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149
The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy in
Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’
Perspective
Martina Vuong
Abstract
In 1978–1979 the news reporting on the Vietnamese boat people attracted attention from the
whole world. Not only the media but also scientific researchers were interested in these mass
refugees. However, this phenomenon has been detached from its context and perceived as a self-
contained event on many occasions. Furthermore, most people were not aware of the fact that the
main body of these refugees were ethnic Chinese, known as the Hoa. The study presented in this
paper takes this as its starting point and focuses on the question of the motivations of the Hoa in
leaving North Vietnam. It takes the historical, internal and foreign political context into considera-
tion and identifies a political atmosphere extremely hostile to the ethnic Chinese.The páihuá policy
drove them to leave behind what they had built up and led to the mass exodus of 1978–1979, but
also gave the Hoa hope for a new and better life for themselves and especially for their future
descendants outside of Vietnam.
Keywords: boat people, Chinese, Hoa, páihuá, Sino-Vietnamese relations, Vietnam
Vuong, Martina. ―The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy in Vietnam after
Reunification: the Refugees‘ Perspective.‖ In Vienna Graduate Journal of East
Asian Studies, Volume 2, eds. Rudiger Frank, Ingrid Getreuer-Kargl, Lukas
Pokorny and Agnes Schick-Chen. Vienna: Praesens Verlag, 2011, pp. 149-170.
https://doi.org/10.2478/vjeas-2011-0012
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Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies
Introduction
From 1978 to 1979, thousands of ethnic Chinese (Hoa) started their journey to the
People‘s Republic of China (PRC, China), to Hongkong or to Macao by either land
or sea. ‗Hoa‘ is the abbreviation for the Vietnamese term hoa kiều—in Chinese
huáqiáo 华侨 (overseas Chinese)—and these people made up to 90 percent of the
whole number of refugees (Will 1988: 177). In the West they are known under the
label of ‗boat people‘, indicating their characteristic means of fleeing from Viet-
nam—by boat.
In the period 1945–1975 Vietnam was constantly at war, a situation that was ac-
companied by various refugee movements. After the First Indochina War (1946–
1954), Vietnam was able to gain independence from French colonial dominance in
1954. One consequence was that the country was divided into a Communist North
Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam—DRV) and a pro-Western South Viet-
nam (Republic of Vietnam). The North‘s attempt to establish a socialist state on its
territory led to the first refugee wave to the South (1954–1956) (UNHCR 2000;
Weggel 1997: 165). As in many other countries during that period, the Cold War
was going on in Vietnam as well—North against South. The Vietnam War (1960–
1975), triggered by the military support of the United States (US) for the anti-
Communist South, formed the peak of this conflict. After the signing of the Paris
Peace Accords in 1973, the United States withdrew from Vietnam, but the internal
war continued until 30 April 1975, when the Communists conquered Saigon.1 The
fall of Saigon caused US collaborators and members of the overthrown government
of the Republic of Vietnam to leave the country. In July 1976, Vietnam was reuni-
fied as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV; Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt
Nam) (UNHCR 2000). From that time on, the aim of the Communists was to estab-
lish socialism in all areas of life (Lulei 2000: 101). According to Weggel (1997:
167), the transformation process consisted of various programmes like the resettle-
ment of urban people into the New Economic Zones. In the view of Engelbert, Lulei,
Suryadinata and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
these programmes were indeed directed against the Hoa (as well as against other
ethnic minorities) and put them under pressure (Engelbert 2002: 621, 617-625; Lulei
2000: 102; Suryadinata 1985: 45-46; UNHCR 2000; Will 1988: 177). Consequently,
the first Hoa left North Vietnam in 1978, aiming for Dōngxīng 东兴, a town on the
border of China in the province of Guǎngxī 广西, and within one month 20,000 Hoa
had already left. This marks the beginning of a mass exodus, which continued until
1979 (Engelbert 2002: 623).
1 In parallel, Soviet-style socialism also gained ascendancy in Cambodia and Laos.
Martina Vuong: The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy
in Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’ Perspective
151
In the meantime, Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated and resulted in the ‗pun-
ishment expedition‘2 (Strafexpedition; according to the Chinese leadership, ‗to teach
Vietnam a lesson‘ (jiàoxùn yuènán 教训越南)) (Engelbert 2002: 623-626). This
incident marked the absolute low in the relationship between the two states, for
which the causes are diverse and complex. Engelbert emphasises that these causes
have to be differentiated between the north and the south of Vietnam. China‘s prox-
imity meant that in the north the Hoa were viewed as possible collaborators and
therefore as a threat to national security. In the south, the Chinese minority was
mainly occupied with business and trading and had connections to the old regime
and became victims of the socialist reformation. Furthermore, the perception of the
Hoa in the eyes of the Vietnamese was influenced by their privileged status during
French colonial times, resulting in their image as a risk to national stability (Engel-
bert 2002: 633-634). Suryadinata shows that ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia have
generally been seen as a threat as they not only represented the biggest ethnic minor-
ity in this region, but also occupied key positions in the economy. Additionally, the
PRC has always encouraged the image of a superpower that sought regional hege-
mony (Suryadinata 1985: 7).
In this study I will identify the circumstances and factors that triggered the mass
exodus out of North Vietnam at the end of the 1970s, and focus on the Hoas‘ percep-
tion. Some migration and refugee researchers point to the issue of attributing a pas-
sive role to refugees (Nicholson and Twomey 1999: 3; Binder and Tosic 2002: 6). In
order to avoid this problematic approach, my arguments pursue the following ques-
tions: what were the Hoas‘ motivations for leaving Vietnam? What were the push
and pull factors? In a second step I question why they chose to continue their flight
to Hong Kong and Austria as places of resettlement. I make the proposition that
even forced migrants do take decisions independently and act in self-determination.
So far there are not any data available that could be used for filtering the push
and pull factors for the Hoa in leaving North Vietnam and resettling in Austria. I
decided therefore to create a qualitative questionnaire along the lines of the qualita-
tive guided interview (qualitative Leitfadeninterview) by Lamnek (2005) and based
it on the theory provided by Han (2000), who established a ‗five phases model‘
(Fünfphasenmodell). He posits that every migrant goes through five steps of consid-
eration until he/she takes the decision to leave a country because of dissatisfaction
with the present situation and to relocate to another country chosen for its future
hopes of a better life and advanced access to resources, especially in terms of the
labour market and education. Although Han‘s conception is based on voluntary mi-
gration, it still offers a suitable instrument for my study of forced migration, as even
refugees go through a decision-making process. Han, Lucassen and Opitz also con-
clude that a differentiation between voluntary and forced is not recommended be-
2 All translations in this article have been made by the author, if not stated otherwise.
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Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies
cause of the complexity of migration (Han 2000: 13; Lucassen and Lucassen 1999:
14-21; Opitz 1997: 11). As mentioned above, Han‘s ‗five phases model‘ describes
the individual‘s confrontation with migration as a process of five phases defined as
follows: social circumstances, establishment of a motive, search for information,
readiness to assume risk, and decision (Han 2000: 171-178). In the first phase, the
individual finds himself in an unsatisfactory situation of burdensome social circum-
stances, which he/she is powerless to change (e.g., political constellations). Han
calls these ‗social push factors‘. In the second stage, the person becomes aware that
migration is not just a potential solution to the unsatisfactory situation, but also con-
nects certain hopes with it, the realisation of which seems to be feasible (Han 2000:
171). In the third phase, the individual deals with the choice of destination by getting
information and evaluating it; family, relatives and friends often play a crucial role
in this stage. The associations that the person has with the destination are rarely
based on reality, but are equally important for the decision. During the fourth phase,
the individual gradually develops a readiness to take the risks that migration in-
volves. Han points out that some migrants do not develop this willingness, depend-
ing on whether they personally do or do not desire to leave the country (Han 2000:
176). In the fifth phase, the decision to migrate is finally made, with family and
friends playing a significant role in the decision. With this last phase, preparation is
finalised and migration will be realised. Han notes that in reality discrepancies from
the ‗five phases model‘ may occur, as decisions to migrate are not always taken in a
mood of rationality (Han 2000: 177).
I would like to note that adhering to the methods of Lamnek‘s qualitative guided
interview and Han‘s ‗five phases model‘ (see above) in creating the questionnaire
gave me the necessary means to ensure distance during the whole research process,
despite my personal connection to this topic.3 But then again, it also turned out to be
an advantage to be ‗part‘ of the group of Hoa living in Austria, because of sharing
the same language and gaining their openness during interviews. In total, six people
were interviewed (identified as Persons 1-6), whom I chose according to the follow-
ing criteria: Hoa from North Vietnam, who should have been adults during the time
of leaving the country, to ensure self-determination and self-consideration. The in-
terviews were carried out in Cantonese, which is the second mother tongue of the
Hoa after Vietnamese. Transcription of the interviews was done firstly in Cantonese
and then translated into Chinese standard language. After summarisation I adapted
the material to Han‘s ‗five phases model‘. Generally, motivations to migrate consist
of multiple factors (Han 2000: 13). On the one hand, exogenous circumstances trig-
ger migration, but on the other hand, subjective opinions and calculations influence
the decision of the individual. E. G. Ravenstein‘s ‗gravitation model‘ (Gravita-
3 I would like to remark that my parents were themselves part of this group of Hoa who left North Vietnam at
the end of the 1970s.
Martina Vuong: The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy
in Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’ Perspective
153
tionsmodell) tries to ensure this complexity by classifying push and pull factors.
Push factors are situations in the home country which give motivation for migration,
while pull factors are circumstances in the destination country, which appear as
stimulation (Han 2000: 13-14). Basing myself on this model I filtered the push and
pull factors; at the same time single factors were ranked according to the frequency
of occurrence, differences and similarities were identified and secondary literature
was consulted wherever required to gain a deeper understanding of the interactions
between the various motives. 4
During the research process the following complexity showed up: four inter-
viewees fled to the PRC (step 1) before they reached Macao or Hong Kong (step 2)
and resettled in Austria (step 3). For reasons of clarity I call them ‗Group 78‘, as
they left Vietnam in 1978. In contrast, the two other interviewees migrated directly
from North Vietnam to Macao or Hong Kong (step 1) and reached Austria after-
wards (step 2). This is ‗Group 79‘, who started their journey in 1979 (see table 1).
Table 1: Differences between ‗Group 78‘ and ‗Group 79‘
Group 78
North Vietnam PRC Hong Kong/Macao Austria
Group 79
North Vietnam Hongkong/Macao Austria
This definition conforms with Engelbert‘s, who also classified the mass exodus of
the Hoa into a first (1978) and second phase (1979), on the one hand because of the
different migration routes and on the other hand because of the different causes.
Whereas the Hoa left the country by land in 1978, those from 1979 had to take the
sea route. Furthermore, Engelbert believes that the first phase was provoked by the
PRC, whereas the second phase was caused by the Vietnamese leadership through
forced relocation of the Hoa into the New Economic Zones, the focus of which was
to gain ‗a more even distribution of population, land reclamation, elimination of
unemployment in the cities, improvement in national defence and the institutionali-
sation of a new division of labour‘5 (Engelbert 2002: 625-626). Indeed, both groups
did take different routes to leave the north, but the interviews done with the Hoa
4 Please note that for reasons of simplification and protection of anonymity, male pronouns refer to both
male and female interviewees.
5 ‗[…] gleichmäßigere Bevölkerungsverteilung, Neulandgewinnung, Beseitigung der Arbeitslosigkeit in den
Städten, Verbesserung der Landesverteidigung und Institutionalisierung einer neuen Arbeitsteilung.‘
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Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies
living in Austria may only partly confirm if the mass exodus was initiated firstly by
the PRC and then by the SRV, as we will see in the course of this study.
Results: Hoa motivations in leaving North Vietnam
Páihuá: the most significant push-factor
The Hoa had the following motivations to leave North Vietnam: they were pushed
on the one hand by the Vietnamese páihuá policy at that time and on the other by the
mutual influence of family, relatives and friends. Páihuá, a term extracted from the
interviews done with the Hoa who resettled in Austria, is the abbreviated form for
páichì huárén 排斥华人 and can be translated as ‗displacement of ethnic Chinese‘.
Páihuá is defined as a discriminative policy of the Vietnamese leadership aimed at
disadvantaging ethnic Chinese especially in terms of access to higher education and
within the labour market (Persons 1-6, 2006). They described the situation as fol-
lows: no admission to university, no equal access to the labour market and no per-
mission to work in the private sector.6 As the situation deteriorated, the Hoa were
refused any kind of jobs (Persons 1 and 2, 2006),7 were partly excluded from food
distribution (Persons 3 and 4, 2006) and became victims of verbal attacks (Person 1,
2006). These circumstances not only made life for the Hoa in Vietnam significantly
difficult, but created also a fear of further worsening in the anti-Chinese policy
without knowing how far the deterioration would go, not only for themselves but
also for following generations (Persons 1, 3, 4, 2006). It has to be mentioned that
páihuá affected not only the Hoa, but also those ethnic Vietnamese who were mar-
ried to Hoa and therefore, were also victims of discrimination (Persons 3, 5 and 6,
2007). Furthermore, the Hoa were not allowed to hold any political office.
Opitz identifies the causes for mass exodus in the Third World within internal
and international conflicts. He points to three important developments: the process
of decolonisation, the East-West conflict or Cold War, and the emergence of new
nation states (Opitz 1997: 18). Following this theory, the causes for the appearance
of páihuá will be defined from a historical, a foreign political and a domestic per-
spective. Additionally, the perspective and the role of the Hoa have been included as
a fourth dimension in order to counter the concept of refugees as passive actors.
6 It should be mentioned that after reunification, Vietnam went through a socialist reformation, which in-
volved negation of the private sector. This might not necessarily have been aimed against the Hoa, but as
ethnic Chinese were mainly active in the private sector they were hit quite hard by the socialist reformation.
7 In order to protect the interviewees‘ anonymity, the term ‗person‘ is used instead of their names.
Martina Vuong: The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy
in Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’ Perspective
155
Historical aspect of the páihuá phenomenon
The historical research shows that the relationship between the Vietnamese leader-
ship and the ethnic Chinese has always been ambivalent. On one side, the Hoa were
needed for their economic abilities and their networks to countries outside of Viet-
nam, but on the other side they were considered as a threat to national stability, as
the Vietnamese leadership has always questioned their loyalty (Engelbert 2002: 130-
134). During colonial times in Vietnam (1859–1945) the Hoa received preferential
treatment by the French. The colonial rulers recognised the role of the ethnic Chi-
nese for the economy and deliberately used the ‗principal of ―divide et impera‖‘ in
order to weaken anti-colonial tendencies within Vietnamese society by attracting the
hatred of the indigenous people on to the Hoa (Opitz 1988: 42). Nevertheless, it has
to be pointed out that specific areas were reserved as monopolies for the French only.
Through their privileged position, many of the Hoa achieved prosperity and wealth
exactly under circumstances that enlarged the gap between themselves and the na-
tives. In addition, the assimilation process was hindered by a migration wave lasting
from 1880 to 1929. In contrast to past immigrations dominated by men, this wave
brought a lot of Chinese women to Vietnam, which according to Engelbert advanced
the preservation of Chinese identity, but at the same time hindered integration (En-
gelbert 2002: 276; Möller 2005: 31). After decolonisation, French preferential
treatment of the ethnic Chinese continued to have an effect on the perception of the
Vietnamese and was thus a breeding ground for a páihuá-style political line.
December 1946 marked the beginning of the Vietnamese-French war, also
known as the First Indochina War. During that time, the Nationalist Guómíndǎng 国
民党 government was only interested in the protection of the overseas Chinese
population in Vietnam. In return, anti-French campaigns were forbidden in China.
However, the Communist victory in China in 1949 constituted a turning point: from
that time on the Việt Minh8 received military support not only from the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but also from the PRC in the war against the
French. At this point, the US stepped into the Indochina War with the argument of
the domino theory, which predicted the Asian region would fall more and more into
the Soviet sphere of influence, a development that in their eyes had to be prevented.
The expansion of the Indochina War from a regional into an international affair,
Engelbert argues, ‗had consequences for the perception of the Chinese and for the
concrete policy towards the Chinese minority in Indochina on the part of the Ameri-
cans, the French and the Vietnamese‘9 (Engelbert 2002: 458). From that time on, the
8 Abbreviation for Việt Nam Ðộc Lập Ðồng Minh Hội, which means ‗League for the Independence of Viet-
nam‘.
9 ‗Auch Folgen für die Wahrnehmungen der Chinesen und für die konkrete Politik gegenüber der chinesi-
schen Minderheit in Indochina durch Amerikaner, Franzosen und Vietnamesen.‘
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Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies
Hoa were perceived as a threat with the potential to form China‘s ‗fifth column‘.10
The French in particular feared Communist manipulation of the ethnic Chinese
(Engelbert 2002: 459-460). However, according to Engelbert, the latter could not be
influenced either by the French or by the Việt Minh (Engelbert 2002: 501). As a
result of the Geneva Conference in 1954, Vietnam was separated along the 17th
latitude into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North and the Republic of
Vietnam in the South, resulting in two independent states (Engelbert 2002: 308-309,
447-504; Sembdner 1978: 32-33). Vietnam stayed divided until 2 July 1976.
Sembdner talks about the ambition of the DRV to enhance the integration of the
Chinese minority into Vietnamese society (Sembdner 1978: 143). But Engelbert‘s
illustrations show us another picture: during that period a series of campaigns had
been carried out that can be classified as anti-Hoa. Here, Engelbert sees the specific
causes for the mass exodus of the Hoa:
The potentials for conflict emerged not only in the year 1978. At this point, a historical re-
turn to the period from 1950 until 1973 seems necessary to be able to understand why the
majority of the Hoa who lived in the north of Vietnam before 1978 left the country from
1978 until 1979 (Engelbert 2002: 617).11
Foreign politics: the role of the PRC
The páihuá phenomenon in the context of Vietnam‘s foreign policy shows that es-
pecially during the 1970s, relations between the PRC and the recently unified So-
cialist Republic of Vietnam deteriorated gradually; the mass exodus of the Hoa from
1978 to 1979 and the PRC‘s ‗education campaign‘ (Erziehungsfeldzug) against the
SRV may be marked as the highlight of the conflict. After the foundation of the PRC
in 1949 the Chinese leadership was close to the USSR and viewed the United States
as the biggest enemy, until the ideological break in the mid-1950s between the So-
viet and Chinese leaderships, which changed the situation substantially. At the same
time, relations between the PRC and the US gradually normalised towards the end of
the 1970s (Kempf 2002: 1-2), which aroused suspicion among the Vietnamese lead-
ers (Engelbert 2002: 631; Suryadinata 1985: 54). According to Suryadinata‘s esti-
mation, after Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, and with publication of the Soviet
Brezhnev doctrine, the PRC considered the USSR as a bigger threat than the US
(Suryadinata 1985: 28-29; Zhou 2004: 136). As a consequence, the PRC sought to
draw close to the US in a refusal of Soviet hegemonic attempts in Southeast Asia.
‗In April 1975 the forcible reunification of Vietnam under Hanoi‘s leadership
10 See the explanation of this term below.
11 ‗Die Konfliktpotentiale entstanden nicht erst im Jahre 1978. An dieser Stelle erscheint ein historischer
Rückgriff auf die Periode von 1950 bis 1973 notwendig, um verstehen zu können, warum die Mehrzahl der
Hoa, die vor 1978 im Norden Vietnams lebte, das Land von 1978 bis 1979 verließ.‘
Martina Vuong: The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy
in Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’ Perspective
157
strengthened China‘s fear of a gradual replacement of US imperialistic supremacy
by the USSR‘12 (Möller 2005: 91). Besides, it seemed that a solution of the Taiwan
issue enjoyed priority in China‘s foreign policy. In December 1978, the PRC and the
US issued a ‗Joint Communiqué on the initiation of diplomatic relations between the
PRC and the USA‘, which shows that the main motive of the Chinese leadership
consisted in recognising the US as a legitimate state and in ensuring that Taiwan
belonged within its sphere of influence (Zhou 2004: 143). Furthermore, the Viet-
namese thought that the Chinese leadership favoured a division of Vietnam in order
to be able to follow their attempts at expansionism and hegemony in Indochina. The
SRV assessed that not only was the closeness between the PRC and the US evidence
for this, but also Chinese resistance to interstate relations between the SRV and es-
pecially the USSR and other socialist states. In Vietnam‘s eyes, therefore, China
would like to prevent the SRV from becoming powerful and following an anti-
Vietnamese policy (Zhōngguó zhànyǒu liánméng 1979). In contrast to the PRC, the
SRV considered the US, not the USSR, as the biggest enemy (Suryadinata 1985: 44).
Furthermore, the PRC was viewed not only by the SRV but also by other countries
in the Southeast Asian region as a threat on account of its size and traditional rela-
tions (Bolt 2000: 108). Hence, according to Dohmen, two opposite poles emerged—
on the one hand the USSR and the SRV (Laos was also part of this group), and on
the other hand the PRC and the US (with Cambodia as an unofficial member): ‗For
this reason it becomes clear that the conflict between Hanoi and Peking has more
than just a regional framework, but has in the meanwhile acquired world political
dimensions‘13 (Dohmen 1978: 430).
It was possible to identify many controversies between the two states, as well as
likely causes. During the time that the PRC considered the USSR as its biggest op-
ponent and approached the US, the SRV evaluated the US as its bitterest enemy and
tied itself closely to the USSR. We may therefore conclude that the Sino-Vietnamese
conflict was inherited from the history between the two states and related to other
controversies, an extension of the Cold War between the USSR and the US into the
Asian region. In this sense, the dispute over the Hoa resulted from rather than caused
the controversies between the PRC and the SRV. In fact, both countries used these
controversies for propaganda purposes. While the Chinese side accused the Viet-
namese government of intentionally displacing the Hoa, the Vietnamese side blamed
the Chinese leadership for initiating the mass exodus of the ethnic Chinese by mix-
ing ‗subversive elements‘ within the Hoa and designated the Hoa as a fifth column
(dìwǔ zòngduì 第五纵队) to destabilise Vietnam (Zhōngguó zhànyǒu liánméng
12 ‗Im April 1975 bestärkte die gewaltsame Wiedervereinigung Vietnams unter Führung Hanois Chinas
Befürchtungen vor einer allmählichen Ablösung der USA als imperialistische Vormacht durch die UdSSR.‘
13 ‗Damit wird deutlich, dass der Konflikt zwischen Hanoi und Peking mehr als nur einen regionalen Rahmen,
sondern inzwischen weltpolitische Dimensionen gewonnen hat.‘
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Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies
1979). The term ‗fifth column‘ originated from the Nationalist general Emilio Mola
Vidal during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), when he named his loyal support-
ers in the opposite camps in Madrid as such, whereas four of his army columns were
marching with him towards Madrid. Thus, the term describes a group of subversive
elements within a country who are loyal to another power and work against local
authorities:
A cardinal technique of the fifth column is the infiltration of sympathizers into the entire
fabric of the nation under attack and, particularly, into positions of policy decision and
national defense. From such key posts, fifth-column activists exploit the fears of a people
by spreading rumours and misinformation, as well as by employing the more standard
techniques of espionage and sabotage (Enyclopaedia Britannica 2011).
In the 1970s the Hoa were increasingly designated as a fifth column and denounced
as the ‗tools‘ of the PRC by the Vietnamese leadership. Such an accusation was not
groundless, as Möller shows that the PRC had been using the foreign policy strategy
of a ‗United Front from below‘ (Einheitsfront von unten), which was marked by the
separation of national and party relations (Möller 2005: 96-97). According to Kempf,
such perceptions on the part of Vietnam (and also of Southeast Asia) were influ-
enced by the fact that after its foundation the PRC supported revolutionary move-
ments opposing the local governments of Southeast Asian countries. Kempf assumes
that the loyalty of overseas Chinese was often questioned because of their economic
strength and dominance in the region (Kempf 2002: 112, 116; Bolt 2000: 109-110).
Bolt points out furthermore that the Chinese government was following an ambigu-
ous policy towards the overseas Chinese: ‗Chinese abroad were called to be patriotic
and contribute to the Four Modernizations. At the same time, they were also encour-
aged to choose local nationality‘ (Bolt 2000: 109). However, the question remains
whether the Chinese leadership was able to or intended to guide the Hoa idelogically
and politically. The Vietnamese White Paper claims that the mass exodus of the Hoa
was caused by ethnic Chinese organisations influenced by the PRC (Zhōngguó
zhànyǒu liánméng 1979). In contrast, Suryadinata and Dohmen think that the refu-
gees became a financial and economic burden to the PRC (Suryadinata 1985: 49;
Dohmen 1978: 427). Dohmen explains that the PRC indeed tried to attract overseas
Chinese, who were to bring investment and the necessary know-how to establish the
country, but as the majority of Hoa refugees from North Vietnam were workers and
craftsmen they were not able to fulfil these demands. Furthermore, they were mainly
occupied in the private sector in urban areas, which led to employment problems
(Dohmen 1978: 427). Four of the six interviewees fled to the PRC first before they
reached Hong Kong or Macao. Only one of the four considered China as a transition
country from the beginning (Person 2), while two of them were not satisfied with
working in the state-owned farms for overseas Chinese—the huáqiáo nóngchǎng 华
侨农场—as they were not familiar with farming. Later on, this became a push factor
Martina Vuong: The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy
in Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’ Perspective
159
for them to leave the PRC again (Persons 4 and 6, 2006). The fact that the Chinese
authorities did not hinder the Hoa from leaving China, by pretending not to have
noticed them leaving for Hong Kong or Macao (Person 2, 2006), seems to confirm
that the Chinese government was itself overburdened by the situation of the mass
refugees. One Hoa reports disappointedly that ‗in fact, too many returned, China was
not able to cope with the situation and placed all of them into the state-owned
farms‘14 (Person 4, 2006). One might argue that economically it would not have
been of any advantage to the Chinese leadership to use the Hoa in Vietnam as a fifth
column and to trigger a mass exodus into their own country. Furthermore, as soon as
the Hoa departed, they would not have been able to fulfil the intention of a fifth
column, namely, practising political subversion within the ‗enemy‘. Labelling the
Hoa as a fifth column suggests that the Vietnamese side was not only expressing its
mistrust of the Hoas‘ loyalty, but was also boosting its propaganda against the PRC
and justifying its páihuá policy.
The question of whether the Hoa were loyal to the PRC or not in order to fulfil
the role of a fifth column is a complex topic and is primarily related to their identity,
which is itself influenced by many factors. Hence, this aspect may only be touched
on marginally in this study. In this context Suryadinata emphasises that, seen ideo-
logically, the ethnic Chinese are relatively heterogeneous and we may not therefore
assume that they are all ‗pro-PRC communist‘ (Suryadinata 1985: 22). Engelbert‘s
analysis shows that only a few Hoa student organisations in Vietnam got enthusias-
tic about Chinese communism and we may not speak about ‗mobilisation‘. On the
contrary, most of the Hoa in Vietnam were (or rather, still are) doing business and
have rarely had a positive attitude towards socialism (Engelbert 2002: 459-467).
Research done by Suryadinata results in a similar picture. He also points to the diffi-
culty of proving connections between overseas Chinese and the Communist party,
due on the one hand to insufficiency of information and on the other to the fact that
Communist organisations in Indochina mainly consist of indigenous members
(Suryadinata 1985: 19). ‗Overemphasis regarding ethnic Chinese involvement in
communist parties tends to obscure the fact that there are also many militant anti-
communist Chinese‘ (Suryadinata 1985: 21). Furthermore, ‗political ideology and
culture are not the same; the ethnic Chinese may be interested in the culture but not
necessarily in the communist ideology‘ (Suryadinata 1985: 141; Bolt 2000: 119).
Referring to the interviewees, they see themselves as Chinese (中国人 zhōngguórén),
consider China as their fatherland and sometimes participate in pro-Chinese move-
ments in Vietnam (Person 4, 2006), but on the other hand they define themselves as
anti-Communist as they developed a negative perception of this ideology after hav-
ing witnessed the socialist transformation in Vietnam. One interviewee describes the
14 ‗Shí zai huí qù dàlù tài duō le, zhōngguó jiějué bú dào, quánbù dōu fàng zài nóngchǎng.‘ 实在回去大陆太
多了, 中国解决不到,全部都放在农场.
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Hoa‘s identity most accurately: ‗We are stateless…Mainland China says we are
Vietnamese; Vietnam says we are mainland Chinese‘15 (Person 6, 2006). The Hoa
mainly adopted an anti-Communist stance and could not be manipulated as a fifth
column by an outside power. Even though there were some individuals who sympa-
thised with the socialist ideology of the PRC during that time, they still did not have
the potential to cause a mass exodus (as the Vietnamese side liked to describe).
Suryadinata concludes:
It appears that the exodus was largely caused by Hanoi‘s policy towards the ethnic Chinese
and the Sino-Vietnamese tension which was building up gradually. Hanoi was suspicious
of the PRC and regarded all ethnic Chinese as pro-Beijing and hence decided to get rid of
them for political and security reasons (Suryadinata 1985: 49).
Although the Chinese leadership did not have the power to manipulate the Hoa ideo-
logically, they were able to influence the decision on the destination of some Hoa in
northern Vietnam by a very positive self-presentation in the media: ‗Vietnam dis-
places and China talks well: if you return, if you lived in the city, then China will let
you go into a city; no matter which area of business you were working in [author‗s
note: in Vietnam], you will be able to work in the same area [author‘s note: in
China)‘16 (Person 4, 2006). It seems that the PRC did not intend a mass exodus to its
own country because of financial and economic constraints, but it showed a positive
attitude towards a ‗return‘ of the Hoa, mainly for propaganda purposes. Nonetheless,
the Chinese leadership thereby created a pull factor for the Hoa to aim at the PRC as
their country of destination. It seems that although the Hoa were mainly anti-
Communist and apolitical, Group 78 was initially still convinced that migrating to
the PRC was the only logical conclusion: ‗Besides, we are also Chinese, except for
China we have nowhere else to go. We did not have another way at all. China was
the nearest, we were only able to go to China. We could not go to any other places‘17
(Person 1 2006). Of course the geographical proximity to China also played an im-
portant role for security reasons. Furthermore, according to an UNHCR report, the
PRC was indeed the only nation in the Asian region granting asylum to the refugees
and initiated a programme to locate them in state-owned farms (UNHCR 2000). Still,
it has to be mentioned that obviously the emphasis on their ‗Chineseness‘ by both
15 ‗Wǒmen shì méi yǒu guójiā de rén…Dàlù shuō wǒmen shì yuènán rén, yuènán shuō wǒmen shì dàlù rén.‘
我们是没有国家的人…大陆说我们是越南人, 越南说我们是大陆人.
16 ‗Yuènán pái, zhōngguó shuō hǎo de dōngxi: nǐ huílái, rúguǒ shì zhù zài chéngshì de, tā ràng nǐ qù
chéngshì; nǐ zuò shénme hángyè tā jiù gěi nǐ zuò shénme hángyè.‘ 越南排,中国就说好的东西: 你回
来,如果是住在城市的,他让你去城市; 你做什么行业他就给你做什么行业.
17 ‗Érqiě wǒmen yě shì zhōngguó rén ma, chú le zhōngguó yǐ wài wǒmen dōu méi shénme dìfang hǎo qù.
Gēnběn dōu méiyǒu dì èr tiáo lù kéyǐ zǒu, zhōngguó shì zuì jìn de, wǒmen zhǐ néng qù zhōngguó. Bié de
dìfang dōu bù néng qù.‘ 而且我们也是中国人嘛,除了中国以外我们都没什么地方好去.根本都没有第
二条路可以走, 中国是最近的, 我们只能去中国. 别的地方都不能去.
Martina Vuong: The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy
in Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’ Perspective
161
the Vietnamese and the Chinese leadership intensified the push and pull factors and
motivated them to choose the PRC as a destination, at least in the first phase of the
exodus.
The páihuá phenomenon in an internal political context: the ‘politicisation of
ethnicity’ in the course of the establishment of a ‘nation state’
Suryadinata traces the local adverse sentiment against China back to the establish-
ment of nation states in Southeast Asia—a process which started after decolonisation
following World War II: ‗The process is by no means smooth, especially in some
countries where the government requires complete eradication of ―Chineseness‖‘
(Suryadinata 1985: 23). In general, ethnicity includes cultural characteristics and
attributes like language and traditions, but also individual identity. Two trends exist
to date. The primordial perception describes ethnicity as given by nature; the ethnic
descent and same historical past and culture include an individual in an ethnic group,
implying that ethnicity is non-changeable. Social constructivists see ethnicity as
flexible, as it only develops through individual interaction with a community, imply-
ing an individual choice of belonging to specific ethnic groups (Cohen 1999: 4;
Dittrich and Lentz 1995: 25, 27-28; Kößler and Schiel 1995: 2-4; Bolt 2000: 19, 21).
Smith notices that most researchers agree that nations and nationalism are phenom-
ena of modernity, but there are also primordialists who consider nations as heredi-
tary to human nature (Gellner 1999: 32).
By placing the páihuá phenomenon in the context of Vietnam‘s internal political
situation we meet with the politicisation of ethnicity in the course of the emergence
of a nation state after decolonisation. A nation state recognises itself as a closed
territory whose citizens are connected by a collective past, common ancestors and
culture (Smith 1999: 38). Smith differentiates the concept of a state from that of a
nation, defined by its institutions within an isolated area. Nationalism, which
emerged after the French Revolution, is defined as an ideologically motivated
movement focusing on maintaining unity and pointing to a shared identity of the
people, especially in terms of establishing a nation (Smith 1999: 37-38; Fine 1999:
154). Smith, MacCormick and Fine identify two different types of nationalism, civic
and ethnic. Civic nationalism is characterised by the joint maintenance of govern-
mental institutions and respect of law and order. Anybody who upholds these prin-
ciples may be part of the nation. In contrast, ethnic nationalism builds on joint de-
scent and a common culture formed by history (MacCormick 1999: 126; Smith 1999:
41). Fine thinks that ‗the basic difference between ―ethnic‖ and ―civic‖ forms of
nationalism is that in the latter case it is the state which defines the nation, while in
the former it is the nation which defines the state‘ (Fine 1999: 152). The mass exo-
dus of the Hoa from 1978 to 1979 can be put into the context of an emerging Viet-
162
Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies
namese nation state and an arising of an ethnic nationalism, where ethnicity became
a political tool (Kößler and Schiel 1995: 1). Kößler and Schiel emphasise the inclu-
sive character of ethnicity as focusing on commonalities and coherence, whereas the
exclusive character underlines the displacement and exclusion of specific groups
(Kößler and Schiel 1995: 5). After decolonisation, the Vietnamese leadership had to
prove its legitimacy by instrumentalising homogenisation—a collective Vietnamese
identity had to be established, which politicised ethnicity (Kößler and Schiel 1995:
17; Dittrich and Lentz 1995: 37; Opitz 1988: 51-52; Opitz 1997: 22-23). Addition-
ally, ‗the privileging of the Chinese was felt more strongly by the Vietnamese na-
tionalist elites after 1954 than it really was‘18 (Engelbert 2002: 280). Thus, ethnic
nationalism used the argument of ethnicity as a political instrument in order to se-
cure access to positions associated with power for those having a place within the
Vietnamese identity and granting them rights and entitlements, while excluding the
Hoa from ‗Vietnamese-ness‘ through discrimination for reasons of separatism,
which the ethnic Chinese were accused of.
One more push factor: family and friends
Another motivation for the Hoa to leave North Vietnam was the push factor: influ-
ence by family, relatives and friends. It turned out that the information flow within
the Hoa community was a strong factor in accelerating migration. Awareness of
those deciding to leave the country was often enough to create unrest among the
ethnic Chinese in such a way that they started considering migrating themselves.
‗However, in reality such a rational approach is not the rule. Family members or
friends often play a central role as a source of information. On many occasions their
information and arguments are more significant than rational and logical argu-
ments‘19 (Han 2000: 175). Han also points out that this phenomenon usually
emerges as soon as migration procedures become something like mass movements.
In situations like these one‘s own motivation becomes unimportant, while the migra-
tion model of others becomes much more significant (Han 2000: 26): ‗Sometimes
we did not need to discuss. If one family left, the second would follow; there was no
need for motivation. Anyway, if you were overseas Chinese you would have to (de-
18 ‗Die Privilegierung der Chinesen von den vietnamesischen nationalistischen Eliten nach 1954 nachdrück-
licher empfunden wurden, als sie in Wirklichkeit war.‘
19 ‗In der Realität ist jedoch eine solche rationale Vorgehensweise nicht die Regel. Oft spielen Familienange-
hörige oder Bekannte als Informationsquelle eine zentrale Rolle. Ihre Informationen und Argumente sind
häufig bedeutsamer als rationale und logische Argumente.‘
Martina Vuong: The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy
in Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’ Perspective
163
cide to) leave‘20 (Person 4, 2006). Up to the end of 1979 more than 250,000 Hoa left
for the PRC (UNHCR 2000).
The pull factor of freedom: opting for Hong Kong
The interviewees show us that life in the state-owned farms was not easy for them as
they were not used to physical work. They were also disappointed, as they were not
aware of the fact that they would be placed in these farms once they arrived in the
PRC (Persons 4 and 6, 2006). In fact, most of Group 78 did not plan to leave the
PRC, but the information flow among the Hoa awakened their awareness of the
possibility of migrating to Hong Kong: ‗Actually, we decided to stay…suddenly I
heard that there was a refugee camp in Hong Kong. We all of us only followed the
masses. We heard that Hong Kong is free‘21 (Person 1, 2006). Consequently, this
factor became a pull factor too. Only one interviewee considered the PRC as a tran-
sit country even before leaving the SRV: ‗I just ―borrowed‖ the way via China be-
cause it was very difficult to get to Hong Kong from Vietnam‘22 (Person 2, 2006).
As mentioned by the interviewees, the unsatisfactory circumstances in the PRC were
lack of democracy and human rights, a similar political system as in the SRV and
low incomes (Persons 1-6, 2006). The pull factors for Groups 78 and 79 differ inso-
far as Group 79 had the additional information from Hoa who had already migrated
that there was the possibility of reaching the refugee camps in Hong Kong. This
raised positive associations of not only entry to a free and better life compared to the
circumstances in Communist China, but also the strong confidence that the latecom-
ers might manage to get there as well. Keeping this in mind, we may conclude that
the migration flow of the Hoa developed its own dynamic, directed by an effective
information network. While the pioneers of Group 78 chose the PRC as a destination
for the first stage, Group 79 already knew that the refugee camps in Hong Kong and
Macao were the better choice. Weggel assumed that the PRC ‗suddenly‘ closed its
borders as they were economically unable to cope with the mass of refugees, and the
Hoa became ‗boat people‘ for this reason (Weggel 1997: 173). This point cannot be
verified by Group 79; rather, they mentioned poverty and a lack of future prospects
in the PRC and the help of the UN in the refugee camps of Hong Kong and Macao
as reasons for no longer choosing the PRC as their destination (Persons 3 and 5,
20 ‗Yǒu shíhou dōu bú yòng tǎolùn. Yí gè jiātíng zǒu le, dì èr gè jiātíng yě gēn zhe zǒu; dōu bú yòng yùndòng
nǐ. Zǒngzhī shì huáqiáo, jiù dǎsuan yào zǒu le.‘ 有时候都不用讨论. 一个家庭走了, 第二个家庭也跟着
走; 都不用运动你. 总之, 是华侨就打算要走了.
21 ‗Běnlái wǒmen juédìng liú xià lái…tūránjiàn tīngdào xiānggǎng yǒu nàn mín yíng. Wǒmen dà jiā zhǐ shì lā
duì zǒu de. Wǒmen dōu tīngshuō xiānggǎng zì yóu.‘ 本来我们决定留下来…突然间听到香港有难民营.
我们大家只是拉队走的.我们都听说香港自由.
22 ‗Wǒ zhǐ xiǎngdào zhōngguó jiè lù, yīnwèi cóng yuènán qù xiānggǎng hěn nán.‘ 我只想到中国借路, 因为
从越南去香港很难.
164
Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies
2006). One interviewee from Group 78 even reported that the Chinese leadership did
not create difficulties for the Hoa in leaving the PRC: ‗The Chinese government did
not care about these overseas Chinese. They knew we were seeking freedom. They
turned a blind eye, they did not care about us‘23 (Person 2, 2006). Both Groups 78
and 79 chose the sea route to reach the destinations of Hong Kong and Macao. Two
interviewees explained that they left the PRC via Běihǎi 北海, at that time a popular
port for starting the journey (Persons 1 and 2, 2006). One Hoa argued that he had to
take the more dangerous sea route instead of the land route as he was aware that
Hong Kong and Macao only accepted refugees from Vietnam. Hence, we may as-
sume that most of Group 78 chose to reach the UN camps by boat in order to fulfil
the conditions of being considered as refugees, and they acquired fame as boat peo-
ple.
The implied pull factor: Austria as the final destination
Analysing the push and pull factors that had an influence on the Hoas‘ decision to
migrate to Austria, it has to be concluded that there were not any, except for one
interviewee. The reasons for the lack of pull factors can be found within the circum-
stances of the refugee camps, which brought about a loss of self-determination on
the part of the Hoa. In the process of ‗dematuration‘, the emphasis is on the bureau-
cratic organisation of the camps, which creates dependency among the refugees and
leads to the assumption on the part of the camp management that a refugee is not
capable of making his or her own decisions, and hence will be reduced to the role of
a passive and helpless child (Domanski 1994: 22-23; Chan and Loverdige 1987: 753;
Inhetveen 2006: 8):
‗Dematuration‘ begins with the transference of the decision-making from the refugee to of-
ficials and with the assuming by the latter of the right to intrude into the private world of
the former. Dependence on bureaucratic arrangements, coinciding with a lack of options
for attaining even modest self-sufficiency, creates a sense of personal inefficacy, lack of
power and self-determination. A person is reduced to the role of a ‗child‘ incapable of
managing his/her own affairs, who can be controlled, patronized and even scolded (Do-
manski 1994: 23).
Asked for their motivation in migrating to Austria, the Hoa indicated mainly reasons
that were imposed on them from the outside; Austria was willing to accept them,
and further organisation was left to the UNHCR.
23 ‗Zhōngguó de zhèngfǔ bù lǐ nà xiē huáqiáo. Tāmen zhīdào wǒmen shì zhǎo zì yóu de. Tāmen yì yǎn kāi yì
yǎn bì de, bù lǐ wǒmen.‘ 中国的政府不理那些华侨.他们知道我们是找自由的.他们一眼开一眼闭的,
不理我们.
Martina Vuong: The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy
in Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’ Perspective
165
In view of the Vietnamese mass exodus of 1978 and 1979, a conference was
convened in Geneva in 1979 in order to find a way to cope with the refugees. In fact,
the Western developed countries agreed to accept them. Quotas and criteria for ac-
ceptance were determined by the individual countries, and representatives were sent
to the UNHCR refugee camps to make a selection. Hans and Suhrke (1997: 101)
have shown that ‗the market system of resettlement was reasonably successful in
finding compatibility between the needs of the receiving countries and refugees.‘
However, since the flood of refugees did not stop until the end of the 1980s, the
Western developed countries in the end were not willing to accept any more refu-
gees from Vietnam. In 1989, a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) was therefore
prepared. From that time on, the refugee status of each individual had to be verified
according to the criteria of the Geneva Convention (Hans and Suhrke 1997: 100-101;
UNHCR 2001; Weggel 1997: 169-170). In this sense Hans and Suhrke assume that
acceptance of refugees was guided by the following points:
(i) legal and humanitarian concerns, (ii) fear of greater international disorder which may
occur by not helping them, and (iii) national interests arising from whatever specific eco-
nomic or political considerations are relevant in the particular cases (e.g. ethnic kin, de-
mand for labour, foreign policy) (Hans; Suhrke 1997: 104).
Steinbock sees the reason for the relatively high receptivity among Western devel-
oped countries as related to ideology: ‗Under the protection of the new Convention,
the Western countries often treated flight from communism, without further evi-
dence, as sufficient to establish well-founded fear of persecution‘ (Steinbock 1999:
29; Sztucki 1999:73). We may conclude that many Hoa succeeded in getting reset-
tled in the developed countries as a consequence of the ideological contest going on
during the Cold War and of the economic boom in the West at the beginning of the
1980s.
Conclusion
In terms of their motivation to migrate, the Hoa from North Vietnam may be consid-
ered as ‗refugees‘, but bearing in mind their behaviour during the migration process
up to the time they reached the refugee camps of Hong Kong and Macao, we may
conclude that they actually were ‗migrants‘, because at certain points they made
their own decisions on destinations and how to reach them under, evaluating possi-
ble dangers and success rates. However, the question is clearly one of perception:
‗The image of the ―helpless passive refugee‖ which is characteristic for many gov-
ernmental and non-governmental refugee-aid-projects was often transferred into
scientific discourse‘ (Binder and Tosic 2002: 6; Nicholson and Twomey 1999: 3).
Vrecer thinks that the term ‗refugee‘ is not appropriate. Instead, ‗forced migrant‘
166
Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies
would be more applicable: ‗it implies that the people in question were forced to
escape the country, it does not carry the negative stigma of a ―passive victim‖ which
the word ―refugee‖ does…‘ (Vrecer 2002: 117). The official Vietnamese and Chi-
nese accounts of the Hoa issue, in which both sides accused each other of having
caused the mass exodus, in particular evoked the impression of a manipulated mass
of people without any kind of self-determination. However, the interviews done with
the Hoa living in Austria provide us with another picture. Even though they consider
the páihuá policy of the Vietnamese leadership of that time as a catastrophe, in ret-
rospect they still view this phenomenon as a chance to escape from poverty and
communism, and they associate personal hope and future perspectives with the fate
of leaving Vietnam. In spite of the fact that the developments in Vietnam during that
time were indeed very inimical to the Hoa, the interviewees still consider them-
selves—however, most of them only after arrival in Austria—as having profited
from the páihuá policy.
The results of the research project presented in this paper finally lead to the con-
clusion that neither the Chinese nor the Vietnamese leadership had the power to
initiate the mass exodus of the Hoa from North Vietnam in the years 1978 and 1979.
Within and despite these interstate conflicts, the Hoa were independent actors who
followed their own logic and developed their own dynamic by means of a well-
functioning information network.
Martina Vuong: The Impact of the Anti-Chinese Páihuá Policy
in Vietnam after Reunification: the Refugees’ Perspective
167
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Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies
GLOSSARY
Běihǎi
北海
port town in the Chinese province of
Guǎngxī 广西
Cộng hòa xã hội chủ
nghĩa Việt Nam
(Viet.) Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
SRV
dìwǔ zòngduì
第五纵队
fifth column; the term describes a
group of subversive elements within a
country who are loyal to another power
and work against local authorities
Dōngxīng
东兴
town at the Chinese-Vietnamese bor-
der in the province of Guǎngxī 广西
Guómíndǎng
国民党
Chinese National People‘s Party,
founded on 12 August 1912 by Sun
Yat-sen (Sūn Yìxiān 孙逸仙)
hoa kiều
(Viet.) overseas Chinese
huáqiáo
华侨
overseas Chinese
huáqiáo nóngchǎng
华侨农场
state-owned farms for overseas Chi-
nese returning to the PRC
jiàoxùn Yuènán
教训越南
to teach Vietnam a lesson
nóngchǎng
农场
farm
páihuá
排华
abbreviated form of páichì huárén 排
斥华人, can be translated as ―dis-
placement of ethnic Chinese‖. Páihuá
is defined as a discriminative policy of
the Vietnamese leadership, aiming at
disadvantaging ethnic Chinese espe-
cially in terms of access to higher
education and within the labour market
(see interviews 2007)
Việt Minh
(Viet.) abbreviation for Việt Nam Ðộc
Lập Ðồng Minh Hội—League for the
Independence of Vietnam
zhōngguórén
中国人
Chinese