Content uploaded by Ulas Basar Gezgin
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Ulas Basar Gezgin on Dec 28, 2018
Content may be subject to copyright.
Eurasian Journal of Anthropology Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
ISSN: 2166-7411
How psychology and psychologists can and can’t
contribute to peace processes? A prolegomenon for a
critical peace psychology
Ulaş Başar Gezgin
Duy Tan University, Danang, Vietnam
Article info
Received: 11 October 2018
Accepted: 18 December 2018
Key words
Peace psychology, critical peace
psychology, critical psychology,
organic peace psychologist,
medical model of peace, and
analogical inference error
For correspondence
Ulaş Başar Gezgin
Duy Tan University, 03 Quang
Trung Street, Danang, Vietnem
E-mail: ulasbasar@gmail.com
Abstract
There may be at least three ways through which psychology and
psychologists can contribute to peace processes: 1. Psychological
research findings can be usual for peace processes. 2.
Psychologists as a professional group can involve in negotiations
or other peace-related processes. 3. Applied psychological
counseling skills such as active listening, basic empathy,
multicultural competency, acceptance, rapport-building etc. can
be utilized to train both sides of the conflict for a smooth
transition to peace processes. Unfortunately, these three options
are rarely taken into consideration. The article discusses various
ways through which psychology and psychologists can and can’t
contribute to peaceprocesses, errors, biases and fallacies
typically observed in the relevant research and the applied fields,
and the distinction between medical and social models of peace.
The introduction of new terms to the field of peace studies in
general, and peace psychology in particular is another key
strength of this article.
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
30
Introduction: theoretical problems with the notions of peace and peace
psychology
Let’s start our article with one of the most common definitions of peace psychology (Christie et
al., 2001:8):
Peace psychology seeks to develop theories and practices aimed at the prevention and
mitigation of direct and structural violence. Framed positively, peace psychology promotes the
nonviolent management of conflict and the pursuit of social justice, what we refer to as
peacemaking and peacebuilding, respectively.
Another definition is the following (Ardila, 2001:39):
Peace psychology is the field of research and application that uses the methods, theories and
scientific findings of psychology for the understanding and modification of the problems
associated with peace, war, violence, aggression, and conflicts among groups, communities,
institutions and nations.
Contrary to the common sense view, conflicts are not always negative (Kimhi, 2011). For
one thing, social history progresses through conflicts and contradictions. So peace psychology
does not aim to end the conflicts, but manage them. That means, even after a successful
peace process, the conflict will exist, but it will be at a manageable level. Otherwise, if the
aim of peace psychology would be to completely end the conflicts, we had to assimilate one
ethnic group into another, forcibly converting a party to become another, e.g. from
Christianity to Islam and vice versa. Thus, peace does not mean to have people similar to each
other, but continue to be different; different but no longer in non-manageable forms of
conflict.
Christie (2011) makes a useful distinction between direct peace and structural peace
referring to a number of pioneering studies in peace psychology, and accordingly between
peacemaking and peacebuilding. The former corresponds to physical confrontation, while the
latter refers to structural forms of violence. Peacemaking accordingly has more to do with
ceasefire, while peacebuilding is more long-term oriented.
However, as we will be discussing soon, peacebuilding requires social justice (e.g. Christie,
2001), but peace psychologists rarely make clear how social justice would ever be possible
under capitalism. In most of the cases, social justice and capitalism are contradiction in terms.
To put it in more details (Christie, 2001:277):
Peace psychologists are not only developing theories and practices aimed at the prevention of
direct violence, but are also working to mitigate structural violence, which means the
reduction of hierarchical relations within and between societies. Hierarchical relations
privilege those on the top while oppressing, exploiting, and dominating those on the bottom.
Framed positively, we can conceptualize peacebuilding as movement toward social justice
which occurs when political structures become more inclusive by giving voice to those who
have been marginalized in decisions that affect their well-being, and economic structures
become transformed so that those who have been exploited gain greater access to material
resources that satisfy their basic needs.
This is in fact not only nearly impossible under capitalism, but also adds a heavy burden to
peace processes that put the whole process in danger. We agree that for long-term peace,
social justice is required, but peace process itself can lead to further problems in society, as it
would scare off middle classes and land owners. Rather than peace psychology, this is more
like liberation psychology which also questions capitalism. A peace psychology not questioning
capitalism and not thinking about its alternatives would be betraying itself with palliative
solutions to conflicts. Furthermore, political participation is often misleading and fake under
capitalism, as even in multi-party regimes, parties themselves are not democratic, they are
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
31
more like leaders’ farmlands, and also there are political and monetary barriers imposed
against people’s rights for social gathering, meeting, organization and freedom of expression
and thought. If we would fight for these rights for a lasting peace, we will alienate the ruling
classes who would leave the negotiation table. Thus, the original claim of the peace psychology
to restore social justice for a lasting peace can’t be taken seriously and it is rarely considered
in empirical works. The focus of most of the peace psychology research is on peacemaking.
Peacebuilding is definitely more complicated than an experimental research would cover. A
lasting peace requires revolution which will be another source of conflict. Even challenging the
patriarchal structure of the traditional societies will itself bring more conflicts. The solution is
either to rename ‘peace psychology’ as ‘revolutionary psychology’ or ‘liberation psychology’ or
narrow down its coverage and scope.1
To sum up, structural violence is sine qua non in capitalism. Peace psychologists who care
about social justice should be clearer about the social alternatives that they are intentionally
or unintentionally promoting such as socialism. In the upcoming sections, we will be listing and
discussing a set of biases, errors and fallacies of mainstream peace psychology and
psychologists that may potentially disable peace efforts wittingly or unwittingly.
Contribution of psychological research findings for peace processes
Biases in naming and formulating the conflict
Being a peace psychologist in research and especially in practice necessitates identifying our
own biases, blind spots and any other subjectivity that can sabotage peace efforts from the
very beginning. This starts with language: If you are part of a peace making team, you are
expected to call the war as ‘Vietnamese-American War’ rather than ‘Vietnam War,’ as for
Vietnamese that war can’t be ‘a Vietnam war,’ but an ‘American war.’2 In this vein, Lykes
(1999) even questions the term ‘American,’ as it also refers to the name of the continent. That
is why, in a number of Latin American songs by anti-United-States musicians, America is
addressed as the beloved continent, but not the country.3 Considering the word matching this
in Spanish (estadounidense), Lykes (1999) uses the term ‘Unitedstatesian.’ Likewise, the
associated syndrome can’t be called as ‘Vietnam syndrome,’ as for the rest of the occupied
non-Western world, it is better to be called as ‘American syndrome.’
In case of ethnic conflicts, associating the conflict with an ethnicity or nation does not
serve the peace efforts, neither ignoring its ethnic/national character: For example, in Turkey
for long decades, the official discourse was: “There is no ethnic/national problem in Turkey,
there is any Kurd. Everybody is Turkish. The problems in the region are due to economic
underdevelopment and feudalism.” This changed recently to: “We have Kurds living in Turkey.
We have a Kurdish problem. It is an ethnic/national issue. Although the economic factors can’t
be ignored, it is mostly an ethnic/national problem.” The Kurdish side as a response states that
“that is improvement over the previous discourse. However, there is no Kurdish problem in
Turkey. Kurds are not the source of the problem, but the Turks. That is why we call it ‘Turkish
problem.’” Such a blame game obviously does not help peace processes. Thus we need more
generic, more objective terms. One could be ‘the regional problem in Turkey’; but because of
forced migration within Turkey, now Kurds are in almost all cities of Turkey. So because of
Turkish governments’ decades of inappropriate policies, it is no longer a regional problem. A
1 For a discussion of liberation psychologies with regard to peace psychology through the case of South African
rights movements, see Dawes (2001).
2 It is called as ‘Kháng chiến chống Mỹ’ (Resistance War against America) or ‘Cuộc chiến tranh Mỹ’ (American
War) in Vietnamese.
3 E.g. Inti Illimani’s ‘América Novia Mía’ (1997) which refers to America, the continent as the girlfriend.
Accessed https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSzfDf7PgNA
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
32
better term would be ‘the national problem in Turkey’ which does not blame any side nor
associate the problem with one of them. Furthermore, such a characterization allow us to
recognize that there are multiple sides to the conflict rather than Turks and Kurds that are
conceptualized as essentialized and homogenized entities (see fallacy of dualism below).
These are all examples of biases in naming and formulating the conflict.
Dehistoricization
Likewise, ignoring colonial antecedents of conflicts formulate the problem in wrong ways: A
conflict with its roots in colonial system is reframed as if it is an ethnic conflict which emerged
out of nowhere. It is as if it would have existed without encouragement or toleration of the
former colonial masters. Furthermore, United States’ involvement in coups and massacres in
Latin America and elsewhere can’t go unnoticed. Without acknowledging facts and constructing
the most realistic historiography, peace can’t be possible at all. In that sense we agree with
Lykes (1999:31):
My point is, rather, that as psychologists our theorizing about conflict must situate the
dynamics of ethnicity within a larger historical framework that contributes to our
understanding of its social construction within a complex set of historical and economic forces.
These analyses also caution against facile causal conclusions about conflicts in areas that are
only remotely understood by those of us in the West.
Converging with Lykes (1999), Dawes (2001) proposes that even imposition of a Western-
oriented peace psychology can be an act of structural violence, as the local channels of peace
making are ignored. For peace psychology to be really universal and objective, the relationship
between the discipline and the local settings should be bidirectional, instead of being
unidirectional. The epistemological method can’t be deduction only, where we apply the
universal principles to particular cases, but also induction, where we collect data of particular
cases to modify and fine-tune our universal principles.
To summarize this point, against dehistoricization of the dominant powers, including
‘colonial masters,’ we offer rehistoricization, or a revisionist historiography. Contrary to the
discourse of historical animosities, it is better to identify the problems in history as they are
rather than hiding them in the name of peace. Although hiding them can be helpful in the
short-term, in the long-term it can negatively affect the peace processes.
Fallacy of analysis without institutions
For peace building, we need transformations in social institutions such as media, education,
justice, military etc. However, popular discussions on mainstream media usually ignore this.
For mainstream media, the key point is not peace building as such, but ceasefire. They often
confuse ceasefire with peace. Most of the social psychology research on peacemaking is flawed,
as war and peace are not sustained by group processes, but by pro-war vs. pro-peace
institutions. If it has nothing to do with group processes, the solution can’t be in changing
group-related variables. A typical example of an institutional influence can be seen in the role
of mass communication in Nazi atrocities and pro-war radio programs in Rwanda that led to
massacres. Radios can also be used to foster peace (cf. Bilali and Vollhardt, 2013).
An institutional psychology is needed for peace
Following from the previous point, psychological research not referring to individual or group
cognition only, but investigating the relationship between pro-war and pro-peace institutions
and individual/group cognition is needed. For example, one reason peace can’t be built in a
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
33
country is political immunity and impunity in cases of state terrorism. Research on peace
psychology and state terrorism is virtually non-existent. If somebody kills a man/woman, he is
punished; but if state officials kill somebody, sometimes they can go away with it. Even if we
can teach people to be more peaceful, such impunity perpetuates state terrorism. The true
questions would be about how this impunity affects people’s behavior, and to what extent the
norms set by institutions such as a justice system which rarely distributes justice in acts of
state terrorism affect the citizens. Without taking institutions into account, the way
mainstream psychology studies peace is analogous to the following situation: Suppose that we
still have slavery, but psychology studies cognitions about slavery rather than the social,
material and institutional foundations of slavery. The end of racism does not necessarily end
slavery. From the other direction, racism didn’t end when the governments abolished slavery,
but without institutional abolishment declarations, the end of slavery was not even possible. In
other words, official change in social norms with regard to slavery was a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for the end of slavery.
Ideological functions of psychologization of peace and war
If research projects are heavily funded because they study cognitions or emotions about
slavery, rather than slavery as an institution, we can state that this is not only a matter of
misunderstanding, but it also serves ideological functions to keep the unfair system as it is. The
situation needs deeper analysis than racism of a few people. The system rather reproduces
itself through the institutions.
Limited external validity of social psychology experiments on peace and war
Social psychology experiments on peace and war come up with sound findings; however
whether they are applicable on society as a whole is problematic. That is because people in
laboratory settings do not necessarily behave naturally. They are in the knowledge that they
are in an experiment, they are isolated from social influences that exert power on their
cognitions and behaviors in real life, and the effects created in the experiments are not
necessarily lasting. Furthermore, institutions can’t be represented in experiments with all their
power in real life. For example, students can be made more peaceful and ready to apologize
for crimes committed by their in-groups etc. in experimental settings, but when they join the
compulsory military service, a strong institutional setting, all these gains will be gone.
Unlike these inapplicable research studies, there are proportionately a smaller number of
peace psychology research with direct implications for what to do for peace, given the
structure of our society and our psychology: Dunwoody et al. (2014:256) find that “those higher
in authoritarianism and social dominance orientation held more misperceptions about the Iraq
war, which, in turn, predicted support for military engagement in Iraq and for a broader pre-
emptive military policy.”
That means we need to find ways to reduce authoritarianism and social dominance in
society, if we want to have peace. This is consistent with an institutional understanding of
psychology and society. We also need ethnographic accounts of conflicts (e.g. Psaltis, 2016)
rather than experimental studies with low realism, but with a focus on institutional influences
instead of semi-structured and unstructured narratives only. For example, just as Psaltis (2016)
did, we can show how education supports, enables or disables these narratives. We should
include as many social institutions as possible for a more integrative analysis of pro-war and
pro-peace narratives.4
4 By the way, as a digression we would like to distinguish peace journalism and pro-peace journalism; and war
journalism and pro-war journalism. The relevant literature uses the terms ‘peace journalism’ and ‘war
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
34
A number of exceptions to our criticisms can be noted here, for example Sherif’s works
which were summarized by Mayor (1995) from a peace perspective. They provide a perfect
example of not only how people can easily get divided by group dynamics, but also how they
can forget about past hostilities for a common cause, as will be mentioned with regard to the
world peace. Sherif’s quasi-experimental method, we can claim, made it more realistic.
However, we still need to keep in mind that real life is far more complicated than
experimental settings. For example, in South Africa of apartheid times, progressive South
African psychologists had declined to offer therapy to the security forces of the regime, which
was for protest and to push for an end to apartheid. Furthermore, progressive psychologists
were simultaneously radical political activists protesting the regime on every occasion (Dawes,
2001). The incommensurability of these two cases, i.e. the results of Sherif’s experiments and
by then the actual situation in South Africa should ring bells in our minds to show that peace
process in reality is far more than in a form that fits schemas of academic research.
Contact hypothesis does not work in real life
For most of the conflicts, the problem is not about whether the belligerents know each other
or not. They do know each other very well, but they still engage in conflict in real life. This
real life fact is contrary to the so-called contact hypothesis which is surprisingly popular in the
mainstream academia.
Common cause is the key for peace, not necessarily a common enemy
The only way to mobilize all people who are in conflict is a common cause. For example, in a
number of science fiction films,5 people who have no other reason to unite and act together do
so to fight for survival against invading aliens. This may be misleading as it implies that we
need a common enemy for peace; which also means a contradiction in terms: Peace among us,
war against others. But this social psychological ingroup-outgroup formation is not necessarily
the only way for peace. People can act together against a coming or already arrived disaster
such as earthquakes, flooding etc. The recent history of international relations offers a high
number of cases where governments in conflict help each other in case of an earthquake (e.g.
Turkish and Greek earthquakes). But such a situation is not really inclusive. It only comprises a
number of countries. Thus, we move to our next principle
The key for peace is our planet-level problems
We have planet-level problems such as climate change. That can be an avenue for governments
and non-state actors to make peace by reference to humanity-wide, planet-level problems. But
environmental movements worldwide are still weak and disorganized. We propose that a focus
on humanity-wide, plant-level problems will help different actors come together which may be
instrumental for building world peace (as discussed in Brenes and Du Nann Winter, 2001).
However, such a peace and peace effort will freeze the current conflicts, which means it will
serve the status quo.6
journalism’. However, the better terms would be ‘pro-peace journalism’ and ‘pro-war journalism’. ‘Peace’ and
‘war’ here refer to the journalism activity area, theme or content; while ‘pro-peace’ and ‘pro-war’ refer to
attitudes. For example, we can do pro-peace war journalism which means we narrate the war, but with an
attitude supporting peace. Likewise, we can do pro-war peace journalism reporting peace efforts with a view
favoring war.
5 E.g. ‘Cowboys & Aliens’ (2011) directed by Jon Favreau.
6 There is even a more serious issue here: In case of global warming, not each and every country is affected in
the same way. While some countries are expected to be submerged such as the Netherlands and the Maldives,
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
35
Contribution of psychologists as a professional community to peace
processes
Most of the peace processes proceeded and succeeded without contributions of psychologists.
Does this show irrelevance of psychology for peace or its hidden potential? At the same time,
we know that only a small percentage of peace processes completely succeeded in history. We
have a number of intractable conflicts all over the world such as Israel-Palestine conflict. Can
psychologists fix them? Or are we just exaggerating the power of psychologists? These questions
are hard to answer as the negotiators were not often interested in psychologists’ support.
What should be the position of the psychologist in the midst of peace process? Should she
take sides? Or should she rather be in a mediator role? A psychologist may think that one party
is right, another party is unfair etc. How would she reconcile her political beliefs in particular
and ideology in general to contribute to the peace process? These questions quickly move us to
another distinction which is analogous to Antonio Gramsci’s distinction between traditional vs.
organic intellectual. We adapt his distinction as academic peace psychologists vs. organic
peace psychologists. Academic peace psychologists are the ones who are interested in peace as
an academic subject. This first type of peace psychologists is expected to be objective with a
position in equal distance to the parties of the conflict. The strength of this type is her ability
to see the larger picture by having insider information and feelings from both sides. Not all
academic peace psychologists can act as negotiators or mediators as they should be the ones in
whom conflict parties trust and who are associated with respect, professional recognition,
scientific point of view etc.
Organic peace psychologists
Organic peace psychologists are the ones who harbor some form of attachment for one of the
conflict parties. They may have family members, friends and other significant people of their
life that are lost, maimed, injured, imprisoned etc. in the conflict. In fact, these psychologists
themselves may be those who suffered from conflict especially in conflicts involving nonstate
actors. They may be discriminated, denied positions, job opportunities etc. On the other side
of the conflict, we may have a disproportionately large number of official peace psychologists,
which are the organic peace psychologists of the other side. These organic peace psychologists
(from both sides) can’t and shouldn’t be negotiators or mediators of peace talks, but they may
be useful to organize their side and help each side to be readier for peace negotiations through
leadership and skill training as discussed later on.
Organic peace psychologists although named differently as progressive psychologists or
liberation psychologists were quite active in South African reconciliation (Dawes, 2001; De La
Rey, 2001). They were the ones to uncover the ideological distortions of truth: For example, as
very well known, one side’s ‘freedom fighters’ is another side’s ‘terrorists.’ Although their
contributions to the process were at a high degree, they were still not of the leading profession
in reconciliation. Furthermore, albeit that South African experiences are incredibly precious for
peace psychology worldwide, its peculiarities make it hard to use this case to come up with a
set of universal peace psychology principles to be applicable everywhere. That is because
apartheid was obviously unfair; it just needed time to collapse. But conflicts in other sides of
the world are more complicated, as it is difficult to identify who is right and how to peacefully
resolve the conflict. Furthermore, the task of peace psychologist can’t be to identify “who is
others such as Russia will benefit from global warming as the Arctic seaway will be opened after the melting of
ice glaciers which will cut transportation costs and multiply Russia’s sea trade revenues.
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
36
right” anyway. South African experience was a harsh, biting one for peace psychologists in
practice, but intellectually speaking, we can claim that, it was easier compared to many other
conflicts of the world.
Apparent empathy illusions
Among the academic peace psychologists, a set of illusions that we call as apparent empathy
illusions is common. That is the tendency of academic peace psychologists to overestimate
their understanding of the conflict. But sometimes, they have superficial information and
basic-level empathy that will not be sufficient to contribute to peace processes. Academic
peace psychologists need to spend more time with the victims and agents of both sides to come
up with a more realistic understanding of the conflict and their own reactions.7
Fallacy of dualism
Among all the actors of the peace process, we can have the following problem: Because of the
saliency of the major sides of the conflict, these actors intentionally or unintentionally reduce
the conflict to one between two major parties. But in fact, when we dig deeper, we can easily
discover that a conflict usually has more than two parties involved. For example in an ethnic
conflict, it is never Vietnamese vs. Americans. There are always pro-Vietnamese Americans and
pro-American Vietnamese. That constitutes four different groups already. We have women and
children from both sides. We have professional groups from both sides such as journalists,
psychologists, artists etc. In almost all ethnic or national conflicts we always have mixed
marriages or relationships, and businessmen from both sides investing to the other country or
region. A likely Russian-German crisis, for example, would affect these two groups the most,
and at the same time these are the ones who need the peace most. That is why their peace
efforts need to be formally recognized and amplified by all means.
Classless analysis fallacy
When a peace negotiation involves racism troubles, we need to keep in mind that racism can’t
be separated from class struggle. We can have programs to reduce discrimination, stereotyping
etc. But what are we trying to influence here by such programs? We try to change majority
people’s attitudes for a particular ethnic group. However, this liberalist point of view is in fact
wrong: We can’t eliminate racism by changing people’s attitudes. People’s attitudes are just a
secondary, mediating variable. We can only fight against racism, if we recognize its class basis
and try to change it. This liberalist understanding of racism brought the current state of South
Africa: No longer racism against Blacks, but class discrimination with a corrupt government
system. Peace built on classless anti-racism produces new class-based racism. This is also noted
by Dawes (2001:304), a South African liberation psychologist:
While democracy has been achieved in South Africa, the goals of a redistribution of wealth and
socialized public services have not. At the end of the 1990s, as is the case in the rest of Africa,
the vast majority of South Africans remain impoverished. Tight macro-economic policies, which
have led to limits on social spending, and South Africa’s vulnerable economic position relative
to the major industrial powers and currencies, are likely to ensure that poverty will remain a
significant force for instability and episodic violence in the twenty-first century.
7 Here we say ‘victims and agents’ rather than ‘victims’ only. That is because politically organized groups rarely
see themselves as victims which implies passivity, but ‘agents’ of the conflict which recognizes their will and
determination. Usually apolitical civilian people are content with the term ‘victim’. Nevertheless we have an
exception: Some official political parties aim to gain legitimacy from their victimhood in the past and
accordingly appeal to the masses which have a sense of an eternal, mythologized understanding of victimhood.
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
37
Applied counselling psychology skills
As to apply counselling psychology skills training for the conflict parties, we agree with Gärling
et al. (2000:81)’s position on the relationship between psychology and diplomacy:
With regard to diplomacy employed for conflict prevention and management, this raises
profound psychological issues of how to handle non-governmental actors, who gets to the
negotiating table, and the perceived legitimacy of the representatives of the other side.
Gärling et al. (2000) defines diplomacy as “the use of peaceful means to prevent, settle,
or resolve conflicts” (p.82). However, in their account of diplomacy and psychology, they
mostly focus on judgment and decision making and relevant biases such as availability,
representativity, framing etc., whereas we claim that even a more outstanding contribution by
psychology can be by applied psychological counselling skills. However, we can’t exaggerate
the role of these skills, as the ultimate arbiter of peace is the social and material conditions of
the conflict
The medical vs. social model of peace process
There are mainly two underlying models on how psychology and psychologists can and can’t
contribute to the peace process: The first one is the medical model. Some of the psychologists’
especially clinically-oriented ones implicitly or even explicitly share this model with most of
the psychiatrists. Such a model leads psychologists to look for pathologies in one of the parties
of the conflict (usually a nonstate party or a weaker party). By pathologizing one side of the
conflict, they offer some sort of therapy to heal or ‘ameliorate’ that particular party for
peace. This mainstream medical model may even dehumanize one of the parties, and before
all objectifying them (i.e. explaining their resistance in passive voice as if they are not agents
to resist). Some strands of this medical model can pathologize both parties or pathologize the
societies as a whole to offer peace. Many of the psychodynamically-oriented approaches to
conflict and peace correspond to this point. We have many reasons to criticize this medical
model and boldly claim that such a model can’t bring peace.
The second model is the social model that most of the critical psychologists share with
social workers and sociologists. The social model criticizes the medical model, as the problems
can’t be conceptualized as disease. The analogy is misleading, as social factors behind the
conflict are ignored. Social problems, unlike medical ones are ill-defined. There is no clear-cut
solution for social problems. There is no analogical prescription that can fix social problems.
They don’t fit any medical schema. We don’t need a metaphorical medicine to cure the
conflict, as there is no cure that can help everybody. The solution is in identifying and working
on the social factors including economic difficulties, cultural denial and assimilation, capitalist,
colonial and patriarchal contradictions etc. Furthermore, the medical model’s search for
pathology is schematic and unrealistic: for example, people commit crimes not because they
are psychologically sick. They are indeed very healthy. This schematic approach to conflict may
lead to whitewashing of perpetrators which is detrimental for peace processes. The
deficiencies of the medical model as such show its untenability for peace building efforts.
Adams (2000) rightly claims that the assertion that human beings are inherently violent or
aggressive is not true. According to Adams (2000) such a belief leads to self-fulfilling prophecy.
Let us add more support to his position: In fact this assertion is due to what we call as
‘analogical inference error’ in evolutionary theory in general and evolutionary psychology in
particular. We can originally define this error here as the wrong inference drawing on
biological analogies that fit what researcher looks for, ignoring a high number of cases that do
not fit. In one sense it is a form of confirmation bias, but this takes the form of analogies in
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
38
comparative thinking. For example, if the scientist wants to claim that human beings are
inherently violent, he finds a case which is as close as possible to human beings in evolution
and states that “as we see in chimpanzee behavior, human beings are inherently violent”
ignoring that another close species is peace-lover, love-maker and peace-maker: These are
bonobos. Furthermore, these mainstream evolutionary researchers forget the fact that due to
the emergence of cognition and culture, we are no longer completely bound by biological
evolution. For example, we live longer than our biological evolution would allow us, thanks to
medicine. Thus, any analogy with lower species would not be applicable to understand current
human behavior. So although evolutionary theory is correct, it can’t be used to interpret
human behavior without caution.8
The proponents of the false idea that human beings are inherently violent are fond of
referring to primitive societies. However, we can comfortably state that primitive societies
were the least violent throughout human history. For nearly 200,000 years, anatomically
modern human beings lived in primitive societies without a political state. Agricultural
revolution, which means settlement and slavery, was nearly 10,000 years ago. In their history
with political states, people killed multiples of the number that were killed in the primitive
age. So why should we blame human nature for violence, rather than political states? Ditto for
animal violence. Animals are not as violent as human beings under slave society, feudalism and
capitalism. Until capitalism we had an interesting way to stop violence: That was by marriage.
Kingdoms exchanged brides and grooms throughout history to build peace. They had a wise
idea: Social psychologically speaking, that way the boundaries between in-group and out-group
were blurred. But of course this was not a perfect solution, although it worked in many cases:
First of all, in a patriarchal society, being a princess was not equal to being a prince. Marriage
was not of equals. Secondly, the history sometimes negated the basic assumption of this
solution which is the following: People will be in peace, if their group boundaries are blurred.
In fact, as shown in Sherif’s works, it is easy to find a reason to form new groups. The history is
not only full of wars between two states, but also full of wars between states of the same
nationality, ethnicity or religion, and civil war. Marriage as a solution is not applicable for
capitalism, but a hint is to be noted in the 68 generation’s slogan: ‘Make love, not war’, and
the point we made about mixed marriages above is to be noted as well.
In this context, let’s remember the preamble of the UNESCO’s constitution: “since wars
begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be
constructed” (UNESCO, 1945).
This is completely wrong. In addition to fact that it is a sexist statement discriminating
women, it just corresponds to idealism-materialism discussions in historiography. Is it because
of violent political leaders that we don’t have world peace or is it because of social conditions?
Obviously, UNESCO’s statement narrowly psychologizes social factors behind peace, and this is
one of the points that we have been criticizing throughout this article. If it would be matter
cognition, we would have peace by changing these cognitions. But we know that it is not the
cognitions, but the social factors that lead to war. Cognitions in that sense are just
epiphenomenal as reflections of the social conditions.
Mainstream psychology prefers to refer to cognitions and also emotions as the sources of
intergroup conflict, as otherwise there won’t be any need for psychology as a profession in
peace processes. It is like shooting her leg. So since psychologization has an ideological
function, it is no surprise that it is very common. E.g. rather than social and material
8 For a comprehensive criticism of the myths of mainstream evolutionary psychology researchers see McKinnon
(2010). Here we are not rejecting evolution, but its mainstream interpretation which is used to analyze human
behavior through analogical inference error. It is no surprise that there is no field called ‘evolutionary peace
psychology’, as the mainstream evolutionary psychology falsely assumes inherent violence in human nature.
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
39
conditions, “dissatisfaction, a sense of injustice, lack of respect, antagonism, anger, and
feelings of mistrust” (Kimhi, 2011:59) are put forth as the reasons for conflict with the wrong
assumption that we will have peace when we eliminate them. This is more like the Goodhard
effect (Sloman et al., 2012). From a medical perspective, it is like stopping the sign of the
problem such as coughing, rather than the problem itself such as catching cold. As a result, you
may assume that since there is no coughing, the patient is no longer sick, which will lead to
even worse health conditions for the patients. In this case, because of your intervention,
coughing is no longer an indicator of distress; so you need to find another indicator. Thus it is
no surprise that mainstream peace psychology is obsessed with group cognitions and emotions
rather than the concrete social factors behind the conflicts. Once the emotions and cognitions
would be pacified, we will wrongly think that the conflict is over, but that is not the case.
Discussion and conclusion
Mainstream psychology is known to serve the military interests through research and practice in
its first decades (Christie, 2011). While psychologists developed and administered tests for
military personnel allocations during World War I, their involvement was even closer in World
War II: In addition to testing, social psychologists helped to design and spread war propaganda,
and clinical psychologists were mobilized to heal war-related sicknesses. Some of the
psychologists were even involved in weaponry design (Christie et al., 2001).
We have our own suspicions that even mainstream peace psychology wittingly or
unwittingly serve military interests through their biases, fallacies, errors etc. that distort the
history and sources of the conflicts. Peace psychology without criticism and self-criticism
immediately transform into mainstream psychology that serve the interests of the military-
industrial complex. We think that the hotly-debated issue of psychologists’ role in unethical
and inhumane interrogations (cf. Arrigo, 2004; Arrigo and Bennett, 2007; Arrigo et al., 2012;
Burton and Kagan, 2007)9 made the distinction even bolder: One can’t be both pro-peace and
pro-torture. Likewise one can’t believe that peace will come by change in cognitions and
emotions, and that it will come by change in social and material conditions. One can’t endorse
both a medical and a social model of peace.
That is why we need a critical peace psychology rather than the current mainstream peace
psychology which can bravely criticize pro-war institutions and the profession itself, and the
role it serves for these institutions, to progress forward towards genuine and sustainable
peace.
References
Adams D. (2000) Toward a global movement for a culture of peace. Peace and Conflict 6(3):259-266.
Ardila R. (2001) Qué es la psicología de la paz? Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología 33(1):39-43.
Arrigo JM. (2004) A utilitarian argument against torture interrogation of terrorists. Science and
Engineering Ethics 10(3):543-572.
Arrigo JM, Bennett R. (2007) Organizational supports for abusive interrogations in the “War on
Terror.” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 13(4):411-421.
Arrigo JM, Eidelson RJ, Bennett R. (2012). Psychology under fire: adversarial operational psychology
and psychological ethics. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 18(4):384-400.
Bilali R, Vollhardt JR. (2013) Priming effects of a reconciliation radio drama on historical
perspective-taking in the aftermath of mass violence in Rwanda. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology 49(1):144-151.
9 For a similar, but earlier discussion from South Africa of the apartheid times see Foster and Davis (1987).
Gezgin Euras J Anthropol 9(1):29-40, 2018
40
Brenes A, Du Nann Winter D. (2001) Earthly dimensions of peace: the earth charter. Peace and
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 7(2):157-171.
Burton M, Kagan C. (2007) Psychologists and torture: more than a question of interrogation. The
Psychologist 20(8):484–487.
Christie DJ. (2001) Peacebuilding: approaches to social justice. In: Christie DJ, Wagner RV, Winter
DA, editors. Peace, conflict and violence: peace psychology for the 21st Century. New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, p 277-281.
Christie DJ. (2011) Peace psychology: definitions, scope, and impact. In: Christie DJ, editor. The
encyclopaedia of peace psychology. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, p 1-5.
Christie DJ, Wagner RV, Winter DD. (2001) Introduction to peace psychology. In: Christie DJ, Wagner
RV, Winter DA, editors. Peace, conflict and violence: peace psychology for the 21st Century.
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, p 1-14.
Dawes A. (2001) Psychologies for liberation: views from elsewhere. In: Christie DJ, Wagner RV,
Winter DA, editors. Peace, conflict and violence: peace psychology for the 21st Century. New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, p 295-306.
De la Rey C. (2001) Reconciliation in divided societies. In: Christie DJ, Wagner RV, Winter DA,
editors. Peace, conflict and violence: peace psychology for the 21st Century. New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, p 251-261.
Dunwoody PT, Plane DL, Trescher SA, Rice D. (2014) Authoritarianism, social dominance, and
misperceptions of war. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 20(3):256-266.
Foster D, Davis D. (1987) Detention & torture in South Africa: Psychological, legal & historical
studies. New York, NY, US: St Martin's Press.
Gärling T, Kristensen H, Ekehammar B, Backenroth-Ohsako G, Wessells MG. (2000) Diplomacy and
psychology: psychological contributions to international negotiations, conflict prevention, and
world peace. International Journal of Psychology 35(2):81-86.
Kimhi S. (2011) Intergroup conflict and attribution theory. In: Christie DJ, editor. The encyclopaedia
of peace psychology. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, p 58-62.
McKinnon S. (2010) Neo-liberal genetics: the myths and moral tales of evolutionary psychology.
Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press.
Lykes MB. (1999) Doing psychology at the periphery: Constructing just alternatives to war and
peace. Peace and Conflict 5(1):27-36.
Mayor F. (1995) How psychology can contribute to a culture of peace. Peace and Conflict 1(1):3-9.
Psaltis C. (2016) Collective memory, social representations of intercommunal relations, and conflict
transformation in divided Cyprus. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 22(1):19-27.
Sloman J, Wride A, Garratt D. (2012) Economics (8th ed.). Essex, UK: Pearson.
UNESCO (1945) UNESCO Constitution. Accessed http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244
&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
