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The Taxation of the “Sharing Economy” (70 Bulletin for International Taxation 11, 2016)

November 2016

Authors:

Giorgio Beretta

University of Amsterdam

This article investigates the phenomenon of the “sharing economy” from a tax policy perspective. In particular, the author analyses the tax challenges resulting from this new model of production and consumption and discusses possible tax policies to address development of the sharing economy.

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However, the introduction of a fixed allowance worth up to EUR 5,000 for all income deriving from sharing activities has been sharply criticized in the subsequent report

Feb 2016
58

Id

Id., at p. 34. However, the introduction of a fixed allowance worth up to EUR 5,000 for all income deriving from sharing activities has been sharply criticized in the subsequent report released in February 2016, which raises concerns that such a measure may be at odds with both the principles of "ability to pay" and equality. See P. Barbezieux & C. Herody, supra n. 52, at p. 58.

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