Between Autonomy and Dependency: the Place of Agency in Brazilian Foreign Policy

Abstract

The article examines the construction of the concept of autonomy in Latin America and discusses to what extent it can be applied to contemporary Brazilian foreign policy. The article first examines classical definitions of the concept, and then looks at the ways in which it has been used to analyze Brazilian foreign policy for over half a century. We then reaffirm the importance of agency and how power relations vary from one thematic area to another. In doing so, the article advocates the concept's applicability for explaining certain behaviours, but rejects its use as a 'grand strategy'.

Full text

A JOURNAL OF THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
brazilianpoliticalsciencereview
ARTICLE
Between Autonomy and Dependency: the Place of Agency
in Brazilian Foreign Policy∗
Letícia Pinheiro†
†Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Maria Regina Soares de Lima†
†Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
The article examines the construction of the concept of auton-
omy in Latin America and discusses to what extent it can be ap-
plied to contemporary Brazilian foreign policy. The article irst
examines classical deinitions of the concept, and then looks at
the ways in which it has been used to analyze Brazilian foreign
policy for over half a century. We then reafirm the importance
of agency and how power relations vary from one thematic area
to another. In doing so, the article advocates the concept’s appli-
cability for explaining certain behaviours, but rejects its use as a
“grand strategy”.
Keywords: Brazilian Foreign Policy; Autonomy; Dependency;
Hélio Jaguaribe; Juan Carlos Puig.
(*)DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821201800030003
This publication is registered under a CC-BY Licence.
The authors wish to thank Eduardo Viola, Haroldo Ramanzini Jr., Monica Hirst and Carlos R. S. Milani
for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, as well as the anonymous referees for their in-
sightful comments and suggestions. Finally, the authors wish also to thank Livia Avelhan, Nicolle Berti
and Maria Priscilla Kreitlon who helped with the footnotes, bibliography and revisions. All mistakes
and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.
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In Latin American academia the concept of autonomy has been used in diverse
ways and become an important tool for political analysis in the region, partic-
ularly since the 1970s. As a result, there are internal and international dimensions — for
the designation of behaviour as autonomist and several foreign policy strategies have been
adopted for attaining such a condition.
Within this large and diverse literature, there have been numerous relections on
different experiences within the region that embody examples of autonomist foreign policy
(COLACRAI, 2009; HURRELL, 2013; LIGIERO, 2011; MEZA, 2013; PAUTASSO and ADAM,
2014; PINHEIRO, 2004; SANTANA and BUSTAMANTE, 2013; SARAIVA, 2010; SPEKTOR,
2014. On the other hand, others question the usefulness of this concept for thinking about
foreign policy in the region in a post-Cold War world (SARAIVA, 2014a) that is so different
from the one in which the concept emerged.
This article does not offer a comprehensive review of all these deinitions and
characteristics. Rather, our objectives are to critically assess the construction of the con-
cept in the Latin American context, and in Brazil in particular and to question whether it
is still possible to use the concept with regard to Brazilian foreign policy, in light of how it
was originally formulated. Whilst we recognise the value of the many attempts that have
been made at redeining the concept, we do not agree that its meaning should be constantly
adapted in line with whatever is the predominant action framework of a given historicmo-
ment (SANTANA and BUSTAMANTE, 2013). The assumption that “autonomy is a political
concept, an instrument safeguarding against the most harmful effects of the international
system” (VIGEVANI and CEPALUNI, 2011, p. 28), with its strong normative bias, can re-
sult in conceptual stretch that would include under the banner of autonomy-seeking any
oficial or unoficial activity of this kind. It is one thing to admit that “expressions of what
autonomy actually is (...) vary according to interests and power positions” (FONSECA JR,
1998, p. 361), another is to claim that each of these expressions is equivalent, in the i-
nal analysis, to the concept itself. In our view, this à la carte interpretation of the concept
sacriices all the rigour embodied in its original construction.
As Lorenzini and Doval (2013) have already noted, it is necessary to
...contextualise interpretations of autonomy so as not to denaturalise the mean-
ings and connotations that, originally, the authors assigned to them. If we ide-
ologise concepts, they lose much of their validity and explanatory value. In other
words, the theory [sic] of autonomy should not be turned into an ideology through
which one tries to justify courses of action that have nothing to do with the orig-
inal meaning that the authors gave to the term (LORENZINI and DOVAL, 2013,
p. 16)1.
As such, however appropriate academic engagement with politically relevant de-
bates may be, it is essential that such engagement does not compromise the analytical
1All references in Spanish were translated by the authors.
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rigour of its interpretations of reality (VIGEVANI and CEPALUNI, 2011, p. 34).
Furthermore, while we concede that there are national particularities in the for-
mulation of the concept (SARAIVA, 2014b), we do not share the belief that these national
particularities can be part of the explanation for why, to take the example of Brazil, foreign
policy exhibits an almost perennial aspiration for autonomy (SPEKTOR, 2014) by whatever
strategy, without ever distorting the original meaning of the concept.
In methodological terms, our relections are based on principles drawn from two
strands of intellectual history (although these are not fully embedded in the ield): the lin-
guistic contextualism of Quentin Skinner (1988), and Reinhart Koselleck’s (1992) history
of concepts. Without going so far as to propose “that it is only possible to understand the
meaning of any given text, or even of an utterance or idea by ’recovering’ the intentions of
the author in the act of writing and by ‘rebuilding’ the context of the linguistic conventions
available at a given historical time” (JASMIN, 2005, pp. 31-32), we argue of the need for
greater analytical rigour in interpreting the guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy. Thus,
just like Skinner (1988), we reject the thesis of timeless ideas; but, like Koselleck (1992),
we also reject the assumption of their immutability. In any event, without going into the
debate about whether or not it is possible to talk about a theory of autonomy2, it cannot
be denied that in order to formulate the concept of autonomy, its founding fathers, Juan
Carlos Puig (1980) and Helio Jaguaribe (1979), had to develop some very speciic postu-
lates. Therefore, in line with Koselleck’s (1992) proposition, we argue that to apply the
label of ’autonomist’ to certain guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy without adherence to
the postulates that originally constituted this concept, actually means the development of
a new concept that is distinct from the original and which is articulated to other contents,
even if the word used — autonomy — may be the same. In this sense, our objectives are
similar to those of Ruiz and Simonoff (2017), who sought to “explore what is the explana-
tory power of these two authors’ [Puig and Jaguaribe] proposals in a world that is surely
different from the one at the time of their formulation” (RUIZ and SIMONOFF, 2017, p. 71).
Moreover our main goal is to draw attention to the misconceptions incurred by recent at-
tempts to use the concept of autonomy in describing Brazilian foreign policy guidelines,
without adequate attention to the concept’s key postulates.
That said, this article is organised in three parts, in addition to this introduction.
Firstly, we examine classical deinitions of the concept of autonomy in the Latin America
context. Secondly, we analyse how this concept has been used to describe Brazilian foreign
policy guidelines for over half a century, often lacking the rigour with which the construc-
tion of the concept itself beneited. Thirdly, we reafirm the centrality of agency in the
classical formulation of the concept of autonomy, and how power relations vary from one
thematic area to another. Rather than another attempt to redeine the concept, we pro-
pose the thesis of the contextualization of power, adding the heuristic potential of agency
2See Ruiz and Simonoff (2017).
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to explain social and political relations. This contributes to a more precise use of the clas-
sical concept of autonomy to explain certain behaviours, but stresses its inadequacy as
generator of a “grand strategy”, at least in the case of contemporary Brazil (RUSSELL and
TOKATLIAN, 2015). Finally, we summarise the core points of this argument and under-
score its main elements.
Origins of and challenges to the concept of “autonomy”
The irst and most robust deinitions of the concept of autonomy in Latin America
were elaborated by two renowned intellectuals, Helio Jaguaribe (1979) and Juan Carlos
Puig (1980). Although they never collaborated, they have so many points in common that,
according to Ruiz and Simonoff (2017), “it is possible to list them as part of a similar re-
search project, in the Lakatian sense of the term”( RUIZ and SIMONOFF, 2017, p. 82) .
We start from the same basis as these founding fathers, in order to discuss the
concept’s adequacy for analysing the recent trajectory of Brazilian foreign policy. In other
words, this starting point provides us with the tools to engage with claims about the au-
tonomist character of Brazilian foreign policy during certain periods of the country’s his-
tory.
Both authors start with the assertion that the international order is hierarchical,
and not anarchic as posited by realist theses (JAGUARIBE, 1979; PUIG, 1980). In this sense
they identify the distinctiveness of those who speak from the periphery, and therefore ex-
perience the condition of dependency and the effects that characterise it.
For Jaguaribe et al. (1969), “autonomy (...) means, at the national and regional
level, both the availability of conditions that allow free decision-making by individuals and
agencies representative of the system, and the deliberate resolution to exercise those con-
ditions” (JAGUARIBE et al., 1969, p. 66). Similarly, for Puig (1980), autonomy represents
“the maximum capacity of choice that one can have, taking into account objective real-
world constraints” (PUIG, 1980, p. 149).
There are components of structure and agency in both deinitions, making the con-
cept more robust and operational, as we shall discuss below.
With regard to structural components, these are divided into internal and external.
In the irst case, it is about what Jaguaribe (1979) calls “national viability”, i.e. the domes-
tic conditions that allow — but do not guarantee — autonomist behaviour (JAGUARIBE,
1979). These are: the possession of adequate human and natural resources, the country’s
capacity for international integration, and its degree of sociocultural cohesion. In a sim-
ilar vein, Puig (1980) considers the existence of suficient material beneits to develop a
national project and to put it into practice, and the explicit commitment of the elites to the
same project as the key criteria (VIGEVANI and CEPALUNI, 2011, p. 31). Another key ele-
ment Puig (1980) identiies for the possibility of an autonomist project was the existence of
a model of internal development and strategic solidarity with other countries that aspired
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to the same goal (PUIG, 1980, p. 155). Note that even among the structural determinants
there is reference tochoice, i.e. to agency. As we shall see, this is also the case for Jaguaribe
(1982).
With respect to “international permissibility” — an external, structural compo-
nent according to Jaguaribe (1982) — , this is characterised by the existence of “conditions
to neutralise the risk from third countries endowed with suficient capacity to exert effec-
tive forms of coercion” (JAGUARIBE, 1982, p. 22). Interestingly, this deinition, which for
Jaguaribe (1982) is structural, involves not only economic and military capabilities, but
also the adoption of a strategy for action, i.e. the “establishment of alliances” (JAGUARIBE,
1982, p. 22) — and so, in our view, is closer to the “agential” criteria, to which we now
turn.
Regarding these agential requirements, for Jaguaribe (1982) they may be one of
two types: either to enjoy internal technical-entrepreneurial autonomy, or “a universal
intra-imperial relationship” (JAGUARIBE, 1982, p. 23). While the irst requirement, of
technical-entrepreneurial autonomy, would involve very high costs for the peripheral coun-
tries in a world of growing internationalisation of capitalism and economic interdepen-
dence, the second, says Jaguaribe (1982), carries within it the failure of any autonomist-
leaning project.
Jaguaribe (1982) and Puig (1980) also refer explicitly to the strategies for achiev-
ing autonomous behaviour, and it is here that agential factors comes into play more clearly.
This concerns making alliances with other countries (JAGUARIBE, 1982) and, more specii-
cally, regional alliances against the centre, in addition to political and economic integration
(PUIG, 1980). As Bernal Meza (2013) aptly summarises it, “autonomy was a quality that
was built from internal decisions, even when it was systemic conditions that made it pos-
sible” (MEZA, 2013, p. 212).
Further developing this point, Puig (1984) goes on to identify degrees of auton-
omy, from a heterodox position up to potential radicalisation, when it assumes a seces-
sionist character. The irst corresponds to
... the stage in which domestic groups who hold state power, forming part of a
bloc, still accept the dominant power’s strategic guidance, but openly disagree
with it on three major issues: to) the domestic development project, which may
or may not coincide with that envisaged by the superpower; (b) international
links that are not globally strategic; (c) the dissociation between the national in-
terests of the dominant power and the strategic interest of the bloc (PUIG, 1984,
p. 78).
Here the national group in power does not accept dogmatic impositions on be-
half of this same bloc, since there are political and strategic considerations corresponding
only to the hegemonic power’s own interests (MEZA, 2013, p. 215). Radicalisation of this
kind of behaviour leads to a secessionist stance, i.e. that in which the state challenges the
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hegemonic power and chooses to withdraw from the bloc led by it.
We must stress that the continuum that Puig (1984) worked with consisted of
quarters: paracolonial dependency, national dependency, heterodox autonomy and seces-
sionist autonomy. It is clear, then, that the author has always worked with the opposites of
“dependency” and “autonomy”. In other words, although he recognises degrees of auton-
omy, even at its lowest level it is already deined by opposition — and not by proximity — to
dependency. It means that autonomy (regardless of its degree) is alwaysa counterpoint to
dependency. This seminal contribution from Puig (1984) should not be minimised.
Jaguaribe’s (1979, 1982) and Puig’s (1980, 1984) contributions were developed
during the Cold War context of bipolar competition, and within the framework of a centre-
periphery dichotomy marked by strong strategic dependency. However, there is an impor-
tant dimension in these authors’ analyses that has been omitted in subsequent updates
and reformulations of the concept in the post-Cold War context: their understanding of
the international order as hierarchical3. As we have seen above, this premise refers to the
core-periphery coniguration, and the understanding of the peripheral condition being a
deining feature of these countries’ situation. Thus, autonomy cannot be interpreted as
sovereignty — a condition that, following Kenneth Waltz (1979), would predominate in
an anarchic order in which no power is above the others. In this sense, deining auton-
omy as a country’s ability to make decisions based on its interest and needs simply echoes
Waltz’s deinition of sovereignty, and as such it would probably be the dominant strategy
of all the states in an anarchic order. But the search for autonomy, according to Puig’s
(1980, 1984) and Jaguaribe’s (1979, 1982) conception, implies overcoming the condition
of dependency, not necessarily attaining self-suficiency or autarchy as it has often been in-
terpreted in the current literature on “the pursuit of autonomy”. It is in this sense that Puig
(1984) clearly deines heterodox autonomy as the search for the state’s very own model of
development, which may or may not coincide with that preferred by the great powers, as
we have seen above.
Moreover, for some analysts, emphasising the dimension of sovereignty rather
than dependence in reformulations of the concept of autonomy for the contemporary world,
makes the quest for autonomy compatible with active participation in international life. In
the new order, states try to implement their decisions in an autonomous manner through
active participation in global institutions, but this strategy does not necessarily represent
an attempt to overcome dependence, as in the original vision of Jaguaribe (1979) and
Puig (1980). This reformulation of the original concept was called “relational autonomy”,
3This dimension is, however, included in Ruiz and Simonoff’s (2017) interpretation as, quite rightly, they
underscore the high degree of abstraction of Puig’s and Jaguaribe’s proposals. This means that ”that they
can explain the international system at any point in time. For example, Puig’s international regime, based
on a hierarchy in which there are donors and recipients, is a model abstract enough to be applied to the Cold
War, the European balance of power system of the 20th century, or the post-Cold War world. Propositions
that are suficiently abstract, like theirs, do not need to be reformulated because their explanatory power
does not vary” (RUIZ and SIMONOFF, 2017, p. 71).
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as we will see below. Ultimately, understanding the autonomist strategy as a pursuit of
sovereignty means turning the concept into a parameter common to all states, or a premise
relating to the behaviour of states in an anarchic order — what Waltz (1979) called “a self-
help strategy”. As a result, the concept loses any analytical value, as it no longer differen-
tiates between the behaviour of different states. And it certainly loses its normative value
as a political objective differentiating the foreign policy strategies of countries situated at
the periphery of the global power system and capitalist order. Nothing could be further
from the original concept as envisaged by its two founding fathers.
The Argentine academics Russell and Tokatlian (2002) sought to renew the con-
cept in light of the signiicant change to the conditions of possibility for action brought
about by the intensiication of globalisation and the end of the Cold War, at the global scale;
and, regionally, by the redemocratisation of many countries and by successful integration
initiatives. They proposed a new approach to autonomy, naming it “relational autonomy”.
Deined as the “capacity and disposition [of the state] to make decisions based on its own
needs and goals without external interference or constraints, and to control processes or
events that occur beyond its borders” (RUSSELL and TOKATLIAN, 2002, p. 162). As high-
lighted above though, this deinition does not share the assumptions found in Jaguaribe’s
(1979) and Puig’s (1980) concepts.
Another important point to highlight in Russell and Tokatlian’s (2002) proposed
model relates to the question of degrees, incorporating the pole of dependency to the scale.
In their words, autonomy is
... a condition of the nation-state that enables it to articulate and achieve politi-
cal goals independently. In accordance with this meaning, autonomy is a prop-
erty that the nation-state may or may not have along a continuum whose ends
are two ideal situations: total dependence or complete autonomy (...). In both
cases, autonomy is always a matter of degree that depends fundamentally on
the capabilities, hard and soft, of states and the external circumstances that they
face (RUSSEL and TOKATLIAN, 2002, p. 162).
Intentionally or not, the authors offer to the analyst a tool likely to generate vari-
ous interpretations; a mechanism comparable to the metaphor of the glass half-illed with
water, which can be seen either as half full or as half empty. Applying this metaphor to our
theme, one could equally qualify the behaviour of a state found near the dependency pole
as “low autonomy or as high dependency”. Despite the signiicance of the adverb — low
or high — it is the nouns — autonomy or dependency — that determine the content of
the behaviour. As we will see later, this has been a strong tendency in the literature as a
result of the politicisation of the concept which, following what has been said above, varies
“according to interests and positions of power” (FONSECA JR, 1998, p. 361).
Having made these observations, we now turn to consider how the main contribu-
tions to the concept of autonomy have shaped analysis of the guidelines of Brazilian foreign
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policy from the 1940s to the present day. To put it differently, we aim to explore whether
and in what ways the claim that Brazil has adopted an autonomist foreign policy through-
out history is, in fact, true according to the original deinitions, or whether it is necessary
to abandon this deinition in favour of a more appropriate one.
Autonomy, autonomies in Brazilian foreign policy
Throughout history it has been common to portray Brazilian foreign policy as hav-
ing an autonomist leaning (FONSECA Jr., 1998; MOURA, 1980; PINHEIRO, 2004; SARAIVA,
2014a; SPEKTOR, 2014; VIGEVANI and CEPALUNI, 2011). The examples that we list below
clearly illustrate trends in the literature on this subject, showing how the concept has been
used in two distinct ways. The irst is contextualising, or “situational”, and the second is
“behavioural”. We will take them as our point of departure to assess to what extent they
adhere to the autonomist label, according to Jaguaribe’s (1979) and Puig’s (1980) original
meaning of the concept.
The irst case — which we call a “situational” characterisation — can be exem-
pliied by the “autonomy in dependency” thesis, a term coined by Gerson Moura (1980).
In the early days of the discipline of international relations in the country, Moura (1980)
wrote one of the irst papers challenging the structural interpretations then prevalent in
the ield, in which Brazilian foreign policy was regarded as innocuous or described only
as an epiphenomenon of systemic determinations. Going in the opposite direction, Moura
(1980) emphasised the role of Vargas’ successful foreign policy in the 1940s. At that time
it was possible to take advantage of the Brazilian Northeast’s strategic geographical loca-
tion, and the need for strategic materials for the war industry during the formation of the
US power system. This allowed Brazil to attract, among other things, US funding for the
construction of the Volta Redonda steel plant, a landmark in Brazilian industrialisation.
Therefore, according to this thesis, even under conditions of strong structural de-
pendence, such as those that prevailed at the time, there were possibilities of agency for
peripheral countries, by inding a “way to negotiate the realignment and take advantage
of it (...) allow[ing] us to characterise the action of the state as autonomy in dependence”
(MOURA, 1980, p. 189). In other words, it would be possible to adopt an autonomist-
leaning policy in order to circumvent the situation of dependency, thus reaping some ben-
eits. Moura’s (1980) add-on to the concept of autonomy — i.e. dependency — was not
proposing how it might be achieved in pure form, but pointing to a particular situation in
which, despite the adverse conditions, it could be reached. In this sense, Moura (1980)
took Jaguaribe’s (1979, 1982) proposition further, but without denying it. While the latter
saw “national viability and international permissibility as sine qua non” conditions for au-
tonomous behaviour, Moura (1980) placed more emphasis on the importance of agency
as the driving force of an autonomist policy in the context of less than ideal conditions, i.e.
even in a situation of dependency.
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At other times, as during the Cold War, foreign policy was an agent of change
for the country’s international integration. At this time it took advantage of a context
favourable to countries of the Geopolitical South, such as decolonisation in the 1960s, and
the discussions over possible new arrangements for the international order in the wake
of the formation of Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the oil crisis of
the 1970s. The “independent foreign policy” (1961-64) and the “responsible pragmatism”
(1974-79) were characterised by strong autonomist connotations, and both were fruits of
a combination between systemic opportunities and the action of agents intent on overturn-
ing the country’s subordination within the international order. Although foreign policy by
itself has not so far been able to change the situation of structural economic vulnerability,
it can improve the conditions of the country’s international integration, and even diversify
its relations of dependence.
It was to this end that the 1970s saw the move to a strategy that the Brazilian
diplomat Gelson Fonseca Jr. (1998) has called “autonomy through distance”, meaning “a
‘qualiied’ distance in the debates and negotiations of surrounding key questions during
the Cold War period” (FONSECA JR., 1998, p. 360).
It is worth noting that, at the time, the country had made signiicant strides in the
condition of “national viability”, a criterion that Jaguaribe (1979) and Puig (1980) had in-
dicated as necessary for the exercise of an autonomist foreign policy. During that period,
there were positive indicators of economic growth, as a result of the model of industrialisa-
tion by import substitution and the investments made in national capacity-building, which
expressed elites’ commitment to a national project, albeit one that lacked both income dis-
tribution and democracy.
We will not go into the strategies used by governments in each one of these two
periods — that of the “independent foreign policy” and that of “responsible pragmatism” —
but is quite clear how their guidelines corresponded to the crucial elements of Jaguaribe’s
(1979) and Puig’s (1980) models: systemic opportunities, national viability and, most im-
portantly, agency. In this sense, the “behavioural” component that Fonseca Jr. (1998) has
added to the concept of autonomy — “through distance” — does not contradict its original
meaning. In fact, we would underscore how this qualiication shows great similarity to the
idea of “heterodox autonomy” elaborated by Puig (1984)4.
As the concept of autonomy was no longer understood as situational or contextual
4For the sake of illustration, it is worth comparing Puig’s deinition to Fonseca Jr.’s (1998). According to the
former, the degree of autonomy that he labels “heterodox” corresponds, as we have already mentioned, “to
the stage in which domestic groups who hold state power, forming part of a bloc, still accept the dominant
power’s strategic guidance, but openly disagree with it on three major issues: a) the domestic development
project, which may or may not coincide with that envisaged by the superpower; b) the international links
that are not globally strategic; c) the dissociation between the national interests of the dominant power
and the strategic interests of the bloc” (MEZA, 2013, p. 215). For Fonseca Jr. (1998), “the irst expression
of ’autonomy’ [through distance] would be to keep a distance from the actions of the Western Bloc, espe-
cially when they entailed military engagement. We sought to maintain an alignment as regards fundamental
values, but we did not turn them into automatic strategic engagement [...]” (FONSECA JR., 1998, p. 362).
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but rather as behavioural, it began to lose its previous speciicity and, more importantly, to
move away from its creators’ original meaning. In fact, rather than being an end in itself,
as was the case in Puig’s (1980) and Jaguaribe’s (1979) formulations, autonomy came to
be used as a different means of reaching an end, which quite often was not made explicit.
If we look at different cases where analysts have described Brazilian foreign policy
as autonomist-leaning, we cannot help but question their adherence to the original concept
developed by Jaguaribe (1979, 1982) and Puig (1980, 1984). Let’s see.
“Autonomy through participation” — a term coined by Fonseca Jr. (1998) in the
same book in which he also presented the term “autonomy through distance” — refers
to the exercise of autonomy through a strategy that promotes adherence to international
regimes in order to inluence them, along the same lines as the “relational autonomy” thesis
put forward by Russell and Tokatlian (2002). In Fonseca Jr.’s (1998) own words “autonomy
translates into ’participation’, i.e. a desire to inluence the open agenda with values that
express diplomatic tradition and the ability to view the direction of the international order
through one’s own eyes, and from unique perspectives” (FONSECA JR., 1998, pp. 368-369).
This interpretation would be repeated by several other scholars. To cite just a few
examples, Vigevani and Cepaluni (2011) have also used it to describe foreign policy during
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration (1995-1998 and 1999-2002), describing it
as an orientation marked by “...adherence to international regimes, including liberal ones
(such as the WTO), without losing the capacity to manage foreign policy. In this case, the
goal would be to inluence the very formulation of the principles and rules governing the
international system. National goals are thought to be attained more effectively in this
way” (VIGEVANI and CEPALUNI, 2011, pp. 35-36).
Spektor (2014) changes the label slightly, and uses the category of “belonging” in-
stead of “participation” to explain the years from 1989 to 1999, arguing that during this
period “the political and diplomatic leadership did not abandon autonomism. It reinter-
preted it in light of new external and internal constraints” (SPEKTOR, 2014, p. 41).
The question we ask ourselves is whether the last two qualiiers added to the
concept — participation and belonging — would not in fact contradict it. Unlike Gerson
Moura’s (1980) contribution — “autonomy in dependency” — which gave greater density
and complexity to Jaguaribe’s (1979) and Puig’s (1980) original formulations by demon-
strating the possibility of an autonomist behaviour even in a situation of dependency; and
equally unlike the add-on suggested by Fonseca Jr. (1998) — “through distance” — which
has succeeded in staying true to the main elements of the autonomist thesis, how can one
claim now to seek autonomy “through participation” or “through belonging”, i.e. through
acquiescence? Does this not represent a position of “diminished autonomy”, or of “in-
creased dependency”?
This is not an easy question to answer and, depending on the perspective we take,
it is possible to arrive at different conclusions. Let us take a closer look.
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Spektor (2014) claims that during that period particular emphasis was placed on
obtaining “good behaviour credentials” (SPEKTOR, 2014, p. 41). This approach is clearly
illustrated by the country’s accession to the Missile Technology Control regime (1995), by
its signing of the Treaty for the Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Tests (1996), by acces-
sion to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1998), by the reduction
of trade barriers, the opening of the economy to private investment, etc. But perhaps Pres-
ident Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s own words most clearly demonstrate that Brazil had
indeed abdicated much of its autonomist behaviour in favour of integration to the main-
stream, and that this new behavioural attribute — through “participation” or through “be-
longing” — strictly speaking nulliies the autonomist premise:
The South is under a double threat — apparently unable to integrate seeking
its own interests, and unable to avoid “being integrated” as a servant of the rich
economies. (...) In the past it was possible to respond politically to the old rela-
tions of dependency by invoking “national autonomy”, demanding greater indus-
trial investment to redress the deterioration in the terms of trade, and expanding
the domestic market in order to break the chain of the “dependency enclave” and
stimulate internal income distribution. Now the political response dictates that
the South too should build a new kind of society (CARDOSO, 1996, p. 12).
We said before that the question was dificult to answer and that it might even
elicit different answers. The reason for this is that we must not overlook the investments
on regional policy made by Brazil during the same period. Through its rapprochement
with Argentina — in resistance to hemispheric integration, and the investments made in
the Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur — MERCOSUR) process of sub-
regional integration — the country also tried to establish regional alliances against the
centre, i.e. it looked for political and economic integration as an autonomy-seeking strategy
(PUIG, 1980, 1984).
Overall, should we conclude then that these new systemic conditions justify the
adaptation of the country’s behaviour, and therefore that the add-ons to the concept of
autonomy do not contradict it? We do not think this is possible or plausible. If we did
this, we would be ignoring the fact that these adaptations and complements go against the
original dichotomy that marks the construction of the concept of autonomy as elaborated
by Jaguaribe (1979) and Puig (1980), i.e. the ability to distinguish what is or is not au-
tonomist behaviour based on its opposite: dependence. The argument by formulators of
foreign policy according to which “adaptations were essential to maintain, not to abandon,
the autonomy project” (SPEKTOR, 2014, p. 42) would, in fact, be perfectly congruent with
the diplomatic strategy of granting continuity status to the policy through a narrative that
always pursues autonomy on the basis of legitimacy, regardless of any epistemological in-
consistency5.
5Although it does not raise the issue of autonomy, it is worth noting that Araú jo Castro, a diplomat and former
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1963-64), considered to be one of the main ideologues of Brazilian foreign policy,
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bpsrBetween Autonomy and Dependency: the
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The risk of ending up with interpretations that confuse the analytical argument
with the political argument regarding what would constitute an autonomist-leaning pol-
icy is further complicated by a very speciic characteristic of the Brazilian context, i.e. the
intimate connection between diplomatic thought and the academic literature on the ield
of foreign policy. In these circumstances, the analysis and formulation of the foreign policy
get mixed up with one another, with deleterious consequences for the analytical content
produced in the ield of Brazilian foreign policy studies6. To quote Lorenzini and Doval’s
warning (2013, p. 16), the justiication of courses of action through the transformation
of what they call “the theory of autonomy” into an ideology, even if it is effective in polit-
ical and diplomatic terms, certainly does not contribute to advance its heuristic potential
— actually, quite the opposite7. One example of this situation that, in our view, leads to a
weakening of the explanatory potential of the autonomy concept is the belief that, despite
“the differences in actions, preferences and beliefs, and having sought very different spe-
ciic results with regard to foreign policy”, both Cardoso government and Lula da Silva gov-
ernments sought “not to distance themselves from the usual quest: to develop the country
economically, while at the same time preserving relative political autonomy” (VIGEVANI
and CEPALUNI, 2007, p. 275).
The above discussion has sought to demonstrate that the use of the concept of
autonomy no longer as an end in itself but as a means has stretched it to such an extent
that behaviour like adaptation to changes in the international scene, of bandwagoning with
the dominant power, and of acquiescence to the global normative status quo end up being
perceived as autonomous because some authors do not determine clearly what the end of
foreign policy is. As we have noted earlier, this end may be framed as typical of the self-
help strategies of countries with limited power resources, situated in the semi-periphery
of the international capitalist system, in an anarchic international context.
In their analysis of the strategy of “autonomy through participation”, Belém Lopes
has proposed a distinction between “foreign policy” and “international politics” which helps us understand
this diplomatic narrative. For him, while “foreign policy” meant the diplomatic acquis with its principles,
i.e. the so called “permanent element”, “international politics” was “a Brazilian norm of conduct within
the community of nations, set in face of the problems of the contemporary world, i.e. the mutable element”
(CASTRO, 1982, p. 198). Thus, the pursuit of autonomy was “foreign policy”, whereas the strategies to reach
it were “international policy”. In the words of Araú jo Castro (1982), “Brazil’s international policy has as its
primary objective the neutralisation of all the external factors that might contribute to limit its national
power” (CASTRO, 1982, p. 212).
6For a discussion of the formation of this ield, see Fonseca Jr. (2011) and Pinheiro and Vedoveli, (2012).
7It should be stressed that the interpretations of some past decisions in the context of Brazil’s very strong
acquiescence to the hegemonic power as indications of an integrationist strategy, and of the latter as a irst
step towards an autonomist-leaning policy, have been equally problematic. This seems to be the case of
Saraiva’s interpretation (2014a) of the inauguration of the Friendship Bridge between Brazil and Paraguay
in 1965: “one of the most important historical moves in Brazil’s integration with its neighbours. (...) By
deinitively attaching Paraguay to Brazil, it set the stage for the Itaipu project and for the corporate and eco-
nomic integration that links both countries and their economies today (...). These examples prove the quick
steps that Brazil has taken, in logistic terms, around the dynamic concept of decision-making autonomy”
(SARAIVA, 2014a).
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bpsrLetcia Pinheiro &
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and Vellozo Jr. (2004, p. 339, apud LOPES, 2013, p. 47) suggest, in line with our argu-
ment, that it would be more appropriate to call it “participation by compliance”, since it
was conceived as an adaptation to the process of economic globalisation that became more
pronounced in the post-Cold War era. It was, in fact, a reafirmation of Brazilian adher-
ence to Western values or, in the words of Chancellor Luis Lampreia, of “adherence to the
normativity of the Western canon”, as summarised by Lopes (2013, p. 41). Contrary to an
autonomist strategy — as this presupposes, an orientation towards revising the status quo
— the multilateral activism of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government might be framed
as a typical foreign policy of “prestige”, in line with the concept developed by Morgenthau
(1971, pp. 67-82). Translated to the present day, a policy of “prestige” aims to use strong
multilateral presence as an instrument of soft power to compensate for the hard power
not available to it, but without aspiring to challenge the current order in strong terms.
We shall continue to present the periods in which the general line of Brazilian
foreign policy has been described as autonomist to the present day, and discuss to what
extent how far these analyses adhere to the original concept.
In the 21st century, the “assertive and active” foreign policy of Lula’s government
— as former Minister of Foreign Relations, Celso Amorim (2015) himself dubbed it — was
another period in which the combination of both dimensions, i.e. systemic opportunities
and national viability, created conditions for an autonomous foreign policy. It was de-
scribed by Vigevani and Cepaluni (2011) as a time when foreign policy was marked by the
“diversiication” strategy in its quest for “autonomy”.
True to the concept’s original deinition, the autonomist label attributed to foreign
policy during the Lula years had a “behavioural” component added to it: “through diversi-
ication”. This addition is somewhat redundant, since it emphasises a strategy that, strictly
speaking, had already been envisaged by Jaguaribe’s and Puig’s formulation, namely, al-
liances with other Third World countries (JAGUARIBE, 1982) or, more speciically, regional
alliances against the centre and political and economic integration (PUIG, 1980, 1984).
However, there is an important aspect of Cepaluni and Vigevani’s analysis (2011) that, al-
though adapted to contemporary circumstances, its with the concept’s original meaning
— i.e. the realisation that the inclusion of alliances with non-regional partners also serves
to increase bargaining power with core countries, something that was epitomised during
the Lula period by the IBSA Forum, G-20, G4 and BRICS coalitions.
In the autonomist orientation attributed to the “assertive and active” foreign pol-
icy we also ind another trait that Jaguaribe (1979, 1982) and Puig (1980, 1984) had con-
sidered indispensable — the formation of a domestic coalition around a model of internal
development and a national project which, together, are part of the criterion of “national
viability”. In this particular case, the coalition formed around a model of state coordination
different from the liberal model that predominates in the contemporary order.
In the case of South America speciically — which saw the creation of the Initia-
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bpsrBetween Autonomy and Dependency: the
Place of Agency in Brazilian Foreign Policy
tive for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), launched at
the end of the Cardoso government and remaining one of the priorities of the PT (Partido
dos Trabalhadores) governments — the differences in interpretation of the PSDB (Par-
tido da Social Democracia Brasileira) and PT governments were striking8. In the 1990s,
both offensive and defensive economic motivations (for meeting the challenges of globali-
sation) put South America at the center of government foreign policy. Steps were taken to
strengthen MERCOSUR, and the IIRSA Initiative was conceived by the end of that decade.
The latter envisaged the future of South America as an integrated economic area, a market
that would expand through the reduction of trade barriers, as President Cardoso stated
at the time of its creation in 2000. However, South America was envisaged differently by
the Lula government, as became evident right from the start of his government. The new
framework for relations with the region revolutionised conventional Brazilian doctrine,
emphasising three key dimensions: a conception of integration that included political and
social aspects as well as commercial ones; the recognition of structural asymmetries and
a willingness to redress them; and the acknowledgement of a strong relationship between
Brazil’s prosperity and that of its neighbours. These priorities suggest a shift in the collec-
tive understandings that had prevailed up until that point, and relect institutional changes
introduced by the PT governments.
These characteristics, which were the hallmark of foreign policy under the Lula
government, coupled with the election of the PT candidate to the presidency in the 2011
presidential election, perhaps led us to the over-hasty assumption that in a context where
the two structural components needed for the exercise of autonomy were both present,
the autonomist orientation would continue without interruption (LIMA, 2015). First were
the elements constituting the context of strong “international permissibility”, namely: a
diffusion of power in the direction of emerging countries; major transformations in South
American politics; less overt US presence in the region due to the redeinition of the coun-
try’s international strategies after September 11; the rise of China; and the emergence of
progressive governments of various stripes in South America created very positive expec-
tations. Second was a context of growing “national viability”, along with the continuation
of the “neodevelopmentalist” domestic political coalition, which led many to believe that
the conditions were ripe for Brazil to achieve a less subordinate position in the interna-
tional system. Maybe this belief spurred voluntarism among the key actors and discour-
aged any measures to institutionalise the several innovations made during the period, such
as: the reconiguration of regional integration, development cooperation, and the estab-
lishment of accountability mechanisms for foreign policy. The latter would certainly have
strengthened elements of “national viability”, thus shielding the country from the period
of diminished “international permissibility” that followed.
8On the programmatic differences between the coalitions under the PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia
Brasileira) and PT governments, see Neri (2015).
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bpsrLetcia Pinheiro &
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What we have seen, however, is that Dilma Rousseff’s irst term triggered the
alarm with respect to the continuation of the previous ’assertive and active’ foreign pol-
icy. This was partly the result of the president’s lesser role vis-à-vis her predecessor, in
a context where face-to-face presidential diplomacy is increasingly necessary to maintain
the status quo, especially for a country like Brazil for whom soft power is one of the main
instruments of international projection and action. In addition, the weak institutionali-
sation of previous initiatives exacerbated the risk of deterioration in what had become a
more constrained domestic and international context.
By the end of 2014, the weakening of presidential diplomacy, a worrying economic
environment beset by budget cuts, turmoil within the diplomatic corps, open conlict be-
tween the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its young diplomats due to narrowed possibili-
ties for career progression, and waning Chinese demand for commodities already pointed
towards a different scenario to that that had prevailed during Lula’s two terms of gov-
ernment. The irst few months of Dilma Rousseff’s second term saw the deepening of the
dificulties she had faced in her irst due to the worsening economic situation, her political
weakness vis-à -vis the Congress, the uniication of opposition forces and of conservative
segments of society, in addition to growing resistance to planned budgetary adjustments
by unions and the general population9. Externally, constraints also increased as global de-
mand declined, commodity prices fell and the Chinese began to prioritise domestic growth
to the detriment of exports. Besides this, several of the instruments used in the foreign pol-
icy approach of Lula and Amorim, such as subsidised loans from the Brazilian Development
Bank (BNDES) to Brazilian investments abroad, and substantial budgetary resources ear-
marked for international cooperation, suffered a dramatic reduction against the backdrop
of recession and iscal adjustment that marked the beginning of Dilma Rousseff’s second
term.
As a result, might we be watching the collapse of the autonomist orientation of
Brazilian foreign policy pursued by the previous government, in light of deteriorating sup-
port in Congress and in society, and a less permissive international order? In other words,
given the weakening of “international permissibility”, the breakup of the domestic political
coalition (a central component of “national viability”), and the Rousseff administration’s
prioritization of domestic issues, can we identify a signiicant change in the design of for-
eign policy, interrupting the previous autonomist trajectory and shifting towards one of
acquiescence, perhaps of dependence?
To answer this question, we will once again make use of the original premises of
the concept of autonomy. In doing this we hope to preserve the concept’s robustness by
rejecting any easy concessions or political resigniications that distort its meaning. Instead,
we favour using it to understand independent actions that, despite perhaps having some
9In 2016, the political and economic crisis reached its peak when the impeachment process against the Pres-
ident went before the Senate on 12 May.
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bpsrBetween Autonomy and Dependency: the
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autonomist features, did not manage to establish a paradigm of international integration
that might be called a “grand strategy” in Russell and Tokatlian’s terms (2015).
Although it is fair to say that the structural conditions of “national viability” and
“international permissibility” were present on those occasions when the logic of autonomy
guided foreign policy choices, it is also true that they did not guarantee its permanence and
continuity. On other occasions, even when the international conditions were permissive,
foreign policy choices tended towards the pole of acquiescence and dependence. But we
have also seen that even under conditions of strong structural dependency there is enough
leeway for the adoption of an autonomist-leaning policy, in order to circumvent this same
situation of dependency (MOURA, 1980). From all this we may conclude that the central
element in this equation is agency: the nucleus of the concept of autonomy. Without agency
there cannot be politics that is critical of the normative structure of the international order.
To recognise the power of structural constraints, however, does not mean thinking
of them in a totalising manner. In other words, we suggest abandoning a generalising vision
that does not contextualise power or treat its resources as situation-dependent, in favour
of one that recognises the possibility of different types of international behaviour resulting
from the incentive structure in certain thematic areas, of speciic power resources in these
areas, and of domestic constraints. After all, as we have already said elsewhere,
... a resource that proves to be effective in one thematic area may be irrelevant
in another. Thus, capacities and vulnerabilities can vary from one thematic area
to another, changing the power relations between these areas. The assumption
that power should be measured with respect to speciic issues leads to question-
ing the notion of “one single general structure of international power not speciic
to any particular thematic area” (LIMA, 1990, p. 10).
When we recognise the existence of different structures of international power
which vary according to the thematic area10, and as part of this vision stress the centrality
of agency, it is possible to identify positions in the same period that both criticise and con-
test the normative structure in place. Even though they may not extend to the foreign policy
guidelines as a whole, some of these positions may indeed be categorised as autonomist,
without having to resort to imprecise gradations or inadequate qualiiers in order to label
(or to legitimise) the general orientation. Similarly, there is no need to throw out the baby
with the bathwater, by giving up altogether the original concept of autonomy. Having said
that, let’s get back to the Brazilian foreign policy during the Rousseff’s government.
Although it would not be accurate to attach the “autonomist” label to this govern-
ment’s general orientation in foreign policy, it would also be wrong to label it “acquiescent”.
It is not autonomy through “participation”, nor “through distance” nor “through diversi-
ication”. But as an action paradigm or general guideline, we were also far from joining
the mainstream, i.e. adopting a liberal orientation. So while we cannot say that there has
10For an insight into this analytical perspective, see Lima (1990).
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bpsrLetcia Pinheiro &
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been any deepening or even continuation of the previous general autonomist orientation,
neither do we observe a decline in Brazil’s international integration (CERVO and LESSA,
2014). Therefore, in assessing this period, we claim that — in line with the requirements
of “international permissibility” and “national viability” within the concept of autonomy,
and in keeping with a contemporary context in which the variation of capacities and vul-
nerabilities has been increasing from one thematic area to another — a variety of foreign
policy options has emerged, with the result of creating some inconsistencies. Due to an
escalation of the political and economic crises during the second term of Dilma Rousseff’s
government, domestic issues became more relevant within her government’s agenda. To
cite Celso Amorim, minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lula administration, foreign policy
continued to be “assertive” (altiva) but much less “active” (ativa) than during the latter’s
tenure.
Whichever way we interpret the foreign policy of Dilma Rousseff’s government,
the president’s impeachment has interrupted the cycle of PT governments, which has meant
dismantling what had been a foreign policy characterised by its autonomist bias during the
Lula/Amorim administration.
Conclusion
Our objective when we began this article was to relect on the possibilities of as-
cribing an autonomist behaviour to Brazilian foreign policy, according to how the term was
originally formulated. In attempting to answer this question, we have identiied some gaps,
advances and missteps in the use of the concept, as well as some other key observations
that we would like to reiterate here.
The irst point to highlight is that the belief in Brazil’s supposedly perpetual pur-
suit of autonomy — the “desire for autonomy”, as Fonseca Jr. (1998) has described it — has
led analysts to classify as autonomist some behaviours that are antithetical to the original
concept of autonomy.
Second, and related to this, is the fact that in Brazil the supposedly distinct activi-
ties of formulating and analyzing foreign policy overlap signiicantly. It is perhaps largely
due to this situation that the concept of autonomy has been stretched to the point whereby,
in practice, it has lost its analytical capacity in accounting for Brazilian foreign policy. In
other words, the resigniication of autonomy was largely the result of a diplomatic strategy
that sought to mobilise a narrative of foreign policy continuity. Therefore, the organising
principle of Brazilian foreign policy — autonomy — was turned into diplomatic acquis.
That is to say that instead of being a standard of conduct that varies according to internal
and external context, it is understood as a permanent stance and a political rallying cry
(real or imagined), rather than an analytical category used to examine speciic behaviours.
A third point has to do with the fact that emphasising autonomy as a permanent
characteristic and key parameter of foreign policy prevents us from identifying the mo-
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bpsrBetween Autonomy and Dependency: the
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ments of rupture and even reversals in foreign policy and external relations. We would
argue that the ’assertive and active’ foreign policy pursued during the PT governments
was one of these moments of rupture.
The traditional role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the formulation of Brazil-
ian foreign policy exerted a strong effect of inertia over it, at least until the 1980s and 90s.
Moreover the pragmatic-realist orientation that aimed to use foreign policy as a tool of the
dominant development model during the postwar period favoured its continuity during
this period. Its relative continuity was guided essentially by the ambitions of the Brazilian
diplomatic establishment to play a role at the multilateral level, particularly on trade and
development issues. This increased international proile was interpreted as a quest for
autonomy, when in fact it was a typical policy of prestige from a country situated on the
periphery of the world system, eager to be recognised by the great powers and to distin-
guish itself from neighbouring countries and others in a similar position within the global
order.
Perhaps one of the most signiicant differences between an autonomist-leaning
policy, in line with Jaguaribe’s (1979, 1982) and Puig (1980, 1984) original deinitions, and
a policy of prestige like the one pursued during the FHC government, is the understanding
each had of agency. Those who formulated a foreign policy based on prestige stressed an
absence of surplus power and the risks associated with participating in major decisions
due to a lack of hard power. In the autonomist view, by contrast, the country should not
behave as a “small country” but rather “harden” its soft power, according to the expression
used by the then chancellor Celso Amorim (2016, pp. 45-59), although this does not imply
becoming a nuclear power.
Due to this belief — that the country should take certain risks on the international
scene, given a favourable international and national context — policies with an autonomist
bias were moments of rupture and discontinuity in Brazilian foreign policy, every time
Brazil adopted a critical position with respect to the status quo.
Moreover, the discussion about autonomist foreign policy directly addresses the
structural, systemic interpretations that prevailed in the country in the 1950s, in which for-
eign policy either had no role or was merely viewed as an epiphenomenon built upon un-
derlying systemic determinations. Although foreign policy agency alone does not have the
capacity to alter conditions of structural economic vulnerability, it can modify the terms
of the country’s insertion in the international order and even diversify its relations of de-
pendence. Emphasizing the role of foreign policy together with a commitment towards a
more autonomous development, confer agency on foreign policy as capable of alleviating
the unfavorable conditions imposed by the country’s peripheral position. Foreign policy
implies agency and the possibility of making distinct choices, even in a situation of struc-
tural dependency. Autonomist approaches to foreign policy were the result of a combina-
tion of systemic opportunities and the actions of agents wishing to alter the terms of the
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bpsrLetcia Pinheiro &
Maria Regina Soares de Lima
country’s insertion within the international order.
With this in mind, we can identify four periods that were exemplary of this au-
tonomous logic: Vargas’s dual policy, the Jânio-Jango governments’ “independent foreign
policy”, the “responsible pragmatism” of the Geisel-Silveira partnership, and the Workers’
Party’s “assertive and active foreign policy” under the command of Lula da Silva and Celso
Amorim. Our discussion of the original meaning of the concept of autonomy leads us to
conclude that, contrary to the dominant interpretation of Brazilian foreign policy since the
postwar period, which tends to emphasise a more or less continuous autonomist orien-
tation, the prevalence of an autonomist logic in foreign policy was, instead, the exception
rather than the rule.
Revised by Matthew Richmond
Submitted on July 24, 2017
Accepted on May 11, 2018
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