Content uploaded by Samuel Defacqz
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Samuel Defacqz on Apr 29, 2021
Content may be subject to copyright.
Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe
Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication
The Internal Legitimacy of European Interest Groups
Analyses of National Interest Groups Perspectives
Thesis submitted by Samuel Defacqz in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Ph. Doctor in Political and Social Sciences
Prof. Virginie Van Ingelgom (Université catholique de Louvain, Fonds de la recherche scientifique–
FNRS), President of the Jury
Prof. Benoît Rihoux (Université catholique de Louvain), Ph.D. co-supervisor
Prof. Theodoros Koutroubas (Université catholique de Louvain), Ph.D. co-supervisor
Prof. Tom Delreux (Université catholique de Louvain), Member of the Ph.D. Committee
Prof. Stéphanie Yates (Université du Québec à Montréal), Member of the Ph.D. Committee
Prof. Sabine Saurugger (Sciences Po Grenoble), External Member of the Jury
Final version, for the public defence on the 10th of September 2018
This research is funded by the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique–FNRS (Belgium)
I
Abstract
As a response to the EU legitimacy crisis, the European institutions strive to increase the
legitimacy of the EU by including civil society in the decision-making process. For years, EU
institutions have informed, consulted and worked with European interest groups (EIGs), which
gather together national interest groups (NIGs). During the last decade, the EU shifted its EU-
society relations model from the promotion of consultations with European groups (partnership
model) to a system where citizens and national groups should play a more important role
(participatory model). This shift constitutes a challenge for EIGs, which see their position as
privileged interlocutors of institutions as threatened. At the same time, we observe
disconnections between NIGs and EIGs. National groups are not always involved in EIGs’
internal structures and some are totally ignorant about their European representatives’ activities.
Overall, we know little about the perspective of NIGs themselves and how they perceive their
European organisations: how do NIGs assess the legitimacy of their European representatives?
The puzzling disconnection between national interest groups and European interest groups lies
at the core of the dissertation. The research aims to investigate the relations between NIGs and
EIGs through the prism of organisational legitimacy. For that purpose, the research sets out to
unpack this concept by means of two research questions corresponding to two empirical
analyses of European groups’ legitimacy. The two research questions structuring the
dissertation are the following:
(RQ1) What are the perceptions of “European interest groups legitimacy” by national
interest groups?
(RQ2) Under which conditions do national interest groups perceive their policy
positions as congruent (or not congruent) with the policy positions of their European
interest groups?
Each question corresponds to a different approach of legitimacy. The first concerns the
perspectives of the represented (subjective approach): how the represented assess the legitimacy
of their representatives. Legitimacy is understood as a perception. The second question
concerns the assessment of legitimacy against a predefined norm (norm-guided approach).
Here, legitimacy is understood as an assumption: in order to consider an EIG as legitimate, its
member organisations (NIGs) have to perceive their EIG’s positions as congruent with their
own positions.
In order to answer RQ1, an inductive qualitative analysis (conceptual thematic analysis) was
conducted on transcripts of interviews. For the purpose of RQ2, a Qualitative Comparative
Analysis was processed. Concerning data collection, a total of 111 interviews with NIGs’ staff
members were conducted in five EU member states. The strategy of data collection was to get
the closest possible to national groups and conduct interviews in the different countries. This
strategy allowed to reach many national groups that are usually not addressed by research on
EU issues.
The results of both empirical analyses are summarised in the following points. Firstly,
socialisation mechanisms seem to be significant when it comes to explain positions alignment
(perceived congruence) between NIGs and EIGs. The QCA allowed to identify conditions that
participate in the understanding of positions alignment between national and European groups
(RQ2). While the vast majority of NIGs perceive their EIGs’ positions as congruent with their
own, this might be explained by interactions and familiarity between national and European
II
actors. A small staff having frequent contacts within a single ‘European networking venue’,
constitutes a configuration that better explains perceived congruence of positions than the
environment within which NIGs work. This indicates the importance of socialisation. It also
highlights that alignment depends on variables upon which actors can act. More importantly, it
means that alignment is not a matter of factors in which national groups are de facto and ad
infinitum embedded in. This is a promising conclusion when considering the potential
emergence of an effective and vivid European civil society, beyond Brussels.
Secondly, EIGs are legitimised by their members for what they are, and less for what they do
(RQ1). Indeed, the conceptual thematic analysis revealed that EIGs are not legitimised by NIGs
as transmitters of an aggregated version of their positions. EIGs are rather legitimised as trusted
champions of broad political objectives, to which NIGs generally adhere. If EIGs should be
treated as representatives of NIGs at the EU level, the analysis of NIGs’ perceptions suggests
that they must be considered first and foremost as acting as trustees of their constituencies and
not as delegates. This great diffuse support enjoyed by EIGs from their members is the
consequence of NIGs’ beliefs that their EIGs fulfil EU institutions’ requirements to be
considered as a relevant stakeholders in consultations on EU issues. This conclusion is even
more relevant when considering the shift of the EU-society relations model as embodied by the
participatory turn that was initiated in the last decade. NIGs have not (yet) taken advantage of
this participatory turn observed in the EU to “enter the game” of the European interest
representation system. European groups managed to keep their privileges intact and still occupy
the central position in the EU interest representation system. This situation is not seen as
problematic by NIGs which acknowledge a division of labour between European and national
actors. The scarcity of resources and the need to prioritise (the level of) advocacy actions
explain the satisfaction of national groups with an arrangement corresponding to the previous
partnership model.
Concerning the contribution to the literature on interest group, this dissertation’s main input is
an innovative approach to study interest groups’ legitimacy. By adopting a subjective approach,
this research takes into consideration the point of views of the ‘first concerned’, the national
groups, that are represented by their European umbrellas. Following an inductive an empirically
grounded approach of organisational legitimacy, this dissertation overcomes the mainly critical
tone of previous research on the subject, which were based on predefined normative criteria.
Without contradicting the results of previous studies, this research brings another perspective
on European interest groups’ legitimacy.
As regards to the contribution of this dissertation to the societal debate on the role of European
groups and their relations with national civil society organisations, this research illustrates the
persistence of the central position of EIGs when it comes to lobby EU institutions. Many
national groups delegate their advocacy function on EU issues to their EU umbrella
organisations. This situation of division of labour seems to satisfy the vast majority of the
actors. The participatory turn initiated by the Commission has thus not changed this
arrangement so far. This reveals a situation where European groups – of which the creation
resulted from the Commission’s consultation practices – become now the organisations to
bypass for institutions to enhance the legitimacy of the EU, by favouring the involvement of
citizens and national actors on European issues.
III
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my co-supervisors Prof. Benoît Rihoux and Prof. Theodoros Koutroubas.
They both made of these four years a great journey. I realise the importance of having
supervisors like both of you. Benoît, it has been four years now since you helped me to apply
to become an Aspirant. You have always been available, particularly in the most critical
moments. Your problem-solving capacity will continue to inspire me. Our meetings have
always been held in a very friendly atmosphere, which made our collaboration so pleasant. And
of course, I am looking forward to enjoying a dinner on a terrace in Valletta. Theodoros, you
always supported me since the very beginning. You are the person who put the idea of doing a
PhD in my mind. You made me discover the world of interest representation in Brussels, but
this is certainly the smallest part of what I learned from you. From Manitoulin Island on Lake
Huron where every day looks like yesterday, to the many places in Brussels where we discussed
so long about so many matters, I owe you a part of who I am.
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Tom Delreux and Prof. Stéphanie
Yates who provided invaluable feedback to improve the quality of this dissertation. Your
comments challenged and stimulated me to make my work better at each stage of this long
process. I have always been impressed by your rigor and your sense of analysis. Without your
contributions as members of my PhD committee, this work would be far from what it is today.
My acknowledgements also go to the other members of my PhD jury, Prof. Virginie
Van Ingelgom and Prof. Sabine Saurugger. I realise how lucky I am to count amongst the jury,
renowned academic and professional experts that you are.
I also thank Eva Thomann and Lasse Cronqvist. They helped me a lot to tackle technical issues
related to QCA. I express my gratitude towards the staff of Belgian, French, Maltese, Slovenian
and Swedish organisations for their willingness to participate in this research. I thank Nicolas
Gallant for his work and his seriousness when transcribing interview recordings. My
acknowledgements also go to the National Fund for Scientific Research—FNRS (Belgium)
which funded this research, as well as to the Royal Academy of Science, Letters and Fine Arts
of Belgium (Françoise-Marie Peemans Fund) and the Institute of Political Science Louvain-
Europe (ISPOLE) which partially funded data collection.
Besides my co-supervisors, committee and jury members, and people directly involved in my
research, I also thank my colleagues at the Center for political science and comparative politics
(CESPOL), the Centre for European Studies (CEE) and ISPOLE. I would also like to thank
colleagues from other universities in Belgium or abroad with whom I had the opportunity to
discuss different parts of this thesis, or much more trivial matters which are certainly equally
important. During these four years, from Louvain-la-Neuve to Oslo (or from Mettet to Krakow),
I have met many great researchers but more importantly, great friends. Many of you supported
me during these four years. I will always keep my door open for all of you. My words of
gratitude are aimed in particular to Anne, Audrey, Benjamin, Camila, David, François, Gaëlle,
Jérémy, Maxime, Michelle, Quentin, Vincent and Thomas. Of course, I don’t forget Ferdinand
and Conrad with whom I enjoyed the Orval verte, between writing sessions in a beautiful
Belgian Trappist abbey.
IV
I would also like to thank my friends of my different improv teams, Les Demi-Écrémés (the
bests), l’équipe nationale and la séléction nationale de la FBIA. Laughing is probably the thing
I value the most. And you are the people with whom I laugh the most. I also warmly thank all
my friends who I have met during my years at UCL, les Sc Potes and my friends from the
Improkot. The last few years have been incredible, and I'm sure the next ones will be just as
amazing. My words of gratitude are aimed in particular to Antoinette, Joseph, Justine, Marie
and Raphael who proofread some chapters of this dissertation.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my partner Mathilde and my family. My mother and
my sister have always been there to make sure I can live and work in the best conditions
possible. No words can acknowledge such engagement. Mathilde, you supported me
unconditionally during these four years that were sometimes difficult. But these years were
much more frequently bright and happy, because of you.
V
Table of Content
List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................... 1
List of national and European interest groups’ acronyms .......................................................... 3
0. General Introduction .......................................................................................................... 7
0.1. Object of study and research questions ....................................................................... 7
0.2. Structure of the dissertation ....................................................................................... 12
1. Studying organisational legitimacy .................................................................................. 15
1.1. Why study the internal legitimacy of European interest groups? .............................. 15
1.1.1. Interest groups participation as a response to the EU legitimacy crisis ............. 16
1.1.2. The successive EU-society relations models ..................................................... 17
1.1.3. The Commission’s ‘European preference’ and its erosion ................................ 22
1.1.4. Intermediate conclusion: the societal implications of the research .................... 24
1.2. How to study organisational legitimacy? .................................................................. 27
1.2.1. Studying legitimacy: different perspectives ....................................................... 28
1.2.2. Studying organisational legitimacy: a norm-guided approach ........................... 29
1.2.3. Studying organisational legitimacy: a subjective approach ............................... 33
1.3. The internal legitimacy of EIGs: what we know and what we do not know ............. 37
1.3.1. What we know: review of previous studies ....................................................... 38
1.3.2. What we do not know: academic gaps ............................................................... 43
1.4. Conclusion: what this research is and is not about .................................................... 47
2. Theoretical framework: a sociological institutionalist approach of the internal legitimacy
of European interest groups ...................................................................................................... 49
2.1. Setting the scene: national and European interest groups ......................................... 49
2.1.1. Definition of interest groups .............................................................................. 49
2.1.2. Membership types and nature of interests .......................................................... 51
2.1.3. Peculiarities of European interest groups .......................................................... 52
2.1.4. Audiences of European interest groups .............................................................. 53
2.1.5. Internal legitimacy of European interest groups ................................................ 55
2.2. A sociological institutionalist analysis of EIGs legitimacy ....................................... 55
2.2.1. Sociological approaches of EU politics and sociological institutionalism ........ 55
2.2.2. How to demonstrate the influence of cognitive frames? .................................... 60
2.2.3. Legitimacy and sociological institutionalism ..................................................... 61
2.3. First empirical analysis’ framework .......................................................................... 62
VI
2.4. Second empirical analysis’ framework ...................................................................... 64
2.5. Summary .................................................................................................................... 68
3. Research Design: Methodology, case selection & data collection ................................... 71
3.1. Analysing national interest groups’ discourses about the legitimacy of European
interest groups: thematic analysis and analysis based on ideal types .................................. 72
3.1.1. The thematic analysis ......................................................................................... 73
3.1.2. Analysis based on ideal types ............................................................................. 86
3.2. Analysing perceived congruence between national interest groups and European
interest groups: QCA ............................................................................................................ 91
3.2.1. QCA: a ‘set-theoretic’ or ‘configurational comparative’ method ...................... 92
3.2.2. Relevance of QCA for an analysis of NIGs’ perceived congruence .................. 93
3.2.3. Software solutions for QCA ............................................................................... 95
3.3. Case selection ............................................................................................................ 97
3.3.1. The ‘fitness check’ of the EU Nature Legislation ............................................ 100
3.3.2. The four member states: France, Malta, Slovenia and Sweden ....................... 105
3.4. Data collection ......................................................................................................... 109
3.4.1. Interviewing key actors in national interest groups ......................................... 109
3.4.2. Additional corpus: documents and peripheral interviews ................................ 112
3.5. Overview of cases: dyadic relations between a NIG and EIG ................................ 113
3.5.1. NIGs member state of origin ............................................................................ 118
3.5.2. NIGs’ nature of interest .................................................................................... 119
3.5.3. Saliency of EU affairs in the perspective of NIGs ........................................... 121
3.5.4. NIGs’ EU-related lobbying activities ............................................................... 123
3.5.5. NIGs’ membership to other EIG ...................................................................... 124
3.5.6. NIGs’ organisational structure (membership composition) ............................. 125
3.5.7. NIGs’ staff members ........................................................................................ 127
3.5.8. Frequency of contact between NIG and EIG ................................................... 129
3.6. Summary .................................................................................................................. 130
4. European interest groups legitimacy: perspectives of national interest groups ............. 133
4.1. Preparation of the thematic analysis ........................................................................ 134
4.2. The three readings of the sequenced thematic analysis ........................................... 138
4.2.1. Cases and data included in each reading .......................................................... 138
4.2.2. Notes and observations about the successive readings .................................... 142
4.3. Outcome of the three readings ................................................................................. 147
4.3.1. The thematisation list ....................................................................................... 147
4.3.2. The thematic tree .............................................................................................. 151
VII
4.4. Discursive analysis .................................................................................................. 159
4.4.1. Elements of discourse about input legitimacy of EIGs [N = 72; 86%] ............ 160
4.4.2. Elements of discourse about output legitimacy of EIGs [N=49; 58%] ............ 176
4.5. Intermediate discussion on the thematic analysis’s outcome .................................. 185
4.6. Analysis based on ideal types: did NIGs integrated the participatory model currently
promoted by the EU? .......................................................................................................... 190
4.6.1. Building the ideal types .................................................................................... 191
4.6.2. Confronting empirical data with the ideal types .............................................. 193
4.7. Conclusion of the first empirical analysis ............................................................... 198
5. Congruence between national interest groups’ and European interest groups’ positions:
explaining the perception of national interest groups ............................................................ 203
5.1. Using QCA to analyse perceived congruence between NIGs’ and EIGs’ policy
positions ............................................................................................................................. 204
5.1.1. NIGs’ perceived congruence ............................................................................ 204
5.1.2. Relevance of QCA for an analysis of perceived congruence ........................... 208
5.2. Cases included in the analysis ................................................................................. 209
5.3. Overview of the data and data preparation for QCA ............................................... 213
5.3.1. The outcome: NIGs’ perception of congruence between NIGs’ and EIGs’
positions ......................................................................................................................... 213
5.3.2. The models ....................................................................................................... 219
5.4. Conditions ................................................................................................................ 221
5.4.1. Condition 1: [ms_old] Being from a “old” member state ................................ 221
5.4.2. Condition 2: [ms_eu_leverage] Being from a member state which has an
important institutional leverage at the EU level ............................................................. 223
5.4.3. Condition 3: [ms_corporatism] Being from a corporatist member state .......... 224
5.4.4. Condition 4: [cause] Advocating a cause ......................................................... 225
5.4.5. Condition 5: [small_staff] Having a limited staff ............................................ 227
5.4.6. Condition 6: [no_direct_mem] Having no direct members ............................. 229
5.4.7. Condition 7: [non_eu_sal] EU affairs not salient ............................................. 230
5.4.8. Condition 8: [non_eu_lob] No direct lobbying of EU institutions ................... 231
5.4.9. Condition 9: [no_oth_eig] No membership to other EIG ................................ 233
5.4.10. Condition 10: [freq_contact] Having frequent contact with the EIG ........... 234
5.4.11. Condition 11: [few_mem_eig] The EIG having few members .................... 235
5.5. Descriptive analysis ................................................................................................. 239
5.5.1. Condition 1: [ms_old] Being from a “old” member state ................................ 244
5.5.2. Condition 2: [ms_eu_leverage] Being from a member state which has an
important institutional leverage at the EU level ............................................................. 245
VIII
5.5.3. Condition 3: [ms_corporatism] Being from a corporatist member state .......... 246
5.5.4. Condition 4: [cause] Advocating a cause ......................................................... 247
5.5.5. Condition 5: [small_staff] Having a limited staff ............................................ 248
5.5.6. Condition 6: [no_direct_mem] Having no direct members ............................. 249
5.5.7. Condition 7: [non_eu_sal] EU issues not salient ............................................. 250
5.5.8. Condition 8: [non_eu_lob] No direct lobbying of EU institutions ................... 251
5.5.9. Condition 9: [no_oth_eig] No membership to other EIG ................................ 252
5.5.10. Condition 10: [freq_contact] Having frequent contact with the EIG ........... 253
5.5.11. Condition 11: [few_mem_eig] The EIG having few members .................... 254
5.6. Intermediate conclusion ........................................................................................... 255
5.7. QCA step 1: partial models ..................................................................................... 256
5.8. QCA step 2: inclusive models ................................................................................. 259
5.8.1. Model 5: All-non MS conditions ..................................................................... 259
5.8.2. Model 6: Full model ......................................................................................... 261
5.9. QCA step 3: minimisation of model 6 (full model) ................................................. 264
5.9.1. Conservative combination of sufficient conditions for the presence of the
outcome to be explained ................................................................................................. 270
5.9.2. Parsimonious combination of sufficient conditions for the presence of the
outcome to be explained ................................................................................................. 277
5.9.3. Conservative combination of sufficient conditions for the absence of the outcome
to be explained ............................................................................................................... 281
5.9.4. Parsimonious combination of sufficient conditions for the absence of the outcome
to be explained ............................................................................................................... 283
5.10. Conclusion of the second empirical analysis ....................................................... 284
6. General Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 291
6.1. Wrapping up ............................................................................................................ 291
6.2. Discussion of the main findings .............................................................................. 292
6.2.1. The thematic analysis results and answers to the first research question ......... 293
6.2.2. The QCA results and answers to the second research question ....................... 295
6.2.3. Linking both empirical analyses....................................................................... 298
6.3. Caveats and limitations of the research ................................................................... 299
6.4. Potential avenues for future research ....................................................................... 301
6.5. Three takeaways on relations between NIGs and EIGs and the EU interest
representation system ......................................................................................................... 304
7. Appendixes ..................................................................................................................... 307
7.1. Appendixes of Chapter 3 ......................................................................................... 307
IX
7.2. Appendixes of Chapter 4 ......................................................................................... 321
7.2.1. NIGs using elements of discourse about expertise ........................................... 322
7.2.2. NIGs using elements of discourse about participation ..................................... 329
7.2.3. NIGs using elements of discourse about functional representation ................. 333
7.2.4. NIGs using elements of discourse about substantive representation ............... 337
7.2.5. NIGs using elements of discourse about territorial representation .................. 342
7.2.6. NIGs using elements of discourse about transparency ..................................... 346
7.2.7. NIGs using elements of discourse about EU lobbying work ........................... 350
7.2.8. NIGs using elements of discourse about effectiveness of EU lobbying .......... 354
7.2.9. NIGs using elements of discourse about information ...................................... 358
7.2.10. NIGs using elements of discourse about status in Brussels .......................... 362
7.3. Appendixes of Chapter 5 ......................................................................................... 366
7.3.1. Model 1: Domestic environment of NIGs ........................................................ 369
7.3.2. Model 2: NIGs’ organisational features ........................................................... 372
7.3.3. Model 3: NIGs’ EU-related activities .............................................................. 376
7.3.4. Model 4: EU related model .............................................................................. 380
8. References & sources ..................................................................................................... 403