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This article analyzes the relationship between the maximization of personal and company gains and the moderate traits of the Dark Triad. The relevance of choosing this topic lies in investigating the attitude of executives who exhibit characteristics of a moderate intensity between the strong and weak traits. It is proven that the vision and charisma of narcissistic individuals, the strategy and tactics of Machiavellian individuals, and the creativity and good strategic thinking of psychopathic individuals are differentiating characteristics that enhance successful and integrative leadership and that are far from the more accentuated and opportunistic attitudes related to the strong traits, whose practices involve dishonest actions for personal gain. This evidence creates the possibility for strengthening the research in the accounting area, especially on the behavioral approach, in order to promote its interface with psychology and clarify how personality, values, and experiences influence managers' choices when conducting business and how workers and companies are impacted by these decisions. The study is empirical-theoretical and involves 263 managers, adopting a survey as its data collection strategy and applying a self-reporting type questionnaire. The data analysis approaches included descriptive statistics, correlations, tests of means, and logistic regressions. In this study, managers with moderate psychopathic traits showed a lower tendency to maximize profit by manipulating results. An opposite tendency was revealed for those with moderate Machiavellian traits. The combined effect of the three Dark Triad traits was significant and positive, revealing opportunistic profit maximization. These findings contribute to future studies that aim to systematically analyze moderate levels of the triad and corroborate the findings that have revealed the common characteristics of manipulation, callousness, and dishonesty when investigating the interactive effect between the traits in question. Do I win, does the company win, or do we both win? Moderate traits of the Dark Triad and profit maximization 2 R. Cont. Fin.-USP, São Paulo
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ISSN 1808-057X
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 79, p. 123-138, jan./abr. 2019 123
DOI: 10.1590/1808-057x201806020
O A
Do I win, does the company win, or do we both win? Moderate
traits of the Dark Triad and prot maximization
Márcia Figueredo D’Souza1
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3196-5396
Email: marciafdsouza@yahoo.com.br
Gerlando Augusto Sampaio Franco de Lima2
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2414-2543
Email: gerlando@illinois.edu
Daniel N. Jones3
Email: dnjones3@utep.edu
Jessica R. Carré3
Email: jrcarre@miners.utep.edu
1 Universidade do Estado da Bahia, Departamento de Ciências Humanas e Tecnologia, Camaçari, BA, Brazil
2 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business, Department of Accountancy, Champaign, IL, United States of America
3 University of Texas at El Paso, Psychology Institute, El Paso, TX, United States of America
Received on 06.09.2017 – Desk acceptance on 07.11.2017 – 2nd version approved on 12.08.2017 – Ahead of print on 10.08.2018
Associate Editor: Fernanda Finotti Cordeiro Perobelli
ABSTRACT
is article analyzes the relationship between the maximization of personal and company gains and the moderate traits of the
Dark Triad. e relevance of choosing this topic lies in investigating the attitude of executives who exhibit characteristics of
a moderate intensity between the strong and weak traits. It is proven that the vision and charisma of narcissistic individuals,
the strategy and tactics of Machiavellian individuals, and the creativity and good strategic thinking of psychopathic
individuals are dierentiating characteristics that enhance successful and integrative leadership and that are far from the more
accentuated and opportunistic attitudes related to the strong traits, whose practices involve dishonest actions for personal
gain. is evidence creates the possibility for strengthening the research in the accounting area, especially on the behavioral
approach, in order to promote its interface with psychology and clarify how personality, values, and experiences inuence
managers’ choices when conducting business and how workers and companies are impacted by these decisions. e study
is empirical-theoretical and involves 263 managers, adopting a survey as its data collection strategy and applying a self-
reporting type questionnaire. e data analysis approaches included descriptive statistics, correlations, tests of means, and
logistic regressions. In this study, managers with moderate psychopathic traits showed a lower tendency to maximize prot
by manipulating results. An opposite tendency was revealed for those with moderate Machiavellian traits. e combined
eect of the three Dark Triad traits was signicant and positive, revealing opportunistic prot maximization. ese ndings
contribute to future studies that aim to systematically analyze moderate levels of the triad and corroborate the ndings that
have revealed the common characteristics of manipulation, callousness, and dishonesty when investigating the interactive
eect between the traits in question.
Keywords: Dark Triad, prot maximization, earnings management, accounting.
Correspondence address
Márcia Figueredo D’Souza
Universidade do Estado da Bahia, Departamento de Ciências Humanas e Tecnologia
Rodovia BA 512, Km 1,5 – CEP 42800-000
Santo Antônio – Camaçari – BA – Brazil
Do I win, does the company win, or do we both win? Moderate traits of the Dark Triad and profit maximization
124 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 79, p. 123-138, jan./abr. 2019
1. INTRODUCTION
Prot maximization is a standard act in the area of
business, but at times it reveals the opportunistic character
of executives in their greed and desire to serve their
own interests (Koch, 2010), especially when they are in
possession of privileged information about the economic
and nancial position of a company or have knowledge
of the weak points in a corporate governance structure
and internal controls (Troy, Smith, & Domino, 2011).
As it is an important tool for determining management
performance and a basis for calculating bonuses and
compensation, accounting information becomes the target
of manipulation for prot maximization purposes by
those who seek personal and corporate success (Crocker
& Slemrod, 2007; Holthausen, Larker, & Sloan, 1995;
Healy, 1985).
Quirin, Beckenkamp, and Kuhl (2008) and Miller and
Pazgal (2002) argue that prot maximization is intimately
related with subjective factors, such as the personality
of executives. e psychological theory of personality
supports the studies from Babiak, Neumann and Hare
(2010), Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), Jain and Bearden
(2011), Maccoby (2004), and Rosenthal and Pittinsky
(2006) in their analysis of the relationship between
the personality traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism,
and psychopathy and the behavior of executives in the
corporate environment, in light of the importance of
analyzing the impact of these traits on nancial reports
(Majors, 2015; Amernic & Craig, 2010; Johnson, Kuhn,
Apostolou, & Hassell, 2013; Olsen, Young, & Dworkis,
2013), especially for detecting tendencies to commit fraud
(Murphy, 2012; Cohen, Ding, Lesage, & Stolowy, 2010),
white collar crimes (Collins & Schmidt, 1993; Blickle,
Schlegel, Fassbender, & Klein, 2006), and to engage in
earnings management (Olsen & Stekelberg, 2016; Ham,
Lang, Seybert, & Wang, 2017; Brown, 2014; Frino, Lim,
Mollica, & Palumbo, 2015; Buchholz, Lopatta, & Maas,
2014; Jones, 2014; Rijsenbilt & Commandeur, 2013;
Shafer & Wang, 2011; Boddy, 2006; Deutschman, 2005;
McCormick & Burch, 2005).
Studies of narcissistic, Machiavellian, and psychopathic
traits have shown their importance in the accounting
and organizational environment, using the personality
psychology social approach, studied by Paulhus and
Williams (2002) and revisited by Jones and Paulhus
(2014). e authors called the triad the Dark Triad and
veried that although there is a conceptual distinction
there is convergence between the traits towards callousness
and a disagreeableness. Individuals who are rich in
these attributes also exhibit behavior with tendencies
for self-promotion, emotional coldness, duplicity, and
aggressiveness.
e tool for measuring the Dark Triad traits derived
from the studies from Jones and Paulhus (2014) and
Paulhus and Williams (2002), called the “Short Dark
Triad” (SD3), has an attitudinal connotation that refers
to the analysis of tendencies and predispositions towards
characteristics spread throughout the population in
general, and is based on a self-reporting questionnaire that
enables the intensity with which an individual matches
to be veried, without intending to make any clinical
diagnosis (Almeida, Laranjeira, & Dratcu, 1996).
Despite the negative connotation of these traits and
the fact that many studies have addressed this particular
issue, there is research that contradicts this line of thinking
and shows their positive side. Studies on the narcissistic
traits indicate that vision, charisma, innovation, the ability
to attract followers, conducting business to gain power
and glory, and an image that conveys the concept of a
great leader are elements that can make those involved
successful in the organizational environment (Campbell,
Homan, Campbell, & Marchisio, 2011; Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007; Maccoby, 2004; O’Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell,
& Chatman, 2013; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006), with a
tendency for eective leadership (Rosenthal & Pittinsky,
2006). Authority, self-suciency, and superiority are
positive for organizational performance (Dworkis, 2013),
as well as cognitive elements such as intelligence, creativity,
competence, and leadership skills (Farwell & Wohlwend-
Lloyd, 1998).
With regards to psychopathy, professionals from the
area of business present a positive association between
charisma, presentation style, creativity, good strategic
thinking, and communication skills (Babiak et al., 2010).
ey can be charming (Boddy, 2006; Wexler, 2008). Bold
dominance can positively inuence general performance
at work and communication (Smith & Lilienfeld, 2013),
enabling them to take dicult decisions using their
courage, rmness, and vision (Wexler, 2008).
When analyzed, Machiavellians display strategy
and management tactics (Jones & Paulhus, 2011), are
adaptable, able to contribute, cooperate, and use pro-
social strategies, not only when this is advantageous for
them (Belschak, Hartog, & Kalshoven, 2015).
us, the objective of this study is to analyze the
relationship between the maximization of personal and
corporate gains and the moderate Dark Triad traits. is
Márcia Figueredo D’Souza, Gerlando Augusto Sampaio Franco de Lima, Daniel N. Jones & Jessica R. Carré
125
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motivation nds support in Upper Echelons eory
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007), which states
that the characteristics of executives, such as personality,
values, and experience, are reected in organizational
results and therefore in the choices and decision of
managers. Studies that cover personality (Papadakis &
Barwise, 2002; Abatecola, Mandarelli, & Poggesi, 2013)
and the traits that compose the Dark Triad (Chatterjee
& Hambrick, 2007; Dworkis, 2013; Olsen & Stekelberg,
2016), in the corporate and accounting environment,
base their assumptions on Upper Echelons Theory,
which is derived from Behavioral eory of the Firm
and Descriptive eory.
We therefore seek to shed light of the following
problem: what is the relationship between the
maximization of personal and corporate gains and the
moderate personality traits of the Dark Triad? Analyses
of the attitude of executives that exhibit characteristics
of a moderate intensity between the strong and weak
traits contribute to the perception that the vision and
charisma of narcissistic individuals, the strategy and
tactics of Machiavellian individuals, and the creativity and
good strategic thinking of psychopathic individuals can
be dierentiating characteristics that enhance successful
and integrative leadership. ey can also reveal that the
eorts of these managers are geared towards achieving
personal and corporate gains, without them engaging
in accentuated negative attitudes and seeking only
personal gains to the detriment of corporate gains and
the combination of both, even if for this they harm their
peers, subordinates, and the long-term interests of the
company itself – as occurs when individuals exhibit strong
Dark Triad traits.
In addition, as Brown (2014) states, most of the studies
in the accounting area that analyze prot maximization via
opportunistic actions examine how the gains are generated,
how they can be detected, and what the consequences
are. ey have not considered that psychological factors
can inuence the attitudes of managers in the corporate
context.
is investigation also provides a practical contribution
for researchers, professionals, companies, and the
population in general. e results may be shown to be
useful for recruiting and selecting individuals to occupy
leadership positions in which they are responsible for
making nancial decisions, whose choices are reected
in signicant results for the organization. For example,
hiring managers that display a moderate level of these
traits may be benecial for company performance.
Section 2 presents the theory and development of the
research hypotheses in greater detail; section 3 describes
the methodological approach adopted; section 4 discusses
the results; and section 5 concludes this article.
2. THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES
2.1 Prot Maximization
Prot maximization, from a technical perspective,
consists of a set of conditions in which a rm’s marginal
revenue is equal its marginal cost. is traditional notion
lost expressiveness when the behavioral perspective of
prot maximization emerged, which argues that the search
for prot produces a type and quantity of products and
services that are sucient for consumption, at the lowest
possible cost, thus contributing to business and common
and personal wellbeing (Primeaux & Stieber, 1994).
Quirin, Beckenkamp, and Kuhl (2008) stress the
behavioral character of prot maximization and state
that factors such as personality, propensities for power,
and aective states inuence decision-making behavior,
although in an inconsistent way. Along this same line
of thinking, Miller and Pazgal (2002) veried that a
manager’s personality, education, and leadership style can
be used as strategic prot maximizing devices in certain
environments, with the aim of inuencing a competitive
position in companies.
ese ndings corroborate with Upper Echelons
Theory, proposed by Hambrick and Mason (1984)
and revisited by Hambrick (2007), by showing that the
characteristics of executives, such as personality, values,
and experience, are reected in organizational results and
therefore in the choices and decisions of managers. is
theory is derived from the studies that defend limited
rationality in decision making in organizations and
investigate the conict of interests regarding the individual
preferences of each participant (Cyert & March, 1963;
March & Simon, 1958).
Considering the search for prot as a normal act,
Koch (2010) argues that the overriding object of prot
maximization is the continuity of operational activities
and should not be restricted to fullling own interests
or corporate greed. For the author, it is warranted for
executives to see profit maximization as their main
Do I win, does the company win, or do we both win? Moderate traits of the Dark Triad and profit maximization
126 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 79, p. 123-138, jan./abr. 2019
objective when conducting their business, providing they
do break laws, norms, or social customs.
However, the search for prot does not always have
a normal and positive character in the organizational
environment. An opportunistic character is revealed when
managers are unable to achieve company goals or meet
the forecasts of analysts, investors, or other interested
parties. is situation drives them to maximize prots by
manipulating results in order to meet such expectations
and those of themselves, especially when remuneration
and bonuses are associated with the prots reported in
nancial statements (Healy, 1985).
In this context, it is worth being aware of subjective
factors, such as personality traits, which are potential
influencers of managers’ attitudes in the corporate
environment.
2.2 Dark Triad: Narcissism, Machiavellianism,
and Psychopathy
Paulhus and Williams (2002) investigated the non-
pathological personality traits of psychopathy, narcissism,
and Machiavellianism – known as the Dark Triad – and
found that they are moderately inter-correlated, have
overlapping characteristics, which are cognitively related,
but are presented as distinct constructs. ese authors
stated that the traits of the triad imply a “socially evil
character with tendencies for self-promoting, emotionally
cold, duplicitous, and aggressive behavior” (Paulhus &
Williams, 2002, p. 557).
For a better presentation of these personality types,
based on the literature review, Figure 1 illustrates the
respective individual, overlapping, and common attributes.
Figure 1 Main characteristics of the Dark Triad personality traits
Source: D’Souza (2016).
ese attributes are not static since they constitute
personality traits and can therefore alter depending on
the circumstances being analyzed. It is also noted that to
a greater or lesser degree some characteristics are more
related to two personality traits, but can also be present to a
lesser degree in relation to the other trait, such as egotism,
which establishes a greater relationship with narcissism
and psychopathy but is also discretely presented in the
personal power behavior of Machiavellians.
In addition, as Jones and Figueredo (2013) state,
the literature is full of debates about the antagonistic
overlapping of the characteristics, observing that despite
such characteristics being the same, the “objectives” or
focuses proposed in them are dierent. For examples,
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Machiavellianism is a trait dened by manipulative,
insensitive, and strategic tendencies. Psychopathy is also
a trait that is dened by manipulation and insensitive
tendencies, but the focus of the manipulation is short
term and of a more antisocial nature. Narcissism, in turn,
is also dened by manipulation and insensitivity, but the
focus is geared towards self-promotion, in light of the
self-inated sense of ego.
It is also worth noting the non-clinical nature of the
Dark Triad traits in this topic. On this point, Almeida
et al. (1996) indicate that social psychology highlights
characteristics normally spread throughout the population
that are displayed via more exible and adaptable attitudes
– measured by statistical tests. As for the clinical focus,
this conveys inexible and maladaptive personality traits,
causing signicant functional impairment or subjective
suering to oneself or, more commonly, to individuals
nearby (Mecler, 2015).
In this topic it is also worth discussing the dierence
between attitudes and behaviors. An attitude can be
dened as a propensity to react to some stimulus in
a positive or negative way (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
Attitudes have three basic components: cognitive, aective,
and behavioral. Cognitive covers beliefs and knowledge of
stimuli and their assessment; aective refers to emotions;
and behavioral is the tendency to behave in a certain way,
reacting to ones own emotions and cognitions. Although
attitudes can lead to an intention to behave in a certain
way, the intention may not come about, depending on the
situation or circumstances (Bowditch & Buono, 1992).
An attitude can precede and influence behavior
(Vaccari, 2014). As for behavior, this refers to the “specic
actions directed towards an object-target, always occurring
in a context or situational environment and at a particular
time” (Peter & Olson, 2009, p. 149). In organizational
contexts, it involves a selection of particular actions,
based on planning guided by objectives and goals (Simon,
1970). erefore, attitudes are “the force of intention of
an individual to carry out a specic behavior” (Fishbein
& Ajzen, 1975, p. 288).
In light of the concepts presented, it can be armed
that personality traits are components that explain
and inuence attitudes and behaviors, but not in their
entirety, given that other variables, such as abilities,
motivations, emotions, values, habits, and sociocultural
determinants also inuence human conduct. A behavior
is presented as a variable, momentary action that is not
necessarily a long-lasting and particular characteristic
of a person.
2.2.1. e Dark Triad traits in the organizational and
accounting context: the good and the bad side.
2.2.1.1 Narcissism.
Campbell et al. (2011) state that characteristics of
Narcissism are commonly identied in executives who
hold senior management positions. ese managers
are praised for their passion, vision, and innovation;
however, they are condemned for their lack of empathy
and sensitivity to criticism. ey have the ability to
manipulate others, they are impulsive, and assume risks
in their investment decisions, especially because of their
excessive condence. ey have a talent for establishing
quick and supercial relationships.
From this same descriptive viewpoint, Chatterjee
and Hambrick (2007) argue that narcissistic chief
executive ocers (CEOs) take bold strategic decisions,
which supposedly underline their talent as managers,
consequently contributing to the success of their
companies. However, Hobson and Resutek (2008) address
the negative side of this attribute, pointing to evidence
that in their aim to bolster their egos and self-esteem,
narcissistic individuals are capable of inating reports
of their performance when there are positive social
status implications. In this context, prot maximization
via earnings management creates an image of nancial
performance that feeds narcissistic individuals’ need for
admiration and praise and their sense of importance. In
the same conception as Hobson and Resuteck (2008),
Olsen et al. (2013) highlight the positive correlation
between narcissism and the unethical behaviors of
accounting report manipulation, especially due to the
fact that performance goals based on accounting numbers
help to dene CEO bonuses and compensation. Collins
and Schmidt (1993) and Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, and
Klein (2006) showed that so-called white collar crimes
are more oen committed by managers with a dark
personality. Strong narcissistic traits are more evident
in executives who have committed white collar crimes
(Blickle et al., 2006).
Buchholz, Lopatta, and Maas (2014) showed that
highly narcissistic CEOs are associated with earnings
management, whose forms are congured as passports to
bad managerial behavior. Frino et al. (2015) conrm that
the most narcissistic CEOs are more likely to be involved
in manipulating results, with the aim of presenting better
performance, thus indicating a higher probability of false
nancial reports.
Olsen and Stekelberg (2016) found narcissistic CEO
involvement in corporate tax evasion. As narcissists feel
Do I win, does the company win, or do we both win? Moderate traits of the Dark Triad and profit maximization
128 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 79, p. 123-138, jan./abr. 2019
they are above the law and are aggressive in pursuing
what they believe belongs to them, they are motivated
to pursue rewards or desirable results. Ham et al. (2017)
investigated the eect of narcissism in chief nancial
ocers (CFOs) over the results of nancial reports. ese
authors showed that CFOs with larger signatures present
more sings of incorrect declarations and more evidence
of earnings management.
When analyzing narcissism in unethical decision
making, Amernic and Craig (2010) argued that since
company directors can dene and inuence opportunistic
conducts, especially using the results of financial
accounting, these conducts become a personal test of
success or failure. In this conception, Olsen et al. (2013)
argue that the higher a company’s earnings, the more the
compliments and praise needed to bolster the inated
sense of ego presented by those individuals with a
tendency for narcissistic behaviors.
When investigating narcissism in CEOs and the
occurrence of frauds, Rijsenbilt and Commandeur (2013)
found a positive and statistically signicant relationship
between these variables. Highly narcissistic CEOs can
achieve greatness for their companies; however, if there
is no control, this can result in unethical behavior and
damage company interests. Johnson et al. (2013) showed
that the narcissistic behavior of managers and willingness
to commit fraud are signicant and positively related to
assessed risks of fraud.
2.2.1.2 Psychopathy.
When analyzing the behavior of successful corporate
psychopaths, Gudmundsson and Southey (2012) identied
attributes such as high levels of assertiveness and low
aability traits, such as simplicity, altruism, complacency,
and modesty. ese professionals seek excitement in
their activities, which is positively reected in their high
competence in organizations, order, eort, and self-
discipline.
On the other hand, when they hold senior executive
positions, corporate psychopaths look for gaps in the
law to avoid or reduce taxes. Whenever possible, they
manipulate share prices for their own benet, without
any concern for investors, pension funds, and employees.
Corporate psychopaths involve corporations in illegal
accounting practices, independent of the implications
that can arise in the long term. Without the inhibiting
eect of their conscience, corporate psychopaths are
capable of lying, persuading, and manipulating in order
to achieve their objectives: power, wealth, and status.
ey can be responsible for a considerable amount of bad
organizational behavior, including accounting fraud, stock
manipulation, unemployment, and environmental damage
resulting from a lack of social responsibility (Boddy, 2006).
Psychopaths are capable of falsifying nancial results in
order to obtain a promotion (McCormick & Burch, 2005),
bonus, and other benets, and even committing absolute
fraud (Clarke, 2005) against the company that employs
them. Individuals with a high level of psychopathy get
involved in bad nancial behavior, even in the presence
of clear and probable punishment, especially due to the
egotistical nature of such individuals and their need for
reputation and image in the nancial world. ose rich
in psychopathy have displayed more persistence when
playing, leading to greater nancial losses for the next
participant, without being concerned about the probable
punishment (Jones, 2014).
2.2.1.3 Machiavellianism.
By concentrating studies on Machiavellian traits, Jones
and Paulhus (2011) revealed strategy, tactics, and a rational
decision-making style, by considering all the costs and
benets for resolving problems. In contrast, Machiavellian
people are manipulative and strategic, with a pragmatic
ethical sense and propensity for using tactics with a view
to achieving their objectives, in order to obtain personal
gains (Jones & Paulhus, 2009).
When analyzing the relationship between
Machiavellianism and unethical behavior, Murphy
(2012) investigated rationalization as being one of the
three characteristics that compose the fraud triangle and
proved that this relationship presupposes the existence of
false declarations in nancial reports. Along these lines,
Byington and Johnson (2011) showed the tendency for
Machiavellian individuals to manipulate budgetary items.
e relationship between the Machiavellian traits and
the decision to manage earnings was found by Shafer and
Wang (2011). Within this same context, Vladu (2013)
showed that a Machiavellian predisposition performs a
central role in the decision to manage nancial results,
since individuals with a high score on the Machiavellian
scale have less rigid views about the ethics of these practices
in the short term, considering this type of management
to be ethically acceptable.
us, based on the conceptual aspects and on the
results of the studies presented, we elaborated the
following research hypotheses:
H1: There is a positive relationship between the
moderate traits of the Dark Triad and a lower
tendency to maximize personal and corporate gains
by manipulating results.
Márcia Figueredo D’Souza, Gerlando Augusto Sampaio Franco de Lima, Daniel N. Jones & Jessica R. Carré
129
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 79, p. 123-138, jan./abr. 2019
H1a: ere is a positive relationship between the
moderate traits of Machiavellianism and a lower
tendency to maximize personal and corporate gains
by manipulating results.
H1b: ere is a positive relationship between the
moderate traits of narcissism and a lower tendency
to maximize personal and corporate gains by
manipulating results.
H1c: There is a positive relationship between
the moderate traits of psychopathy and a lower
tendency to maximize personal and corporate gains
by manipulating results.
H2: e interactions between the traits that compose
the Dark Triad promote the tendency to maximize
personal and corporate gains by manipulating results.
It is hoped that the dierences between the levels and
intensities of the traits (weak, moderate, and strong) are
revealed. e weak trait is not highlighted in the literature,
given that it is present in the population in general and does
not generate consequences. e strong trait is emphasized
in the literature and the results are unanimous: it reveals
an insensitive, manipulative, and dishonest character. As
for the moderate trait, which is barely explored in the
literature, this can reveal a middle ground between the
previous results and enable the conrmation of positive
attitudes, as armed by Spain, Harms, and LeBreton
(2014). e combined eect of H2 will enable it to be
veried that those characteristics that are common among
the 3 traits lead to more accentuated negative attitudes
that are not extreme but are opportunistic.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Methodological Approach, Strategy, and
Research Variables
is investigation adopts the theoretical-empirical
methodological approach. A survey was used as data
collection strategy, involving a self-reporting questionnaire
sent by email, given the diculty involved in personally
applying it to managers.
e Dark Triad was chosen as the independent variable
as it is able to explain and predict the dependent variable
– prot maximization. e research design was congured
as shown in Figure 2, presenting the conceptual and
operational variables, in accordance with the model from
Libby, Bloomeld, and Nelson (2002).
Figure 2 Conceptual and operational variables of the study.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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e age, gender, and time of experience variables
were considered to be potential inuencers of managers
choices since they are personal characteristics, which is a
conception that is supported by Upper Echelons eory.
3.2 Procedures and Operationalization of the
Data Collection Tool
3.2.1 “Short Dark Triad”.
e “Short Dark Triad” (SD3), proposed by Jones and
Paulhus (2014) was used, with 9 brief assertions for each
personality trait, using the Likert scale (1 to 5 points).
In accordance with the research tool, the answers to the
assertions (N2, N6, N8, P2, and P7) were reverted: answer
1 to 5; answer 2 to 4; and answer 3 remained the same
with no reversion.
In order to establish the levels of the traits, the following
criterion was adopted: rst the mean for each individual
and group (quantitative variable) was measured, and then
terciles were used to divide the group into three bands:
weak traits, moderate traits, and strong traits (qualitative
variable). A means calculation was used as this is the
current practice in studies in the area of psychology
(Campbell et al., 2004; Jones & Paulhus, 2014; Paulhus
& Williams, 2002) and in the accounting area (Johnson
et al., 2013; Majors, 2015; Murphy, 2012).
3.2.2 Business simulation.
Ten questions were elaborated involving a business
simulation (BS) based on prot maximizing actions,
focusing on 7 assertions in the Likert format (1 to 5
points), for possible nancial maneuvers of an accounting
nature, discussed by Schilit and Perler (2010). e other
three assertions were included to divert the focus from
the theme investigated. e contextualization of the
BS suggests that managers’ decisions will impact their
performance, the possibility of losing their position,
and dismissal of employees who work in the team. e
assertions are:
I convene the team to present the results and ask for an eort
to achieve the goal in the remaining two days.
I verify with the sales sector the possibility of bringing forward
the recording of sales that will be realized in the following
month.
I verify whether the current maintenance expenses can be
postponed.
I invite colleagues to dinner to reduce day-to-day tensions.
I verify whether it is possible to assign miscellaneous expenses
to Permanent Assets.
I verify whether the nancial charges from the current month
can be posted in future periods.
I observe the possibility of postponing probable losses indicated
by the legal sector related to employment proceedings that
should be recorded in the current month.
I do not communicate that the stock stored at a particular
location is lost due to some technical problem.
I do not inform accounting and maintain an important balance
to be received from a bankrupt client in Assets.
I relax, aware that I did everything possible to achieve the
results.
In order to operationalize the answers derived from
the BS method, the mean (quantitative variable) was
taken and then the group was divided by the median,
that is, into two bands – manipulation/non-manipulation
(qualitative variable).
3.2.3 Lottery.
e lottery (L) method was developed to complement
that of the BS and constituted with the aim of detecting
personal prot maximizing behavior, for joint analysis,
using 10 questions of a managerial and nancial nature, in
the “lottery” format (right/wrong), with the aim of making
the respondents answer the questions and participate in
a draw for two minitablets, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Lottery
Assertions Right Wrong
1 –The components of the nancial environment are managers responsible for the investment and nancing decisions,
investors, and nancial markets.
2 –If the managers make unsuitable decisions, inconsistent with maximizing share values, the investors will buy more
shares, exerting downward pressure on the price.
3 –The Ebitda is an accounting indicator that measures the ability to generate gross operating cash ow.
4 –The main aim of cash ow management is to increase the amount of cash kept at the minimum limit needed for the
business to operate.
5 –Discounted cash ows are future cash ows expressed at present value, in which the rate of return on the investment
is related with the cost of capital employed.
6 –In all situations, the equilibrium point is the desirable target price for a company.
7 –The master budget is a comprehensive operational plan, composed of various joint department and activity budgets.
8 –Maximizing the internal rate of return on an investment implies maximizing the company’s absolute prot.
9 –The sales price of a product or service must be at least equal to the variable cost of producing or selling it.
10 – Aligning production with supply is a critical decision in the corporate environment.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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When each respondent concluded the answers to the
L method questions, or when the time limit for answering
the questions had expired, he/she was asked to save the
answers and verify the right ones. At this point, one of
the following situations could occur:
a.
Congratulations! You got all the questions right.
You could be one of the winners! (In this situation,
there was no way to detect unethical behavior). Click
SAVE and FINISH.
b.
Unfortunately, you did not get all the questions right.
But you can participate in the draw if your number of
right answers is equal to that of the other participants.
For this, click SAVE and FINISH.
When the respondent clicked SAVE, the following
error message illustrated in Figure 3 appeared.
Figure 3 Bluff
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
e error message was inserted on purpose as a “blu,
with the aim of observing the respondent’s tendency,
when faced with two alternatives (yes/no), to decide
to manipulate the results, given that the individual had
already been informed about his/her result/performance.
If the participants clicked “I got all the questions right”,
even knowing that they had not, they manipulated their
decision and revealed opportunistic behavior.
So that the respondents would not suspect the main
aim of the study, nor consult the internet to answer the
questions, the following measures were adopted: (a)
only 4 minutes were made available to save the answers
(a chronometer was included on the screen); (b) the
questions were elaborated in such a way that it was not
possible to quickly verify the answers on the internet or
using other sources; (c) the questions were shown one by
one; (d) a device was included to prevent the questions
being copied; and (e) an automatic blocking function was
included in the questionnaire aer it was answered in full.
To justify the time limitation for the answers, the
wording of the L method communicated that the intention
of the study was to detect the manager’s ability to make
quick decisions, with the aim of maximizing company
prots. However, this strategy was adopted with the
previously reported objectives and to verify whether,
under pressure, especially in the context of a business
simulation, the individuals had a tendency to maximize
their gains (performance) by manipulating the results.
At the same time, the prize was used as an incentive and
strategy for detecting the intention of the individuals
when encouraged to behave opportunistically.
For the parametrization of the binary-nature (yes/no)
variables, “yes” was categorized for manipulation and
“no” for non-manipulation (qualitative variable). With
the aim of verifying the tendency to manipulate in an
integrated way, a binary variable called joint manipulation
(JM) was categorized, based on the following procedure:
if the individual manipulated via 1 or via the 2 methods
at the same time, he/she had a tendency to manipulate
results. is criterion was also adopted via the presence of
a correlation (r = 0.282, p < 0.001) between the BS method
and the L method. e operationalization of the variable
was also binary (yes/no) and “yes” was categorized for
manipulation and “no” for non-manipulation (qualitative
variable).
3.3 Statistical Approach
e following statistical techniques were applied:
descriptive, correlation, one-way ANOVA hypothesis
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tests, Mann-Whitney test, and logistic regression, these
last ones being to validate hypotheses H1 and H2. e
correlation technique enabled the association to be veried
between the personality traits, as well as the relationship
between the personality trait and prot maximization
variables. e logistic regression was applied due to the
binary nature of the dependent variables resulting from
the L and JM methods. is technique enabled the eects
of each of the variables inserted into the model to be
veried, along with the probability of occurrence of a
particular event and the individual contribution of each
of the predictors.
4. RESULTS ANALYSIS
4.1 Applying the Study
4.1.1 Participants.
e study was carried out on 263 managers with the
following demographic prole: gender (63.1% male),
age group (10.3% between 18 and 25; 54% between 26
and 35; 22.1% between 36 and 45; and 13.7% over 45).
eir experience in management was quite stratied,
with higher incidences for 10 months (20%), 24 months
(41%), 36 months (19%), and 72 and 120 months (14%).
4.1.2 Results and discussions.
Machiavellianism presented the highest mean (2.9155)
of the 3 traits. Regarding the frequency of the traits by
level, revealed based on the tercile, Machiavellianism and
psychopathy presented the highest proportions (38% and
41.1% in the low ranges, respectively) and narcissism
presented the highest proportion in the moderate ranges
(43%). Division by level of intensity of the traits into low
and high has been used in studies such as those from
Johnson et al. (2013), Majors (2015), and Murphy (2012).
is procedure enables a perception of the strength of
the traits to dierentiate a higher and lower tendency in
an individual to display opportunistic conducts in the
corporate environment. As psychopathy presented the
lowest mean in relation to the other 2 traits, the tercile
also reects the lowest value among the high, moderate,
and low ranges.
Moreover, nding the moderate level represents an
additional contribution to the research that has studied
this topic, with the expectation that this level can
present attitudes that reveal the desirable and positive
characteristics of each personality trait, in the corporate
environment, instead of the negative and opportunistic
side of the triad. As Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007)
state, moderate narcissism is essential to human beings.
With regards to the frequency of prot maximization
via manipulation of results, the results indicated a higher
incidence of non-opportunistic conducts, both for the
BS method (53.2%) and for the L method (83.3%).
However, analyzing the 2 methods together, 51.3% of
the respondents presented the behavior. On this point,
it is worth explaining that 30 respondents showed a
tendency for manipulation via the 2 methods at the
same time.
As it is measured by the Likert scale, the BS method
reects the respondent’s agreement and disagreement with
regards to manipulating results and enables an attitudinal
analysis, without necessarily conrming the action of
manipulation, but merely some predisposition. As for
the L method, the respondents present opportunistic
behavior when they indicate having got all the questions
right, even aer being informed that they did not. e 2
methods together reect both attitude and opportunistic
behavior. As was already mentioned previously, this
combination of the 2 methods was also enabled by the
statistical correlation revealed.
ese results are consistent with Giammarco, Atkinson,
Baughman, Veselk, and Vernon (2013), whose evidence
indicates that by lying individuals with a Machiavellian,
psychopathic, or narcissistic tendency believe that they
are better than the average person, in a wide range of
situations. Machiavellians are people who show the
greatest capacity for cheating, followed by psychopaths,
with narcissists coming in third position. According to
Austin, Farrelly, Black, and Moore (2007), Machiavellians
have a large capacity for emotional manipulation.
When the Pearson correlation between the variables
was analyzed, a positive and signicant relationship was
observed between Machiavellianism and narcissism (r =
0.209, p < 0.05), Machiavellianism and psychopathy (r
= 0.349, p < 0.05), and narcissism and psychopathy (r =
0.251, p < 0.05). e BS method was revealed to be positive
and signicant with the 3 personality types, showing more
intensity with psychopathy (r = 0.232, p < 0.05).
By analyzing the correlation between Machiavellianism
and psychopathy, it can be inferred that there is a greater
propensity for psychopaths to get involved in misleading
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management tactics in order to obtain their own gains,
without feeling guilty about the harm caused to others.
If they need to persuade and convince others in relation
to adopting a misleading management tactic, they tend
to lie without feeling remorse.
Regarding the correlation between Machiavellianism
and narcissism, the results suggest that narcissists have
a greater tendency to use manipulative strategies than
Machiavellians in order to feed their sense of greatness
and exhibitionism, in the search for praise and status.
Despite being the lowest of the 3, the correlation between
narcissism and psychopathy suggests, among other
behaviors, a search for self-esteem and self-promotion
in the corporate environment.
e Spearman correlation, used due to the qualitative
nature of the variables categorized in the L and JM method,
conrms the association between the traits and the JM
(Machiavellianism: r = 0.230, p < 0.05; narcissism: r =
0.108, p < 0.10; psychopathy: r = 0.165, p < 0.05) and the
correlation between the L and JM methods (r = 0.436,
p < 0.05).
The results enable the inference that there is a
signicant relationship between the Dark Triad traits
and prot maximization, thus corroborating with the
previous studies that related traits of Machiavellianism
(Austin et al., 2007; Hartman & Mass, 2010; Murphy,
2012; Shafer & Wang, 2011), narcissism (Frino et al.,
2015; Ham et al., 2017; Johnson et al., 2013; Rijsenbilt
& Commandeur, 2013), and psychopathy (Boddy, 2006;
Clarke, 2005; Jones, 2014) with earnings management
and corporate fraud.
In addition, the ndings conrm the base theory of
this investigation, which is that personality inuences
individuals’ interpretations and consequently aects their
choices (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007).
Aer conrming the homogeneity of the variances using
the Levene test – Machiavellianism (p = 0.557), narcissism
(p = 0.795), and psychopathy (p = 0.715) – the one-way
ANOVA statistical method was applied, using the BS
method, as shown in Table 2. e F test revealed the
values F(2.260) = 7.006, p = 0.001 for Machiavellianism;
F(2.260) = 1.717, p = 0.182 for narcissism; and F(2.260)
= 8.071, p < 0.001 for psychopathy. ese results suggest
that there is a dierence in prot maximizing attitudes
between the individuals, in accordance with the low,
moderate, and high levels for the managers who display
traits of Machiavellianism and psychopathy.
Table 2
ANOVA: business simulation
SS = sum of the squares; MS = mean square.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
When analyzing the dierence between the means for
the traits, using the L and JM methods, it was observed,
via the Mann-Whitney test, that there is a dierence in
the manipulation of results for the Machiavellian and
psychopathic traits (Table 3).
As for narcissism, this did not present any dierence
in mean in any of the methods adopted here for detecting
results manipulation. It is inferred that this nding could
be related with the secretive nature of the data collection
for this study, which did not motivate the dierence of
intensity of the trait, given the need of narcissists to be
gloried and applauded for their conquests, especially
when they stand out from the rest. As failure and criticism
scare narcissists, they restrain themselves to hide and
protect their greatness and their sense of superiority and
can show a lack of willingness to take risks in competitive
situations (Mecler (2015). Another point to be veried
in previous studies is the prize oered, which may not
have been enough to motivate manipulation to maximize
gains. is nding refutes the assumption that narcissists
exhibit a moderate and positive tendency.
Machiavellianism Narcissism Psychopathy
SS DF MS F Sig. SS DF MS F Sig. SS DF MS F Sig.
Between groups 9.67 2 4.836 7.006 0.001 2.464 2 1.232 1.717 0.182 11.054 2 5.52 8.071 0,000
In groups 179.43 260 0.690 186.646 260 0.718 178.056 260 0.685
Total 189,11 262 189,11 262 189,110 262
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Table 3
Mann-Whitney test: lottery and joint manipulation
Dependent
variable Test Machiavellianism Narcissism Psychopthy
Sig. Decision Sig. Decision Sig. Decision
Lottery Mann-Whitney 0.453 Does not reject H0 0.373 Does not reject H0 0.206 Does not reject H0
Joint
manipulation Mann-Whitney 0.000 Rejects H0 0.82 Does not reject H0 0.007 Rejects H0
P < 0.05 is in bold.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
With the aim of simultaneously comparing each level
of the traits that compose the Dark Triad, it was observed
using the Bonferroni test (post hoc ANOVA test) that the
individuals with moderate and strong Machiavellian traits
exhibit a signicant dierence (p = 0.006 and p = 0.004) in
relation to the BS in comparison with the individuals that
show weak traits. Via the JM method, Machiavellianism
also diers for the moderate (p = 0.055) and strong (p
< 0.001) traits. As for the L method, this did not show
any dierences.
From the Tukey test it is observed that the moderate
level of Machiavellianism is closer to the high level, with
means of 0.5432 and 0.6585, respectively, which denotes a
greater tendency among these managers to intentionally
manipulate results, based on strategies that enable
personal goals and objectives to be achieved. It is also
inferred that managers with moderate Machiavellianism
tend to adopt managerial manipulation tactics based on
calculations lacking moral and ethical standards that
are geared towards long-term future gains, in a similar
behavior to managers who exhibited strong traits. Hartog
and Belschak (2012) highlight that when leaders are highly
Machiavellian, the positive eects of the leader’s behavior
can end up being suppressed.
From the Bonferroni and Tukey tests, narcissism did
not reveal any dierences of means between the weak
traits and the moderate traits and the strong traits via the
3 methods (BS, L, and JM). e Tukey test presents the
formation of a single subgroup, conrming the previous
results.
When psychopathy is analyzed, it is possible to note
from the Bonferroni test that those individuals with weak
and moderate psychopathic traits exhibit signicant
dierences (p < 0.001 and p = 0.008) via the BS method
in relation to individuals that show strong traits. e
Tukey test corroborates the results found previously
by demonstrating that subgroup 1, composed of the
decision of individuals with weak traits and moderate
traits (means of 2.2169 and 2.2780, respectively), presents
more signicantly similar and closer statistical means,
diering from subgroup 2, composed of the strong traits.
e results also suggest that the strong traits dier
from the moderate traits (p = 0.017) and the weak traits
(p = 0.027) when analyzing the JM method. e Tukey
test conrms the formation of subgroup 1, composed of
the weak traits and the moderate traits (means of 0.4324
and 0.4630, respectively, signicant and more similar)
and of subgroup 2 (mean of 0.6543), composed of the
strong traits. e L method did not show any dierences.
With this result, it is inferred that the moderate traits
reveal a greater tendency for managers to maximize their
gains by manipulating results. e greater approximation
between the weak traits and moderate traits conrms
the assumption that psychopathy exhibits a moderate
and positive tendency in the sample studied. This
nding suggests that managers with moderate traits use
intelligence and moderate impulsivity to leverage and
do good deals, as well as using charm, communication
skills, creativity, vision, courage, and the ability to make
dicult decisions in a positive way within the corporate
environment.
Applying the logistic regression to test H2, the Dark
Triad traits were grouped interactively as Mach*Narc*Psyc
to observe the combined eect using the evidence of a
positive and signicant correlation between the 3 traits
and the evidence that manipulation is a characteristic
that is common to the triad. e same procedure was
adopted for the variables Experience*Age group, using
the evidence of the correlation between them (r = 0.683,
p < 0.001).
The Chi-squared test showed that the combined
coecients are statistically signicant for the model being
studied, in light of the BS (sig. 0.000) and JM (sig. 0.000)
methods. is result enables it to be interpreted that the
model is able to accurately predict the investigation.
e Mach*Narc*Psyc interaction is signicant and
presents a positive sign, showing that the positive variation
of this variable leads to an increase in the probability of
managers deciding to manipulate results, measured by the
BS, L, and JM methods, when the other variables remained
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constant. is denotes that if the interactive variable
Mach*Narc*Psyc increased by one unit, the estimated
logit increases by an average of 1.069, 1.025, and 1.063,
suggesting a positive relationship between the decision
to manipulate results and the personality traits, measured
by the BS, L, and JM methods. e gender variable was
also shown to be positive via the L method and suggests
a positive relationship with the logit.
Regarding the signicance of the variables individually,
the Wald test shows the signicance of the interactive
variable Mach*Narc*Psyc, indicating that it is statistically
significant as a predictive factor for the decision to
manipulate results. e Experience*Age group interactive
variable was also shown to be signicant and a predictive
factor when analyzing the BS method. According
to Bommer, Gratto, Gravander, and Tuttle (1987), in
situations in which there are ethical dilemmas, individual
attributes (personality, demographic prole, personal
objectives, position/status, and experiences) are necessary
conditions for the perception and selection of alternatives
that reect ethical or unethical decision-making behavior.
ey also emphasize that when there are situations of
conict between the personal values of the manager and
the objectives of the organization, the former chooses the
path that serves his/her own interests, especially when
his/her career progress is in play.
In relation to the other variables included in the model,
although they have not been shown to be signicant, the
Chi-squared test showed the signicance of the model
studied, when analyzing the variables together (Table 4).
Table 4
Coefcients, signs and Wald test
P < 0.10 is in bold. Variables that entered into Step 1: Mach*Narc*Psyc, Gender, Experience*Age Group. BS = business
simulation; L = lottery; JM = joint manipulation.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
e nding is consistent with the results of Lee and
Ashton (2005), which indicated that all the Dark Triad
traits are strongly and negatively correlated with the
Honesty-Humility dimension of the Hexaco model, clearly
indicating that this triad has common characteristics
that presuppose a strong tendency for dishonesty and
opportunism.
In this context, it is inferred that dark personalities
leave individuals vulnerable to ethical lapses that
can compromise a company in the short and/or long
term. On this point, Ferrel and Gresham (1985) state
that ethical or unethical decisions are inuenced by
individual factors (the individual’s cognitive structure,
knowledge, values, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions)
and by the opportunity for action.
In summary, this study, supported by Upper Echelons
eory, revealed the moderate side of the personality traits
and veried that for the Machiavellian and psychopathic
traits the tendencies were presented as opposing. If on
one hand moderate Machiavellianism displayed a greater
similarity with individuals who are rich in Machiavellianism,
moderate psychopathy displayed a greater approximation
with weak psychopathy, which supports H1c. It was also
shown that there is a positive relationship between the
interaction of the traits that compose the Dark Triad and
prot maximization, which supports H2.
Variables Expected sign Sign found B Coefcient Exp(β) Coefcients Wald Test
p-value
BS
Mach.*Narc.*Psyc. + + 0.067 1.069 0.000
Experience*Age Group +/- - 0.001 0.999 0.086
Gender +/- - 0.202 0.817 0.338
Constant +/- - 1.015 0.362 0.016
L
Mach.*Narc.*Psyc. + + 0.025 1.025 0.235
Experience*Age Group +/- - 0.061 0.941 0.823
Gender +/- + 0.000 1.000 0.370
Constant +/- - 1.909 0.148 0.000
JM
Mach.*Narc.*Psyc. + + 0.061 1.063 0.001
Experience*Age Group +/- - 0.069 0.934 0.743
Gender +/- - 0.001 0.999 0.028
Constant +/- - 0.801 0.449 0.056
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It is inferred that moderate Machiavellians are more
likely to display opportunistic tendencies in the corporate
environment, thus going against the expectation of
positive behavior, while moderate psychopathy suggests
positive and desirable behavior, which is consistent with
the expectations of the researchers from this study, who
believe that the Dark Triad personality traits can also reveal
their positive side in the organizational environment.
e rejection of H1a and H1b elicits a continuation of
the studies on the topic, in particular due to the cultural
dierences, the setting in which the study is applied, and
the subjects of the research.
5. CONCLUSION
e moderate traits of Machiavellianism were shown
to be closer to the strong traits, which enables it be
inferred that there is greater tendency among managers
to display opportunistic attitudes, with the cynicism that
characterizes them, using strategies that uphold their
reputation and enable them to achieve personal goals
and objectives. As for the moderate traits of psychopathy,
these exhibited a greater approximation and similarity
to the weak traits and the moderate traits, enabling it to
be inferred that there is a lower tendency for managers
to maximize prot by manipulating results. is nding
conrms the assumption that psychopathy exhibits a
moderate and positive tendency in the sample studied.
In this context, managers with moderate traits use
intelligence and moderate impulsivity to leverage and
make good deals, as well as charm, communication skills,
creativity, vision, courage, and the ability to make dicult
decisions in a positive way in the corporate environment.
e combined eect of the Dark Triad traits was
shown to be signicant and positive, showing that their
positive variation leads to an increase in the probability
of managers maximizing their gains by manipulating
results. e interaction between experience and age group
was also shown to be signicant and a predictive factor,
when the BS method was analyzed. us, in a similar
way for the three traits, the chance of occurrence of prot
maximization associated with manager opportunism and
dishonesty in the corporate environment is estimated.
In this context, the aim of this study was achieved and
the research problem was addressed. Although a dierence
of levels for narcissism was not revealed, which is a nding
that may show bias or error in the application of this study,
or as Furtner, Rauthmann, and Sachse (2011) state, the
results of the investigations that discuss narcissism can
dier and become desirable or undesirable, depending on
the culture of the geographical setting that is the object
of analysis. However, this nding may be a reection of
the conception of Giammarco et al. (2013) that, of the
3 traits, narcissism is the one that involves the lowest
tendency to cheat.
e evidence found strengthens investigations in the
accounting area, especially concerning the behavioral
approach, by promoting its interface with psychology
for an understanding of how personality, values, and
experience inuence managers’ choices when conducting
business and how employees and companies are impacted
by these decisions. It also enables future research to
systematically analyze the moderate intensity of the triad,
as well as corroborating with the nding that revealed the
common characteristics of manipulation, insensitivity,
and dishonesty – when the interactive eect between the
traits was analyzed.
It is also worth noting some limitations of the study.
Applying a self-reporting type personality questionnaire
may lead to tendenciosity in the self-descriptions of the
characteristics and the behavior of the respondents, which
may show some bias, especially if they nd it dicult
to answer questions about themselves objectively. In
addition, the method for capturing prot maximization
via results manipulation involves a delicate, complex
path that is dicult to measure, given the sensitivity of
the topic.
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Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of audit partners’ narcissism on the readability of audit reports for companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). It examines the effects of narcissism among both lead and review audit partners on the clarity of audit reports, considering the regulatory requirements and auditing practices within the Iranian financial reporting context. Design/methodology/approach This paper analyzed 2,691 firm-year observations from TSE-listed companies spanning 2011–2023, using ordinary least squares regression. Readability of audit reports was assessed using the FOG index, with the size of partners’ signatures serving as a proxy for narcissism. Findings The findings indicate a significant negative relationship between increased narcissism and audit report readability; higher levels of narcissism correspond with elevated FOG index scores. Narcissism in lead partners notably diminishes readability more than that of review partners. This pattern holds across various robustness checks, including alternative readability metrics, variations in auditor engagement complexity, auditor specialization, subsets of qualified audit reports and considerations for endogeneity. Audit reports for economically significant clients tend to be clearer, suggesting a preference for reputation management over yielding to client pressure. Although no direct link was established between partners’ quality and readability, a positive relationship exists between audit firm rank and partners’ narcissism. Furthermore, interactions between auditor and CEO narcissism increase report complexity, especially in contentious negotiation scenarios. Despite regulatory advancements such as International Auditing Standard 701, its moderating effects were found to be inconsequential, highlighting the persistent influence of narcissism on audit report outcomes. Originality/value This research expands the understanding of how auditor personality traits, particularly narcissism, affect audit outcomes. By exploring the influence of narcissism on report readability within the Iranian context, this study fills a notable gap in the literature on emerging markets and non-Western reporting environments, providing valuable insights into global audit practices.
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Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of an exogenous corporate governance shock that curbs Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) power on the relationship between CEO narcissism and earnings management practices. Design/methodology/approach The authors performed a quasi-experiment using a differences-in-differences approach to examine Brazil’s duality split regulatory change on 101 Brazilian public firms during the period 2010–2022. Findings The main findings indicate that the introduction of duality split curtails the positive influence of CEO narcissism on earnings management, suggesting that this corporate governance regulation may act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating the negative consequences of powerful narcissistic CEOs. Further robustness checks indicate that the results remain consistent after using entropy balancing and alternative measures of CEO narcissism. Practical implications In emerging markets, where governance systems are frequently perceived as less than optimal, policymakers and regulatory authorities can draw insights from this enforcement to shape governance systems, reducing CEO power and, consequently, improving the quality of financial reporting. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine whether a duality split mitigates the influence of CEO narcissism on earnings management. Thus, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature that calls for research on the effectiveness of external corporate governance mechanisms in emerging markets as well as the CEO narcissism literature that calls for research on moderating factors that could curtail negative consequences of narcissistic CEO behavior.
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Applies the most recent research in social-psychology to decisive historical events that built white supremacy as a cultural force, institutional system, and dominant social character. Simultaneously discusses the progressive counter forces that have and continue to challenge white supremacy, and how this dialectical battle has brought the United States to the social, cultural, and political polarization of the present day. Builds a four-part argument. First, the origins of white supremacy in the United States, and how some (many) people uphold it today. Second, discusses the dark tetrad character type (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism) that finds white supremacy appealing. Third, examines sociohistorical patterns that promoted white supremacy, rewarded people who practiced it, and instilled the dark tetrad character type that finds meaning and comfort in racist (and misogynist, heteronormative) domination. Fourth, discusses the social counterforces that challenge white supremacy and instilled what the author calls the affirmative tetrad—compassion, gratitude, awe, and love.
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