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The Role of Virtue in Good Management
Abstract
Any investigation into “good management” raises questions about what it means
to be a “good manager.” This itself suggests that there is more to moral theorizing
than impartially analyzing the specific details of discrete decisions, and that some
consideration ought to be paid to moral agents themselves and what constitutes
their good. Such considerations are integral to the virtue ethics tradition. This
chapter illustrates how the key features of Aristotelian virtue ethics are necessary
for understanding moral issues, as they are faced by managers, using the issue of
data manipulation as an example. Based on the view that a moral theory will only be useful for management if it can adequately describe such moral issues, it
argues that the Aristotelian tradition is thereby well suited for application
to managers. Three ways in which the Aristotelian perspective can contribute to
good management are then presented, which include consideration of: the virtues
or excellences relevant to managerial functions; those relevant to living well qua
human; and the importance of both individual and common goods. The chapter
closes by drawing attention to how the Aristotelian perspective stands in stark
contrast to a common conception of ethics as compliance.
... For an excellent example of this approach recently we have decades of management experience titrated to six mindsets according to Dewar et al. (2022). The personal effectiveness mindset in the McKinsey list would owe much to what it means to be a good manager as unfolded with the virtue management approach to business ethics espoused by West (2018). Yeager and Dweck (2020) describe the evolv-unfolding of leadership into administration across the ecosystem within which the manager operates internally and externally. ...
Is freedom and capability enough to sustain our well-being? For human flourishing to progress, defer, and avoid decline, managers as persons must grow in virtue to transcend to the ultimate source of the good. In our definition of a person we develop an anthropology of gift through the communication of one self to another and whose form is love, the willing the good of the other. We ask four questions about the humanistic manager as a person: what is the goal, end, good; what form, structure guides the manager; what materials, resources, technology, and context does the manager use within the structure to meet the end and exceed the goals, what is the means of effecting the change needed to meet the manager’s goals. Each of these questions form the basis to construct a philosophical anthropology of humanistic management. To these four questions we add three types of finality: the usual absolute terminal and horizontally immanent finalities plus the vertical finality of every growing and developing person among other persons in community. The need for a philosophical anthropology derives from a concomitant ethical requirement of what does and ought the manager, as person, undertake. What and how the person knows, wills, acts on provides the reality within which the manager, as person, operates. Along the way we will visit topics of transcendence, secularism, vulnerability, authentic personhood, and virtue. We conclude with a description, which is a dynamically evolving scheme of the meaning of a manager in the world, the social, and perhaps, the terminal goods of order. We move far from the homo farber of a technology-led world whose thought conforms being. We have begun to extend our manager into the species homo transcendens where being conforms thought and responsible action. We conclude with a sketch on the emerging role of spirituality in the workplace with connections to compassionate leadership, organizations as sites for healing and growth, and examples from the experience of humanistic organization who seem to have survived and thrived centuries of global operations. From an anthropology of gift we can identify several implications for managers. Humanistic management education would subsume the rational choice hegemony of economic modeling to a technological subset of tools, subject to the goals and nature of human persons. The scientism of thinking that psychology, sociology, political science, and economics would suitably describe, explain, and model human decisions would be replaced by an overarching framework leading to higher levels of knowledge, especially wisdom based educational experiences and content based on the natural integrity of human beings as learners. Since all technology follows, rather than leads, persons in an anthropology of gift, workplace practices would be founded in the structures immanent in persons and communities of persons. This would imply practices which transcend appraisal and assessment of performance to heights of contemplation and implementation of meaning in every task. Instead of beginning with a deficit of “what’s in it for me?” practices can begin with the surplus “how can I help you?” Proposed are practices which impound wisdom-based attributes of compassion, active listening, alterity, mercy, companionate and agapic love in decision analyses, interpretations of results, and incentives. The objective of the humanistically managed organization under the aegis of an anthropology of gift would be to minimize the maximum grief for the the most vulnerable. The objective would be applied as a policy across all authorities delegated by jurisdictions over organizations, and by boards, oversight groups, over decisions within organizations. This view from an anthropology of gift is consonant with emerging definitions of organizations as healing spaces where a balance of solidarity and subsidiarity guide decisions as opposed to simplistically applying supply and demand trade-offs.
Uncovering Aristotle's motivations and basic views while paying careful attention to his arguments, this introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's great masterpiece of moral philosophy, offers a thorough examination of the entire work. The chapter on friendship captures Aristotle's doctrine with clarity and insight, and Michael Pakaluk develops original and compelling interpretations of the Function Argument, the Doctrine of the Mean, courage and other character virtues, Akrasia, and the two treatments of pleasure.
Each of us is ultimately lonely, In the end, it's up to each of us and each of us alone to figure out who we are and who we are not, and to act more or less consistently on those conclusions.
–Tom Peters, “The Ethical Debate” Ethics Digest Dec 1989, p. 2.
We are gratefully past that embarrassing period when the very title of a lecture on “business ethics” invited—no, required—those malapert responses, “sounds like an oxymoron” or “must be a very short lecture.” Today, business ethics is well-established not only in the standard curriculum in philosophy in most departments but, more impressively, it is recommended or required in most of the leading business schools in North America, and it is even catching on in Europe (one of the too rare instances of intellectual commerce in that direction). Studies in business ethics have now reached what Tom Donaldson has called “the third wave,” beyond the hurried-together and overly-philosophical introductory textbooks and collections of too-obvious concrete case studies, too serious engagement in the business world. Conferences filled half-and-half with business executives and academics are common, and in-depth studies based on immersion in the corporate world, e.g. Robert Jackall’s powerful Moral Mazes , have replaced more simple-minded and detached glosses on “capitalism” and “social responsibility.” Business ethics has moved beyond vulgar “business as poker” arguments to an arena where serious ethical theory is no longer out-of-place but seriously sought out and much in demand.
Business ethics courses can help improve our students' ethics by teaching them about character, as opposed to just principles, the application of which creates difficulties. In particular, we can help our students consider their values and realize them in practice. According to Aristotle, ethics is about virtue, which is a matter of one's own well-being primarily, but as we are rational and social creatures, this state of well-being entails having what we would consider good moral values. Does good character really serve the agent's interests? Yes, if the agent has the right interests, and interests can be cultivated to some degree. One's values must be coherent, and one must be able to discern the salient moral features of the situations with which one deals. These are marks of good character, which the culture of one's organization may nurture or undermine. We arrive at principles supportive of good character by reflective equilibrium, a process like what Aristotle calls dialectic. Case studies assist our students in developing good character and learning to bring it to bear in complex situations, as some recent research has suggested is possible. One way to protect one's character, our students may learn, is to choose a workplace that does not undermine it.
It may be nearly impossible to use standard principles to make a decision about a complex ethical case. The best decision, say virtue ethicists in the Aristotelian tradition, is often one that is made by a person of good character who knows the salient facts of the case and can frame the situation appropriately. In this respect ethical decisions and strategic decisions are similar. Rationality plays a role in good ethical decision-making, but virtue ethicists emphasize the importance of intuitions and emotions as well. Virtue ethics suggests a reconciliation of the factual and the normative. Virtues may explain as well as justify actions. The same is true of other psychological states and events. That psychological terms have normative implications does not render them useless in explanation. As Aristotle does not distinguish cleanly between the normative and empirical, so many moral philosophers today reject the is-ought dichotomy. They are prepared to learn from economists, psychologists, and other empirical scientists who offer information about the nature of the good life and of values. Social psychologists who study community or corporate culture suggest a close relationship between organizational and ethical features, much as Aristotle saw a close relationship between politics and ethics. We should infer from all this that in business ethics there is good reason for philosophers and organization scholars to work closely together.
I have developed a theoretical framework which I call ‘an Aristotelian approach to business’ to talk about corporations and organizations in general. Although Aristotle is famous largely as an enemy of business, he was the first economist and he might well be called the first business ethicist as well. We can no longer accept the amoral idea that ‘business is business’ (not really a tautology but an excuse for being socially irresponsible and personally insensitive). According to Aristotle, one has to think of oneself as a member of the larger community—the Polis for him, the corporation, the neighborhood, the city or the country (and the world) for us—and strive to excel, to bring out what is best in ourselves and our shared enterprise. What is best in us—our virtues—are in turn defined by that larger community, and there is therefore no ultimate split or antagonism between individual self-interest and the greater public good. The Aristotelian approach to business ethics, rather, begins with the two-pronged idea that it is individual virtue and integrity that count, and that good corporate and social policy encourage and nourish individual virtue and integrity.
I will begin by stating three theses which I present in this paper. The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty—moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of “ought,” ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. My third thesis is that the differences between the wellknown English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.
To teach that being ethical requires knowing foundational ethical principles – or, as Socrates claimed, airtight definitions of ethical terms – is to invite cynicism among students, for students discover that no such principles can be found. Aristotle differs from Socrates in claiming that ethics is about virtues primarily, and that one can be virtuous without having the sort of knowledge that characterizes mathematics or natural science. Aristotle is able to demonstrate that ethics and self-interest may overlap, that ethics is largely compatible with common sense, and that Aristotle’s virtuous person can make ethical decisions rationally. Case studies can help students improve their ethical perception and keep their values from being overwhelmed by corporate culture.
Seek the good life, not money: the Aristotelian approach to business ethics
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