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Factors Influencing Password Reuse: A Case Study


Abstract and Figures

Passwords are the primary, most widely used single sign-on and multiple point authentication scheme adapted across the globe. Yet password policies vary greatly and there is little empirical research on how these policies impinge reuse. For our research, we studied the password policies of twenty-two universities and analyzed 1.3 billion email addresses and passwords obtained from and Anti-Public combination lists. We analyzed the potential for reuse by the students, staff, faculty, and other associated users for each of the universities' domains by checking whether the exposed credentials meet the specific requirements of each password policy. Through our analysis, we found several policy decisions adopted by educational institutions that may decrease security related to account credentials and make actionable recommendations for addressing these risks. Our goal is to mitigate the reuse of passwords by implementing updated policies to decrease the probability of credential exposure by a third party. Our recommendations can be generalized to improve the policies employed by any password-using organizations , especially with accounts that are deemed to be highly valued, ex. email providers, banks, or medical portals.
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Factors Influencing Password Reuse: A Case Study
Jacob Abbott
Indiana University
Daniel Calarco
Indiana University
L. Jean Camp
Indiana University
Passwords are the primary, most widely used single sign-on and
multiple point authentication scheme adapted across the globe. Yet
password policies vary greatly and there is little empirical research
on how these policies impinge reuse. For our research, we stud-
ied the password policies of twenty-two universities and analyzed
1.3 billion email addresses and passwords obtained from
and Anti-Public combination lists. We analyzed the potential for
reuse by the students, staff, faculty, and other associated users for
each of the universities’ domains by checking whether the exposed
credentials meet the specific requirements of each password policy.
Through our analysis, we found several policy decisions adopted by
educational institutions that may decrease security related to account
credentials and make actionable recommendations for addressing
these risks. Our goal is to mitigate the reuse of passwords by imple-
menting updated policies to decrease the probability of credential
exposure by a third party. Our recommendations can be generalized
to improve the policies employed by any password-using organiza-
tions, especially with accounts that are deemed to be highly valued,
ex. email providers, banks, or medical portals.
Passwords, Policies, Requirements, Reuse
Passwords are the de facto method of authentication online, yet
specific regulations and policies regarding password usage vary
among different websites, platforms, and organizations. Given
previous research that shows many people reuse and create weak
passwords [38], this paper seeks to answer if it might be possible to
reduce the likelihood of password reuse through the implementation
of different password policies. Additionally, we investigated to what
extent specific policies may affect the likelihood of password reuse
by analyzing the user behaviour and practices.
To investigate the potential impact of policy on password reuse
we analyzed password policies from twenty-two different U.S. uni-
versities and extracted sets of emails and passwords from two large
credential data sets that were published online. These two datasets, and Anti-Public, comprised over 1.3 billion email ad-
dresses and password combinations [43, 24]. Based on email ad-
dresses belonging to a university’s domain (we checked the .edu
domain address), passwords were compiled and tested against a
university’s prescribed password policy. In order to protect poten-
tial vulnerable accounts, passwords were treated as having been
potentially reused if a password met all the criteria required in a
university’s password policy and was paired with an email matching
that institution’s domain address. Then it was flagged and counted
as a possible reuse, otherwise it was flagged as not meeting the pre-
scribed requirements and therefore not matching the policy of the
university. Following this method, a count was established for each
of the twenty-two universities regarding the number of potential
pairs of reused credentials found in the leaked datasets.
In order to gauge the amount of potential password reuses and
the impact of such vulnerable practices to a university’s data, we
requested the universities to share the actual number of active ac-
counts that were found in the and Anti-Public databases.
Two universities agreed to share their information with the require-
ment of anonymity, so we will compare the real results from the
two universities with those of the twenty-two universities sampled.
The aim of this detailed study and analysis is to anchor our analysis
on confirmed data points to assist in providing references for the
potential password reuse.
Through this analysis we find several practices which could poten-
tially lead to future vulnerable practices and thus provide actionable
recommendations on future policy usage, as authentication via ap-
plications, websites, and services continues to integrate further in
everyday activities of the users. The advice of creating a unique pass-
word for every login is nearly unusuable in the past, but in today’s
society with the average number of password protected accounts
steadily growing the task is inhuman since there is a limitation to
the memory capacity of the users [36]. We strive to suggest policies
that can be used to limit the reuse of passwords with accounts that
are deemed to be highly valued or of import such as, bank accounts,
medical portal, emails, and other accounts.
In the following section, we begin with an overview of decades of
password research and establish the requirement of such large scale
comparison of password policies. We then detail the methodology
used in analyzing the data in section 3, followed by the results
of the analysis in the section 4 which details the usage practices
for the comparative analysis between the universities. We then
move to discuss applications and implications of our research by
making adaptable recommendations in section 6. We conclude by
discussing the limitation of our current research in section 7 and
provide concrete direction for future work in section 8. As an aside
the results indicate that the passwords sets that are available for
download or purchase, including the ones which impinge much of
the public research passwords, may be quite polluted.
Despite repeated claims in the private sector and academic re-
search of the imminent death of passwords [30, 22], passwords
maintain their status as the de facto authentication method em-
ployed not only through websites but also on significant number of
devices as well [14]. Passwords provide the possibility of single and
multi-factor authentication and are familiar to the largest user base.
However, there are still usability issues with the current password
practices for actual humans. Bonneau et al. reviewed multiple pro-
posals of technologies designed to replace passwords, but found that
none of the options met all requirements to address every frustration
that users currently suffer from interacting with passwords [2].
Regarding passwords, the old adage of the weakest link, tends
to be aimed at users and their behavior with creating and using
passwords. Florencio and Herley observed half a million users and
the strength of their passwords in one of the first large scale password
studies finding many weak passwords [17]. Similarly, Devillers
analyzed a large database of user created passwords and derived
that over 90% of the passwords used were weak passwords [14] and
Dell’Amico found that without enforced password policies users
tend to pick weak passwords [12]. Liu et al. specifically looked at
over 20 million passwords of Chinese users and found that – similar
to English speaking counterparts – their passwords were considered
weak [33]. Thus, stronger policy implementation is treated as one of
the potential solutions to enhance the security practices of the users
in general and reduce the possibility of using and reusing weaker
Though evidence of user behaviors’ not being the most secure
exists, many researchers, such as Adams and Sasse, view the sup-
posed failing of users more as due to a failure of design rather than
the fault of adversarial or apathetic users [1]. The trade-off between
usability and security of authentication schemes and user behavior
has been and continues to be an area of increased study [15, 16, 39,
42, 4]. Even while establishing certain policies one should consider
the readability and understandably of the policies as well as the
ability of users to understand and follow them [27, 34, 13]. Thus,
reuse of passwords is not the only criteria, in fact implementation of
standardized and understandable policy is preferred [40, 37].
The password polices thus developed should not only be read-
able, but also must be feasible and align with the user capabilities.
Tam et al. investigated the psychology of users behind their ac-
tions [41] while Pilar tested the limitations of user’s memory in
using passwords [36]. Garg and Camp aimed to improve user pass-
words through persuasion and behavior change [19, 5]. Forget et
al. tested persuasive technology to affect user behavior [18] while
Yan et al. used different advice to attempt to nudge users towards
better password creation habits [47]. Dell’Amico and Filiponne
created a tool to check passwords to assist admins in testing their
environments to potentially help them prepare for any automated
attacks [11]. We must note that, keeping unique passwords for all
the websites, services, and portals is not feasible and thus better
tools should be developed and proper communication of the need
for such password practices should be well established.
Despite continued advances in the usability and design of security
tools, not all problems can be blamed or fixed through changes
in user behavior. Password managers still require users to have
passwords, but are aimed to reduce the stress felt by users [6, 26].
Yet even password managers cannot solve problems when websites
mishandle handle passwords and expose even users who create
strong passwords through technical failures outside their control [3].
A growing number of sites promote the use of multi-factor au-
Big 10 Western Universities
Ohio State U. U. of California Davis
Michigan State U. U. of California Los
Indiana U. U. of Washington
Purdue U. Loyola Marymount
U. of Michigan Pomona College
U. of Illinois Pepperdine University
U. of Iowa U. of California Berkeley
U. of Nebraska U. of Southern California
U. of Maryland U. of California San Diego
Rutgers U. Claremont McKenna
Northwestern U.
U. of Minnesota
Table 1: Universities originally selected for analysis
thentication tools to remove passwords as a single fail point for
accessing accounts, yet most implementations suffer from their own
issues with usability and still require the use of passwords as one
factor regardless of if they use biometrics [35], one time codes [10,
21, 46], or hardware tokens [20, 32, 45, 9].
The threat of password reuse is still impactful as two-factor au-
thentication is not mandatory everywhere and does not completely
remove dangers presented by password reuse [8, 25]. Our investi-
gation thus provides an insightful discussion on how after decades
of research on the password usage behavior, users are still reusing
passwords and also how design modifications, risk communication,
and policy modifications combined together can help in creating a
secure environment.
Policies from the "Big 10" universities in the United States that are
located in the eastern half of the country were selected for analysis
after a report identified millions of university email credentials were
for sale on the Dark Web [23]. Additionally a similar number of
universities from the western half of the United States were selected
to increase the sample size for investigation. Password policies
and account creation details were collected for each of the selected
universities and the text was analyzed to measure the readability
of the password policies using the Flesch-Kincaid readability score
metric. The Flesch reading and Flesch-Kincaid readibility scores
were chosen as they have been used as reliable readability metrics
for decades and serve as a point of reference [28].
To investigate if password policies have an effect on potential
password reuse, email addresses ending with ".edu" and their corre-
sponding passwords were pulled from the and Anti-Public
combo lists as described by Hunt’s article that described the two
datasets comprising over 1 billion credential records [24]. Of the
1.3 billion records, 7,384,281 were associated with a ".edu" address.
From the full set of university related emails a subset was pulled out
to match each of the specific university’s domain. Table 1 shows the
full list of universities analyzed.
In order to maintain security of accounts and handle the data
ethically, researchers did not actually test if emails and passwords
were active at different university’s. Instead each subset of data was
tested against the university’s published password policies to test
if the password listed in the datasets could meet the requirements
listed and therefore theoretically be a potentially reused password.
University password policies were also measured on the minimum
length required by their passwords as well as the stated required
complexity of the policies. Policies were considered to have higher
complexity requirements based on the number of different character
types that were specifically required between lowercase alphas,
uppercase alphas, numbers, and special characters.
Further policy information was recorded for each of the policies
when expressed, but not all universities specified the same criteria.
The additional information recorded included the maximum length
of passwords allowed, whether password duration was listed, how
long a password could be used before expiration, whether reuse
of previous passwords was prohibited, and if prohibited how far
into the past passwords were checked against for reuse. Some
additional notes that did not fit into specific trends were observed
across multiple universities and were recorded on an individual
Here we describe the factors of passport practices obtained from
our investigation. We also note the readability and literacy require-
ments of the password policies for the different universities and the
rate of credentials from and Anti-Public datasets matching
the individual password policy requirements. We provide detailed
information of the mismatch between the password policies imple-
mented across different universities, as well as what is shared across
the different policies.
4.1 Policy Readability
Of the twenty-two universities originally selected to have their
password policy analyzed, researchers were unable to obtain a pass-
word policy for Claremont McKenna College that was accessible
to the public, therefore they are omitted from the analysis with the
twenty-one additional universities still being reported. The first task
after collecting password policies was to gather the Flesch Reading
score to measure readability and the Flesch-Kincaid score for the
grade literacy required to understand the text. Figure 1 shows the
Flesch Reading score for each of the university password policies.
The higher the Flesch Reading score, the easier a document is con-
sidered to read and understand. For example a score of 90 or higher
is considered to be very easy to read, with 80 to 89 being easy, 70 to
79 is fairly easy, 60 to 69 as standard difficulty, and 50 to 59 as being
fairly difficult. A score between 30 and 49 is considered difficult
and anything below 30 is considered very difficult and confusing.
As evidenced in Figure 1 the four highest scored password poli-
cies fell into the standard difficulty rating with Pomona College
scoring the highest at 62.9. Eight other universities fell into the
fairly difficult category. The remainder of the password policies
were rated as being difficult to read and comprehend, with the ex-
clusion of University of Iowa’s policy which was the only score
observed to fall into the very difficult category with a score of 24.
Table 2 shows the Flesch-Kincaid [17] score for grade level lit-
eracy required for each of the password policy documents. The
median of all twenty-one universities scored a 10 indicating a U.S.
tenth grade reading level as being appropriate to understand the
policy document. The lowest grade score was observed by Pomona
College’s policy that suggested a sixth grade reading level. The
highest observed was that of University of Iowa which scored a
14, which would roughly be a second year undergraduate student
reading level. The majority of policies fell between requiring a ninth
or eleventh grade reading level.
4.2 Password Policy Matches
Big 10 Score Western
Ohio State U. 8 U. of California
Michigan State U. 8
U. of California Los
Indiana U. 11 U. of Washington 11
Purdue U. 12 Loyola Marymount
U. of Michigan 8 Pomona College 6
U. of Illinois 7 Pepperdine
U. of Iowa 14 U. of California
U. of Nebraska 10 U. of Southern
U. of Maryland 11
U. of California San
Rutgers U. 10
Northwestern U. 11
U. of Minnesota 11
Table 2: Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score by University
From the 1.3 billion credentials found in the and Anti-
Public datasets there were nearly 7.4 million email addresses as-
sociated with .edu domains. Of those 7.4 million addresses the
twenty-one universities analyzed here made up 533,927 observa-
tions from the datasets. Table 3 shows a breakdown of the number of
email addresses observed from each university in the datasets. The
results include repeated email addresses that were paired with differ-
ent passwords in the datasets. Each password was tested against the
password policy of the corresponding university and was counted
as a potential reuse if the password matched the requirements as
listed in the policy document regarding both length and complexity
requirements. The number of observed policy matches and the rate
for each university is listed in Table 3. The frequency of potential
reuse based on matching university policy requirements ranged from
almost zero with Indiana University (0.02%), University of Iowa
(0.17%), and University of California Davis (0.26%) all having less
than 1% observed as being potentially reused university credentials
all the way up to essentially a coin toss as seen with University
of California Los Angeles (45.03%), University of Washington
(51.68%), and University of California San Diego (56.79%). Again
these numbers do not reflect actual password reuse, but merely the
potential of university credential reuse given the password and email
address in the published datasets.
Such large differences in the likelihood of potential reuse across
different universities with a number of unique policies led to the
researchers looking for similarities and differences between policies.
To that end university policies were grouped into categories based
on their minimum password length to explore potential impact of
minimum length requirements.
4.3 Minimum Password Length Requirements
Figure 2 shows each university’s minimum required length for
passwords according to their published policy. Thirteen of the
twenty-one universities required a minimum of 8 characters for
passwords, while two universities had a minimum requirement of
7 characters. Two universities required 9 characters, while an ad-
ditional three universities had a minimum of 12 characters. Only
Indiana University required more than 12 characters for passwords
Figure 1: Flesch Reading Score by University
Big 10 Addr. Policy Matches
Ohio State U. 52,299 2,171 (4.15%)
Michigan State U. 66,120 6,356 (9.61%)
Indiana U. 71,096 15 (0.02%)
Purdue U. 38,441 2,550 (6.63%)
U. of Michigan 56,510 15,073
U. of Illinois 8,871 2,518 (28.38%)
U. of Iowa 19,574 34 (0.17%)
U. of Nebraska 3,721 100 (2.69%)
U. of Maryland 2,231 293 (13.13%)
Rutgers U. 3,763 281 (7.47%)
Northwestern U. 13,020 1,028 (7.90%)
U. of Minnesota 41,322 5028 (12.17%)
Western Universities Addr. Policy Matches
U. of California Davis 23,855 62 (0.26%)
U. of California Los Angeles 25,770 11,603
U. of Washington 29,999 15,503
Loyola Marymount University 779 74 (9.50%)
Pomona College 2,051 343 (16.72%)
Pepperdine University 5,470 344 (6.29%)
U. of California Berkeley 20,425 1,293 (6.33%)
U. of Southern California 28,868 862 (2.99%)
U. of California San Diego 18,831 10,694
Table 3: Number of emails by university in dataset and upper bound
on password reuse rates.
Minimum University Policy
Length Matches
Min 7 U. Michigan, UC San Diego 34.2%
Min 8 Ohio State, Michigan State, Purdue,
Illinois, Nebraska, Maryland, Rutgers,
Northwestern, Minnesota, UC Los
Angeles, Washington, Loyola, Pomona
Min 9 Iowa, UC Berkeley 3.32%
Min 12 UC Davis, Pepperdine, U. of Southern
Min 15 Indiana 0.02%
Table 4: Universities grouped by minimum password length
to meet the minimum requirement of 15 characters. Table 4 shows
the universities grouped by their minimum length and the likelihood
of password reuse of that group combined. There is a distinct trend
of having a higher minimum length required reducing the likelihood
of reuse across multiple universities.
4.4 Password Complexity Requirements
Figure 3 shows the complexity requirement by each university’s
policy. The policy’s complexity requirement is rated based on the
number of distinct character types that are mentioned as being re-
quired. For example, a policy requiring at least one lowercase alpha,
uppercase alpha, number, and special character would receive a
complexity rating of 4, while a policy that specifically only requires
an alpha and digit would receive a complexity rating of 2. Despite
not specifying requirement of higher complexity, it should be noted
that none of the observed university’s forbade passwords of higher
complexity than the required limit, excluding some specific symbols
that could not be used.
Figure 2: Minimum Password Length Required by University
Figure 3: Password Complexity by University
Requirements University Policy Matches
1 Req Northwestern, U. of
Southern California
2 Req Purdue, UC Los
3 Req Ohio State, Michigan
State, U. of Michigan,
Illinois, Nebraska,
Maryland, Rutgers,
Washington, Loyola,
Pomona, Pepperdine,
UC Berkeley, UC San
4 Req Indiana, Iowa, UC
Table 5: Universities grouped by number of character types required
Table 5 shows the universities grouped by their complexity re-
quirement along with the likelihood of reuse by each group. Only
two universities fell into the complexity rating 1 category, two in
complexity rating 2, and three in complexity rating 4. Fourteen of
the twenty-one universities fell into the complexity rating 3 category.
Similar to length, there is a distinct trend towards higher complexity
having a lower likelihood of being reused.
4.5 Additional Requirements
Beyond the investigation into length and complexity requirements
in university password policy, additional information was presented
in certain policies. Eleven of the twenty-one universities reported
specific maximums for their password length. Two universities
maxed their password length at 16 characters, while others spread
out all the way to University of California Berkeley’s maximum of
255 characters. Of the observed universities the vast majority of
passwords were never close to reaching the maximum requirements
of any of the universities. Regarding the Big 10 and the Western
Universities, both sets matched in their password lengths from me-
dians at 8 characters up to 90% quantile of 10 characters in length.
The observed credentials for Big 10 universities hit 12 characters in
length at the 95% quantile while the Western universities were up to
15 characters at the 95% quantile. We can infer that even the lowest
maximum wasn’t met by at least 95% of the observed passwords.
Thirteen of the twenty-one universities also published the maxi-
mum duration passwords could be used before expiration ranging
from a minimum of six months all the way up to two years. Simi-
larly nine of the twenty-one universities specifically forbade reuse
of previous passwords, though only four gave a specified number of
previous passwords that would be checked against.
Furthermore ten of the universities had policies that featured addi-
tional notes or requirements that did not fall into previous categories.
For example the University of California Berkeley specifically stated
that passwords must pass a CrackLib test to be allowed. Two univer-
sities specified that the password could not include the user’s name
or username. University of Washington was the only university to
specifically identify the number of failed authentication attempts
before account lockout.
Reuse of passwords is not ideal in the sense of security, but
it happens frequently enough that it is often considered common
place, as very few people can truly claim to use a unique password
for every site or account they have. Many users may cite ease of
use or similarity between sites as reasons for reusing credentials,
but the risk of reusing credentials from a university account are
not insignificant. Krebs’ article on the value of a hacked email
account can easily be juxtaposed to a university account [31]. Many
students work while attending university and if they are employed
by their respective university it is likely they have personal financial
information connected to their university credentials, as well as tax
records, calendar information, personal communications, and more.
Therefore, credential reuse can pose a significant risk if users are
not cautious or if their data is mishandled.
The danger is not only posed to affect students but also staff and
faculty of universities who may reuse their credentials. The threat
of faculty and staff having credentials reused may pose a greater
threat as faculty and staff are more likely to have access to more
information and permissions than students.
The majority of university password policies’ Flesch-Kincaid
school grade score fell in the mid-high school level for the literacy
rate required to comprehend the policy. The majority of policies fell
into the difficult and somewhat difficult to read categories for their
Flesch readability score. The requirement of high school literacy
may be seen as an acceptable level for those affiliated with the
university, but it remains to be seen if a lower literacy requirement
would have a significant increase in the usability of passwords.
The potential reuse of passwords that match the published univer-
sity policies does not accurately predict the actual rate of password
reuse. As previously mentioned two universities shared their own
findings from checking the and Anti-Public databases
for potentially vulnerable accounts. The average result from the
two universities showed a likelihood of 1.5% of an account being
active and the credentials being reused. Despite 1.5% being signif-
icantly lower than a number of the potential reuse rates identified
through simply checking against the minimum length and complex-
ity requirements, that could still be a significantly large number of
accounts. If we take the 1.5% as a baseline, then of the 7,384,281
accounts associated with .edu addresses a total of 110,764 would be
actively vulnerable from the reused credentials.
The thought experiment regarding the number of vulnerable ac-
counts cannot be confirmed, but we could additionally push this
thought out to other accounts of import, such as banking sites. Over-
time research has shown that people continue to create better pass-
word and that changes to policies can affect behaviors [29], but
many users are creating better passwords because of adjustments
to policies, such as increases the minimum length from 6 to 8 char-
acters. The trend of higher minimum length requirements having
lower likelihood of reuse might be due to the tendency of people to
meet the minimum requirements of policies.
Similarly the increase in password complexity showed a trend
towards a decrease in the likelihood of credential reuse, but attempt-
ing to increase the complexity requirements of passwords may be
implausible. What additional characteristics could be required of a
policy that already requires the use of lowercase alphas, uppercase
alphas, digits, and symbols to increase the complexity is an open
question that is open for future work.
Additional information regarding password policies such as the
duration before expiration, the number of attempts before a lockout,
or forbidding certain password constructions may benefit the univer-
sities. However, due to the low number observances no strong points
could be observed regarding these points. Further investigation into
these factors may lead to additional insights in the future.
Some changes to policies may have greater effects on reducing
risk to an organization than others, but there are different costs
in usability or actual financial cost, such as implementing multi-
factor authentication, when implementing changes in policies. The
following recommendations are based on previous literature and
observations of this paper.
1. Set the minimum password length above 8 characters.
An increase to the minimum length required for passwords
would put the new minimum higher than over 50% of the
observed passwords in the entire set of .edu addresses present
in the and Anti-Public datasets. With the trend of
users to meet the minimum requirements, having a higher
minimum requirement for high value sites and accounts could
potentially lead to reduced likelihood of credential reuse for
lower valued accounts with lower minimum requirements.
2. Increase maximum password length.
The recommendation to increase the maximum length allowed
for passwords should be done so selectively. Increasing the
maximum over the minimum of other policies will allow for
a wider range of choices for users. Having a maximum of
12 characters, for example, may increase the likelihood of
password reuse on other sites that also contain a low ceiling
on the max length of their passwords.
3. Increase the password complexity requirement.
Increasing the complexity requirement of passwords to re-
quire the standard lower and uppercase alphas, digits, and
special characters will add to the minimum requirements of
the ecosystem. This simple increase, similar to an increase in
minimum length, would raise the standard higher than what a
nontrivial number of other websites and systems even allow,
potentially removing the chance of reuse elsewhere.
4. Disallow the user’s name or username inside passwords.
Removing the ability of users to include their name or user-
name inside passwords will additionally remove the ability to
have the password and username match. This simple distinc-
tion may reduce the likelihood of credential reuse as it may
increase the difficulty of guessing the account’s password.
5. Contemplate multi-factor authentication.
Multi-factor authentication is becoming more common and
usable [7, 44]. With potential benefits of reducing the risk of
password reuse, multi-factor authentication may be a viable
option to replace changes to the length and/or complexity of
password policies.
The and Anti-Public databases available are from a
number of previous breaches and leaks that were compiled together
with the articles announcing the datasets in the spring of 2017.
Therefore, there are a number of credentials that might not meet
the requirements for duration even if they were actually reused.
Because we cannot tell when credentials were taken and will not test
the validity of credentials on any university’s system, we can only
report on credentials that meet the policy requirements of minimum
password length and password complexity.
Additionally, given the nature of the datasets we cannot be certain
that credentials are or ever were real, it is possible that credentials
were fabricated, both email addresses and passwords. Due to ethical
concerns we made no effort to test the validity of email and password
pairs and only tested passwords against the published password
policies of each university.
There still exists the potential of users’ passwords being reused
with an email address not associated with a university. This potential
is outside the scope of the project and was not considered when
processing the data and looking at the potential password reuse of
the university credentials.
Additional research can be targeted towards how to increase the
complexity of passwords beyond requiring four different character
types. This can be done by requiring passphrases using spaces or
potentially by disallowing certain combinations of characters, such
as sequential numbers or characters closely located on a keyboard
(ex. "QWER"). We can also change the frequency of password
expiration or the number of login attempts before lockout. To what
extent potential changes this would have on security and user be-
havior is an open question. Certain techniques are implemented in
banking sectors and could be implemented to protect important and
confidential data for universities.
Websites that provide email addresses like Gmail or Yahoo may
be ripe for additional examination comparing their password poli-
cies using the same methodology as that employed to test the .edu
addresses from the and Anti-Public datasets. Finding
and examining the policies of non-educational organizations may
highlight distinct differences in organizational behavior regarding
security policies.
Given the large amount of data contained in the and
Anti-Public datasets with over 1.3 billion email addresses and pass-
words, exploration of unique accounts may yield some larger in-
sights into the password creation and usage patterns. Despite the
large number of .edu domain addresses it only comprised 0.057% of
the full dataset. With observations of this, relatively, small sample,
the exploration of potential password usage difference across do-
mains with specific geographic codes, such as .de for Germany or .fr
for France, may provide unique insights into individual countries as
well as potentially global trends that may exist despite geographical,
cultural, or linguistic differences.
Passwords continue to be a necessity in the daily lives of millions
around the world, yet the collective wisdom still maintains that
passwords are difficult to use and the best security practices are not
humanly possible. Yet this investigation looked into how policies
might effect user behavior in reusing credentials from a high valued
account and our method identified policy matches as potential reuse
since calculating true reuse of credentials posed significant ethical
We found that requiring longer and more complicated passwords
trended towards a lower likelihood of password reuse. Additionally,
we found that the majority of password policies were difficult to
very difficult to read and understand according to the Flesch reading
scale and typically have a literacy requirement of high school level.
We give recommendations for potential policy changes that might
further reduce the likelihood of credential reuse without impacting
the feasibility of implementing such password practices. Our rec-
ommendations are not only applicable for universities, but also can
be used by other organizations , services, or applications, with high
value accounts and point to areas of interest for future work.
This research was supported in part by the National Science
Foundation under CNS 1565375, Cisco Research Support, and the
Comcast Innovation Fund. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions
or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the the US
Government, the National Science Foundation, Cisco, Comcast,
nor Indiana University. Additional thanks to Sanchari Das and
Chamikara Arachchige for their insights.
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... Researchers have measured password-related behaviors in a variety of ways, e.g., by asking participants to install password-logging tools [17,44] and analyzing breached passwords from publicly posted lists [6,13] or privately collected datasets [30]. We leverage data collected through the Security Behavior Observatory (SBO) (see Section 3), which captures detailed, real-world behavior of home computer users by instrumenting their operating systems and web browsers [18,19,35]. ...
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