On Why There is a Problem of Supererogation

Abstract

How can it be that some acts of very high moral value are not morally required? This is the problem of supererogation. I do not argue in favor of a particular answer. Instead, I analyze two opposing moral intuitions the problem involves. First, that one should always do one’s best. Second, that sometimes we are morally allowed not to do our best. To think that one always has to do one’s best is less plausible, as it makes every morally best act obligatory. I argue that, despite its implausibility, this is the main ingredient in a traditional outlook I call ‘morality of law,’ which conceives of morality as impartial, impersonal, rule-based and obligation-based. My main point is that supererogation will always be seen as problematic if the background theory is a morality of law. This is because supererogation encapsulates a view of morality-outside-obligation, whereas morality of law centers upon obligation as its main instrument of curbing a supposedly natural human selfishness.

Full text

On Why There is a Problem of Supererogation
Nora Grigore
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Received: 3 January 2018 /Revised: 31 May 2018 / Accepted: 31 October 2018 /
Published online: 14 November 2018
#Springer Nature B.V. 2018
Abstract
How can it be that some acts of very high moral value are not morally required? This is the
problem of supererogation. I do not argue in favor of a particular answer. Instead, I analyze
two opposing moral intuitions the problem involves. First, that one should always do one’s
best. Second, that sometimes we are morally allowed not to do our best. To think that one
alwayshastodoone’s best is less plausible, as it makes every morally best act obligatory. I
argue that, despite its implausibility, this is the main ingredient in a traditional outlook I
call ‘morality of law,’which conceives of morality as impartial, impersonal, rule-based
and obligation-based. My main point is that supererogation will always be seen as
problematic if the background theory is a morality of law. This is because supererogation
encapsulates a view of morality-outside-obligation, whereas morality of law centers upon
obligation as its main instrument of curbing a supposedly natural human selfishness.
Keywords Supererogation .Morality.Obligation .Law .Virtue
1 What the Problem of Supererogation says about Morality
and Obligation
How can one explain that some morally excellent deeds are not required? The question
presupposes some degree of puzzlement, or at least of skepticism, towards the idea that
not all morally good deeds can be required. This is the problem of supererogation.
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Philosophia (2019) 47:1141–1163
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0045-z
1
The problem has been formulated in many ways depending on the theoretical framework used. In deontic terms,
how can one explain that some excellent moral deeds are merely permitted, not obligatory? In maximization terms
(e.g. New (1974), Dreier (2004), Scheffler (1994) and Slote (1984)). how can one explain that the moral agent is
allowed not to maximize the good in some circumstances? Raz (1975) gives one of the clearest formulations of the
problem of supererogation in terms of reasons:“One important characteristic of supererogatory acts …is that their
performance is praiseworthy while their omission is not blameworthy. But this creates a problem. If doing a
supererogatory act is praiseworthy there must be reason for doing it, and the reasons must outweigh any
conflicting reasons for not doing it. But if there are conclusive reasons for performing the act then not to perform it
is to act against the balance of reasons. If reason requires that the act be done then surely one ought to do it, and the
‘ought’is based on all the reasons which apply to the case; it is a conclusive ought. But this entails that failing to
perform the act is failing to do what one ought (conclusively) to do, so why isn’t it blameworthy not to perform a
supererogatory act?”(Raz 1975: 164) Also, the definition of supererogation sometimes varies from author to
author. Heyd (1982) defines supererogation as the action that is neither obligatory nor forbidden, which is not
wrong to omit, it is morally good and done voluntarily for the sake of someone else’s good. I am using a
commonsensical notion of supererogation that is common among most views.
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