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https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118819067
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148118819067
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Understanding the
effectiveness and desirability
of de-radicalisation: How
de-radicalisation is framed
in The Daily Mail
Gordon Clubb and Ryan O’Connor
Abstract
Research on de-radicalisation has been primarily concerned with the efficacy of de-radicalisation
programmes and their negative consequences. However, there has been little research on how
the public perceives de-radicalisation programmes and whether they are viewed as effective or
desirable. It is important to understand public attitudes to de-radicalisation programmes because
public opinion can affect the capacity to deliver the programmes. The following article takes a
first step towards understanding these issues by examining how The Daily Mail has framed de-
radicalisation in terms of whether or not the programmes are effective or desirable. We argue that
an assumption of potential efficacy exists throughout the newspaper’s framing of de-radicalisation
which presents the policy as desirable, despite also framing de-radicalisation as ineffective. While
practitioners are reluctant to promote de-radicalisation programmes, The Daily Mail’s framing of
de-radicalisation as natural, logical and desirable reflects the concept’s ideological flexibility as both
a rehabilitative and normative endeavour.
Keywords
counter violent extremism, Daily Mail, de-radicalization, framing, media, Prevent, returning
foreign fighters, terrorism
The interest in de-radicalisation programmes has continued to grow as a means to counter
terrorism among states across the world since 2009 (Horgan, 2009), with the UK govern-
ment recently piloting its own de-radicalisation programme to assist in re-integrating and
managing returning foreign fighters associated with Islamic State (Pettinger, 2017; Powell,
2016). While the content of de-radicalisation programmes vary, programmes typically tar-
get the post-criminal space and seek to facilitate a substantial cognitive shift away from
extremist views through various interventions (Weeks, 2018). The term captures a wider
POLIS (Department of Politics and International Studies), University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
Corresponding author:
Gordon Clubb, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK.
Email: g.clubb@leeds.ac.uk
819067BPI0010.1177/1369148118819067The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsClubb and O’Connor
research-article2019
Original Article
2 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
debate on whether counter-terrorism policy should prioritise challenging radical ideas
based on the assumption that holding radical ideas causally relates to an increased risk of
(re)engaging in terrorism (Richards, 2017), or challenging extremism as a normative end
in itself. The radicalisation debate permeates much of the discussion on de-radicalisation
itself. There has been extensive interest from academia on de-radicalisation programmes,
which has predominantly focused on whether de-radicalisation is necessary (Horgan and
Altier, 2012; Horgan and Braddock, 2010), how to measure the success of such pro-
grammes (Koehler, 2016; Webber et al., 2017), or as part of a broader critical response to
government criminalisation and securitisation of the ideational space (Elshimi, 2017;
Heath-Kelly, 2013; Powell, 2016). A significant proportion of this literature is sceptical of
whether de-radicalisation programmes are effective, especially those programmes prior-
itising ideological change, which has prompted calls to prioritise behavioural change over
ideological change in order to reduce the risk of re-offending (Horgan and Altier, 2012;
Marsden, 2015). Thus, the effectiveness and desirability of de-radicalisation programmes
have been challenged in academic research.
However, there has been little research on wider perceptions of de-radicalisation
programmes (Ambrozik, 2018; Msall, 2017), the manner in which these programmes
are conveyed to the public, or what de-radicalisation is understood to mean more
broadly. This subject is an increasingly important area of enquiry for a number of rea-
sons. First, the capacity and willingness of governments to implement and fully support
de-radicalisation programmes can be influenced by the perceived sensitivity among the
public to what may be seen as preferential treatment or too soft an approach: a potential
public backlash against de-radicalisation programmes can have consequences for the
success of the programme as they are often a ‘time-intensive endeavour’ which may not
overlap with the political life-cycle (Neumann, 2010; Schuurman and Bakker, 2016).
Furthermore, the public reputation of a de-radicalisation programme is important to
facilitate inter-agency co-operation, for example, where judicial decisions are required
to allow offenders to attend a de-radicalisation programme (Schuurman and Bakker,
2016). Thus, public attitudes towards de-radicalisation, whether attitudes are support-
ive or hostile, can shape the effectiveness of the programme’s delivery. Second, public
responses to de-radicalisation programmes are important because the fundamental
objective of the programme is to (eventually) re-integrate the programme participants
into society. Familial and social networks can facilitate successful re-integration
(Kaplan and Nussio, 2018), and de-radicalisation programmes can help former combat-
ants to reintegrate, (Barrelle, 2015) potentially amplifying pull factors within society
and providing greater agency to ensure re-integration and desistance (Altier et al.,
2017; Marsden, 2015). However, this focus on re-integration does not take into consid-
eration the agency of communities to resist re-integration and de-radicalisation, espe-
cially if the latter has been publicly discredited. For example, the public backlash
against re-integrating former combatants poses challenges to the Nigerian de-radicali-
sation programme, where former combatants have been killed or pushed away
(Anyadike, 2017). Public support is an important factor in de-radicalisation programmes
being successful due to their fundamentally community-based constitution, especially
where they fit within a broader family of counter violent extremist (CVE) initiatives
which are becoming increasingly community-oriented (Ambrozik, 2018; Msall, 2017),
thus shifting responsibility for CVE to various sectors in society (Spalek, 2013; Thomas,
2017). While there has been a wide range of studies on de-radicalisation programmes
and whether they are effective, there has been very little research conducted on how
Clubb and O’Connor 3
these programmes are relayed to the public despite the importance it can have on the
core debates on efficacy and the implementation of policy.
Thus far, literature which has looked at public attitudes on de-radicalisation has been
scarce. An evaluation of a Dutch de-radicalisation programme pilot makes a number of
references to the impact of public attitudes upon the delivery of the programme
(Schuurman and Bakker, 2016) and another evaluation of de-radicalisation programmes
claims that de-radicalisation programmes are likely to be less popular publicly in Western
countries than non-Western countries (Neumann, 2003). In the first extensive study on the
subject, Ambrozik (2018) draws upon data from an experimental survey which tests the
differential effect of the term ‘counter violent extremism’ on support for such initiatives,
as opposed to the more neutral community-oriented term ‘community resilience initia-
tive’. The research shows high public support in the United States for policies under both
labels (63% and 67%, respectively) with no significant statistical difference between
framings. However, the term de-radicalisation is merged within the broader term and
policies of CVE which only provides some speculative indication of support for de-radi-
calisation programmes, as it is reasonable to assume attitudes may vary regarding de-
radicalisation since such programmes are qualitatively different from more preventive
measures and are conceptually distinct (and more controversial) too (Baker-Beall et al.,
2014; Horgan and Taylor, 2013; Kundnani, 2012; Neumann, 2003; Sedgwick, 2010). The
only study to look specifically at attitudes of de-radicalisation programmes was con-
ducted among university students in Yemen, where the most dominant theme was the
perception that de-radicalisation programmes can be effective but only if the participant
wanted to change, if the environment was right, and if the programme had the correct
support (Msall, 2017). Scepticism of de-radicalisation programmes (the second theme)
revolved around the perception that de-radicalisation programme participants had been
brainwashed and there was little chance of redemption, or scepticism that the environ-
ment was conducive for re-integration. A third theme revolved around the belief that
participants had a right to a second chance (providing they did not kill anybody), which
was framed as a human rights issue (Msall, 2017). Msall’s (2017) study is important in
providing the groundwork for further research on public attitudes to de-radicalisation
programmes, although as he notes there are limitations to drawing upon student percep-
tions and the survey method does not capture how de-radicalisation is discursively opera-
tionalised, nor does the study capture the weight of attitudes over time. The following
study builds upon this emerging and important literature which seeks to understand
broader attitudes to de-radicalisation programmes through a case study examination of
how The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation, as a term and as a policy.
While an examination of media frames does not provide an indication of public atti-
tudes to de-radicalisation, it provides a rich understanding of the dominant discourse sur-
rounding de-radicalisation that has the potential to influence and shape public opinion and
elite responses. In particular, the media ‘is stunningly successful in telling its readers what
to think about’ (Cohen, 1963: 13), which can be seen to influence ‘how [they] think about
the attitude objects described in the news’ (Melkote, 2009: 548). Media framing of issues
in turn affects the actions of political elites as they ‘monitor public attitudes because they
want people to behave in ways that favour or passively acquiesce in elite choices’ (Entman,
2010: 392). The role of the media in influencing public perception has been expounded
upon at great length (Aday, 2010; Entman, 2003, 2006; Entman and Rojecki, 1993;
Goddard et al., 2008; Melkote, 2009; Yarchi et al., 2013) and underlines the potential for
media shaping how the public perceive de-radicalisation. There has been extensive
4 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
research on how the media frames terrorism, and more generally on counter-terrorism
discourse (Brinson and Stohl, 2012; Hatton and Nielsen, 2016; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Hoskins
et al., 2011), yet to date there has been no research on how the term de-radicalisation is
operationalised and whether the media frames de-radicalisation (programmes) in a posi-
tive or negative manner.
De-radicalisation programmes present an interesting case in terms of media framing
insofar as, contrary to other areas of governance, some governments have been reluctant
to promote or release information on de-radicalisation programmes (see Schuurman and
Bakker, 2016; Thornton and Bouhana, 2017; Weeks, 2018), which may be out of a con-
cern that publicity will negatively impact upon the programme’s operations or due to
privacy laws, ethics and security concerns to name a few. Another factor is what consti-
tutes an actual de-radicalisation programme is contested (Pettinger, 2017) – therefore the
media may refer to a programme as de-radicalisation-oriented where said programmes
may be better described as pre-criminal interventions which seek to prevent radicalisa-
tion. In addition, some governments do run a de-facto de-radicalisation programme;
however, they prefer to not refer to it as a ‘de-radicalisation programme’ because the
term mischaracterises the sum of its activities and its objectives. For example, while the
UK government has developed a range of programmes that have been erroneously
labelled as de-radicalisation programmes, most notably the Prevent and Channel pro-
grammes (Thornton and Bouhana, 2017), the government rarely uses the term de-radi-
calisation to frame its approach.1 In fact, the government’s recently launched ‘Desistance
and Disengagement Programme’ – the closest to an actual de-radicalisation programme
– eschews the term de-radicalisation. Thus, the contested nature of de-radicalisation,
alongside the potential controversy of programmes, means there is a disconnect between
how the government and the media frame de-radicalisation, which has consequences for
how the media discusses the term de-radicalisation in relation to its effectiveness and
desirability.
Building on the media framing literature which emphasises how media reproduces
government framings for certain policies, thereby generating public support (Brinson and
Stohl, 2012), by extension the lack of government framing of de-radicalisation would
also potentially be counter-productive to policy ends, especially where the media frames
CVE activities as discriminatory and ineffective (Ambrozik, 2018; Thomas, 2017). In
particular, if the political elite are not seen to have a unified position on, or are not actively
producing a consistent frame of an issue ‘the public will reframe media coverage through
the prism of their political predispositions’ (Aday, 2010: 447). Thus, given the potential
relationship between the media’s framing of de-radicalisation and the efficacy of pro-
grammes, in the context of a government and practitioner reluctance to publicly frame it,
the issue merits a deeper study of how de-radicalisation is discursively constructed. The
following article provides a case study analysis of The Daily Mail to identify the domi-
nant themes in the presentation of de-radicalisation, whether these themes are broadly
positive or negative and to identify what sub-frames are present within these value judge-
ments. The following section outlines the methods deployed in the study.
Methods
The article explores the manner in which The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation, high-
lighting the potential for these representations to influence judgements as to the usefulness
of de-radicalisation programmes. The Daily Mail was selected because it provided a broad
Clubb and O’Connor 5
coverage of de-radicalisation within the United Kingdom,2 it is widely read and attended
to,3 and because it should offer, in theory, a sympathetic platform for the current
Government’s policies which allows us to explore the significance of framing.4 There are
two significant areas of debate regarding research on de-radicalisation in both academic
and policy circles: the first concerns whether the programmes are effective and how suc-
cess can be measured, and the second concerns the problematic nature of the term and the
deleterious effects de-radicalisation policies have in securitising sections of society.
Therefore, the article sets out to examine how the media frames the efficacy and the (social)
desirability of de-radicalisation programmes through an exploratory deconstruction of The
Daily Mail’s frames. Broadly, and unsurprisingly, the discussions of de-radicalisation fall
into two camps, positive frames and negative frames. By ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, we
refer to statements which make claims on the in/efficacy, and success/failures of initiatives
associated with the term de-radicalisation and advocating or opposing its implementation.
Of course, calling into question whether de-radicalisation programmes are effective does
not necessarily preclude advocating that they should be implemented. Nevertheless, the
distinction provides a basic organising framework to identify and analyse the key themes
present in the media in relation to those in academic research and to ascertain whether
certain themes are underrepresented or emphasised in the media.
The article contends that media outlets are situated in ‘privileged discursive position’
(Tomlinson, 1991: 28) and as such they have the ability ‘to construct the topic in a certain
way …’ while limiting ‘the other ways in which the topic can be constructed’ (Hall et al.,
1996: 291). From this position of privilege, the representations of de-radicalisation pro-
vided by media outlets have the potential to influence public perception of the pro-
grammes being instituted in the United Kingdom and as a result affect their success or
failure. As such, it is important to understand both the broader discursive trends surround-
ing de-radicalisation in media outlets and also the process by which these representations
are constructed. In order to begin elucidating the process by which UK media outlets
(re)interpret and (re)display academic and policy debates for public consumption we have
employed a content analysis case study of The Daily Mail that will be outlined below.
We hold that media outlets are integral in the presentation of information to the public,
and as such, the way they package information has the potential to shape public percep-
tion on any given issue. The representations depicted within these sites of production can
come to be ‘a socially shared organizing principle through [their] transmission’ (Reese
and Lewis, 2009: 778). How any given issue is presented and subsequently transmitted to
the public, how it is framed, is ‘critical to the stories’ ultimate acceptance or rejection’
(Ryan, 2004: 364). We follow from Entman’s (1993: 52) definition of framing that:
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.
Furthermore, we accept Hansen’s (2006) appraisal that the media is an influential discur-
sive producer with the power to shape the construction of policy representations.
In attempting to catalogue how de-radicalisation is framed by The Daily Mail, this
article utilised a Lexis Nexis archival search. The search terms used to identify references
to de-radicalisation were ‘de-radical!’ OR ‘deradical!’, which allowed us to capture dif-
ferent iterations of the term. We excluded duplications of a highly similar nature through
Lexis Nexis but coded the remaining duplication because it allowed us to identify articles
6 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
that were repeated over a few days and to identify shifts in framing between edits.
Importantly, we decided to only code uses of the term de-radicalisation and not synonyms
or official policy names, such as Channel, unless they were mentioned alongside de-rad-
icalisation. The decision to exclude references to Channel limits the article’s ability to
speak to framing of policies and to compare the differential effect of using the term de-
radicalisation has on attitudes to policies. However, this decision was made because it is
first necessary to provide a foundation by exploring in depth how the term de-radicalisa-
tion itself is framed and second it is contentious to what extent Channel constitutes a de-
radicalisation programme (Thornton and Bouhana, 2017), therefore its relevance to the
project is through its explicit ascription as a de-radicalisation programme.
Having limited our search terms to the use of de-radicalisation, we determined a time-
frame of discursive viability for de-radicalisation commencing from 2008 until the point
that research was undertaken, 7 June 2018. The starting point was chosen to coincide with
the increasing focus on de-radicalisation programmes, particularly within academia,
though within The Daily Mail the first use of the term is in 2009. We limited the Lexis
Nexis search options to MailOnline and The Daily Mail and Sunday Mail (London), both
of which were merged as they constitute the same newspaper but are separated by Lexis
Nexis. By importing all of The Daily Mail’s articles discussing de-radicalisation into
NVivo we were able to determine the general tone, major themes, and trends regarding
the representation of de-radicalisation within this publication. Once catalogued, we uti-
lised quantitative and qualitative content analysis elaborated upon below to deconstruct
the framing of these representations.
Once highly similar results were excluded by Lexis Nexis, we had a sample size of 302
articles with 420 mentions of de-radicalisation. In order to effectively catalogue the dif-
ferent representational trends within this body of text we assessed the collection with a
mix of inductive and deductive approaches. As defined by Semetko and Valkenburg
(2000: 94), the inductive approach involves analysing a news story ‘with an open view to
attempt to reveal the array of possible frames, beginning with very loosely defined pre-
conceptions of these frames’; while the deductive approach ‘involves predefining certain
frames as content analytic variables to verify the extent to which these frames occur in the
news.’
Accordingly, our initial readings were informed by our understanding of the broad
framings of de-radicalisation bound to be present within the articles, thus the initial focus
was on the positive and negative framing of the efficacy and desirability of de-radicalisa-
tion which has underpinned academic approaches. These preconceived themes formed
the basis for our code book which was subsequently updated after preliminary readings to
account for any unexpected framings. For example, we found a small number of articles
that framed de-radicalisation as creating suspect communities, which we subsequently
included in the code book. The data was coded in three stages, each stage providing a
different analytical insight and deploying quantitative and qualitative content analysis.
Our unit of analysis for these articles was the paragraph; for as de-radicalisation was often
discussed in conjunction with unrelated topics there was a need to isolate it from irrele-
vant information. Another advantage of coding per paragraph is that it allows us to cap-
ture frequency of framings within articles, and the overall trends were similar if the article
was coded as the unit, therefore the limitations of paragraph coding was minimal. Coders
were tasked with determining whether paragraphs discussing de-radicalisation fell first
into negative or positive frames and then within the following emergent themes: in/effi-
cacy, advocacy and general negative.
Clubb and O’Connor 7
For the efficacy theme, coders were asked if a paragraph had claimed or demonstrated
de-radicalisation (programmes) ‘working’ or being successful. Ineffective frames were
considered to be clear statements of de-radicalisation being ineffective or not being suc-
cessful and included stories of failed referral processes. For the advocacy theme, coders
were asked if a paragraph stated a need for de-radicalisation (programmes), made a
claim that an object should be de-radicalised, or stated problems if de-radicalisation
programmes are not implemented. For the general negative theme, coders were asked if
a paragraph (a) used negative adverbs and adjectives to describe de-radicalisation, (b)
showed the negative social consequences of de-radicalisation such as alienating Muslim
communities or creating problems for social service providers, or (c) framed those
referred to de-radicalisation programmes as being innocent or being critical of referral
processes? The remaining samples were coded as ‘neutral’. Mentions coded ‘neutral’ are
included in the analysis as they are relevant to the topic but different methods are applied:
they are not included in the quantitative analysis of the main themes outlined above;
however, the ‘neutral’ articles are included in the qualitative content analysis. Below we
discuss how the neutral descriptions of de-radicalisation present a normalising context
that buttresses the positive framings.
First, a sample of articles was coded and both authors discussed the sample to ensure
accurate replication, then both authors independently coded 302 The Daily Mail
sources. The discrepancy between how articles were assigned to nodes (such as effec-
tive/ineffective framing) was relatively low for four out of five frames (.98–.93 inter-
coder reliability). The ineffective frame had a slightly higher discrepancy between
coders (.87 inter-coder reliability); however, the discrepancy can be accounted for in
the uneven familiarity with the suspect community literature between coders, spelling
mistakes in The Daily Mail which changed the meaning of sentences, and different
interpretations of what constituted the unit of analysis. A reconciliation process was
conducted to account for disparities in coding to an agreed baseline. It is worth noting
that the general themes and trends remained consistent for both coders prior and fol-
lowing the reconciliation of coding.
By coding positive and negative sentiments through inductive and deductive
approaches, we are able to present a thorough account of how The Daily Mail framed de-
radicalisation over several years. The codification of themes allows us to present the
longitudinal trends in how de-radicalisation is represented in The Daily Mail, indicating
whether framing tends to be more positive or negative. While the themes provide more
depth to the content of positive and negative framings, we further deepen the examination
of the framings by exploring and further breaking down the themes to illustrate how, for
example, The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation as ineffective. Through this three-
staged approach, we can, for example, (a) identify the broader trend that The Daily Mail’s
framing becomes significantly more negative in 2017, (b) that it is framed negatively
more due to efficacy rather than its negative social consequences, and (c) through the
qualitative content analysis of all references to de-radicalisation in the newspaper, we
show that the inefficacy of de-radicalisation programmes is located in its implementation
rather than its overall desirability or potential success.
In addition, the majority of these articles have framed de-radicalisation in a neutral
manner, and have been coded as such, which in turn has limited the severity of some
of the framing trends. While the manner in which they are written does not allow for
us to definitively code these instances as positive advocating/efficacy, the fact that de-
radicalisation is not actively questioned entrenches these programmes as a matter of
8 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
routine that should be adhered to. In essence, there is an implicit assumption of effi-
cacy within these frames and the result of including these frames would be a surge in
the positive advocacy/efficacy frames. But as we cannot definitively account for the
intent nor the individual’s interpretation, they have been coded as neutral. Nevertheless,
the benefit of having a mixed quantitative and qualitative analysis is the qualitative
analysis allows us to identify the significance of articles that would not be captured by
a quantitative approach.
Results
We first coded The Daily Mail articles based on whether they represented de-radicali-
sation positively or negatively. Out of 420 coded references to de-radicalisation, 84
were coded as positive, 91 as negative, and 245 were coded as neutral/unassigned.
‘Positive’ referred to articles that demonstrated de-radicalisation being successful,
including claims of success without evidence, or advocating the use of de-radicalisa-
tion. One of the clearer examples of what we considered positive framing is ‘Islamic
Council of Victoria pulled out of successful de-radicalisation program (emphasis
added)’ (White, 2017). Another example illustrates advocacy of de-radicalisation
which we also coded as positive: ‘Labour leader Ed Miliband has suggested a manda-
tory programme of de-radicalisation for people involved on the fringes of radical
groups such as the Islamic State’ (Duell, 2014). ‘Negative’ refers to articles that dem-
onstrate de-radicalisation being ineffective, experiencing problems such as recidivism,
and being criticised for its wider social consequences. A number of negative articles
were clear-cut: ‘I was sent on Government’s de-radicalisation scheme but just spent
the whole time playing pool says convicted extremist preacher’ (Charlton, 2015). The
ineffectiveness of de-radicalisation was also framed frequently in terms of failure of
the programmes to stop participants engaging in terrorism (Drury et al., 2017) or
where there was little uptake in de-radicalisation initiatives (Morgan, 2017), often due
to their voluntary nature (Taylor, 2016). Several mentions are more unequivocal in the
failing of de-radicalisation, especially where it is claimed that the programmes cause
radicalisation (Margan, 2017; Matthews, 2016). Other mentions were classified as
negative where they linked to a wider critique of Prevent and the Prevent Duty: ‘A
nursery tried to send a four-year-old boy on a deradicalisation programme because
staff thought he mispronounced “cucumber” like “cooker bomb,” it has been claimed’
(Willgress, 2016). The majority of neutral mentions of de-radicalisation were, (a)
descriptions of policies (Doyle, 2016), (b) description of individuals being referred to
a ‘de-radicalisation programme’ or description of referral numbers (Slack, 2014), or
(c) reference to ‘de-radicalisation experts’ (Robinson, 2016). As the examples show,
the use of de-radicalisation is not explicitly positive or negative; however, they nor-
malise the practice of de-radicalisation by uncritically using the term and there is an
inherent assumption of potential efficacy and necessity. We explore this point more in
the discussion.
Overall use of the term de-radicalisation increases from 2013 onwards, peaking in
2017 and subsiding significantly in 2018. While initial academic interest in de-radicalisa-
tion emerged between 2008 and 2010 in relation to a wide variety of international cases,
we see de-radicalisation entering public consciousness from 2013 onwards in relation to
the rise of Islamic State and the (returning) foreign fighter phenomenon. The number of
Clubb and O’Connor 9
positive and negative framings of de-radicalisation runs concurrently, although we see
more positive reporting in 2015 shifting to more negative reporting in 2017.
Following coding the mentions of de-radicalisation as positive or negative, we sepa-
rated these mentions into sub-themes to identify how often de-radicalisation is framed in
terms of efficacy and how this compares to framing in terms of desirability. The break-
down of the sub-themes as percentages was as follows: advocacy (33%), effective (14%),
ineffective (41%) and negative general (12%). Framing de-radicalisation as successful
and effective play a relatively low part in how it is represented. De-radicalisation is
largely framed as unsuccessful and ineffective, yet these framings run concurrently along-
side the advocacy for de-radicalisation across the newspaper’s reporting. Mandatory de-
radicalisation programmes were advocated (Spillett, 2014), de-radicalisation is presented
as a ‘glimmer of hope [to] break the cycle of violence’ (Pemberton, 2015), and de-radi-
calisation is an important component in a proposed policy of internment (Ghaffur, 2017).
As shown in Figure 2, mentions that advocate de-radicalisation without showing it to be
effective constitute the majority of positive framings of de-radicalisation, even increasing
alongside articles framing it as ineffective in 2017.
We separated ‘negative general’ to code the extent to which de-radicalisation is framed
negatively through pejorative adjectives and its negative social consequences, namely,
that they create suspect communities (Richards, 2017; Thomas, 2017). However, de-rad-
icalisation framed in relation to the suspect communities narrative is often within a con-
text of discrediting those who claim de-radicalisation creates suspect communities
(Johnson, 2017; Mohamed, 2015); therefore, the representation of de-radicalisation in
this way can be construed as a defensive riposte against the suspect communities critique.
The Daily Mail reports on several controversial stories surrounding the Prevent Duty and
the inappropriate referral of children by schools. However, these are only descriptively
labelled as de-radicalisation programmes rather than forming a larger critique of the pro-
gramme (Willgress, 2016) and are within the context of framing the threat of terrorism
Figure 1. Positive and negative framing by mentions.
10 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
(Beckford, 2015). The Daily Mail reported several times on the criticisms of Prevent;
however, this was not linked to de-radicalisation and therefore was not included.
The article has sought to identify the main trends in how The Daily Mail has framed
de-radicalisation to understand whether or not it presents de-radicalisation as successful
and desirable. As shown above, negative reporting runs concurrently alongside the advo-
cacy of de-radicalisation within the newspaper, and while these positions are not neces-
sarily contradictory it does reveal that the appeal of de-radicalisation is not dependent
upon it being viewed as effective. This parallel framing may be viewed to reflect an
acceptance that efficacy can be rarely measured or that it reflects an attitude that it is ‘bet-
ter to do something than doing nothing’. However, as discussed below, we argue that it
reflects the ideological elasticity of the term de-radicalisation which, at least in The Daily
Mail, means that the framing of de-radicalisation is positive despite its ineffectiveness.
Indeed, as negative framing of de-radicalisation partly concerns the failed implementa-
tion of policies, or that such policies need to be mandatory, we find an overarching narra-
tive that frames de-radicalisation as desirable despite its failings. This frame is reinforced
by how de-radicalisation is not heavily associated with criticisms levelled at Prevent. The
following section discusses these points in greater detail, concluding with several areas
for future research stemming from the findings and their limitations.
Discussion
The article primarily set out to examine how The Daily Mail framed de-radicalisation
and whether it was framed as successful. However, given the contested nature of the
meaning of de-radicalisation within academic and policy circles, it is also worthwhile
discussing how de-radicalisation is understood in The Daily Mail’s framing of the term.
The majority of references to de-radicalisation are not accompanied by a definition, with
one exception discussing new entries to the dictionary (Charlton, 2015b), or more sig-
nificantly, they define de-radicalisation in relation to policies, such as Prevent (Duell
Figure 2. Efficacy framing by mentions.
Clubb and O’Connor 11
2016; Lawson, 2017; Slack, Drury, & Groves, 2015). In linking de-radicalisation to
Prevent, The Daily Mail shifts the focus of de-radicalisation away from concerning the
post-criminal space towards also including the pre-criminal space. While to an extent
this mirrors the contestation of de-radicalisation within academia, this formulation of
de-radicalisation builds upon and reinforces the problematisation of being radical and
that de-radicalisation is a worthy end in itself. In regard to the assumption of a causal
link between ideas and behaviour, which underpins the concept of de-radicalisation,
only one article explicitly referenced this issue relating to the relationship between the
de-radicalisation programmes and recidivism rates in Saudi Arabia (Goodman, 2017).
References to the inefficacy of de-radicalisation naturally imply the absence of a causal
link. However, in The Daily Mail’s framing, rarely was the inefficacy of de-radicalisa-
tion linked to a challenge of the fundamental assumptions underpinning de-radicalisa-
tion. Thus, The Daily Mail’s framing of de-radicalisation does not mirror existing
mainstream academic and policy positions on the concept. The newspaper’s framing
produces an understanding of de-radicalisation that uncritically reproduces the causal
mechanisms that derive from being de-radicalised and places de-radicalisation firmly
within a pre-criminal space which subsequently presents de-radicalisation as a positive
end in itself in addition to a counter-terrorism instrument.
Returning to the issue of efficacy and desirability, there has been no research on how
the media frames de-radicalisation, despite its significance for academic study and policy,
yet several comments in existing literature would indicate that a newspaper such as The
Daily Mail would frame de-radicalisation negatively (Neumann, 2010; Schuurman and
Bakker, 2016). Given the potentially controversial nature of de-radicalisation pro-
grammes, which are typically seen as soft approaches to counter-terrorism (Dechesne,
2011; Dugas and Kruglanski, 2014), The Daily Mail would be expected to frame de-rad-
icalisation negatively given its previous reporting on social spending, government inter-
vention, terrorism, rehabilitation and Muslim communities (Nickels et al., 2012; Philo
et al., 2013; Poole, 2018). Indeed, there are some examples where de-radicalisation is
framed within a right-wing framework: one article refers negatively to an ex Jihadi bride’s
taxpayer funded de-radicalisation (Taher and Craven, 2018). This article’s extensive
examination of The Daily Mail’s usage of de-radicalisation shows that this hypothesis is
partially accurate. Mentions of de-radicalisation that make an explicit judgement tend to
frame de-radicalisation as less successful and few mentions frame de-radicalisation as a
success. The negative reporting of de-radicalisation reaches a peak in 2017, where de-
radicalisation becomes conflated less with Prevent and becomes more associated with
returning Islamic State fighters (Taher and Beckford, 2015). However, it is not clear-cut
to say that The Daily Mail (and possibly by extension, right-wing press) is opposed to
de-radicalisation. This assumption has played a part in why practitioners have sought to
downplay de-radicalisation activities, to an extent true with the UK government which
does not use the term de-radicalisation. The argument presented in this article is that,
rather than framing de-radicalisation negatively, The Daily Mail’s reporting is in fact
more conflicted and sympathetic to the idea de-radicalisation which can be attributed to
the specific flexibility of the concept of de-radicalisation and the lack of overt govern-
ment framing of the issue. We argue that The Daily Mail normalises the desirability of
de-radicalisation even within its presentation of the initiatives being ineffective.
De-radicalisation is framed as desirable largely regardless of efficacy because the con-
cept’s fused rehabilitative and normative dimension transcends divisions within the polit-
ical mainstream. The lack of an overt framing of de-radicalisation by political elites
12 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
represents a missed opportunity (for themselves) to utilise the terminology to mobilise
media support for de-radicalisation.
An assumption of potential efficacy can be found across all framings of de-
radicalisation: positive, negative and neutral. De-radicalisation is presented as an initiative
which can potentially work in the indeterminate future. Thus, regardless of current evi-
dence to the contrary, de-radicalisation is a policy which should be continually strived
towards. This assumption of efficacy is naturally most obvious in those articles which
framed it as effective. De-radicalisation is presented as an almost inevitable outcome of
having been radicalised if there are interventions ready to capitalise on agential realisation.
HRH The Prince of Wales states how he has asked his charity, Mosaic, which was designed
to help Muslims in deprived areas to help build self-esteem, ‘to do more towards de-radi-
calisation’ because there are ‘interesting examples of how people can be de-radicalised
once they become radicalised because they find they are horrified by what it leads to’
(HRH The Prince of Wales, 2015). Another story reports how in a French prison there was
no attempt to de-radicalise ‘the fundamentalists’, and one of the Charlie Hebdo attackers
emerged from prison more radical and ‘festering with even more anger’ (Jones, 2015).
De-radicalisation programmes are thus presented as a logical and desirable space for
‘fanatics’ and ‘barbarians’ to be sent to. The Daily Mail quotes one unnamed source as
saying, ‘The law protects people like Ahmed but how can we ever be safe if people like
him go unpunished? It’s ridiculous – at the very least he should be made to attend the
Government’s deradicalisation programme [emphasis added]’ (Narain, 2015). We see an
assumption of potential efficacy fed into a wider framing of de-radicalisation programmes
as socially desirable, crucially within neutral references to de-radicalisation. The presence
of this assumption is important considering neutral references to de-radicalisation signifi-
cantly outweigh references, which frame it negatively. The extensive number of ‘neutral’
descriptions of referral rates to de-radicalisation programmes leaves open to interpretation
their effectiveness by not providing deeper context on the differences between the high
number of referrals and those actually enrolled in the programmes. Interestingly, negative
and positive framings on the efficacy of de-radicalisation programmes build upon this
larger ‘neutral’ representation of de-radicalisation. For example, one article makes similar
reference to referral numbers however it differs by framing 777 out of 3934 potential
extremists as being ‘such a danger’ (Drury, 2015). Thus, the wide-ranging usage of ‘de-
radicalisation’ in a descriptive and ‘neutral’ manner provides the architecture for the pres-
entation of de-radicalisation as natural, logical and desirable.
Even where The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation negatively, it on occasion con-
tributes to a wider sense of desirability. The concept of de-radicalisation does not share
the same fate of Prevent as a toxic brand, which has been widely critiqued in the media.
As mentioned, in the few cases where de-radicalisation is associated with the suspect
community narrative, this frame is situated within the context of discrediting critical
voices. In several cases, de-radicalisation is often framed as ineffective due to its failed
implementation as opposed to its failed success rate. The Parsons Green Bomber inci-
dent is framed as the officials having missed a chance to de-radicalise the attacker
(Camber, 2018), and other cases link the refusal to participate in voluntary de-radicali-
sation initiatives as potentially leading to violent extremism (Beckford, 2015; White
and Noble, 2017). Out of 66, 16 cases where de-radicalisation is framed as ineffective
also suggest that de-radicalisation could have been successful. Of course, this point is
not to deny that The Daily Mail does frame de-radicalisation as negative in a significant
amount of its reporting – it does – however, contained within negative reporting is an
Clubb and O’Connor 13
assumption that de-radicalisation could work, which links to a broader framing of de-
radicalisation as desirable.
To conclude, the article does not find that The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation in a
predominantly negative manner, and while negative framing is certainly a significant fea-
ture in its reporting it has to be contextualised in a more extensive framing of de-radicalisa-
tion as desirable. As a concept and a policy, de-radicalisation challenges expectations of
media framing as demonstrated through our analysis of The Daily Mail; the UK government
does not aim to use the term or actively frame a distinct ‘de-radicalisation policy’. Thus, the
policy of de-radicalisation raises tensions in terms of how right-wing press would tradition-
ally report on a policy. The constituent parts of de-radicalisation – ‘soft’ rehabilitation, prag-
matic management of risk, and normative social/ideological engineering, alongside its
malleable but vague definition – make it a policy which can be framed across mainstream
ideological lines in public opinion. The result is an assumption of potential efficacy existing
throughout The Daily Mail’s framing of de-radicalisation which presents the policy as desir-
able, even in cases where it is shown to have not been effective. De-radicalisation pro-
grammes are framed as potential transformative social spaces which provide physical and
ideational security – their in/efficacy is secondary to their desirability.
Conclusion: Limitations and future directions for research
De-radicalisation has been primarily studied and implemented through consideration of
what types of programmes are more effective at reducing the risk of recidivism –
therefore debates have revolved around measures of success and the negative social con-
sequences of such programmes. Governments and programme practitioners have been
reluctant to promote their activities to the public out of fear of a backlash or have not used
the label ‘de-radicalisation’ due to the problematic nature of the term for programme deliv-
ery. However, this article has contended that public support is important if de-radicalisa-
tion programmes are to be effective and that the problematic nature of the term for
programme delivery is distinct from how the term de-radicalisation is operationalised pub-
licly, particularly in its capacity for generating support. While de-radicalisation pro-
grammes may be concerned with effectiveness, this study of how one newspaper, The
Daily Mail, frames de-radicalisation would suggest that in/effectiveness is not the only
factor in shaping the newspaper’s attitude to de-radicalisation (and by extension its read-
ers). The desirability of de-radicalisation extends beyond whether a programme can chal-
lenge violent extremism to facilitate their re-integration and reduce the risk of recidivism.
The power of de-radicalisation conceptually, as framed by The Daily Mail, is its inescap-
able social desirability in the face of either no evidence of success or an abundant evidence
of failure and negative social consequences. De-radicalisation is framed as a good to be
achieved in itself and crosses typical political positions, which creates a logic of perpetu-
ally striving for better implementation: deeper, broader, more community oriented and so
on. Underlying these frames is the assumption that de-radicalisation is an inherent good for
society and that its failures are based on the implementation of specific policies but not
de-radicalisation itself. The findings of this article would suggest greater optimism for
practitioners in being more open with the public about de-radicalisation programmes and
that the term de-radicalisation has a distinct potential in mobilising support, in contrast to
‘damaged brands’ such Prevent. As such, practitioners should seek to establish frames
based around the term de-radicalisation instead of policy specific ‘brands’ which would
potentially, at least initially, engender media outlets to discuss the programmes in
14 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
the practitioners’ terms. The generation of media and public support for de-radicalisation
initiatives is important because it can assist in the effectiveness of the initiatives through,
for example, greater support for re-integration among the public.
The article was the first to explore media framing of de-radicalisation, but it reflects a
need to better understand how the public perceive such initiatives, especially where public
support impacts upon their delivery. One area for future research in this vein would be to
compare media framing of de-radicalisation between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ coun-
tries. Neumann (2003) hypothesises that support for de-radicalisation would vary between
Western and non-Western countries and there are grounds to hypothesise that de-radicalisa-
tion is framed positively more in some contexts over others. The Daily Mail contains
Australian and Indian international sections; as they are part of the same newspaper, we had
considered them collectively, and it was out of the scope of the article to provide sufficient
context to merit analysing them separately in depth. However, we found a substantial differ-
ence in the framing of de-radicalisation in India-related stories where there are no negative
framings of de-radicalisation and it is framed as effective in the majority of uses (67%). The
fact that Australian and UK-related stories in The Daily Mail broadly followed the same
trend (reflected in the article) while India-related stories diverge significantly indicates
scope for future research to examine Neumann’s hypothesis.
A limitation of the article (and an opportunity for further research) is we do not take
into account how de-radicalisation policies by other names are framed and therefore ref-
erences to Channel programme are not included in the data despite the programme being
referred to as the United Kingdom’s de-radicalisation programme. While it is accepted
that Prevent and Channel are viewed negatively, a future study could replicate Ambrozik’s
(2018) research to analyse whether interventions framed using the term ‘de-radicalisa-
tion’ generates greater support over other terms. Finally, our results focused on explicit
references to de-radicalisation, yet as mentioned the articles coded as ‘neutral’ cannot be
causally separated from how readers perceive the subject, especially insofar as neutral
references to de-radicalisation programmes contribute to providing meaning to de-radi-
calisation. We sought to capture this data through a qualitative content analysis; however,
to ensure consistency with the quantitative content analysis, we restricted analysis of
‘neutral’ articles to the unit (the paragraph). The benefit of this approach was we could
provide a more extensive and longitudinal account of framing. Sentiment analysis or
discourse analysis would capture the context of articles as the unit of analysis referring to
de-radicalisation and provide a thick description, which would complement our findings
on the framing de-radicalisation. Thus, while in one sense our research is limited by not
exploring these areas, the results presented here demonstrate the opportunity to under-
stand de-radicalisation by examining how it is framed publicly.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Notes
1. Hansard was used to search the use of de-radicalisation and the term was used twice in government
written statements and 41 times in spoken references in both houses. Government documents and policy
statements were also searched and corroborated that the term is not used significantly to describe policies.
While not the focus of the current article, we found that not one of the references to de-radicalisation by
Labour and Conservative MPs framed it negatively.
2. The Daily Mail and the MailOnline had the most results for de-radicalisation, 463, in the United Kingdom
according to Lexis Nexis, compared with the Guardian’s 281 results which had the second highest
Clubb and O’Connor 15
number in the United Kingdom. While the number of articles was reduced as we excluded irrelevant
articles and merged duplications with a high similarity, The Daily Mail still made the most references to
de-radicalisation.
3. The Daily Mail/dailymail.co.uk has a monthly readership of 31.1 million according to the NRS, making it
the most widely read UK publication.
4. The latter of these three rationales is of particular interest for this research as publications of a similar
political ilk to the political elite tend to provide favourable coverage of their policy prescriptions. As such
de-radicalisation, as will be discussed later, offers a unique point of departure from this overriding trend.
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