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Model(ing) Justice: Perfecting the Promise of International Criminal Law

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Cambridge Core - Human Rights - Model(ing) Justice - by Kerstin Bree Carlson
... 310) while others, such as Carlson, explicitly espouse the Western liberalism enshrined in the project for international criminal justice with the aim of 'perfecting' it. 7 This opposition between the denunciation of the ICC as the epitome of 'tropical justice … at the service of the powerful' 8 and calls for the ICC to 'exclusively use the language of the law' 9 signals the acute difficulty of situating the critique of the ICC. First and foremost, such debates illustrate what could be described as the 'bunkerization' of the Court among the very restricted market of scholars and practitioners clustered around the Hague 10 -whereby what Clark aptly construes as law's 'inherent virtue' of distance (p. ...
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This article investigates rconparticipation in politics as a rich set of moral, political, and cultural engagements. Contrary to the idea of apathy as an absence of political and social progress, Jessica Greenberg argues that nonparticipation can be an expression of complex and sophisticated responses to changing sociopolitical contexts. Greenberg also examines how such responses are affected by the global deployment of normative models of democratic success and failure. Starting with both policy and academic discourse about civic participation and popular Serbian narratives about politics and European belonging, Greenberg integrates the ethnographic material from her fieldwork in Serbia to illuminate the context in which such ideas reinforce understandings of democratic policies as elitist, corrupt, morally suspect, and disempowering. In conclusion, she suggests that researchers and practitioners should interrogate their own roles in creating and deploying frameworks for political success and failure and the impact these frameworks have on the lived experience of democracy.
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