The Quest for Order in Anarchical Societies: Anthropological Investigations

Abstract

There is a fundamental link between political anthropology and Hedley Bull's classical study of international order, which has been persistently neglected by contemporary students of international society. While traditional assessments of Bull's work normally focus on the influences of political philosophy, international law, and history, a discussion of Bull's reliance on anthropological studies of anarchical societies is also essential for a more comprehensive understanding of his conceptualization of order and the sources, number, and functions of the “fundamental institutions” of international society. After showing how exactly political anthropology has underpinned Bull's work, the article explores its relevance for contemporary English school theorization. In particular, it offers a critique of the new institutionalists’ claims on the issue of sources, numbers, and functions of Bull's fundamental institutions. An updating of Bull's original “anthropological investigations” suggests a reconsideration of “Trade” as a sixth fundamental institution, a closer attention to “binding” and “dividing” forces in international society, as well as a reframing of the domestic analogy in IR.

Full text

ANALYTICAL ESSAY
The Quest for Order in Anarchical Societies:
Anthropological Investigations
NICOLÁS TERRADAS
Florida International University
There is a fundamental link between political anthropology and Hedley Bull’s classical study
of international order which has been persistently neglected by contemporary students of
international society. While traditional assessments of Bull’s work normally focus on the
influences of political philosophy, international law and history, a discussion of Bull’s
reliance on anthropological studies of anarchical societies is also essential for a more
comprehensive understanding of his conceptualization of order, and the sources, number and
functions of the “fundamental institutions” of international society. After showing how
exactly political anthropology has underpinned Bull’s work, the article explores its relevance
for contemporary English School theorization. In particular, it offers a critique of the New
Institutionalists’ claims on the issue of sources, numbers, and functions of Bull’s
fundamental institutions. An updating of Bull’s original “anthropological investigations”
suggests a reconsideration of “Trade” as a sixth fundamental institution, a closer attention to
“binding” and “dividing” forces in international society, as well as a re-framing of the
domestic analogy in IR.
Keywords: anarchy, order, international society, institutions
The problem of order is one of the most fundamental questions in the study of politics. While
most political scientists rely on political philosophy to explain how societies can achieve order
through the centralization of power or authority, those who study world politics—where such a
power or authority has yet to emerge—face the more difficult task of explaining the prevalence
of order amidst anarchy.1 Confronted with this challenge, students of global order have
commonly relied on a “domestic-analogy” type of explanation that tries to reproduce among
states the same conditions of order found within them (Bull 1966a; 1977; 1981; Suganami 1989).
In this context, the traditional way of thinking about order in world politics has remained
associated with the advancement of some form of global organization able to, if not bring about
1 The literature on political order is vast. Some classical works are Hobbes (1996); Parsons (1949); Wrong (1995);
Huntington (1968). On the problem of order in world politics, see Bull (1977); Trachtenberg (2006); Rosenau and
Czempiel (1992); Rengger (2000); Cox (1987; 1996); Ikenberry (2000, 3–79).
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world government, then partially fulfill the functions of one.2 A popular alternative position has
been the outright rejection of the possibility (or desirability) of global order in the traditional
sense, for states cannot (or perhaps should not) transcend anarchy given their “inescapable
predicament.”3 Beyond these differences, however, both positions perpetuate an understanding of
order that, even when arguing for its limits, remains attached to the notion of a prospective
general subjection either by force or consent to a common power. Thus, while alternative
proposals for world order have proliferated during the twentieth century, the idea of a centralized
government or authority has endured as the intellectual referent object par excellence.
Consequently, most contemporary discussions about order have typically focused on the type of
domestic government to be used as a foil to pass judgment on world politics.4
The main problem when dealing with world politics in these terms is not so much that there
may be intrinsic limits to thinking by analogy per se, but rather that the construction of the
domestic analogy itself has remained incomplete. While the global arena is commonly portrayed
as open to two possible conditions (world government or world anarchy), the domestic realm is
kept constrained to only one “realistic” scenario: the Leviathan state.
In this sense, despite (neo)realist scholars’ repeated assertions that by anarchy they mean
neither chaos nor disorder but simply “the absence of a central authority,” the implications that
they derive from the uncentralized condition of world politics (viz., fear, mistrust, feeble
cooperation, and deception) are nevertheless associated with a notion of anarchy as the
“permissive cause” of international conflict. This view is most evident in the work of
Neorealists, such as Mearsheimer (2001, 30) and Waltz (1979, 102–4, 111–4), but also in studies
on security dynamics in fragile or “failed” states by Posen (1993) and Van Evera (1992). In the
end analysis, the absence of central authority becomes the source of chaos and disorder that
anarchy was said not to represent in the first place (cf. Milner 1991, 70–2). This has implications
for the domestic analogy, for as one prominent realist has argued, conventional thinking has
followed a faulty logic borrowing from one type of realm characterized by hierarchy (domestic
2 For some recent examples of this traditional view, see Wendt (2003); Etzioni (2004, 161–214); Deudney (2007,
191–277); Cabrera (2006; 2011, 77–100); Baratta (2004); Yunker (2011; 2014).
3 Representative works of this alternative view are Zolo (1997); Butterfield (1951, 15–7, 20–2); Waltz (1959, 159–
238, esp. 228, 238; 1979, 111–2, 194–210); Herz (1950; 1951, 157); Wight (1978, 101–2, 142); Bull (1966a, 38;
1977, 74–6, 302–5); Mearsheimer (2001, 40–6); Watson (1983, 182, 10ff, 205–6; 1992, 246, 320). The classical
indictment remains Kant (1991, 41–53, 93–130).
4 Westad (2005) offers an erudite demonstration of how this logic worked during the Cold War, with communism
and liberal democracy as rival templates for both domestic and international orders.
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politics) to act upon another characterized by anarchy (world politics) (Waltz 1979, 88–93; 1986,
322–45). In this view, “the domestic” represents the realm of the good life, while “the
international” that of survival and endless repetition (Waltz 1959, 159–61, 171–5; 1979, 102–7;
cf. Wight 1966; Morgenthau 1962, 62–78; Jackson 1990). A problematic dichotomy is thus
created between hierarchy=order, on the one hand, and anarchy=disorder, on the other.5
Even prominent non-realist scholars who often associate “hegemony” with the centralization
of authority and order (Kindleberger 1973; Keohane 1984) further obscure the fact that
anarchical orders are not only viable in practice, but can also accommodate highly-asymmetric
power relations in anarchy (Clark 2011; Donnelly 2006; Dunne 2003; Lake 2009; Milner 1991;
Zarakol 2017). Despite anarchy’s multiple potential meanings, a sharp distinction between
hierarchy and anarchy is hard to maintain empirically, given that a certain degree of hierarchy
between units is not only consistent with and possible within anarchical systems, but also forms a
critical component of its functioning (Lake 2009, 17, 175; Milner 1991, 80–1, 85; Zarakol 2017,
9).
In the field of IR, few scholars have made a more lasting impact on the study of order in
world politics than Hedley Bull. As part of his many contributions, Bull developed over the
course of the second half of the twentieth century a distinct approach for studying order in world
politics (Bull 1966a; 1966b; 1977; 1979; 1981; Bull and Watson 1984). His approach was one of
the first to suggest that order and anarchy were not necessarily antithetical phenomena, neither
theoretically nor empirically. On the theoretical side, Bull (1966a; 1981) advanced a devastating
critique of the prevalent domestic-analogy thinking in IR, highlighting important limitations
within early twentieth-century Liberal, Marxist and Realist theorizing on international affairs.
His early essays also laid down the foundations for Bull’s greatest contribution: The Anarchical
Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (1977)—widely considered today his magnum opus
and the most important text within the so-called English School (ES) approach to IR.
On the empirical side, his contributions represented a laudable attempt at reconnecting
abstract concepts—such as “international society”—with historical reality and actual diplomatic
practice. In order to demonstrate that “order is part of the historical record of international
relations,” Bull (1977, 24) showed that throughout the history of the modern states system, a
5 Despite Waltz’s (1979) well-known categorization of hierarchy and anarchy as “ordering principles,” in practice
not much room is left in Neorealist theory for an understanding of “order” as anything but an unstable or weak
condition of balanced mutual fear. In its crude representation of anarchy, Neorealism sees order (at best) as a
mechanical, spontaneous, and (“tragic”) unintended outcome of the relentless struggle for power among states.
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certain idea or notion of international society had always existed, “proclaimed by philosophers
and publicists, and present in the rhetoric of the leaders of states,” but also that this idea was
“reflected, at least in part, in international reality; [with] important roots in actual international
practice.” The idea of international society, therefore, ultimately “reflect[s] the thought of
statesmen” (Bull 1977, 40). Bull tried to improve upon the “notional” international society of
Hugo Grotius and others by historically demonstrating that a meaningful amount of social order
among states can exist despite the absence of an overseeing global Leviathan.6 These elements of
order could most notably be perceived in a number of key embedded international practices and
customs, which he referred to as “fundamental” institutions (Bull 1977, xiv). Specifically, he
identified five such institutions that help explain the prevalence of global order in international
relations: viz., the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the role of the great
powers as responsible custodians of international order (Bull 1977, 56, 71–4, 30–3, 37, 67, 101–
229).
As frequently pointed out by students of international society, Bull’s work on order relied
extensively on insights drawn from history, international law and political philosophy (Hurrell
2001; Alderson and Hurrell 2000, 1–73). The special attention paid to the works of Grotius,
Heeren, Vattel, Pufendorf, Kelsen, Kant, and Hobbes, for instance, illustrates the importance that
Bull attached to their contributions for the study of international society. But despite these well-
known influences, contemporary students of international society have neglected the study of
political anthropology as an additional meaningful influence on Bull’s conceptualization of order
in world politics.7 Although Bull’s reliance on the work of classical anthropologists on so-called
“stateless” or “uncentralized” societies is well known to any careful reader of his work
(specifically through chapter 3 of The Anarchical Society), this article calls attention to an even
earlier exposure to anthropology during the first meetings of the British Committee on the
Theory of International Politics in the early 1960s. This article argues that political anthropology
played a central role in how Bull originally conceived of key notions, such as “fundamental
institutions” and “ordered anarchy,” crucial for his overall perspective on international society. In
this context, to properly grasp Bull’s overall argument about order-creation and order-
6 For Bull’s contrast between “notional” and “real” conceptions of international society, see Bull (1966b; 1977, 20,
59, 39, 31–2, 40–6; 1990, 71–5, 89–90).
7 For a passing acknowledgement, see Vigezzi (2005, 156: fn. 20). Although Buzan and Little (2000), Luard (1990)
and Schouenborg (2017) do touch on some elemental aspects of anthropology, they do so only in a cursory way and
overlook the specific role that anthropology played on Hedley Bull’s work.
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maintenance among states, it becomes indispensable to reconstruct the way in which he
systematically borrowed from early anthropological studies on domestic “anarchical societies” to
then theorize about order in the international one. A reassessment of the link between Bull’s
work and that of classical political anthropologists, therefore, is relevant not only for empirically
substantiating his original conceptualization of order in anarchy, but also for properly
contextualizing the sources, number and functions (or characteristics) of Bull’s fundamental
institutions of international society.
The article is structured around three main sections and a conclusion. The first section
briefly introduces Bull’s argument about international order and then reconstructs the way in
which political anthropology has underpinned it. A following section elaborates on how a general
neglect of studying these anthropological influences has led to a number of problematic
contemporary reformulations of Bull’s view on “institutions.” The third section identifies a
number of classical anthropological insights surprisingly underdeveloped or simply overlooked
by Bull himself, and suggests ways in which a renewed engagement with political anthropology
can meaningfully contribute to contemporary discussions on institutions and order within the ES
approach. In the concluding section, the article briefly reflects on the merits of Bull’s
anthropological investigations for contemporary theory, and on how these could contribute to the
study of “anarchical orders” as a distinct class or category of political systems—moving away
from the deeply entrenched view of anarchy simply as a “state of nature” on a global scale.
Hedley Bull and “The Spectacle of «Ordered Anarchy»”
A Study of Order in World Politics
The Anarchical Society stands today as one of the most important contributions to the ES
approach, and to IR more generally. It has provided fellow scholars a lasting set of useful
concepts and working definitions, as well as a flexible analytical framework with which to
approach the study of international affairs, and the problem of global order in particular. Bull’s
conception of order has certainly become one of the most widely recognized definitions in the
field, being commonly referenced by liberal, realist and constructivist scholars alike. By order,
Bull meant neither “the whole of world politics,” nor the “totality of relationships among states,”
but simply “one element within it” (Bull 1977, xi). By international order—that is, order among
states—he alluded to a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains elementary,
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primary or universal goals of the society of states (Bull 1977, 8, 16, 20; Bull and Watson 1984,
1). In this sense, he adopted a purposive conception of order linking patterns of human activity to
specific goals or values, such as the proverbial triad: “life” (security), “truth” (law), and
“property” (independence/autonomy). His work, therefore, offered an important yet partial
understanding of world politics via the exploration of the possibility of creation and maintenance
of order among states in their shared condition of anarchy. Bull’s main contention is that, firstly,
a sense of common interests develops, followed by a set of rules that may emerge to prescribe
the pattern of behavior to sustain society’s goals and values—although such rules are not
indispensable. Lastly, (fundamental) institutions can form to help make these rules effective and
reassure the common interests of states underpinning international order (Bull 1977, 53–9, 66–
74; Holsti 2009).
Bull’s theoretical contribution posed a challenge to the strong intellectual consensus at the
time, which likened international politics to the “state of nature” pictured by classical political
philosophers. Despite the absence of a world government, he maintained, world politics displays
a more considerable amount of social order than most contemporary theories cared to allow.
Contrary to realist perspectives, for example, Bull’s approach convincingly demonstrated that
order and war could be complementary elements of an “international society” (Bull 1977, 45, 41,
42). Against liberal perspectives, Bull argued that war should not always imply the interruption
of order, and that anarchy should not necessarily be a condition in need of fixing or mitigation
via values and institutions of a liberal tone only. His understanding of international order, in
effect, transcended the standard “tragic” view of international anarchy, where considerations of
“war” and “peace” are commonly given analytical priority over those of “order” and “justice”
(Bull 1966b, 37–40, 43, 49; 1977, 184–99, 71–4).
As part of his attack on the “domestic analogy,” Bull also raised important questions for IR
as an academic discipline. By successfully exposing the misuses and limits of this analogy,
profound theoretical implications emerge for the all too important question: “What is truly
unique to IR?” For Waltz and others after him, the distinctive element making it possible to
speak about international relations as a separate or autonomous “realm”—and thus, also, as a
distinct academic field (worthy) of study—is the fact that the “ordering principles” of the
international and domestic realms are diametrically opposed. But once anarchy and society are
no longer deployed as contradictory phenomena, elements of social order become possible even
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in the absence of a Leviathan (Bull 1977, 46–51). In this case, the traditional defining
characteristic of IR as an academic discipline ceases to be simply the absence of a central
government or authority—as the common wisdom maintains. The point becomes, instead, a
question of how differently can social order develop and sustain itself in the absence of a central
mechanism of enforcement and protection of common interests, rules and values; not whether
order is to be found only in one realm, and not in the other (Kratochwil 1989, 45–68; Milner
1991; Zarakol 2017, 3–4).
Simultaneously, Bull’s work points to the intricate connections between a narrowly defined
“national interest” (raison d’état) and larger systemic considerations based on the development
of “a common interest in order” (Bull 1977, 66–7). Adam Watson defined this common interest
in order as a raison de système, or “the belief that it pays to make the system work” (Watson
1983, 201ff; 1990, 104; 1992, 14; 1997, 95–105, 149–50). The ES is one of the few
contemporary approaches to IR to emphasize such interconnectivity between self and global
interests in the study of order in international society, while also underscoring the inexorable
“limits of independence” inherent to world politics (Watson 1983, 1997; Butterfield 1975; Coll
1985; Armstrong 1993, 244–51, 273–80; cf. Deudney 2007; Onuf 1998). In this context, given
that anthropologists have produced over the course of more than seven decades now a copious
amount of ethnological studies giving sustained empirical support to the prevalence of anarchical
—yet orderly—societies, the suggested redeployment of anarchy and social order as compatible
phenomena, among tribes as much as among states, becomes something more than a mere
abstract possibility. The thoughtful consideration given by Bull to this anthropological challenge
to certain core IR theory assumptions and micro-foundations, therefore, opens the door to
meaningful theoretical implications and forces us to take his initial “anthropological
investigations” seriously.
Bull’s Anthropological Investigations
The relation between Bull and political anthropology can be traced back to 1961, when a draft of
one of his projected contributions to Diplomatic Investigations was first read to the British
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Committee on July 20th of that year.8 In this early essay, Bull explained how he first came about
the idea of “fundamental institutions” in an anarchical society:
My colleague, Ernest Gellner, a gifted philosopher and anthropologist, has been many years
studying the Berbers of Morocco, particularly in the period before the French conquest, when
they did in fact live in a kind of state of anarchy—without any superior government. Gellner has
been, as it were, testing the philosophical theory of the state of nature, by observing and trying
to discover how the Berbers lived when they were in a state of nature. He has discovered all
sorts of analogies in the institutions which they developed over the years, through trial and error,
to make it possible to live together in anarchy. And these features—these institutions which they
developed—suggest some of the fundamental institutions of international society (in Vigezzi
2005, 394).
Bull was referring to a short article published in 1958, titled “How to Live in Anarchy,” in
which Gellner explained in detail how the Berber tribes in Morocco solved their conflicts
peacefully despite “functioning against a background of anarchy” (Gellner 1958, 579).9 Gellner
paid special attention to three common practices that left an indelible mark on Bull’s own
thinking later. First, he recognized a “trial by collective oath” system, which characterized not
only the Berbers, but also other comparable communities elsewhere under similar conditions of
anarchy. According to Gellner, this system seemed to throw the most light on contemporary
international politics. The “trial by collective oath” system was a set of moral commitments
made as much by those accused of a certain wrongdoing as by those making the accusation, and
even by those others standing up for the accused. The procedure was that, if some of the co-
jurors failed to turn up, or failed to testify, or made a slip while testifying, the whole oath became
invalid and the case was lost. The losing party was then forced to pay a proportionate fine
determined by custom. Typically, conflicts were resolved by consensual agreements on the
culpability of the accused and the particular ways to redress the offenses committed. On this
point, Bull commented:
the principle that “might is right” appears to be a moral principle of sorts amongst this people,
since it facilitates their living together in anarchy. You might think that the principle of “might is
right” is simply an inversion of moral principles—simply a way of saying that there is no moral
principle. Yet there is a difference between considering that might is right (i.e., ordering your
relations on that principle) and actually fighting it out. […] The results of violent conflict were
obtained without the necessity of going through the actual violence. […] Actual violence is
avoided, and we go directly to what the result of a violent conflict would have been. Acting
8 The original draft remains in the Hedley Bull Papers special collection at the Bodleian Library, University of
Oxford. It has been reproduced by Vigezzi (2005, 392–5) under the title “International Society and Anarchy
(Introductory Talk).” A revised and substantially longer final version of the draft was subsequently published as
chapter 2 in Diplomatic Investigations (see Bull 1966a).
9 Mayall (1990, 14: fn. 8) makes a reference to Gellner’s article, but he incorrectly dates it as 1959 and never
associates this article with Bull’s work.
8

according to the principle of “might is right” is an advance on having an actual trial of strength
(in Vigezzi 2005, 394; cf. Bull 1966a, 44; 1977, 306–15).
Second, there were other informal mechanisms of conflict-settlement located outside this
system itself. One additional way to prevent violence in the absence of central enforcement was
letting the habitual offenders down at the collective oath, for by removing the expectation of
unconditional support, groups could also instill restraint on the potential future offender as well
as on other offended groups (Gellner 1958, 579). Thus, members of a group were sometimes
prepared to impose legal defeat on themselves and face the consequences, based on their
acknowledgement of their shared responsibility for the misbehavior of the accused. Gellner was
quite impressed by how well this system worked; although—as he later found—part of the
answer is that it does not altogether work. “[I]n order to work at all it is paradoxically essential
that it should not work perfectly: for the ultimate sanction of its legal procedures is violence, and
if violence never occurred the sanction would lose its force” (1958, 583). In a sentence that
would later become one of Bull’s signature remarks, Gellner concluded that, although there was
no Leviathan, nor anything resembling a central government or authority, “there was a society,
for everyone recognised more or less the same code, and recognised, more or less, the universal
desirability of pacific settlement of disputes [sic].” Although in these anarchical societies there
was no law-and-order-enforcing machinery, “there [was] a recognised obligation to respect
order” (Gellner 1958, 579; cf. Bull 1977, 40–52).
In this view, the self-interest of the group is entangled with that of the community itself.
Group membership is quickly recognized by social actors as a precious commodity, if not an
overriding necessity, which habitual offenders soon learn they cannot afford to jeopardize so
easily, for by doing so they can as easily become a liability to the other members of the same
group or clan who could decide to make them outcasts, or even to punish them themselves. Thus,
a third practice was that every group exercised a “double-policing,” first, of its own members,
but also of other groups. The “fears of being thrown to the wolves” on the one hand, coupled
with fears of external groups on the other, enable groups and group-members to practice and
attach value to the act of self-restraint—beyond the more traditional others-restraint (Gellner
1958, 579, 582; cf. Bull 1977, 60–1, 66–7, 54). This entangling web of interests, for its part,
bears a strong resemblance to how international relations, despite its fundamental condition of
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anarchy, can accommodate asymmetries of power within a sense of common interests
underpinned by international society (see Bull 1977, 32–3, 37–8; Clark 2011; Dunne 2003).
Lastly, Gellner briefly explored some implications for the study of international anarchy.
Comparing the reality of tribal order with that of international politics, Gellner suggests that
there are limits to such an intellectual exercise. Ultimately, he argues, this is an “incomplete
analogy” which should not obscure the fact that order in world politics has its own “unique
institutions” (1958, 579). The importance of comparing one reality with the other comes from the
fact that several ideas behind each instance of order are essentially the same: in both cases the
situation is anarchic, and while groups may need to discipline their own members, they also want
to maintain their strength without losing any members. In both cases total war would be
disastrous to each side, and hence it is generally desired to avoid it (cf. Bull 1977, 62–5). “These
ideas,” says Gellner (1958, 582), “although often ignored, can however conveniently be invoked
by those who wish to break loyalty at the oath. In both cases it is known that if punishment
comes it will be collective: the bomb or the famine will descend upon the innocent and the guilty
alike.”
In conclusion, Gellner believed he had touched upon a crucial, shared quality of all human
communities living in anarchy: “a subtle machinery”—he called it—“for adjusting verdicts to the
reality of power” (1958, 582). In this sense, both tribal and interstate societies could be
understood as institutionalizing realities of power through certain fundamental practices and,
thus, also as cultivating inducements to orderly behavior. On a sarcastic note, Gellner (1958, 582
[sic]) concluded that “[o]ne cannot have small and isolated countries taking powerful or well-
aligned ones to court, and even winning, for no better reason than they happen to be right. That
would undermine the order by leading to a series of totally unenforceable verdicts.” Gellner and
Bull understood that if one truly wants to give justice a chance, both “might” and “right” must be
seen as in compromise one with the other. “When both [strong and weak] contestants stand to
lose from open violence or when it is unpredictable which one would, it makes the verdict partly
a function of justice. Only partly, but also at least partly: half a loaf is perhaps better than no
bread” (Gellner 1958, 582).
Despite these profound similarities and parallelisms between Gellner’s anthropological
insights and Bull’s argument about order in the anarchical society of states, Bull’s intellectual
debt to his colleague at the LSE was progressively suppressed, and later abandoned, as his 1961
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draft went from a published chapter in 1966 to a core argument in chapter 3 of the The
Anarchical Society in 1977. Bull also seems to have overlooked Gellner’s Saints of the Atlas
(1969), now considered a classic anthropological work on the Berbers’ political system. The
intellectual connection between Bull and political anthropology, however, transcends this single
early connection, as Bull made further inroads into a growing body of work pioneered by other
classical political anthropologists of the mid-twentieth century who were also interested in the
study of political order in uncentralized societies—or so-called “tribes without rulers”
(Middleton and Tait, 1958).
After Gellner’s initial influence, Bull’s major source of anthropological insights was the
work of Roger D. Masters, who in a “penetrating article” (Bull 1977, 323: fn. 2) conveniently
summarized most of the anthropological literature up to the 1960s on anarchical societies. The
relevance of this article upon Bull’s thinking cannot be overstated, for in The Anarchical Society,
not only is the anthropological literature consulted exactly as in the one reviewed by Masters, but
also the structure of argumentation in the subsection of chapter 3 dedicated to “Order in
Primitive Stateless Societies” is conspicuously similar to Masters’ line of reasoning (cf. Bull
1977, 59–95; Masters 1964, 597–600, 605–15). But by relying so heavily on Masters’ own
approach, Bull also circumscribed his engagement with anthropology to only those specific texts
referenced in the 1964 article. Carrying onto his own work the same limits and emphases as
Masters’, Bull failed to consider other important insights, well-known in classical anthropology
at the time, yet not reviewed by Masters. Such was the case of many texts from economic
anthropology.
In this context, whereas Gellner’s work first suggested the idea of “institutions” in
anarchical societies and helped reinforce Bull’s understanding of “common interests” and “self-
restraint,” it was through Masters’ article that Bull was able to empirically substantiate his search
for the sources, number, and functions (or characteristics) of the “fundamental institutions” of
international society. In effect, Bull found in the classical anthropology studies of small-scale
anarchical societies a fitting body of literature with which to further ground the idea of
international society in the historical and well-documented examples of human communities
living together in anarchy. Following both Gellner and Masters, he recognized the potential value
of comparing both types of anarchical societies as a distinct type of “uncentralized order.” As he
neatly put it, while “[o]rder within the modern state is the consequence, among other things, of
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government, order among states cannot be, for international society is an anarchical society, a
society without government. But primitive stateless societies also present this spectacle of
‘ordered anarchy’, and it is worth considering the resemblances and differences between the
ways in which order is created and maintained in the one and in the other” (Bull 1977, 59). Bull
took the concept of “ordered anarchy,” without proper citation, from the anthropologist Edward
Evans-Pritchard (1940a, 6, 181). A possible explanation for Bull’s uncharacteristic lapse could be
found, perhaps, in his reliance on Masters’ (1964, 595, 609) own references to the concept.
In his original contribution, Masters (1964, 605, 609, 619) compared uncentralized societies
with international politics in an explicit “first-cut approach” intended to explore insights derived
from anthropology that could be useful for the study of “anarchical societies” in general—
understood as a distinct class of political orders. Apart from its bibliographic survey and analysis
of the anthropological literature at the time, Masters’ article offered a crucial way for Bull to
anchor his concept of “fundamental institutions” in more than “notional” representations of
classical political philosophers and jurists, or the comparative historical approaches of ancient
regional “systems of states” à-la Wight (1977) or Watson (1990; 1992). Bull’s distinctive
approach, incorporating anthropology to the analysis of international society, set him apart from
fellow British Committee members, and led him down a comparatively more consistent path
toward the notion of institutions as goal-oriented “patterned practices.” But while Gellner
conceived of these institutions in a general sense, certainly reinforcing Bull’s interest in the idea,
Masters (1964, 597–613) went a bit further by identifying a more precise set of institutions that
seemed to fulfill similar functions in relation to social order as those considered “fundamental”
by Bull in his work. In this, he seems to have followed Masters almost à-la lettre in recognizing
a set of factors that “operate outside the structure of rules itself,” which induce the politically
competent groups to conform to them. The similarities between Bull, Masters and Gellner on
“institutions” are so remarkable that they merit a closer and more detailed examination (cf. Bull
1977, 60–2; Masters 1964, 597–613; Gellner 1958, 579).
According to Masters, institutions like the “balance of power,” “war,” “law” and
“diplomacy” have always existed among uncentralized societies. Since these institutions have
historically been core practices in the provision of social order in conditions of anarchy, Masters
concluded, they should also be considered as genuine components of IR. For this point, he relied
on the pioneering work of Ragnar Numelin (1950), which still remains one of the most
12

comprehensive studies on inter-tribal “international relations” to date. Apart from Masters, in the
anthropological literature, the study of “balance-of-power” dynamics qua order-maintaining
institutions is the subject of many classical works.10 Although Bull’s elaboration on the role of
the balance of power in world politics is limited to relations among states, his analysis of the
function of the balance of power toward order is nevertheless similar to the one proposed by
most political anthropologists (cf. Bull 1977, 101–26). A similar argument can be made of the
institution of diplomacy.
Following Masters, Bull (1977) relied extensively on Numelin for his own treatment of
“diplomacy” as an institution.11 In essence, Bull (1977, 162–83) understood diplomacy in rather
simple and generic terms as the conduct of relations among states (“or other political entities
with standing in world politics”), taking place via representative agents, or “diplomatists,” who
must manage with tact and subtlety the social interactions between states (or other political
entities). In his characteristic taxonomical approach to different terms and definitions of
diplomacy, Bull concluded that “it is clear from Ragnar Numelin’s account, to which reference
has been made, that diplomatic contact even among primitive peoples are often highly
institutionalised in this sense, the exchange of messages and the conduct of negotiations
conforming to elaborate rules backed up by magical or religious sanction” (1977, 166). In both
instances, diplomacy is identified as a patterned practice that facilitates communication and
negotiation between leaders and “diplomatists” of different social groups, and thus underpins
order in (and between) uncentralized societies. In both instances, diplomacy assists in the
“reading” of the strategic environment by gathering intelligence about other groups and
facilitating the “minimisation of the effects of friction in international relations” (Bull 1977,
170ff).
On the issue of “war” as an order-maintaining institution, the influence of anthropology also
remains clear. Gellner’s and Masters’ recurrent references to “war” as a social institution are part
of a wider consensus among classical political anthropologists on the roles played by conflict as
a disciplining mechanism in all societies—anarchical or otherwise. More specifically, the
10 For some prominent examples (most of them also referenced by Bull), see Banton (1965); Evans-Pritchard
(1941b, 293); Middleton and Tait (1958, 21–2); Claessen (1979, 183–96); Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940, xviii–
xxiii, 11–4, 19); Bailey (1969; 2001); and Mair (1975, 40–8).
11 A number of recent texts have tried to contest Numelin’s core argument, problematically suggesting that
diplomacy began only with the advent of the first “states” in the Ancient Near East. See Cohen and Westbrook
(2002); Liverani (2001, 1–3); and Podany (2010, 19–36). Cf. Bull (1979).
13

practice of restraint in “war” has always been a cornerstone of the field of international law, with
its discussions on ius bello and ius ad bellum as examples of the “civilizing” force of law, but it
has also been well-documented in a vast number of classical studies of political anthropology
throughout the twentieth century (Van der Dennen 2014; Helbling 2006; 2009; LeBlanc 2003).
These studies commonly classify the subject of war into two areas: a restrained type of armed
violence occurring between members of a society, and that taking place between different
societies inter se (Clarkson and Cochran 1941; Harrison 1993; Masters 1964; Malinowski 1941).
This is what Gellner (1958, 1991) referred to when discussing the Berbers’ practice of “double
policing,” for uncentralized societies—unlike today’s anarchical society of states—deal with a
double condition of anarchy: one among members of the community, and another between their
community and others. Thus, both “war” and “the feud” represent common institutionalized
practices in such societies that, together with other institutions like the balance of power, help
maintain internal plurality and diversity, and prevent the formation of a central (potentially
oppressive) power or authority above the society itself (Helbling 2006; Clastres 1987, 2010;
Harrison 1993). Both the “feud” (intra-community) and “war” (inter-communities) illustrate
well how a sense of common interests contributes to the maintenance of commonly agreed,
tolerable levels of social violence, as well as the role that conflict plays as an order-maintaining
institution (Gluckman 1955; 1963; 1965, 81–122; Fortes 1945; Swartz and Turner 1966; cf. Bull
1977, 184–99).
Anthropologists studying the development, role and function of “law” in anarchical societies
were equally surveyed by Masters in his important article. Here, too, there is a strong parallelism
between what Bull describes as “international law” for the anarchical society of states and what
anthropologists have called “ancient” or “primitive” law in domestic anarchical communities.
Among states, as among tribes, law fulfills similar roles in the provision of a socially-agreed-
upon standard for the restraining of violence, the reinforcement and proscription of expected
social roles, the protection of rights and duties, and the stability of individual or collective
possessions (Barton 1919, 1930, 1949; Bailey 1969, 2001; Bohannan 1967; Hoebel 2006; cf.
Bull 1977, 127–61). Both international and so-called “primitive” law are par excellence
customary law, for in both cases an independent enforcing-agent is absent. Society members
enjoy an overlapping set of “legally sanctioned” roles, duties and identities that simultaneously
bind and segment the society as a whole, in what anthropologist Max Gluckman popularized as
14

mutually-reinforcing “overlapping identities” (Gluckman 1955; 1963; 1965). Similarly, legal
principles adopt a comparable institutional form, prescribing as well as proscribing specific
member-behavior according to social taboos, myths, customs, rules and norms, which evolve
from experience and consensus—regardless of their codification or not (Numelin 1950; Clastres
1987, 2010).
Finally, even Bull’s notion of the role of the great powers in “managing” international order
finds resonance in the institutions identified by political anthropologists. In several classical
studies of ordered anarchy, anthropologists identify a “special role” that is typically reserved for
the elders, or other equivalent group, within a specific community (Evans-Pritchard 1940a,
1940b; Middleton and Tait 1958). These individuals are made responsible for the protection of
the community’s traditions, rules, customs and culture, and are likewise assigned very specific
roles regarding the enforcement of collective norms and morally-binding arrangements of the
community as a whole. These roles are carefully monitored and continuously “checked” by the
rest of the society to avoid the emergence of positions of centralized power that could become
more permanent (Clastres 1987, 1998, 2010). Since anarchical communities display this
tendency to reject the formation of any central authority above them, these roles and tasks are
normally not simply “appropriated” by the strongest or the intellectually canniest members for
their own parochial benefit. Instead, these roles are taken up by those who earn the community’s
prestige, trust and respect and, thus, are recognized as “wiser” and more responsible members
who can procure for society’s overall interests. Anthropologists such as Evans-Pritchard (1940a,
1940b) argue that such roles as the “leopard-skin chief,” despite creating de facto social- and
power-asymmetries among individuals, do not represent a break-up, or a “scission” (Clastres
1998), of society into what Max Weber famously classified as “private” and “public” spheres
(Bailey 1969, 2001). These roles are not substitutes for a Western-centric conception of the state
as some critics have argued (Schouenborg 2017; Easton 1949), but they do constitute a distinct
type of (anarchical) order of their own. Pierre Clastres, who has studied this aspect in greater
depth than any other anthropologist of the twentieth century, famously concluded that the “most
powerful” in an uncentralized society are not truly empowered by such special responsibilities as
much as they are charged with performing a service to the community in the expectation of
exercising their power with moderation and self-restraint—or else the society as a whole would
often turn against them (sometimes even violently) in protection of their autonomy and freedom.
15

Anarchical societies of this kind, in short, are not societies without a state, but against it (Clastres
2010; Barclay 1996).
In this general context, therefore, Masters (1964, 595–7) suggested three main reasons for
comparing so-called “primitive” and international politics, which also directly informed Bull’s
own comparison (cf. 1977, 59–65). First, in both cases the phenomenon of anarchy is moderated
or inhibited by specific “institutions.” A second reason is the need for bridging the gap between
political science and anthropology—an attempt that “has merits because such cross-disciplinary
endeavors may free one from unnecessarily narrow assumptions which often dominate research
in a given field (Masters 1964, 596). A final reason is the fact that political philosophy has
typically analyzed pre-state conditions before the development of the academic discipline of
anthropology itself (Masters 1964, 596; Bull 1977, 59–60; Myres 1916), thus generating
problematic assumptions, like the “state of nature,” which remain today as popular heuristic
models in mainstream IR theory (cf. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940, 4; Mair 1975, 18;
Ellingson 2001; Kuper 2005; 2014; LeBlanc 2003; Sahlins 2008).
An important limitation of this comparison, however, is the fact that there are different
levels of cultural homogeneity in domestic anarchical societies and of heterogeneity in the
international one (Bull 1977, 64; Masters, 614ff). “Together,” Bull adds (1977, 65), “what is
shown by these points of contrast is that the forces making for social cohesion and solidarity are
very much stronger in primitive anarchical societies than in international society.” While the
anarchical societies studied by anthropologists were characteristically small in scale, rarely
reaching a population of more than 100,000 people (or 200 groups), modern states are notorious
for their capacity to embrace quite efficiently not only larger populations (involving millions of
people), but also diverse nationalities, ethnic groups and identities, and even sometimes adopting
multiple official languages and religions (Masters 1964, 603–4; Bull 1977, 65; Fortes and Evans-
Pritchard 1940, 7–11). The main objective of Masters’ comparison, however, was to suggest that
“[t]hese similarities indicate that the analogy between primitive political systems without
governments and international politics is not merely fanciful; both appear to belong to a general
class of political systems in which self-help or violence is an accepted and legitimate mode of
procedure” (1964, 605 [sic]). In this sense, Bull seems to have extended the classical
anthropologists’ study of the how-to-live-in-anarchy problématique into the realm of world
politics itself. “If we ask why [people] attach value to order,” he inquired, “at least part of the
16

answer is that they value the greater predictability of human behavior that comes as the
consequence of conformity to the elementary or primary goals of coexistence” (Bull 1977, 7–8;
Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940, 55–6, cf. Easton 1959).
While the institutions identified by Bull as the balance of power, war, law, diplomacy and
great-power management were not a direct transposition of the institutions discovered in the
anthropological literature on uncentralized societies into the international realm, Bull saw in both
types of “ordered anarchies” a comparable type of fundamental practices and customs:
“institutions” of a similar fundamental nature. Despite their differences in size, type of members,
and degree of solidarity, Bull considered both sets of institutions as component parts of a distinct
type of “order” that had to be analyzed independently of the prevalent model of the modern state,
and according to its own institutions and characteristics. A survey of the parallelisms between the
work of Bull and that of classical anthropologists suggests that the notion of “fundamental
institutions” in anarchical societies, in general, cannot be easily disentangled from the study of
their roles, functions and characteristics in relation to the provision of order. What seems to be
fundamental about them is, precisely, their contribution to the maintenance of the goal of “order”
in anarchy.
Political anthropology, in conclusion, has been not only an additional influence upon Bull’s
work, but an early and relevant one as well. Although generally aware of the link to
anthropology, contemporary students of international society have persistently overlooked the
systematic study of this important intellectual influence. The rather exclusive attention paid to
political philosophy, history and international law—crucial as they are—has hindered a further
contextualization of Bull’s thinking about order in international society and its fundamental
institutions. Premised on a still incomplete understanding of the influences upon his work,
therefore, several contemporary scholars—professing to be following Bull’s steps—have felt
justified in problematizing Bull’s view on institutions by challenging their sources, numbers, and
characteristics. In the next section, the article offers “a critique of the critics” suggesting that, in
light of Bull’s anthropological investigations, the critics’ core premise for rethinking Bull on the
issue of institutions loses much of its raison d’être and should be carefully reconsidered.
From “Fundamental” to “Primary” Institutions? The Missing Link
17

In The Anarchical Society, Bull dedicated an entire third of his work to a detailed study of those
institutions that fulfill “key positive functions” in relation to order (Bull 1977, xii). “To find the
basic causes of such order as exists in world politics,” he argued, “one must look not to the
League of Nations, the United Nations and such bodies, but to institutions of international
society that arose before these international organisations were established, and that would
continue to operate (albeit in a different mode) even if these organisations did not exist” (Bull
1977, xiv). He called these the “effective,” “real,” or “fundamental” institutions of international
society, and defined them as “a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of
common goals” (Bull 1977, 74; see also Hurrell 1993). In world politics, no other goal is more
conducive to an international society than a common interest in order. Following Wight, Bull
looked down on international organizations as “pseudo institutions.” These, Bull (1977, xiv)
complained, have been over studied, “deflecting scholarly attention away from sources of
international order that are more fundamental.” But as Navari and Knudsen (2019, 2) put it, it is
not that international organizations did not matter, “but that they did not provide the
fundamentals of international order.”
Despite Bull’s efforts at clarification, prominent contemporary students of international
society have advanced over the past twenty years a reinterpretation of his original take on
“fundamental institutions” that, by neglecting the study of the link with political anthropology,
has promoted a new line of research on institutions that retains little of the distinctiveness or
specificity of Bull’s original perspective.12 The main argument of the so-called “New
Institutionalists” is that the primary concern of the ES can be understood as the study of social
institutions (Schouenborg 2014, 77; Buzan 2004, 167). To overcome lingering conceptual
ambiguities in IR between regimes and organizations on the one hand, and what Bull specifically
meant by “fundamental institutions” on the other, New Institutionalists suggest a reinterpretation
of the latter as “primary institutions,” and of the former as “secondary institutions” (Schouenborg
2014, 77–85; Buzan 2004, 161–204). Although the original insight by Bull was that institutions
are sociologically “more fundamental” than international organizations and regimes, New
Institutionalists have shifted the focus away from the view of institutions as pillars of order in
12 For some of the most relevant works on the issue of “institutions” in the ES, see Little and Williams (2006, esp.
73–188); Buzan (2004, 161–204); Holsti (2004); Knudsen (2013); Mayall (1990); Clark (2011, 51ff); Schouenborg
(2011, 26–44; 2014, 77–89; 2017); Reus-Smit (2009, 3–39); and Navari and Knudsen (2019); cf. Hurrell (1993) and
Onuf (2002).
18

world politics and further suggested that the emphasis should be put instead on change (Holsti
2004; 2009, 138; Schouenborg 2014, 78; cf. Navari and Knudsen 2019, part 1).
In this context, New Institutionalists have advanced two problematic propositions. On the
one hand, they have based their new take on institutions on the argument that Bull’s five-set
lacked proper justification or criteria (Schouenborg 2014, 77, 80–1; Buzan 2006, 78). In short,
they have questioned the sources of Bull’s original institutions and called for an expansion of the
list of “primary” institutions of international society—each with their own set of “derivative”
sub-institutions (Buzan 2004, 166–76, 184; Schouenborg 2014, 80–8). As part of this view,
however, international organizations are given prominence and added as “secondary institutions”
that can retroactively modify “primary” ones (Buzan 2004, 167, 187; cf. Navari and Knudsen
2019, 2). On the other hand, and more problematically still, the New Institutionalist literature has
recast Bull’s overall framework as a “structural-functional theory” in direct defiance of Bull’s
explicit rejection of this approach for studying order in international society (Buzan 2004, 176–
90; 2006, 78; Schouenborg 2014, 80–1; cf. Bull 1977, 74–6). Peter Wilson (2012) has already
articulated a clear and compelling critique of this literature, calling for an “empirical grounding”
of Bull’s fundamental institutions, as well as a pause in the viral practice of continuously adding
more institutions to the list, or in arranging them differently, in the absence of a clear or coherent
criterion. This, as Wilson (2012, 568) argues, has led to an uncontrollable and unproductive
proliferation of institutions; truly a “laundry list” of more than twenty-six “primary,”
“derivative,” “master,” and so on, institutions of international society. In this context, bringing
back the influence of anthropology on Bull’s view of fundamental institutions can meaningfully
contribute an answer to the contested issue of their sources, number, and characteristics, while
also reinforcing Wilson’s pertinent call for a coherent criterion with which to ground the study of
institutions within the ES.
“Why Only Five?”
According to Buzan (2006, 78), “Bull never gave a full definition of what constitutes an
institution, nor [did] he set out criteria for inclusion into or exclusion from this category.”13
Similarly, Holsti (2009, 137–8) holds a pessimistic view regarding Bull’s purported “lack of
explicit selection criteria” for choosing among alternative institutions that promote international
13 Buzan seems to have held a different opinion before, cf. Buzan (2004, 169, 165).
19

order, and further concludes that “[t]here is probably no authoritative solution to the problem of
selection criteria.” Schouenborg (2014, 80–1), for his part, claims that Bull only “rested on
deductive premises,” for although he “did go and look for institutions,” these were only
“empirical” in the general sense of a social order as studied in political philosophy. Despite his
critical take on the New Institutionalist literature, even Wilson (2012) seems to share the belief
that Bull’s five-set of institutions is more or less “up for grabs.” As Wilson (2012, 569) put it,
“[t]he main problem is the lack of a precise and stable definition.” Wilson is correct in
identifying that the ES’ collective understanding of institutions has certainly changed over time
for no apparent reason, with the number of these institutions shrinking or expanding
unexpectedly from publication to publication. This is the case, for example, for Wight (1977),
Mayall (1990), Buzan (2004), Holsti (2004) and others when considered as a group, since each
failed to offer a clear-cut framework for identifying exactly which types of state “patterned
practices” should stand out over others. They seem to have grounded their view of institutions
exclusively on contemporary historical examples, while lacking a less “case-by-case” criterion.
However, the historical record is infinitely populated with social institutions of all sorts, and
without a more stable criterion there is no real compass for effectively and systematically
discriminating between “fundamental” and other types of institutions.
But as Wilson (2012, 570) has also correctly pointed out, the main issue is not whether
Bull gave a clear definition of institutions, for actually “we have the definitions, and we have the
lists, but nowhere is there an attempt to systematically link the two.” In this context, Wilson’s
overall critique is important insofar as it analyzes not only Bull but many other ES scholars as a
group. Across the board, definitions do vary and diverge. The importance of Bull, however, is
that he was the only one who eventually condensed many of the fluctuating and imprecise
notions emanating from the early meetings of the British Committee and other fora, like LSE or
RIIA, into a stable list of five.
In light of Bull’s anthropological investigations, the contemporary challenge to his
understanding of institutions loses much of its rationale, for it was precisely from political
anthropology that Bull derived a general idea of “institutions,” as well as their number and most
critically their functions and roles. The reason why Bull eventually settled with only five
institutions acquires new meaning when the “missing link” with anthropology is recovered and
properly contextualized. In this sense, and quite unlike other ES scholars, Bull’s position was
20

rooted not only in history, international law, or political philosophy, but also in political
anthropology. It was from the latter that he developed his definition and his list. Political
anthropology, in short, was Bull’s guiding criterion and the source with which he attempted “to
systematically link the two.”
“Key Positive Functions in Relation to Order”
Kalevi Holsti (2009, 137) has also charged Bull with “loading the dice” in favor of institutions
that only promote order, thus missing the crucial point that Bull explicitly focused on those
institutions that play a “key positive function” regarding order in anarchical societies. This is
precisely Bull’s own standard or criterion for identifying some institutions as “fundamental.”
Other contemporary scholars, accepting in toto Buzan’s (2004) recasting of Bull’s framework,
have failed to provide a solid alternative criterion of their own on which to ground such an
overhauling of the classical ES position on institutions (cf. Buzan 2004, 167ff; Schouenborg
2011a, 27–8; 2011b; 2013, 1–70; Holsti 2004, 2009). This reframing of the argument is
problematic because it implies a move from five to an ever-growing number of institutions, and
thus undermines the useful simplicity, coherence and focus of the original framework. More
importantly, it has been premised on an incomplete reading of Bull’s intellectual influences and
criteria for selection. In the end, with political anthropology problematically absent from their
(mis)treatment of Bull’s work on institutions, critics have also transitioned to a second
problematic proposition: that of recasting the ES as a structural-functionalist theory.
In an important, but often overlooked, sub-section of chapter 3 in The Anarchical Society,
titled “Functional and Causal Explanations,” Bull makes a crucial disclaimer that runs directly
against this second claim made by the New Institutionalists. Bull (1977, 74) argues that, although
his work dealt with rules and institutions as carrying out “positive functions or roles in relation to
international order,” these rules and institutions are simply “part of the efficient causation of
international order, that they are among the necessary and sufficient conditions of its
occurrence.” Unambiguously, Bull (1977, 75) declares that his study is not an attempt to apply
structural-functionalist explanations, in which terms such as “function” and “role” have a
different meaning. Without the intellectual referent of political anthropology, it can be easy to
miss the reason why Bull added such a seemingly out-of-place methodological clarification in a
book by the champion of the “classical approach” (Bull, 1966c). Bull’s effort in clarifying his
21

position, however, acquires contextual meaning in light of the anthropological literature of the
1950s and 1960s, itself dominated by methodological debates between “structural-functionalist”
and “cultural” anthropologists (see Balandier 1970; Gellner 1995; Vincent 1994; Kuper 2005;
2014; Swartz and Turner, 1966). Writing in the mid-1970s, Bull (1977, 75) wanted to make clear
he was not suggesting that the only way to achieve order in world politics was by “patching up”
a pre-established set of functions or roles derived a priori from some form of domestic
government template, nor “to provide a rationale for, or justification of, the rules of coexistence
in international society or the institutions that help to make them effective,” as many of his critics
argue. Bull emphasized that order was not the only, nor an overriding, value in international
politics, and doubted the validity of the whole structural-functionalist “reasoning” when being
applied to the society of states itself (Bull 1977, 75).
As Bull pointed out, had he adopted an explanation of the rules and institutions of
international society as if dealing “only with the functions they served in relation to international
society as a whole,” then his explanation would have “overlook[ed] the extent to which
international politics is better described as a state of war or as a political field in which
individuals and groups other than the state are the principal actors” (Bull 1977, 75–6). His final
point expresses his larger concerns with the validity of the whole structural-functionalist analysis
“even when applied to societies displaying more unity than does the society of states.” Even in
these circumstances, he concludes, “there are forces making for antisocial or nonsocial behavior
which cannot be readily encompassed in a theory which seeks to relate all social events to the
working of the social framework as a whole” (1977, 76).
In conclusion, the ensuing proliferation of a long list of “primary, “master” and “derivative”
institutions has taken place under two questionable premises. One is the view that Bull had no
criterion for selecting his five fundamental institutions, while the other is the claim that the
alternative framework proposed by the New Institutionalists offers a better criterion for selection
via structural-functional theory. These problematic justifications have led not only to a popular
confusion of any social institution with those identified by Bull as “fundamental,” but also to an
endorsement of a “soft version” of structural-functionalism (Buzan 2004; Schouenborg 2013;
2017). On this point, it is revealing that the New Institutionalists have put such special attention
only on so-called “binding forces” (Buzan 2004, 253–7, 103–6, 109–10; Schouenborg 2013, 24–
8), while neglecting the study of counteracting, “dividing” ones. This has rendered the ES almost
22

indistinguishable from other approaches like security communities, (soft) constructivism, or
liberal integration theory (cf. Buzan 2004, 176–90; Schouenborg, 2011b, 77–89; 2013, 80–7).
Although Bull could have certainly helped his readers by better emphasizing the anthropological
roots on which he relied for developing the original five-set of fundamental institutions, the
intellectual connections were hiding in plain sight for everyone to see, as this article has tried to
illustrate. The theoretical implications, however, could be important for contemporary
discussions on institutions within the ES, as well as for rethinking some rather archaic but well-
established ideas in the field of IR itself.
Beyond Bull: Anthropological Investigations 2.0
A closer examination of how Bull systematically borrowed insights from political anthropology
not only suggests from where Bull may have taken additional inspiration in coming up with a
more stable number of institutions or particular concepts related to an ordered anarchy, but also
how many, and why. In doing this, however, Bull seems to have followed too closely similar
lines of argumentation found in the classical anthropological literature reviewed by Masters,
without conducting further investigations of his own on other, equally important, aspects of that
literature. There are many areas into which Bull could have delved deeper, enriching his
approach and even anticipating later criticisms leveled at his work. These additional insights
could have also opened interesting areas of research in his own work on international society,
impacting the way in which we interpret and apply his own framework today. Three insights, in
particular, were surprisingly ignored by Bull despite their centrality in the anthropology literature
consulted at the time: the role of economic exchange (or “Trade”), the interplay of centripetal
and centrifugal forces, and the reconsideration of anarchical societies as a self-standing class of
political orders.
“Trade” as a Sixth Fundamental Institution
The idea of incorporating Trade as an additional institution is not new to contemporary ES
thinking (see Buzan 2005; Mayall 1990, 70–87; Holsti 2004, 211–38; Beeson and Bell 2017). In
effect, the lack of attention to economic factors has been one of the traditional lines of criticism
leveled at Bull’s work (see Rosecrance 1981). Bull’s failure to discuss economic aspects of
international society is all the more intriguing when seen in the context of the 1970s, a decade
23

marked by popular debates on “complex interdependence,” the rise of an International Political
Economy subfield, and globalization. But Bull’s inattention to economics is also surprising in the
context of the literature of political anthropology itself, which was so influential in his
conceptualization of fundamental institutions. Although anthropologists have long studied the
role of economic exchange and trade as a universal practice that sustains order in uncentralized
societies, Masters made no reference to it in his influential article—thus, neither did Bull. This is
an important line of research left unexplored by Bull but from which he could have benefitted
greatly. Unlike previous calls for inclusion premised on the idea of Trade as a new “primary
institution,” however, political anthropology suggests a more consistent guiding criterion, similar
to the original five fundamental institutions, on which to premise the inclusion of Trade to the
traditional list.
In The Anarchical Society, Bull suggested that one of the most important factors that plays
an active role in keeping domestic anarchical societies in stable social order is the element of
“solidarity.” Everything seems to indicate, he argued, that “though government is lacking in
these systems, an impressive degree of social solidarity is not. The maintenance of order in
international society has to take place not only in the absence of government but also in the
absence of social solidarity of this sort” (Bull 1977, 65). In the field of political anthropology, the
study of solidarity or social reciprocity was popularized by Marcel Mauss in his classical work,
The Gift (2002). The study of the institution of “gift giving” (or the kula) is one of the classical
themes in the study of economic exchange (intra-society) and trade (inter-society) in modern
economic anthropology (Sahlins 1972; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Malinowski 1978). Although Bull
made no incursions into this other body of literature, it offers extremely important contributions
to the understanding of “ordered anarchy.” Bull’s analysis could have been greatly enriched had
he paid a closer attention to the role of economic exchange as one of the original “institutions”
underpinning his view of the anarchical society of states (see Polanyi et al. 1957, 243–69;
Polanyi 1968; 2001, 177–87, 218–36; cf. Graeber 2001, 217).
Although inter-group economic exchange was not formally identified by Bull as an
“institution” per se, it was mentioned as a common practice in a “system” of states. Since all five
of Bull’s original institutions correspond with what political anthropologists commonly identified
as elementary social institutions in domestic anarchical societies, Bull’s non-inclusion of Trade
as an institution is surprising, for in his own words:
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International politics, in the Grotian understanding, expresses neither complete conflict of
interest between states nor complete identity of interest; it resembles a game that is partly
distributive but also partly productive. The particular international activity which, on the
Grotian view, best typifies international activity as a whole is neither war between states, nor
horizontal conflict cutting across the boundaries of states, but trade—or, more generally,
economic and social intercourse between one country and another (Bull 1977, 26–7).
In Karl Polanyi’s own anthropological investigations on the role of economic exchange in
ancient political communities, both economy and society cannot be understood but as
“embedded” one into the other, making them inseparable phenomena (Polanyi et al. 1957, 12–
26; Polanyi 2001, 45–58). In this sense, all anarchical societies are rooted, in an important way,
in such social bonds as those created and reinforced by a general “common interest” in order and
the procurement of basic goals of social life, which must unavoidably include economic and
social factors. Considering Trade as a sixth institution on the basis of Bull’s anthropological
investigations offers the possibility for contemporary scholars to open new ways of incorporating
international economic exchange back into the foundational social practices that make and
sustain order in a society of states. In doing so, they would be following closely the same
criterion for selection employed by Bull himself.
Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces
A second aspect in which contemporary scholars could benefit from updating Bull’s
anthropological investigations is by rescuing one of Bull’s most underdeveloped, yet important,
contributions to the study of global order: the inherent duality of the “fundamental institutions.”
Across Bull’s entire work, an idea recurs: the understanding of fundamental institutions as
playing not just centripetal (or “binding”) roles, underpinning the society component of an
anarchical society, but also centrifugal (or “dividing”) roles by keeping the society segmented or
uncentralized—underpinning the anarchical component (cf. Bull 1977, 198, 108–9, 117, 143–5,
159, 188, 206–7). Similar ideas have been long maintained by political anthropologists since the
1950s when explaining how uncentralized communities maintained order via the dual role played
by their social institutions (see Clastres 1987, 2010; Campagno 2014; Abensour 2007). These
institutions, in turn, seem to fully require at times the invocation (if not the downright use) of
legitimate collective violence to carry out their roles in relation to social order (Gellner 1969;
1958). In the 1950s and 1960s, critics of structural functionalism, such as Gluckman (1955;
1963, 81–122; 1965) and Bailey (1969; 2001), popularized the study of “conflict” as a dualistic
25

process with positive order-inducing effects on society—acting as a centrifugal force keeping in
check other centripetal forces (see also Harrison 1993; cf. Leach 1970). Comparable ideas about
the coexistence of integrating and disrupting social forces abound in anthropological and
sociological discussions, although they are still rarely used, or properly understood, in
mainstream IR theory debates.14 Although Bull seems to have missed a great opportunity to
further ground his “anthropological investigations” by making use of this parallel body of
literature, contemporary scholars could take up the challenge by making use of newer and more
refined anthropological studies than the ones available to Bull half a century ago.
In principle, the very framing of world politics as a field continuously checked by the
interplay of integrating and disrupting forces can be said to be already present in the Three
Traditions at the heart of the ES approach itself (Wight 1991). Whereas the Hobbesian elements
of world politics highlight the roles played by autonomy, restraint, prudence, and the basic
condition of a “national interest” in a “state of warre” à la Hobbes, the opposing Kantian
elements bring forth conditions of transnational interconnectivity, underpinning a more
encompassing “Humanity interest” that pulls states toward a promise of transcendence beyond
international anarchy. In sum, one tradition points to the reasons why independent political
communities partake in constructing and sustaining a “society” at all, while the other helps
explain why the same members choose to maintain their relations uncentralized. Sandwiched in
the middle stand the Grotian elements of world politics. Bull’s argument thus strives for a
compound, “triangulated” view of international society: not as simply characterized by disorder
and strife, nor simply defined by a larger identification with the whole of Humanity, but by the
proverbial via media.
To view Bull’s position on fundamental institutions, therefore, as if only favoring order (as
“loading the dice”) should at least not confound order with peace (see Halliday and Rosenberg
1998, 384). Bull, as Wight before him, saw the Three Traditions as contributing together to a
more nuanced, balanced, and richer perspective with which to tackle international relations. In
this, a renewed engagement with similar insights from anthropology can further ground
international society and many of its analytical components, such as the Three Traditions, in
more elements than simply the political philosophy of Hobbes, Kant, and Grotius.
14 One interesting case is Rosenau’s (1994) notion of “fragmegration.” See also Helbling (2006, 2009).
26

Rethinking Bull’s “Domestic Analogy”
Finally, rethinking and updating Bull’s contribution in light of the anthropological influences
identified earlier forces us to pay much closer attention to the central problem of the domestic
analogy in IR. Most thinking by analogy in world politics has typically revolved around the
contrast between a “World Anarchy” and a domestic “Leviathan” (i.e., between the top-left and
bottom-right quadrants in FIGURE 1).
FIGURE 1: The “Domestic Analogy” Revisited
Political
Authority
Uncentralize
d“World Anarchy” “State of Nature”
“Ordered Anarchy”
Centralized “World Government” “Leviathan”
Global Local
Scale
The vast majority of students in IR has displayed a tendency to draw insights, and even
policy prescriptions, from local or “domestic” conditions in which a centralized political
authority is present (a Leviathan) in order to “solve” the problem of World Anarchy, where such
authority is absent. This type of thinking leads many to view international relations as a field in
need of fixing. Such a way of reading the two-by-two matrix, however, can only be coherently
sustained by those (still) holding antiquated Hobbesian assumptions, like the “state of nature,” as
valid templates for thinking about global order. An incursion into Bull’s borrowing from the field
of anthropology also suggests a revision even of his own critique of the “domestic analogy” in an
effort to salvage it from being used simply as a pejorative label, and to make it relevant once
again—if only heuristically—for contemporary thinking in IR. Bull did provide, after all, a
domestic analogy of his own the moment he borrowed insights from the anthropological study of
uncentralized societies and applied them to world politics. Bull’s implicit “domestic analogy,”
however, is an accurate one given that, as Masters suggested, both domestic and international
anarchical societies do seem to belong to a similar category or class of political systems (Masters
27

1964; see also Scott 2010; Gibson and Sillander 2011; Barclay 1996; Macdonald 2009; Layton
2006).
By adopting Masters’ logic, therefore, Bull was also—perhaps unknowingly—endorsing a
reincorporation of the top-right quadrant in FIGURE 1. This quadrant points out the need to
profoundly rethink how contemporary political philosophy and IR theory have retained a
problematic notion of the “state of nature” to derive a view of anarchy as the underlying source
of essentially unstable, anti-social and disorderly relations. Replacing the “state of nature” with
Evans-Pritchard’s concept of “ordered anarchy,” as Bull did as a starting point of his analysis,
helps reconnect contemporary thinking about international society with political anthropology
and create new areas of inter-disciplinarity for both fields on issues like anarchy, order,
institutions, norms, and culture.
In this way, insights drawn from one realm (“domestic” anarchy) could be resuscitated in a
more holistic understanding of the distinctive characteristic making IR, ultimately, a unique field
of inquiry. Since analogies entail, by definition, the analytical association of two similar or
comparable phenomena, a proper domestic analogy in IR has to develop “horizontally,” between
the top-left and top-right (or bottom-left and bottom-right) quadrants; but not diagonally or
vertically. The implication is that either the absence or presence of a centralized political
authority seems to have less to teach us about “the international” than commonly maintained by
Realists and Liberals of all persuasions. A more promising task appears be the study of a specific
type or class of political system in its distinctive scope or scale (one of the main distinctions
highlighted by Masters and Bull), as well as the different levels of “solidarity” among groups and
group members of international society. The multiple arguments explored in this paper do
suggest, at least in part, some important reasons for rethinking and transcending pre-established
categories and common places in IR theory.
Conclusion
Over the past twenty years, the ES approach has regained a central place in IR theory
discussions, as it once enjoyed in the 1950s. Apart from its traditional focus on history, political
philosophy and international law, the ES has delved into areas previously unexplored, such as
regionalism, International Political Economy, gender, globalization, and sociology. In its
expansion as a theoretical approach, it has incorporated other non-European histories, from Asia
28

to Africa, and it has even ventured into outer space. The study of political anthropology as an
important early influence on Hedley Bull’s thinking on international society, however, has
remained a neglected area of research. As this article has tried to demonstrate, this has had
serious implications for how contemporary IR scholars have come to grapple with the issue of
“institutions” within the ES approach itself. The problem has been that, in their attempt at
reinvigorating the approach “for the twenty-first century,” important aspects of the original
theoretical argument advanced by Bull have been either overlooked, or transfigured,
misrepresented, and lost—thus risking to take the ES in directions running contrary to its
traditional core tenets and propositions. The popular current ES understanding of “fundamental”
and “primary” institutions as synonyms, for example, illustrates well the point. Our recognition
of the role and importance of political anthropology within the ES approach, through its
influence on Bull’s work, however, should not simply serve as a “corrective” for how we read
the intellectual history of the ES, or for how we contextualize some of the discussions within the
British Committee in its early stages, but also—and perhaps most fundamentally—it should
incentivize contemporary students of international society to seek alternative ways to ground
their approach in actual practice, with special attention to how leaders, diplomats, and other
relevant actors embody and shape international relations.
Reconnecting with the anthropological influences on Bull’s thinking also carries important
implications for contemporary students of international society interested in extending Wight’s
and Watson’s historical excavations beyond the history of past regional “systems of states.” In
this area, anthropology can contribute, through a renewed interpretation of the domestic analogy,
a long list of new historical or practical instances of small-scale anarchical societies from which
to draw lessons and comparisons, and develop new ideas. The multiplicity of synergies waiting
to be explored between anthropology and IR can run both ways, for not only is there much that
IR theorists can learn from reaching out to political anthropology and other disciplines, but also
there are many insights that anthropologists themselves could incorporate back from IR for the
common study of “anarchical societies” as a distinctive type or class of social order. Moreover,
political anthropology seems to reinforce Bull’s (1977, 315, 318) overall defense of the necessity
of strengthening and preserving “the element of society” in world politics by underscoring the
role of “solidarity” as a component of domestic and global anarchical societies, as well as the
accommodation of the intrinsic asymmetries of any anarchical society (Bull and Watson 1984,
29

429ff). Bull captured this aspect mainly through the inclusion of the institution of the great
powers as “responsible” actors of international society and its interplay with other relevant
collective concerns for legitimacy and justice (Bull 1966a, 44; 1977, 284, 288–301, 306–15), but
also through his treatment of war, international law, the balance of power and diplomacy.
Lastly, the anthropological influence on Bull’s work suggests another aspect of
“fundamental institutions” that is usually overlooked: a view of Bull’s institutions as universal,
or transcultural, patterned practices—and not just as the sole product of Western civilization and
its global expansion. Given that so-called “secondary institutions” adopt empirical and concrete
historical forms, they also remain confined to a particular era, time, or epoch. Anthropology,
however, helps illuminate the “universal” character of fundamental institutions, as they transcend
scales and scope, but also time, space, and cultures. By raising awareness of this “missing link”
in Bull’s view of institutions and order, this article also draws attention to several insights and
areas of research within the ES approach left unexplored by Bull himself, but which could help
contemporary scholars in answering more effectively Wight’s initial challenge about the paucity
of “international theory.” From Bull’s original anthropological investigations we can begin by
(re)imagining uncentralized societies as “ordered anarchies”; that is, as a separate type or class
of political systems that challenges theoretically and empirically enduring contemporary notions
of anarchy as a global “state of nature” in need of fixing, amelioration, or transcendence.
Acknowledgements
Preliminary versions of this article were presented at the BISA 40th Anniversary Conference,
London, June 15th, 2015; the ISA 57th Annual Convention, Atlanta, March 18th, 2016; and the
EISA 11th Pan-European Conference on IR, Barcelona, September 14th, 2017. I want to thank
the two anonymous reviewers for their help in substantially improving the quality of the paper. I
am also greatly indebted to Patrick Barker, Filippo Costa-Buranelli, Thomas Diez, Onur Erpul,
Harry D. Gould, Daniel M. Green, George Lawson, Nicholas Lees, Félix E. Martín, Iver B.
Neumann, Daniel O’Quinn, Kilian Spandler, Dimitrios Stroikos, Peter Wilson, and Sophia
Yunes, for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am particularly grateful to Charles A.
Jones for his kind invitation in 2015 to the University of Cambridge and for the day-long tour
around campus while we candidly discussed the main ideas now reflected in this paper.
30

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