Getting Gerasimov Right

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January-February 2016 MILITARY REVIEW30
Geing
Gerasimov
Right
Charles K. Bartles
On 26 February 2013, chief of the Russian
General Sta Gen. Valery Gerasimov
pulished “e Value of Science Is in the
Foresight: New Chalenges Demand Rethinking
the Forms and Methods of Carying out Combat
Operations” in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuie (VPK)
(Military-Industial Couie). In this article, Gerasimov
lays out his perective—and the prevalent view in
Russian security circles—of the recent past, present,
and expected future of warfare. is article was pub-
lished about a year before the Maidan protests that set
in motion the events leading to the eventual annex-
ation of Crimea and Russian-sponsored insurection
in eastern Ukraine. e chain of events that folowed
the Maidan protests could in no way be foreseen by
Gerasimov, but his article is oen cited in the West
as “Gerasimov’s Doctrine” for the way Russian forces
conducted its operations.
In this vein of Western thinking, Gerasimov’s ar-
ticle is often interpreted as proposing a new Russian
way of warfare that lends conventional and uncon-
ventional warfare with aspects of national power,
often refered to as “hybrid warfare.” This article
wil attempt to put Gerasimov’s article, which was
written for a Russian audience, in context for U.S.
readers to explain some alusions that are sometimes
missed or misunderstood.
e Russian Chief of General Sta
For background, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Sta is
oen equated with the Russian General Sta, but
this is a great understatement of the Russian General
Sta’s importance. e Russian chief of the General
Sta has far more authority than any ag grade ocer
in the U.S. military. He is responsile for long-term
planning duties equivalent to both the U.S. Oce
of the Secretary of Defense and the unied com-
batant commanders. In adition, he has oversight
of strategic transportation equivalent to that of U.S.
Transportation Command, force doctrinal and capa-
bilities development, and equipment procurement for
al branches of the Ministry of Defense. He even has
an inector-general-like function for ensuring that
General Sta standards and reulations are ahered to.
Also, although the chief of the General Sta does
not have operational control of the force, he does have
day-to-day control (in peacetime) of the Glanoye
Razvedyvatel’noye Upraleniye (Main Inteligence
Directorate, commonly known as GRU), which is a
directorate of the General Sta, and several strategic
assets including the Russian airborne, which functions
as a strategic reserve.
In the hierarchy of the Russian government,
there are uniformed officers serving in positions
technicaly above the chief of the General Staff, but
Chief of the Russian General Sta Gen. Valery Gerasimov
(Photo courtesy of the Press Service of the Russian Defense Ministry)

31MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2016
RUSSIAN VIEW
arualy none of these assignments are
as prestigious.
Elaboration on Strategic
Foresight
In general, it is a duty of the Russian
general sta to use foresight to develop
the theory and praice of future war. is
is the context in which Gerasimov’s article
is wrien. e use of the term “foresight”
in the article’s title is not coincidental, and
the term has a ecic military denition
in the Russian lexicon:
Foresight (military) is the process of
cognition regarding possile changes
in military aairs, the determina-
tion of the perectives of its future
development. e basis of the science
of foresight is knowledge of the objective laws
of war, the dialectical-materialist analysis of
events transpiring in a given concrete-histor-
ical context.
In Russian military thought, foresight is directly
linked to military science, with military science being
the science of future war.
e General Sta takes a rather academic ap-
proach to the endeavor of military science, including
the use of a peer-review-like process that functions
by opening debates on ideas through the pulication
of articles in various outlets, including profession-
al journals. ere are several oen-used outlets for
the military’s academic discussion and debate, most
notaly the journal Voyennaya Mysl (VM) (Military
ought), which is pulished by the General Sta.
Gerasimov chose to pulish this article in VPK, a
dierent, but also commonly used journal for such
ideas. e VPK is a private newspaper, owned by the
quasi-government-controled Almaz-Antey company,
which focuses on the military and military-industrial
complex maers. VPK also serves as a frequent venue
for top military leaders to inform the force, tout suc-
cesses, and propose reforms.
is particular article, like other such articles by
senior military leadership, was likely pulished in the
VPK in order to reach a much larger audience than the
rather dry VM. e intended audience for Gerasimov’s
article may not even be in the Russian armed forces,
but instead in Russia’s senior political leadership. Russia
has powerful militarized inteligence and security
services that compete with the Ministry of Defense for
resources. Gerasimov’s article may have been intended
to send a message that the Ministry of Defense can
meet Russia’s curent and future threats, an import-
ant message in a resource-constrained environment.
No maer what reason the article was pulished, it is
important to keep in mind that Gerasimov is simply
explaining his view of the operational environment
and the nature of future war, and not proposing a new
Russian way of warfare or military doctrine, as this
article was likely draed wel before the start of the
Maidan protests.
e Russian Narrative of the United
States and Forced Regime Change in
the Post-Soviet Era
For U.S. readers, Gerasimov’s linking of the Arab
Spring and “color revolutions” (and in later comments,
the Maidan Movement) with military capability devel-
opment may seem od. In order to put his comments
in context, it is necessary to look at the Russian view of
warfare and forced regime change as it has developed
since the end of the Cold War.
In the Russian view, transgressions against the
post-Cold War international order began with the
partition of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when Russia
was at her weakest. While the Weern narative of
Hundreds of thousands of protesters poured into the streets of Ukraine’s capital, Kiev,
8 December 2013, toppling a statue of Soviet-era leader Vladimir Lenin and blockading
key government buildings during escalating protests against the government. Gen. Valery
Gerasimov has stated that the greatest dangers to Russia are so-called “color revolutions.”
(Photo by Efrem Lukatsky, A ssociated Press)

January-February 2016 MILITARY REVIEW32
NATO’s Yugoslavia intervention is one of military
aion to prevent mass genocide, Russia has a much dif-
ferent view. Most Russians generaly view the NATO
bombing campaign as having been ilegal because it was
conducted without the aproval of the UN Security
Council and believe that Serbia was simply being
punished for engaging in counterterorism operations,
abeit with some excesses. e most egregious sin, from
the Russian view, was the partitioning of Yugoslavia.
is aion set a precedent for external actors to make
decisions about the internal aairs and teritorial integ-
rity of sovereign nations aleged to have commied
some wrong. It is important to note that Russia was
dealing with its own Islamic insurgency at the same
time in the North Caucasus. is may have caused
Russian concern about a similar NATO aion tak-
ing place inside Russia. One consequence of Weern
intervention resulting in the destruction of Yugoslavia
is that most Russians
stil resent this U.S./
NATO aion.
us, it is no sur-
prise Russia justied
many aects of its
Crimea annexation on
the lessons learned and
precedents set by the
West in Yugoslavia,
which led to the even-
tual independence of
Kosovo. Aditionaly,
post-Kosovo, the
most obvious U.S.
regime change op-
erations occured in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Russia views those
operations as having
been very similar to
the Kosovo operation.
In the Russian view,
the paern of U.S.
forced regime change
has been as folows:
deciding to execute
a military operation;
nding an apropriate
pretext such as to prevent genocide or seize weapons
of mass destruction; and naly, launching a military
operation to cause regime change (ure 1).
However, Russia believes that the paern of forced
U.S.-sponsored regime change has been largely sup-
planted by a new method. Instead of an overt military
invasion, the rst voleys of a U.S. aack come from
the instalment of a political oposition through state
propaganda (e.g., CNN, BBC), the Internet and social
media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Aer successfuly instiling political dissent, separat-
ism, and/or social strife, the legitimate government has
increasing diculty maintaining order. As the security
situation deteriorates, separatist movements can be
stoked and strengthened, and undeclared ecial opera-
tions, conventional, and private military forces (defense
contractors) can be introduced to bale the govern-
ment and cause further havoc. Once the legitimate
“Traditional” Approach for Achieving Political-Military Goals
Search for a pretext to
launch a military operation
Military Operation
Opposing State
Iraq
1991, 1998, 2003
Yugoslavia
1999
Haiti
1994, 2004
Afghanistan
2001
Figure 1. Adapted from a brieng given by Gen. Valery
Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense’s ird
Moscow Conference on International Security

33MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2016
RUSSIAN VIEW
government is forced to use increasingly agressive
methods to maintain order, the United States gains a
pretext for the imposition of economic and political
sanctions, and sometimes even military sanctions such
as no-y zones, to tie the hands of the besieged govern-
ments and promote further dissent (ure 2).
Eventualy, as the government colapses and anarchy
results, military forces under the uise of peacekeepers
can then be employed to pacify the area, if desired, and
a new government that is frienly to the United States
and the West can be instaled (ure 3).
is theory may sound far-fetched to U.S. ears but
is a very common view throughout the former Soviet
Union. is narative also sheds some light on the
Russian government’s hostility toward NGOs. ough
there are usualy no alegations of NGOs being directly
or indirectly controled by foreign governments, most
Russian reporting on NGOs purports that they are
simply being funded because they have an objective to
inuence a particular government in a given way, or to
just cause general instabil-
ity. An interesting aect
of these alegations is that
the Central Inteligence
Agency (a favored
scapegoat for any Russian
misfortune) is no longer
typicaly mentioned;
the usual culprits (in the
new narative) are the
U.S. State Department
and United States
Agency for International
Development (USAID).
From a Russian mili-
tary perective, this new
Weern way of war has
many implications that
can be easily identied
in Gerasimov’s article
and Russia’s curent
military doctrine. In the
past, the primary threat
of foreign-forced regime
change has come from an
army storming across the
border. In contrast, today,
the threat is coming increasingly from more indirect
and asymmetric methods. is change in the nature
of the threat to Russia’s sovereignty is causing Russian
military development to increasingly focus on obtain-
ing improved capabilities to counter those asymmetric
and indirect threats.
e means required to implement these capabilities
wil be as diverse and asymmetric as the threats they
are intended to counter and could come in the form of
undeclared conventional forces, peacekeepers, ecial
operators, Cossacks, private military companies, foreign
legionnaires, biker gangs, Russian-sponsored NGOs,
and cyber/propaganda wariors.
Hybrid War, the Nature of War, and
Models
Probaly the most misunderstood aect of
Gerasimov’s article is the idea of “indirect and asym-
metric methods” that has been interpreted by the West
as hybrid war. Of note, there is a general consensus in
Adaptive Approach for Use of Military Force
Concealed Use of Military Force
Military train-
ing of rebels
by foreign
instructors
Supply of weapons
and resources to the
anti-government
forces
Application of special
operations forces and
private military com-
panies
Reinforcement
of opposition
units with
foreign ghters
Search for (creation of) a
Pretext for Military Operation
Military Operation
Change of
Political Regime
Has the resistance of
the opposing side
been suppressed?
Yes
No
Accusing a con-
icting party of
using weapons of
mass destruction
Protection
of civilians
and foreign
citizens
Figure 2. Adapted from a brieng given by Gen. Valery
Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense’s ird
Moscow Conference on International Security

January-February 2016 MILITARY REVIEW34
Russian military circles that hybrid war is a complete-
ly Weern concept as no Russian military ocer or
strategist has discussed it, except to mention the West’s
use of the term, or to mention the West’s use of hybrid
warfare against Russia.
e Russian military has been adamant that they
do not praice a hybrid-war strategy. Moreover, there
have been many Russian commentaries that state this
concept is nothing new, that the aects of hybrid war
mentioned by Weern analysts have been praiced
since warfare began.
However, it is dicult to compare the terms
because there is no recognized denition for the
terms, either in Russia or the West. Undoubtely,
there is some overlap about what these terms likely
mean, but it is clear that hybrid war refers to a much
narower scope of aivities than the term “indirect
and asymmetric methods.” One example that clearly
ilustrates the dierence in the terms is the Russian
understanding of the previ-
ously discussed color revo-
lutions and the Arab Spring.
e view that NGOs are
the means of an indirect
and asymmetric method of
war makes it very clear that
Gerasimov is taking about
something very dierent
than the Weern notion of
hybrid war.
One of the most interest-
ing aects of Gerasimov’s
article is his view of the
relationship on the use of
nonmilitary and military
measures in war. e lever-
aging of al means of national
power to achieve the state’s
ends is nothing new for
Russia, but now the Russian
military is seeing war as
being something much more
than military conict. As the
graphic from Gerasimov’s
article ilustrates (ure 4),
war is now conducted by
a roughly 4:1 ratio of non-
military and military measures. ese nonmilitary
measures include economic sanctions, disruption of
diplomatic ties, and political and diplomatic pressure.
e important point is that while the West considers
these nonmilitary measures as ways of avoiding war,
Russia considers these measures as war (ure 4).
Some analysts in the West, having read Gerasimov’s
article and viewed curent Russian operations in
Crimea and eastern Ukraine, have created models for
a new Russian way of warfare. Although these models
may be useful analyzing past aions, not much stock
should be put in them for predicting the nature of
future Russian operations. In Gerasimov’s own words,
“Each war represents an isolated case, requiring an un-
derstanding of its own particular logic, its own unique
charaer.” He is saying that there is no model or for-
mula for understanding the operational environment
or the exercise of national power in every war scenario.
Each instance of a prolem wil be looked upon as a
Adaptive use of force
Search for a pretext
to launch a military
operation
Open military
interference
Concealed
use of force
Special
operations
forces
application
Support to
armed
opposition
Application of
private military
companies
Nonmilitary means
“Color Revolutions”
Opposing state
“New” Approach for Achieving Political-Military Goals
Figure 3. Adapted from a brieng given by Gen. Valery
Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense’s
ird Moscow Conference on International Security

35MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2016
RUSSIAN VIEW
unique situation that wil require the marshaling of
the state’s resources in whatever way is necessary.
Although Russia may respond similarly to two
dierent situations, this is not an indicator of a ecic
formula for aion, rather it just means the similarity
of the situations required similar responses. At the tac-
tical level, models and formulas are essential for deter-
mining the corelation of forces needed for victory, but
at the operational and strategic levels, a much dierent
aproach is required (ure 5).
e U.S. reat to Russian Strategic
Deterrence Capabilities
A cornerstone of Russia’s national security policy
is the concept of strategic deterence. Russia’s theory
of strategic deterence is based upon the premise that
Nonmilitary
measures
Military
measures
e transformation of dier-
ences into contradictions
and their recognition by the
military-political leadership
Deepening contradictions
Crisis reaction
Localization of military conict
Neutralization of military conict
e formation of coalitions and alliances e search for methods of regulating a conict
Political and diplomatic pressure
Economic sanctions
Disruption of diplomatic relations
Economic
blockade
Transition of
economy to
military lines
Carrying out com-
plex measures to
reduce tensions in
relations
Formation of the political opposition Actions of opposition forces
Change of the
political-military
leadership
Military measures of strategic deterrence
Strategic deployment
Conduct of military operations Peacekeeping operations
Conduct
Correlation of nonmilitary
and military measures (4:1)
Information conict
Military conict
Direct
military threat
Targeted
military threat
Potential
military threat
1. Covert origin 2. Strains 3. Initial
conicting
actions
4. Crisis 5. Resolution 6. Reestablishment of peace
(postconict regulation)
Figure 4. Graphic from Gerasimov article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, 26
February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles

January-February 2016 MILITARY REVIEW36
the threat of a mass employment of primarily strategic
nuclear forces wil cause such an amount of damage to
an agressor’s military and economic potential under
any circumstances that the cost of such an endeavor
wil be unacceptale to the agressor. Even in the worst
of economic times, Russia has been ale to rely on her
strategic nuclear forces for such strategic deterence.
However, aer NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia,
Russia saw NATO’s interference with what it per-
ceived as an internal maer in Yugoslavia as something
that might be replicated in its own breakaway region,
Chechnya. In response, Russia incorporated the concept
into its 2000 Military Doctrine of “de-escalation” that
says if faced with a large-scale conventional aack it
could respond with a limited nuclear strike. In the past,
the relatively weak condition of Russia’s conventional
forces required Russia to change the conditions for the
use of strategic nuclear forces as a strategy for deter-
rence, but the parity and deterence value of nuclear
forces was never questioned. e combination of the
United States’ development of the anti-balistic missile
defense and Prompt Global Strike (capability to conduct
a precision strike on any target in the world in less than
hour) programs in the 2000s changed this status quo of
parity for the rst time. Russia believes that a combi-
nation of these two programs would severely degrade
Russia’s strategic nuclear deterent, eecialy with the
adition of hypersonic weapons.
Other Salient Observations of Note
Gerasimov’s view of the future operational envi-
ronment is in many ways very similar to our own. Like
us, he envisions less large-scale warfare; increased use
of networked command-and-control systems, robot-
ics, and high-precision weaponry; greater importance
placed on interagency cooperation; more operations in
urban terain; a melding of oense and defense; and a
general decrease in the dierences between military ac-
tivities at the strategic, operational, and taical levels.
Interestingly, despite some very similar views, he and
his sta are aproaching these prolems in some very
dierent ways. Russia is experimenting with some rather
unconventional means to counter hostile indirect and
asymmetric methods, but Russia also sees conventional
military forces as being of the utmost importance.
At a time when the U.S. military is cuing back on
heavy conventional capabilities, Russia is looking at a
similar future operational environment, and douling
e use of military forces
Traditional forms and methods
e use of political, diplomatic, economic
and other nonmilitary measures in combi-
nation with the use of military forces
New forms and methods
-initiation of military operations aer strategic deployment
-frontal clash of large groupings of line-units, the basis of
which consists of ground troops
-the destruction of personnel and weaponry, and the conse-
quent possession of lines and areas with the goal of the seizure
of territories
-destruction of the enemy, destruction of the economic poten-
tial and possession of his territories
-the conduct of combat operations on the ground, in the air and
at sea
-the command-and-control of groupings of line units (forces)
within a framework of a strictly organized hierarchical struc-
ture of command-and-control agencies
-initiations of military operations by groupings of line-units
(forces) in peacetime
-highly maneuverable, noncontact combat operations of inter-
branch groupings of line-units
-reduction of the military-economic potential of the state by the
destruction of critically important facilities of his military and
civilian infrastructure in a short time
-the mass use of high-precision weaponry, the large-scale use
of special operations forces, as well as robotic systems and
weapons based on new physical principles and the participa-
tion of a civil-military component in combat operations
-simultaneous eects on line-units and enemy facilities through-
out the entire depth of his territories
-warfare simultaneously in all physical environments and the
information space
-the use of asymmetric and indirect operations
-command-and-control of forces and assets in a unied
information space
Figure 5. Graphic from Gerasimov article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy
Kurier, 26 February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles

37MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2016
RUSSIAN VIEW
down on hers. While the United States increases its
ecial operations forces (SOF), Russia is keeping her
SOF numbers relatively static and is entrusting her
conventional forces to perform many SOF functions,
not by necessity, but by design.
The bigest difference in how Gerasimov per-
ceives the operational environment is where he
sees threat and risk. His article and Russia’s 2014
Military Doctrine make aparent that he perceives
the primary threats to Russian sovereignty as stem-
ming from U.S.-funded social and political move-
ments such as color revolutions, the Arab Spring,
and the Maidan movement. He also sees threats in
the U.S. development of hypersonic weapons and
the anti-balistic missile and Prompt Global Strike
programs, which he believes could degrade Russian
strategic deterence capabilities and disturb the cur-
rent strategic balance.
Conclusion
Gerasimov’s position as chief of the General Sta
makes him Russia’s senior operation-strategic planner
and architect for future Russian force structure and
capability development. In order to execute these duties,
the individual in that position must have the foresight to
understand the curent and future operating environ-
ments along with the circumstances that have created
those environments and wil alter them. Gerasimov’s
article is not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or
a hybrid war, as has been stated in the West. Moreover,
in Gerasimov’s view of the operational environment, the
United States is the primary threat to Russia.
Notes
1. Gabriel Gatehouse, “e Untold Story of the Maidan Mas-
sacre,” BBC, 12 February 2015, accessed 5 November 2015, hp://
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31359021.
2. Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
1983), 585, s.v. “foresight.”
3. Jacob Kipp, “e Methodology of Foresight and Forecasting
in Soviet Military Aairs,” Soviet Army Studies Oce, Fort Leaven-
worth, Kansas, 1988, accessed 30 October 2015, hp://www.dtic.
mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a196677.pdf.
4. Mark Galeoi, “e ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian
Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows (blog), 6 July 2014, ac-
cessed 5 November 2015, hps://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.
com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-
war/. Any assessment of Gen. Gerasimov’s article should include a
thorough read of Galeoi’s blog on the topic. Galeoi’s blog also
provides a translation of the article with inline commentary that is
invaluable.
5. Nathan Hausman, “Competing Narratives: Comparing
Perspectives on NATO Intervention in Kosovo,” December 2014,
accessed 30 October 2014, hp://www.cla.temple.edu/cenfad/
SAandJROTC/documents/Hausman%20US-Russia%20Kosovo.pdf.
6. Roger N. McDermott, “Protecting the Motherland: Rus-
sia’s Counter–Color Revolution Military Doctrine,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor 11, 18 November 2014, 206, accessed 30 October
2015, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=43094&no_cache=1#.VJzJe14AA; Tony Papert,
“Moscow Conference Identifies ‘Color Revolutions’ as War,”
Executive Intelligence Review, 13 June 2014, accessed 30 Octo-
ber 2015, http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2014/eir-
v41n24-20140613/07-25_4124.pdf; Anthony H. Cordesman,
“Russia and the ‘Color Revolution’: A Russian Military View of a
World Destabilized by the US and the West,” Center for Strate-
gic & International Studies, 28 May 2014, accessed 30 October
2015, http://csis.org/publication/russia-and-color-revolution;
“Aliyev: ‘Maidan’ Was Being Prepared in Azerbaijan, Money for
which Was Brought by ‘Fih Column’ NGOs,” Interfax, 8 Septem-
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Charles K. Bartles is a Rusian linuist and analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Oce at Fort Leaenworth,
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BA in Rusian from the Uniersity of Nebraska-Lincoln, and an MA in Rusian and Eaern European Studies from
the Uniersity of Kansas.

January-February 2016 MILITARY REVIEW38
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