Why States Fail: Internal Colonialism and the Challenges of State Making in the 21st Century

Abstract

The tentative argument made in this article is that “failed states” have failed to develop successful projects of internal colonialism. Yet, in the present era, human rights norms and world society governance models denounce states that pursue internal colonial projects. This paradox highlights the great challenge of state making in the present age.

Full text

The tentative argument made in this article is that “failed
states” have failed to develop successful projects of internal
colonialism. Yet, in the present era, human rights norms
and world society governance models denounce states that
pursue internal colonial projects. This paradox highlights the
great challenge of state making in the present age.
Internal colonialism can be defined in terms of a failed
state concept that conceives of the state along a strong-weak
state continuum, based on three core factors: the monopoly
of the legitimate use of force, effective institutions and
national consensus.1 In that order, they relate to coercive
power, administrative and infrastructural power, and cultural
hegemony. Succeeding with these three core aspects of state
making has historically been an internal colonial process –
that is, it involved (1) pacification and subduance of enemies
of the state; (2) dismantling of the existence of parallel
institutions; and (3) suppression of rival cultural frameworks.
The campaign of the Argentine state to establish dominance
over Patagonia, known as the Conquest of the Desert, is
an example of this internal colonial process, which had
catastrophic effects for the indigenous people who inhabited
the area. This was in line with the dominant understanding
of the Westphalian ideal of the state where authority is one,
bureaucracy is one and nation is one – and together they
make up the trinity of the modern state.
The fundamental contradiction between internal and
external sovereignty inherent in the modern Westphalian
system is evident.2 States gained external sovereignty
through recognition before they gained internal sovereignty
within their territories. Therefore, to establish internal
sovereignty, states needed to engage in internal colonialism –
that is, processes of organised violence, bureaucratic
expansion and cultural assimilation. States that fail these
WHY STATES FAIL – INTERNAL COLONIALISM
AND THE CHALLENGES OF STATE MAKING IN
THE 21ST CENTURY
BY JOHN H.S. ABERG
Above:The campaign of the Argentine state to establish
dominance over Patagonia, known as the Conquest of
the Desert, is an example of an internal colonial process,
which had catastrophic effects for the indigenous people.
PUBLIC DOMAIN
conflict trends I 51

A more restrictive definition of internal colonialism involves the rule of one ethnic group over other ethnic groups
combined with territorial separation of the subordinate groups, as in apartheid South Africa.
© LOUISE GUBB/CORBIS SABA/VIA GETTY IMAGES
processes thus fail in their projects of internal colonialism
and, hence, fail in their state making project as conceived by
the Westphalian ideal of the state.
Pablo Gonzalez Casanova defines internal colonialism
as “a structure of social relations based on domination
and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous, distinct
groups”.3 It is further conceived as “the result of an
encounter between two races, cultures, or civilizations,
whose genesis and evolution occurred without any mutual
contact up to one specific moment. The conquest or the
concession is a fact which makes possible intensive racial
and cultural discriminations.”4 In other words, internal
colonialism is domination of a population by another
population.5 Casanova applied the concept to understand the
situation of the indigenous population in post-independence
Mexico. Pierre van den Berghe offers another, more
restrictive definition of internal colonialism that involves the
rule of one ethnic group over other ethnic groups combined
with territorial separation of the subordinate groups, which
also have special legal status.6 Native American reservations
in the United States and apartheid South Africa exemplify
this conception.
While Casanova focuses on internal colonialism as a
process of domination, inequality and uneven development
resulting in marginalisation, Van den Berghe focuses on
rule over other spatially separated groups with distinct legal
status, or internal colonialism as separation. This article
argues that more than inequality resulting in marginalisation
or spatial separation, internal colonialism is a process of
extermination associated with the development of the
modern state. In this sense, modernity is indeed a colonial
project writ large, yet more so; modernisation is a process
of structural transformation that entails extermination, if
not physically, by necessity culturally. Hence, the aim of the
Chinese Cultural Revolution to eradicate the “four olds” – old
culture, old customs, old habits and old ideas – captures well
what internal colonialism entails. While genocide or mass
violence7 is the extreme form, ethnocide or acculturation
in the form of assimilation – forced and intentional, or as
a result of socialising effects – is what characterised the
development of the modern homogenous nation-state.
Se en fr om th is pe rs pe ctive , fai li ng wi th in terna l
colonialism is indeed a good thing. That is, it might highlight
the fact that the state making process was bloody and
oppressive, or that states will not succeed if they follow
a European model of state making, or that the primary
institution of territorial sovereignty of the Westphalian
system is inherently flawed and imbued with an anti-
nomadic bias,8 or that internal colonialism is fundamentally
at odds with human rights norms and world society
52 I conflict trends

FINE ART IMAGES/HERITAGE IMAGES/GETTY IMAGE
The aim of the Chinese Revolution to eradicate old culture,
customs, habits and ideas captures well what internal
colonialism entails.
governance models.9 At the same time, many developing
states face continued tensio ns and contradictions li nked
to the Westphalian understanding of state making and its
logical connection to internal colonialism.
State Failure and the Nation
From a neorealist perspective, one would explain state
failure as a matter of insufficient capabilities at the unit
level.10 From a world-system perspective, one would explain
state failure as part of core-periphery and dependency
relations at the system level.11 Both perspectives have merits,
yet they share the same flaw: they omit culture.
Among the five capabilities Kenneth Waltz includes in his
neorealist analytical model, culture is hidden in the undefined
capability he terms “political stability and competence”.12
Immanuel Wallerstein, on the other hand, includes culture
in his analytical framework as part of mini-systems, but
never as part of world-systems. Yet world-system scholars
have convincingly addressed this by elevating culture to
the macro level and including world-culture next to world-
economy and world-empire in the world-system trinity.13
In essence, materiality alone did not structure the emergence
of the modern (Westphalian) international order. Even if we
consider culture as epiphenomenal, the cultural make-up of
entities and the cultural system of the world should not be
left unexplored.
Philip Bobbitt argues that state making is the result of the
dynamic interplay between strategy and law – that is, military
and constitution.14 While Bobbitt develops a classification of
six historically specific state types that emerged from this
interplay, Liah Greenfeld, on the other hand, argues that
nationalism is the cultural framework of the modern world15 –
the new consciousness and vision of reality that has come
to shape state making up until this day, despite shifts in law
and strategy. This further resonates with the English School
perspective, which puts attention on the cultural dimension
of an international society structured by primary institutions
such as sovereignty, territoriality and nationalism.16
The work of Bobbitt and Greenfeld is impressive and
useful, yet they fail to acknowledge the racist superstructure
of the world-system that divided human beings into different
degrees of humanity.17 In contrast to Bobbitt, the dynamic
interplay between strategy and law did not apply to people
whom Europeans denoted as savages, since savages
stood outside the law.18 In contrast to Greenfeld, there was
one cultural framework at a higher level of abstraction
than nationalism that united British, French, Germans and
Spaniards alike: the world-cultural framework of white
supremacy. Hence, the formation of law and the emergence
of the nation generated a contradiction that had a direct
bearing on the relationship between external and internal
sovereignty. Externally, the nation-state exercised sovereign
rights, while internally, the dominant (white supremacist)
culture suppressed difference and subdued people that
deviated from the national standard. The historical process
of internal pacification, the growth of the infrastructural and
administrative capabilities of the state, and the development
of the homogenous nation were internal colonial processes.
Today, while human rights norms and universalistic
governance models denounce the internal colonial practices
of the modern state, the lack of monopoly of the legitimate
use of force and institutional weakness are very real
things in many African states, as is the lack of a unifying
national framework. Greenfeld would argue that in the
postcolonial age, nationalism is still the dominant cultural
framework of the world, and perhaps the prerequisite for
successful state making. If so, the answer to why states
fail, offered by Acemoglu and Robinson – who distinguish
between “inclusive” and “extractive” institutions19 – is then
EVEN IF WE CONSIDER CULTURE AS
EPIPHENOMENAL, THE CULTURAL
MAKE-UP OF ENTITIES AN D TH E
CULTURAL SYSTEM OF THE WORLD
SHOULD NOT BE LEFT UNEXPLORED
conflict trends I 53

dependent on a “national solution” that is, according to
Greenfeld’s terminology, a choice between individualistic/
civic, collectivistic/civic and collectivistic/ethnic types of
nationalism.
The individualistic/civic type of nationalism views
the nation as a composite entity made up of individuals
considered free and equal. This is the foundation of Western
liberal democracy and the Anglosphere – the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand
exemplify this type of nationalism. This type is, in principle,
the least prone to forced assimilation, yet a crucial question
is if it can escape the need for a dominant national language.
The collectivist/civic type of nationalism views the nation as
a collective individual with its own unique will and interests.
With this type, we do not escape assimilation, since the
nation, the collective individual, has its unique language,
characteristics and culture that one needs to “buy into”
to gain full membership in the nation. Here, France serves
as the archetype. Ultimately, the collectivistic/ethnic type
of nat ionalism is defined by blood. Whi le membership
in the individualistic/civic and collectivistic/civic types of
nationalism is in principle voluntary, membership in the
collectivistic/ethnic type of nationalism is connected to a
primordial or genetic link to the nation. The collectivistic/
ethnic type of nationalism is, in fact, a form of racism, which
makes it very hard – in principle, impossible – to join the
nation without blood ties. It is thus also the most intolerable
and aggressive type of nationalism. Historically, this type
of nationalism first developed in Russia, then in Germany,
before it spread to the rest of the world.20
The Contemporary Challenge of State Making
In the present postcolonial age, how do we
establish monopoly of the legitimate use of force while
creating inclusive institutions and a culturally diverse
nation that simultaneously allows cohesive national
development projects to be undertaken? How do we
avoid the conflicts and the human rights violations
that have come to plague the developing world? Of
course, posing these questions is much easier than
answering them. Notwithstanding the severity of other
problems – such as dependency relations and neocolonial
schemes that encumber various African countries –
a conscious deliberation about what type of nationalism that
should be nurtured could perhaps lead the way forward.
If multi-ethnic African states are run by myopic,
ethnically defined patron-client networks,21 the expansion of
the state bureaucracy and of national development projects
cannot escape being met with resistance when the ethnically
defined state ventures into land where it has no blood
ties. As a result, the monopoly of the use of force will be
seen as illegitimate and challenged. The construction of a
collectivist/civic type of nationalism will also meet resistance
from people who do not “buy into” the national project.
In the postcolonial age, nationalism is still the dominant cultural framework of the world, and perhaps the prerequisite
for successful state making.
ВО СВОБОДА
54 I conflict trends

Bolivia recently revised its constitution and redefined the country as a pluri-national state. Evo Morales, the president of
Bolivia, is pictured here.
UN PHOTO/MARK GARTEN
Yet, one could perhaps consent to a dominant language
(while giving some room for local secondary languages)
and accept that there are certain common national values
that all can agree with. If not, secession might be a solution,
albeit a highly controversial one. The collectivist/civic type
further requires institutional centralisation and a national
vision carried out by skilled, farsighted and honest politicians
who, above all, desire their nation to develop. Yet, with
the spread of globalisation and the emergence of a world
society, my supposition is that the individualistic/civic type of
nationalism will grow - so also in Africa. The only accepted
social differentiation, in principle, should then come as a
by-product of effort, the corollary of hard work for the sake
of individual security and prosperity. A significant challenge
is then to fight against the discrepancy between the real
and the ideal. One’s university diploma might get devalued
by nepotism, one’s social mobility might get blocked by
discrimination, and one’s entrepreneurial spirit dismayed by
corruption. Differentiations based not solely on merits but
on ascribed status attributes (including inherited wealth)
are particularly damaging to the individualistic/civic type of
nationalism.
The contemporary challenge of state making is well
illustrated by the cases of Bolivia and Ethiopia. In Latin
America, Bolivia recently revised its constitution and
redefined the state as a pluri-national state. It is widely seen
as a progressive exemplar of how to elevate indigenous
rights. However, these rights clash with the right of the
state to exploit natural resources to finance welfare reforms
designed to benefit the common good. This tension has
prompted protests among indigenous social movements that
oppose extractive development of the land.22
In Ethiopia (perceived to be dominated by the Tigrinya
ethnic group), there is an ongoing tension between forces
of centralisation, connected to the government’s national
development plan, and forces of decentralisation, nurtured
by Ethiopia’s federal constitutional structure and ethno-
national social movements desiring greater autonomy. This
tension is observable in local-level disputes as well as violent
protests, triggering the state of emergency that has plagued
Ethiopia in recent years as the government pushes through
its national development plans.23 The central government
is also clearing the ground for agribusiness and large-scale
land acquisition by foreign investors, which has resulted in
people being forcibly removed from the land and transferred
to new villages under Ethiopia’s “villagisation” programme.24
Bolivia and Ethiopia showcase the contemporary
challenge of state making, yet there are many more
examples, and the contradiction can be seen wherever state
practices contravene human rights norms and resistance
arises. How do we move beyond internal colonialism and
create more just, equitable and inclusive nations? This is
the great social challenge of state making in the 21st century
that developing states need to tackle.
conflict trends I 55

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Endnotes
1 Jackson, Richard (2013) Regime Security. In Collins, Alan (ed.) Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 161–75.
2 Ayoob, Mohammed (2002) Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern
Realism. International Studies Review, 4 (3), pp. 27–48.
3 Casanova, Pablo Gonzalez (1965) Internal Colonialism and National Development. Studies in
Comparative International Development, 1 (4), p. 33.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Van den Berghe, Pierre (1978) Education, Class and Ethnicity in Southern Peru: Revolutionary
Colonialism. In Altbach, Philip G. and Kelly, Gail P. (eds) Education and Colonialism: Comparative
Perspectives. New York: Longman.
7 Egbert, Stephen L., Pickett, Nathaniel R., Reiz, Nicole, Price, William, Thelen, Austen and Artman, Vincent
(2016) Territorial Cleansing: A Geopolitical Approach to Understanding Mass Violence. Territory, Politics,
Governance, 4 (3), pp. 297–318.
8 Ringmar, Erik (forthcoming) The Anti-nomadic Bias of Political Theory. In Levin, Jamie (ed.) Nomad-state
Relationships in International Relations: Before and After Borders. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
9 Meyer, John W., Boli, John, Thomas, George M. and Ramirez, Francisco O. (1997) World Society and the
Nation-state. American Journal of Sociology, 103 (1), pp. 144–81.
10 Waltz, Kenneth (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
11 Goldfrank, Walter L. (2000) Paradigm Regained? The Rules of Wallerstein’s World-System Method.
Journal of World-Systems Research, 6 (2), pp. 150–95.
12 Babones, Salvatore (2015) What is World-systems Analysis? Distinguishing Theory from Perspective.
Thesis Eleven, 127 (1), pp. 3–20.
13 Ibid.
14 Bobbitt, Philip (2002) The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History. New York: Anchor
Books.
15 Greenfeld, Liah (1993) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
16 Buzan, Barry (2004) From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure
of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
17 Trouillot, Michel-Rolph (1995) Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Boston, MA:
Beacon Press; and Mignolo, Walter (2000) Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern
Knowledges, and Border Thinking. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
18 Ringmar, Erik (2014) Recognition and the Origins of International Society. Global Discourse, 4 (4), pp.
446–58.
19 Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and
Poverty. London: Profile Books.
20 Greenfeld, Liah (1993) op. cit.
21 Berman, Bruce J. (1998) Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism.
African Affairs, 97 (388), pp. 305–41.
22 Lalander, Rickard (2017) Ethnic Rights and the Dilemma of Extractive Development in Plurinational
Bolivia. The International Journal of Human Rights, 21 (4), pp. 464–81.
23 Gebresenbet, Fana (2014) Securitisation of Development in Ethiopia: The Discourse and Politics of
Developmentalism. Review of African Political Economy, 41 (sup1), pp. S64–74; Abbink, Jan (2011)
Ethnic-based Federalism and Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Reassessing the Experiment after 20 Years. Journal of
Eastern African Studies, 5 (4), pp. 596–618; and Adugna, Fekadu (2011) Overlapping Nationalist Projects
and Contested Spaces: The Oromo–Somali Borderlands in Southern Ethiopia. Journal of Eastern African
Studies, 5 (4), pp. 773–87.
24 Human Rights Watch (2012) ‘“Waiting Here for Death”: Displacement and “Villagization” in Ethiopia’s
Gambella Region’, Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/01/16/waiting-here-death/forced-
displacement-and-villagization-ethiopias-gambella-region>; Becker, Derick A. and Wittmeyer, Hannah
(2013) Africa’s Land Rush and the Embedded Neoliberal State: Foreign Agricultural Investment in
Ethiopia and Mozambique. Comparative Sociology, 12 (6), pp. 753–84; and Lavers, Tom (2012) ‘Land
Grab’ as Development Strategy? The Political Economy of Agricultural Investment in Ethiopia. The
Journal of Peasant Studies, 39 (1), pp. 105–32.
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