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Definitely, maybe: A new experimental paradigm for investigating the pragmatics of evidential devices across languages
Abstract
We present a new experimental paradigm for investigating lexical expressions that convey different strengths of speaker commitment. Specifically, we compare different evidential contexts for using modal devices, epistemic discourse particles, and statements with no evidential markers at all, examining the extent to which listeners' interpretations of certain types of evidential words and their judgments about speaker commitment differ in strength. We also probe speakers' production preferences for these different devices under varying evidential circumstances. The results of our experiments shed new light on distinctions and controversies that play a key role in the current theoretical literature on the semantics and pragmatics of modals and discourse particles. Our paradigm thus contributes to a domain of experimental research on evidential expressions that is only just taking shape at the crossroads of theoretical semantics/pragmatics and psycholinguistics; we provide a potential starting point for approaching theoretical debates on the nature of modal evidential expressions from an experimental and context-oriented perspective.
... Such an effect has been found in the investigation of various pragmatic phenomena. For example, expressions of confidence or certainty (Lorson et al., 2021;Vullioud et al., 2016), different pragmatic devices for encoding speaker meaning (Mazzarella et al., 2018), and modal expressions (Degen et al., 2019) have all been shown to modulate perceived speaker commitment. ...
... However, even languages that do not encode source claims through explicit grammatical markers have a multitude of ways to express evidentiality. For example, modal expressions in English and German (such as must, presumably, maybe, definitely) have an evidential interpretation (Degen et al., 2019). In fact, the role of source information in communication is so important that Mahr and Csibra (2018; have proposed that it contributed to shaping the evolution of episodic memory to serve as a form of source memory in humans. ...
... Conversely, epistemic modals might be said to encode different speaker commitments while evidentials merely imply them. Regardless of one's stance on this question, however, it has been observed that, just as modal expressions, evidential claims can have effects on speaker commitment (e.g., Wierner, 2018; see Degen et al., 2019, for experimental evidence in this regard). Framed in these terms then, the question we are asking here is whether differential effects on reliability judgments of different evidential claims can be accounted for purely through semantically encoded information (i.e., assumptions about the properties of the respective source) or whether inferences to speaker commitment play a role as well. ...
What is the effect of source claims (such as “I saw it” or “Somebody told me”) on the believability of statements, and what mechanisms are responsible for this effect? In this study, we tested the idea that source claims impact statement believability by modulating the extent to which a speaker is perceived to be committed to (and thereby accountable for) the truth of her assertion. Across three experiments, we presented participants with statements associated with different source claims, asked them to judge how much they believed the statements, and how much the speaker was responsible if the statement turned out to be false. We found that (1) statement believability predicted speaker accountability independently of a statement’s perceived prior likelihood or associated source claim; (2) being associated with a claim to first-hand (“I saw that . . .”) or second-hand (“Somebody told me that . . .”) evidence strengthened this association; (3) bare assertions about specific circumstances were commonly interpreted as claims to first-hand evidence; and (4) (everything else being equal) claims to first-hand evidence increased while claims to second-hand evidence decreased both statement believability and speaker accountability. These results support the idea that the believability of a statement is closely related to how committed to its truth the speaker is perceived to be and that source claims modulate the extent of this perceived commitment.
... Our proposal makes two concrete predictions about utterances implying direct evidence: (i) they convey uncertainty relative to bare forms, and (ii) they are more likely to be used under circumstances where the implied type of evidence is compromised and hence less reliable, e.g., poor visibility in the case of visual evidence. We present results from two experiments, based on the experimental paradigm of Degen et al. (2019), which provide initial corroboration of our predictions. Exp. 1 measures the perceived certainty of a speaker using bare forms and using evidential devices implying evidence of varying directness. ...
... Participants are placed in a listener's role: they are presented with utterances and asked to rate the speaker's certainty. 1 Degen et al. (2019) previously established that listeners ascribe varying degrees of certainty to a speaker depending on whether they use an evidential device, and on which evidential device they use. Importantly, all the evidential devices they examined (English must, might, and probably, and German muss ('must'), vermutlich ('probably') and wohl (lit. ...
Using evidential expressions to indicate one's source of information for an utterance tends to convey uncertainty on the speaker's part. Previous accounts of this uncertainty inference attribute it to either extralinguistic reasoning about evidence directness, or to pragmatic reasoning about alternative utterances. Here we present a novel hybrid account, and introduce a set of utterances which allows us to tease apart the three ac-counts' predictions. We test these predictions in two studies by manipulating the directness of evidence indicated by an ev-idential expression. Exp. 1 shows that listeners infer more uncertainty with extreme values of directness. Exp. 2 shows that speakers are more likely to indicate evidence in contexts where the evidence is unreliable. We argue that these findings support an account which involves both extralinguistic and pragmatic reasoning, and develop a formal implementation of such an account within the Rational Speech Act framework.
... Weighing up doctors' diagnosis as medical expertise (Atanasova et al. 2017), the patient normally feels convinced by the doctor's text-based alarming words regarding their concern. As for the basic model for such regulation, it is to deploy uncertainty again, which is a central feature of the experience of acute and chronic illness (Degen et al. 2019). Therefore, as they have already done, doctors could use the uncertainty of illness to properly manage patients' emotions for medical purposes. ...
Prior studies have focused on the prevalence, causes and impacts of patients’ negative emotions during doctor-patient communication. However, to date, there is a paucity of research riveting on doctors’ emotion-regulating strategies and their effects in online medical consultation (OMC). In this connection, drawing on the concept of extrinsic emotion regulation, this paper analyzes empirically the doctors’ strategies in regulating patients’ emotions and examines the effects based on data from “Dingxiang Yisheng”, one of the largest online medical consultation platforms in China. It is found that doctors deploy extensive discourse of relational work and diagnosis to regulate patients’ negative emotions. Comments from patients not only reveal the effectiveness of doctors’ strategies in alleviating negative emotions but also showcase that patients attribute the relief of their emotions to doctors’ expertise, attitude, response speed, and communication skills. All these findings contribute to theoretical insights into emotion regulation and have practical implications for online doctor-patient communication.
... A number of authors have offered arguments against von Fintel and Gillies' strong account of English must, including Ippolito (2017) and Sherman (2018). Lassiter (2016), Del Pinel and Waldon (2018), and Degen et al. (2019) offer carefully developed experimental evidence that in ordinary usage by native speakers must is relatively weak, contra von Fintel and Gillies' predictions. ...
We assume a central thesis about modal auxiliaries due to Angelika Kratzer, the modal base presupposition: natural language expressions that contain a modal component in their meaning, including all English modal auxiliaries and epistemic modal auxiliaries (EMA)s in particular, presuppose a modal base, a function that draws from context a relevant set of propositions which contribute to a premise-semantics for the modal. Accepting this thesis for EMAs leaves open (at least) the following two questions about the meaning of English EMAs like must and might: (i) What constraints, if any, are there on the character of the premise set for an EMA? And (ii) what is the nature of the relationship between premises and conclusion that is required for truth of the EMA statement? I argue for at least a partial answer to (i), with a hypothesis about constraints on the modal base for an EMA: EMAs, unlike some other types of modals, are indexical: They are anchored to an agent-in-a-situation whose doxastic state is currently under discussion in the context of utterance. Realized in a Kratzerian semantics, indexicality sheds new light on a number of outstanding puzzles, including the widely observed variability of anchoring of EMAs, the ways in which EMAs differ from so-called root modals, Yalcin’s (Mind 116:983–1026, 2007) puzzle (a version of Moore’s paradox for epistemic modals embedded under attitudes), how to explain the apparent weakness of necessity EMAs, and problems with second order belief and disagreement.
... In addition, semanticists and computational linguists have long studied speaker commitment factors such as factivity (Karttunen, 1971;Degen and Tonhauser, 2022) and projection (Simons et al., 2010), and more recent work include corpora like the CommitmentBank (De Marneffe et al., 2019) which offers naturally occurring examples, as well as new experimental paradigms to investigate speaker commitment (Degen et al., 2019). A wide variety of scholars have examined computational issues in factuality, veridicality, and commitment (Saurí and Pustejovsky, 2009;de Marneffe et al., 2012;Stanovsky et al., 2017;Rudinger et al., 2018;Jiang and de Marneffe, 2021, inter alia) as well as bias (Pryzant et al., 2020;Patel and Pavlick, 2021) and specific devices like hedges (Prokofieva and Hirschberg, 2014;Raphalen et al., 2022), and modality (Pyatkin et al., 2021). ...
Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.
... clickworker.de), following previous literature on experimentation in pragmatics (Degen et al., 2019). Participants had to rate the acceptability of Speaker B's reactions on a scale ranging from 1 (¼ very bad) to 6 (¼ very good). ...
In this paper, we explore exclamatives when used as responses in a discourse. Our proposal is based on the following pragmatic observation: so-called that-exclamatives in both Germanic and Romance languages are preferred as responses to polar questions, while wh-exclamatives are restricted to a response use in non-polar contexts. We establish this data pattern empirically by means of two judgment studies, and we then provide a detailed theoretical account for these challenging new data points. In particular, we show that the differences between the response uses of wh-exclamatives and that-exclamatives can be explained on syntactic grounds, analogous to ‘the syntax of answers’ proposed in recent syntactic work by Holmberg (2013, 2015) at the syntax-pragmatics interface. In sum, we provide a pragmatically more refined view on exclamatives and their use in a discourse, suggesting new empirical distinctions at the syntax-pragmatics interface.
... Interestingly, there are also differences at the level of pragmatics suggested by recent experimental work on how evidential discourse particles differ from other evidential devices in the domain of 'speaker commitment' (see Degen et al. 2019). Although these pragmatic meaning components should maybe not be represented in the functional hierarchy of the clause, we take this work as further evidence that discourse particles and corresponding modal devices are indeed different categories, both at the syntactic (see our discussion in Section 2.1) and at the semantic level (see our remarks above). ...
In this paper, we focus on the syntax of question particles in Basque and provide an account that draws new parallels between the syntactic behavior of discourse particles in Basque and some recent findings that have been reported for the German language, perhaps the most studied language of all when it comes to discourse particles. In particular, after having argued for a syntactic perspective on discourse particles for German, we deal with Basque particles in both wh -questions and polar questions. For wh -questions, we provide evidence for the claim that the particle ote occupies an IP/TP-internal particle position and, when attaching to a wh -element, can serve to form emphatic questions of the type that have also been proposed for German. In the context of polar questions, we demonstrate that there are two distinct positions for discourse particles in central and eastern dialects of Basque: one inside the IP/TP-domain and one in the left periphery of the clause. Again, we indicate relevant cross-linguistic parallels, thereby dealing with Basque discourse particles from the perspective of a cross-linguistic syntax of particle elements.
... A related observation is due to Degen et al. (2019), who use a series of experiments to show that participants tend to assert Must p more when the speaker has weaker evidence for p, and to assert p more when she has stronger evidence for p. Likewise, listeners tend to infer that speakers of Must p have weaker evidence for p than speakers of p alone. ...
There is a difference between the conditions in which one can felicitously use a ‘must’-claim like (1-a) and those in which one can use the corresponding claim without the ‘must’, as in (1-b): (1)a. It must be raining out.b. It is raining out.It is difficult to pin down just what this difference amounts to. And it is difficult to account for this difference, since assertions of ⌜ Must p⌝ and assertions of p alone seem to have the same basic goal: namely, communicating that p is true. In this paper I give a new account of the conversational role of ‘must’. I begin by arguing that a ‘must’-claim is felicitous only if there is a shared argument for the proposition it embeds. I then argue that this generalization, which I call Support, can explain the more familiar generalization that ‘must’-claims are felicitous only if the speaker’s evidence for them is in some sense indirect. Finally, I propose a pragmatic derivation of Support as a manner implicature.
Copulative perception verbs such as English sound have received scant attention relative to other perception verbs, especially in non-European languages. In Hebrew, these verbs can take both adjectival and adverbial complements, a fact which sets Hebrew apart from previously studied languages, and which has heretofore been overlooked. This article investigates the usage of Hebrew copulative perception verbs with adverbial complements, with adjectival complements, and in impersonal constructions. A large-scale corpus study and a preference experiment reveal that each of these three constructions has a different interpretation. With adverbial complements, the verbs have an “attributary” meaning, attributing properties to perceptual impressions of objects. The complement slot in these cases is restricted to subjective multidimensional properties, which previous accounts of the attributary meaning fail to predict, motivating a novel analysis in terms of dimension selection. With adjectival complements, as well as in impersonal constructions, the verbs have a parenthetical meaning, taking and modifying a proposition argument. The two constructions are not equivalent, however. With adjectival complements, the verbs encode evidential but not epistemic information, and vice versa in impersonal constructions, reinforcing the need to maintain a distinction between the classes of evidentials and epistemic modals.
This article presents a series of three experiments investigating the processing of nested epistemic expressions, utterances containing two epistemic modals in one clause, such as “he certainly may have forgotten.” While some linguists claim that in a nested epistemic expression one modal is semantically embedded within the scope of the other modal based on the word order, it is possible that in daily conversation the scope of nested modals may not be thoroughly processed, leading to a “good-enough” interpretation that is not sensitive to the word order of the two modals. This study used probability judgment tests to investigate people’s interpretation of nested epistemic expressions, and the effect of word order was not observed. This result fails to support the scope account of the nested epistemic expressions and suggests a holistic processing mechanism in line with the good-enough processing framework.
Specification of information sources in human speech – evidentiality – prevents misunderstandings and allows listeners to assess the validity of the information communicated. Some of the same linguistic forms used for evidentiality, including grammatical markers and lexical items, are also reported to have a ‘mirative’ function, and can be used by speakers to express their surprise. Importantly, languages differ in the type of forms they typically use for evidentiality. For instance, corpus analyses suggest that German uses lexical items, while Korean typically encodes evidentiality via grammaticalized sentence-ending (SE) markers. Little is known, however, about the extent to which such linguistic differences are reflected in speakers' use of these forms in verbal interaction. To fill this gap, we carried out an experimental study in which Korean and German speakers were presented with events in audio and/or visual modalities and asked to describe them verbally as well as to rate their degree of surprise about the events. The results revealed several major differences between the two languages. Korean speakers used a high frequency of evidential SE markers, particularly the hearsay marker -tay, while German speakers, who relied on lexical items, encoded evidentiality much less frequently. In Korean, grammatical markers of evidentiality showed pragmatic extensions: The hearsay marker -tay carried an overtone of mirativity. Korean speakers seldom used markers having to do with perception, -te(la) and -ney; instead, it was the neutral marker -e that correlated with the salience of the visual evidence. In contrast, German speakers encoded hearsay and visual perception with lexical verbs in comparable frequencies, slightly prioritizing visual evidence. In German, lexical expressions (sagen/hören ‘say/hear’, sehen ‘see’) did not show pragmatic extension, and unmarked sentences did not imply a visual information source. These and other findings offer important insight into the lexical-grammatical continuum in evidentiality and the relationship between language and cognition in general.
Speakers take responsibility for their utterances in communication. Theoretical literature has suggested that speakers are more committed to what they explicitly say than what they implicate, but recent empirical studies have shown mixed results. This study readdresses the issue of speaker commitment attribution (i.e., to what's said vs. to what's implicated) by taking into account the factor of speech act (i.e., assertion and promise). Results showed that while speakers were more committed to what's said than what's implicated in an assertion, they were perceived to be equally committed to the said and implicated contents of a promise. We suggest this should be attributed to the difference in the nature of the implicated propositional content of the two speech acts, which was evidenced by participants' higher degree of certainty of the implicature derived from promise than assertion. The results suggest that commitment to what's said or what's implicated is not a fixed phenomenon and that speech act is an important factor that cannot be neglected in commitment study. In the end, we propose an experimental paradigm that contributes to future empirical study of speaker commitment at the theoretical and psycholinguistic crossroads.
Source representations play a role both in the formation of individual beliefs as well as in the social transmission of such beliefs. Both of these functions suggest that source information should be particularly useful in the context of interpersonal disagreement. Three experiments with an identical design (one original study and two replications) with 3- to 4-year-old-children (N = 100) assessed whether children’s source memory performance would improve in the face of disagreement and whether such an effect interacts with different types of sources (first- vs. second-hand). In a 2 x 2 repeated-measures design, children found out about the contents of a container either by looking inside or being told (IV1). Then they were questioned about the contents of the container by an interlocutor puppet who either agreed or disagreed with their answer (IV2). We measured children’s source memory performance in response to a free recall question (DV1) followed by a forced-choice question (DV2). Four-year-olds (but not three-year-olds) performed better in response to the free recall source memory question (but not the forced-choice question) when their interlocutor had disagreed with them compared to when it had agreed with them. Children were also better at recalling ‘having been told’ than ‘having seen’. These results demonstrate that by four years of age, source memory capacities are sensitive to the communicative context of assertions and serve social functions.
Recently, a number of theorists (MacFarlane (2003, 2011), Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005), Egan (2007), Stephenson (2007a,b)) have argued that an adequate semantics and pragmatics for epistemic modals calls for some technical notion of relativist truth and/or relativist content. Much of this work has relied on an empirical thesis about speaker judgments, namely that competent speakers tend to judge a present-tense bare epistemic possibility claim true only if the prejacent is compatible with their information. Relativists have in particular appealed to judgments elicited in so-called eavesdropping and retraction cases to support this empirical thesis. But opposing theorists have denied the judgments, and at present there is no consensus in the literature about how the speaker judgments in fact pattern. Consequently there is little agreement on what exactly a semantics and pragmatics for epistemic modals should predict about the pattern of judgments in these cases. Further theorizing requires greater clarity on the data to be explained. To clarify the data, we subjected eavesdropping and retraction cases to experimental evaluation. Our data provide evidence against the claim that competent speakers tend to judge a present-tense bare epistemic possibility claim true only if the prejacent is compatible with their information. Theories designed to predict this result are accordingly undermined.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.7.10
BibTeX info
p class="p1">Many semanticists have claimed that must’s meaning is weaker than
epistemic necessity, a claim that von Fintel & Gillies ( 2010 ) dub “The Mantra”.
Recently von Fintel & Gillies have argued in an influential paper that the Mantra is
false, and that the intuitions that have driven it can be accounted for by appealing to
evidential meaning. I show that von Fintel & Gillies do not provide a compelling
argument against the Mantra, and that their theory of evidential meaning, while
promising in certain respects, also has serious empirical and conceptual problems.
In addition, a variety of corpus examples indicate that speakers who assert must
p are not always maximally confident in the truth of p. As an alternative, I reimplement
von Fintel & Gillies ’ theory of indirect evidentiality in a probabilistic,
Mantra-compatible framework. Ultimately, both sides of the debate are partly right:
must is weak in several respects, but it also encodes an indirect evidential meaning.</p
Within formal semantics, research on the expression of modality in natural language has traditionally focused on verbs. This book brings together novel work on the semantics and pragmatics of some nominal expressions that also convey modality. The book focuses on indefinites that can convey ignorance on the part of the speaker with respect to which individual satisfies the existential claim that they make. Despite the fact that epistemic indefinites have attracted some attention in the recent semantics literature, we still do not have a good understanding of the phenomenon: there is currently no agreement as to what the source of their epistemic component is, we lack sufficient cross-linguistic data to develop a semantic typology of these items, and the parallelisms and differences between epistemic indefinites and other expressions that convey epistemic modality have not been explored in depth. In this volume, the reader will find novel empirical observations on and important theoretical insights into epistemic indefinites, together with discussions of related topics (e.g. modal free relatives, modified numerals, and epistemic modals). This brings us one step closer to developing a semantic typology of epistemic indefinites that explores the place of these expressions within a general typology of modal items.
In this paper, I analyse German and Italian modal particles and argue that they are deficient (i.e., weak) adverbs merged with dedicated functional constituents of the Mood/Mod field. I also show that sentence-initial and sentence-final particles are not one and the same element. In particular, sentence-final particles are not (functional) heads in the left-periphery of the clause and cannot be derived by movement of their complement to their specifier. They are instead merged with functional constituents of the IP-internal Mood/Mod field, like sentence-internal particles, and their final position is derived by remnant movement of what follows the particle to a specifier higher than the particle, similarly to what happens with right-dislocated constituents. Verb-based particles are also briefly discussed. In their sentence-final use, they are shown to have the same syntax as adverb-based particles; in their sentence-initial use, they are instead merged in the CP layer.
The class of meaning known as conventional implicature (CI) has received a great deal of attention in the pragmatics and semantics literature in recent years. While the limits of this class of meaning have been greatly expanded and understood in new ways, this renewed attention has also resulted in a certain amount of confusion in regard to the category. There are now two competing conceptions of conventional implicature, but this fact is not always recognized. This paper addresses these two instantiations of CIs: the original description of the phenomenon in Grice (1975:44–45) and a recent reincarnation of it in Potts (2005, inter alia). It then points out differences between the two CI types, comments on the fact that these differences are not always acknowledged, and then illustrates problems that can arise when this occurs.
It is a recurring matra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having
a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength
of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems.
We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous
to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence
on the part of the speaker who uses must.
KeywordsModality-Epistemic-Evidentiality
The recent literature on adverb positioning is roughly divided between two theoretical camps, one of which claims that adverbs are licensed in spec positions by empty functional heads (Cinque, 1999), the other taking adverbs as adjoined and licensed largely by semantically based principles (Ernst, 2002). This paper defends the latter view, presenting two sets of evidence. First, the syntactic approach invoking functional heads holds that certain aspects of an adverb's meaning are encoded in the functional heads, such as the different scopes of frequency adverbs, e.g. in Texans often drink beer versus Texans drink beer often. It is shown that this approach to adverb meaning leads to significant redundancy and great difficulties in representing adverb semantics in a coherent way. Second, while the functional-head theory does account for the normal order of subject-oriented adverbs and negation (She probably didn’t leave versus *She didn’t probably leave), the existence of exceptional cases where adverbs may follow negation requires this theory to adopt a semantically based explanation (invoking the adverbs’ status as positive polarity items) in any case. As a result, its original account of subject-oriented adverbs is redundant. For both sets of evidence, the semantically based theory handles the data easily: scope and related patterns are predicted by its basic semantic principles, and the polarity explanation for the second set also fits naturally into this framework without redundancy. Thus, the two phenomena provide evidence for the semantically based theory.
A cost and information-theoretic account of epistemic "must
- J Degen
- J Kao
- G Scontras
- N D Goodman
Degen, J., Kao, J., Scontras, G., Goodman, N.D., 2015. A cost and information-theoretic account of epistemic "must". In: Poster Presented at CUNY 2015, Los
Angeles, Mar 19e21.
Discourse particles. To appear
- P Grosz
- L Matthewson
- C Meier
- H Rullmann
- Zimmermann
Grosz, P., 2016. Discourse particles. To appear. In: Matthewson, L., Meier, C., Rullmann, H., Zimmermann, T.E. (Eds.), The Companion to Semantics (SemCom).
Wiley, Oxford.
Shedding new light on the wohl muddle: the particle schier in Austrian German
- P Grosz
Grosz, P., 2017. Shedding new light on the wohl muddle: the particle schier in Austrian German. Wien. Linguist. Gaz. 82, 71e78.
Karttunen, L., 1972. Possible and must. In: Kimball, J. (Ed.), Syntax and Semantics, vol. 1. Academic Press, New York, pp. 1e20.
Heterogeneity and Uniformity in the Evidential Domain
- N Korotkova
Korotkova, N., 2016. Heterogeneity and Uniformity in the Evidential Domain. PhD dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles.
Discourse particles in the left periphery
- M Zimmermann
- B Shaer
- P Cook
- W Frey
Zimmermann, M., 2008. Discourse particles in the left periphery. In: Shaer, B., Cook, P., Frey, W., Maienborn, C. (Eds.), Dislocated Elements in Discourse:
Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Perspectives. Routledge, New York & London, pp. 200e231.
Semantics: an International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning
- M Zimmermann
Zimmermann, M., 2011. Discourse particles. In: Portner, P., Maienborn, C., von Heusinger, K. (Eds.), Semantics: an International Handbook of Natural
Language Meaning. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 2011e2038.
The neighbor's dog is barking./Der Nachbarshund hat gebellt References Aikhenvald
A.4 The neighbor's dog is barking./Der Nachbarshund hat gebellt
References
Aikhenvald, A.Y., 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford University Press, Oxford.