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Hakların Tükenmesi İlkesinin Coğrafi Sınırları, Paralel Ticaret ve Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar

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We consider the simultaneous choice of parallel importing regime and tariff policy in a setting of international price discrimination by a monopolist. We show that an importer's optimal tariff decreases when parallel imports (PIs) are permitted. This may lead to the monopolist benefiting from PIs. Allowing PIs is always attractive for a country whether or not it sets an optimal tariff. In a political economy modification, we show that the prohibition of PIs is more likely to emerge (where it would not otherwise) the more the government cares about lobby contributions and the greater are profits from price discrimination.
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This paper examines the extent to which multinational location decisions reflect a trade-off between achieving proximity to customers and concentrating production to achieve scale economies. It finds that overseas production by multinationals increases relative to exports the higher are transport costs and trade barriers and the lower are investment barriers and scale economies at the plant level relative to the corporate level. However, it is not possible to reject a model with only country and industry effects. The evidence also suggests that multinational activity is more likely the more similar are the home and foreign markets--contrary to conventional wisdom. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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This paper analyses the issue of parallel trade (arbitrage) for products protected by intellectual property rights. Many countries have traditionally allowed owners of intellectual property rights to prohibit arbitrage in the face of international price discrimination. In a well-known paper Malueg and Schwartz (1994) showed that this policy decreases social welfare when the same markets are served in both regimes, with and without arbitrage. Their model considered only the setting of prices, and not investment in product development. We consider a two-stage game where firms choose quality first and then prices. Since the threat of arbitrage ex post reduces the incentive to invest ex ante, the net benefits of parallel trade may vanish. We also show that the size of the welfare effects is significantly affected by the presence of a ‘generic’ product, which represents a form of competition for the monopolist. The monopolist will introduce a ‘fighting brand’ to compete with the generic, which dilutes but does not eliminate the result on the adverse effects of parallel trade on investments.
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Incorporating parallel imports (PI), we develop a two-country two-firm model which relates to the incentives for cost-reducing innovation. We show that PI may facilitate or inhibit the manufacturers' incentives to innovate. In particular, PI could encourage both firms' innovations. The difference between the manufacturer's profits under successful innovation and failed innovation is either a U-shaped curve or an inverted U-shaped curve in terms of the cost of engaging in PI. As these differences reflect the manufacturers' incentive to innovate, the variations in R&D investment depend on transportation cost, and firms' marginal costs before and after successful innovations.
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We study the dependence of incentives for product innovation on the presence, or absence, of parallel trade. The common assertion is that the presence of parallel trade lowers the incentive for product innovation. Our results support this assertion for some parameter values. However, there are cases in which the presence of parallel trade increases research intensity. For this to occur the innovating firm must already produce and export another good. Further, the new good and the old must be close substitutes and have different transportation costs.
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We overview the international policy debate concerning parallel imports, which are goods traded without the authorization of an original trademark or copyright owner. Parallel imports are likely to have multiple causes, including vertical price control, which we model. A manufacturer selling its product through an independent agent needs to set the wholesale price sufficiently low to induce a desired retail price in a certain country. This creates an opportunity for the agent to sell the product profitably, outside authorized distribution channels, in another country. The combined social surplus in two countries is shown to first decrease and then increase in the private cost of parallel trade. Restricting parallel imports always benefits the manufacturer, but it may either raise or reduce global surplus. These findings suggest certain policy implications. Both informal empirical evidence and econometric work indicate that our vertical-control explanation of parallel imports is important in practice.
Global supply chains and international competitiveness. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Policy Paper
  • C Altomonte
  • A Rungi
Altomonte, C., Rungi A. 2014. Global supply chains and international competitiveness. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Policy Paper 2014/04, European University Institute.