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China's planned floating nuclear power facilities in South China Sea: Technical and political challenges



The operation of the fleet of Chinese floating nuclear power plants in the South China Sea carries with it numerous safety and security risks that may have widespread consequences to not only China but also to Southeast Asia and beyond.
China's planned floating nuclear power facilities in South China Sea: Technical and
Political Challenges - Viet Phuong Nguyen
China's planned floating nuclear power facilities in
South China Sea:
Technical and Political Challenges
Viet Phuong Nguyen
Postdoctoral fellow,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Kennedy School
The operation of the fleet of Chinese floating nuclear power plants in the
South China Sea carries with it numerous safety and security risks that
may have widespread consequences to not only China but also to
Southeast Asia and beyond.
Whereas most of the nuclear power plants (NPPs) that have been built since the
1950s are land-based, in the maritime environment nuclear energy has been
mainly used for propulsion purpose in nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft
carriers, or icebreakers. The first floating electricity-generating reactor was built
by the United States (U.S.) in the late 1960s using a MH-1A reactor of 45 MW
thermal (MWt) and 10 MW electric (MWe) capacity, but noticeable interest in
floating NPPs only surfaced in the 2000s when the Russian government
announced the plan to construct its first floating NPP the Akademik Lomonosov
using two 150-MWt (38.5 MWe) KLT-40S pressurized reactors at an estimated
cost of $170 million. Due to financial and technical issues, the Akademik
Lomonosov was only delivered in 2018 8 years behind schedule at a cost about
$700 million, or three time the original price tag.1
Besides Russia, China has been the most promising candidate to have an
operational floating NPP since the country started the construction of its first
plant in 2016, which would be followed by up to 20 floating NPPs to be operated
in the South China Sea once the demonstration unit is completed and deployed
for trials in the Bohai Sea by 2020.2 However, different from Russia’s
deployment of the Akademik Lomonosov to its undisputed waters in the Far
East, the islands where the floating NPPs of China will likely be tethered have
also been claimed by other states in the region like Vietnam or the Philippines.
Accordingly, this article presents an in-depth analysis of the technical and legal
issues regarding this ambitious plan by China.
China’s floating nuclear program
Despite initially considering to import floating NPP technology from Russia, in
2016 China announced its first Chinese floating nuclear project using a 200 MWt
(60 MWe) ACPR50S reactor designed indigenously by the China General Nuclear
China's planned floating nuclear power facilities in South China Sea: Technical and
Political Challenges - Viet Phuong Nguyen
Power (CGN), which was followed by a joint-venture led by the main competitor
of CGN in the domestic nuclear market the China National Nuclear Corp.
(CNNC) in 2017 based on its own 310 MWt (100 MWe) ACP100S model. Aside
from CGN and CNNC, other types of floating NPPs based on fast reactors have
also been under research and development in China.3
In general, land-based NPPs have several inherent limitations including
extensive land requirement, sophisticated infrastructure for connection to the
grid, and continuous and high demand for cooling water. Therefore, floating
NPPs have long been considered the alternative technological solution for
electricity, heating, or water desalination in remote coastal towns and small
islands, as they have been designed mostly based on reactors of less than 300
MWe and to be transportable with the use of barge or ship.4 For example, a
floating NPP using an ACPR50 reactor can provide enough electricity for a
community of about 100,000 people, or the daily water consumption for at least
60,000 people.
Given such advantages, it came as no surprise when Chinese officials announced
that floating NPPs are to be built and deployed to the South China Sea in order
to support China’s offshore oil and gas exploration, as well as to sustain the
Chinese civilian presence in the Paracel and Spartly Islands in the South China
Sea.5 However, the extreme land scarcity of the China-controlled islands, despite
its land reclamation efforts, makes the civilian settlement expansion very
unlikely, and thus rends this ambitious plan of up to 20 floating NPPs
unjustifiable if only for civil facilities. Instead, by supplying Chinese
infrastructures over the South China Sea with electricity and fresh water, these
floating NPPs will help solidify China’s military foothold in this contested area,
and raise the political and economic cost of any attack made by state or non-
state actors against these China-controlled features. The military dimension of
China’s intention to deploy floating NPPs to the South China Sea can be
observed through the fact that at least one floating NPP project currently under
development in China has been partially funded by the People’s Liberation
Army.6 In addition, operational experiences from the deployment of floating
NPPs in the South China Sea will be valuable for China’s plan to develop nuclear-
powered aircraft carriers.
Technical challenges of floating NPPs in South China Sea
Due to the smaller size of the reactor and its being surrounded by abundance of
cooling water during operation, floating NPPs have been considered safer than
full-size, land-based NPPs. For example, the risks of earthquake and tsunami,
which are the major concerns to the safety of land-based NPPs and were the
main cause of the Fukushima nuclear accident, are essentially eliminated in case
of floating NPPs deployed to deep waters.7 However, multiple safety security
China's planned floating nuclear power facilities in South China Sea: Technical and
Political Challenges - Viet Phuong Nguyen
issues remain related to China’s future operation of floating NPPs in the South
China Sea, with which any incident occurs, whether it is a radioactive spill to the
sea, or a containment damage caused by tropical cyclones or accidental collision
with passing-by ships, will have serious economic and psychological impacts to
regional states like Vietnam, the Philippines, or Singapore. Although countries in
Northeast Asia like Japan and South Korea might not be directly affected by
environmental consequences of such accidents, they will still suffer economically
as both countries heavily depend on the oil and gas supply via shipping routes
over this contested maritime area.8
In terms of safety, floating NPPs are fraught with risks as they are often
designed to store spent fuels and radioactive wastes on board for years.
Radioactive sources might be leaked to the environment, causing serious
hazards for human and the maritime ecological system if the vessel carrying this
plant is rammed by a ship at high speed, or its hull is destroyed upon collisions
with rocky surface during difficult weathers, or it is scuttled in shallow or deep
waters.9 Both the risks of ship collision, and of adverse weather conditions are
typical operational concerns in the waters of the South China Sea, as a third of
global shipping goes through this region, whereas the intensity of typhoons
striking here has increased for more than 10% since the late 1970s, with higher
rate of category-4 and category-5 (strongest wind-scale) tropical cyclones.10
Moreover, because almost all radioactive release in case of floating NPP
accidents will result in maritime contamination instead of partly land, partly
maritime contamination like the case with land-based NPPs, accidents like core-
melt scenario with maritime NPPs would become more damaging due to the
quicker dispersion of radioactivity in maritime environment.11
In terms of security, as a floating NPP is operated on the ocean surface while
being anchored near a small island, it cannot benefit from any natural defense
barrier for its security. Thus, such a plant is vulnerable from attacks from both
the surface (by fast boats), or underwater (by submarines, suicide divers), the
latter of which are especially difficult to defend in comparison with other land-
based NPPs. Perpetrators of such assaults could be pirates, terrorist groups, or
other non-state actors with the goals of either damaging the reactor vessels to
release radioactive materials to the environment, or hijacking the floating plant
in order to steal radioactive materials for dirty bombs or other proliferation
purposes.12 To protect the plant from such attempts, experience can be drawn
from the operation of nuclear-powered warships like aircraft carriers. However,
given the military nature of these ships, the strategy and tactics to protect them
from those security threats would not be applicable for floating NPPs, which are
often civil facilities and do not enjoy the same level of protection like their armed
Political and diplomatic tensions
China's planned floating nuclear power facilities in South China Sea: Technical and
Political Challenges - Viet Phuong Nguyen
In general, despite some concerns over possible transboundary consequences in
cases of accidents, the deployment of the Akademik Lomonosov has been mostly
without legal controversies as it was built, transported, and anchored within
Russia’s territory. But there is a world of difference in the case of China’s
deployment of floating NPP to the South China Sea. As is well known, several
South East Asian countries are also claimants in part, or in whole, of the offshore
features in the South China Sea, China's deployment of floating NPP would
surely spark ire from its Southeast Asian neighbors and create diplomatic row
over the issue. Other claimants may argue that the operation of China’s floating
NPPs in the vicinity of these features is a clear violation of their sovereignty. In
addition, they would argue that the operation of any floating NPP in their
territorial waters needs the permission and supervision of their competent
authorities. For example, according the 2008 Law on Atomic Energy of Vietnam,
“transportation of radioactive materials transiting the Vietnamese territory,
operation of seagoing ships and other vehicles that are nuclear-powered in the
Vietnamese territory must be permitted by the Prime Minister and supervised by
competent state management agencies”. 13 Therefore, if a floating NPP is defined
by the Vietnam authority as a “nuclear-powered vessel”, its operators will be
required to apply to the Prime Minister of Vietnam for a special permission of
operation and to receive Vietnamese safety inspectors on board. This was the
case of the first visit to Vietnam of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl
Vinson in March 2018, when Vietnamese safety regulators were invited to visit
the vessel for radiation monitoring while it was anchored off the coastal city of
Danang.14 Although similar clause is not found in the 1968 Atomic Energy
Regulatory and Liability Act of the Philippines,15 the Filipino government can still
ask for its right to supervise the operation of China’s floating NPPs on the basis
that they are operated in the country’s territorial waters and thus have to obey
the Philippines’ laws related to vessels and shipping. As a claimant to the islands
in the South China Sea, China would likely reject such demands from either
Vietnam or the Philippines. If it is the case, it will create tensions, as other
claimants will be likely to consider counter-measures to such deployment.
Besides the dispute over operating permission, China’s deployment of floating
NPPs to the South China Sea will also create regional concerns over safety
oversight and civil liability in case of nuclear accidents. Firstly, to ensure that a
country can maintain the highest level of safety for its nuclear power program,
an international system of legally-binding instruments has been developed
including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
(the Joint Convention), the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or
Radiological Emergency. The last two conventions were created after the
Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986) in order to improve the international
China's planned floating nuclear power facilities in South China Sea: Technical and
Political Challenges - Viet Phuong Nguyen
coordination and cooperation in case of nuclear incidents with possible
transboundary consequences. Once a country ratifies the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, it is required to participate in the review process of the Convention by
submitting a national report to the triennial review meeting organized by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Having participated in this
Convention since 1996, China has regularly submitted to the review meetings its
national reports on nuclear safety, which are made public by the IAEA for third
parties. Southeast Asian countries are therefore able to verify whether or not
China has implemented necessary safety measures for its civil nuclear facilities.
However, such peer review will not be possible regarding the future floating NPP
fleet of China, as the Convention on Nuclear Safety only covers land-based
NPPs.16 Although the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,
which includes all types of nuclear reactors and that has been ratified by China
and all ASEAN countries, provides that states can request China to inform them
should any accident occurs with its floating NPPs, it will be obviously too late for
regional states to implement meaningful emergency response or mitigation plan
in such case.
Secondly, regarding the financial compensation mechanism in cases when other
countries are affected by nuclear accident, as they will be deployed and operated
in the sea, Chinese floating NPPs will not be covered by either the Vienna
Convention or the Paris Convention for civil liability, both of which only focus on
land-based nuclear installations. The only international convention with such
scope - the Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships
(1962) has never been put into force.17 Even if floating NPPs fall under the scope
of either the Vienna or Paris Conventions, the civil liability issue with Chinese
floating nuclear plants over the South China Sea would not be resolved, as China
has neither participated in any international convention on civil liability in cases
of nuclear accidents, nor has a coherent domestic legislation for such issue,
especially in case of transboundary nuclear accidents.18
While many have viewed that the deployment of floating NPPs to the South
China Sea could further complicate the security situation in this contested
maritime area, China has largely doubled down on this ambitious project with
the goal to test the first prototype of a made-in-China floating reactor in the
Bohai Sea “well before 2020”. 19 Once this demonstration step is completed, the
construction and operation of the Chinese NPP fleet in the South China Sea will
likely be accelerated and create numerous safety and security risks, which are
elaborated in this paper. Given the transboundary consequences of any incident
with these floating NPPs, which will affect not only regional nations like China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, but also countries relying on the energy supply routes
through the South China Sea like Japan and South Korea, it is necessary for
China's planned floating nuclear power facilities in South China Sea: Technical and
Political Challenges - Viet Phuong Nguyen
these potential recipients of fallout from such incident to consider several policy
Firstly, the general development of the Chinese floating NPP program should be
addressed through diplomatic and legal channels. For example, regional states,
in cooperation with relevant international organizations like the IAEA or the
ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, may call for a
multinational program to study the risks of operating NPPs in the South China
Sea with the participation of any country that will be affected by such operation
in order to provide China with a more comprehensive risk assessment of their
program. In addition, the legal aspects of China’s deployment of floating NPPs to
the South China Sea, including the legitimacy of such deployment, and whether
such facilities should be considered artificial islands or maritime vessels, also
need to be addressed so that regional states can form a coherent and reasonable
voice against the Chinese floating NPP program in international venues.
Secondly, mechanisms to minimize the safety and security risks of the Chinese
floating NPPs should be developed, including informal communication channels
with China to exchange safety information of such facilities while being
operated,20 modification to the review process of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety and Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management in order to
take into account the new category of floating NPPs operated in contested
waters, and a regional network for radiation monitoring and early warning of
nuclear safety and security risks in adverse weathers and other difficult
operating conditions. Finally, the civil liability of China in cases of transboundary
consequences from nuclear accidents with its NPP fleet should be considered and
negotiated by involving parties so that legal and financial provisions in such
situations are in place well before the deployment of the floating NPPs to the
South China Sea.
To conclude, it is necessary to emphasize that the operation of the fleet of
Chinese floating NPPs in the South China Sea carries with it numerous safety
and security risks that may have widespread consequences to not only China but
also to Southeast Asia and beyond. Therefore, such deployment should be
thoroughly evaluated by relevant states, while measures to minimize those risks
must be developed as early as possible in order to not make the situation in the
South China Sea more complicated that it already is.
Viet Phuong Nguyen is a postdoctoral fellow with the International Security
Program and Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, where he also was a pre-doctoral
fellow from 2016 to 2017.
China's planned floating nuclear power facilities in South China Sea: Technical and
Political Challenges - Viet Phuong Nguyen
3!S.!Chen,! "Could!China!build! the!world’s!smallest!nuclear!power!plant!and! send!it!to! the!South!China! Sea?,"!
7!J.!Buongiorno,!J.! Jurewicz,!M.!Golay,!and!N.!Todreas,!"The!offshore!floating! nuclear!plant! concept,"!Nuclear$
9!V.F.!Demin,!and!V.P.!Kuznetsov,!"Issues!of! insurance! of! civil! liability! for! nuclear!damage! from! nuclear!low!
power! plants,"! Proceedings$ of$ the$ ASME$ 2014$ Small$ Modular$ Reactors$ Symposium$ SMR2014,! April! 15-17,!
14!"Giám!sát!an! toàn! bc!xạ!đối! vi! Tàu! sân! bay! chy! bng!năng!ng!ht! nhân"!(in!Vietnamese),!Vietnam!
16!Convention! on! Nuclear! Safety,! IAEA! Information! Circular! No.! INFCIRC/449,! Vienna:! International! Atomic!
17!J.! Handrlica,! "The! Vienna! Convention! on! Civil! Liability! for! Nuclear! Damage! and! Nuclear! Installations:!
19!C.! Woody,! "China! may! add! ‘nuclear! element’! to! the! disputes! in! the! South! China! Sea,"! Business$ Insider,!
development! of! mechanism! to! exchange! safety! information! related! to! the! construction! and! operation! of!
Chinese! NPPs! located! near! the! border! between! the! two! countries.! Hoang! Dan,! "3! nhà! máy! đin! ht! nhân!
... Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and its "sister" Convention on Assistance in the 6 Communications Department of ROSATOM. ROSATOM Reports Power Start-up of the World's Only Floating Nuclear Power Unit. ...
INTRODUCTION. The article is devoted to practical and legal aspects of floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs). The first ever FNPP “Academic Lomonosov” was built in 2019 in Russia. It is a unique transportable nuclear low-power unit intended for energy and heat supply of remote port cities, industrial enterprises, gas and oil platforms. “Lomonosov” and its successor generations will have a major impact on the global nuclear energy market. The question arises how FNPPs fit into the rules of International Law. MATERIALS AND METHODS. The research was based on the analyses of international conventions on nuclear safety, security and civil liability, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA documents on safeguards and standards, scholarly publications. General and special methods of legal research were used. RESEARCH RESULTS. The authors determined that in the specific case of “Academic Lomonosov” which will operate on the Russian territory no collisions with the rules of International Law are expected. However, if future serial FNPPs go for export, it will be important to analyze their compatibility with international treaties. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. This paper concludes that FNPPs are largely compatible with the existing rules of International Law. However, there are some gaps and grey areas, especially in an export scenario. To mitigate those problems, bilateral intergovernmental agreements between the supplying and the importing states shall be concluded on their obligations in all legal and institutional issues prior to FNPP’s international shipment. Safeguards arrangement with the IAEA should be envisaged as well.
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Intensity changes in landfalling typhoons are of great concern to East and Southeast Asian countries. Regional changes in typhoon intensity, however, are poorly known owing to inconsistencies among different data sets. Here, we apply cluster analysis to bias-corrected data and show that, over the past 37 years, typhoons that strike East and Southeast Asia have intensified by 12-15%, with the proportion of storms of categories 4 and 5 having doubled or even tripled. In contrast, typhoons that stay over the open ocean have experienced only modest changes. These regional changes are consistent between operational data sets. To identify the physical mechanisms, we decompose intensity changes into contributions from intensification rate and intensification duration. We find that the increased intensity of landfalling typhoons is due to strengthened intensification rates, which in turn are tied to locally enhanced ocean surface warming on the rim of East and Southeast Asia. The projected ocean surface warming pattern under increasing greenhouse gas forcing suggests that typhoons striking eastern mainland China, Taiwan, Korea and Japan will intensify further. Given disproportionate damages by intense typhoons, this represents a heightened threat to people and properties in the region.
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A new offshore floating nuclear plant (OFNP) concept with high potential for attractive economics and an unprecedented level of safety is presented. OFNP creatively combines state-of-the-art light water reactors and floating platforms similar to those used in offshore oil/gas operations. A reliable and cost-effective global supply chain exists for both technologies; therefore, robust expansion in the use of nuclear energy becomes possible on a timescale consistent with combating climate change in the near future. OFNP is a plant that can be entirely built within a floating platform in a shipyard; transferred to the site, where it is anchored within 12 nautical miles (22 km) off the coast in relatively deep water (≥ 100 m); and connected to the grid via submarine transmission cables. OFNP eliminates earthquakes and tsunamis as accident precursors; its ocean-based passive safety systems eliminate the loss of ultimate heat sink accident by design. The OFNP crews operate in monthly or semimonthly shifts with onboard living quarters, like on oil/gas platforms. OFNP is a reactor for the global market: It can be constructed in one country and exported internationally; it lends itself to a flexible and mobile electricity generation approach, which minimizes the need for indigenous nuclear infrastructure in the host country; and it does not commit the customer to a 40- To 60-year-long project.
It is hard to see how our energy system can be decarbonized if the world abandons nuclear power, but equally hard to introduce the technology in nonnuclear energy states. This is especially true in countries with limited technical, institutional, and regulatory capabilities, where safety and proliferation concerns are acute. Given the need to achieve serious emissions mitigation by mid-century, and the multidecadal effort required to develop robust nuclear governance institutions, we must look to other models that might facilitate nuclear plant deployment while mitigating the technology's risks. One such deployment paradigm is the build-own-operate-return model. Because returning small land-based reactors containing spent fuel is infeasible, we evaluate the cost, safety, and proliferation risks of a system in which small modular reactors are manufactured in a factory, and then deployed to a customer nation on a floating platform. This floating small modular reactor would be owned and operated by a single entity and returned unopened to the developed state for refueling. We developed a decision model that allows for a comparison of floating and land-based alternatives considering key International Atomic Energy Agency plant-siting criteria. Abandoning onsite refueling is beneficial, and floating reactors built in a central facility can potentially reduce the risk of cost overruns and the consequences of accidents. However, if the floating platform must be built to military-grade specifications, then the cost would be much higher than a land-based system. The analysis tool presented is flexible, and can assist planners in determining the scope of risks and uncertainty associated with different deployment options.
The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963 did not specifically include several nuclear technologies into its scope of application. When the Convention was drafted the question of hazards arising from certain uses of nuclear materials was not yet fully understood. The lack of explicit provisions concerning these uses in the Convention is due to the fact that, when the Convention was drafted, the development of nuclear energy was in its infancy and there was little concern about activities at the back end of the fuel cycle. However, most recently, problems have arisen from the disposal of radioactive waste, the decommissioning of nuclear installations and also from the launching of new nuclear technologies (e.g. floating nuclear power plants, nuclear fission etc.) which again raised questions concerning the applicability of the liability regime of this Convention on various types of technologies. This contribution intends to deal with these issues in the light of existing scientific literature and also in the light of developments in other liability frameworks. © 2015, Czech Society of International Law. All rights reserved.
The costs of Russia's flagship floating nuclear power plant, Akademik Lomonosov, have significantly increased from the original 2006 estimate of 9 billion rubles to 37 billion rubles. The project has also been plagued by delays owing to a shipyard switch. State nuclear reactor monopoly Rosatom plans to operate the world's first floating nuclear power plant at the port of Pevek in Russia's remote far east region of Chukotka by October 2016. The project comprises two 35-Mw reactors (with a 40-yr lifetime) built atop a 144-m barge that must be towed to its destination. The plant can operate in shallow waters and be connected to onshore infrastructure, making it useful to power ports, industrial infrastructure, oil and gas platforms, and to help with Arctic exploration. Russia plans to build seven more such floating power plants.
Increasingly, China is planning to move to nuclear power. The plan for China is to double its nuclear capacity in the near future. A critical component is that a regulatory framework has to be developed to accompany this move towards nuclear energy. An important component of such a framework is a nuclear liability regime. In this article, the Chinese compensation regulatory regime for nuclear accidents is addressed. Part II of the article provides a short history of China’s nuclear policy and its existing nuclear energy regulatory framework. Part III discusses the legislative framework for liability and the effectiveness of two government documents. Part IV discusses in more details the rules regarding nuclear liability in China. Part V provides a critical evaluation and comparison of the nuclear liability framework in China, contrasting it to some nuclear liability economic starting points and to the nuclear liability regime and the US Price-Anderson Act and international conventions.
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In the frame of economic analysis of nuclear power (NP) with SMRs in their total life cycle the expert analysis of the problems associated with the civil liability for nuclear damage from SMRs on the example of transportable nuclear power units (TNUs) was performed. Purpose of the analysis is as follows: • Assessment of NP’ safety and economy changes in its development based on TNUs with KLT-40S and partly with RITM-200M reactor units. • Work out of recommendations on this development’ direction in terms of the insurance approach justification and amount of compensation for nuclear damage. The following aspects were considered in the analysis: 1. National and international approaches and practice of nuclear insurance. 2. Specific features of TNUs and differences from large NPPs basing on example of the design of floating power unit FPU “Academician Lomonosov” with KLT-40S reactors. 3. Assessment of severe accident consequences during TNU’ life cycle. 4. Analysis of insurances’ approaches and assessment of possible insurance costs.
Of the newly suggested energy sources, nuclear power has the most immediate potential for solving predicted energy shortages in the U.S. during the next two decades. Nuclear power plants require approximately 500 acres of ground and a million gallons of cooling water per minute, but there are few remaining land sites in the U.S. which meet these requirements. One solution is to build floating nuclear plants (FNPs) and site them in the ecologically sensitive oceans. The environmental impacts of constructing and operating FNPs appear to be large; however, the domestic legislation of the U.S. can adequately regulate the problems associated with thermal discharge, perimeter contamination, and the risk of major accidents. On the international level, the U.S. needs to recognize the environmental and jurisdictional issues involving FNPs and then avoid potential FNP problems in the current law of the sea negotiations.
Could China build the world's smallest nuclear power plant and send it to the South China Sea?
  • S Chen
S. Chen, "Could China build the world's smallest nuclear power plant and send it to the South China Sea?," South China Morning Post, October 11, 2016.