebene angesiedelt sind. Die Grundlage einer Mehrebenenanalyse ist damit eine hierarchische Datenstruktur, deren Elemente der unteren Ebene jeweils genau einem Element der höheren Ebene zugeordnet sind (z. B. Personen in Ländern). Der Beitrag bietet eine Einführung in die Logik und Vorgehensweise der Mehrebenenanalyse. Dabei werden die Voraussetzungen der Mehrebenenanalyse (z. B. Fallzahl) sowie typische Analyseschritte vorgestellt. Der Beitrag gibt auch einen knappen Überblick über Weiterentwicklungen (z. B. Drei-Ebenen-Modell).
Article
On the basis of the 2013 Chinese Social Survey (CSS) data, this paper makes an in-depth analysis of the influence of social, economic and cultural factors on the national identity of the population, with a focus on the differences between the younger and the older generation. Our findings show that the sense of national identity of the younger generation is weaker than that of the older generation, and this is even more marked among the tertiary-educated younger generation. The sense of national identity of the older generation is more influenced by social structural factors, especially by their position in the social hierarchy, while that of the younger generation is more affected by cultural and economic factors. In addition, we find that in China, the sense of national identity of the privileged stratum is stronger than that of the middle and base-level strata. These findings, which run counter to Huntington and Inglehart’s view of “the weakening of elite national identity,” may be due to the different roles of the state in globalization and economic growth.
Article
Full-text available
In 2012 we published an article on how attachment to social groups might extend from local communities to the nation and to a transnational entity in the context of the expanding European Union. Since then, the EU has expanded further to formally include a number of post-communist countries and began to face some significant backlash both in Western and Eastern Europe. Using extended International Social Survey Programme data covering 28 countries and 3 time-points between 1995 and 2015, we revisit the findings and conclusions of our original article. In addition, we complement our analysis with results from the Eurobarometer surveys between 2004 and 2019. Our updated analyses show that 1) the overall level of national identification did not increase substantially in the Western countries despite the rise in nationalist movements in Europe, 2) the length of membership in the EU does not necessarily increase European identification in the long run, notwithstanding a recent uptick in European identification, and 3) ethnic minorities, particularly in post-communist countries, have turned away from Europe.
Technical Report
Full-text available
Tι πιστεύουν οι νέοι; Ποιες είναι οι αντιλήψεις τους για ζητήματα όπως η Ευρώπη, τα μνημόνια, η οικονομία, η πολιτική, το μεταναστευτικό, η πανδημία και οι συνέπειες του πολέμου; Σε τι διαφέρουν (αν διαφέρουν) από τις αντιλήψεις των μεγαλύτερων σε ηλικία; Η παρούσα μελέτη επιχειρεί να απαντήσει στα ερωτήματα αυτά, εξετάζοντας τα ευρήματα των ερευνών της διαΝΕΟσις «Τι Πιστεύουν οι Έλληνες». Η εξέταση των αντιλήψεων των νέων για την Ευρώπη, την οικονομία, την πολιτική, το μεταναστευτικό και τον πόλεμο βασίστηκε στις έρευνες που διενεργήθηκαν σε δύο κύματα, τον Φεβρουάριο και τον Μάρτιο του 2022 από τη Μarc. Για το θέμα των μνημονίων αξιοποιήθηκαν τα ευρήματα από την αντίστοιχη έρευνα που διεξήχθη τον Δεκέμβριο 2019. Επίσης, για το θέμα της πανδημίας η ανάλυση βασίστηκε τόσο στα στοιχεία της έρευνας για την «Πανελλαδική Έρευνα Κοινής Γνώμης για την Πανδημία του Κορωνοϊού» που δημοσιεύτηκε τον Νοέμβριο 2021 από τη Μetron Analysis όσο και σε εκείνα των ερευνών του 2022. Σε όλες τις περιπτώσεις η μελέτη εστιάζει στα δημοσκοπικά ευρήματα που αφορούν στη νεότερη γενιά και ειδικότερα σε πολίτες από 17 έως 24 και από 25 έως 39 ετών, δεδομένης της ηλικιακής ομαδοποίησης που ακολουθήθηκε κατά την πραγματοποίηση των ερευνών. Η εικόνα που αναδύεται για τις αντιλήψεις των νεότερων είναι σύνθετη κι εν μέρει αντιφατική. Από τη μία πλευρά, εμφανίζονται (σε επίπεδο γενικού προσανατολισμού) ευρωπαϊστές, πολιτικά μετριοπαθείς, οικονομικά και κοινωνικά φιλελεύθεροι. Από την άλλη, επιζητούν την εργασιακή ασφάλεια, επιθυμούν αυστηρότερη αντιμετώπιση του μεταναστευτικού, δυσπιστούν έναντι της επιστήμης και των εμβολίων, αποφεύγουν την ενεργό συμμετοχή στα κοινά και δυσπιστούν έναντι του πολιτικού συστήματος. Επίσης ανησυχούν έντονα για τον πόλεμο επιρρίπτοντας μεγαλύτερη ευθύνη στη Ρωσία και υποστηρίζοντας ταυτόχρονα την επιτάχυνση της ευρωπαϊκής ενοποίησης στα ζητήματα άμυνας και εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Γενικότερα φαίνεται πως οι επιπτώσεις των αλλεπάλληλων κρίσεων των τελευταίων 13 ετών -σε οικονομία, μετανάστευση, υγεία, εξωτερική πολιτική και τώρα πάλι οικονομία- έχουν επηρεάσει αρνητικά τις οικονομικές προσδοκίες εντείνοντας το έλλειμμα πολιτικής αντιπροσώπευσης των νεότερων. Υπό αυτή την έννοια, η ανασύσταση της σχέσης εμπιστοσύνης με το πολιτικό σύστημα αναδεικνύεται σε πρώτη προτεραιότητα για τις πολιτικές δυνάμεις.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.