Behavioural modelling of attackers’ choices

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... Introducing strategic attackers into the game environments extends the possibilities where actions could have dormant objectives and motives challenging the efficacy of existing defence strategies Panda et al. (2018). Intelligent attackers can monitor systems and deploy advanced attacks avoiding being detected by the victim. ...
... Anderson (2009), Tambe et al. (2014 and Veksler and Buchler (2016) have displayed reform in the predictability in the behaviour of attackers by using behavioural/cognitive modelling in a repeated security game environment. Panda et al. (2018) presented a decision model capturing the choices of attackers during the attack process. The lowest level of the model represented the definitive actions of the attacker to either attack or not attack. ...
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Cybersecurity is typically characterised as being between defenders and attackers. The economic analysis of such situations is made using either simple normal form games or Stackelberg game or dynamic games. We draw upon experiences in the telecommunications operator and standardisation domain in this study. While this model suffices for the understanding of the basic concepts, it does not and can not capture many of the subtle realities of the cybersecurity environment. Indeed it can result in a misunderstanding of the nature of threats when the defender is not under active attack. We construct a model consisting of more roles and introduce the notion of an explicit security concept with a value to each of the participants or roles. Using this model we can explore the individual sub-games between participants and roles through dynamic games with imperfect information. In the former, we can understand the internal dynamics for any given security control, while in the latter we obtain a larger overall understanding of the players and their actions. Two results that are of particular interest in the studied domain are where the distinction between 'foes' and 'allies' is lost and where the absence of an attack cannot be understood as the absence of an attack.
In this survey, we summarize different modeling and solution concepts of networking games, as well as a number of different applications in telecommunications that make use of or can make use of networking games. We identify some of the mathematical challenges and methodologies that are involved in these problems. We include here work that has relevance to networking games in telecommunications from other areas, in particular from transportation planning. Keywords: Game Theory, Telecommunication. 1