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1
China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative
Heng Wang*
Journal of International Economic Law, Volume 22, 2019 (forthcoming)
Abstract: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China’s most significant strategic
move for engagement with its partners following its accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO). As a new form of regional multilateralism, the BRI is a hub-
and-spoke network with China as the hub. This paper analyses China’s approach to
the BRI from a legal perspective, focusing on two questions: first, is there an
identifiable approach that China adopts in the BRI context; and second, what is the
essence that underlies this project? The article argues that China’s approach to the
BRI has three primary qualities: it is (i) less-institutionally focused; (ii) non-treaty-
based; and (iii) proactive rather than reactive. However, the stability of these
characteristics across different contexts should not be exaggerated, since China chiefly
employs a “middle-of-the-road” strategy in engaging with the BRI. Flexibility is
arguably the essence of China’s approach, and reflects the government’s adaptive
attitude. Such a path not only diverges from China’s engagement with the WTO, but
also could constitute a kind of Chinese counter-model to deep trade agreements
pursued by developed economies.
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................2
II. A less institutionally-focused approach ..........................................................................3
A. The selective innovation of informal or related institutional mechanisms ......................4
B. The BRI as a hub-and-spoke network .............................................................................6
III. A non-treaty-based approach ..........................................................................................7
A. The maximized mobilization of soft law .........................................................................7
B. The continued relevance of treaties .............................................................................10
C. The possible hardening of soft law? .............................................................................11
IV. A proactive approach ...................................................................................................13
A. A shift to a proactive approach ....................................................................................13
1. An evolution in Chinese practices .............................................................................13
2. The upgrade to a proactive approach .......................................................................14
* Associate Professor and Co-Director of CIBEL (China International Business and
Economic Law) Initiative, Faculty of Law, the University of New South Wales; University
Visiting Professorial Fellow, Southwest University of Political Science and Law. Email:
heng.wang1@unsw.edu.au.
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers, Tomer Broude, Markus Wagner, Shen Wei,
Mark Feldman, David A. Gantz, Locknie Hsu, Pasha L. Hsieh, Yip Man, Bin Gu, Donald
Lewis, Jingxia Shi, Manjiao Chi, Peter K. Yu, Rosalind Dixon, Bronwen Morgan, Daniel
Joyce, Simon Lester, Giuseppe Martinico, Julien Chaisse, Qingjiang Kong, Congyan Cai,
Tong Qi, and participants at the 2017 Tsinghua-UNSW Workshop, Oxford University One
Belt One Road Summit, the conference “The Emergence of New and Dynamic China-Africa
Economic Relationships” for their insightful comments, and my presentations at SWUPL,
and China University of Political Science and Law, and to Melissa Vogt and Hamish
Collings-Begg for excellent assistance and comments. All errors are my own.
2
B. Prioritized and ambitious movements on dispute settlement? ....................................18
1. Courts’ efforts to reach the BRI goal .........................................................................19
2. Institutional development to affect international norms ..........................................20
C. Passiveness in engagement with sensitive or unclear aspects ......................................21
V. The Essence of China’s Approach to the BRI: Flexibility? ...........................................22
VI. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................25
I. Introduction
As “the most ambitious geo-economic vision in recent history”, the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) could involve around 70 countries and over two-thirds of the global
population.
1
China has taken many steps to promote the BRI, ranging from various
BRI projects to establishing an expanded trade and investment network. Closely
related to the BRI, a $40 billion Silk Road Fund (SRF) was established in 2014, with
the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) occurring the following
year. Other institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB), could also
contribute to the BRI. The BRI could involve legal, economic, geopolitical,
development, and security considerations. It remains open whether the BRI will lead
to fundamental changes in political and economic philosophy in global governance.
2
The BRI is part of regional multilateralism,
3
with multilateralism here referring to
“the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states,
through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions.”
4
The BRI represents
China’s most significant strategic move for engagement with its partners after its
accession to the WTO in 2001. In China’s view, the BRI augurs and builds a
community of shared destiny.
5
China’s BRI Action Plan calls for the creation of “an
open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture.”
6
More
specifically, the BRI is an essential part of Chinese trade and investment initiatives to
advance regional and wider economic integration.
7
China utilizes its status as a
1
Jonathan Hillman, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later(2018), available at
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/ts180125_hillman_testimony.pdf?mSTOaqZbgZdRpx4QWoSt1HtIa4fN42
uX.
2
Michael M. Du, China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Context, Focus, Institutions, and
Implications, 2 THE CHINESE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 30, 43 (2016).
3
Weifeng Zhou & Mario Esteban, Beyond Balancing: China’s Approach Towards the Belt and
Road Initiative, JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1, 10 (2018).
4
Robert O. Keohane, Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research, 45 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 731,
731 (1990).
5
He Lifeng, Belt and Road Initiative Builds Human Community of Shared Destiny(2018),
available at https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/wksl/14789.htm.
6
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Full text: Action Plan on the Belt
and Road Initiative Part I (2015).
7
Joshua P. Meltzer, China’s One Belt One Road initiative: A view from the United
States(Jun. 19, 2017), available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-one-belt-one-
road-initiative-a-view-from-the-united-states/.
3
leading trading nation (both in export and import) to promote the BRI.
8
In turn, the
BRI can also help China to increase its importance in the world economy by
expanding trade and investment.
It is crucial to understand China’s approach to the BRI.
9
On the one hand, this
approach has not yet been fully explored through the lens of law and, in particular,
international economic law.
10
Current research on China’s approach is often
conducted through lenses other than law, such as political science and international
relations.
11
On the other hand, this approach profoundly affects China’s future
engagement in international economic law since the initiative is its major strategic
move. Therefore, this article explores two questions from a legal perspective: first,
what is China’s approach to the BRI; and second, what is the true essence of this
approach? Parts two to four explore three facets of China’s approach to the BRI: first,
that it is less institutionally-focused; second, that it is not treaty-based; and third, that
it is proactive. This discussion is followed by Part five, which probes into the essence
of China’s approach. Part six concludes by reflecting on the implications and future of
the approach.
This article provides a deeper understanding of China’s paths forward for
participating in the international economic legal order. It should be noted that this
article focuses on China’s approach to the BRI rather than the merits of BRI projects
and rules,
12
which deserve separate analysis.
II. A less institutionally-focused approach
As a preliminary step, it is helpful to look at the structure of non-domestic-law
13
documents and rules that may apply to the BRI. Although it is difficult to list all of
them, these documents and rules can be classified under two categories.
The first category comprises BRI-specific documents,
14
including bilateral
documents, that specifically refer to the BRI and deal with relevant issues. Notably, it
8
Dilip K. Das, A Chinese Renaissance in an Unremittingly Integrating Asian Economy, 18
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 321, 321-338 (2009).
9
Although one could argue that the BRI is a Chinese initiative, China needs its own approach
to the BRI so that it can deal with situations or problems therein.
10
It seems that current research often addressed investment or bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) issues in respect of the BRI. See, e.g., Shu Zhang, China’s Approach in Drafting the
Investor-State Arbitration Clause: A Review from the ‘Belt and Road’ Regions’ Perspective,
THE CHINESE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 1-31 (2017);Vivienne Bath, "One Belt, One
Road" and Chinese Investment 1-36 (2016).
11
For the most recent research, see, e.g., Zhou & Esteban, JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA, 1-
15 (2018);Yong Wang, Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China's New
Grand Strategy, 29 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 455, 455-463 (2016).
12
A clear definition of BRI projects seems to be lacking.
13
Given the space limit, it is difficult to analyse the national law of the large number of the
BRI states.
14
For many of BRI-specific documents, see, HKTDC, The Belt and Road Initiative:
Implementation Plans and Co-operation Agreements(January 10, 2018), available at
http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-
4
is difficult to find “formal legal sources, either domestic or international” regarding
the BRI.
15
These BRI-specific documents are often soft law, which, as discussed
below, is understood here to include hortatory rather than legally binding
obligations.
16
Moreover, BRI-specific documents usually involve states and
international organizations. An example of the former is the Memorandum of
Arrangement (MOA) on the BRI between China and New Zealand (China-New
Zealand MOA),
17
while an example of the latter is the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between China’s National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) (UNECE-NDRC MOU).
18
The other category consists of BRI-related rules, which do not refer to the BRI but
can be applied to trade and investment under the BRI. They include WTO rules and
preferential trade and investment agreements (PTIAs), including free trade agreements
(FTAs), and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
19
BRI-specific documents are
representative of how the initiative is intended to operate, while BRI-related rules play
an important role in the actual practice of the initiative.
A. The selective innovation of informal or related institutional mechanisms
It is more correct to observe that the BRI is less institutionally-focused, rather than
operating without any institutional arrangement whatsoever. The BRI does not have a
stringent international institutional structure in the legal sense. It lacks a rigid
regulative legal structure,
20
or an overarching institutional system, consisting, for
example, of plenary and executive organs, and a regional dispute settlement agency
(like a multilateral court).
21
There does not seem to be a clear plan for a strict BRI
legal framework.
Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Implementation-Plans-and-Co-operation-
Agreements/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A3857.htm.
15
Lingliang Zeng, Conceptual Analysis of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Road towards a
Regional Community of Common Destiny, 15 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 517, 539
(2016).
16
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, Internaitonal Soft Law, 2 JOURNAL OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS 171, 172 (2010).
17
Memorandum of Arrangement on Strengthening Cooperation on the Belt and Road
Initiative Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of
New Zealand (2017).
18
Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe and the National Development and Reform Commission of China (2017).
19
It should be noted that there is a trilateral investment treaty: China-Japan-Korea Investment
Agreement. For the sake of simplicity, BITs are deemed to include this trilateral investment
agreement in this article.
20
Maria Adele Carrai, It Is Not the End of History: The Financing Institutions of the Belt and
Road Initiative and the Bretton Woods System, 14 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT
1, 2-3 (2017).
21
Zeng, CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 527 (2016);Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and
investment adjudication involving ‘silk road projects’: Legal methodology challenges 15
(2018).
5
Instead, China has adopted a dual-track approach towards the BRI’s interaction
with institutions. On one track, the BRI utilizes and builds on existing bilateral and
multilateral arrangements and mechanisms in various fields such as energy.
22
In this
respect, one may argue that the BRI proceeds on a largely ad hoc basis. Current
mechanisms include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Asia Cooperation
Dialogue (ACD), Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in
Asia (CICA), China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), China-Gulf
Cooperation Council Strategic Dialogue, Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)
Economic Cooperation, and Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
(CAREC).
23
There are regional platforms focusing on the link with regions other than
Asia, particularly the 16+1 Group (G16+1), involving China and Central and Eastern
European states (CEEs), that was established in 2012 in Warsaw, over a year ahead of
the announcement of the BRI.
24
Some of the mechanisms are not limited to BRI
states, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
On the other track, China has undertaken selective innovation in respect of BRI-
related mechanisms or informal institutional arrangements. This reflects China’s
desire for “new models of international cooperation and global governance”,
25
and the
Chinese government’s view of the BRI as “an important international public good.”
26
To promote China’s global governance ambitions,
27
China has developed BRI-related
institutions (particularly the AIIB), and sponsored informal BRI multilateral
mechanisms of various kinds. The latter include the Belt and Road Forum for
International Cooperation (BRF) that is to be regularly held,
28
and BRI platforms for
commercial arbitration.
29
As an illustration, the Asian Financial Cooperation
Association (AFCA) has been established as one outcome of the BRF, which is
reported to be “work[ing] to establish a liaison mechanism,... an information sharing
22
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part V. 2015;Vision and Actions on
Energy Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime
Silk Road(2017), available at
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201705/201705161049036.pdf
.
23
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part V. 2015.
24
Manzoor Ahmad, et al., One Belt One Road Initiative (“OBOR”): Editorial, 14 TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 1, 1 (2017).
25
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part I. 2015.
26
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Holds Briefing for Chinese and Foreign Media on President Xi
Jinping's Attendance and Chairing of Related Events of the BRF(Apr. 18, 2017), available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1455115.shtml.
27
Alice Ekman, China’s New Silk Roads: A Flexible Implementation Process, in THREE
YEARS OF CHINA'S NEW SILK ROADS: FROM WORDS TO (RE)ACTION? 15, (Alice Ekman, et al.
eds., Feb. 2017).
28
China.org.cn, Full text: List of Deliverables of the Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation(Jun. 7, 2017), available at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2017-
06/07/content_40983146.htm.(the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation is to
be held regularly)
29
Ekman, 15. Feb. 2017.
6
platform, as well as a regional financial idea exchange platform.”
30
The BRF could
develop as a major BRI negotiation avenue or forum,
31
and a way to collect ideas and
responses according to which the BRI could be shaped and adjusted.
32
However, the
current institutional development does not involve BRI-specific institutions with a
stringent or rigid legal structure, as discussed above.
B. The BRI as a hub-and-spoke network
The BRI is of a hub-and-spoke networked nature with China as the hub, which
helps to develop “an international environment of prosperity and stability friendly to
China.”
33
The BRI strategy aims for “an ambitious China Circle.”
34
This networked
nature can be seen particularly in the BRI’s framework and documents. First, the
initiative provides an organizing framework rather than a strict institutional structure.
The BRI lacks an “institutional framework or decision-making mechanism through
which participating countries are connected with one another.”
35
The initiative is
neither a top-down (through the imposition of multinational treaties) nor bottom-up
approach.
36
Instead, China intends to build a partnership network through the BRF,
37
which reflects its desire to build a “a global network of partnership.”
38
Accordingly,
the BRI is loosely organized:
39
the new or existing bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms utilized by the BRI are often “loose” mechanisms (like dialogues or
forums), which highlight communication and consultation.
40
These mechanisms, such
as the G16+1, could develop into networks of national regulators.
Second, BRI-related and BRI-specific documents form a kind of loosely connected
network. The BRI is based on “a series of unrelated but nonetheless interconnected
30
Li Xiang, Asian Financial Cooperation Association Launched in Beijing(July 24, 2017),
available at https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d67444e796b444e/share_p.html.
31
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Holds Briefing for Chinese and Foreign Media on President Xi
Jinping's Attendance and Chairing of Related Events of the BRF. Apr. 18, 2017.(During the
BRF, it is expected that "China will negotiate and sign cooperation documents with nearly 20
countries and over 20 international organizations")
32
Ekman, 13. Feb. 2017.
33
William H. Overholt, One Belt, One Road, One Pivot(Sep. 26, 2015), available at
http://theoverholtgroup.com/media/Article-Southeast-Asia/One-Belt-One-Road-One-Pivot-
Global-Asia-Corrected-Oct2015.pdf.
34
Shuaihua Cheng, China’s New Silk Road: Implications for the US(2015), available at
http://e15initiative.org/blogs/chinas-new-silk-road-implications-for-the-us/.
35
Vinay Kaura, Understanding India’s response to China’s Belt and Road(10 June 2017),
available at http://www.atimes.com/understanding-indias-response-chinas-obor/.
36
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization: Top down, Bottom up — And Now Sideways?
The Impact of the IP Provisions of Megaregional Agreements on Third Party States 4 (2017).
37
Xinhua, Belt and Road Forum Agenda Set, China Daily(April 18, 2017), available at
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/18/content_28982925.htm.
38
Xinhua, Xi Eyes More Enabling Int'l Environment for China's Peaceful Development(2014),
available at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/894240.shtml.
39
Greening the belt and road initiative: WWF's recommendations for the finance
sector(2018), available at http://www.sustainablefinance.hsbc.com/our-reports/greening-
the-belt-and-road-initiative.
40
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part V. 2015.
7
bilateral trade pacts and partnerships.”
41
In particular, the BRI utilizes a network of
predominantly non-binding bilateral agreements (like MOUs).
42
The non-binding
MOUs under the BRI show China’s intention to engage with other parties through a
less rigid structure, while these documents create network effects.
43
These documents
appear to gradually be forming a set of instruments for policy coordination on
financial integration, trade liberalization, and people-to-people connectivity across
Asia and beyond.
44
Such a policy coordination network may expand: these BRI-
specific instruments will in all likelihood increase in number, as evidenced by the BRI
Action Plan which calls for more MOUs between China and other states in areas such
as cooperation in bilateral financial regulation.
45
Notably, the BRI is a network with considerable thought put into it, rather than
being haphazard. China has taken a gradual approach to the BRI and developed a plan
(such as devising economic corridors to promote China’s trade and linkage with BRI
states
46
).
That said, it remains to be seen whether the BRI will establish a strict institutional
arrangement in the long term, as the structure of the BRI is currently at a rudimentary
development stage. The BRI may grow into a legal framework or remain as an open
forum or framework.
47
III. A non-treaty-based approach
A. The maximized mobilization of soft law
China adopts a non-treaty-based approach to the BRI.
48
There is no BRI-wide
treaty or similar international law instrument establishing the BRI. The BRI neither
has a constituting treaty with all BRI states (a BRI-wide treaty), as is the case with
international organizations, nor formal membership protocols.
49
Moreover, it does not
have many formal international law instruments (e.g., few new BRI-specific treaty
obligations), unlike most mega-regional agreements.
41
Wade Shepard, Why the Ambiguity of China's Belt and Road Initiative Is Perhaps Its
Biggest Strength, Forbes(October 19, 2017), available at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/10/19/what-chinas-belt-and-road-
initiative-is-really-all-about/#49dc2a4be4de.
42
Donald J. Lewis & Diana Moise, OBOR Roadmaps: The Legal and Policy Frameworks, 14
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 1, 8 (2017).
43
Id. at, 10, 19-20.
44
Tommi Yu, China’s ‘One Belt, One Road Initiative’: What’s in It for Law Firms and
Lawyers?, 5 THE CHINESE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 2 (2017).
45
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part IV. 2015.
46
HKTDC, The Belt and Road Initiative(September 13, 2017), available at http://china-trade-
research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-
Initiative/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36B7.htm.
47
Julien Chaisse & Matsushita Mitsuo, China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: Mapping the
World Trade Normative and Strategic Implications, 52 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 1, 23
(2018).
48
Given the different definitions of soft law, it is perhaps more accurate to use the term
“non-treaty-based approach”.
49
Shepard. October 19, 2017.
8
China has frequently mobilized soft law under the BRI, which in this paper is
understood as consisting of hortatory rather than legally binding obligations. Despite
the lack of an accepted definition of soft law, the term usually refers to “any written
international instrument, other than a treaty, containing principles, norms, standards,
or other statements of expected behavior.”
50
First, BRI-specific documents are not binding. China seems to prefer avoiding
treaties with measurable compliance requirements in favor of less formal but more
flexible arrangements.
51
BRI-specific documents call for voluntary cooperation
instead of hard law-imposing treaty obligations backed by enforcement mechanisms.
For example, the MOA and MOUs under the BRI are non-binding documents.
52
The
documents are carefully drafted; for example, the China-New Zealand MOA typically
uses the word ‘will’ rather than ‘shall.’
Second, soft law under the BRI should be understood according to its own terms
and different contexts. BRI-specific documents are devised ad hoc, and vary
dramatically: there are general cooperation agreements,
53
guiding principles,
54
joint
communiques (a major one is the Joint Communique of the Leaders Roundtable of the
Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF Joint Communique)),
55
joint
statements,
56
agreements,
57
an MOA (i.e., the China-New Zealand MOA), MOUs,
58
a
letter of intent,
59
initiatives,
60
and consensuses.
61
50
Dinah L. Shelton, Soft Law 3 (2008).
51
Du, THE CHINESE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 40 (2016).
52
Decision time: Australia’s engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. (2017).
53
Vivienne Bath, The South and Alternative Models of Trade and Investment Regulation:
Chinese Investment and Approaches to International Investment Agreements, in
RECONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 80,
(Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin eds., 2017).
54
See, e.g., Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road (2017).
55
Joint Communique of the Leaders Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for
International Cooperation (2017).
56
OFFICE OF THE LEADING GROUP FOR THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE, BUILDING THE BELT
AND ROAD: CONCEPT, PRACTICE AND CHINA’S CONTRIBUTION 26 (Foreign Languages Press
first ed. 2017).(e.g., Chongqing Joint Statement related to quarantine cooperation, and Joint
Statement on the Belt and Road Food Safety Cooperation)
57
China.org.cn. Jun. 7, 2017.(e.g., Intergovernmental Agreement on the Peaceful Use of
Nuclear Energy with the government of Thailand)
58
See, e.g., id. at.(MOU in the Field of Water Resources with the government of Malaysia,
and the UNECE-NDRC MOU)
59
Letter of Intent between the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China on Promoting
Regional Connectivity and the Belt and Road Initiative (2016).
60
See, e.g., Initiative on Promoting Unimpeded Trade Cooperation along the Belt and Road
Released in Beijing(May 16, 2017), available at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201705/20170502578235.s
html.
61
See, e.g., Suzhou Consensus of the Conference of Presidents of Supreme Courts of China
and Central and Eastern European Countries(May 5, 2017), available at
http://www.sohu.com/a/73518080_117927.
9
These BRI-specific documents are patchy among BRI states, given the huge
variation among these countries. They are adapted to BRI states and international
organizations (e.g., the China-New Zealand MOA, and UNECE-NDRC MOU), areas
and sectors (e.g., the MOU in the Field of Water Resources with the Government of
Malaysia), or projects (e.g., the Protocol on Establishment of Joint Ocean Observation
Station with the Ministry of Environment of Cambodia).
62
They need to be understood
on a case-by-case basis. As an example, the China-New Zealand MOA calls for,
among other things, the upgrade of the China-New Zealand FTA and cooperation at
the multilateral level (e.g., the AIIB).
63
One of its three cooperation principles calls for
adherence to “international good practice, market orientation and professional
principles” in the promotion of cooperation under the BRI.
64
This MOA should be
read with the China-New Zealand FTA, the AIIB, and the cooperation principles.
Third, soft law instruments rarely bring substantial normative development under
the BRI. The normative development of the BRI is at a very embryonic stage. BRI-
specific documents often contain statements of expected behavior (particularly
common policy priorities), and to a lesser degree, principles. The call for expected
behavior is often vague and general, such as “a long-term, stable, sustainable
financing system that is well-placed to manage risks”.
65
Taking Suzhou Consensus of
the Conference of Presidents of Supreme Courts of China and Central and Eastern
European Countries as an example, it emphasizes, among other aspects, judicial
efficiency, the unification of judicial practice, and “clear, precise and predictable
jurisprudence”.
66
Additionally, BRI-specific documents sometimes set out principles.
The China-New Zealand MOA indicates principles, including “wide consultation,
joint contribution and shared benefits,” the enhancement of existing bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms, and the consistency with international good practice, market
orientation and professional principles.
67
These soft law documents make it easier to build consensus through information
sharing and persuasion without concerns around treaty ratification or litigation.
68
For
instance, the UNECE-NDRC MOU aims to promote information sharing through the
dialogue mechanism under the BRI, including a multilateral dialogue mechanism on
62
See e.g. China.org.cn. Jun. 7, 2017.
63
Memorandum of Arrangement on Strengthening Cooperation on the Belt and Road
Initiative Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of
New Zealand Paragraphs III.2, III.4. 2017.
64
Id. at, Paragraphes II.3.
65
Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road. 2017.
66
Suzhou Consensus of the Conference of Presidents of Supreme Courts of China and
Central and Eastern European Countries paragraph VII. May 5, 2017.
67
Memorandum of Arrangement on Strengthening Cooperation on the Belt and Road
Initiative Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government
of New Zealand Paragraph II. 2017.
68
Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements,
and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 706, 709 (2010).
10
the public-private partnership (PPP).
69
However, the effect of soft law is yet to be
determined as it consists of hortatory or even promotional language without an
enforcement mechanism.
B. The continued relevance of treaties
The BRI involves treaties, but these treaties often existed before or outside the BRI
or do not refer to the BRI. A number of reasons for the continued use of treaties exist.
For one, soft law is insufficient to protect investors from the grave risks they face: the
BRI provides for investment largely in jurisdictions where other states and
international financial institutions have been reluctant to invest,
70
and few of these
countries are “noted for the rule of law.”
71
There are obvious downsides to the soft
law approach, particularly the difficulties in enforcement of soft law. In addition, the
reliance on treaties, particularly PTIAs and WTO norms, may be attributed to
difficulties in coordinating among BRI states, transaction costs (in forging a BRI-wide
treaty) and a path dependence.
Therefore, treaties could be utilized when applicable in BRI trade and investment.
First, PTIAs help China strengthen its economic and political relationships with BRI
jurisdictions through, inter alia, important albeit often limited market opening and
investment protection.
Second, WTO rules arguably remain the core of international norms applicable to
BRI-related trade. There are a number of considerations. The fate of the multilateral
system will profoundly affect the BRI, since the BRI will rely on multilateral
mechanisms in global governance.
72
WTO law overall benefits China as a major
goods exporting country, although it has limited coverage, sets WTO-plus obligations
for China, and largely has not been upgraded. Therefore, China supports the
multilateral trading system and endeavors to ensure consistency or alignment with
these norms.
Moreover, most of the BRI countries are WTO members, and WTO norms could
help promote BRI-related trade in prioritized areas. This explains why the WTO
Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA) is the only specific trade agreement that is
referred to in the BRI Action Plan, and its implementation is highlighted.
73
The BRI
could build on the TFA to promote trade facilitation. WTO multilateral agreements in
other areas are also useful, such as those on technical standards and intellectual
property. For WTO plurilateral agreements, the Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA) is particularly relevant,
74
including its rules on non-
69
Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe and the National Development and Reform Commission of China Article 1(1)(d)
2017.(the establishment of a BRI PPP multilateral dialogue mechnism)
70
Avery Goldstein, A Rising China’s Growing Presence: The Challenges of Global
Engagement, in CHINA'S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: COOPERATION, COMPETITION, AND
INFLUENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9, (Avery Goldstein & Jacques Delisle eds., 2017).
71
Peter Ferdinand, Westward Ho—the China Dream and 'One Belt, One Road': Chinese
Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping, 92 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 941, 953 (2016).
72
Zeng, CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 541 (2016).
73
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part IV. 2015.
74
Several BRI countries (including Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine) are party to the GPA,
while China and a number of BRI countries (e.g., Albania, Georgia, and Jordan) are
11
discrimination. On the one hand, Chinese investors will probably bid for government
procurement contracts in the BRI states.
75
On the other hand, accession to the GPA
will help assuage possible criticism about non-transparency or discrimination as
regards public procurement for BRI projects.
Third, other treaties are relevant. For instance, China acceded to the Customs
Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR
76
Carnets
(TIR Convention, 1975) in 2016, which is “the only universal customs transit system
for moving goods across international borders.”
77
The TIR Convention accession is
deemed as a possible “real game changer” for trade that will strongly contribute to the
BRI, since it helps harmonize standards and boost transport, trade and development
across the Eurasian landmass.
78
However, these treaties are not specific to the BRI. WTO norms and the TIR
Convention exist without the BRI, while the legal text of China’s PTIAs with BRI
states concluded after the announcement of the initiative rarely refers to the BRI.
C. The possible hardening of soft law?
China does not stop at soft law, and may utilize soft law to affect, cement or
develop hard law. Hard law could overall be beneficial to China if the norms are
favorable to China, since it would be more effective in helping China to realize the
priorities of the BRI (including policy coordination, and financial integration), and its
goal of refashioning the world economic order.
79
Soft law could be a progressive path
towards becoming hard law.
80
In the mid- to long-term, China may want its preferred rules to gradually obtain
normative status as hard law. China could leverage its political, economic and
technological advantages to promote its national standards in BRI countries, which
may even shape global standards and foster a paradigm change in global standard
development.
81
Through the BRI, China wants to “assume commeasurable
negotiating accession. WTO, Agreement on Government Procurement: Parties, observers
and accessions(2018), available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm.
75
See, e.g. Charlotte Greenfield, New Zealand's far north paves way for China's 'One Belt,
One Road'(Apr. 14, 2017), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-
china-infrastructure/new-zealands-far-north-paves-way-for-chinas-one-belt-one-road-
idUSKBN17G0GK.
76
TIR represents “Transports Internationaux Routiers.”
77
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, China's Accession to the United Nations
TIR Convention Opens Prospects for New International Trade Routes(July 26, 2016), available
at https://www.unece.org/info/media/presscurrent-press-h/transport/2016/chinas-
accession-to-the-united-nations-tir-convention-opens-prospects-for-new-international-
trade-routes/doc.html.
78
Id. at.
79
Petersmann, 5. 2018.
80
H. Wolfgang Reincke & Jan Martin Witte, Challenges to the International Legal System
Interdependence, Globalization, and Sovereignty: The Role of Non-binding International
Legal Accords, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE 95, (Dinah Shelton ed. 2003).
81
Jyh-An Lee, The New Silk Road to Global IP Landscape, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 424-425, (Lutz-Christian Wolff & Xi Chao eds., 2016).
12
responsibilities and have the corresponding influence and voice in determining
international affairs and rules.”
82
China may develop hard law through the BRI to
innovate trade and investment rules,
83
and respond to emerging norms elsewhere (e.g.,
deep FTAs such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP)). This is echoed by the arguments of a former Vice-President of
the Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC) that the BRI requires a system of
international treaties that is suitable to the development of the initiative.
84
It is likely that China will pursue the hardening of soft law under the BRI in
selective areas where China has advantages. China will in all likelihood utilize soft
law to gradually establish practices which can be elevated to hard law. Technical
standards are one potential area. The BRI is likely to promote China’s technical
standards, since infrastructure projects provide standard-setting opportunities.
85
The
BRF Joint Communique also reveals the aim of “harmonizing rules and technological
standards when necessary.”
86
Another area could be e-commerce. China is reported to
be planning to take the lead in shaping rules on cross-border e-commerce regulation,
through first shaping the standard and then forming the relevant fundamental
principles of the World Customs Organization (WCO).
87
Notably, China may pursue the hardening of soft law through agreements,
particularly PTIAs. China has signed 56 BITs and 11 FTAs with BRI jurisdictions
88
(e.g., bilateral FTAs with Pakistan, South Korea and Singapore, as well as BRI states
under the China-ASEAN FTA), many of them concluded before the BRI was
announced. Within China’s proposed global FTA network, China’s strategy of free
trade areas envisages the expansion of FTAs alongside the BRI in the medium and
long-term,
89
which is related to the need for China to adapt to economic globalization
82
Justin Yifu Lin, "One Belt and One Road" and Free Trade Zones-China's New Opening-up
Initiatives, 10 FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS IN CHINA 585, 588 (2015).
83
For instance, there is a paper available at the website of State Council Information Office
in 2017 that indicates such possibility. Monan Zhang, Comprehensively Promote
Cooperation on BRI Framework Mechanism, www.scio.gov.cn(2017), available at
http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/35861/36637/xgbd36644/Document/1551139/
1551139.htm.(The BRI should envisage major normative and rule innovations in the trade
and investment system)
84
Rong He, On China’s Judiciary Participation in the Formation of International Economic
Rules, 1 CHINESE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 15 (2016).
85
Jonathan Hillman, Belt and Road Summit: Beijing’s Push on Trade(May 2, 2017),
available at https://www.thecipherbrief.com/belt-and-road-summit-beijings-push-on-trade-2.
86
Joint Communique of the Leaders Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for
International Cooperation Paragraph 15(e). 2017.
87
Xinhua News Agency, China to Push Formulation of Cross-Border E-Commerce
International Rules for World Customs(January 11, 2018), available at
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/rdxw/43482.htm.
88
Manjiao Chi, Integrating the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Regulation of
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the Belt and Road Countries: A Chinese
Perspective(2018), available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Blog/Index/64.
89
State Council, Opinions on Speeding up the Implementation of Free Trade Area Strategy
(2015).
13
and to possibly deepen domestic reform.
90
Regarding the recent FTAs with BRI
countries, China has signed an FTA with Georgia,
91
concluded FTA negotiations with
the Maldives,
92
and is negotiating new or upgraded FTAs with a limited number of
BRI states (e.g., Sri Lanka, Moldova, and Pakistan).
93
China has also substantially
concluded the negotiation of a trade and economic cooperation agreement with the
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
94
In addition, the BRI Action Plan pushes forward
negotiations on investment protection agreements and double taxation avoidance
agreements to protect investors.
95
That said, it is difficult for China to develop hard law in wide-ranging areas
(particularly WTO-plus stringent domestic regulatory norms) at this stage due to
China’s capacity limitations (e.g., local administrative agencies’ capacity), its
reluctance to accept high-level regulatory disciplines, and the difficulties of
coordination among BRI countries. If hard law is to be promoted at the regional level,
it also requires compelling normative justification that will be not easy. For instance,
developing BRI countries may doubt the necessity of binding obligations on higher
levels of intellectual property protection (e.g., patents, trade secrets), since it could
increase the costs of accessing knowledge,
96
and intellectual property has not “catered
to agriculture and rural populations.”
97
Therefore, China adopts a soft law approach,
but this may change over time.
IV. A proactive approach
A. A shift to a proactive approach
1. An evolution in Chinese practices
China’s BRI strategy represents an evolution of its prior practice. The BRI is part of
China’s long-term approach to trade and investment, including as a continuity of its
“go-out” policy in the late 1990s in sectors such as energy.
98
Dispute settlement is a
90
Bath, "One Belt, One Road" and Chinese Investment 6. 2016.
91
China FTA Network, China and Georgia formally signed the free trade agreement(May
15, 2017), available at
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinageorgia/chinageorgianews/201705/34958_1.html.
92
China FTA Network, China and Maldives Concludes the Free Trade Agreement
Negotiations(Sept. 20, 2017), available at
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enrelease/201709/35939_1.html.
93
China FTA Network, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml (last visited 9 March
2018).
94
China FTA Network, China and the Eurasian Economic Union Substantially Conclude the
Negotiation of Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement(Oct. 13, 2017), available at
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enrelease/201710/35977_1.html.
95
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part IV. 2015.
96
Lee, 425. 2016.
97
Thomas Cottier, Intellectual Property and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: Progress and
Opportunities Missed, in MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CETA, TTIP, AND TISA 155, (2017).
98
Françoise Nicolas, The Economics of OBOR: Putting Chinese Interests First, in THREE
YEARS OF CHINA'S NEW SILK ROADS: FROM WORDS TO (RE)ACTION? 17 (BRI could be
interpreted as "a new version of the 'going out' strategy launched in the late 1990s with a
view to facilitating the internationalization of Chinese firms"), (Alice Ekman, et al. eds., Feb.
2017);Gabrielle Desarnaud & Seaman John, OBOR and Energy: China’s Evolving
14
typical area. The increased attention of Chinese courts to the BRI is connected with
the previous adjustment of China’s judicial policy to protect overseas interests.
Alongside its ascendance, China has started to adjust its judicial policy (e.g.,
exercising jurisdiction on the basis of international law) to protect its expanding
overseas interests and exhibit its growing status as a great power.
99
Chinese courts
have been involved in foreign relations in a deliberate manner, and begun to
coordinate with other governmental bodies to expand and protect China’s national
interests.
100
Crucially, the dynamic of the BRI requires that an expanded range of
trade disputes are resolved efficiently. Businesses, which are often large SOEs,
investing in BRI projects or conducting BRI-related trade, recognize that their
interests are best protected through legal infrastructure and the court has a crucial role
here.
101
For instance, intellectual property protection demands judicial cooperation
and enforcement alongside the BRI.
102
China makes a major movement, including by
proposing several international commercial courts, to seek a central position in BRI
dispute settlement.
China’s approach to the BRI cannot be separated from its practice outside of the
BRI. China’s BRI approach echoes and builds on its efforts to advance regional
economic cooperation in various forums such as the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), the APEC (e.g., China’s strong support for the
development of an Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)), the G20 (e.g., the
G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking
103
), and PTIAs prior to
the announcement of the BRI (e.g., an incremental PTIA approach reflecting its
sensitivity to the specific needs of its neighbors
104
). China’s movements in respect of
the BRI will naturally benefit from China’s international practice elsewhere.
2. The upgrade to a proactive approach
China’s proactive approach cannot be completely differentiated from reactive
considerations. In particular, one may argue that the BRI is a kind of Chinese response
to the US’ strategy of “containing China”. It has been observed that China’s
motivations for launching the BRI include responding to US discourse of containing
China
105
or a “pivot to Asia”. The BRI arguably reduces China’s reliance on the US in
Internationalization Strategy, see id. at 30 (the BRI is viewed as the continuation of China's
'goging abroad' strategy in the energy area), (.
99
Congyan Cai, International Law in Chinese Courts During the Rise of China, 110 THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 269, 287 (2016).
100
Congyan Cai, Chinese Foreign Relations Law, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 336, 340 (2017).
101
Supreme People’s Court Monitor, Supreme People’s Court and “One Belt One Road”
(2015).
102
Karry Lai, IP Trends to Watch in China's Belt and Road Initiative(14 November 2017),
available at http://www.managingip.com/Article/3766976/IP-trends-to-watch-in-Chinas-
Belt-and-Road-Initiative.html?utm_campaign=Email+verification&utm_content=2018-03-
30&utm_term=Verification+link&utm_medium=Email+operational&utm_source=Registratio
n+Form&r=verified.
103
G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, (2016).
104
Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW, 1009 (2011).
105
Sonia E. Rolland, Making International Economic Law Work: Integrating Disciplines and
Broadening Policy Choices, 48 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 371, 375
15
terms of trade and investment by developing its network in Asia and elsewhere, and
contributes to further balancing US hegemony.
106
However, the BRI cannot simply be considered a reaction to US policy. China has
moved to a proactive approach under the BRI through systematic and coordinated
efforts in designing and implementing the initiative at the internal and external levels.
Internally, China has shifted away from reactive measures particularly in the WTO
context. Under the WTO, domestic measures are mainly reactive to the needs of
complying with WTO commitments. In contrast, the BRI is an endogenously-
determined policy. Several aspects are worthy of note. As an illustration, China’s
courts are more proactive than before in terms of institutional development in
international commercial courts (discussed further below).
China has been “experimenting” through pilot programs on BRI-related issues
largely to accumulate experience for the BRI. This follows China’s usual practice of
piloting programs in certain parts of the country before they are expanded nationwide.
China actively promotes FTZs that are closely linked to,
107
and arguably part of, the
BRI. Both the BRI and FTZs are regarded as “new reform and opening-up strategies
proposed in line with the changed domestic and international circumstances”.
108
The
number of FTZs increased greatly from one to 11 in recent years, including seven new
FTZs announced in 2016 that underline China’s long-term plans to develop inland
China and support the BRI.
109
The FTZs make a number of contributions to the BRI:
(i) hosting a large number of businesses which have participated or are to participate
in China’s overseas investment; (ii) serving as hubs for transit along the BRI and
platforms for trade co-operation; (iii) building important links for cultural and people-
to-people exchange; (iv) exploring techniques for risk management (e.g., financial
risks, legal risks);
110
and (v) experimenting in respect of 21st Century issues (e.g., the
negative list approach, pre-establishment national treatment, and competitive
neutrality) to accumulate experience for China’s leading role in international
negotiations,
111
to name a few. However, the developments produced by FTZs are
considered mainly procedural (e.g., simplified procedure, reduced processing time),
instead of policy-related or systematic.
112
Their effect on the BRI remains to be seen.
China has proactively taken measures targeting Chinese stakeholders to promote the
BRI and particularly address issues faced by Chinese actors. A large number of
(2017);NADÈGE ROLLAND, CHINA'S EURASIAN CENTURY?: POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 118 (National Bureau of Asian Research.
2017).
106
Carrai, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT, 3 (2017).
107
One Belt One Road, FTZ Plans Go Hand in Hand(Feb. 25, 2015), available at
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/908837.shtml.
108
Lin, FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS IN CHINA, 590 (2015).
109
Dezan Shira & Associates, Investing in China’s Free Trade Zones(September 21, 2017),
available at http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2017/09/21/investing-in-chinas-free-trade-
zones.html.
110
Chen Yin, Chinese FTZs and Their Contributions to BRI (2017).
111
He, CHINESE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 13 (2016).
112
Bin Sheng, How to Develop the Upgraded Free Trade Zones?, Shanghai Securities
News(Mar. 28, 2017), available at http://news.cnstock.com/paper,2017-03-28,796736.htm.
16
measures are adopted by China to promote investment and trade under the BRI,
113
ranging from a binding investment process to non-binding guidelines (like those on
insurance to support BRI projects,
114
and on the environment to relieve environmental
concerns over BRI projects through exhortation
115
), and other tools (e.g., databases).
For instance, the approval process has been changed to record filing
116
regarding
China’s overseas direct investment (ODI),
117
and the PPP approval procedures have
been streamlined.
118
In practice, Chinese businesses are observed to “enjoy a
relatively smooth approvals process” for deals connected to the BRI.
119
Moreover,
infrastructure projects that facilitate adopting BRI policy fall within the encouraged
industry category under the Further Guidelines on the Monitoring and Supervision of
Outbound Direct Investment issued by the Chinese government in 2017.
120
In
addition, China endeavors to develop a “holistic and effective approach” to address
intellectual property risks through, inter alia, a database documenting seven indices of
intellectual property challenges in BRI jurisdictions to assist Chinese businesses with
better understanding intellectual property risks.
121
Externally, China initiated and leads the BRI (e.g., as the main provider of
funding, goods, services and technical resources for BRI projects
122
) as a China-
centric initiative. The BRI reflects China’s ambition in respect of global governance,
such as the pursuit of “new models of international cooperation and global
governance”
123
through the BRI.
113
Lee, 420-421. 2016.
114
Xinhua, Chinese insurers to serve projects along Belt and Road Initiative(Apr. 28, 2017),
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-04/28/content_29123286.htm.
115
Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road (2017).
116
Ningning & Terri, 147-152. 2016.
117
It should be noted that investors shall submit the relevant information and materials to
regulators before establishing an enterprise outside China, and that recordation or
confirmation will be granted only if the statutory requirements are met. This differs from an
automatic recordation after overseas investment. Chinese Ministry of Commerce, et al.,
Interim Measures for the Recordation (or Confirmation) and Reporting of Outbound
Investment Article 2.1 (2018).
118
Lan Lan, PPP List Open to Foreign Bidders with More Than 1,000 Projects on Offer,
China Daily Europe(May 26, 2015), available at
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-05/26/content_20817843.htm.
119
Andrew Lumsden & Lizzie Knight, Tails Will Wag on the Belt and Road(2018), available at
http://www.corrs.com.au/thinking/insights/tails-will-wag-on-the-belt-and-
road/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWW1JMU1EQTBPV1JoWlRkaiIsInQiOiJwdHh1ZkpTZEthcFNUaTRpSG
FOd0orRnp5WTVzeGZBTDZpOHc2V0JFVWtwZXVFUUNKY0VLd0ZMQlk1Q2VCSXQ5RGdNRVJ
GSEpYRU1IQjQza013OStCMnFzY1ZJS1FzXC9GdnRMNDI2OFBlQktoRTVPRDRaelR4ZFpGT3VR
UkgwM0sifQ%3D%3D.
120
Greg Pilarowski & Lu Yue, China Further Tightens Control of Outbound Direct
Investment(Aug. 28, 2017), available at http://www.pillarlegalpc.com/en/news/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/PL-China-Regulation-Watch-ODI-Restriction-2017-08-28.pdf.
121
Lee, 420-421. 2016.
122
Petersmann, 15. 2018.
123
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part I. 2015.
17
China proactively interacts with other jurisdictions and international organizations.
The initiative reflects the underlying profound shift in China’s foreign policy from
“keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement”.
124
This contrasts with China’s
previous approach of “hide brightness and nourish obscurity”,
125
and its role as a
participant rather than a leader in multilateral and megaregional negotiations (i.e., the
WTO, and the RCEP as the only megaregional that China joins
126
).
China proactively engages with international organizations, particularly the United
Nations (UN). The Chinese government has signed BRI documents with at least nine
international organizations,
127
while Chinese government departments have signed at
least ten such documents.
128
As the first ever China-UN MOU,
129
the UNECE-NDRC
MOU arguably marks the beginning of an epoch in China-UN interactions. MOUs and
agreements with the UN also include the MOU on a Green BRI with UNEP, and an
agreement with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on BRI
intellectual property cooperation.
130
In working with the WCO, China endeavors to
take the lead in shaping international rules on cross-border e-commerce regulation. In
addition, the BRI has been included in a UN Security Council Resolution for the first
time, and it is regarded as one of the “regional development initiatives.”
131
124
Zhou & Esteban, JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA, 6 (2018).
125
Simon Chesterman, Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past,
Present and Futures, 27 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 945, 967 (2016).
126
Chinese government "firmly supports Asean's core leading role" in the RCEP
negotiations. See, Beijing 'firmly supports' Asean's core role in RCEP negotiations(Jan 31,
2018), available at http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/beijing-firmly-supports-aseans-core-
role-in-rcep-negotiations.
127
These international organizations include the United Nations Development Programme,
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Human
Settlements Programme, the United Nations International Children's Fund, the United
Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the
World Health Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the
International Criminal Police Organization. China.org.cn, Part I.2. Jun. 7, 2017.
128
These international organizations include the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, the World Economic Forum, the International Road Transport Union, the
International Trade Center, the International Telecommunication Union, the International
Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, the International
Development Law Organization, the World Meteorological Organization and the
International Maritime Organization.Id. at, Part I.4.
129
Lewis & Moise, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT, 10-11 (2017).
130
Agreement on Enhancing ‘Belt and Road’ Intellectual Property Cooperation between the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO). World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Director General
Visits Belt and Road Forum and China Supreme People’s Court(May 18, 2017), available at
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/china/news/2017/news_0001.html.
131
Security Council Authorizes Year-Long Mandate Extension for United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan, Adopting Resolution 2344 (2017)(2017), available at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12756.doc.htm.(paragragh 34 of Resolution 2344
"Welcomes and urges further efforts to strengthen the process of regional economic
cooperation, including measures to facilitate regional connectivity, trade and transit,
18
Through issuing action plans, the Chinese government intends to define the
contours of the BRI and provide soft law guidance. These action plans target all BRI
states in prioritized areas, and could gradually have BRI-wide implications if properly
managed. Taking standards as an example, official documents aim to accelerate the
alignment of standards and formulate international standards or rules of certification
and accreditation, including the Action Plan on Connecting the Belt and Road by
Standards and the Belt and Road Vision and Actions for Cooperation in Metrology.
132
For trade facilitation, Guidelines on the Implementation of Promoting International
Road Transport Facilitation in the Context of the Belt and Road Initiative aim to align
the connectivity-related regulations and systems for better “soft connectivity”.
133
More broadly, China proactively engages with BRI states through numerous ways.
A key and integral feature of the BRI is the designation of specific countries along
BRI routes as “strategic partners”.
134
As an all-inclusive approach, China has
indicated a willingness to work with any government, including jurisdictions with
active conflicts (such as Syria and Yemen),
135
governments at different levels (such as
California
136
), and jurisdictions with different political systems, levels of economic
development and levels of rule of law.
137
Specifically, China offers to pursue BRI
projects,
138
and calls for “all forms” of industrial parks in BRI states.
139
For
documents, the Chinese government emphasizes negotiating and signing general
cooperation agreements with developing states along the BRI’s trade routes,
140
which
usually call for cooperation and announce specific agreed projects. China also pursues
other forms of documents (like joint communiques) and FTAs relating to the BRI.
B. Prioritized and ambitious movements on dispute settlement?
China appears to prioritize dispute settlement in the BRI. Its major movements
include envisaged international commercial courts, BRI-related “typical cases”
including through regional development initiatives such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and
the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (the Belt and Road) Initiative...")
132
OFFICE OF THE LEADING GROUP FOR THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE, 20. 2017.
133
Id. at, 21.
134
Lewis & Moise, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT, 15 (2017).
135
Hillman, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later 6. 2018.
136
California and China to Work Together on Belt and Road Globalization Project, and
Climate Change(June 8, 2017), available at
https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/California-to-Work-with-China-on-Belt-and-Road-
Initiative-20170608-0005.html.
137
Jonathan Hillman, Will China's Belt and Road Stretch Further?(December 26, 2017),
available at https://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Jonathan-Hillman/Will-China-s-Belt-and-
Road-stretch-further.
138
Hillman, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later 5. 2018.
139
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part IV. 2015.
140
Bath, The South and Alternative Models of Trade and Investment Regulation: Chinese
Investment and Approaches to International Investment Agreements 80. 2017.
19
(guiding cases),
141
and a plan on wide-ranging issues to support the BRI.
142
As the
special policy document on the BRI, Several Opinions on Providing Judicial Services
and Safeguards for the Construction of the “Belt and Road” by People’s Courts (SPC
Opinions)
143
is ambitious. It covers measures relating to a wide range of issues,
including the exercise of jurisdiction (e.g., respecting the jurisdiction of other
countries along the BRI’s trade routes, handling parallel litigation),
144
the efficiency of
the courts, the protection of foreign parties, and judicial assistance and cooperation.
145
Generally speaking, China highlights the courts’ role to realize the BRI goal and
institutional development to shape international norms.
1. Courts’ efforts to reach the BRI goal
The Chinese government’s goals in respect of the BRI influence judicial thinking.
The SPC’s BRI document explicitly emphasizes that it aims to “bring the trial
functions and roles of the people's courts into full play and effectively serve and
safeguard the smooth implementation” of the BRI.
146
The Chinese judicial system
shares this ambition with the government and works cooperatively to reach that goal.
To strengthen its courts’ capacity to serve the BRI, China connects transnational legal
issues with its domestic courts more closely than before in at least four ways. First, the
courts seek to closely associate international dispute settlement with China’s domestic
courts through institutional development, particularly international commercial courts
proposed by the SPC.
Second, the judicial system strives to increase international confidence in Chinese
court judgments,
147
and move the locus of China-related dispute settlement from
Europe or elsewhere to China.
148
For instance, the SPC highlights the application and
interpretation of international treaties (like trade, investment, finance, and maritime
transport pacts with BRI states) according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
149
141
At the time of writing, there are 18 BRI-related guiding cases and the number is likely to
increase. Stanford Law School China Guiding Cases Project, B&R Cases Archive - China
Guiding Cases Project, available at https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/belt-and-road/b-and-r-
cases/?page=1.
142
Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Providing Judicial Services and
Safeguards for the Construction of the “Belt and Road” by People's Courts (2015).
143
Id. at.
144
Id. at, Paragragh 5.
145
Id. at, Paragraphs 4, 5.
146
Id. at.
147
Id. at, Paragragh 7.
148
Supreme People’s Court Monitor, Update on China’s International Commercial
Court(March 11, 2018), available at
https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2018/03/11/update-on-chinas-international-
commercial-court/.
149
Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Providing Judicial Services and
Safeguards for the Construction of the “Belt and Road” by People's Courts Paragraghs 7, 8.
2015.
20
Third, the courts aim to improve the application of transnational norms (such as
through court capacity-building, and the fulfilment of PTIA obligations
150
). Besides
the application of international treaties as discussed above, BRI-related guiding cases
reflect a greater emphasis on transnational norms by Chinese courts considering legal
issues associated with the BRI. These guiding cases are provided by the SPC to
address legal risks in BRI projects.
151
They help to ensure a consistent approach
among different courts, since local courts handling BRI-related cases need guidance
from the SPC.
152
These guiding cases involve, amongst other issues, letters of credit,
and the recognition of foreign judgments and arbitration awards (including the first-
time recognition of a Singaporean commercial judgment).
153
Last but not least, the courts endeavor to strengthen judicial assistance from other
states. Reciprocity in judicial assistance is a prime example. Chinese courts may take
the initiative in extending reciprocity to the counterparts of other jurisdictions to
promote the formation of reciprocal relationships.
154
In this way, China’s courts
endeavor to actively engage with the counterparts of other BRI jurisdictions.
2. Institutional development to affect international norms
China prioritizes institutional development concerning BRI-specific dispute
settlement. In particular, the SPC will set up three international commercial courts to
deal with disputes related to the BRI, since the existing system to solve disputes is
“complicated, time-consuming and costly.”
155
This BRI dispute resolution mechanism
aims to provide parties from BRI states with one-stop legal services.
156
China’s
envisaged international commercial courts arguably constitute a landmark in Chinese
court development from the perspective of international economic law. However, the
proposed international commercial courts face a number of challenges, such as the
selection of judges and development of international confidence in the courts.
China, in developing BRI-related dispute settlement institutions, is seeking to
shape international norms. The enhancement of China’s role in BRI dispute settlement
and, more broadly, the international influence of China’s judicial system is a major
aim behind the SPC’s efforts. One of the underlying goals set out in the SPC Opinions
is to “improve the international standing and influence of the Chinese courts and other
150
Id. at, Paragragh 8.
151
Stanford Law School China Guiding Cases Project, Seminar Summary: China’s Guiding
Cases and U.S. Precedents(July 31, 2017), available at https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2017/08/guiding-cases-seminar-20170731-English.pdf.
152
Supreme People’s Court Monitor. 2015.
153
Legal Daily, China Recognized the Singaporean Commercial Judgement for the First
Time(May 16, 2017), available at http://legal.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0516/c42510-
29277953.html.
154
Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Providing Judicial Services and
Safeguards for the Construction of the “Belt and Road” by People's Courts Paragraph 6.
2015.
155
China to establish 3 international courts to deal with BRI disputes, The Asian Age(2018),
available at http://www.asianage.com/world/asia/270118/china-to-establish-3-international-
courts-to-deal-with-bri-disputes.html.
156
Supreme People’s Court Monitor, SPC Reveals New Belt & Road-Related Initiatives
(Oct. 7, 2017).
21
legal institutions”.
157
Under the BRI, the SPC expects Chinese courts to “actively
participate in the formulation of the relevant international rules and constantly
improve China’s international discourse power in justice.”
158
In the view of a former
Vice-President of the SPC, Chinese courts could play an active role in FTZ-related
scenarios regarding heated issues (e.g., intellectual property, labor, and climate
change), with the aim of promoting the reform and development of certain
“unreasonable” international economic norms.
159
Chinese courts will strive to play an
important role in the BRI, including by making decisions in internationally influential
cases, and confirming new-type business rules.
160
In this sense, dispute settlement is arguably the most significant aspect of China’s
approach to the BRI, from a legal perspective. Other measures either lack substantial
normative or institutional development (e.g., the joint initiatives to promote
collaboration) or do not only target the BRI (e.g., the AIIB and FTZs). That said, the
role of courts in BRI-related legal and economic reform should not be exaggerated.
Arbitration bodies within and outside China are likely to play an important role, as
many BRI-related disputes will be settled by arbitration. The courts will address some
of the issues raised by arbitration, including the recognition and enforcement of
arbitration awards.
C. Passiveness in engagement with sensitive or unclear aspects
China’s proactiveness is limited to certain aspects of the BRI. China demonstrates
greater passivity in respect of providing clarity on the vague aspects of the BRI (e.g.,
the lack of legal and policy documents or mechanisms that clarify what is currently
unclear). In various facets of the BRI, vagueness is revealed by a lack of clear rules,
implementation mechanisms, definitions and explanation of key relationships.
Regarding rules, it is not easy to find “formal legal sources, either domestic or
international” regarding the BRI.
161
It remains to be seen how the BRI will strike a
balance between market and social values, and turn this into operational norms. As a
result, detailed norms on the design and operation of the BRI can hardly be identified,
which makes many aspects of the BRI vague. Policy documents alone can hardly
address these issues. In respect of implementation mechanisms, there are few details
on these mechanisms provided in the BRI Action Plan.
162
Regarding definitions, the
BRI is unclear on the meaning of key terms (e.g., BRI-related disputes,
163
BRI
157
Supreme People’s Court Monitor, Supreme People’s Court and “One Belt One Road”.
2015.
158
Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Providing Judicial Services and
Safeguards for the Construction of the “Belt and Road” by People's Courts Paragraph 13.
2015.
159
He, CHINESE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 14 (2016).
160
Id. at, 11-13.
161
Zeng, CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 539 (2016).
162
Greening the belt and road initiative: WWF's recommendations for the finance sector 8.
2018.
163
Supreme People’s Court Monitor. March 11, 2018.
22
projects,
164
the meaning of “partnering” with BRI programs
165
). Finally, concerning
relationship, a number of aspects should be clarified, including the interrelation
between the BRI and Chinese legal instruments, and the link between BRI projects.
V. The Essence of China’s Approach to the BRI: Flexibility?
In theory, China could have adopted an institutionally-focused, treaty-based and
“clearer” approach to the BRI. For example, China could strive to draft a BRI-wide
treaty, build a formal institutional arrangement, and provide more clarity on aspects of
the BRI. There could be several advantages to such an approach. First, it could help
build the legitimacy of and trust in the BRI. An agreement on the BRI could facilitate
the implementation of the initiative with “a sustained and solid international legal
foundation.”
166
It could thereby, to some extent, address certain concerns of the BRI
countries, including as to the transparency of the bidding process, social and
environment standards, and national security. Second, such an approach could
enhance the enforcement of rules, and the protection of Chinese investors and traders,
particularly through adoption of a treaty-based mechanism. Third, a BRI-wide treaty,
a strict institutional arrangement and more clarity on the BRI could provide
predictability and consistency.
Why, then, did such an approach not emerge? The basis and essence of China’s
approach to the BRI is arguably flexibility. Flexibility appears to prevail over other
considerations such as predictability, consistency, and rule enforcement. As an
illustration, the BRI Action Plan explicitly indicates that the BRI is an open and
“highly flexible” process of cooperation that “does not seek conformity.”
167
Flexibility
could be affected by the positions of BRI states and China itself. On the one hand, the
large number of BRI states vary considerably in respect of each other, and it would be
difficult to reach a BRI-wide treaty containing clear rules. Flexibility helps to engage
BRI states and promote the initiative. On the other hand, China has diverse interests:
the preferencing of dispute settlement and hard law in certain areas in the long term
(e.g., trade in goods, investment, and intellectual property) to protect China’s
investment and promote trade, alongside hesitation in accepting strict obligations
regarding social issues (e.g., labor rights and the environment).
China demonstrates flexibility in its approach to issues – acting proactively in
responses to prioritised issues, and not proactively, or passively, in respect of issues it
does not prioritise. For external engagement, China pushes forward negotiations on
investment protection agreements, double taxation avoidance agreements, and FTAs
to protect investors and traders regarding prioritized issues (like technical standards,
investment protection, e-commerce, and intellectual property). Intellectual property is
164
Mikael Weissmann & Elin Rappe, Sweden’s approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative:
Still a glass half-empty(2017), available at https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-
eng/publications/ui-publications/2017/paper-1-swedens-approach-to-chinas-belt-and-road-
initiative.pdf.(China considered the construction of a Swedish high-speed railway and two
private wind power projects as BRI projects "simply because they are about infrastructure").
165
Astrid H. M. Nordin & Mikael Weissmann, Will Trump Make China Great Again? The Belt
and Road Initiative and International Order, 94 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 231, 231 (2018).
166
Zeng, CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 532 (2016).
167
National Development and Reform Commission, et al., Part VIII. 2015.
23
a prime example: as the BRI aims to expand China’s technology industries and
outbound investment, the protection of intellectual property in BRI jurisdictions
becomes a major concern of the Chinese government and enterprises since Chinese
businesses will probably engage in more cross-border intellectual property-driven
M&A transactions under the BRI.
168
Regarding domestic measures, China prioritizes dispute settlement under the BRI,
particularly the role of Chinese courts to protect Chinese investors in a number of
ways. First, the SPC endeavors to improve its efficiency and attractiveness, suggesting
that one option for Chinese investors is to negotiate the choice of Chinese dispute
resolution venues – either courts or arbitration centers – in addition to the application
of Chinese law, particularly in countries with relatively weak legal systems.
169
Second, China’s efforts are intended to avoid recourse to international courts and
respond to the often inadequate independence and judicial expertise of local courts in
certain African and Asian states.
170
Third, through the proactive engagement with BRI
counterparts, Chinese courts strive to address the insufficiency of agreements with
BRI countries, since only seven out of 64 BRI countries have concluded bilateral
treaties on judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters with China.
171
Future
judicial assistance agreements would be more useful for breaches of commercial
contracts. Therefore, SPC Opinions target, inter alia, expanding the scope of
international judicial assistance, and focus on delivering judicial documents, obtaining
evidence, and recognizing and enforcing foreign court judgments.
172
China’s approach maximizes institutional, temporal, and normative flexibility. In
respect of institutional flexibility, the less institutionally-focused approach helps
China avoid being checked by a strict external institutional structure. The BRI could
utilize different instruments to promote its implementation. For instance, the BRI
incorporates certain elements of regional economic integration and of a partnership
arrangement between states,
173
without addressing the thorny institutional legal issues.
Regarding China’s internal institutions, the development of China’s courts and FTZs
is a self-driven process without international obligations. Therefore, sensitive systemic
issues can be avoided.
As to normative flexibility, China prefers leeway in adapting or innovating
international norms. The non-treaty-based approach and vagueness of the BRI mean
that there is much room left for China regarding whether and how to apply
international norms. Soft law increases the elasticity of China in addressing the
difficulty of building BRI projects.
174
168
Lee, 421. 2016.
169
Bath, "One Belt, One Road" and Chinese Investment 5. 2016.
170
Petersmann, 1. 2018.
171
Weidong Zhu, Some Considerations on the Civil, Commercial and Investment Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms Between China and the Other B&R Countries, 14 TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTE MANAGEMENT, 5 (2017).
172
Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Providing Judicial Services and
Safeguards for the Construction of the “Belt and Road” by People's Courts Paragragh 6.
2015.
173
Zeng, CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 517 (2016).
174
Du, THE CHINESE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 40 (2016).
24
Moreover, the non-treaty-based approach and vagueness enable China to either
develop or challenge current rules, particularly through soft law. Soft law has the
advantages of flexibility and informality,
175
and arguably brings less contention. On
the one hand, soft law can be adopted to develop existing agreements. Soft law helps
entrench substantive standards as international obligations. Taking investment pacts as
an example, China may largely maintain the status quo with existing pacts operating
alongside new, less formal commitments.
176
These less formal commitments probably
constitute soft law. On the other hand, soft law can be used to obfuscate existing legal
norms.
177
Soft law may soften hard law mechanisms, particularly in the case of
distributive conflicts between powerful nations.
178
China can deviate from existing
norms through soft law and create new practices.
Regarding temporal flexibility, China engages with partners in a pragmatic way
under separate terms and structures, which can be renegotiated when needed. Such
flexibility ensures that the BRI can evolve over time, taking into account economic
and political factors.
179
China’s positions on international norms can be adjusted when
needed. China could learn by developing soft law instruments and gradually explore
and develop rules related to the BRI. This is partially due to the fact that China lacks
experience in engaging in global affairs, and needs to learn in the international
arena.
180
China’s BRI approach may take flexible shapes for different scenarios. The loose
institutional structure, use of soft law and vagueness in various aspects of the BRI
(e.g., BRI definitions, rules and relationships) mean that China could easily maintain
elasticity in the design and operation of the BRI. Such flexibility enables the BRI to
incorporate treaty or soft law arrangements, and go beyond rigid institutions. It thus
supports the versatility, evolution and even effectiveness of the BRI.
Moreover, the flexible strategy could have spillover effects. For instance,
institutional flexibility could give China the prevailing negotiation position, since
negotiations are conducted separately with China.
181
Despite existing organizations
such as the SCO seeking to promote dialogue, the BRI does not have an explicit
coordination mechanism and heavily relies on bilateral coordination.
182
The BRI relies
on predominantly bilateral legal structures,
183
and projects conducted through bilateral
175
Shaffer & Pollack, MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, 710 (2010).
176
Bath, "One Belt, One Road" and Chinese Investment 8-9. 2016.
177
Shaffer & Pollack, MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, 709 (2010).
178
Id. at.
179
Shepard. October 19, 2017.
180
Bloomberg News, China Cites ‘The Art of War’ as Trump Signals Trade Battle(Nov. 28,
2016), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-28/china-turns-to-the-
art-of-war-as-trump-signals-battle-on-trade.
181
Wade Shepard, China's Challenges Abroad: Why the Belt & Road Initiative Will Succeed,
Forbes(October 17, 2017), available at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/10/17/chinas-challenges-abroad-5-
reasons-why-the-belt-road-will-succeed/#34972eba4a82.
182
Yiping Huang, Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework and
assessment, 40 CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW 314, 320 (2016).
183
Petersmann, 15. 2018.
25
agreements.
184
They are often either one-on-one or group+1, involving states and
political blocs across Asia, Europe, and Africa.
185
China is likely to have a good
negotiation position in such a context.
VI. Conclusion
China has adopted a less institutionally-focused, non-treaty-based and proactive
approach to the BRI. However, the strength of these characteristics should not be
exaggerated. Reflecting Chinese culture, China takes a flexible “middle-of-the-road”
strategy in respect of the BRI, which avoids extremes and occupies an intermediate
position. Despite its less institutionally-focused approach, China also promotes BRI-
related institutions (particularly the AIIB), and the development of BRI-specific
mechanisms that do not have a strict legal structure (like the BRF). China’s proactive
approach is also a limited one, given the vagueness of various aspects of the BRI.
China may be less or more proactive, depending on the issues. Further, despite its
non-treaty-based approach, China also explores PTIAs with BRI states (albeit slowly
and with a limited number of BRI jurisdictions) and utilizes other treaties, particularly
WTO norms.
The desire to retain flexibility is arguably the essence of, and a unifying factor in,
China’s BRI approach. China’s approach maximizes flexibility, through which the
BRI can readily respond to variations in practice. This reflects a largely instrumental
approach to law, and adaptive and pragmatic attitude. On a related note, the
underlying logic of China’s BRI approach is observed to be “somewhat analogous to
the functionalist approach that launched the European Coal and Steel Community
after the Second World War”, although substantial differences exist in various
areas.
186
The BRI approach diverges from China’s engagement with the WTO and the deep
FTA
187
templates advocated by developed nations (particularly the US and EU). The
BRI may constitute a kind of Chinese counter-model to deep FTAs. Foremost, both
the WTO and deep FTAs are treaty-based and institutionally-focused, and thus differ
from the BRI. The WTO system is based on a number of multilateral and plurilateral
agreements, and relies on a set of institutions ranging from ministerial conferences to
committees. These were “preset” by WTO founding members before China joined the
WTO. Meanwhile, a feature of deep FTAs is the increasingly long treaty text. The
institutionally-focused approach of deep FTAs can be found in, inter alia, the
proposed investment courts under the recent FTAs of the EU (like those with Vietnam
and Canada) and institutional arrangements under deep FTAs (e.g., the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Commission, working groups and other subsidiary bodies under the
184
Kaura. 10 June 2017.
185
Shepard, China's Challenges Abroad: Why the Belt & Road Initiative Will Succeed.
October 17, 2017.
186
Ferdinand, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 950 (2016).(the differences include a greater sensitivity
to national sovereignty under the BRI).
187
In this paper, deep FTAs refer to trade pacts that target non-tariff measures and set
stringent regulatory disciplines. They focus on WTO-plus and WTO-extra rules that go
deeper and broader than the WTO counterparts respectively.
26
CPTPP
188
). Second, China’s proactive approach under the BRI is a departure from its
predominantly reactive approach to the WTO. China predominantly responded to
external demands during the WTO accession, and has taken “a backseat rather than a
leadership role” in the Doha Round negotiations,
189
although it is becoming
increasingly active in WTO dispute settlement. This contrasts with China’s proactive
BRI approach. Third, China’s BRI approach diverges from deep FTAs that set high-
level regulatory disciplines. The thrust of the BRI approach is not to create new norms
at this stage, given that trade relations are viewed as a way to expand a country’s
influence.
190
Presently, China contributes to, rather than leads, the development of
norms. This is due internally to China’s capacity limitations and unwillingness to
adopt regulatory disciplines, and externally to the need to engage various, less
developed BRI states given the huge variation among BRI countries.
Looking into the future, the BRI will not only implement but also probably shape
China’s future trade and investment law and policy. In any case, China’s BRI
approach is likely to stimulate selective innovation, particularly in relation to dispute
settlement and soft law instruments. Regarding dispute settlement, China’s courts are
likely to explore innovations through the envisaged international commercial courts.
For soft law, China’s BRI approach seems to be to develop an emerging network of
soft law to coordinate policy. Soft law instruments could be hardened in selected areas
in the future (e.g., technical standards and e-commerce). More broadly, an
amalgamation of trade and investment rules could be possible given their concurrent
practice under the initiative. Outside the sphere of law, political clout could play an
important role. All the development of China’s BRI approach deserves close attention.
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