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Warwick Economics Research Papers
ISSN 2059-4283 (online)
ISSN 0083-7350 (print)
The Trade Effects of the Brexit Announcement Shock
Mustapha Douch, T.Huw Edwards & Christian Soegaard
August 2018 No: 1176
The Trade Effects of the Brexit Announcement Shock
Mustapha Douch∗T.Huw Edwards†Christian Soegaard‡
29th August 2018
Abstract
The unexpected vote for Leave in the Brexit referendum of June 2016 has introduced a classic case of a ‘rene-
gotiation period’ for trade agreements, where no formal barriers have been imposed, but trade is affected by policy
uncertainty. We analyse the effects upon bilateral trade between the UK and 14 EU and 14 non-EU trading partners,
using a Synthetic Control Method (SCM), with the Brexit vote seen as a country-specific treatment effect upon the
United Kingdom. Our main findings are that, after the exchange rate changes, UK exports have been lower than those
of the ’synthetic Britain’, with only a modest difference between exports to EU and to non-EU countries. Robustness
checks suggest that this is not attributable to short-term sluggishness in responding to a fall in Sterling. Imports from
the EU have declined a little, while those from non-EU countries have if anything declined more. However, there is
some evidence that UK consumers may be turning towards Commonwealth countries.
JEL Codes: F02, F13, F15
Keywords: Anticipation, policy uncertainty, Brexit, synthetic control method.
∗Aston University, UK
†Loughborough University, UK.
‡University of Warwick, UK.
1
1 Introduction
Econometric analysis of the magnitudes and directions of trade flows traditionally applies a combination of economic,
geographical, sociopolitical and observable policy variables to explain trade patterns.1However, a number of papers
have indicated important roles for less directly observable factors relating to expectations, anticipation and uncer-
tainty. For example, Freund & McLaren (1999) provide evidence of an anticipatory effect: that trade flows adjust in
anticipation of trade agreements. This has been formalised theoretically by Handley & Lim˜
ao (2017), who distinguish
between the anticipation effect and the effect of policy uncertainty, which creates a strong real option value of delaying
market entry decisions at times when policy changes are anticipated but not finalised. Regarding policy uncertainty,
a recent WTO study found that average trade policy uncertainty is equivalent to an average tariff of between 1.7 and
8.7 per cent (Osnago et al. 2015). Some authors also claim that trade agreements play a major role in reducing trade
policy uncertainty (Lim˜
ao & Maggi 2015 and Carballo et al. 2018).
While there is a strong literature on historical divorces, such as decolonisation events (Head et al. 2010) as well
as the post-Soviet break-ups, this literature has not focused upon the announcement effects when an actual break-up
is delayed. A very recent exception, Crowley et al. (2018), also uses the Brexit example, although its focus is on
firm/product level entry and exit into export markets, and so is somewhat different methodologically to our study, and
should perhaps be seen as complementary to it.
In this paper, we view the Brexit shock as a classic case in which to test the policy uncertainty and announcement
effects of an anticipated breakup. This is partly because the result of the Brexit referendum result of 23rd June, 2016,
was such a shock to most businesses and the markets. While the Conservatives had announced a proposed referendum
in the general election a year previously, it was unclear that they would be able to enact it.2In any case it was widely
expected that, with the support of Prime Minister Cameron, Remain would win. Betting on the eve of the poll had still
strongly favoured the likelihood of a Remain victory.3There was therefore a strong announcement shock when the
results of the first constituency to report (Sunderland) were published, indicating a narrow but decisive victory for the
Leave side. A clear indicator of this shock is the movement of exchange rates, shown in Appendix Figure A1.4The
vote represented an almost instantaneous move to a much lower value for sterling, which has largely been sustained
since.
While no formal trade barriers have yet been imposed, at least some increase in trade barriers with the European
Union is expected after the announced transition/implementation period ends (expected to be December 2020, assum-
ing there is an agreement prior to the end of the Article 50 period in March 2019). This is a classic case of a ‘rene-
gotiation period’, in Handley & Lim˜
ao’s (2017) terminology, but one which we would expect to have a particularly
marked effect, because of the estimated downside risk from a ‘no deal’ Brexit. Born et al. (2017) show a Brexit-related
1This is primarily in the form of gravity models, following Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), Head et al. (2010), Head & Mayer (2014).
2Up to 2015 they had been in a coalition with the pro-European Liberal Democrats.
3Odds on a Remain win were cited at around 4:1.
4Within the space of seven hours of the shock Sunderland Leave vote, the pound fell by 8.6 percent against the euro and by 11.91 percent against
the dollar.
2
spike in economic uncertainty after the referendum, which has not yet fully subsided. Dhingra et al. (2017), Steinberg
et al. (2017), and Ebell & Warren (2016) are among a consensus of studies showing that the economic impact of a
‘hard’ Brexit for the UK economy is expected to be very negative.
In this article, we investigate the effects of this period upon the UK’s exports and imports of goods, both with the
EU and with major non-EU partners. Hence, we are looking at the effects of the announcement on overall imports
and exports (‘trade creation’) and on direction of imports and exports (‘trade diversion’ or ‘deflection’). We focus in
particular on the following research questions:
(i) Regarding the UK’s exports, is there any sign of an inward shift in Britain’s export demand curve?
(ii) Is there a difference between changes in export demand from the European Union and from the rest of the
World?
(iii) Do any such shifts in (i) or (ii) appear to be short-lived or lasting?
(iv) Are there any differential shifts in UK import demand between the EU and non-EU sources, and within those
groups?
The rationale for these questions is as follows. In the first instance, UK suppliers now face considerable potential
increases in trade costs in the near future, particularly if they are engaged in supply chains with the EU, and if a
satisfactory customs and border deal is not forthcoming. Since trade requires investment in plant, products and rela-
tionships, the uncertainty might be expected to deter any UK exports - hence the relevance of (i).(ii) looks at whether
the anticipation of (or uncertainty about) future tariff and non-tariff barriers on exports to the EU affect exports to
those markets differentially, (iii) distinguishes between this effect and simply sluggish adjustment in the short-run to
the fall in sterling following the vote. If the primary effect is anticipation of specific future trade costs on UK-EU trade
following Brexit, then we would also expect this result to be more marked in exports to the EU than elsewhere (ii).
(iv) is interesting, as it asks whether there is evidence of UK consumers – particularly Brexit voters – switching de-
mand away from Europe towards other sources, and particularly to the Commonwealth, maybe as a result of negative
campaigning against the EU.
In carrying out this analysis, we utilise a Synthetic Control Method (SCM) approach to compare the Brexit an-
nouncement as a treatment effect upon the United Kingdom’s bilateral trade with its various partners (as opposed to
trade between other pairs). As such, we are the first to apply this popular approach to the issue of the effects of the
Brexit announcement on the volume and direction of the UK’s trade, although previous studies (Born et al. 2017,Kren
2017) have analysed the Brexit announcement effect upon UK GDP growth and exchange rate pass-through respect-
ively. Saia (2017) applied a similar methodology to an earlier trade event: Britain’s decision not to enter the eurozone,
showing a negative effect on UK trade compared to that between countries which joined.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In the rest of this section we briefly outline our main findings. Section 2
discusses our approach to modelling, and lays out in particular how we model the Brexit announcement as a treatment
3
effect upon bilateral trade flows involving the UK, and on how we carry out the SCM analysis, including testing for
statistical significance. Section 3briefly lays our our data sources, while in Section 4we focus on the results for UK
exports, including the implications in terms of our research questions, and carry out some robustness checks. The
subsequent Section 5carries out a similar discussion for UK imports. Section 6concludes.
2 Our Modelling Approach
We are interested in the effects of the announcement shock upon the direction and volume of trade in the months
following the Brexit referendum (in other words, during the ‘renegotiation period’ prior to any actual Brexit). As such,
we would like to differentiate the announcement shock effect from the exchange rate effect (which is observable).
Our modelling approach is based around aggregate bilateral trade flows, so that it is more disaggregated in terms
of source/destination information compared to some recent work (Crowley et al. 2018), but aggregated in terms of
products. We are also looking at effects on both exports and imports.
Our approach is an application of the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) for Comparative Case Studies (Card &
Krueger 1993,Card 1990,Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003,Abadie et al. 2010). The key assumption underlying the
choice of this method is that the Brexit shock is concentrated upon just one country (the UK) out of a panel of many
countries. While this may be simplistic, there are strong a priori grounds to believe that Brexit will affect the UK far
more than other countries, on the grounds that trade with the European Union is larger as a share of the UK’s overall
trade than the UK’s share in the overall trade of any EU member.
Our application of the SCM then proceeds as follows. The sample (in our case, monthly bilateral trade data from
Jan 1999 to Jan 2018) is divided into two periods: a control period, before the Brexit referendum result, and a treatment
period, following the announcement.5The UK is assumed to be the only country directly affected by the treatment.
Our sample contains the UK plus 14 European countries, namely Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland and Greece. We then add a list of 14
non-EU countries - Australia, Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, New Zealand, USA, South Africa, Brazil, Israel,
Japan, South Korea, Mexico and Russia.
To establish the direct announcement effect upon trade, we seek to control for a series of observable control
variables: these include bilateral exchange rate movements, exchange rate volatility and GDP movements. In addition,
we wish to control for unobservable shocks which are correlated across country pairs in our sample. UK trade patterns
with individual trade partners, even after correcting for exchange rates and GDP, show clear correlation in terms of
shock patterns with the behaviour of certain other country pairs: it is in this way that UK trade with each partner
country is matched by the SCM algorithm with a weighted average of trade between other country pairs (i.e.pairs
excluding the UK).
It is worth noting that SCM has been used successfully for a wide variety of case studies in the past. In the case of
5We have excluded the referendum month, June 2016, from the fitting period, even though the referendum was quite late in the month.
4
the EU, we can cite the modelling of EU membership effects, Campos et al. (2014). We are looking at this in reverse.
Saia (2017) analysed the UK’s missing trade gains from not joining the euro. In the case of Brexit announcement
effects, we have already cited the study by Born et al. (2017), on GDP effects, and Kren (2017)’s work on exchange
rate pass-through. Nevertheless, this is the first application of SCM to examining the trade announcement shock.
We observe a bilateral trade flow of country pairs ifrom a set X– i.e. i∈X. When we carry out the analysis
on UK trade with a particular EU member (say Germany) we start by creating a counterfactual from the various flows
between EU member states. Thus, given that the EU sample compromises 14 countries, and that we exclude one
country’s trade with itself from the analysis, we have 91 pairs (14 X 13/2, ignoring direction) eacluding the UK and
a further 14 including the UK. We denote the latter as the treatment group, XT,and the former as the control group,
XNT .
We start by taking as an example one particular treated flow - that between the UK and Germany, which we
denominate as BT Ft,GB R−DEU (T). We can compare this treated flow with a counterfactual, had the treatment not
occurred, which we designate as BT Ft,GB R−DEU (N T ). Hence in principle we can derive the percentage loss or gain
in the Bilateral Trade Flow (BTF) over the the period of Jan 1999-March 2018 as follows:
θJan1999−M ar 2018,GBR−DE U =
Mar 2018
X
t=Jan1999
(BT Ft,GB R−DEU (T)−B T Ft,GBR−DE U (NT ))
PMar 2018
t=Jan1999 B T Ft,GBR−DEU (N T )(1)
The problem is that BT Ft,GB R−DEU (N T )is not observable. Hence we need to construct a credible counterfactual
that is able to replicate the bilateral trade flows between this treated pair. Thus, a selection of country pairs or a
combination of those from the list XNT as a counterfactual would lead to a measure of unobserved trade flows, i.e.
Italy-France. However, manual selection of the pairs would inevitably lead to a selection bias. Therefore, we use the
SCM, which constructs these counterfactuals as a weighted average from the list XNT of country pairs, using a best
fit algorithm to choose the weights. This therefore yields:
ˆ
θJan1999−M ar 2018,GBR−DE U =
Mar 2018
X
t=Jan1999 B T Ft,GBR−DEU (T)−
XNT
X
i=1
αiBT Ft,i (N T )!
PMar 2018
t=Jan1999 PXN T
i=1 αiBT Ft,i (N T ),
where
XNT
X
i=1
αi= 1.(2)
In this case, PXNT
i=1 αiBT Ft,i (N T )is the synthetic counterfactual and αirepresents a positive weight for each pair in
the XNT list. Moreover, each combination of weights provides different counterfactual units, thus we need to select
only those weights that minimise the distance between pre-treatment characteristics of the treated unit – i.e. GBR-DEU
– and the characteristics of the pre-treatment of the counterfactual units.
5
To carry out this analysis, we correct for the effects of a series of observable confounding variables: namely GDP
of the reporting country, GDP of the partner, bilateral exchange rates and the volatility of exchange rates, and bilateral
distance.
To assess the statistical significance of our results we use the subsampling method of Politis & Romano (1994),
which was also adopted by Saia (2017). If we simply chose the single best fitting set of weights, this would lead to
only one estimate of our counterfactualˆ
θJan1999−M ar 2018,GBR−DE U , meaning that we would be unable to statistically
test whether these results differ from zero. By contrast, the Politis & Romano (1994) subsampling method considers
the statistical variability associated with different potential selections of countries and weights when constructing the
synthetic variable. We do this as follows. First, we randomly construct Cdifferent counterfactual groups, of which
every group (XNT ,c) has been randomly selected from the pool of possible counterfactual groups based on XN T by
drawing z×91, where zrepresents a sample size of 10 from the original sample size of 91.6Thus, using this alternative
subsampling procedure we can define:
ˆ
θJan1999−M ar 2018,GBR−DE U =1
CXC
c=1
Mar 2018
X
t=Jan1999
BT Ft,GB R−DEU (T)−
XNT ,c
X
i=1
αi,cB T Ft,c,i(N T )
PMar 2018
t=Jan1999 PXN T ,c
i=1 αi,cB T Ft,c,i(N T )
(3)
and
σJan1999−M ar 2018,GBR−DE U =r1
CXC
c=1 θJan1999−M ar 2018,GBR−DE U,c −ˆ
θJan1999−M ar 2018,GBR−DE U 2
(4)
where θJan1999−M ar 2018,GBR−DE U,c is the percentage difference between observed BTF and the constructed coun-
terfactual group (XNT ,c ). We use a sample size equal to 500, e.g. C= 500, however we analysed our results by
employing alternative sampling size for robustness checks – i.e. C= 100,200,300,750,1000 – and the results
confirm the one reported here with little variation in the point estimates. This allows us to create a distribution of
parameter estimates, which can be tested for statistical significance.
To evaluate the aggregate effects – i.e. by summing all UK treated country pairs – we can modify (3) to provide
an estimate of the overall effect – i.e. gain or loss – of the UK Brexit referendum on BTF for both EU and non-EU
6We performed other sampling sizes, but the results remain quantitatively similar.
6
imports and exports, as follows:
ˆ
AJan1999−J an2018 =1
500X500
c=1
Jan2018
X
t=Jan1999
XT
X
A=1
BT Ft,A (T)−
XT
X
A=1
XNT ,c
X
i=1
αi,cB T Ft,c,i(N T )
PJan2018
t=Jan1999 PXT
A=1 PXNT ,c
i=1 αi,cB T Ft,c,i(N T )
,(5)
where PXT
A=1 BT Ft,A (T)is the sum of the twelve BTF of treated country pairs, whereas
XT
X
A=1
XNT ,c
X
i=1
αi,cB T Ft,c,i(N T ),
is the corresponding sum of counterfactual units.
3 Data
Our sample uses monthly data from IMF DOTS for bilateral trade in goods for the period Jan 1999 to March 2018,
which is the latest month available. Sadly, data on services trade are not available on a monthly basis. We supplement
the data set with GDP and exchange rate data from the IMF. GDP is expressed into current US dollars. We calculate a
set of bilateral exchange rates, as well as a measure of bilateral exchange rate volatility over a 5 year period.
The synthetic control method requires a balanced panel, with no missing values. Consequently, we had to drop data
from a number of significant non-EU countries, such as Turkey and Indonesia, due to too many holes in the data. This
left us with Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, Israel, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia,
South Africa, Japan and the USA as our sample of non-EU countries, plus 14 EU countries. Even with these countries,
which reported for most months, some missing monthly data had to be filled in, albeit a relatively small number of
observations. Fortunately, traded goods appear in the trade statistics twice: once as exports from the origin country,
and the second time as imports for the destination country. While there is not a direct month-on-month comparison,
partly because trade often takes time, we were able to fill in missing values using regressions on lagged (or leading)
trade reported in the other direction.
Data has been seasonally adjusted, to reduce seasonal volatility before fitting for the synthetic doppelgangers. In
addition, in few circumstances, since GDP is reported on a monthly basis, we used linear interpolation when data were
missing.
4 Results for UK exports and discussion
In order to focus on our research questions about the effects of Brexit, we choose to review the results of our SCM for
the UK’s exports first, in this section, and then discuss them, before moving on to reviewing and discussing results for
7
imports in Section 5.
First we construct the doppelganger (or synthetic Britain) based on the pre-referendum period (1999:1-2016:5).7
This doppelganger serves as our counterfactual Britain which has not been subject to the ‘treatment’ of the vote to
leave the European Union. We divide UK trade partners into a group of EU partners and a group of non-EU partners.
We then analyse separately exports from the UK to our sample of EU countries and those from the UK to our sample
of non-EU countries. In tables A1-A4, we provide a list of potential counterfactual trade flows as well a the weights
obtained through our synthetic matching algorithm. Table A1 and Table A2 show our sample weights for our UK-EU
exports and our UK-non-EU exports and Table A3 and Table A4 show our sample weights for imports from both our
sample of EU and of our non-EU countries.
4.1 UK Exports to the European Union
In Figure 1, we plot aggregate UK exports to our sample of EU countries. The solid line maps actual UK exports over
the entire period and the dashed line maps exports of our synthetic doppelganger. The Brexit shock vote is marked
as the shaded area in the graph. The synthetic doppelganger follows actual trade values very closely in our pre-
referendum sample period (1999:1-2016:5), but following the vote the two series diverge. Exports show an initial fall
at the time of the referendum. By contrast, growth of the UK’s trading partners, combined with the effects of sterling
devaluation, lead our SCM model to suggest that the UK’s exports should have been on an upward path. While exports
do actually turn upwards from November 2016, they remain well below our synthetic doppelganger, and the gap even
widens in certain months.
Table 1: Aggregate percentage exports difference between UK-EU partners vs counterfactual
Pre-referendum Post-referendum
1999:1-2016:5 2016:6-2018:3 2016:6-2016:12 2017:1-2018:3
% difference actual -0.228 -15.807 -16.733 -15.558
vs synthetic (0.033) (0.321) (0.306) (0.336)
We summarise our results in Table 1. Trade in the pre-referendum period is insignificantly different from the
synthetic, whereas in the post-referendum period the differences are highly significant. The post-referendum period
(2016:6-2018:3) is divided into two: an initial six month period (the second half of 2016), and a second period
comprising the year of 2017 and early 2018. This allows us to further examine the timing of any effects on trade. It
is clear that, for both these periods, UK export performance is very poor. Initially, that is in the second half of 2016,
exports are down by an average of 16.73% compared to the doppelganger, and export performance makes no significant
recovery in 2017-18 where exports were 15.55% lower than Britain’s doppelganger. We discuss the implications of
this result in more detail later in this section.
7We choose to finish our fitting period at the end of the last month before the referendum date, so that no post-referendum data are included in
the fit.
8
Figure 1: UK – EU aggregate exports
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
12
14
16
18
20
22
Billions of US$
Actual trade flows Synthetic trade flows 99% con. interval
In Table 2we summarise our results by exports to individual EU countries. Notably, export performance to Finland
(FIN), Greece (GRC) and Portugal (PRT) has been exceptionally poor, with differences between actual and synthetic
trade at, respectively, -37.4%, -44.7% and -31.6%. Exports to Belgium (BEL), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), France
(FRA), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA) and the Netherlands (NLD) have fallen between approximately 14.7-24.8% whereas
exports to Germany (DEU) and Austria (AUT) changed much less relative to our synthetic control. Notice that exports
to all EU countries are lower relative to our doppelganger. In figure A3, we provide a visual presentation of our results
by country in which the timing of the trade effects are made clearer.
Table 2: Percentage exports difference between the UK-EU single partner vs counterfactual
AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE
% difference actual minus synth
1999:1-2016:5. -0.422 0.040 -0.099 -0.305 -0.156 -0.349 -0.155 -0.224 0.144 -0.243 0.160 0.071 -0.322 -0.112
(0.036) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.036) (0.030) (0.050) (0.022) (0.020) (0.168) (0.019) (0.043) (0.017)
% 2016:6-2018:3. -3.604 -22.465 -4.276 -24.769 -22.783 -37.361 -15.950 -44.691 -18.582 -18.080 -50.553 -14.723 -31.564 -24.748
(1.116) (0.366) (0.377) (0.677) (0.349) (0.705) (0.401) (0.726) (0.391) (0.366) (2.925) (0.357) (0.879) (0.387)
4.2 UK exports to non-EU countries
Turning now to UK exports to our sample of non-EU countries, we see a strikingly similar picture. We depict the time
series in Figure 2. We see a clear divergence of the actual UK export values from their synthetic control following
the Brexit vote (the shaded area shows the treatment period). As with exports to the EU, non-EU exports started the
post-referendum period with a fall, later recovering. The doppelganger suggests that they should have increased. Even
9
though from late 2016 exports pick up, the gap with the doppelganger remains constant or increases slightly.
Figure 2: UK – non-EU aggregate exports
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
4
6
8
10
12
14
Billions of US$
Actual trade flows Synthetic trade flows 99% con. interval
We summarise the results in Table 3. Over the whole post-Brexit period, actual exports are 13.3 % lower than their
synthetic counterparts. Inspecting the last two columns of the table we note that the shortfall in actual exports relative
to the doppelganger was slightly larger in our second post-Brexit period (2017-early 2018).
Table 3: Aggregate percentage exports difference between UK-Non EU partners vs counterfactual
Pre-referendum Post-referendum
1999:1-2016:5 2016:6-2018:3 2016:6-2016:12 2017:1-2018:3
% difference actual -0.605 -13.326 -12.936 -13.337
vs synthetic (0.099) (1.171) (0.895) (1.306)
In Table 4we summarise the differences between actual and synthetic exports by country. Despite the very weak
performance overall, there is a wider variability in performance: exports to China (CHN), Korea (KOR) and New
Zealand (NZL) seem to have performed very well since the referendum, while those to Mexico also grew. By contrast,
exports to Israel (ISR), Russia (RUS) and Brazil (BRA) performed very badly compared to their synthetic counterparts.
We have divided the countries in this sample into a Commonwealth grouping (including Hong Kong, which strictly left
the Commonwealth in 1997) and a non-Commonwealth grouping, with the English-speaking USA as an intermediate
case. It is worth noting that Brexit-supporting ministers have made a number of bullish statements about trade with
former Commonwealth countries. However, there is little evidence of difference between these groups with respect to
10
British exports. See also Appendix Figure A4 for trade with individual countries.
Table 4: Percentage exports difference between the UK-non EU single partner vs counterfactual
Commonwealth + HK USA Rest of World
AUS CAN HKG IND NZL ZAF USA BRA CHN ISR JPN KOR MEX RUS
% diff. actual vs synth.
1999:1-2016:5 0.002 -0.092 0.045 -0.047 -0.097 -0.103 -0.346 -0.147 0.020 -0.107 -0.138 -0.145 -0.327 -0.099
(0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.080) (0.038) (0.087) (0.034) (0.036) (0.049) (0.032) (0.035) (0.044) (0.031)
2016:6-2018:3 -19.753 -19.351 -4.269 -23.196 24.396 -42.431 -17.281 -28.804 43.615 -40.552 -18.663 30.762 0.236 -31.563
(0.902) (0.834) (1.190) (0.756) (3.177) (0.750) (0.188) (0.987) (2.592) (1.025) (0.919) (1.464) (1.745) (0.851)
4.3 Discussion with respect to our research questions
In the Introduction, we posed a number of export-related questions. First of all, whether the post-Referendum period
shows evidence of an inward shift in the UK’s export demand curve. This is somewhat different to simply asking
whether exports have increased or decreased, since we need to correct for flows in other trading partners whose
patterns have traditionally tracked the UK well. We have also to correct for the effect of exchange rates, since in
normal circumstances a fall in sterling would be expected to benefit exporters. The underlying hypothesis is that
policy uncertainty (see Osnago et al. 2015,Lim˜
ao & Maggi 2015 and Carballo et al. 2018), and particularly fears
about the supply chains feeding UK exporters, would be expected to damage UK exports.
The results from our SCM analysis of UK exports are quite clear: compared to doppelgangers, there is an aggregate
drop in exports of around 16 % to the EU across the post-referendum period, and around 13 % to non-EU countries,
when measured in dollars. Moreover, in response to our second question, while the performance of exports to the EU
is slightly worse than to non-EU countries (and the difference is statistically significant), both have fallen substantially
behind their respective doppelgangers. This indicates that the primary driver is not simply expectations of the direct
effect of future tariff movements exports to the EU after Brexit (assuming that markets might be discounting in future
EU tariffs against the UK in the case of a hard Brexit, whereas tariffs in some other countries might even eventually
fall, if the UK were successful in striking Free Trade Agreements of its own). Hence, the evidence suggests that
worries about effects on the UK supply side post-Brexit are the main driver.
Our results are not directly comparable to Crowley et al. (2018), since their study is focused upon the extensive
margin of exports (market entry/exit by firms/products), and makes some very significant inter-industry comparisons
(linking uncertainty to the size of EU most favoured nation tariffs by product), which we cannot do. Nevertheless,
both studies find evidence of disappointing performance by UK exporters, especially, but not exclusively to the EU,
and should probably be considered to be consistent. Indeed, Crowley et al. (2018) argue that the collapse of entry in
sectors most at threat of tariffs bears comparison with the effects on the French gross entry margin during the Great
Trade Collapse of 2008-9 (Bricongne et al. 2012). However, our results are in some respects more striking, since
exports are compared to other countries’ bilateral trade flows in dollar terms, which emphasises the deterioration of
the UK’s terms of trade far more than either figures in sterling or export participation rates. Crowley et al. (2018) find
11
a Brexit announcement effect of about -5 % on the extensive margin (i.e. on the number of firms/products participating
in trade). This is less than our Brexit effect, presumably because the intensive margin (sales per firm/product) has also
fallen, which is entirely plausible.8
Exchange Rate considerations
We do, however, have to give a little more consideration to the possible role of exchange rates in this analysis, espe-
cially given the very large exchange rate movements directly following the referendum (see Appendix Figure A1). It
is worth noting that our analysis has been carried out in dollars: this makes sense in any panel-type analysis based
upon comparing bilateral trade between multiple pairs of countries, since it would not make sense to be comparing
trade denominated in a variety of exchange rates. It is worth noting, of course, that, given the scale of the exchange
rate depreciation seen in Figure A1, a flat export performance in dollar terms may appear as a sharp rise in exports in
sterling terms.
Nevertheless, there is a potential issue of dynamics. While our SCM contains the bilateral exchange rate of each
trading pair (i.e. sterling to euro, for UK-German trade, for example), and both countries’ GDPs in dollars (which
will change rapidly if the dollar exchange rate changes) as confounding variables, they are there in current levels,
with the dynamics of the SCM provided by the weighted matching of the other bilateral trade flows in the synthetic
doppelganger. We need to consider the possibility that traded volumes may take time to react to a large fall in the
exchange rate, and hence that dollar values of UK exports may initially fall simply because UK export costs are
falling.9
To test for this, we carry out a robustness check, by repeating our SCM exercise for UK exports to EU countries,
this time including lagged, as well as current, export values and exporter’s nominal GDP, which incorporates the dollar
exchange rate. Results are reported in Table 5below. We find that including these rather simple dynamics does not
greatly change our conclusion that there has been a significant fall in UK export demand.
Table 5: Aggregate percentage exports difference between UK-EU partners vs counterfactual: lagged values included
as confounding variables
Pre-referendum Post-referendum
1999:1-2016:5 2016:6-2018:3 2016:6-2016:12 2017:1-2018:3
% difference actual -0.206 -12.733 -13.819 -13.390
vs synthetic (0.131) (1.145) (1.086) (1.096)
The evidence in Crowley et al. (2018) of a fall in entry by firms/products is consistent with our finding: if the fall
in sterling was going to have a positive but delayed effect on exports, one of the first things we would expect to see is
increased entry by firms, leading to larger sales in the long run as they expand. Hence, a fall in the extensive margin
8the percent change in overall trade will approximately equal the sum of the percentage changes on the extensive and intensive margins
9Against this, of course, many studies suggest that traded prices are sticky in terms of the importer currency, with limited exchange rate pass-
through.
12
supports our finding that the Brexit announcement has produced a lasting negative shock to export demand, which has
mainly been manifest as a deterioration in the UK’s terms of trade.
5 Results for UK imports and discussion
5.1 UK Imports from the EU
In the aggregate, we have found smaller effects upon imports than on exports. We plot imports as well as our synthetic
doppelganger in Figure 3. We again depict the Brexit shock vote as the shaded area. We note that pre-referendum the
synthetic doppelganger and actual data follow very closely, while after the referendum imports gradually fall behind
the doppelganger. Nevertheless the effect is not great.
Figure 3: UK – EU aggregate imports
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
15
20
25
30
Billions of US$
Actual trade flows Synthetic trade flows 99% con. interval
We summarise our results in Table 6. Actual imports fall below our synthetic doppelganger albeit by a small but
significant amount for the full post-Brexit period, and there is a growing shortfall. In the first six months after the
Brexit vote, imports are insignificantly lower than the doppelganger, while, in our second post-Brexit period (2017-
early 2018) imports are 3.6 % below the doppelganger, and this is statistically significant.
Inspection of Table 7reveals that there are significant effects of the Brexit vote on imports by country. For example,
actual imports from Belgium (BEL), Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), the Netherlands (NLD) and Portugal (PRT) exceed
UK’s synthetic doppelganger by large and significant amounts (5%-14%). Strikingly, imports from Denmark (DNK),
Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Ireland (IRL), Luxembourg (LUX) and Sweden (SWE) significantly underperformed.
13
Table 6: Aggregate percentage imports difference between UK-EU partners vs counterfactual
Pre-referendum Post-referendum
1999:1-2016:5 2016:6-2018:3 2016:6-2016:12 2017:1-2018:3
% difference actual -0.339 -3.084 -0.605 -3.643
vs synthetic (0.027) (0.955) (0.659) (1.045)
See Appendix Figure A5 for graphical representations of the results by country.
Table 7: Percentage imports difference between the UK-EU single partner vs counterfactual
AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE
% diff. actual vs synth.
1999:1-2016:5 -0.272 0.051 0.220 -0.165 -0.159 -0.085 -0.094 -0.145 0.047 -0.143 -0.161 0.129 -0.147 -0.034
(0.022) (0.016) (0.030) (0.020) (0.016) (0.028) (0.024) (0.073) (0.017) (0.016) (0.125) (0.017) (0.031) (0.015)
2016:6-2018:3 -1.957 8.432 5.674 -16.179 5.500 -31.297 -15.064 3.934 -14.763 -3.608 -52.012 12.783 12.267 -24.619
(0.448) (0.563) (1.190) (0.313) (0.546) (0.349) (0.431) (1.929) (0.448) (0.506) (1.859) (0.635) (0.731) (0.281)
5.2 UK imports from non-EU countries
In Figure 4, we plot actual and synthetic aggregate imports. Similar to the previous series which we have analysed,
actual and synthetic imports follow each other closely before the Brexit vote, but there is a clear divergence afterwards,
with aggregate imports from non-EU countries falling well behind the doppelganger.
Figure 4: UK – non-EU aggregate imports
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
10
15
20
25
Billions of US$
Actual trade flows Synthetic trade flows 99% con. interval
We summarise our results for imports in Table 8. Inspection of this table reveals that imports from our sample
14
of non-EU countries initially did not change significantly (-0.8%). However, imports fall significantly short of their
synthetic counterpart in the 2017-2018 period. The results for each individual country are summarised in Table 9and
in Figure A6 and we will discuss these results in more detail in the next section.
Table 8: Aggregate percentage imports difference between UK-non-EU partners vs counterfactual
Pre-referendum Post-referendum
1999:1-2016:5 2016:6-2018:3 2016:6-2016:12 2017:1-2018:3
% difference actual 0.268 -7.325 -0.807 -9.937
vs synthetic (0.010) (1.201) (1.246) (1.307)
5.3 Results and discussion: UK imports from EU and non-EU countries
As with exports, we now discuss the evidence with respect to our research questions. In particular, our fourth research
question (iv) asked whether there were differential shifts in imports between EU and non-EU sources, and whether
these were lasting.
As regards the differential shifts, the answer is clear, certainly at the aggregate level. Imports from both sets of
countries slipped compared to the doppelganger, but the effects has been more marked in the case of the non-EU
countries.
5.4 Discussion and Robustness Checks
An interesting question is whether there have been changes in these import patterns between different countries. As
in the section on exports, Table 9splits non-EU countries into Commonwealth/Hong Kong, the USA and the rest. All
members of the former group, except New Zealand, have provided higher imports to the UK since the Referendum
than the doppelganger, although this is only statistically significant for four of the six countries (Canada, Hong Kong,
India and South Africa). By contrast, there have been sharp falls for most countries in the non-Commonwealth group,
except for Mexico. This is consistent with the idea of a reorientation of imports specifically towards Commonwealth
partners. note that imports from the USA did not perform particularly well compared to our doppelganger.
Table 9: Percentage imports difference between the UK-non EU single partner vs counterfactual
Commonwealth + HK USA Rest of World
AUS CAN HKG IND NZL ZAF USA BRA CHN ISR JPN KOR MEX RUS
% diff. actual vs synth.
1999:1-2016:5 0.107 0.125 0.107 0.055 0.095 0.163 -0.060 0.020 0.112 -0.095 0.027 0.091 -0.220 0.063
(0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.045) (0.030) (0.110) (0.023) (0.044) (0.038) (0.042) (0.028) (0.032) (0.033)
2016:6-2018:3 1.887 12.604 12.509 29.827 -5.608 4.423 -11.701 -18.361 -6.689 -27.059 -25.524 -1.591 23.314 -20.666
(2.122) (2.020) (2.129) (2.175) (1.883) (1.922) (0.139) (1.238) (1.964) (1.469) (1.328) (1.652) (2.298) (1.454)
One can certainly argue that this shift is in line with political trends among conservative-leaning UK correspondents
15
and politicians 10. However, it is not entirely clear whether such a trend will have influenced a wider public mood. One
factor may well be a compositional effect in UK demand: while the economics community has overwhelmingly viewed
Brexit in terms of its downsides (and financial markets – at least exchange markets – seem to share this view), this is
not the view within the pro-Brexit press, or indeed in communities where ‘experts’ are viewed with suspicion. One
should perhaps not expect consumers who supported Brexit to batten down the hatches in the ways that most economic
models suggest they should. A Bank of England survey reveals how Leave voters’ consumer confidence rose after the
vote, along with their household expenditure, while Remain voters’ confidence and spending declined.11. It is quite
conceivable that these voters have stronger identification with the old Commonwealth than with EU countries.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the effects upon trade of the announcement of the ‘Leave’ vote in the United Kingdom
on 23 June, 2016. This can be seen as a classic case of an announcement inducing uncertainty, since, two years on,
no formal trade barriers have been announced, and there is considerable uncertainty still, both over future UK-EU
relations, and upon potential future trade relations with other parts of the World – the latter depending upon a clear
decision on what type of relationship the UK and EU settle upon.
Despite the lack of formal barriers, our work confirms very clearly that an announcement can have strong economic
effects. Regarding the United Kingdom’s exports, the discussion in Section 4provides some interesting insights into
the effects of Brexit. UK export demand, measured in dollar terms, has fallen below what would be expected, from
the trends of other countries’ trade and GDP, and from exchange rate movements to both EU and non-EU destinations.
There is no sign of this gap closing over the 18 months of our study, which indicates a prolonged negative demand
shock, rather than adjustment issues. There is a small but significant difference in the poor performance of UK exports
to the EU and to non-EU countries, indicating that fear of barriers on exports to the EU plays some part, but that the
main negative shock seems to be related to uncertainty and fears about the negative productivity/cost consequences
of Brexit, which affects exports to all destinations. We discuss the relation of this to other recent firm/product level
evidence (Crowley et al. 2018), which also indicate that policy uncertainty is deterring UK exporters. To summarise:
we find clear evidence of an inward shift in the demand curve, mainly manifest as a deterioration in the UK’s terms
of trade. Further robustness checks confirm that this does not seem to be simply a case of the response of exports to
devaluation being delayed.
Regarding imports, Section 5shows that those from the EU fall modestly below the doppelganger. Imports from
many non-EU countries perform even worse, but there is a clear distinction between Commonwealth countries (except
New Zealand), whose sales to the UK have risen, and non-Commonwealth countries. We argue that this may be
consistent with the Brexit campaign reinforcing pro-Commonwealth sentiment among Leave voters, whose consumer
10https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/02/rise-anglosphere-how-right-dreamed-new-conservative-world-order
11https://bankunderground.co.uk/2018/01/10/voting-with-their-wallets-consumer-expectations-after-the-eu-referendum/#more-3664
16
confidence also rose following the result.
We need to make a few cautionary remarks at this stage. First, while monthly data on bilateral trade in goods
are available for many countries, we lack comparable data on trade in services, which are an important component of
overall UK exports. It would be interesting to see whether services trade has shown similar trends.
Secondly, the poor export performance picked out by our analysis is mostly in comparison with what one should
have expected, given an upturn in many other economies, and the stimulus from a fall in sterling. This would be less
evident in data published in sterling terms. Indeed, in sterling terms, UK exports have grown somewhat (although
more or less in line with what we would have expected from the growth of export markets): the poor performance is
that the UK is now having to sell its exports at a lower price, with little gain in volume terms.12
Overall, however, there seems to be an important message. Even before actual policy changes have been finalised,
uncertainty and anticipation have sizeable and measurable effects upon trade.
As regards Brexit: substantial parts of the British electorate may have chosen ‘the wide open sea’13 , but there is
little evidence of the World outside Europe switching towards British exports – in fact, rather the reverse.
12In this regard, the Department of International Trade’s announcement in its export strategy briefing of 21 August 2018 that UK exports are ‘at
record levels’ is both true and quite misleading in terms of the UK’s ability to purchase imported goods and services with what it exports.
13In Winston Churchill’s famous phrase
17
Appendix
Figure A1: Sterling vs dollar and euro – Jan 2016-June 2018
2016 2017 2018
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
£/$ and £/e
Sterling-dollar exchange rate Sterling-euro exchange rate
Figure A2: United Kingdom EU membership referendum opinion polling – Feb 2012-June 2016
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Remain Leave Undecided
18
Table A1: UK – EU sample weights – exports
EU pairs
GBR pairs AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE
AUT-BEL 0.151
(0.196) 0.039
(0.115) 0.009
(0.073) 0.125
(0.218) 0.023
(0.112) 0.018
(0.076) 0.016
(0.090) 0.011
(0.066) 0.028
(0.096) 0.020
(0.103) 0.078
(0.196) 0.049
(0.125) 0.028
(0.099) 0.033
(0.098)
AUT-DEU 0.000
(0.002) 0.109
(0.160) 0.705
(0.337) 0.003
(0.011) 0.151
(0.125) 0.001
(0.004) 0.438
(0.267) 0.001
(0.003) 0.202
(0.239) 0.164
(0.118) 0.000
(0.000) 0.256
(0.268) 0.001
(0.006) 0.030
(0.042)
AUT-DNK 0.209
(0.217) 0.021
(0.099) 0.000
(0.000) 0.223
(0.241) 0.007
(0.040) 0.049
(0.102) 0.004
(0.025) 0.026
(0.102) 0.014
(0.088) 0.009
(0.040) 0.362
(0.393) 0.024
(0.091) 0.072
(0.128) 0.096
(0.181)
AUT-ESP 0.060
(0.101) 0.020
(0.141) 0.045
(0.160) 0.036
(0.146) 0.120
(0.195) 0.045
(0.123) 0.071
(0.174) 0.027
(0.092) 0.020
(0.141) 0.227
(0.286) 0.000
(0.000) 0.020
(0.141) 0.041
(0.119) 0.056
(0.152)
AUT-FIN 0.313
(0.321) 0.016
(0.081) 0.000
(0.000) 0.125
(0.229) 0.031
(0.122) 0.307
(0.330) 0.000
(0.000) 0.245
(0.294) 0.012
(0.055) 0.030
(0.111) 0.327
(0.425) 0.005
(0.041) 0.292
(0.344) 0.089
(0.172)
AUT-FRA 0.008
(0.019) 0.024
(0.134) 0.165
(0.244) 0.015
(0.052) 0.074
(0.154) 0.002
(0.009) 0.141
(0.217) 0.001
(0.009) 0.020
(0.133) 0.164
(0.205) 0.000
(0.000) 0.031
(0.137) 0.002
(0.009) 0.033
(0.133)
AUT-GRC 0.353
(0.332) 0.029
(0.101) 0.000
(0.000) 0.163
(0.253) 0.020
(0.077) 0.140
(0.236) 0.002
(0.013) 0.076
(0.188) 0.015
(0.060) 0.017
(0.070) 0.520
(0.428) 0.009
(0.034) 0.220
(0.270) 0.053
(0.147)
AUT-IRL 0.171
(0.252) 0.022
(0.093) 0.000
(0.000) 0.096
(0.217) 0.026
(0.115) 0.157
(0.259) 0.002
(0.016) 0.136
(0.257) 0.015
(0.066) 0.023
(0.099) 0.239
(0.354) 0.013
(0.052) 0.177
(0.270) 0.066
(0.185)
AUT-ITA 0.005
(0.015) 0.138
(0.337) 0.175
(0.343) 0.015
(0.031) 0.179
(0.315) 0.002
(0.009) 0.251
(0.344) 0.000
(0.002) 0.131
(0.337) 0.273
(0.360) 0.000
(0.000) 0.149
(0.335) 0.001
(0.008) 0.071
(0.127)
AUT-LUX 0.195
(0.228) 0.077
(0.160) 0.001
(0.008) 0.215
(0.280) 0.016
(0.102) 0.159
(0.223) 0.009
(0.068) 0.105
(0.191) 0.089
(0.165) 0.013
(0.101) 0.663
(0.345) 0.072
(0.150) 0.197
(0.250) 0.074
(0.173)
AUT-NLD 0.056
(0.101) 0.011
(0.045) 0.018
(0.063) 0.039
(0.118) 0.025
(0.077) 0.000
(0.001) 0.037
(0.102) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.002) 0.060
(0.159) 0.009
(0.066) 0.019
(0.066) 0.004
(0.030) 0.022
(0.066)
AUT-PRT 0.129
(0.201) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.039
(0.091) 0.040
(0.096) 0.306
(0.270) 0.001
(0.004) 0.464
(0.341) 0.000
(0.000) 0.035
(0.085) 0.189
(0.325) 0.000
(0.000) 0.237
(0.240) 0.074
(0.144)
AUT-SWE 0.218
(0.272) 0.004
(0.025) 0.000
(0.000) 0.158
(0.193) 0.034
(0.123) 0.064
(0.174) 0.004
(0.027) 0.056
(0.175) 0.000
(0.000) 0.029
(0.112) 0.097
(0.227) 0.002
(0.011) 0.067
(0.177) 0.111
(0.207)
BEL-DEU 0.001
(0.004) 0.091
(0.105) 0.458
(0.217) 0.003
(0.010) 0.098
(0.082) 0.001
(0.004) 0.304
(0.186) 0.001
(0.004) 0.147
(0.150) 0.089
(0.079) 0.000
(0.001) 0.198
(0.149) 0.001
(0.005) 0.020
(0.030)
BEL-DNK 0.065
(0.144) 0.053
(0.132) 0.002
(0.017) 0.144
(0.202) 0.001
(0.006) 0.004
(0.025) 0.006
(0.031) 0.000
(0.000) 0.050
(0.131) 0.000
(0.000) 0.021
(0.065) 0.053
(0.128) 0.011
(0.049) 0.052
(0.101)
BEL-ESP 0.006
(0.028) 0.154
(0.353) 0.240
(0.371) 0.009
(0.035) 0.319
(0.375) 0.003
(0.020) 0.306
(0.398) 0.001
(0.011) 0.145
(0.355) 0.441
(0.440) 0.000
(0.000) 0.170
(0.352) 0.002
(0.016) 0.082
(0.146)
BEL-FIN 0.104
(0.239) 0.003
(0.024) 0.006
(0.046) 0.066
(0.168) 0.037
(0.137) 0.126
(0.257) 0.012
(0.073) 0.124
(0.277) 0.004
(0.036) 0.014
(0.083) 0.029
(0.120) 0.001
(0.009) 0.114
(0.244) 0.048
(0.142)
BEL-FRA 0.000
(0.001) 0.111
(0.119) 0.378
(0.295) 0.003
(0.013) 0.065
(0.084) 0.001
(0.003) 0.242
(0.215) 0.000
(0.002) 0.188
(0.167) 0.047
(0.070) 0.000
(0.001) 0.223
(0.170) 0.001
(0.004) 0.015
(0.029)
BEL-GRC 0.080
(0.202) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.047
(0.133) 0.023
(0.097) 0.189
(0.301) 0.002
(0.012) 0.244
(0.361) 0.000
(0.000) 0.026
(0.112) 0.041
(0.179) 0.000
(0.000) 0.140
(0.261) 0.034
(0.097)
BEL-IRL 0.048
(0.131) 0.032
(0.105) 0.000
(0.002) 0.065
(0.148) 0.015
(0.090) 0.029
(0.106) 0.005
(0.035) 0.027
(0.111) 0.032
(0.090) 0.010
(0.058) 0.089
(0.231) 0.014
(0.065) 0.034
(0.119) 0.016
(0.070)
BEL-ITA 0.010
(0.027) 0.231
(0.414) 0.332
(0.403) 0.015
(0.052) 0.269
(0.310) 0.006
(0.026) 0.382
(0.399) 0.004
(0.018) 0.225
(0.413) 0.402
(0.316) 0.001
(0.004) 0.238
(0.411) 0.007
(0.029) 0.062
(0.117)
BEL-LUX 0.009
(0.039) 0.170
(0.257) 0.047
(0.213) 0.035
(0.104) 0.041
(0.190) 0.010
(0.048) 0.047
(0.213) 0.004
(0.029) 0.164
(0.272) 0.040
(0.187) 0.003
(0.014) 0.162
(0.255) 0.011
(0.048) 0.049
(0.157)
BEL-NLD 0.001
(0.006) 0.153
(0.149) 0.294
(0.429) 0.004
(0.014) 0.051
(0.108) 0.001
(0.007) 0.172
(0.286) 0.001
(0.005) 0.256
(0.223) 0.042
(0.095) 0.000
(0.000) 0.260
(0.229) 0.001
(0.007) 0.016
(0.039)
BEL-PRT 0.157
(0.269) 0.045
(0.162) 0.000
(0.000) 0.096
(0.228) 0.041
(0.136) 0.243
(0.358) 0.018
(0.080) 0.204
(0.341) 0.044
(0.141) 0.033
(0.124) 0.073
(0.187) 0.028
(0.121) 0.215
(0.358) 0.104
(0.230)
BEL-SWE 0.011
(0.047) 0.013
(0.059) 0.000
(0.000) 0.030
(0.088) 0.000
(0.000) 0.008
(0.055) 0.000
(0.002) 0.005
(0.035) 0.009
(0.058) 0.001
(0.006) 0.000
(0.000) 0.021
(0.104) 0.008
(0.057) 0.048
(0.117)
DEU-DNK 0.022
(0.041) 0.670
(0.267) 0.218
(0.397) 0.108
(0.093) 0.280
(0.313) 0.031
(0.052) 0.251
(0.396) 0.023
(0.040) 0.60
(0.315) 0.212
(0.302) 0.005
(0.013) 0.576
(0.295) 0.034
(0.056) 0.279
(0.142)
DEU-ESP 0.004
(0.011) 0.235
(0.191) 0.495
(0.417) 0.018
(0.029) 0.217
(0.126) 0.007
(0.013) 0.421
(0.314) 0.007
(0.014) 0.378
(0.243) 0.185
(0.129) 0.000
(0.002) 0.361
(0.263) 0.008
(0.015) 0.068
(0.064)
DEU-FIN 0.052
(0.077) 0.309
(0.339) 0.073
(0.262) 0.145
(0.162) 0.249
(0.314) 0.063
(0.096) 0.112
(0.267) 0.043
(0.070) 0.238
(0.318) 0.163
(0.284) 0.009
(0.017) 0.205
(0.303) 0.077
(0.105) 0.424
(0.297)
DEU-FRA 0.000
(0.001) 0.084
(0.062) 0.252
(0.144) 0.001
(0.005) 0.054
(0.051) 0.001
(0.003) 0.162
(0.121) 0.001
(0.003) 0.134
(0.088) 0.045
(0.047) 0.000
(0.000) 0.159
(0.092) 0.001
(0.002) 0.011
(0.017)
DEU-GRC 0.158
(0.136) 0.193
(0.325) 0.108
(0.273) 0.310
(0.235) 0.363
(0.321) 0.223
(0.150) 0.150
(0.285) 0.163
(0.134) 0.174
(0.317) 0.277
(0.301) 0.029
(0.053) 0.154
(0.301) 0.240
(0.153) 0.459
(0.299)
DEU-IRL 0.247
(0.149) 0.201
(0.280) 0.035
(0.144) 0.482
(0.258) 0.285
(0.273) 0.253
(0.177) 0.082
(0.180) 0.147
(0.145) 0.134
(0.227) 0.185
(0.220) 0.041
(0.056) 0.117
(0.207) 0.285
(0.172) 0.431
(0.286)
DEU-ITA 0.002
(0.006) 0.144
(0.099) 0.469
(0.190) 0.004
(0.013) 0.094
(0.075) 0.002
(0.007) 0.312
(0.154) 0.001
(0.005) 0.218
(0.145) 0.078
(0.070) 0.000
(0.001) 0.282
(0.132) 0.002
(0.007) 0.023
(0.031)
DEU-LUX 0.173
(0.155) 0.383
(0.303) 0.022
(0.142) 0.426
(0.234) 0.107
(0.204) 0.132
(0.165) 0.053
(0.159) 0.064
(0.121) 0.305
(0.292) 0.066
(0.180) 0.065
(0.086) 0.249
(0.258) 0.169
(0.180) 0.219
(0.238)
DEU-NLD 0.000
(0.003) 0.154
(0.090) 0.256
(0.235) 0.006
(0.012) 0.053
(0.071) 0.001
(0.005) 0.173
(0.177) 0.001
(0.004) 0.285
(0.086) 0.041
(0.063) 0.000
(0.001) 0.261
(0.119) 0.001
(0.005) 0.022
(0.029)
DEU-PRT 0.073
(0.093) 0.194
(0.312) 0.094
(0.266) 0.143
(0.181) 0.292
(0.311) 0.141
(0.117) 0.142
(0.271) 0.103
(0.098) 0.185
(0.314) 0.216
(0.303) 0.005
(0.016) 0.164
(0.298) 0.138
(0.120) 0.339
(0.286)
DEU-SWE 0.008
(0.020) 0.536
(0.280) 0.350
(0.462) 0.052
(0.058) 0.363
(0.252) 0.010
(0.023) 0.393
(0.446) 0.005
(0.017) 0.649
(0.369) 0.270
(0.243) 0.001
(0.003) 0.609
(0.341) 0.010
(0.024) 0.186
(0.108)
19
DNK-ESP 0.007
(0.024) 0.000
(0.001) 0.034
(0.106) 0.001
(0.009) 0.047
(0.115) 0.004
(0.022) 0.060
(0.163) 0.005
(0.037) 0.000
(0.000) 0.083
(0.181) 0.000
(0.000) 0.002
(0.015) 0.001
(0.006) 0.005
(0.026)
DNK-FIN 0.025
(0.099) 0.015
(0.038) 0.000
(0.000) 0.013
(0.059) 0.000
(0.000) 0.010
(0.060) 0.000
(0.000) 0.006
(0.042) 0.004
(0.021) 0.000
(0.000) 0.018
(0.076) 0.004
(0.016) 0.006
(0.043) 0.001
(0.007)
DNK-FRA 0.012
(0.032) 0.007
(0.022) 0.066
(0.154) 0.007
(0.036) 0.047
(0.090) 0.000
(0.001) 0.069
(0.152) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.003) 0.122
(0.166) 0.001
(0.004) 0.004
(0.015) 0.000
(0.003) 0.008
(0.030)
DNK-GRC 0.043
(0.138) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.011
(0.058) 0.002
(0.010) 0.076
(0.185) 0.000
(0.000) 0.102
(0.207) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.025) 0.066
(0.168) 0.000
(0.000) 0.066
(0.178) 0.010
(0.050)
DNK-IRL 0.045
(0.140) 0.003
(0.015) 0.000
(0.000) 0.043
(0.121) 0.001
(0.010) 0.034
(0.126) 0.000
(0.000) 0.031
(0.127) 0.001
(0.007) 0.000
(0.000) 0.156
(0.311) 0.000
(0.002) 0.038
(0.132) 0.009
(0.046)
DNK-ITA 0.006
(0.013) 0.001
(0.007) 0.025
(0.076) 0.000
(0.000) 0.028
(0.074) 0.000
(0.001) 0.054
(0.113) 0.000
(0.001) 0.000
(0.000) 0.072
(0.161) 0.000
(0.000) 0.003
(0.019) 0.000
(0.000) 0.001
(0.008)
DNK-LUX 0.068
(0.096) 0.023
(0.051) 0.000
(0.000) 0.062
(0.134) 0.003
(0.021) 0.042
(0.087) 0.000
(0.000) 0.028
(0.080) 0.020
(0.050) 0.003
(0.021) 0.356
(0.314) 0.012
(0.039) 0.059
(0.107) 0.010
(0.066)
DNK-NLD 0.005
(0.021) 0.010
(0.035) 0.031
(0.116) 0.000
(0.002) 0.031
(0.134) 0.000
(0.000) 0.048
(0.155) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.024) 0.056
(0.189) 0.000
(0.000) 0.008
(0.031) 0.000
(0.000) 0.006
(0.029)
DNK-PRT 0.018
(0.061) 0.000
(0.002) 0.000
(0.000) 0.006
(0.044) 0.003
(0.016) 0.051
(0.127) 0.000
(0.000) 0.111
(0.182) 0.000
(0.000) 0.001
(0.007) 0.042
(0.159) 0.000
(0.000) 0.040
(0.118) 0.001
(0.005)
DNK-SWE 0.001
(0.004) 0.278
(0.40) 0.212
(0.408) 0.012
(0.033) 0.205
(0.390) 0.000
(0.002) 0.197
(0.396) 0.000
(0.000) 0.266
(0.401) 0.175
(0.378) 0.000
(0.000) 0.270
(0.40) 0.000
(0.002) 0.065
(0.126)
ESP-FIN 0.175
(0.187) 0.005
(0.037) 0.001
(0.009) 0.079
(0.153) 0.020
(0.068) 0.305
(0.236) 0.000
(0.002) 0.518
(0.241) 0.002
(0.016) 0.032
(0.101) 0.281
(0.341) 0.002
(0.013) 0.267
(0.236) 0.041
(0.123)
ESP-FRA 0.001
(0.005) 0.120
(0.178) 0.693
(0.395) 0.008
(0.019) 0.172
(0.139) 0.001
(0.004) 0.520
(0.315) 0.000
(0.002) 0.205
(0.264) 0.151
(0.137) 0.000
(0.000) 0.255
(0.289) 0.001
(0.005) 0.039
(0.054)
ESP-GRC 0.387
(0.348) 0.069
(0.201) 0.020
(0.080) 0.245
(0.334) 0.137
(0.269) 0.634
(0.308) 0.040
(0.127) 0.798
(0.279) 0.060
(0.175) 0.083
(0.196) 0.113
(0.196) 0.054
(0.164) 0.546
(0.340) 0.194
(0.297)
ESP-IRL 0.322
(0.260) 0.057
(0.166) 0.000
(0.000) 0.218
(0.277) 0.063
(0.176) 0.306
(0.282) 0.013
(0.055) 0.304
(0.301) 0.038
(0.111) 0.070
(0.187) 0.405
(0.327) 0.030
(0.096) 0.333
(0.297) 0.120
(0.255)
ESP-ITA 0.010
(0.027) 0.212
(0.398) 0.40
(0.367) 0.021
(0.052) 0.393
(0.283) 0.008
(0.024) 0.552
(0.334) 0.005
(0.018) 0.196
(0.393) 0.558
(0.205) 0.001
(0.006) 0.210
(0.393) 0.008
(0.026) 0.089
(0.107)
ESP-LUX 0.544
(0.238) 0.110
(0.224) 0.000
(0.000) 0.348
(0.326) 0.062
(0.170) 0.417
(0.232) 0.005
(0.022) 0.381
(0.276) 0.111
(0.222) 0.043
(0.128) 0.883
(0.104) 0.053
(0.156) 0.497
(0.230) 0.156
(0.256)
ESP-NLD 0.026
(0.060) 0.133
(0.309) 0.106
(0.280) 0.050
(0.114) 0.266
(0.353) 0.030
(0.066) 0.149
(0.30) 0.020
(0.061) 0.110
(0.290) 0.232
(0.354) 0.000
(0.000) 0.108
(0.288) 0.033
(0.069) 0.126
(0.261)
ESP-PRT 0.007
(0.021) 0.493
(0.405) 0.222
(0.403) 0.032
(0.060) 0.195
(0.307) 0.011
(0.028) 0.263
(0.406) 0.008
(0.020) 0.558
(0.374) 0.145
(0.256) 0.001
(0.003) 0.455
(0.391) 0.011
(0.029) 0.094
(0.128)
ESP-SWE 0.260
(0.272) 0.042
(0.155) 0.034
(0.125) 0.218
(0.304) 0.150
(0.254) 0.283
(0.297) 0.057
(0.163) 0.433
(0.313) 0.035
(0.132) 0.190
(0.287) 0.041
(0.090) 0.027
(0.124) 0.257
(0.294) 0.184
(0.279)
FIN-FRA 0.015
(0.041) 0.000
(0.000) 0.056
(0.150) 0.008
(0.024) 0.073
(0.108) 0.010
(0.031) 0.056
(0.129) 0.013
(0.049) 0.000
(0.000) 0.144
(0.166) 0.001
(0.004) 0.000
(0.000) 0.006
(0.023) 0.018
(0.045)
FIN-GRC 0.096
(0.146) 0.008
(0.057) 0.012
(0.084) 0.031
(0.096) 0.021
(0.118) 0.222
(0.232) 0.016
(0.099) 0.364
(0.321) 0.015
(0.105) 0.015
(0.079) 0.122
(0.243) 0.013
(0.095) 0.153
(0.197) 0.031
(0.086)
FIN-IRL 0.080
(0.151) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.016
(0.056) 0.011
(0.048) 0.179
(0.226) 0.000
(0.000) 0.281
(0.314) 0.000
(0.000) 0.006
(0.046) 0.160
(0.296) 0.000
(0.000) 0.120
(0.194) 0.015
(0.064)
FIN-ITA 0.026
(0.050) 0.000
(0.000) 0.053
(0.141) 0.004
(0.019) 0.058
(0.099) 0.024
(0.061) 0.049
(0.118) 0.043
(0.095) 0.000
(0.000) 0.125
(0.179) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.016
(0.051) 0.012
(0.041)
FIN-LUX 0.095
(0.187) 0.003
(0.015) 0.000
(0.000) 0.037
(0.102) 0.000
(0.000) 0.172
(0.217) 0.000
(0.000) 0.177
(0.254) 0.010
(0.056) 0.000
(0.000) 0.333
(0.342) 0.006
(0.042) 0.153
(0.207) 0.018
(0.055)
FIN-NLD 0.033
(0.079) 0.000
(0.000) 0.014
(0.079) 0.012
(0.039) 0.055
(0.149) 0.009
(0.044) 0.023
(0.102) 0.005
(0.025) 0.000
(0.000) 0.075
(0.191) 0.000
(0.000) 0.002
(0.014) 0.009
(0.044) 0.042
(0.094)
FIN-PRT 0.030
(0.085) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.034) 0.007
(0.026) 0.102
(0.137) 0.000
(0.000) 0.247
(0.226) 0.000
(0.000) 0.001
(0.008) 0.075
(0.207) 0.000
(0.000) 0.053
(0.105) 0.002
(0.012)
FIN-SWE 0.019
(0.056) 0.111
(0.258) 0.060
(0.240) 0.090
(0.149) 0.064
(0.239) 0.013
(0.054) 0.066
(0.242) 0.010
(0.049) 0.091
(0.253) 0.060
(0.240) 0.001
(0.004) 0.10
(0.253) 0.009
(0.049) 0.168
(0.285)
FRA-GRC 0.474
(0.192) 0.083
(0.191) 0.008
(0.055) 0.381
(0.321) 0.258
(0.291) 0.713
(0.104) 0.025
(0.092) 0.566
(0.166) 0.070
(0.160) 0.206
(0.245) 0.094
(0.158) 0.056
(0.144) 0.697
(0.117) 0.353
(0.315)
FRA-IRL 0.515
(0.245) 0.159
(0.268) 0.018
(0.077) 0.649
(0.343) 0.154
(0.248) 0.476
(0.297) 0.041
(0.123) 0.321
(0.268) 0.104
(0.211) 0.127
(0.211) 0.176
(0.225) 0.082
(0.178) 0.533
(0.288) 0.366
(0.306)
FRA-ITA 0.007
(0.014) 0.219
(0.181) 0.901
(0.161) 0.017
(0.028) 0.280
(0.101) 0.008
(0.017) 0.756
(0.076) 0.007
(0.014) 0.340
(0.250) 0.243
(0.107) 0.000
(0.001) 0.430
(0.242) 0.009
(0.018) 0.066
(0.070)
FRA-LUX 0.539
(0.228) 0.320
(0.311) 0.007
(0.051) 0.622
(0.187) 0.152
(0.240) 0.457
(0.246) 0.039
(0.103) 0.377
(0.290) 0.236
(0.278) 0.111
(0.186) 0.262
(0.184) 0.186
(0.227) 0.519
(0.244) 0.304
(0.271)
FRA-NLD 0.015
(0.032) 0.858
(0.231) 0.323
(0.447) 0.049
(0.074) 0.395
(0.327) 0.016
(0.038) 0.441
(0.406) 0.011
(0.029) 0.678
(0.360) 0.335
(0.298) 0.002
(0.009) 0.713
(0.283) 0.018
(0.039) 0.151
(0.140)
FRA-PRT 0.157
(0.150) 0.180
(0.254) 0.012
(0.060) 0.401
(0.297) 0.196
(0.284) 0.171
(0.177) 0.032
(0.112) 0.101
(0.141) 0.121
(0.214) 0.180
(0.266) 0.029
(0.067) 0.097
(0.183) 0.196
(0.188) 0.532
(0.352)
FRA-SWE 0.208
(0.125) 0.207
(0.296) 0.078
(0.224) 0.525
(0.225) 0.411
(0.322) 0.195
(0.160) 0.137
(0.248) 0.137
(0.134) 0.151
(0.264) 0.333
(0.302) 0.019
(0.044) 0.158
(0.258) 0.199
(0.164) 0.773
(0.257)
GRC-IRL 0.007
(0.030) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.002
(0.009) 0.000
(0.001) 0.018
(0.065) 0.000
(0.000) 0.032
(0.074) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.011
(0.065) 0.000
(0.000) 0.016
(0.067) 0.001
(0.011)
GRC-ITA 0.005
(0.015) 0.000
(0.002) 0.011
(0.060) 0.002
(0.006) 0.008
(0.029) 0.000
(0.002) 0.015
(0.061) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.023
(0.066) 0.000
(0.001) 0.000
(0.002) 0.001
(0.002) 0.002
(0.007)
GRC-NLD 0.002
(0.008) 0.000
(0.001) 0.007
(0.033) 0.000
(0.001) 0.008
(0.026) 0.002
(0.009) 0.019
(0.066) 0.010
(0.048) 0.000
(0.001) 0.009
(0.026) 0.003
(0.019) 0.000
(0.001) 0.001
(0.005) 0.001
(0.007)
GRC-PRT 0.004
(0.014) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.001) 0.014
(0.034) 0.000
(0.000) 0.026
(0.059) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.001) 0.011
(0.060) 0.000
(0.000) 0.010
(0.025) 0.000
(0.000)
GRC-SWE 0.030
(0.074) 0.000
(0.000) 0.003
(0.022) 0.002
(0.011) 0.006
(0.034) 0.032
(0.070) 0.004
(0.030) 0.082
(0.160) 0.000
(0.000) 0.011
(0.038) 0.008
(0.038) 0.000
(0.000) 0.025
(0.058) 0.008
(0.041)
20
IRL-ITA 0.006
(0.021) 0.003
(0.020) 0.031
(0.108) 0.008
(0.023) 0.084
(0.132) 0.006
(0.027) 0.041
(0.107) 0.006
(0.028) 0.000
(0.000) 0.188
(0.217) 0.000
(0.000) 0.002
(0.019) 0.002
(0.009) 0.018
(0.040)
IRL-LUX 0.166
(0.206) 0.020
(0.067) 0.004
(0.031) 0.085
(0.139) 0.000
(0.000) 0.075
(0.110) 0.004
(0.035) 0.044
(0.103) 0.019
(0.082) 0.000
(0.000) 0.525
(0.382) 0.006
(0.037) 0.122
(0.157) 0.005
(0.024)
IRL-NLD 0.040
(0.087) 0.049
(0.187) 0.077
(0.219) 0.045
(0.149) 0.097
(0.251) 0.018
(0.087) 0.088
(0.232) 0.012
(0.062) 0.034
(0.184) 0.120
(0.266) 0.000
(0.000) 0.062
(0.205) 0.018
(0.088) 0.068
(0.196)
IRL-PRT 0.143
(0.236) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.066
(0.153) 0.011
(0.058) 0.094
(0.191) 0.000
(0.000) 0.058
(0.166) 0.000
(0.000) 0.011
(0.064) 0.281
(0.379) 0.000
(0.000) 0.113
(0.220) 0.022
(0.095)
IRL-SWE 0.203
(0.220) 0.002
(0.013) 0.007
(0.052) 0.117
(0.161) 0.058
(0.166) 0.10
(0.167) 0.018
(0.082) 0.10
(0.189) 0.000
(0.000) 0.057
(0.172) 0.064
(0.216) 0.010
(0.058) 0.096
(0.171) 0.126
(0.169)
ITA-LUX 0.399
(0.233) 0.087
(0.174) 0.008
(0.043) 0.278
(0.273) 0.083
(0.196) 0.309
(0.213) 0.032
(0.087) 0.274
(0.212) 0.069
(0.162) 0.069
(0.172) 0.853
(0.193) 0.054
(0.131) 0.361
(0.228) 0.113
(0.223)
ITA-NLD 0.040
(0.069) 0.132
(0.261) 0.094
(0.222) 0.096
(0.149) 0.174
(0.260) 0.042
(0.081) 0.125
(0.244) 0.029
(0.063) 0.104
(0.234) 0.195
(0.284) 0.011
(0.031) 0.122
(0.236) 0.047
(0.088) 0.158
(0.238)
ITA-PRT 0.171
(0.222) 0.115
(0.225) 0.004
(0.022) 0.303
(0.414) 0.201
(0.282) 0.361
(0.267) 0.054
(0.107) 0.30
(0.228) 0.072
(0.165) 0.157
(0.246) 0.034
(0.063) 0.062
(0.139) 0.335
(0.271) 0.297
(0.373)
ITA-SWE 0.122
(0.157) 0.055
(0.151) 0.026
(0.085) 0.197
(0.281) 0.119
(0.175) 0.154
(0.175) 0.060
(0.123) 0.150
(0.176) 0.041
(0.125) 0.155
(0.194) 0.030
(0.072) 0.042
(0.110) 0.132
(0.162) 0.220
(0.276)
LUX-NLD 0.052
(0.087) 0.032
(0.079) 0.017
(0.092) 0.048
(0.092) 0.006
(0.026) 0.005
(0.022) 0.014
(0.080) 0.004
(0.030) 0.013
(0.047) 0.023
(0.077) 0.085
(0.159) 0.034
(0.085) 0.008
(0.030) 0.022
(0.059)
LUX-PRT 0.139
(0.208) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.039
(0.101) 0.005
(0.034) 0.142
(0.206) 0.000
(0.000) 0.123
(0.214) 0.001
(0.004) 0.001
(0.007) 0.218
(0.343) 0.000
(0.000) 0.129
(0.191) 0.012
(0.049)
LUX-SWE 0.180
(0.216) 0.002
(0.016) 0.007
(0.048) 0.094
(0.165) 0.044
(0.130) 0.038
(0.10) 0.018
(0.077) 0.038
(0.116) 0.000
(0.000) 0.042
(0.130) 0.117
(0.239) 0.002
(0.012) 0.046
(0.111) 0.040
(0.115)
NLD-PRT 0.061
(0.172) 0.038
(0.166) 0.020
(0.141) 0.10
(0.250) 0.049
(0.165) 0.129
(0.237) 0.025
(0.145) 0.116
(0.213) 0.035
(0.157) 0.028
(0.145) 0.022
(0.142) 0.035
(0.158) 0.111
(0.227) 0.077
(0.213)
NLD-SWE 0.017
(0.047) 0.132
(0.292) 0.087
(0.266) 0.077
(0.150) 0.117
(0.296) 0.018
(0.052) 0.105
(0.285) 0.016
(0.047) 0.124
(0.290) 0.096
(0.275) 0.001
(0.005) 0.119
(0.287) 0.014
(0.048) 0.194
(0.277)
PRT-SWE 0.062
(0.111) 0.000
(0.000) 0.022
(0.108) 0.023
(0.076) 0.053
(0.156) 0.086
(0.121) 0.031
(0.131) 0.184
(0.196) 0.001
(0.012) 0.042
(0.123) 0.063
(0.187) 0.001
(0.008) 0.055
(0.104) 0.026
(0.066)
21
Table A2: UK – non-EU sample weights – exports
EU pairs
GBR pairs AUS BRA CAN CHN HKG IND ISR JPN KOR MEX NZL RUS USA ZAF
AUT-AUS 0.122
(0.174) 0.051
(0.093) 0.001
(0.008) 0.000
(0.000) 0.010
(0.037) 0.000
(0.000) 0.013
(0.072) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.026
(0.095) 0.525
(0.384) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.001
(0.005)
AUT-BRA 0.010
(0.048) 0.034
(0.107) 0.007
(0.036) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.026) 0.000
(0.000) 0.007
(0.034) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.019
(0.067) 0.148
(0.335) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.010
(0.035)
AUT-CAN 0.000
(0.000) 0.003
(0.010) 0.040
(0.095) 0.022
(0.066) 0.000
(0.000) 0.002
(0.012) 0.017
(0.066) 0.142
(0.248) 0.000
(0.000) 0.121
(0.185) 0.000
(0.000) 0.009
(0.045) 0.006
(0.034) 0.000
(0.000)
AUT-CHN 0.033
(0.137) 0.002
(0.008) 0.015
(0.064) 0.018
(0.057) 0.021
(0.067) 0.051
(0.135) 0.000
(0.000) 0.014
(0.049) 0.049
(0.150) 0.024
(0.075) 0.000
(0.000) 0.028
(0.104) 0.000
(0.000) 0.020
(0.065)
AUT-HKG 0.006
(0.030) 0.093
(0.251) 0.023
(0.085) 0.004
(0.018) 0.030
(0.083) 0.029
(0.116) 0.069
(0.163) 0.000
(0.000) 0.049
(0.158) 0.095
(0.211) 0.052
(0.143) 0.020
(0.067) 0.000
(0.000) 0.053
(0.153)
AUT-IND 0.020
(0.072) 0.053
(0.143) 0.008
(0.031) 0.039
(0.137) 0.000
(0.000) 0.047
(0.092) 0.124
(0.206) 0.038
(0.128) 0.040
(0.124) 0.172
(0.217) 0.006
(0.029) 0.052
(0.144) 0.000
(0.000) 0.045
(0.145)
AUT-ISR 0.000
(0.000) 0.081
(0.120) 0.048
(0.112) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.022
(0.060) 0.213
(0.237) 0.000
(0.000) 0.016
(0.054) 0.053
(0.139) 0.006
(0.023) 0.090
(0.148) 0.003
(0.015) 0.013
(0.052)
AUT-JPN 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.003) 0.000
(0.000) 0.013
(0.046) 0.004
(0.023) 0.008
(0.041) 0.000
(0.000) 0.081
(0.148) 0.012
(0.054) 0.042
(0.060) 0.017
(0.092) 0.018
(0.098) 0.007
(0.037) 0.006
(0.035)
AUT-KOR 0.004
(0.022) 0.128
(0.187) 0.003
(0.015) 0.022
(0.070) 0.024
(0.082) 0.031
(0.076) 0.058
(0.150) 0.000
(0.000) 0.083
(0.169) 0.188
(0.298) 0.098
(0.227) 0.049
(0.135) 0.000
(0.000) 0.082
(0.164)
AUT-MEX 0.034
(0.111) 0.068
(0.152) 0.024
(0.091) 0.000
(0.000) 0.002
(0.009) 0.018
(0.063) 0.022
(0.073) 0.102
(0.257) 0.000
(0.002) 0.356
(0.295) 0.199
(0.323) 0.013
(0.051) 0.014
(0.076) 0.029
(0.10)
AUT-NZL 0.064
(0.117) 0.128
(0.169) 0.006
(0.022) 0.001
(0.006) 0.031
(0.095) 0.018
(0.065) 0.075
(0.171) 0.000
(0.000) 0.047
(0.123) 0.097
(0.155) 0.609
(0.296) 0.036
(0.120) 0.000
(0.000) 0.055
(0.114)
AUT-RUS 0.000
(0.000) 0.007
(0.032) 0.025
(0.084) 0.022
(0.071) 0.016
(0.071) 0.021
(0.080) 0.049
(0.113) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.002) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.171
(0.189) 0.000
(0.000) 0.001
(0.005)
AUT-USA 0.093
(0.189) 0.010
(0.041) 0.145
(0.240) 0.244
(0.398) 0.145
(0.289) 0.086
(0.184) 0.001
(0.004) 0.265
(0.277) 0.041
(0.111) 0.009
(0.023) 0.002
(0.010) 0.038
(0.093) 0.264
(0.440) 0.029
(0.088)
AUT-ZAF 0.005
(0.025) 0.151
(0.240) 0.022
(0.089) 0.005
(0.018) 0.037
(0.10) 0.046
(0.127) 0.131
(0.254) 0.000
(0.000) 0.088
(0.181) 0.191
(0.267) 0.042
(0.109) 0.067
(0.180) 0.000
(0.000) 0.081
(0.191)
BEL-AUS 0.075
(0.130) 0.014
(0.055) 0.004
(0.024) 0.001
(0.006) 0.023
(0.069) 0.001
(0.003) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.001
(0.006) 0.075
(0.152) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000)
BEL-BRA 0.054
(0.155) 0.052
(0.162) 0.040
(0.119) 0.034
(0.174) 0.029
(0.124) 0.034
(0.123) 0.021
(0.109) 0.028
(0.129) 0.036
(0.136) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.038
(0.143) 0.037
(0.192) 0.043
(0.151)
BEL-CAN 0.001
(0.007) 0.019
(0.065) 0.068
(0.153) 0.003
(0.013) 0.000
(0.000) 0.007
(0.034) 0.043
(0.149) 0.067
(0.218) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.026) 0.000
(0.000) 0.033
(0.125) 0.043
(0.209) 0.010
(0.044)
BEL-CHN 0.162
(0.307) 0.045
(0.112) 0.220
(0.378) 0.227
(0.381) 0.242
(0.380) 0.188
(0.319) 0.011
(0.051) 0.189
(0.337) 0.105
(0.20) 0.002
(0.008) 0.001
(0.003) 0.124
(0.203) 0.139
(0.340) 0.052
(0.142)
BEL-HKG 0.079
(0.187) 0.079
(0.198) 0.016
(0.065) 0.032
(0.099) 0.067
(0.186) 0.025
(0.101) 0.028
(0.090) 0.000
(0.000) 0.049
(0.186) 0.013
(0.052) 0.000
(0.000) 0.010
(0.057) 0.000
(0.000) 0.058
(0.166)
BEL-IND 0.106
(0.196) 0.037
(0.083) 0.163
(0.260) 0.357
(0.420) 0.306
(0.310) 0.169
(0.201) 0.033
(0.081) 0.199
(0.318) 0.084
(0.155) 0.006
(0.024) 0.001
(0.005) 0.130
(0.167) 0.269
(0.452) 0.059
(0.132)
BEL-ISR 0.020
(0.078) 0.006
(0.022) 0.127
(0.255) 0.088
(0.230) 0.093
(0.213) 0.084
(0.155) 0.255
(0.248) 0.039
(0.189) 0.034
(0.090) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.155
(0.229) 0.036
(0.189) 0.022
(0.072)
BEL-JPN 0.105
(0.274) 0.048
(0.138) 0.120
(0.257) 0.147
(0.325) 0.113
(0.254) 0.121
(0.274) 0.031
(0.104) 0.274
(0.304) 0.118
(0.288) 0.032
(0.068) 0.000
(0.000) 0.129
(0.296) 0.186
(0.386) 0.107
(0.256)
BEL-KOR 0.000
(0.003) 0.065
(0.153) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.006
(0.029) 0.004
(0.022) 0.033
(0.101) 0.000
(0.000) 0.004
(0.025) 0.092
(0.235) 0.035
(0.110) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.001
(0.008)
BEL-MEX 0.036
(0.143) 0.069
(0.183) 0.032
(0.078) 0.014
(0.049) 0.026
(0.087) 0.051
(0.139) 0.028
(0.091) 0.063
(0.147) 0.053
(0.165) 0.245
(0.344) 0.048
(0.179) 0.028
(0.122) 0.000
(0.000) 0.063
(0.183)
BEL-NZL 0.148
(0.183) 0.072
(0.127) 0.002
(0.011) 0.004
(0.019) 0.034
(0.080) 0.010
(0.030) 0.047
(0.150) 0.005
(0.027) 0.061
(0.140) 0.079
(0.149) 0.498
(0.348) 0.004
(0.024) 0.000
(0.000) 0.065
(0.136)
BEL-RUS 0.042
(0.204) 0.043
(0.127) 0.064
(0.207) 0.048
(0.204) 0.056
(0.207) 0.088
(0.217) 0.041
(0.114) 0.042
(0.204) 0.049
(0.181) 0.023
(0.066) 0.000
(0.000) 0.30
(0.321) 0.042
(0.204) 0.042
(0.146)
BEL-USA 0.082
(0.085) 0.013
(0.025) 0.104
(0.093) 0.216
(0.163) 0.107
(0.105) 0.066
(0.077) 0.007
(0.022) 0.136
(0.104) 0.035
(0.051) 0.004
(0.012) 0.001
(0.003) 0.035
(0.052) 0.806
(0.391) 0.027
(0.042)
BEL-ZAF 0.000
(0.000) 0.062
(0.150) 0.000
(0.000) 0.003
(0.017) 0.006
(0.034) 0.001
(0.004) 0.023
(0.126) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.079
(0.198) 0.040
(0.164) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.017)
DEU-AUS 0.625
(0.058) 0.132
(0.111) 0.352
(0.265) 0.506
(0.409) 0.566
(0.223) 0.364
(0.231) 0.052
(0.081) 0.319
(0.279) 0.283
(0.178) 0.029
(0.044) 0.055
(0.076) 0.216
(0.192) 0.266
(0.446) 0.250
(0.158)
DEU-BRA 0.376
(0.193) 0.091
(0.10) 0.339
(0.260) 0.751
(0.30) 0.537
(0.233) 0.267
(0.231) 0.056
(0.079) 0.353
(0.259) 0.191
(0.178) 0.026
(0.041) 0.014
(0.028) 0.187
(0.181) 0.667
(0.480) 0.156
(0.151)
DEU-CAN 0.408
(0.254) 0.129
(0.114) 0.652
(0.090) 0.660
(0.430) 0.505
(0.319) 0.458
(0.190) 0.103
(0.113) 0.514
(0.314) 0.30
(0.197) 0.037
(0.057) 0.010
(0.043) 0.310
(0.172) 0.50
(0.512) 0.235
(0.171)
DEU-CHN 0.042
(0.036) 0.007
(0.013) 0.030
(0.035) 0.102
(0.059) 0.052
(0.040) 0.022
(0.029) 0.003
(0.007) 0.031
(0.040) 0.015
(0.024) 0.002
(0.005) 0.000
(0.001) 0.014
(0.023) 0.875
(0.275) 0.010
(0.019)
DEU-HKG 0.550
(0.309) 0.265
(0.147) 0.604
(0.30) 0.492
(0.441) 0.694
(0.331) 0.645
(0.219) 0.245
(0.120) 0.514
(0.386) 0.550
(0.190) 0.115
(0.085) 0.034
(0.044) 0.458
(0.209) 0.293
(0.463) 0.486
(0.169)
DEU-IND 0.337
(0.247) 0.089
(0.112) 0.503
(0.220) 0.677
(0.345) 0.532
(0.329) 0.475
(0.123) 0.067
(0.097) 0.391
(0.307) 0.255
(0.196) 0.022
(0.045) 0.015
(0.036) 0.299
(0.155) 0.337
(0.472) 0.193
(0.178)
DEU-ISR 0.208
(0.331) 0.437
(0.192) 0.379
(0.334) 0.189
(0.362) 0.230
(0.367) 0.381
(0.328) 0.516
(0.091) 0.202
(0.341) 0.372
(0.303) 0.210
(0.139) 0.083
(0.086) 0.675
(0.181) 0.125
(0.338) 0.403
(0.252)
DEU-JPN 0.104
(0.096) 0.015
(0.026) 0.153
(0.103) 0.328
(0.182) 0.147
(0.134) 0.10
(0.086) 0.006
(0.014) 0.237
(0.133) 0.048
(0.062) 0.007
(0.013) 0.001
(0.003) 0.044
(0.055) 0.652
(0.479) 0.038
(0.052)
22
DEU-KOR 0.314
(0.145) 0.074
(0.084) 0.308
(0.168) 0.770
(0.040) 0.495
(0.089) 0.282
(0.138) 0.053
(0.076) 0.352
(0.20) 0.177
(0.143) 0.027
(0.042) 0.025
(0.050) 0.160
(0.136) 0.529
(0.514) 0.141
(0.128)
DEU-MEX 0.403
(0.227) 0.064
(0.083) 0.445
(0.268) 0.836
(0.274) 0.479
(0.324) 0.334
(0.192) 0.035
(0.069) 0.505
(0.262) 0.158
(0.165) 0.019
(0.038) 0.011
(0.028) 0.135
(0.160) 0.615
(0.496) 0.126
(0.143)
DEU-NZL 0.393
(0.294) 0.332
(0.171) 0.079
(0.144) 0.046
(0.111) 0.125
(0.158) 0.117
(0.161) 0.207
(0.155) 0.141
(0.172) 0.205
(0.190) 0.342
(0.149) 0.763
(0.062) 0.074
(0.130) 0.015
(0.075) 0.253
(0.20)
DEU-RUS 0.066
(0.062) 0.013
(0.021) 0.088
(0.064) 0.222
(0.096) 0.113
(0.074) 0.072
(0.054) 0.009
(0.016) 0.070
(0.077) 0.036
(0.043) 0.000
(0.002) 0.002
(0.004) 0.055
(0.040) 0.865
(0.333) 0.027
(0.036)
DEU-USA 0.018
(0.018) 0.002
(0.004) 0.028
(0.019) 0.058
(0.028) 0.024
(0.023) 0.014
(0.016) 0.002
(0.004) 0.037
(0.025) 0.007
(0.010) 0.000
(0.001) 0.001
(0.002) 0.006
(0.010) 0.574
(0.030) 0.005
(0.008)
DEU-ZAF 0.467
(0.20) 0.102
(0.096) 0.426
(0.252) 0.625
(0.372) 0.748
(0.085) 0.435
(0.182) 0.092
(0.094) 0.349
(0.311) 0.265
(0.184) 0.022
(0.035) 0.016
(0.035) 0.278
(0.181) 0.308
(0.471) 0.214
(0.159)
DNK-AUS 0.049
(0.131) 0.015
(0.033) 0.004
(0.013) 0.011
(0.040) 0.017
(0.048) 0.002
(0.007) 0.004
(0.021) 0.008
(0.040) 0.006
(0.017) 0.010
(0.037) 0.115
(0.213) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.009
(0.030)
DNK-BRA 0.052
(0.181) 0.010
(0.034) 0.036
(0.173) 0.033
(0.152) 0.036
(0.168) 0.037
(0.178) 0.028
(0.103) 0.035
(0.169) 0.039
(0.186) 0.046
(0.141) 0.017
(0.065) 0.039
(0.186) 0.000
(0.000) 0.039
(0.189)
DNK-CAN 0.000
(0.002) 0.010
(0.024) 0.056
(0.112) 0.010
(0.033) 0.000
(0.000) 0.011
(0.030) 0.014
(0.053) 0.056
(0.119) 0.000
(0.000) 0.056
(0.097) 0.000
(0.000) 0.016
(0.047) 0.007
(0.037) 0.003
(0.012)
DNK-CHN 0.000
(0.000) 0.046
(0.183) 0.033
(0.088) 0.003
(0.011) 0.000
(0.000) 0.009
(0.050) 0.033
(0.173) 0.013
(0.071) 0.010
(0.046) 0.024
(0.119) 0.000
(0.000) 0.015
(0.049) 0.000
(0.000) 0.008
(0.031)
DNK-HKG 0.002
(0.009) 0.043
(0.111) 0.013
(0.035) 0.007
(0.025) 0.015
(0.049) 0.008
(0.036) 0.014
(0.067) 0.000
(0.000) 0.003
(0.011) 0.040
(0.164) 0.047
(0.127) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.001
(0.003)
DNK-IND 0.000
(0.000) 0.050
(0.110) 0.013
(0.060) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.115
(0.219) 0.015
(0.069) 0.000
(0.000) 0.191
(0.218) 0.006
(0.027) 0.048
(0.135) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000)
DNK-ISR 0.003
(0.013) 0.048
(0.090) 0.063
(0.099) 0.001
(0.006) 0.003
(0.015) 0.013
(0.060) 0.154
(0.194) 0.000
(0.001) 0.014
(0.073) 0.038
(0.090) 0.047
(0.131) 0.070
(0.141) 0.000
(0.000) 0.010
(0.048)
DNK-JPN 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.009
(0.037) 0.018
(0.045) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.022) 0.000
(0.000) 0.043
(0.112) 0.000
(0.000) 0.023
(0.044) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.013
(0.053) 0.000
(0.000)
DNK-KOR 0.001
(0.006) 0.006
(0.033) 0.001
(0.005) 0.004
(0.019) 0.005
(0.026) 0.016
(0.068) 0.034
(0.108) 0.000
(0.000) 0.014
(0.049) 0.064
(0.186) 0.018
(0.094) 0.025
(0.094) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.024)
DNK-MEX 0.021
(0.097) 0.080
(0.115) 0.063
(0.149) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.016
(0.052) 0.037
(0.087) 0.012
(0.053) 0.007
(0.033) 0.197
(0.252) 0.067
(0.158) 0.013
(0.050) 0.000
(0.000) 0.008
(0.032)
DNK-NZL 0.122
(0.195) 0.036
(0.062) 0.016
(0.063) 0.012
(0.059) 0.021
(0.066) 0.016
(0.062) 0.013
(0.058) 0.008
(0.021) 0.032
(0.077) 0.016
(0.044) 0.368
(0.296) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.044
(0.089)
DNK-RUS 0.000
(0.000) 0.024
(0.080) 0.033
(0.085) 0.000
(0.000) 0.014
(0.049) 0.019
(0.072) 0.109
(0.174) 0.001
(0.005) 0.007
(0.028) 0.022
(0.086) 0.000
(0.000) 0.102
(0.168) 0.000
(0.000) 0.008
(0.032)
DNK-USA 0.076
(0.159) 0.009
(0.022) 0.143
(0.245) 0.183
(0.352) 0.124
(0.259) 0.079
(0.165) 0.003
(0.009) 0.191
(0.301) 0.028
(0.087) 0.006
(0.011) 0.000
(0.000) 0.035
(0.091) 0.242
(0.434) 0.020
(0.064)
DNK-ZAF 0.025
(0.096) 0.081
(0.171) 0.027
(0.079) 0.000
(0.000) 0.009
(0.049) 0.022
(0.089) 0.043
(0.154) 0.000
(0.000) 0.026
(0.109) 0.074
(0.155) 0.246
(0.326) 0.030
(0.120) 0.000
(0.000) 0.034
(0.126)
ESP-AUS 0.214
(0.226) 0.170
(0.192) 0.046
(0.093) 0.049
(0.155) 0.073
(0.144) 0.086
(0.143) 0.080
(0.151) 0.026
(0.098) 0.148
(0.224) 0.090
(0.142) 0.334
(0.289) 0.061
(0.146) 0.000
(0.000) 0.135
(0.210)
ESP-BRA 0.065
(0.154) 0.069
(0.103) 0.085
(0.173) 0.045
(0.115) 0.099
(0.193) 0.096
(0.192) 0.121
(0.244) 0.031
(0.111) 0.165
(0.265) 0.024
(0.060) 0.021
(0.079) 0.060
(0.156) 0.000
(0.000) 0.112
(0.231)
ESP-CAN 0.037
(0.108) 0.144
(0.137) 0.151
(0.227) 0.075
(0.236) 0.050
(0.154) 0.094
(0.162) 0.164
(0.272) 0.112
(0.245) 0.056
(0.110) 0.183
(0.177) 0.072
(0.135) 0.105
(0.199) 0.015
(0.059) 0.050
(0.092)
ESP-CHN 0.315
(0.411) 0.244
(0.30) 0.368
(0.419) 0.30
(0.415) 0.344
(0.422) 0.346
(0.411) 0.163
(0.302) 0.368
(0.388) 0.384
(0.428) 0.149
(0.173) 0.031
(0.091) 0.301
(0.425) 0.179
(0.390) 0.360
(0.423)
ESP-HKG 0.128
(0.254) 0.371
(0.314) 0.051
(0.175) 0.105
(0.238) 0.153
(0.273) 0.130
(0.239) 0.276
(0.297) 0.066
(0.175) 0.259
(0.298) 0.452
(0.336) 0.474
(0.410) 0.10
(0.223) 0.000
(0.000) 0.280
(0.308)
ESP-IND 0.045
(0.134) 0.393
(0.274) 0.118
(0.249) 0.050
(0.130) 0.085
(0.188) 0.178
(0.264) 0.465
(0.298) 0.071
(0.198) 0.226
(0.281) 0.645
(0.241) 0.235
(0.310) 0.265
(0.261) 0.019
(0.109) 0.241
(0.273)
ESP-ISR 0.056
(0.155) 0.311
(0.255) 0.101
(0.168) 0.129
(0.294) 0.152
(0.299) 0.161
(0.210) 0.507
(0.244) 0.033
(0.087) 0.194
(0.272) 0.384
(0.287) 0.211
(0.315) 0.257
(0.289) 0.007
(0.031) 0.174
(0.252)
ESP-JPN 0.095
(0.157) 0.156
(0.215) 0.026
(0.084) 0.031
(0.143) 0.051
(0.170) 0.072
(0.195) 0.087
(0.210) 0.240
(0.259) 0.131
(0.211) 0.202
(0.185) 0.153
(0.189) 0.065
(0.210) 0.000
(0.000) 0.140
(0.208)
ESP-KOR 0.051
(0.099) 0.428
(0.251) 0.020
(0.055) 0.041
(0.123) 0.056
(0.129) 0.109
(0.153) 0.432
(0.286) 0.034
(0.129) 0.233
(0.244) 0.623
(0.319) 0.494
(0.358) 0.163
(0.251) 0.000
(0.000) 0.255
(0.232)
ESP-MEX 0.166
(0.317) 0.119
(0.209) 0.145
(0.260) 0.020
(0.081) 0.076
(0.148) 0.138
(0.277) 0.072
(0.175) 0.132
(0.253) 0.206
(0.335) 0.052
(0.119) 0.015
(0.038) 0.124
(0.277) 0.000
(0.002) 0.240
(0.395)
ESP-NZL 0.211
(0.212) 0.226
(0.198) 0.017
(0.052) 0.014
(0.052) 0.052
(0.089) 0.037
(0.069) 0.135
(0.216) 0.003
(0.015) 0.096
(0.137) 0.212
(0.175) 0.701
(0.234) 0.037
(0.074) 0.000
(0.000) 0.148
(0.171)
ESP-RUS 0.108
(0.299) 0.324
(0.379) 0.165
(0.286) 0.096
(0.301) 0.130
(0.299) 0.185
(0.311) 0.580
(0.441) 0.076
(0.225) 0.232
(0.341) 0.202
(0.247) 0.044
(0.089) 0.411
(0.355) 0.048
(0.218) 0.260
(0.362)
ESP-USA 0.054
(0.091) 0.001
(0.002) 0.080
(0.124) 0.303
(0.334) 0.118
(0.183) 0.051
(0.086) 0.001
(0.006) 0.206
(0.153) 0.022
(0.063) 0.006
(0.013) 0.000
(0.000) 0.015
(0.040) 0.457
(0.492) 0.005
(0.016)
ESP-ZAF 0.115
(0.194) 0.383
(0.277) 0.086
(0.218) 0.079
(0.192) 0.120
(0.250) 0.181
(0.267) 0.431
(0.330) 0.077
(0.202) 0.286
(0.296) 0.442
(0.346) 0.40
(0.353) 0.193
(0.218) 0.005
(0.027) 0.321
(0.299)
FIN-AUS 0.082
(0.181) 0.032
(0.060) 0.007
(0.021) 0.001
(0.006) 0.006
(0.019) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.004
(0.024) 0.013
(0.041) 0.534
(0.387) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.006
(0.030)
FIN-BRA 0.010
(0.052) 0.071
(0.171) 0.008
(0.044) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.018
(0.093) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.055
(0.148) 0.133
(0.320) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.024) 0.001
(0.005)
FIN-CAN 0.000
(0.002) 0.007
(0.028) 0.040
(0.123) 0.001
(0.004) 0.000
(0.000) 0.014
(0.063) 0.035
(0.134) 0.032
(0.102) 0.001
(0.005) 0.052
(0.125) 0.012
(0.064) 0.021
(0.110) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000)
FIN-CHN 0.020
(0.105) 0.044
(0.123) 0.062
(0.197) 0.040
(0.186) 0.048
(0.188) 0.059
(0.195) 0.056
(0.146) 0.058
(0.196) 0.011
(0.043) 0.036
(0.083) 0.000
(0.000) 0.090
(0.223) 0.034
(0.186) 0.044
(0.117)
FIN-HKG 0.005
(0.027) 0.047
(0.182) 0.025
(0.141) 0.003
(0.014) 0.001
(0.006) 0.026
(0.113) 0.085
(0.189) 0.000
(0.000) 0.011
(0.057) 0.095
(0.207) 0.020
(0.083) 0.014
(0.078) 0.005
(0.026) 0.014
(0.077)
23
FIN-IND 0.006
(0.033) 0.054
(0.130) 0.035
(0.121) 0.014
(0.073) 0.021
(0.082) 0.029
(0.086) 0.166
(0.254) 0.010
(0.039) 0.037
(0.107) 0.190
(0.250) 0.067
(0.207) 0.062
(0.134) 0.000
(0.000) 0.035
(0.107)
FIN-ISR 0.000
(0.000) 0.070
(0.127) 0.029
(0.080) 0.007
(0.024) 0.013
(0.045) 0.033
(0.075) 0.225
(0.260) 0.000
(0.000) 0.030
(0.086) 0.079
(0.118) 0.027
(0.096) 0.082
(0.145) 0.000
(0.000) 0.031
(0.088)
FIN-JPN 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.001) 0.003
(0.014) 0.000
(0.000) 0.002
(0.007) 0.000
(0.000) 0.085
(0.175) 0.000
(0.000) 0.024
(0.047) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.015
(0.080) 0.000
(0.000)
FIN-KOR 0.000
(0.000) 0.023
(0.087) 0.010
(0.056) 0.001
(0.005) 0.009
(0.037) 0.045
(0.106) 0.090
(0.184) 0.001
(0.004) 0.029
(0.103) 0.072
(0.158) 0.010
(0.046) 0.089
(0.211) 0.001
(0.008) 0.020
(0.075)
FIN-MEX 0.011
(0.058) 0.041
(0.103) 0.000
(0.000) 0.013
(0.056) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.018
(0.076) 0.007
(0.036) 0.006
(0.027) 0.324
(0.298) 0.068
(0.157) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.014
(0.040)
FIN-NZL 0.072
(0.108) 0.034
(0.089) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.015
(0.029) 0.000
(0.000) 0.007
(0.020) 0.000
(0.000) 0.005
(0.016) 0.072
(0.112) 0.413
(0.325) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.017
(0.046)
FIN-RUS 0.142
(0.231) 0.043
(0.103) 0.217
(0.273) 0.225
(0.381) 0.193
(0.312) 0.185
(0.247) 0.091
(0.131) 0.157
(0.336) 0.077
(0.163) 0.009
(0.038) 0.002
(0.008) 0.278
(0.252) 0.167
(0.383) 0.099
(0.177)
FIN-USA 0.028
(0.074) 0.002
(0.009) 0.081
(0.146) 0.103
(0.234) 0.057
(0.157) 0.032
(0.076) 0.002
(0.010) 0.233
(0.204) 0.007
(0.027) 0.011
(0.017) 0.000
(0.000) 0.006
(0.021) 0.181
(0.386) 0.006
(0.023)
FIN-ZAF 0.016
(0.056) 0.021
(0.072) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.001) 0.018
(0.054) 0.000
(0.000) 0.014
(0.074) 0.014
(0.074) 0.004
(0.016) 0.125
(0.212) 0.216
(0.313) 0.000
(0.000) 0.000
(0.000) 0.025
(0.081)
FRA-AUS 0.673
(0.332) 0.417
(0.245) 0.280
(0.329) 0.226
(0.342) 0.340
(0.345) 0.314
(0.326) 0.273
(0.258) 0.262
(0.276) 0.383
(0.299) 0.20
(0.150) 0.227
(0.193) 0.244
(0.330) 0.10
(0.308) 0.508
(0.299)
FRA-BRA 0.395
(0.416) 0.334
(0.229) 0.554
(0.379) 0.314
(0.391) 0.368
(0.419) 0.641
(0.355) 0.273
(0.193) 0.251
(0.369) 0.675
(0.365) 0.108
(0.129) 0.052
(0.077) 0.625
(0.327) 0.133
(0.346) 0.529
(0.348)
FRA-CAN 0.383
(0.377) 0.385
(0.228) 0.590
(0.301) 0.216
(0.341) 0.283
(0.367) 0.494
(0.328) 0.387
(0.245) 0.337
(0.30) 0.490
(0.373) 0.217
(0.137) 0.068
(0.088) 0.557
(0.392) 0.103
(0.310) 0.544
(0.367)
FRA-CHN 0.174
(0.163) 0.038
(0.065) 0.239
(0.185) 0.732
(0.182) 0.316
(0.208) 0.168
(0.157) 0.027
(0.053) 0.213
(0.217) 0.097
(0.118) 0.013
(0.024) 0.005
(0.015) 0.098
(0.124) 0.577
(0.504) 0.073
(0.097)
FRA-HKG 0.704
(0.286) 0.379
(0.219) 0.384
(0.366) 0.270
(0.388) 0.559
(0.329) 0.594
(0.341) 0.272
(0.220) 0.407
(0.366) 0.803
(0.262) 0.129
(0.129) 0.10
(0.081) 0.506
(0.420) 0.143
(0.355) 0.722
(0.207)
FRA-IND 0.224
(0.30) 0.652
(0.185) 0.337
(0.371) 0.183
(0.338) 0.256
(0.370) 0.455
(0.356) 0.557
(0.219) 0.199
(0.339) 0.644
(0.281) 0.351
(0.159) 0.119
(0.103) 0.643
(0.271) 0.110
(0.310) 0.698
(0.245)
FRA-ISR 0.135
(0.224) 0.501
(0.240) 0.320
(0.311) 0.093
(0.188) 0.155
(0.232) 0.281
(0.284) 0.864
(0.095) 0.123
(0.212) 0.311
(0.285) 0.454
(0.315) 0.351
(0.164) 0.534
(0.276) 0.000
(0.000) 0.367
(0.290)
FRA-JPN 0.317
(0.250) 0.062
(0.084) 0.424
(0.307) 0.477
(0.434) 0.335
(0.337) 0.307
(0.242) 0.063
(0.089) 0.877
(0.039) 0.146
(0.153) 0.053
(0.054) 0.006
(0.015) 0.145
(0.164) 0.434
(0.50) 0.155
(0.159)
FRA-KOR 0.553
(0.394) 0.499
(0.158) 0.438
(0.389) 0.386
(0.387) 0.563
(0.382) 0.624
(0.347) 0.370
(0.225) 0.393
(0.389) 0.971
(0.052) 0.203
(0.132) 0.125
(0.096) 0.575
(0.384) 0.115
(0.326) 0.875
(0.080)
FRA-MEX 0.331
(0.371) 0.724
(0.292) 0.350
(0.338) 0.268
(0.394) 0.324
(0.414) 0.433
(0.342) 0.496
(0.362) 0.331
(0.372) 0.586
(0.327) 0.513
(0.168) 0.176
(0.127) 0.409
(0.363) 0.115
(0.326) 0.638
(0.305)
FRA-NZL 0.288
(0.323) 0.281
(0.203) 0.065
(0.121) 0.051
(0.168) 0.094
(0.187) 0.098
(0.178) 0.151
(0.171) 0.056
(0.151) 0.159
(0.208) 0.299
(0.201) 0.891
(0.193) 0.067
(0.146) 0.000
(0.000) 0.218
(0.222)
FRA-RUS 0.349
(0.340) 0.215
(0.143) 0.624
(0.331) 0.515
(0.448) 0.590
(0.376) 0.573
(0.282) 0.183
(0.141) 0.492
(0.429) 0.390
(0.261) 0.066
(0.083) 0.022
(0.035) 0.519
(0.169) 0.308
(0.471) 0.331
(0.232)
FRA-USA 0.064
(0.056) 0.010
(0.017) 0.080
(0.056) 0.177
(0.10) 0.093
(0.073) 0.055
(0.052) 0.007
(0.013) 0.134
(0.073) 0.030
(0.040) 0.008
(0.012) 0.001
(0.004) 0.031
(0.039) 0.980
(0.108) 0.024
(0.034)
FRA-ZAF 0.202
(0.320) 0.833
(0.177) 0.269
(0.341) 0.152
(0.315) 0.194
(0.320) 0.365
(0.353) 0.809
(0.259) 0.238
(0.344) 0.476
(0.368) 0.561
(0.185) 0.224
(0.177) 0.415
(0.308) 0.038
(0.196) 0.540
(0.353)
GRC-AUS 0.009
(0.027) 0.003
(0.011) 0.000
(0