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Is Moral Enhancement a Right, or a Threat to Rights?

October 2018
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:209-231

Authors:

Bowie State University

Enhancements for morality could become technologically practical at the expense of becoming unethical and uncivil. A mode of moral enhancement intensifying a person's imposition of conformity upon others, labeled here as “moral righteousness”, is particularly problematic. Moral energies contrary to expansions of civil rights and liberties can drown out reasoned justifications for equality and freedom, delaying social progress. The technological capacity of moral righteousness in the hands of a majority could impose puritanical conformities and override some rights and liberties. Fortunately, there cannot be a human right or a civil right to access righteous moral enhancement, and governments would be prudent to forbid such technology for moral righteousness. From an enlarged perspective, less righteousness could lead to a more just society. Going further, if a neurological intervention for moral righteousness could be invented, so too could moral de-enhancement, here labeled as “moral toleration”. Perhaps moral toleration deserves as much commendation as so-called moral enhancement. Justice with less delay can be justice enhanced.

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Is Moral Enhancement a Right, or a

Threat to Rights?

JOHN R. SHOOK

Abstract

Enhancements for morality could become technologically practical at the expense of

becoming unethical and uncivil. A mode of moral enhancement intensifying a

person’s imposition of conformity upon others, labeled here as “moral righteousness”,

is particularly problematic. Moral energies contrary to expansions of civil rights and

liberties can drown out reasoned justifications for equality and freedom, delaying

social progress. The technological capacity of moral righteousness in the hands of a

majority could impose puritanical conformities and override some rights and liberties.

Fortunately, there cannot be a human right or a civil right to access righteous moral

enhancement, and governments would be prudent to forbid such technology for

moral righteousness. From an enlarged perspective, less righteousness could lead to a

more just society. Going further, if a neurological intervention for moral righteousness

could be invented, so too could moral de-enhancement, here labeled as “moral

toleration”. Perhaps moral toleration deserves as much commendation as so-called

moral enhancement. Justice with less delay can be justice enhanced.

1. Introduction

The moral conviction demanding respect for a civil right or a civil

liberty is often a powerful social and political force. Moral convic-

tions in opposition can be just as powerful. Those threatening a

violation of familiar categories, traditional statuses, and regular

roles are accused of disrupting the social order, claiming an unearned

privilege, or inflicting harms on others. Showing that the social order

will adapt well, new equalities can elevate everyone, and sure benefits

outweigh exaggerated harms, are all morally relevant ways to supply

reasoned responses. Convictions do not promptly yield the floor

for that rational debate, though. Instead, shrilly moralistic alarms

are sounded, tribalistic sides take defensive postures, and fronts of

potent resistance are raised. “Only those in the right should be

heard”, each side declares. Cultural discourse seizes up with symbolic

posturing and then crystallises into slogans. Decades soon pass, and

successive generations wait for progress.

Faulting morality itself is understandably counter-intuitive. We

write our histories after more rights and more equality have been

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secured, crediting the morally inspired and righteously energised

victors. (Conservatives, no less morally energised, are clearly wrong

only in hindsight.) Those post-victory narratives are accurate

enough, considering the moralistic resistance which had to be repeat-

edly overcome. Less moralistic grounds for social change are not

known for arousing fervent support. But those good grounds do

not arouse intense opposition either, so long as inequalities and injus-

tices are not worsened by social change. If the eagerness to impose

one’s moral stance on the lives of others could be diminished across

a population, the overall re-balancing of moral energies with

mundane reasonings might shift society towards faster expansions

and surer protections of civil rights and liberties. The likelihood of

such a shift can appearcounter-intuitive, especially to partisan political

camps (liberal and conservative alike) who are proud of their devotion

to civil rights and liberties. And those camps perennially beg the public

to be just as morally passionate about the next struggles to come.

Moral psychologists, thanks in part to neuroscience, are discerning

cognitive-affective processes connected to moral conviction and

action. Proposals for experimental adjustments to people’s moral

judgements and energies have been aired. If lack of moral passion

and social action from the public is at fault, morality enhancement

can look like an appealing remedy. This essay argues to the contrary.

The sort of moralistic enhancement conducive to partisan victory is

not the right solution; no-one has a right to it, and government

would be right to suppress it. Moral enhancement need not be the

continuation of culture wars by other means. A society may be

wiser for encouraging the opposite of moral enhancement where

rights and liberties are concerned.

2. Morality Enhancement and Moral Righteousness

Let morality enhancement be defined as a technological intervention

that alters neural functioning which happens to improve one’s exhib-

ition of moral conduct. For the purposes of this discussion, in order

to be a morality enhancer, of whatever contrivance –pharmaco-

logical, modulatory, cybernetic, and so on –the intervention demon-

strably works. If it does not work by adjusting actual moral conduct

in some positive and objective manner, it is not a morality enhancer.

(And if it alters other behaviours too, then it is still a morality enhan-

cer, though of dubious value and potentially immoral character.) By

“objective”, empirical accessibility to behaviour is meant, not other

senses of “valid”or “true”.

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A person can truly come to sense or understand moral concerns dif-

ferently over time, and feel validly enhanced in the process. Moral

philosophies consider subjective matters supposedly intrinsic to

morality (willful freedom, intending good, empathy, dutifulness,

right reasoning, and so on), but moral psychology co-ordinates

them with behaviours. Morality enhancement, as defined here,

does not target anything purely subjective that leaves behaviour

entirely unaltered (if that were even possible). A person who con-

tinues to act precisely the same manner as before, but acts for clarified

motives, is someone with a fresh ethical perspective, not a new moral

capacity. The enhancement of morality will not be delayed by incon-

clusive ethical theorising about internal criteria essential to morality.

Besides, those demanding “ethical enhancement”satisfying internal

criteria must explain how any alleged subjective improvement would

be confirmable in moral conduct.

An agnostic stance is further recommended in regard to ethical the-

orising looking for the lone “true”morality, and just as much agnos-

ticism towards abandoning that quest as well. The enhancement of

morality will not be dispelled as impossible upon the challenge,

“By which morality?”The appropriate answer is obvious: “Our mor-

ality”. What is relative or multiform can still be naturally real. What

people can regard as moral provides the only meaning to morality that

any human beings in the real world are capable of discussing. That is

why the enhancement of morality, like the improvement of anything

we do as humans, can only happen in actual human settings. This

must never be forgotten. Anyone speaking of moral enhancement

takes the risk of inflating transhumanist optimism, encouraging par-

tisan radicalism, or purveying idiosyncratic moralism. These risks ac-

company “moral enhancement”in the abstract by ignoring key

contexts: (a) the diversity to cultural traditions that instill differing

sets of moral norms; (b) the varying social conditions that warrant de-

cisions about moral priorities; and (c) the individual characters that

balance moral virtues in distinctive ways. For example, could the en-

hancement of trust be a moral enhancement? Some cultures empha-

sise trust as a moral duty, while others do not; some groups should

not enjoy dutiful trusting from their members; and generous trust

is often unwise for people with naïvely helpful characters. For any-

thing that comes to mind as assuredly moral for anyone, it could be

immoral, unjust, and/or harmful when intensified in someone

chosen at random from around the world.

Recognising context is one step; acknowledging practicalities is the

next. No intervention designed for morality enhancement exists

today. Alterations to moral ability will more likely be discovered

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by accident, while tinkering with one or more entwined functions:

interpersonal sensitivity, social cognition, foresight salience, threat

management, emotional moderation, impulse inhibition, motiv-

ational control, practical inference, and the like.

Current science

has only modest clues about designing morality enhancement, or

any sort of cognitive enhancement, but the many physiological and

neurological obstacles to practical enhancement are not discussed

here.

If a neurological intervention was to somehow influence

moral ability, experimental detection and confirmation are further

hurdles, but they are not insurmountable. Subjects can be tested

for certain moral tendencies and preferences after specific moral

contexts have been pre-arranged. So long as no-one imagines that

“universal”moral abilities of “the human being”are thereby re-

vealed, moral psychology can objectively measure alterations to

moral performance.

This essay has so far been talking about “morality enhancement”

rather than “moral enhancement”to call initial attention to the way

that any ideal moral enhancer could well be an immoral moral enhan-

cer. “Moral enhancement”cannot automatically be moral just

because “moral”was prefixed to “enhancement”. An imagined

moral enhancer may lose its moral character when situated within a

real-world context, it might turn out to be largely immoral in its

overall effects, or its usage by many could lead to unjust social conse-

quences. No “moral enhancement”should be tautologically defined

as entirely moral or ethical. With that cautionary point in place, the

rest of this essay returns to convention, with “moral enhancement”

standing in for “morality enhancement”.

To demonstrate the efficacy of a putative moral enhancer, moral

psychology would apply pre-set standards of moral ability, to

Discussions of morally relevant capacities are offered by Thomas

Douglas, ‘Moral Enhancement via Direct Emotion Modulation: A Reply

to John Harris’,Bioethics 27:3 (2013), 160–168; Molly Crockett and

Regina Rini, ‘Neuromodulators and the (In)stability of Moral Cognition’,

in J. Decety and T. Wheatley (eds), The Moral Brain: A Multidisciplinary

Perspective (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 221–235; and G. Owen

Schaefer, ‘Direct vs. Indirect Moral Enhancement’,Kennedy Institute of

Ethics Journal 25:3 (2015), 261–289.

Consult John Shook and James Giordano, ‘Defining Contexts of

Cognitive (Performance) Enhancements’,inF.JotterandandV.Dubljevic

(eds), Cognitive Enhancement: Ethical and Policy Implications in

International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 76–98.

John R. Shook, ‘Neuroethics and the Possible Types of Moral

Enhancement’,AJOB Neuroscience 3:4 (2012), 3–14.

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compare against the moral conduct of a subject receiving the inter-

vention.

What types of behaviours count as morally relevant, and

morally right, must be chosen in advance in order to supply needed

contexts. The confirmation that moral behaviour has been measur-

ably altered (in whatever direction) in a subject then further

permits researchers to realistically determine whether any novel

moral behaviours (and possibly other anomalous behaviours), have

been added to this subject’s performance.

A“generic”moral enhancer by definition only improves the sub-

ject’s ability to be the kind of moral person that the subject already

tries to be. Let the target of moral enhancement be charity, to

supply examples. A subject who believes that donating a large per-

centage of income to one’s church will maintain that belief, and

display moral enhancement by fulfilling that felt duty more regularly

and/or more generously. By contrast, a “morphic”moral enhancer

improves moral conduct by altering a subject’s moral views, such as

moral values or beliefs. A subject who had not thought that avoiding

charity was a moral failing will reverse that belief, displaying this

moral enhancement by fulfilling a newly acknowledged duty to give

generously to charity. As for a theoretical third category, the

“ethical”moral enhancer that adjusts morality towards what is

truly moral (not simply what any number of people happen to

think is moral), this chapter has nothing to say, because moral phil-

osophy is not driving this essay’s enquiry. These three goals for

moral enhancement must be kept distinct, although philosophical

debates over its merits have exhibited their conflation.

Morphic moral enhancement (if anything approaching that mode

became technological feasible) is not this essay’s focus, but it deserves

two observations. First, few people would voluntarily undergo

morphic moral enhancement. “There’s nothing about wasting

money on charities that seems moral to me –why shouldn’tmy

family enjoy the wealth that I’ve earned?”“I’m pretty sure that

killing someone threatening my home is my right –why should I

become a defenseless wimp?”Pro-choice advocates will not accept

“enhancement”of their baby-loving ability, and pro-life advocates

will not accept “enhancement”of their women-respecting ability.

If I do not think that a so-called “enhancement”is all that moral, I

must regard its morphic application upon me as immoral, or oddly

amoral, or just something to make me congenial to others. In the

absence of peer pressure or coercion, a typical person will not

John Shook, ‘My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance

Enhancement for Realists’,Neuroethics 9:3 (2016), 199–211.

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regard morphic enhancement as obligatory. Second, following from

this, a society compelling morphic moral enhancement violates

human rights and civil rights unless stringent criteria are satisfied,

akin to justifications for mandatory mental treatment or

imprisonment.

Another distinction by moral psychology is needed next, to distin-

guish “judgemental”moral enhancement from “performative”and

“corrective”moral enhancement. Confirming one mode in an enhan-

cer is not automatically a confirmation of the others. A judgemental

moral enhancer improves the subject’s ability to make accurate assess-

ments of moral situations and correctly judge what is right more

reliably. Expressing judgements upon hypotheticals without partici-

pating in actual problematic situations is one way for a subject to

reveal aspects of moral capacity. Participation is a second way. A per-

formative moral enhancer improves the subject’s ability to judge what

is morally right (it fulfils the judgemental mode) and also the sub-

ject’s ability to do more morally right actions while participating in

real-world situations.

Scrutinising the behaviour of others goes

well beyond attending to one’s own behaviour, providing a third

target for moral enhancers. A corrective moral enhancer not only im-

proves the subject’s own moral performance (it fulfils the judgemen-

tal and performative modes), but additionally improves the subject’s

corrective efforts against wrongs by others.

For example, a subject

receiving a moral enhancement against theft will duly regard stealing

as more morally wrong and also seek harsher punishment for thieves

than the subject had approved before enhancement. Corrective

efforts against wrongs could take any number of concrete forms,

such as voting, donating money, civic activism, social nonco-operation,

public unrest, and the like –amounting to material support for group

and third-party activities, and not necessarily personal retribution.

This judgemental-performative-corrective distinction agrees

that proven moral enhancers will likely manifest multiple modes

simultaneously, since their underlying psychological factors are

Kathryn Francis, et al., ‘Virtual Morality: Transitioning From Moral

Judgment to Moral Action?’,PLoS ONE 11 (2015), e0164374.

The role for punishing in the development of morality is discussed by

Robert Kurzban, Maxwell Burton-Chellew, and Stuart West, ‘The

Evolution of Altruism in Humans’,Annual Review of Psychology 66:3

(2015), 575–599. Determining conditions where people regard harms as

moral punishment is the subject of research by Kimmo Eriksson, Pontus

Strimling, and Per Andersson, ‘Costly Punishment in the Ultimatum

Game Evokes Moral Concern, in Particular When Framed as Payoff

Reduction’,Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 69 (2017), 59–64.

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interrelated. Enhancers affecting psychological factors in isolation

would not be helpful. An enhancer that only improves morality in the

judgemental mode would produce subjects sounding like self-assured

moralisers who are not more moral themselves. An enhancer that im-

proves moral performance, while leaving subjects unsure why they are

so good, would be quite disorienting. Busily correcting the behaviour

of others while resting content with one’s own morality would expose

a subject to the charge of hypocrisy. Moralising, self-doubt, and hypoc-

risy would render a subject’s moral life incoherent and incapacitated. By

contrast, a moral enhancer significantly elevating all three modes would

make a subject noticeably more “righteous”in attitude and action.

This essay now proceeds by considering a singular type of moral

enhancement that improves morality through the final “corrective”

mode in the generous “generic”direction. We shall label this type

of intervention Moral Righteousness. A morally righteous person,

we agree to say, is not merely generous with stern moralistic judge-

ments, but also takes concrete action to exemplify them personally

and have those judgements enforced on others. Any partisan side to

a controversy over rights would be keenly interested in attracting

the energies aroused by moral righteousness.

The invention of corrective moral enhancement, if its neurological

mechanisms were understood to some degree, could be paired with its

counterpart, moral enhancement reduction. Before examining the

possible benefits of preventing and reducing moral righteousness

for the purpose of promoting civil rights, the next sections first con-

sider whether moral enhancement holds the moral high ground as a

human right or a civil liberty.

3. The Morality of Moral Righteousness

If every sort of moral enhancement were treated (wrongly, in my

view) as just a non-therapeutic procedure for beneficial self-improve-

ment, then many questions might be easily answered. Respecting the

liberty of people to access such a procedure, absent safety or efficacy

concerns, is consistent with modern liberal societies and non-intru-

sive governments. Governments are nevertheless capable of excessive

regulation, especially when something new offers lifestyle alterna-

tives disturbing to conventional opinion, or offends mainstream

moral sensibilities.

Government should at least respect the liberty

Matt Lamkin, ‘Regulating Identity: Medical Regulation as Social

Control’,BYU Law Review 2(2016), 501–573.

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of competent adults to refuse a procedure unconnected with public

health and safety.

If government can refrain from indulging

popular prejudices and maintain respect for individual liberties,

then moral enhancement would be treated much like an innocuous

lifestyle choice, akin to a health regimen. The right of people to

accept or decline moral enhancement has secure political grounds if

it is classified as non-therapeutic self-improvement.

In truth, morality is not just another option for self-improvement.

A right to Moral Righteousness has firmer grounds in morality itself,

rendering moral enhancement more obligatory. If morality is the re-

pository for whatever we can understand as worthy and right, then

morality itself must truly be worthy and right. As morality directs

us to unfailingly pursue what is worthy and right, then people have

a moral duty to become more moral. That superior duty is indifferent

to individual preferences and lifestyle choices. To leave vital moral

virtues and values in an underdeveloped and unappreciated condition

is practically as immoral as violating them. A basic argument can be

constructed favouring the enhancement of all morality to any

extreme.

People have a moral duty to accept safe moral enhancement.

(Moral Growth)

Moral Growth is always good for one’s self and others. (Moral

Beneficence)

So, people always have a moral duty to consent to safe moral

enhancement. (Moral Perfectionism)

Moral Perfectionism is not comfortable with people freely accepting

or declining moral enhancement: it is only right for people to be

morally enhanced, and it is never right to avoid moral enhancement.

As far as morality can see, Moral Perfectionism is compatible with

corrective moral enhancement, and it even encourages corrective

measures.

Moral Perfectionism strengthens one’s commitments to moral

values. (by definition)

Moral enhancement could be linked to questionable therapeutic goals;

see Harris Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain: The Limits of Moral

Enhancement (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), chap. 8; and Sarah

Carter, ‘Could Moral Enhancement Interventions Be Medically

Indicated?’Health Care Analysis 25:4 (2017), 338–353.

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Strong commitment to moral values is consistent with motiva-

tions to ensure that others must conform or be corrected.

(premised)

Hence, Moral Perfectionism approves motivations to ensure con-

formity through corrections.

Corrective moral enhancement efficiently heightens motivations

to ensure conformity through corrections. (by definition)

Therefore, Moral Perfectionism approves corrective moral

enhancement.

Finally, since Moral Perfectionism’s approval of corrective moral

enhancement practically amounts to an approval of Moral

Righteousness, the moral duty of people to consent to moral enhance-

ment extends to a duty to become Morally Righteous. So long as

Moral Growth and Moral Beneficence are acceptable, a final conclu-

sion seems to follow: everyone has a moral duty to become more

Morally Righteous.

The Morally Righteous themselves would not endorse that general

conclusion, because generic moral enhancement is involved here. No

Morally Righteous person would approve of the enhancement of

values that he or she views as immoral. For a population displaying

ample disagreement over moral values and how to prioritise them,

generic moral enhancement generously distributed throughout a

society would deepen those divides. Each Morally Righteous

person would vastly prefer selectively generic moral enhancement

for those already in agreement (and morphic moral enhancement

for those who are not in agreement). Readers who have been thinking,

“Just let people who are right get moral enhancement for righteous-

ness, and forbid that ‘enhancement’to those who are wrong”, already

understand what these Morally Righteous people must think.

The typical Morally Righteous person would in effect be a Moral

Puritan, let us say, convinced that others should conform to righteous

moral values (which are always this Puritan’s own values).

“Puritanism”is a term with religious connotations that play no role

here; Moral Puritanism for this essay’s purposes is simply driven

by moral conviction to devote resources to increasing social conform-

ity, irrespective of any association with a religious or secular world-

view. No-one wants the label of “Puritan”attached to them, of

course. Purveyors of “ethical enhancement”would doubtless

inform us how to distinguish the truly Righteous from the misguided

Puritan –every Puritan movement has its ethical apologists.

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Because this essay takes no stand on moral philosophy, it remains ag-

nostic about where righteous morality can always be found. We shall

have to leave the Morally Righteous to their moral cacophony, as

they criminalise what they can agree upon, and tolerate what they

cannot. Are they so different from us in our societies today? Perhaps

not. As we imagine a hypothetical future society in which most

people have become Morally Righteous, we could be forgiven for

hoping that our society does not become more like theirs. Our world

already has plenty of moral disagreement and social fractiousness, con-

vulsing many countries with civic tensions and the occasional civil war.

Morally Righteous people are not insensitive to civil strife. Indeed,

a remedying proposal occurs to them. If only more people were

morally righteous, they would think, then a majority of morally right-

eous people would emerge, and the law could enforce conformity

with that moral majority. Moral groups in the minority can quarrel

with that outcome, of course. Yet they would have no right to com-

plain about the illegality of their way of life, as far as the Morally

Righteous can see, since those moral minorities are neither righteous

nor right. Where civil strife is due to moral conflict between large

sectors of society, a dominant moral majority is a blunt but practical

remedy. However, until a Morally Righteous majority is well-estab-

lished, as far as society as a whole can tell, any would-be moral major-

ity is neither so moral nor a majority.

4. A Right to Righteousness?

Undeterred by their status as a moral majority only in name, a group of

common-minded Moral Puritans would encourage people of lesser con-

viction to join them in Moral Righteousness. Those unsure about a

moral issue would not use Moral Righteousness to learn what is right.

Still, there may already be enough morally agreeable people who only

lack strong commitment. Generic moral enhancement for them would

amount to a conversion into Moral Righteousness and membership

among the Moral Puritans. Moral Puritans have this argument to advance:

People have a moral duty to accept safe moral enhancement of

their stable moral values. (Moral Growth)

Moral Growth is always good for one’s self and others. (Moral

Beneficence)

People cannot be denied a liberty right to access moral and

beneficial resources. (Right to Morality)

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Therefore, People have a right to freely pursue moral enhance-

ment. (Right to Righteousness)

Moral Puritans would vastly prefer that only people who are

already morally agreeable take advantage of accessible righteousness.

Nevertheless, unable to regulate access to moral enhancement (yet),

Moral Puritans could at least support a broad Right to Righteousness,

in the hopes that they could eventually win an enhancement race

by attaining majority status. With a Right to Righteousness securely

recognised, society cannot obstruct the growth of the Morally

Righteous towards a hoped-for Puritan Majority.

By this reasoning, a typical Puritan-minded group would approve

of a legally recognised right to moral enhancement, especially if that

group was already a significant segment of society. As for the rest of

society, with Puritanical efforts approaching effective levels, moral

enhancement may be a good idea for everyone.

Puritanical moral determination is best countered by determined

moral opposition. (Moral Counterpoise)

So, the safeguard against Puritanical social “reform”is general

moral enhancement. (Moral Standoff)

Therefore, all people have a right to freely pursue moral enhance-

ment. (Right to Righteousness)

Two arguments now stand favouring a general Right to

Righteousness, representing both Puritanical and non-Puritanical

interests. This right is general, the moral enhancement is generic,

and the degree of enhancement is left indefinite.

Anyone has the right, by these arguments, to enhance any moral

stance to any (available) degree. Only efficacious limitations will slow

someone’s moral ambitions, if wisdom cannot. The neural interven-

tions making moral enhancement possible will not know when to

stop working when “good enough”morals have been attained. We

may not be able to tell when morality is still being enhanced. The am-

biguities to “enhancement”cometotheforeaswetrytoclassify

conduct transcending familiar normalities.

Under which special

circumstances would peculiar conduct still count as moral? What

“posthumans”,übermensch, or angels must do will surpass our

John Shook and James Giordano, ‘Neuroethics Beyond Normal:

Performance Enablement and Self-Transformative Technologies’,Cambridge

Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 25:1 (2016), 121–140.

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understanding. Either improved morals are still answerable to our

moral judgement (so those morals cannot advance very far), or we

must surrender judgement to whomever claims moral superiority (so

our morals cannot be so good). Any sufficiently “advanced”morality

may be indistinguishable from indecency or evil.

It seems wiser to rely on what we do understand about morality.

Can present-day society figure out where to place boundaries on

access to moral enhancement?

Motivations for limiting or denying a right to moral enhancement

are not difficult to imagine. Privileged classes of society could not be

indifferent about Moral Righteousness for aggrieved classes, to begin

with. And Moral Righteousness can alarm the many, as well as the

few. The majority of society could deny a right to enhance certain

moral views on the grounds that they cause behaviours widely

deemed too immoral, perverse, or dangerous. Similarly, if resulting

conduct due to enhancing certain moral views (immoral views, for

the majority) encourages criminality, denying a right to such en-

hancement would be expected. The majority could also deny a

right to enhance morality on the grounds that resulting conduct

would impede or contravene an established right. Furthermore, the

majority could deny a right to enhance particular moral views if the

righteously enhanced would obstruct or delay the establishment of

a new right favoured by many.

Defending a Right to Righteousness from an entrenched majority

opinion or established legal system might resort to the strategy of

portraying this putative right as a human right. Compared against

other rights, what is the measure of the importance for a Right to

Righteousness?

Over the past three centuries, declarations and constitutions have

offered lists of essential rights. Peter Baehr recounts the culmination

of those endeavours:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the

UN General Assembly as a resolution. Such resolutions have the

legal status of recommendation, which means that they are not

legally binding. However, it is by now commonly accepted that

the so-called “core rights”in the Universal Declaration have

acquired the status of (binding) international customary law.

Core rights are rights that are indispensable for an existence in

This point, familiar to theologians, exposes incoherencies to specula-

tion about creating morally superior beings. Consider Vojin Rakić,‘We

Must Create Beings with Moral Standing Superior to Our Own’,

Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 24:1 (2015), 58–65.

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human dignity and therefore need absolute protection. They

include the right to life and the right to the inviolability of the

human person, including the prohibition of slavery, serfdom,

and torture, wrongful detention, discrimination and other acts

that violate human dignity. In addition, the right to freedom of

religion is often mentioned in this list.

A Right to Righteousness cannot rank among these core rights. It is

not essential to the freedom of thought and expression of moral views:

it is not necessary for living according to one’s moral conscience, as-

sociating with those in moral agreement, or urging others to agree.

The generic enhancement of moral righteousness is not to be con-

fused with the basic ability to be a morally conscientious person. A

Right to Righteousness goes far beyond a right to live morally, by

affecting the moral lives of others. A right to one’s moral conscience

is vulnerable to oppression and surely deserves legal protection.

Protection from the zealous righteousness of others must not be left

to chance. Protecting a Right to Righteousness, which presupposes

moral conscience, could not take precedence over the ability of

everyone to freely possess a moral conscience.

Describing moral righteousness as a potential threat to moral con-

science can sound like a contradiction in terms. If a conscience is truly

moral, righteousness would respect it. But what is truly moral?

The Morally Righteous do esteem moral conscience in anyone, but

they see far less value in anyone’simmoralconscience. Psychologically,

this is true of any of us. A warning against a Puritan majority’sinability

to respect the consciences of smaller groups serves equally well as a

warning against any majority righteously concerned with immorality.

Sociologically, that is true of any majority. Pretending that society

need only be concerned with criminality while mere immorality falls

short of social sanction keeps up the pretense that society’slawsare

not connected to society’s moral views. How is a Puritan majority so

different from any social majority? If social majorities have the

right to enforce important moral norms by law, so long as human

rights remain respected, then a Puritan majority has that right, and

its Moral Righteousness only threatens serious immorality.

Philosophically, this is true if every morality deserves enforcement.

Puritans acquire their distasteful reputations while they are in the mi-

nority; they retain that reputation as majorities only from an external

standpoint. All the same, no Righteous majority needs a Right to

Peter Baehr, Human Rights: Universality in Practice (Berlin: Springer,

2016), 4.

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Righteousness to uphold civic morals, and no small Righteous group

requires a Right to Righteousness to find moral society for company.

Ethically, this is true regardless of whether the Righteous know what

is truly moral or not. Whether in the company of the majority or

not, each conscience at least counts as something not to be overpowered

or overruled without due moral consideration.

All things considered, enhancement for Moral Righteousness does

not hold the moral, civic, or political high ground. Society may there-

fore prohibit access to Moral Righteousness enhancement if it

inspires conduct attempting to impede or deny a human right, or

any right needed for upholding a human right.

5. Moral Righteousness as a Civil Liberty

The conclusion of the previous section suggests that the freedom of

adults to obtain Moral Righteousness should not be infringed, so

long as one can conduct oneself civilly. Access to civil Moral

Righteousness may amount to a civil liberty, in the sense that it per-

tains to the civic life of a citizen and it is worthy of protection from gov-

ernment infringement.

A government able to prohibit access to civil

Moral Righteousness would be a government able to infringe upon

access to conventional means of arousing moral indignation, inspiring

moral idealism, and activating moral energies. That government is on a

collision course with freedom of conscience, freedom of speech,

freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of religion.

Furthermore, because righteous social action translates easily into the

sphere of political action, denying access to civil Moral Righteousness

without compelling justification amounts to unequal treatment and a

violation of civil rights. There are compelling justifications, however.

First and foremost, a government would be justified in scrutinising

and regulating neurotechnological moral enhancement to ensure its

safety, efficacy, and consistency with civil conduct and civil order.

Second, additional government control over moral righteousness is

probably warranted. Imagining a society in which access to civil

Moral Righteousness is largely unfettered returns us to that

There are analogous civil liberties. Citizens already access ordinary

means of moral improvement, to the point of righteous social action and cor-

rective civic activism, and they should have the liberty to do so without ob-

structive government scrutiny or regulation. Many organisations, secular

and religious, offer principled exhortations to recruit people for community

activism projects and political action agendas.

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hypothetical scenario in which much of society is undergoing moral

enhancement to run in a righteousness race that no-one can win.

Perhaps moral stalemates and political stand-offs will permit an

uneasy but stable equilibrium. But perhaps not. Society as a whole

may be the loser in the long run. Two concerns for social welfare

and civic life are paramount.

First, morally righteous groups have large incentives to not only

assist members with access to moral enhancement, but to additionally

pressure members into undergoing moral enhancement. It requires

no stretch of the imagination to foresee how the Morally Righteous

would be motivated to compel moral enhancement as a condition

of membership and eligibility for status within the group. If moral

enhancement is always an unadulterated good, where is the clear

line to show people where enough is enough? Unable to see anything

but the beaconing light of moral perfection, the Morally Righteous

might be the least likely to know when or how to stop. The eventual

consequences could be deleterious for both in-group members and

out-group targets of righteous indignation, as the liberty to morally

enhance slowly morphs into the confinement of mental cages. This

is not a path towards ethical sensitivity or human enlightenment.

Second, many morally righteous groups, all accelerating their mo-

mentum simultaneously, must find themselves on a collision course

with each other. The erosion of public discourse and the rise of

social tensions can only result from highly energised organisations

eager and willing to criminalise each other out of existence.

Utopian plans about general moral enhancement leading everyone

towards a new ethical age of harmony and peace are entertaining

but unrealistic. What that utopian actually wants is plenty of

morphic moral enhancement in uniformity with his or her own

ethical ideals. Unfettered generic moral enhancement will only

strengthen moral antagonisms, and weaken civic bonds in the long

run. Civil Moral Righteousness is only civil up to point when it is

not anymore, and by then it may be too late. This could not be a

civil liberty that is truly worth risking the loss of civic solidarity

and security.

Even worse outcomes are foreseeable. A privileged class with suf-

ficient political power could enforce moral righteousness for social

behaviours conducive to civic conformity and complacency. A

Morally Righteous majority may also look to moral enhancement,

both generic and morphic, as useful tools. Generic moral enhance-

ment for those already morally agreeable, and morphic moral

enhancement for immoral deviants, will appear on the political

agenda. Allowing general moral enhancement will no longer be on

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the agenda, and that civil liberty may be taken away by a sufficiently

Puritanical majority. Indeed, the corresponding civil liberty to refuse

moral enhancement may be taken away. After all, that Puritanical ma-

jority will think, only a moral degenerate would refuse the opportun-

ity to become more morally normal, and such moral degeneracy

deserves no respect or toleration. Avoiding proper moral enhance-

ment could be criminalised by a Morally Righteous majority.

The notion of mandatory moral enhancement seems improbable at

present because experimental neurological interventions, medical ther-

apies, and non-therapeutic procedures all require informed consent.

But we are contemplating a powerful privileged class, or a puritanically

principled regime, wielding proven moral enhancement and ample

motivation to use it. It does appear that any government has justifica-

tions for severely restricting access to civil Moral Righteousness. The

drive for perfection behind Moral Righteousness cannot be as good

as they seem.

6. The Wrongs of Righteousness

Moral Perfectionism should be deeply questioned. It observes no dis-

tinction between remedying moral deficiencies and surpassing moral

normalcy. Moral Perfectionism does not consult society’s expecta-

tions about sufficiently moral conduct. Furthermore, it overrides a

person’s own judgement about appropriate devotion to moral

matters. For Moral Perfectionism, no matter how moral a person

may already be, a duty to undergo more moral enhancement awaits.

If Moral Perfectionism is rejected, then its supporting premises,

Moral Growth and Moral Beneficence, must be questioned.

Moral Growth: People have a moral duty to accept safe moral

enhancement.

Moral Beneficence: Moral Growth is always good for one’s self

and others.

It is not easy to question Moral Growth. Common sense says that

morality must be a very good thing, surely as good as anything else

in life, and probably needed for any genuine good to come from

life. All the same, common sense also says that uncommon moral

zeal is rarely so pure and beneficent.

There is no duty to pursue any of our moral values to extremes.

Wisdom cautions that a moderate and balanced commitment to

central virtues and values is more congenial to our enterprises and

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relationships over the course of a lifetime.

Must moral duty compel

more and more moral ability? If we are speaking in generalities,

perhaps, but no neurological enhancement will demonstrably

improve just “moral ability”in general or in the abstract. No

“essence”to morality could represent a practical goal, either.

Platitudes about caring, sharing, sacrificing, protecting, loving (and

so on) are ethical ideals, to which no actual moral enhancer will cor-

respond with any specificity. Saintly figures exemplifying one key

virtue must be partly mythical –we are instructed to become more

like many of them, not to become one of them.

Cautionary principles apply once again. An actual moral enhancer

will at best partially modify one or another aspect of human conduct

having certain moral ramifications along with other non-moral impli-

cations. For any specific moral capacity, distorting its role to the point

of domination over, or distraction from, one’s moral life is a course

that hardly seems advisable, much less dutiful. Replacing these two

idealised premises about moral growth and beneficence yields a real-

istic aim for moral improvement:

People have a prevailing duty to attain and maintain social stan-

dards for morality, which are (almost) always good for one’s self

and others. (Moral Adequacy)

Alternatively, one’s prevailing duty could aspire to a critically minimal

level:

People have a prevailing duty to attain and maintain respect for

core human rights and important corollary rights and liberties.

(Moral Decency)

Arguments justifying moral enhancement to the point of satisfying

Moral Decency could be advanced at this stage, but this essay will not

digress into that issue.

Moral Righteousness is clearly in tension with both Moral Adequacy

and Moral Decency. General and generic Moral Righteousness will not

closely follow pre-existing social standards, since multifarious moral en-

hancement will somewhere and somehow exceed whatever counts as

moral normalcy in a society. Moral Righteousness can even lead to vio-

lations of Moral Decency. Someone’s moral convictions, sufficiently

William Kabasenche, ‘Moral Formation and Moral Enhancement’,

AJOB Neuroscience 7:2 (2016), 130–131.

See I. Glenn Cohen, ‘This Is Your Brain on Human Rights: Moral

Enhancement and Human Rights’,Law and Ethics of Human Rights 9:1

(2015), 1–41.

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exaggerated and energised, can motivate a denial of someone else’s

human rights, civil rights, or important liberties. History is replete

with illustrative examples too numerous to recount. Puritanical deter-

mination has accompanied pro and con sides to lengthy and torturous

struggles over rights and liberties down to our own times. Shall we be

resigned to such slow progress? Perhaps not.

In an earlier section, an argument was offered in favour of permit-

ting Moral Righteousness which was premised on that resignation:

Puritanical moral determination is best countered by determined

moral opposition. (Moral Counterpoise)

So, the safeguard against Puritanical social “reform”is general

moral enhancement. (Moral Standoff)

Yet there is a proactive alternative available to society. Puritanical

moral determination can be more effectively countered by preventing

its intensification, suggesting that society may resort to denying

access to general and generic Moral Enhancement.

There is no right to uncivil Moral Righteousness, and no right to

Moral Righteousness conducive to the rise of a Puritanical majority.

Why should there be a right to Moral Righteousness for sectors of

society enabling them to delay the advancement of human and civil

rights and liberties? Holding and expressing moral views, associating

with like-minded advocates, and engaging in public protest and civil

disobedience, is not at issue. What can be questioned is a right to a

technology designed for moral zealotry and aggressive activism, so

easily targeted against equal rights and expanded liberties for others.

7. The Righteousness of Conformity

Repressing retrograde Moral Righteousness need not be the first

resort. If a majority of society is already persuaded of the urgency

to enlarge or equalise a right, swift codification renders the opposition

unable to access newly uncivil enhancement. However, if a resolute

majority has not yet congealed, which partisan position is in the

right to demand that others refrain from intensifying their resolve

while righteously enhancing their own side?

The inattentive reader is naturally supposing that whoever is truly

in the right must not be denied access to Moral Righteousness. The

attentive reader is noticing the argumentative symmetry now threa-

tening our deliberations. Did we already clarify who the morally

righteous side will always be? We did say that no Puritanical majority

should get the opportunity to righteously congeal and suppress its

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opposition. Of course, from the standpoint of the rest of society, a

Righteous majority is the Puritanical majority. Lacking moral philo-

sophy’s final call, that moral standoff has returned in converse form:

Denying access to excessive moral enhancement safeguards against

any Puritanical social reform. (Righteousness Prevention)

Righteousness Prevention recognises one argumentative symmetry,

but a second symmetry awaits on another axis. We are unable to

declare in advance who would have the moral high ground for future con-

tests over new rights, having no finalised ethical theory in hand, and we

cannot yet say whose moral improvement encroaches on dangerously

righteous enhancement, either. Did we lay down that bright line where

moral improvement intensifies beyond the level of Moral Decency and

surpasses Moral Adequacy? From one righteous standpoint, an increase

in moral ability still falls regrettably short; from another righteous stand-

point, such “improvement”is too excessive or even a moral disablement.

“Moral enhancement”was not defined from the outset as improvement

above Moral Adequacy precisely in order to anticipate this local moral

relativity. Nevertheless, a society could decide that promoting Moral

Righteousness, up to the level of Moral Adequacy, would helpfully in-

crease the number of satisfactorily moral people, who are also eager to

promote the conformity of still more people.

For example, society could promote the prevention of theft with an

enticement offered to everyone: if you sincerely believe that theft is

immoral, accept an inexpensive procedure for Moral Righteousness

with regard to stealing and receive a government incentive in

return. Governments already subsidise and incentivise innumerable

programmes to alter the public’s behaviour for the general welfare.

The degree of Moral Righteousness could be scientifically calibrated

to ensure stricter conformity with Moral Adequacy without causing

overzealous excesses. This voluntary programme seems both

morally right (by definition –only what is right is promoted) and

consistent with the liberty to accept or decline the programme.

Government can incentivise acceptance of Moral Righteousness

to elevate conformity to common moral standards. (Righteousness

Conformity)

No government pressure is necessary. “Those avoiding enhancement

only confess their immorality”, the masses will think.

As the

‘Ethics is for bad guys!’, as John Harris puts it, in How to Be Good:

The Possibility of Moral Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2016), chap. 7.

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number of Righteous Conformers gradually increases, they will apply

the usual peer pressures and social coercions in order to grow the

number of conformists. Those who refuse enhancement will be

understood as either expressing their doubt that theft could ever

tempt them, or signaling their preference that stealing remains an

option. Either way, trust is easily secured by acceding to enhance-

ment. Proof of righteousness could be attached to housing and loan

applications, employment criteria, promotion decisions, and even

boardroom appointments.

In the long run, Righteous Conformists could conceivably become

a vast majority of the population, enveloping even politicians and bu-

reaucrats. As a permanent Righteous majority, they would enforce

the common moral norms so rigidly, generation after generation,

that any reform movement urging a novel deviation would be dispar-

aged (if not criminalised). If establishing a moral government enfor-

cing serious morality standards for a highly moral society is the goal,

then voluntary Moral Righteousness towards near-total Righteous

Conformity sounds like an efficient means. Righteous Conformity

could also mean endless moral rigidity, accompanied by overall

cultural stagnation. Which society really has the right to imprison

future generations with whatever passes for moral adequacy now-

adays? If authentic moral progress deserves a chance, then

Righteous Conformity is not really right.

Moral Righteousness to elevate conformity to common moral

standards should not have social approval or legal sanction.

(Moral Nonconformity)

Moral Nonconformity sounds illicit, but that retention of social

flexibility preserves adaptability as well as liberty. There is little

reason to allow society’s current norms to rigidly set the bar for

many people forever, as moral relativists and moral objectivists can

agree. And society can agree, too. Ask anyone –disappointment

with what passes for public morals is heard from plenty of people.

An appetite for moral improvement, at least for others if not oneself,

is not scarce, but it is not uniform, either. Righteous Restraint at most

offers a tenuous compromise, since little concrete meaning is assign-

able to “excessive”moral enhancement. Disagreement over what

counts as excessive moral righteousness will only serve as a proxy

fight over the underlying moral disagreement. Righteous standoffs

again appear to be unavoidable, with access to Moral Righteousness

at the center of the struggle.

The value of short-cut moral improvement must be seriously

doubted. What seemed like a straight-forward means to moral

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progress has led straight into a roadblock. What was supposed to be

lacking, moral conviction and determination, is what can always

erupt in abundance. That explains why titanic struggles over

modest progress in the name of rights must be fomented and

endured practically every time.

8. The Case of Government v. Righteousness

Righteous crusades conflicting over a right typically delay com-

promise or resolution by disrupting regular political deliberations

and sidelining cooler-headed debates. Previous sections have

pointed out how access to Moral Righteousness can only exacerbate

those delays. If the sort of moral enhancement permitting Moral

Righteousness is invented, there are good reasons to discourage

its use.

Prohibiting access to Moral Righteousness mitigates righteous

crusades over rights. (Righteousness De-Escalation)

Moral disagreement should not be weeded out of society, but it

need not grow to strangle society. Two prior guidelines can also

provide assistance here:

Denying access to excessive moral enhancement safeguards

against any Puritanical social reform. (Righteousness Prevention)

Moral Righteousness to elevate conformity to common moral stan-

dards should not have social approval or legal sanction. (Moral

Nonconformity)

Combining all three, there is an imperative to discourage Righteous

enhancement:

Access to Moral Righteousness should be tightly regulated and

illegal for most people, excepting only for rare therapeutic

cases. (Criminalised Righteousness)

Criminalised Righteousness should not be confused with govern-

ment oppression of civil reform movements. No society could, or

should, try to obstruct or crush civil crusades. The moral energies of

the oppressed and the outraged propel the advancement of rights

and liberties as much as anything.

Limited moral enhancement

This essay is premised on rejecting liberalism’s ideal of public debate

proceeding without appeals to devoutly-held values. This essay’s concerns

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could be useful. The weaker modes –judgemental and performative

enhancement –do not fall under as much suspicion as corrective

moral enhancement. No society should be obliged to fracture the

civic bonds for which civil rights exist. Countries torn by cultural

struggles, or countries making progress on rights, might be interested

in de-enhancing Righteousness as well as criminalising Righteousness.

9. The Morality of De-Enhancing Morality

Enhancing the advocacy and enshrinement of civil rights would be ma-

terially aided by forbidding Moral Righteousness enhancement. That

goal could be pursued through encouraging Moral Righteousness di-

minishment as well. The diminishment of Moral Righteousness

would be a technological intervention that alters neural functioning

which happens to lessen interest in corrective measures taken

against violators of the subject’s moral judgements, without affecting

those judgements to a significant degree. For a label, let us call a

workable intervention “Moral Toleration”.

Moral Toleration, as defined, does not alter a person’s self-concep-

tion of who they are as a person with moral dignity and rights, includ-

ing the right to one’s own moral views and the liberty to express them

in one’s lifestyle. Moral Toleration, accordingly, only tempers a

person’s capacity to participate in, or lend support for, the prevention

of others from pursuing those same rights and liberties. Nor is this

hypothetical technique for tempering moralistic righteousness

about weakening morality or inspiring moral relativism. Subjects of

this technique, if successfully developed, would maintain the same

moral convictions and pass the same moral judgements as before,

and their own conduct would be unaffected. Other notions of toler-

ance, detached from moral psychology, may or may not imply the be-

havioural adjustment due to Moral Toleration, since the idea of

toleration is complex and multifaceted for legal, political, and philo-

sophical purposes. For ethical purposes, moral tolerance is far less

worthy than mutual respect or communal solidarity. However, any

abstract conception of tolerance should at least embrace the same

aim as Moral Toleration to have any practical merit.

Although Moral Tolerance has delimited behavioural aims, could

its widespread usage lead to unacceptably unjust results? Like any

about righteousness within politics presume an essential role for all citizens

and their values.

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other sort of “enhancement”, it cannot automatically be good or just.

We may envision a future reform movement, without resistance from

a too-tolerant majority, inflicting undue harms on other social

groups, rearranging statuses to the unfair detriment of many, or dis-

rupting the social order beyond repair. However, Moral Tolerance

does not diminish anyone’s concerns for regular social order, fairly

distributed privileges, or harms to public welfare. These concerns,

while less moralistically defended, would still matter to people and

motivate them to the same degree, so unjust reforms would be criti-

cised and reconsidered on those accounts.

With these provisions in mind, a government could tentatively

promote the acceptance of Moral Tolerance in a society to promote

the goal of increasing overall justice.

Government can incentivise acceptance of Moral Tolerance to

de-escalate moral righteousness. (Tolerance Conformity)

This promotion of Moral Tolerance does not suffer from the problems

inherent to Righteousness Conformity. Tolerance Conformity does

not threaten any violation of human rights. Even if broad moral toler-

ance were to spread throughout a society, neither human rights nor

established civil rights and liberties would suffer. Disruptions to the

comfortable social order (especially to those feeling quite comfortable

with their status and privilege) could ensue, but such discomforts

would be more easily ameliorated if moral tolerance prevailed over

moral righteousness.

What does the world need now? Lauding moral tolerance must

sound as futuristically optimistic as the high hopes bestowed on

moral enhancement. Neither will come into practical usage in the

forms envisaged even by the most well-informed researchers, but

the lures are potent and the ends are beckoning. The pursuit of

justice and equality, in the form of enlarged civil rights and expanded

civil liberties, has never been easy but need not be so hard. This

pursuit might deserve Moral Righteousness, or it might require

Moral Toleration. If one can be invented, so can the other –which

does the world need more?

Bowie State University

j.shook@pragmatism.org

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Effects of brain lesion on moral behavior and relevant ethical dilemma

Article

Jul 2020

When talking about the relationship between moral behavior and brain functional localization, the former involves various moral abilities, and the latter refers to the specific brain network structures related to psychological functions. Moral behavior refers to the behavior that is beneficial or harmful to others or society, including good behavior and bad behavior. The moral consequence caused by brain injury is mainly demonstrated by immoral behavior, which is of great theoretical and practical value. By summarizing studies on whole-brain coordinated activities of morality, the present study attempts to clarify the influence of specific brain damages on moral behavior. The results showed that for the cerebral cortex, injury to the frontal cortex (i.e., the command and control center of the brain), leads to self-functional damage and further servility or blind obedience. In particular, the frontal cortex injury during infancy may cause risks for moral development. Next, orbital frontal cortex (OFC) injury mainly causes impairment in risky decision-making, social emotion, and self-information correction. Corresponding moral consequences include ignoring social etiquette and norms, and difficulties in establishing and maintaining close relationships. Also, injury to the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) may result in the damage of learning adaptation, abstract event judgment, self-control, and other functions. Relevant moral consequences are moral utilitarian preference and "acquired social disease", which is expressed as impulse behavior. Furthermore, temporal cortex injury leads to potential decreased control of the cerebral cortex and disorder of activation of limbic structure that results in violent attacks and other problems. In the subcortical area, amygdala injury leads to some patients' serious violence; and injuries of hypothalamus, globus pallidus and septum lead to improper satisfaction of basic physiological needs, mainly manifested as sexual moral disorders. The effects of some other brain localization injuries are discussed in specific neural networks. With regard to the brain mechanism of morality, research on brain injury does not aim to explore the direct relationships between morality and the brain, but to investigate the role of intermediate elements such as the psychological process (e.g., social cognition) and mental ability (e.g., memory ability). It is easy to fall into the ethical dilemmas when the relationship between brain injury and moral consequences is simply analyzed and then applied. The first dilemma concerns whether patients with brain injury have enough free will or self-discipline, and if not, how to evaluate their immoral behavior. The second dilemma is, whether there exists universal moral and ethical principles, and if not, how to evaluate the value of intervention and treatment that are applied to improve the morality of patients with brain injury. The third dilemma is, whether the realization of certain moral changes owing to brain injury can reduce patients' stigmatization, and if not, what is the next step. Studies along with these research lines are called for in the future: The cognitive neural mechanism of moral behavior, the diversification of the sequelae of brain lesions, generalization of these research findings to the Chinese people, and so on.

Virtual Morality: Transitioning from Moral Judgment to Moral Action?

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2016
PLOS ONE

The nature of moral action versus moral judgment has been extensively debated in numerous disciplines. We introduce Virtual Reality (VR) moral paradigms examining the action individuals take in a high emotionally arousing, direct action-focused, moral scenario. In two studies involving qualitatively different populations, we found a greater endorsement of utilitarian responses–killing one in order to save many others–when action was required in moral virtual dilemmas compared to their judgment counterparts. Heart rate in virtual moral dilemmas was significantly increased when compared to both judgment counterparts and control virtual tasks. Our research suggests that moral action may be viewed as an independent construct to moral judgment, with VR methods delivering new prospects for investigating and assessing moral behaviour.

My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance Enhancement for Realists

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2016

John Shook

How should ethics help decide the morality of enhancing morality? The idea of morally enhancing the human brain quickly emerged when the promise of cognitive enhancement in general began to seem realizable. However, on reflection, achieving moral enhancement must be limited by the practical challenges to any sort of cognitive modification, along with obstacles particular to morality’s bases in social cognition. The objectivity offered by the brain sciences cannot ensure the technological achievement of moral bioenhancement for humanity-wide application. Additionally, any limited moral enhancement will not easily fulfil ethical expectations. Three hypothetical scenarios involving putative moral enhancement help illustrate why. Philosophical concerns about the “Does-Must Dichotomy” and the “Factor-Cause Plurality,” as I label them, forbid easy leaps from views about morality on to conclusions about ways to enhance morality, and then further on to ethically justifying those enhancements. A modest and realistic approach to moral enhancement emerges from exploring these issues.

Could Moral Enhancement Interventions be Medically Indicated?

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Dec 2017
HEALTH CARE ANAL

Sarah Carter-Walshaw

This paper explores the position that moral enhancement interventions could be medically indicated (and so considered therapeutic) in cases where they provide a remedy for a lack of empathy, when such a deficit is considered pathological. In order to argue this claim, the question as to whether a deficit of empathy could be considered to be pathological is examined, taking into account the difficulty of defining illness and disorder generally, and especially in the case of mental health. Following this, Psychopathy and a fictionalised mental disorder (Moral Deficiency Disorder) are explored with a view to consider moral enhancement techniques as possible treatments for both conditions. At this juncture, having asserted and defended the position that moral enhancement interventions could, under certain circumstances, be considered medically indicated, this paper then goes on to briefly explore some of the consequences of this assertion. First, it is acknowledged that this broadening of diagnostic criteria in light of new interventions could fall foul of claims of medicalisation. It is then briefly noted that considering moral enhancement technologies to be akin to therapies in certain circumstances could lead to ethical and legal consequences and questions, such as those regarding regulation, access, and even consent.

Neuroethics beyond Normal

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2016
CAMB Q HEALTHC ETHIC

An integrated and principled neuroethics offers ethical guidelines able to transcend conventional and medical reliance on normality standards. Elsewhere we have proposed four principles for wise guidance on human transformations. Principles like these are already urgently needed, as bio- and cyberenhancements are rapidly emerging. Context matters. Neither "treatments" nor "enhancements" are objectively identifiable apart from performance expectations, social contexts, and civic orders. Lessons learned from disability studies about enablement and inclusion suggest a fresh way to categorize modifications to the body and its performance. The term "enhancement" should be broken apart to permit recognition of enablements and augmentations, and kinds of radical augmentation for specialized performance. Augmentations affecting the self, self-worth, and self-identity of persons require heightened ethical scrutiny. Reversibility becomes the core problem, not the easy answer, as augmented persons may not cooperate with either decommissioning or displacement into unaccommodating societies. We conclude by indicating how our four principles of self-creativity, nonobsolescence, empowerment, and citizenship establish a neuroethics beyond normal that is better prepared for a future in which humans and their societies are going so far beyond normal.

Neuromodulators and the (In)stability of Moral Cognition

Chapter

Feb 2015

An overview of the latest interdisciplinary research on human morality, capturing moral sensibility as a sophisticated integration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms. Over the past decade, an explosion of empirical research in a variety of fields has allowed us to understand human moral sensibility as a sophisticated integration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms shaped through evolution, development, and culture. Evolutionary biologists have shown that moral cognition evolved to aid cooperation; developmental psychologists have demonstrated that the elements that underpin morality are in place much earlier than we thought; and social neuroscientists have begun to map brain circuits implicated in moral decision making. This volume offers an overview of current research on the moral brain, examining the topic from disciplinary perspectives that range from anthropology and neurophilosophy to justice and law. The contributors address the evolution of morality, considering precursors of human morality in other species as well as uniquely human adaptations. They examine motivations for morality, exploring the roles of passion, extreme sacrifice, and cooperation. They go on to consider the development of morality, from infancy to adolescence; findings on neurobiological mechanisms of moral cognition; psychopathic immorality; and the implications for justice and law of a more biological understanding of morality. These new findings may challenge our intuitions about society and justice, but they may also lead to more a humane and flexible legal system. ContributorsScott Atran, Abigail A. Baird, Nicolas Baumard, Sarah Brosnan, Jason M. Cowell, Molly J. Crockett, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Andrew W. Delton, Mark R. Dadds, Jean Decety, Jeremy Ginges, Andrea L. Glenn, Joshua D. Greene, J. Kiley Hamlin, David J. Hawes, Jillian Jordan, Max M. Krasnow, Ayelet Lahat, Jorge Moll, Caroline Moul, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Alexander Peysakhovich, Laurent Prétôt, Jesse Prinz, David G. Rand, Rheanna J. Remmel, Emma Roellke, Regina A. Rini, Joshua Rottman, Mark Sheskin, Thalia Wheatley, Liane Young, Roland Zahn

The Myth of the Moral Brain: The Limits of Moral Enhancement

Book

Feb 2016

Harris Wiseman

An argument that moral functioning is immeasurably complex, mediated by biology but not determined by it. Throughout history, humanity has been seen as being in need of improvement, most pressingly in need of moral improvement. Today, in what has been called the beginnings of “the golden age of neuroscience,” laboratory findings claim to offer insights into how the brain “does” morality, even suggesting that it is possible to make people more moral by manipulating their biology. Can “moral bioenhancement”—using technological or pharmaceutical means to boost the morally desirable and remove the morally problematic—bring about a morally improved humanity? In The Myth of the Moral Brain, Harris Wiseman argues that moral functioning is immeasurably complex, mediated by biology but not determined by it. Morality cannot be engineered; there is no such thing as a “moral brain.” Wiseman takes a distinctively interdisciplinary approach, drawing on insights from philosophy, biology, theology, and clinical psychology. He considers philosophical rationales for moral enhancement, and the practical realities they come up against; recent empirical work, including studies of the cognitive and behavioral effects of oxytocin, serotonin, and dopamine; and traditional moral education, in particular the influence of religious thought, belief, and practice. Arguing that morality involves many interacting elements, Wiseman proposes an integrated bio-psycho-social approach to the consideration of moral enhancement. Such an approach would show that, by virtue of their sheer numbers, social and environmental factors are more important in shaping moral functioning than the neurobiological factors with which they are interwoven.

Regulating Identity: Medical Regulation as Social Control

Article

Jan 2014

Matt Lamkin

Costly punishment in the ultimatum game evokes moral concern, in particular when framed as payoff reduction

Article

Sep 2016

The ultimatum game is a common economic experiment in which some participants reject another's unfair offer of how to split some money, even though it leaves them both worse off. This costly behavior can be seen as enforcement of a fairness norm and has been labeled “altruistic punishment”, suggesting that it is a moral thing to do. But is this behavior viewed as moral by participants? Is it viewed as punishment? And are the payoff consequences of the behavior sufficient to determine the answers to these questions? To investigate this we framed costly punishment in two different ways: either as rejection of an offer (the standard ultimatum game framing) or as reduction of payoff. In a series of paid and hypothetical experiments we found that moral concerns about costly punishment depended on the framing. Specifically, the reduction frame elicited more moral concern about, and less use of, costly punishment than did the rejection frame. Several implications are discussed.

Defining Contexts of Neurocognitive (Performance) Enhancements: Ethical and Policy Implications in International Perspectives

Chapter

Jul 2016

Moral Formation and Moral Enhancement

Article

Apr 2016

William Paul Kabasenche

Is Moral Enhancement a Right, or a Threat to Rights?

Abstract

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