No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Sustaining and jeopardising a credible arbiter: Judicial networks in Benin’s consolidating democracy
Abstract
Democracy greatly benefits from credible courts. If context conditions make democratic consolidation unlikely, as in many African countries, credible arbitration between political actors can be essential for democracy. This article argues that informal judicial networks can critically affect a court’s credibility. Network analysis of Benin’s Constitutional Court using original data on major politicians and all 25 judges who have served between 1993 and 2018 provides evidence that biased judicial networks can jeopardize the crucial role of courts for democratic consolidation. In Benin, the loss of credibility under the Yayi presidency correlates with a clear political representation bias on the constitutional bench whereas socio-cultural representation remained balanced. Since executive and legislative appointment practices account for the network balance or bias, the political creation and privation of informal judicial relations emerges as an interesting avenue for studies of democratic consolidation.
... International networks of judges have helped courts to defend themselves against executive interference and protect human rights (see Brett, 2018, in this special issue). Conversely, where support networks are absent or political networks dominate the bench, the public legitimacy of courts may suffer greatly (as Stroh, 2018, in this special issue illustrates; see also Sanchez-Urribarri, 2012), particularly when linked to corrupt activities on the bench (Dressel, 2018). ...
... This underscores the responsibility politicians take on when making decisions about judicial appointments. His contribution suggests that well beyond Benin, judicial network structures created, sustained or framed by such decisions can either help consolidate democracy or jeopardise it (Stroh, 2018). ...
This special issue proposes a relational approach to the study of judicial politics outside of Western democracies. The articles illuminate how common political interests, ideas, social identity, family and professional ties and even patron–client obligations between judges and other actors shape a variety of phenomena of interest to the study of judicial institutions, in terms of how the judiciary is organised and administered, how judges are appointed and make decisions, and the prospects for judicial reform. Collectively, the articles explore the informal dimension of judicial politics in a systematic fashion, through
rich empirical case studies in very different contexts. Thus, they help structure a new comparative agenda for research on informal judicial politics outside of the West.
... Additionally, in many scenarios the executive or incumbent party controls the designation process in a way that is able to appoint lawyers aligned with their preferences and/or who are otherwise loyal to the government. 3 In the latter case, appointed judges tend to be committed to support the government on the basis of personal connections and/or in exchange for material benefits or other particularistic advantages (Stroh 2018). Both dimensionsideological and particularisticare key for cross-national analyses of courtpacking processes. ...
A growing body of literature on the role of courts in democratic backsliding claims that court-packing weakens liberal democracy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The goals of the actors who produce court-packing help to explain why the co-optation of the judiciary can have a substantial negative effect on liberal democracy in some (although not all) cases. In this respect, we distinguish two types of court-packing. First, policy-driven court-packing occurs when politicians manipulate the composition of courts in order to assure a quick implementation of policies. Although this tends to negatively affect judicial independence, it is not per se a first step towards regime change. Second, regime-driven court-packing happens when politicians alter the composition of the courts with the goal of eroding democracy. In this case, court-packing’s negative effect on judicial independence has a systemic negative effect on different dimensions of liberal democracy. Relying on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, we conceptualize these two types of court-packing by comparing two cases: Carlos Menem (1989–99) in Argentina, seeking judicial support to carry out pro-market economic reforms, and Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) in Venezuela, seeking to control the judiciary in the context of democratic backsliding.
Latin America was one of the earliest and most enthusiastic adopters of what has come to be known as the judicialization of politics - the use of law and legal institutions as tools of social contestation to curb the abuse of power in government, resolve policy disputes, and enforce and expand civil, political, and socio-economic rights. Almost forty years into this experiment, The Limits of Judicialization brings together a cross-disciplinary group of scholars to assess the role that law and courts play in Latin American politics. Featuring studies of hot-button topics including abortion, state violence, judicial corruption, and corruption prosecutions, this volume argues that the institutional and cultural changes that empowered courts, what the editors call the 'judicialization superstructure,' often fall short of the promise of greater accountability and rights protection. Illustrative and expansive, this volume offers a truly interdisciplinary analysis of the limits of judicialized politics.
Zusammenfassung
Benin, Afrikas ehemalige Modelldemokratie, steht vor einem Scheideweg. Nach einem friedlichen Systemwechsel und der anschließenden Herausbildung und Konsolidierung demokratischer Institutionen hat ein Abschwung begonnen, dessen Ende noch nicht abzusehen ist. 30 Jahre nach der demokratischen Erneuerung hat die ärmere Bevölkerung bisher keine demokratische Dividende erhalten, und checks and balances werden als Hindernisse für Reformen wahrgenommen. Hat das Modell ausgedient, wird sich ein weiterer Staat Afrikas für ein autokratisches System entscheiden?
ABSTRACT & RÉSUMÉ & ZUSAMMENFASSUNG : A 'democratic recession' is to be observed, which is not restricted to Sub-Sahara Africa but spreads worldwide since the beginning of the 21st century. Instead of concentrating on the outward appearance of a democratic form of government, greater attention should be paid to good governance and the stealthy erosion of democratic institutions, even in formerly shining examples and African 'model democracies' like Benin and Senegal. It went along with the rise of populist new nationalism and lack of regard of the concerned for the need to defend democracy actively. The lingering process of the decline of democratic institutions is driven by increasingly poor governance and disregard for the rule of law and transparency, which has been especially pronounced in African countries since the early 2000s. On the other hand, recent examples of African social movements that successfully campaigned for a democratic renaissance in Africa and elsewhere are promising indicators of progressive social forces that counteract global trends of the resurgence of right-wing nationalism and autocratic rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RÉSUMÉ : On observe une « récession démocratique » qui ne se limite pas à l’Afrique subsaharienne mais s’étend à l’échelle mondiale depuis le début du XXIe siècle. Au lieu de se concentrer sur l’apparence extérieure d’une forme de gouvernement démocratique, il faudrait accorder une plus grande attention à la bonne gouvernance et à l’érosion furtive des institutions démocratiques, même dans les exemples jadis brillants et les « démocraties modèles » africaines comme le Bénin et le Sénégal. Cela a coïncidé avec la montée d'un nouveau nationalisme populiste et le manque de vigilance des personnes concernées quant à la nécessité de défendre activement la démocratie. Le processus persistant du déclin des institutions démocratiques s’explique par une gouvernance de plus en plus médiocre et un mépris de l’état de droit et de la transparence, qui se fait particulièrement sentir dans les pays africains depuis le début des années 2000. D'autre part, des exemples récents de mouvements sociaux africains qui ont mené avec succès une renaissance démocratique en Afrique et ailleurs sont des indicateurs prometteurs de forces sociales progressistes qui vont à l’encontre des tendances mondiales à la résurgence d’un nationalisme de droite et des régimes autocratiques. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ZUSAMMENFASSUNG : Es ist eine "demokratische Rezession" zu beobachten, die sich nicht nur auf Afrika südlich der Sahara beschränkt, sondern sich seit Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts weltweit ausbreitet. Anstatt sich auf das äußere Erscheinungsbild einer demokratischen Regierungsform zu konzentrieren, sollte der verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung und der heimlichen Erosion demokratischer Institutionen größere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden, selbst in früheren Vorbildern und afrikanischen „Modelldemokratien“ wie Benin und Senegal. Dies geht einher mit dem Aufkommen eines populistischen neuen Nationalismus und dem mangelnden Augenmerk auf die Notwendigkeit, die Demokratie aktiv zu verteidigen. Der anhaltende Niedergang der demokratischen Institutionen ist auf eine zunehmend mangelhafte Regierungsführung und die Missachtung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Transparenz zurückzuführen, die in den afrikanischen Ländern seit Anfang der 2000er Jahre besonders ausgeprägt ist. Andererseits sind afrikanischer soziale Bewegungen, die sich erfolgreich für eine demokratische Renaissance in Afrika und anderswo einsetzen, vielversprechende Indikatoren für fortschrittliche soziale Kräfte, die globalen Trends des Wiederauflebens eines rechten Nationalismus und autokratischer Herrschaft entgegenwirken.
ABSTRACT & RÉSUMÉ & ZUSAMMENFASSUNG : A 'democratic recession' is to be observed, which is not restricted to Sub-Sahara Africa but spreads worldwide since the beginning of the 21st century. Instead of concentrating on the outward appearance of a democratic form of government, greater attention should be paid to good governance and the stealthy erosion of democratic institutions, even in formerly shining examples and African 'model democracies' like Benin and Senegal. It went along with the rise of populist new nationalism and lack of regard of the concerned for the need to defend democracy actively. The lingering process of the decline of democratic institutions is driven by increasingly poor governance and disregard for the rule of law and transparency, which has been especially pronounced in African countries since the early 2000s. On the other hand, recent examples of African social movements that successfully campaigned for a democratic renaissance in Africa and elsewhere are promising indicators of progressive social forces that counteract global trends of the resurgence of right-wing nationalism and autocratic rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RÉSUMÉ : On observe une «récession démocratique» qui ne se limite pas à l’Afrique subsaharienne mais s’étend à l’échelle mondiale depuis le début du XXIe siècle. Au lieu de se concentrer sur l’apparence extérieure d’une forme de gouvernement démocratique, il faudrait accorder une plus grande attention à la bonne gouvernance et à l’érosion furtive des institutions démocratiques, même dans les exemples jadis brillants et les «démocraties modèles» africaines comme le Bénin et le Sénégal. Cela a coïncidé avec la montée d'un nouveau nationalisme populiste et le manque de vigilance des personnes concernées quant à la nécessité de défendre activement la démocratie. Le processus persistant du déclin des insti-tutions démocratiques s’explique par une gouvernance de plus en plus médiocre et le mépris de l’état de droit et de la transparence, qui se fait particulièrement sentir dans les pays africains depuis le début des années 2000. D'autre part, des exemples récents de mouve-ments sociaux africains qui ont mené avec succès une renaissance démocratique en Afrique et ailleurs sont des indicateurs prometteurs de forces sociales progressistes qui vont à l’encontre des tendances mondiales à la résurgence d’un nationalisme de droite et des ré-gimes autocratiques. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ZUSAMMENFASSUNG : Es ist eine "demokratische Rezession" zu beobachten, die sich nicht nur auf Afrika südlich der Sahara beschränkt, sondern sich seit Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts weltweit ausbreitet. Anstatt sich auf das äußere Erscheinungsbild einer demokratischen Regierungsform zu konzentrieren, sollte der verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung und der heimlichen Erosion demokratischer Institutionen größere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden, selbst in früheren Vorbildern und afrikanischen „Modelldemokratien“ wie Benin und Senegal. Dies geht einher mit dem Aufkommen eines populistischen neuen Nationalismus und dem mangelnden Augenmerk auf die Notwendigkeit, die Demokratie aktiv zu verteidigen. Der anhaltende Niedergang der demokratischen Institutionen ist auf eine zunehmend mangelhafte Regierungsführung und die Missachtung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Transparenz zurückzuführen, die in den afrikanischen Ländern seit Anfang der 2000er Jahre besonders ausgeprägt ist. Andererseits sind afrikanischer soziale Bewegungen, die sich erfolgreich für eine demokratische Renaissance in Afrika und anderswo einsetzen, vielversprechende Indikatoren für fortschrittliche soziale Kräfte, die globalen Trends des Wiederauflebens eines rechten Nationalismus und autokratischer Herrschaft entgegenwirken.
Scholars have generally assumed that courts in authoritarian states are pawns of their regimes, upholding the interests of governing elites and frustrating the efforts of their opponents. As a result, nearly all studies in comparative judicial politics have focused on democratic and democratizing countries. This volume brings together leading scholars in comparative judicial politics to consider the causes and consequences of judicial empowerment in authoritarian states. It demonstrates the wide range of governance tasks that courts perform, as well as the way in which courts can serve as critical sites of contention both among the ruling elite and between regimes and their citizens. Drawing on empirical and theoretical insights from every major region of the world, this volume advances our understanding of judicial politics in authoritarian regimes.
This article presents new theoretical and empirical insights into democratization in Africa, using the typology developed
by John Higley and Michael Burton to understand elite interaction in Ghana. Social network analysis (SNA) is used to test
the main proposition of the Higley/Burton theory, namely that a ‘liberal democracy is impossible without a consensually united
elite’. Empirical evidence is provided from a unique data set that maps the interaction patterns between Members of Parliament
elected to the Ghanaian legislature in 2012. The article shows that MPs in Ghana form a dense and strongly interconnected
network bridging ethnic and party cleavages, and that MPs from different parties have developed a measure of trust in one
another. These findings not only support Higley and Burton's claim that elite integration is conducive to stable democracy,
but also point to new directions in African Studies by demonstrating the capacity of actor-centric approaches to explain processes
of democratization in countries that lack the classic structural preconditions for consolidation.
Are Japan’s politics judicializing? Certainly Japan has been somewhat of an outlier among advanced industrial democracies, in which scholars have documented a strong trend toward greater scope and authority of judicial decision-making. This chapter examines the sources of Japan's judicial quiescence, arguing that they ultimately have ideological origins in the continuing relevance of 19th century German legal theory.
Existing explanations of judicial reform emphasize the positive effects of electoral competition. However, multiple, competing, and even contradictory mechanisms behind this association obfuscate causation, and variation in the timing and content of reforms remains puzzling for these accounts. Leveraging a “most similar” comparative design at the subnational level across three Mexican states, and drawing on archival analysis and 61 interviews with judges and other legal elites, I examine variation in judicial councils – a key institutional transformation – and find that principled-ideological factors shape reform. That is, judicial reform is less a mechanical side-effect of increasing electoral competition and more the product of principled, purposeful action. The findings help resolve the abovementioned puzzles, emphasizing the role of agency and ideas in building democratic institutions.
Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these important questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in East Asia, where law is traditionally viewed as a tool of authoritarian rulers. New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Thomas Ginsburg argues that, while judicial review does put constraints on government, it is sought as a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing –insurance— to prospective electoral losers, judicial review facilitates democracy.
This paper argues that the experiences of colonialism in Africa have led to the emergence of a unique historical configuration in modern postcolonial Africa: the existence of two publics instead of one public, as in the West. Many of Africa's political problems are due to the dialectical relationships between the two publics. I shall characterize these two publics and attempt to explain some of Africa's political features within the matrix of these publics. In order to give some empirical content to the distinction drawn here, I shall illustrate the issues raised with examples from Nigeria.
Segal and Cover (1989) analyzed the content of newspaper editorials to devise measures of the ideological values of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. Because their measures came from sources independent of the judicial vote, scholars have widely adopted them. This note updates, backdates, and extends the Segal and Cover research by adding the two Bush appointees and the seven Roosevelt and four Truman nominees whose service extended beyond the start of the Vinson Court. While we find that the ideological values of the Eisenhower through Bush appointees correlate strongly with votes cast in economic and civil liberties cases, the results are less robust for justices appointed by Roosevelt and Truman.
Models and Methods in Social Network Analysis, first published in 2005, presents the most important developments in quantitative models and methods for analyzing social network data that have appeared during the 1990s. Intended as a complement to Wasserman and Faust's Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, it is a collection of articles by leading methodologists reviewing advances in their particular areas of network methods. Reviewed are advances in network measurement, network sampling, the analysis of centrality, positional analysis or blockmodelling, the analysis of diffusion through networks, the analysis of affiliation or 'two-mode' networks, the theory of random graphs, dependence graphs, exponential families of random graphs, the analysis of longitudinal network data, graphical techniques for exploring network data, and software for the analysis of social networks.
A new measure of centrality, CF, is introduced. It is based on the concept of network flows. While conceptually similar to Freeman's original measure, CB, the new measure differs from the original in two important ways. First, CF is defined for both valued and non-valued graphs. This makes CF applicable to a wider variety of network datasets. Second, the computation of CF is not based on geodesic paths as is CB but on all the independent paths between all pairs of points in the network.
Systematic study of changes in support for the U.S. Supreme Court across time has not been undertaken. Armed with a time series of observations from 1966 through 1984, I provide a description of the ebb and flow of public esteem for the Court. Then I outline and test several plausible propositions about the dynamics of support. Statistical analyses compel the conclusion that apart from a relatively constant core of support, increases in judicial activism, inflation, and solicitude for the rights of the accused decreased confidence in the Court; the events surrounding Watergate and increases in presidential popularity and the public salience of the Court brought about increased popular esteem for the high bench. Previous scholars, based on cross-sections of individuals, have emphasized the public's ignorance of and disinterest in the Supreme Court and judicial policy making. The responsiveness of public support for the Court in the aggregate to political events and shifts in the behavior of the justices stands in stark contrast to the conventional image of United States citizenry as singularly out of touch with and unmoved by the Supreme Court.
This special issue proposes a relational approach to the study of judicial politics outside of Western democracies. The articles illuminate how common political interests, ideas, social identity, family and professional ties and even patron–client obligations between judges and other actors shape a variety of phenomena of interest to the study of judicial institutions, in terms of how the judiciary is organised and administered, how judges are appointed and make decisions, and the prospects for judicial reform. Collectively, the articles explore the informal dimension of judicial politics in a systematic fashion, through
rich empirical case studies in very different contexts. Thus, they help structure a new comparative agenda for research on informal judicial politics outside of the West.
During the 1990s, judicial reform swept Latin America. While some of the region's supreme courts have been able to exercise increased power as a result of these reforms, others have not. Why do some instances of judicial reform appear to be leading to the development of a powerful judiciary while others have failed to do so? In this careful analysis, Jodi S. Finkel investigates judicial reform in Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. She suggests that while ruling parties can be induced to initiate judicial reforms by introducing constitutional revisions, they often prove unwilling to implement these constitutional changes by enacting required legislation. To understand the outcomes of judicial reform, as well as to predict where reforms are likely to empower courts, it is necessary to examine the political incentives faced by politicians at the implementation phase. Finkel argues that the implementation of judicial reform may serve the ruling party as an insurance policy, in that a strong judicial branch reduces the risks faced by a ruling party once it loses power and becomes the opposition. Finkel suggests that as the ruling party's probability of reelection declines, the likelihood of the enactment of reforms resulting in an empowered judiciary increases.
Presenting a theory to explain how politics revolves around one axis of social cleavage instead of another, Daniel Posner examines Zambia, where people identify themselves either as members of one of the country's seventy-three tribes or as members of one of its four principal language groups. Drawing on a simple model of identity choice, Posner demonstrates that the answer depends on whether the country is operating under single-party or multi-party rule, thus revealing how formal institutional rules determine the social cleavages that matter.
To what extent do courts in Latin America protect individual rights and limit governments? This volume answers these fundamental questions by bringing together today's leading scholars of judicial politics. Drawing on examples from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica and Bolivia, the authors demonstrate that there is widespread variation in the performance of Latin America's constitutional courts. In accounting for this variation, the contributors push forward ongoing debates about what motivates judges; whether institutions, partisan politics and public support shape inter-branch relations; and the importance of judicial attitudes and legal culture. The authors deploy a range of methods, including qualitative case studies, paired country comparisons, statistical analysis and game theory.
A longitudinal case study of Chile that assesses competing hypotheses regarding judicial behavior in both democratic and undemocratic contexts, this book explores the relevance of regime-related factors, judges' personal policy preferences, social class, and legal philosophy, but argues that institutional features grounded in the ideal of –apoliticism— best explain the persistent failure of Chilean judges to take stands in defense of rights and rule of law principles, before, during, and after the authoritarian interlude. Dr. Hilbink offers comparative examples to support broader theoretical claims about when judges will be willing and able to assert their independence against abuses of public power.
This book is the first in-depth study of the actual role that the Russian Constitutional Court played in protecting fundamental rights and resolving legislative-executive struggles and federalism disputes in both Yeltsin's and Putin's Russia. Trochev argues that judicial empowerment is a non-linear process with unintended consequences and that courts that depend on their reputation flourish only if an effective and capable state is there to support them. This is because judges can rely only on the authoritativeness of their judgments, unlike politicians and bureaucrats, who have the material resources necessary to respond to judicial decisions. Drawing upon systematic analysis of all decisions of the Russian Court (published and unpublished) and previously unavailable materials on their (non-)implementation, and resting on a combination of the approaches from comparative politics, law, and public administration, this book shows how and why judges attempted to reform Russia's governance and fought to ensure compliance with their judgments.
This book examines the complex relationship that exists between the construction of judicial power, and the institutional characteristics of the courts and their regime setting. It examines the intriguing connection between the construction of judicial power on the one hand, and the institutional characteristics of the courts and regime setting on the other. The book asks whether courts are rendered powerful by virtue of their institutional characteristics or by a supportive, perhaps acquiescent, regime setting.
The creation of constitutional courts is a political affair because the judicial review of laws and competences potentially curbs the power of the elected branches. This paper seeks to explain the spread of constitutional courts and the extent of their formal independence. Our comparison
of nine former French colonies in West Africa is built upon (a) the combination of the two competing theories of international diffusion and domestic strategic action–the political insurance model–and (b) a new, theoretically and arithmetically refined index of formal independence.
The empirical analysis in this area of similar political context supports the argument that global trends and foreign reference models set a minimum standard and that interests in political insurance determine the deviations from institutional diffusion.
The social construction of judicial power is a complicated process, especially in hybrid political regimes. We argue that off-bench resistance against blatant interference supported by vibrant social networks is an important manifestation of judicial autonomy. By drawing on evidence from field research, media coverage, and the existing scholarly literature, we clarify the logic of off-bench judicial resistance against external interference, outline a taxonomy of five strategies of resistance in hybrid regimes, and explain the political implications of off-bench judicial behavior.
The last decade has seen the judiciary's legitimacy come under increasing scrutiny as more and more sensitive and politically charged battles are fought in the courts. These have not only placed constitutional adjudicators in awkward situations but raised questions about how they are chosen. The process of selecting judges, generally, is probably one of the most powerful and effective means that could be used by the other two branches of government to interfere with and influence the judiciary. Are they chosen through procedures that ensure the appointment of persons based on their technical and professional merit as well as their ability to decide matters independently, objectively and fairly? Is there any constitutional design that can facilitate the appointment of the calibre of independent-minded judges that are needed at a time of tremendous change and when the threats to sustaining Africa's fragile attempts to entrench an ethos of constitutionalism, good governance, protect human rights and respect for the rule of law is under siege by pro-authoritarian forces masquerading as democrats?
Scholars of the U.S. Supreme Court have emphasized two main sources of the court's ability to protect its institutional integrity and ensure compliance with its decisions: public support and the competing ambitions of actors under the separation of powers. These explanations of court authority can be tested through the experience of other countries. After its establishment in 1951, the German constitutional court fit these explanations well. Propositions generated in the American context are thus generalizable. However, neither public support nor institutional rivalries are necessary for courts' authority. Case study methods, as employed here for Germany, are useful in supplementing statistical studies to evaluate strategic theories.
For the eighth consecutive year, Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s annual report on the condition of global political rights and civil liberties, showed a global decline in freedom. While the overall level of regression was not severe, the countries experiencing setbacks included a worrying number of strategically or economically significant states whose political trajectories influence developments well beyond their borders.
This article examines the development of constitutional politics under the Fifth Republic. In particular, it investigates the logics underlying constitutional vetoes. It shows that data for the French case do not support existing theories of veto politics. Therefore, the article develops an electoral theory of veto politics. It emphasises the fact that the incentives generated by electoral competition shape the signalling game between legislative majority, legislative minority and the Constitutional Council. The structure of this game fuels a high level of vetoes and explains the pattern of vetoing in France.
Systematic study of changes in support for the U.S. Supreme Court across time has not been undertaken. Armed with a time series of observations from 1966 through 1984, I provide a description of the ebb and flow of public esteem for the Court. Then I outline and test several plausible propositions about the dynamics of support. Statistical analyses compel the conclusion that apart from a relatively constant core of support, increases in judicial activism, inflation, and solicitude for the rights of the accused decreased confidence in the Court; the events surrounding Watergate and increases in presidential popularity and the public salience of the Court brought about increased popular esteem for the high bench. Previous scholars, based on cross-sections of individuals, have emphasized the public's ignorance of and disinterest in the Supreme Court and judicial policy making. The responsiveness of public support for the Court in the aggregate to political events and shifts in the behavior of the justices stands in stark contrast to the conventional image of United States citizenry as singularly out of touch with and unmoved by the Supreme Court.
The book is motivated by a disjuncture in social science research on ethnicity, politics and economics: Although theories of the formation of ethnic groups are driven by the constructivist assumption that ethnic identities can change over time, theories of the effect of ethnicity on economic and political outcomes are driven by the primordialist assumption that these identities are fixed. This book is a first cut at building-and rebuilding-our theories of politics and economics on a fortified constructivist foundation. It proposes a new conceptual framework for thinking about ethnic identity. It uses this framework to synthesize constructivist arguments into a set of testable propositions about how and why ethnic identities change. It translates this framework-and the propositions derived from it-into a new, combinatorial language. And it employs these conceptual, constructivist, and combinatorial tools to theorize about the relationship between ethnicity, politics and economics using a variety of methods. Taking the possibility of change in ethnic identity into account, this book shows, dismantles the theoretical logics linking ethnic diversity to negative outcomes and processes such as democratic destabilization, clientelism, riots and state collapse. Even more importantly, it changes the questions we can ask about the relationship between ethnicity, politics and economics.
Constitutional courts are often considered to be ‘veto players’ or ‘third chambers of parliament’. However, no attention has been paid to the composition of European constitutional courts and how they make decisions. Do European judges exhibit political preferences as their US counterparts do? If so, it is important to know who selects the judges as the selection determines the outcome. This article analyses the composition of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the French Conseil constitutionnel. It tests the correlation between the party affiliation of the pivotal judge and oppositional success empirically for all abstract reviews filed between 1974 and 2002. In both countries the likelihood of an oppositional victory or defeat varies with the ideological position of the pivotal judge. This leads to the conclusion that European judges decide on the basis of their political preferences like their US counterparts.
What role do courts play in the establishment and maintenance of constitutional democracies? To address this question, we elaborate a model that draws on existing substantive literature and on theories that assume strategic behavior on the part of judges, executives, and legislatures. This model, in turn, leads to several behavioral predictions about the interactions among the relevant political actors. Although those predictions could be assessed in many distinct contexts, we focus on Russia. In particular, we provide a demonstration of how the model helps make sense of the behavior of the Constitutional Court (Konstitucjonnyj sud) in light of the difficult political situation it confronted. We conclude with some thoughts on the broader implications of our theory for the study of courts throughout Eastern Europe and how it may well illuminate constitutional politics in other parts of the world.
Latin America has witnessed an undeniable increase in the importance of courts in policy debates, in debates about the rights of citizens and the duties of states, and in controversies across branches of government. This raises the question, whose rights and interests are these courts protecting? Are they perhaps newly empowered by the need to police a more democratic separation of powers? Who benefits from the increasing intervention of courts in politics? Are courts acting autonomously, or as agents of the executive, the legislature, or someone else? In this paper I propose a theoretical and conceptual scheme for explaining the capacity and inclination of courts to effectively police the separation of powers and enforce the rights of citizens. The framework takes into account both the institutional design of courts and their political context and seeks to explain which issues and whose interests the courts will protect with special solicitude. By way of illustrating its utility, I apply the scheme to the STF, the highest constitutional court in Brazil.
Although “judicial independence” is a much revered principle and there is much writing about the conditions needed to support it, the literature on judicial independence lacks a clear and coherent sense of what judicial independence is. In this chapter I apply the general account I gave of judicial independence in the introduction to a 2001 international book on judicial independence to the essays written for this volume which focuses on Canada. I find that most of the conditions that I submitted were essential ingredients of judicial independence are discussed in the contributions to this book. But I also find that there is a tendency to conflate judicial independence with judicial impartiality or with one particular condition for safeguarding judicial independence. The contents of the book indicate to me that the gravest threats to judicial independence in Canada stem from populist law and order conservatism and undue partisan political influence on the appointment and promotion of judges by the federal government.
We test the efficacy of judicial independence in preventing regime reversals toward authoritarianism. Using a dataset of judicial constraints across 163 different countries from 1960 to 2000, we find that established independent judiciaries prevent regime changes toward authoritarianism across all types of states. Established courts are also capable of thwarting regime collapses in nondemocracies. These results provide some of the first large-n evidence confirming the ability of the judiciary to maintain regime stability. Unfortunately, however, the beneficial effects of court systems seem to take time to develop. The evidence indicates that newly formed courts are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and nondemocracies.
Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experience of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development and other aspects of material welfare. The findings, several most surprising, dispel any notion of a trade-off between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies. Political regimes have no impact on the growth of total national incomes, while political instability affects growth only in dictatorships. Per capita incomes grow faster in democracies since population increases faster under dictatorships. In general, political regimes have more of an effect on demography than on economics.
Part I. Introduction: Networks, Relations, and Structure: 1. Relations and networks in the social and behavioral sciences 2. Social network data: collection and application Part II. Mathematical Representations of Social Networks: 3. Notation 4. Graphs and matrixes Part III. Structural and Locational Properties: 5. Centrality, prestige, and related actor and group measures 6. Structural balance, clusterability, and transitivity 7. Cohesive subgroups 8. Affiliations, co-memberships, and overlapping subgroups Part IV. Roles and Positions: 9. Structural equivalence 10. Blockmodels 11. Relational algebras 12. Network positions and roles Part V. Dyadic and Triadic Methods: 13. Dyads 14. Triads Part VI. Statistical Dyadic Interaction Models: 15. Statistical analysis of single relational networks 16. Stochastic blockmodels and goodness-of-fit indices Part VII. Epilogue: 17. Future directions.
Conceptual Distance in Social Network Analysis
- Anthony Dekker
Dekker, Anthony (2005) Conceptual Distance in Social Network Analysis. Journal of Social Structure 6(3).
Boni Yayi: Le vrai visage de la conquête du pouvoir
- Marie Gnanih
- Ruz
Gnanih, Marie Ruz (2008) Boni Yayi: Le vrai visage de la conquête du pouvoir. Cotonou: Alpha Com.
Ideology and African Political Culture
- Ali Mazrui
- Al'amin
Mazrui, Ali Al'amin (2001) Ideology and African Political Culture. In Teodros Kiros (ed) Explorations in
African Political Thought. New York, NY: Routledge, 97-132.
Nicéphore Soglo décidé à installer les autres institutions de contre-pouvoir
- Léon Brathier
Léon Brathier (1993) Nicéphore Soglo décidé à installer les autres institutions de contre-pouvoir. La
Nation (Cotonou), 7 June.
Pour que le Bénin ne tourne pas en rond. La Nation
- Akutété Assevi
Akutété Assevi (1993) Pour que le Bénin ne tourne pas en rond. La Nation, 8 June.
Mme Pognon victime d'un complot
- Charles Toko
Charles Toko (1998) Mme Pognon victime d'un complot. Le Matinal (Cotonou), 27 May; Agapit
Napoléon (1998) En suspens. Coup de force. Le Matinal, 2 June.
Une alternance quand même. La Nation
- Roman-Phillipe Assogba
Roman-Phillipe Assogba (1998) Une alternance quand même. La Nation, 28 May.
- Charles Toko
Charles Toko (1998) La Cour constitutionnelle
enfin au complet. Le Matinal, 6 June.
Suspicion et réalité. La Nation
- Edgard Couao-Zotti
Edgard Couao-Zotti (2008) Suspicion et réalité. La Nation, 5 March.