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The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Abstract

Russian Military
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... The Russian Armed Forces operational concept, inherited from the Soviet Union, was modernized during the major transformation in 2009, as discussed in Grau and Bartles (2016). In parallel, Russia replaced the obsolete Soviet logistics system with a leaner one, involving significant downsizing and outsourcing (Westerlund & Oxenstierna, 2019, p. 26), largely untested in combat operations (McDermott, 2013, p. 37). ...
... The Force Commander chooses the course of action (COA), and the commander's staff details how to proceed with this COA. According to Grau and Bartles (2016), the military staffs are smaller than those of NATO. The logistics planning often follows predefined principles, well-exercised scenarios, and calculations of ammunition consumption, attrition, and so on. ...
... As Grau and Bartles (2016) observe, Russian operational planning is conducted on a higher hierarchical level than that of logistical planning. Based on the Force Commander's chosen COA, logisticians plan the volumes and distribution of the different resources needed. ...
... The senior NCOs and a significant percentage of the kontraktniki personnel are actually employed in various technical and maintenance services, in support roles. 97 In this light, it is a technical elite who supports operations, but do not play a role in the command structure in ways similar to western NCOs. It appears, as well, that employment conditions have improved, but remain not as attractive as they could be for would be kontraktniki. ...
Technical Report
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Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation has strived to re-assert itself as a major power. Although the future of Russia is far from assured in demographic terms, as well as in economic terms, some analysts have underlined that the Russian military has not only improved in terms of equipment and readiness, but also in organizational effectiveness. Some of those military improvements were noted in the particular realm of command, both at the tactical and strategic-political levels. This paper proposes an assessment of the propensity for reported social innovations related to command in Russian military affairs to become institutionalized features. Geert Hofstede well-known concepts of power distance and uncertainty avoidance have been used to explore the more fundamental social and cultural dynamics of Russian military. This lead to highlight some specific social and cultural patterns about decision-making found in both the Russian society and military across time. Given the wide applicability of these patterns to explain command relationships in Russia, Hofstede’s approach has been found as a valid entry point to understand Russian command today. Specifically, the greater innovative and imaginative practices shown by Russian SOF in non-military roles and the social greater diversity found among the trusted operators in the Kremlin appear to be genuine social innovations. However, they also appear to be the result of necessity, and they are limited in scope and potential for institutionalization.
... The Russian concept of maneuver by fire may dominate the battlefield, as it alone may enable maneuver. 19 The linear battlefield may be replaced by the fragmented, or nonlinear [очаговый], battlefield, where brigades maneuver like naval flotillas, deploying maneuver and fire subunits over large areas, protected by air-defense systems, electronic warfare and particulate smoke. Strongpoints will be established and abandoned, artillery fires will maneuver and difficult terrain will become the future fortresses and redoubts. ...
... In order to do this, the personnel in the threat cell (usually the AMSO, an instructor pilot, and a mission planner) must become familiar with enemy threat doctrine. The Russian Way of War book (Grau & Bartles, 2016) and Field Manual 100-2-1, "The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics," (Department of the Army, 16 July 1984) are publications that depict how a near-peer threat will array its forces in a decisive action environment. Additionally, the Army Training Network provides opposing forces threat force structures and tactics reports with historical examples of how near-peer threats have operated. ...
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Abstrakt: Artykuł poświęcony jest zaprezentowaniu możliwości zastosowania teorii gier refleksyjnych w analizie współczesnych konfliktów w przestrzeni informacyjnej. Problemem badawczym jest analiza jednego z ujęć teorii gier, stworzonego przez rosyjskiego matematyka i psychologa Władimira Lefevra, pod kątem wykorzystania w badaniach nad walką informacyjną. Zastosowano metody badawcze właściwe dla nauk społecznych z wykorzystaniem modelowania charakterystycznego dla klasycznej teorii gier i logiki gier refleksyjnych. W pierwszej kolejności przedstawiono konwencję terminologiczną związaną z walką informacyjną. Następnie zaprezentowano teorię gier refleksyjnych w kontekście możliwości jej wykorzystania do analizy walki informacyjnej. Omówiono przy tym zagadnienie strategicznego zarządzania percepcją i dywersji ideologicznej. Słowa kluczowe: walka informacyjna, teoria gier, fake news, teoria gier refleksyjnych, bezpieczeństwo informacyjne. Walka informacyjna staje się coraz ważniejszym elementem współczesnych konfliktów. Rozwój technologii informacyjnych pozwala na coraz efektywniejsze oddziaływania na sferę psychiczną nie tylko jednostek, ale i całych społeczeństw. Choć sfera świadomości zawsze odgrywała swoją rolę na polu walki, dziś sfera percepcji nie tylko członków sił zbrojnych, ale przede wszystkim ludności cywilnej staje się niejednokrotnie decydująca. Społeczeństwa, zwłaszcza w państwach demokratycznych, są w stanie skutecznie wywierać presję na rządzących, także w czasie rzeczywistym, korzystając choćby z internetowych narzędzi komunikacyjnych takich jak media społecznościowe. Sprawa firmy Cambridge Analytica i wykorzystywaniu przez nią informacji na temat użytkowników Facebooka do wpływania na wynik wyborów prezydenckich w Stanach Zjednoczonych, uświadomiła nie tylko ekspertom, że każda jednostka może stać się obiektem wpływu. Spersonalizowany przekaz propagandowy, wykorzystujący metodę mikrotargetingu, związaną z
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