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KLIMOS Policy Brief #8 – 2017
Support needed and received by non-Annex I Parties: What can we
learn from their first Biennial Update Reports?
Romain Weikmans
2
Suggested citation: Weikmans, R. (2017), “Support needed and received by non-Annex I
Parties: What can we learn from their first Biennial Update Reports?”, KLIMOS Policy Brief
#8, KLIMOS-ACROPOLIS, Brussels, Belgium.
About the author: Romain Weikmans is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Institute for
Environmental Management and Land Use Planning of the Université Libre de Bruxelles / Free
University of Brussels. His main research interests lie in the interface between climate change
and development co-operation. He is the author of several academic articles on climate finance
and of a book on climate change adaptation (L’adaptation au changement climatique, Editions
La Découverte, with V. van Gameren and E. Zaccai). Romain Weikmans earned his Ph.D. in
Environmental Sciences and Management from the Université Libre de Bruxelles / Free
University of Brussels in 2015. In 2015-16, he was a Postdoctoral Researcher at Brown
University (Providence, RI, USA) and a Fellow of the Belgian American Educational
Foundation. During his Ph.D., he was a Visiting Researcher at the Environmental Change
Institute (Oxford University) and at the Institute for Environment and Human Security (United
Nations University).
For correspondence: romain.weikmans@ulb.ac.be
Acknowledgements
Funding for the KLIMOS-ACROPOLIS consortium is generously provided by the Directorate
General for Development Cooperation (DGD; www.dgos.be) through VLIR-UOS (the
‘Vlaamse Interuniversitaire Raad – Universitaire Ontwikkelingssamenwerking’; ‘Flemish
Interuniversity Council – University Development Cooperation’; www.vliruos.be) and ARES-
CCD (‘Académie de Recherche et d’Enseignement supérieur – Commission de la Coopération
au Développement’; www.ares-ac.be).
About KLIMOS-ACROPOLIS
KLIMOS is an interdisciplinary and interuniversity research platform aiming at generating
capacity to enable the necessary transition to a sustainable society through research for
development. Research activities will focus on (1) management of natural resources for
multiple ecosystem services, (2) development of sustainable energy systems and urban
infrastructures, (3) innovations in governance and institutional reform, and (4) sustainability
monitoring & evaluation. KLIMOS is an ACROPOLIS, an ACademic Research Organisation
for POLIcy Support.
Copyright
This material is considered to be an international public good that can be freely copied for use
in a non-commercial context, provided that the source is acknowledged. The opinions expressed
in this working paper are solely those of the author.
3
Support needed and received by non-Annex I Parties: What can we learn
from their first Biennial Update Reports?
Romain Weikmans
Abstract
How much climate finance has each developing country received? As basic as this question
may seem, we currently do not have any satisfactory answers to it. This is highly problematic
for several reasons. In addition to eroding trust in international negotiations on climate change,
the current state of affairs means that it is impossible to meaningfully identify if there is any
gap in the international support for climate actions and where those gaps are, in terms of
geographic (country and region), thematic (mitigation, adaptation, etc.) or sectorial (agriculture,
health, energy, etc.) allocations. It also means that it is extremely complicated to assess the
extent to which climate finance help developing countries address mitigation and adaptation
challenges in an equitable and efficient manner.
In this policy brief we try to understand whether or not the blurry image of climate finance
received can be explained by the lack of compliance of developing country Parties toward
transparency requirements agreed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). We show that the lack of compliance is not the only reason for concern.
Inadequate transparency requirements decided under the UNFCCC are also to blame. What are
the most important challenges that need to be addressed? Will the Paris ‘enhanced transparency
framework’ help address them? We discuss these issues in the last part of this brief, along with
some policy recommendations for the Belgian Development Cooperation.
Policy pointers
• For a variety of reasons, most non-Annex I Parties do not report information on climate
finance needed and received in a timely and comprehensive manner.
• The Belgian Development Cooperation could support its partner countries in the tracking
and reporting of support needed and received for climate action. This could be done
billateraly by supporting for example the establishment of national dashboards of climate
finance received in partner countries. This could also be done multilateraly by
contributing among others to the “Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency”
established as part of the Paris Agreement.
• The Belgium Development Cooperation could make sure that Belgium actively supports
(in the UNFCCC negotiations) the development of common accounting modalities for
financial support needed and received.
4
Support needed and received by non-Annex I Parties: What can we learn
from their first Biennial Update Reports?
Romain Weikmans
1. Introduction
How much climate finance has each developing country received? As basic as this question
may seem, we currently do not have any satisfactory answers to it. This is highly problematic
for several reasons. In addition to eroding trust in international negotiations on climate change,
the current state of affairs means that it is impossible to meaningfully identify if there is any
gap in the international support for climate actions and where those gaps are, in terms of
geographic (country and region), thematic (mitigation, adaptation, etc.) or sectorial (agriculture,
health, energy, etc.) allocations. It also means that it is extremely complicated to assess the
extent to which climate finance help developing countries address mitigation and adaptation
challenges in an equitable and efficient manner.
In this policy brief we ask: why is it currently impossible to know how much climate finance
each developing country has received? What can be done about it? We have already described
elsewhere (see Roberts & Weikmans, 2017; Weikmans et al., 2017; Weikmans & Roberts,
2016; 2017) the many elements that impede the emergence of a clear picture of the landscape
of climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries. In this policy brief we go
one step further and try to understand whether or not the blurry image of climate finance
received can be explained by the lack of compliance of developing country Parties toward
transparency requirements agreed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) (section 2). We show that the lack of compliance is not the only reason for
concern. Inadequate transparency requirements decided under the UNFCCC are also to blame
(section 3). What are the most important challenges that need to be addressed? Will the Paris
‘enhanced transparency framework’ help address them? We discuss these issues in section 4,
along with some policy recommendations for the Belgian Development Cooperation.
2. Non-Annex I Parties’ compliance toward UNFCCC transparency guidelines
As per the decisions adopted in 2011 in Durban by the COP, non-Annex I Parties are expected
to submit Biennial Update Reports (BURs) containing among others information on support
needed and received (UNFCCC, 2011, Decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 12-22). The COP decided
that non-Annex I Parties, consistent with their capabilities and the level of support provided for
reporting, should submit their first BUR by December 2014. Subsequent BURs shall be
submitted every two years, either as a summary of parts of their National Communication (NCs)
in the year in which the NC is submitted or as a stand-alone update report. Least developed
country Parties (LDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS) may submit their BURs at
their discretion.
5
Only ten (out of 154) non-Annex I Parties had submitted their first BUR by December 2014.
As at 30 July 2017 – more than two years after the 2014 deadline – only 37 non-Annex I Parties
had submitted their first BUR. These figures show that non-Annex I Parties are confronted with
a variety of challenges in their reporting to the UNFCCC Secretariat (Ellis & Moarif, 2015;
Gupta & van Asselt, 2017). These challenges may be related to capacity constraints, including
the lack of established domestic reporting systems. They may be linked to the insufficiency of
international support provided to help them in their reporting. The absence of or delay in
reporting may also be explained by a lack of political willingness to report on climate finance
needed and received.
To which extent do those non-Annex I Parties that have submitted at least their first BUR
comply with the specific guidelines that have to be followed by BURs? In order for us to answer
this question, we reviewed the report of the technical analysis of each BUR. These technical
analysis are conducted by international teams of technical experts in accordance with the
modalities and procedures contained in the annex to Decision 20/CP.19 (UNFCCC, 2013). The
technical analysis only aims at identifying the extent to which the elements of information on
support needed and received that are supposed to be reported
1
by non-Annex I Parties are
included in their BURs. The results of these technical analysis are then presented in summary
reports, that are made available online
2
.
The results of our review are presented in table 1. The 32 non-Annex I Parties included in
this table are those for which a technical analysis of their first BUR was available as at 8 July
2017. Our results show a concerning picture, where only two non-Annex I Parties fully comply
with UNFCCC transparency requirements on support needed and received. Ten Parties score
less than half of the maximum score possible. The blurry image that we currently have of the
landscape of climate finance needed and received is not only due to the failures of some non-
Annex I Parties to report to the UNFCCC in a timely manner. It also is the result of a relative
lack of compliance of some non-Annex I Parties in following UNFCCC transparency
guidelines.
1
The guidelines that have to be followed by BURs in terms of the information to be provided on support needed
and received are contained in UNFCCC (2011, Annex III of Decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 14-16): Ҥ14. Non-
Annex I Parties should provide updated information on constraints and gaps, and related financial, technical and
capacity-building needs. §15. Non-Annex I Parties should also provide updated information on financial resources,
technology transfer, capacity-building and technical support received from the Global Environment Facility,
Parties included in Annex II to the Convention and other developed country Parties, the Green Climate Fund and
multilateral institutions for activities relating to climate change, including for the preparation of the current biennial
update report. §16. With regard to the development and transfer of technology, non-Annex I Parties should provide
information on technology needs, which must be nationally determined, and on technology support received.”
2
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php
6
Table 1. Non-Annex I Parties’ compliance toward climate finance transparency requirements
R
a
n
k
Non-Annex I Party
BUR1
submitted by
December
2014
Extent to which the elements of information are included
Total
score
Constraints
and gaps
Related financial,
technical and
capacity-building
needs
Financial resources, technology
transfer, capacity-building and
technical support received
Technology needs,
which must be
nationally determined
Technology
support
received
1
Namibia
6
1
South Africa
6
3
Viet Nam
/
5.5
4
Andorra
5
4
Armenia
5
4
Chile
5
4
Ghana
5
4
India
5
4
Moldova
5
4
Thailand
5
11
Azerbaijan
/
4.5
11
Brazil
/
/
/
4.5
11
Colombia
/
4.5
14
Argentina
4
14
Indonesia
/
/
4
14
Tunisia
/
/
4
17
Bosnia and Herzegovina
/
3.5
17
Lebanon
/
/
/
3.5
17
Mexico
/
3.5
17
Montenegro
/
3.5
17
Serbia
/
3.5
17
Uruguay
/
/
/
3.5
23
Paraguay
3
23
Peru
/
/
3
25
Costa Rica
/
2.5
25
Malaysia
/
2.5
27
Israel
2
28
Macedonia (F. Y. R. of)
/
/
2
29
Mauritania
/
1.5
30
Korea (R. of)
1
30
Morocco*
/
/
1
30
Singapore
1
Notes: : Yes; : No; /: Partly. The total score of each Party is calculated by adding up the score obtained in each column (= 1; = 0; /= 0.5). The non-Annex I
Parties included in this table are those for which a report of the technical analysis of their BUR was available on the UNFCCC website as at 8 July 2017. The following non-
Annex I Parties are those that submitted a BUR that had not yet been considered for a technical analysis as at 8 July 2017: Ecuador, Georgia, and Jamaica (for their first BUR);
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Namibia, Singapore, and Tunisia (for their second BUR). *Partner country of the Belgian governmental cooperation.
7
3. Reporting approaches used by non-Annex I Parties for climate finance received
The relative lack of compliance of some non-Annex I Parties toward UNFCCC transparency
requirements identified in the former section is not the only element that impedes the emergence
of a clear picture of climate finance received. The weaknesses of UNFCCC guidelines that have
to be followed by non-Annex I Parties in their reporting of information on climate finance
received are also to blame. There is currently no common format for reporting information on
financial support received
3
, nor is there a common methodology to assess the financial support
received. The result of this lack of specific guidance is that Parties decide what to report on an
individual basis, as can be observed in their first BURs. For example, the time periods over
which the finance is reported as received vary widely (UNFCCC SCF, 2016) – other examples
are summarized in table 2.
In addition, the UNFCCC guidelines do not require information on underlying assumptions,
definitions and methodologies used in generating the information reported on climate finance
received (UNFCCC SCF, 2016, p. 31). As observed by the the UNFCCC SCF (2016, p. 91),
countries often use different definitions of climate finance, and of adaptation and mitigation
activities. This means that it is extremely complicated to meaningfully compare the amount of
climate finance received by each non-Annex I Party. Added to the problems of partial and/or
opaque reporting, the multiple accounting approaches used by Annex II (see AdaptationWatch,
2016) and non-Annex I Parties mean that it is impossible to compare the total support provided
and received. These problems are further exacerbated by the absence of project-level data that
underlie Annex II and non-Annex I Parties’ reports, making it extremely difficult to understand
what types of projects and programmes are being supported, and how this support is being
provided.
3
By contrast, a “Common Tabular Format – CTF” has to be used by Annex II Parties in their reporting of
information to the UNFCCC Secretariat on climate finance provided.
8
Table 2. Reporting approaches used by some non-Annex I Parties for financial support received
Non-Annex I Party
Reported in tabular
format
Allocation channels
Sectors
Financial instruments
Other
Per project or
activity
Per donor
Per thematic areai
Only headline
figures
Top donors
Bilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
financial institutions
Multilateral climate
change funds
Specialized United
Nations bodies
GEF
Private foundations
Private sector
Thematici
Economicii
Grant
Concessional loan
Loan
National budget
Result-based
payment
Leasing
ODA/non-ODA
Status of financeiii
Domestic finance
flows
Co- financing
Argentina
Armenia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ghana
Indonesia
Lebanon
Malaysia
Mauritania
Mexico
Montenegro
Morocco*
Paraguay
Peru
Moldova (R. of)
South Africa
Thailand
Tunisia
Viet Nam
Source: Weikmans and Roberts (2017); Data extracted from UNFCCC SCF (2016: 32-33 and 103-105).
Note: iE.g., mitigation, adaptation; ii E.g., energy, transport, agriculture; iiiReceived or approved. Parties are shown in alphabetical order. The twenty non-Annex I Parties included
in this table are those that had submitted their BURs as at 30 June 2016 and that provided summary information on financial support received during a certain period of time. In
total, thirty-two non-Annex I Parties had submitted their BURs by 30 June 2016. Twelve of these thirty-two non-Annex I Parties do not appear in this table because they
indicated financial support received only for some projects, activities, sectors or donors, or did not include quantitative financial information at all in their BURs. *Partner
country of the Belgian governmental cooperation.
9
4. Conclusions and policy recommendations
Observers have pointed out the multiple benefits of greater transparency as it matters to
preserve the base of public support for aid; helps donor nations to more effectively evaluate
their aid programs; is necessary for recipient country citizens to be able to hold their
governments accountable over any discrepancies between aid received and aid spent; and helps
recipient countries improve national strategic planning in the face of climate change (see for
example Ghosh & Kharas, 2011; Weikmans, 2015). The blurry picture of support needed and
received for climate action in many developing countries means that opportunities are lost
among others in terms of addressing possible duplications of donors’ efforts or reducing the
risks of corruption around climate finance.
There are at least two sets of challenges that need to be addressed to allow the emergence of
a clearer picture of international climate finance needed and received:
1) Frequent reporting by non-Annex I Parties is the first condition that would permit a
comprehensive picture of the landscape of climate finance needed and received to
emerge. However, as described above, few non-Annex I Parties have submitted their
first BUR so far.
Out of the 14 partner countries of the Belgian governmental cooperation
4
, only one country
(i.e., Morocco) has submitted its first BUR to the UNFCCC Secretariat. As shown in Table 1
above, the first BUR submitted by Morocco lacks several elements of information on support
needed and received that are supposed to be communicated as per Decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs
12-22 (UNFCCC, 2011).
• There is a pressing need to understand why many non-Annex I Parties have not yet
submitted their first BUR to the Convention Secretariat. Similarly, we need to
understand why some countries fail to comply with UNFCCC guidelines when
preparing their BURs. If the main reasons are linked to capacity constraints, more
international support should aim at building capacities to track and report the support
needed and received. If reporting is hampered by a lack of political willingness,
incentives to report in a timely manner should be identified and promoted.
With the exceptions of Tanzania and the Palestinian Territory, the other partner countries of the
Belgian governmental cooperation are LDCs and may therefore submit their BURs at their
discretion.
• Under the Paris “enhanced transparency framework”, LDCs and SIDS are still allowed
to submit their BURs “at their discretion” (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 13.10; Decision
1/CP.21, para. 90). This provision is necessary to protect these countries from heavy
reporting duties. However, discretionary reporting might impede the emergence of a
4
The partner countries of the Belgian governemental cooperation are Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, the Palestinian Territory,
Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda (as listed in the Royal Decree of 26 January 2004).
10
comprehensive picture of the international climate finance landscape (van Asselt et al.,
2017).
The Belgian Development Cooperation could support its partner countries in the tracking and
reporting of support needed and received for climate action. This could be done billateraly by
supporting for example the establishment of national dashboards of climate finance received.
This could also be done multilateraly by contributing to the “Capacity Building Initiative for
Transparency” established as part of the Paris Agreement
5
.
2) A second challenge identified in this policy brief concerns the lack of comparativeness
between the information on support needed and received contained in BURs. The
lack of specific guidelines on how to account and report on climate finance needed
and received has given rise to a plethora of approaches used by non-Annex I Parties
6
.
The Paris “enhanced transparency framework” aims at dealing with the issue of accounting
modalities for climate finance provided and mobilized (UNFCCC, 2015, Decision 1/CP.21,
para. 57). However, the accounting modalities that are currently being negotiated in this regard
will not applied to climate finance needed and received (van Asselt et al., 2017).
• This is a gap that deserves immediate attention: For a comprehensive transparency
framework to emerge, it will be necessary to also develop common accounting
modalities for financial support needed and received.
The Belgium Development Cooperation could make sure that Belgium actively supports (in the
UNFCCC negotiations) the development of common accounting modalities for financial
support needed and received.
5
See https://www.thegef.org/topics/capacity-building-initiative-transparency-cbit
6
Note that a similar problem is apparent in the various ways that Annex II Parties report on the support provided
and mobilized for climate action in developing countries (see Weikmans & Roberts, 2017).
11
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