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Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: threat or opportunity for transatlantic defence relations?
Abstract
The EU’s common security and defence policy was launched in the 1990s as a quest for ‘autonomy.’ Fifteen years of efforts failed to deliver. The coherence of the EU member states in their security dealings with the US was always vulnerable to the incompatible objectives of the UK and France. But as EU leaders post-Brexit re-launch CSDP, as the European Global Strategy rediscovers the virtues of ‘strategic autonomy,’ and as Europe juggles with a US president who questions the basis of NATO, it is time to re-think the relations between the EU and NATO. Brexit has the potential to strengthen the coherence of the EU member states in their quest for autonomy. This might seem to weaken the transatlantic bond. This paper will argue that, in the longer term, it is through the transcendence of the EU-NATO relationship that a genuine strengthening of that bond will emerge.
... Consequently, although there have been high ambitions about European Defence and security since the 1950s and failures to meet these expectations (Howorth, 2000(Howorth, , 2018, this time, the need and urgency for a capable EU in defence and security are profoundly amplified by the changing security environment and the distrust between the EU and its long-standing allies (Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2019). ...
... Howorth believes the transatlantic partnership has always been pivotal to the CSDP (Howorth, 2018). Therefore, he focuses on the "Euro-Atlantic Security dilemma" (Howorth, 2005) and the relationship between NATO and the EU when scrutinising the EU's "quest for SA." (Howorth, 2018(Howorth, , 2019 He presents three scenarios for the future of the EU-NATO relationship (Howorth, 2018, p.532); ...
... Howorth believes the transatlantic partnership has always been pivotal to the CSDP (Howorth, 2018). Therefore, he focuses on the "Euro-Atlantic Security dilemma" (Howorth, 2005) and the relationship between NATO and the EU when scrutinising the EU's "quest for SA." (Howorth, 2018(Howorth, , 2019 He presents three scenarios for the future of the EU-NATO relationship (Howorth, 2018, p.532); ...
This thesis investigates the EU’s concept of 'Strategic Autonomy' (SA) articulated
as a response to significant geopolitical developments, notably the election of
Donald Trump and Brexit. Although the concept is frequently used by EU
documents and leaders, the EU does not offer a concrete definition of the
concept. Therefore, the SA becomes a buzzword employed with different
meanings in different contexts. This situation hinders the efforts to scrutinize the
SA and its usefulness, particularly in defence and security. This study carries out
a content analysis of official EU documents to unpack the meaning, application,
and ambition levels of SA in order to contribute to broader academic discussions
on Strategic Autonomy in the domain of defence and security.
... Disse to dimensjonene har utviklet seg skritt for skritt, og selv om det fremdeles er mye som gjenstår før EU er en fullverdig aktør på dette området, har mye skjedd siden slutten på 1990-tallet. Siden den gang har EU foretatt 37 krisehåndteringsoperasjoner, styrkeoppbyggingen er intensivert, og samarbeidet mellom EU og Nato er tettere enn noen gang (Blockmans & Crosson, 2021;Fiott, 2023;Howorth, 2018). I tillegg har EU blitt utvidet østover og gått fra å vaere en vesteuropeisk til å bli en mer alleuropeisk union (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2020). ...
... Det har vaert mye diskusjon rundt hvorvidt en sterkere rolle for EU i forsvars-og sikkerhetspolitikken vil undergrave Nato og det transatlantiske forholdet (Howorth, 2018;. Spørsmålet om EUs «strategiske autonomi» og forslaget om en EU-reaksjonsstyrke på 5 000 personell har gjenopplivet denne diskusjonen. ...
... Spørsmålet om EUs «strategiske autonomi» og forslaget om en EU-reaksjonsstyrke på 5 000 personell har gjenopplivet denne diskusjonen. Snarere enn duplisering må imidlertid EUs forsvarsinitiativer og -insentiver, som PESCO og EDF, i dag ses på som forsøk på å få mest mulig ut av de europeiske lands nasjonale forsvar og kombinere dem bedre -noe som har vaert etterlyst også i Nato i lang tid (Fiott, 2022;Howorth, 2018;Rieker & Giske, 2023). Også EU-Natofelleserklaeringen fra 2023 understreket komplementaritet som grunnleggende for samarbeidet (Nato, 2023a;Rieker & Giske, 2023). ...
EUs samlede respons på krigen i Ukraina illustrerer bredden i EUs utenrikspolitiske virkemidler og medlemslandenes økte vilje til å løse felles utfordringer innenfor EU systemet. Det har også blitt tydeligere hvordan EU og Nato i økende grad komplementerer hverandre. Krigen og en endret geopolitisk situasjon illustrerer også hvordan sikkerhet i økende grad spiller over i andre politikkområder i EU som handel, energi, teknologi, kommunikasjon og kritiske råvarer. Vi befinner oss dermed i en europeisk sikkerhetspolitisk kontekst som er radikalt endret siden 1994. En hovedutfordring for Norge er at avtalene med EU ikke reflekterer denne utviklingen. For å kompensere for dette må man dermed stadig søke å inngå nye avtaler for å sikre norske sikkerhetspolitiske interesser, noe som er krevende og uforutsigbart. Så langt har det for eksempel skapt utfordringer knyttet til en eventuell norsk tilknytning til EUs nye satellittkommunikasjonssamarbeid (IRIS²) og helseunion. Denne artikkelen diskuterer EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og implikasjoner for Norge. Vi redegjør for viktige utviklingstrekk og drivere av EUs utenrikspolitikk, før vi går litt mer i dybden på hva slags utenrikspolitisk aktør EU er i dag. Til slutt diskuterer vi betydningen av denne utviklingen for Norge. Abstract in English:EU Foreign and Security Policy and Their Implications for NorwayThe European Union’s (EU) collective response to Russia’s war on Ukraine illustrates the breadth of the EU’s foreign policy tools and Member States’ increased willingness to address common challenges within the EU-system. How the EU and NATO increasingly complement each other has also become clearer. The war and a changed geopolitical situation also illustrate how security increasingly spills over into other policy areas in the EU, such as trade, energy, technology, communication and critical raw materials. We therefore find ourselves in a European security policy context that has radically changed since 1994. A key challenge for Norway is that its agreements with the EU do not reflect these developments. To compensate for this, there is a continuous need to pursue new agreements in order to ensure Norwegian security interests, which is demanding and unpredictable. So far, there have been challenges related to potential Norwegian participation in the EU’s satellite-based communications collaboration (IRIS2) and the health union, for example. This article discusses the EU’s foreign and security policies, and implications for Norway. We outline important developments and drivers behind the EU’s foreign policy, before delving deeper into the kind of foreign policy actor the EU is today. Finally, we discuss the significance of this development for Norway.
... In EU foreign policy, old concepts die hard, and strategic autonomy is a prime example. The idea has informed the EU's efforts to grow into a sovereign security actor from the moment then-French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed on the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, which paved the way for common EU security and defence policies (Ricketts 2017, Howorth 2018. The notion of strategic autonomy kept floating around, without appearing in official EU documents until late 2013, when the EU revived it for the purpose of enhanced security and defence cooperation (European Commission 2013). ...
... Letting these themes fade away in the open strategic autonomy discourse, the EU moved on from the decades-long stalemate its members had found themselves in when discussing national preferences for or against greater autonomy in security and defence. Yet this appeared counterintuitive, given shifting priorities in U.S. foreign policy (Howorth 2018, Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2019, Engelbrekt 2022, the decline of American hegemony prompting geopolitical reconfigurations and rivalries (Riddervold and Rosén 2018, Olsen 2022, Poutala et al. 2022, an intensification of hybrid security threats (Balcaen et al. 2022), and increased instability in the EU's neighbourhood (Plank andBergmann 2021, Nitoiu andSimionov 2023). This also seemed unreasonable as the EU and its members had been repeatedly caught off-guard when facing violent conflict with implications for European security. ...
... Europe's efforts to gain sovereign strategic thinking got an additional boost when Britain, which traditionally maintains a closer relationship with the United States, left the EU (Prikhodko, 2022). In recent years, discussions on this issue have centered around the notion of strategic autonomy (Howorth, 2018;Fiott, 2018;Tocci, 2021;Shcherbak, 2021;Arbatova, 2019). The supporters of this policy are unhappy that European countries are vulnerable to external pressure and are, in fact, unable to achieve foreign policy goals dictated by geopolitics without external assistance (Leonard and Shapiro, 2019). ...
... Politicians (Macron, 2021) and European experts (Howorth, 2018;Thompson, 2019) alike constantly emphasize that the desire for strategic autonomy does not undermine NATO and European-American cooperation. However, if one shoves scholasticism aside and pays attention to the fact that in reality the preferences of the EU countries and the United States often collide, there is an alternative explanation: European countries are trying to send a signal to the United States that they pose no threat and thus avoid American opposition at a time when they are unable to counter such pressure. ...
The article investigates the impact of the 2022 European security crisis on global hegemony. The author conceptualizes international hegemony as a legitimate rule based on the provision of club and public goods, and on coercion. The more benefits hegemon's allies get from such international order and the more they fear coercion, the more they are willing to contribute to the hegemonic project. In recent years, the academic literature has increasingly documented the United States' decline as a hegemonic power. In trying to consolidate power and optimize costs, the hegemon has shattered international regimes it helped create, thereby losing much of its international legitimacy. A comparative analysis of the European reaction to the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises shows how the perceived "Russian threat" to security has instantly boosted the legitimacy of NATO and the U.S. as the main security provider. As a result, the U.S. no longer faces opposition from its allies to its attempts to dismantle existing international regimes and halt the production of public goods. The threat-induced consolidation effect is not perpetual, and the current crisis entails some long-term negative consequences for future hegemony. However, the U.S. has acquired a chance to use its preponderant capabilities and loyal allies to safeguard its hegemony over the period of international reordering.
... Alt dette er tegn på at USA og EU sakte glir fra hverandre (Howorth, 2018;Riddervold & Newsome, 2018). Stadig negative utfall fra avtroppende president Donald J. Trumps side mot de europeiske allierte, som at Nato er overflødig, at brexit bidrar til at Storbritannia tar tilbake kontrollen fra EU og at Tyskland er gratispassasjer på det euroatlantiske samarbeidet, synes å bekrefte dette. ...
... Den omtalte lederskapskonflikten danner grunnlaget for å forstå USAs holdninger og handlinger til EUs forsvarspakke. USAs mål er at europeisk integrasjon foregår innenfor USA-dominerte atlantiske rammebetingelser (Howorth, 2018). Det betyr for alle praktiske formål Nato-rammen, selv om president Trump og hans administrasjon ved flere anledninger har uttrykt skepsis mot Nato og sine europeiske allierte (se for eksempel Bolton, 2020, s. 140;Herszenhorn, 2020). ...
Artikkelen diskuterer forholdet mellom den europeiske integrasjonsprosessen og det atlantiske samarbeidet under USAs ledelse. Problemstillingen artikkelen besvarer er hvilke tilnærminger Trump-administrasjonen har hatt til EUs sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk, og hvordan vi kan forklare denne tilnærmingen. I særlig grad dreier dette seg om balansegangen mellom europeisk strategisk autonomi på den ene siden, og amerikansk lederskap i Nato på den andre. Dette forholdet må forstås i lys av spørsmålet om lederskap i euroatlantisk sikkerhetspolitikk, noe som har vært et gjennomgangstema i europeisk integrasjon siden starten på 1950-tallet. Med en organisasjonsteoretisk tilnærming søker artikkelen å forklare hvorfor USA inntar et mer instrumentelt perspektiv overfor EU. Et slikt perspektiv innebærer at USA prioriterer ressurser til de områdene i verden der USA står overfor de største sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringene. For å forklare denne utviklingen diskuterer artikkelen USAs holdninger til EUs nyere forsvarsinitiativer og supermaktens ambivalens i forhold til disse. I møte med den nye Biden-administrasjonen blir det derfor viktig å avklare grunnlaget for det transatlantiske sikkerhetsfellesskapet. Et slikt fellesskap dreier seg ikke bare om felles interesser, men også om delte normer og verdier om hvordan en skal håndtere felles sikkerhetsutfordringer.
... With the EU's new Global Strategy and in the face of recent crises, the EU has moreover expressed ambitions of further developing an autonomous foreign and defence policy (see Howorth 2018 andandM.E. Smith 2018 this volume). ...
... Without doubt, the security relationship between the EU and the US remains strong. As discussed in Howorth's article on NATO and the EU's common foreign and security policy (the CSDP), transatlantic relations 'will continue to exist as a meaningful entity in world politics -at least for the foreseeable future' (Howorth 2018). Most European states still rely on the US as their main security provider, and although perhaps for different reasons, legal considerations underline and unite their policies in both of our cases: In Ukraine the sovereignty principle, and in the South China sea the Law of the Seas. ...
How do the EU and the US respond to rising powers making territorial claims? Are they unified in their approaches, and if not, where do their policies diverge? Transatlantic unity or dissent in response to main geopolitical issues has implications for our understanding of transatlantic security relations and for the future of global power-relations more broadly. We explore EU-US positions and responses to Chinese advances in the South China Sea and Russia’s actions in the Ukraine. Two hypotheses guide our analysis: First, that they cooperate to balance against these powers, hence strengthening transatlantic relations. Secondly, that the EU is developing policies independently of the US, thus weakening EU-US relations. Our findings suggest that despite a general coherence of American and European stance in both cases, the level of coordination varies. Instead, we find signs of weakening EU-US security relations as the EU develops a more autonomous policy vis-à-vis the US.
... Serving as the inaugural iteration in the post-2016 epoch, the 2018 Capability Development Plan (CDP) assumed a central role in shaping the novel agenda embraced by the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (Frau and Tira 2020;Houdé and Wessel 2022), and the European Defense Fund (EDF). Presently, there exists a heightened level of collaboration with NATO's autonomous defense planning process (Howorth 2018). Finally, the period after 2020 witnessed a palpable decline in publications about the CSDP domain. ...
This article presents a thorough examination of the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in comparison with the educational programs offered by the European Security and Defense College (ESDC), with a specific focus on the High-Level CSDP Course. We conducted a comprehensive analysis using a meta-synthesis research approach. Our research commenced with a Systematic Literature Review and was further validated through a qualitative case study, which included interviews with the 2023 high-Level CSDP course participants. Our research findings highlight the need to prioritize emerging topics such as climate security and identify new areas in cyber and space domains to potentially expand the CSDP. We emphasized the importance of developing strategic approaches to facilitate the dissemination of comprehensive CSDP knowledge generated by the ESDC to higher education institutions. This initiative aims to equip future EU leaders with the necessary knowledge and skills to effectively engage in CSDP-related matters.
... US scholars continue to debate the extent to which any "China-first" grand strategy requires Washington to drawn down military resources in Europe (Colby 2021;Mazarr 2023). Relatedly, scholars on both sides of the Atlantic disagree about the prospect of US military abandonment of Europe, and on the question of whether or not America's European allies can/or should be able to defend themselves without the USA (Snyder 1984;Biscop 2013;Howorth 2018;Posen 2020;Brooks and Meijer 2021). Such debates have become more salient following Russia's re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with the most outspoken "Asia-firsters" in the USA arguing that "Ukraine is a distraction from Taiwan" (Colby and Mastro 2022;see also Townshend 2022). ...
Since Washington announced its “rebalance to Asia” in 2011, debates about America’s Europe strategy have centered on whether America’s European allies could defend themselves without the USA. This debate has overlooked a crucial point: Washington’s security commitment to Europe is not only about military power but also hinges on European acquiescence to Washington’s politico-economic leadership position. US policymakers today increasingly view China as the main challenge to the latter. Accordingly, this article’s driving hypothesis is that the more significance the USA assigns to its European allies in the context of its China agenda, the more it will, for better or worse, seek to maintain (some degree of) European security dependence on the USA. Case studies of the Europe strategies of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations, respectively, serve as a vehicle to probe the plausibility of this argument.
... These elements are being elaborated in many think-tank publications in the post-2015 period (Arteaga, 2017;Biscop, 2015Biscop, , 2016Biscop, , 2019Kempin, Kunz, 2017;Järvenpää, Major, Sakkov, 2019;Mauro, 2018). Military-centric understanding of ESA has been also hitherto dominant in the academic research on ESA (García Pérez, 2019;Howorth, Keeler, 2003;Howorth, 2017Howorth, , 2018Howorth, , 2020. Recently, several robust scientific studies were published and provide for an in-depth analysis of European security & defence policy that touches upon important aspects of ESA in the military-centric context (Bartels, Kellner, Optenhögel, 2017;Fiott, 2019;Calcara, 2020;Koppa, 2022). ...
Since the Global Strategy of 2016 which presented European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) a global “ambition” of the European Union, the concept of ESA became increasingly embedded in the EU policymaking. However, its meaning remains elusive due to a plurality of competing definitions and interpretations. The aim of this article is to show and analyse how the concept of European Strategic Autonomy is being defined and to verify the hypothesis: despite many competing conceptualizations of ESA, a common understanding of the notion is emerging in the EU. It traces how the concept of ESA is received and evolves in relation to European think-tanks and EU institutions. The research behind this article is based on an extensive review of academic literature, think-tank publications and official EU documents, as well as interviews conducted with EU officials and members of the European think-tank community.
... The ability to produce the desired result is what determines its effectiveness. Political will, a shared strategic vision, and the ability to act are requirements for effective strategic sovereignty (Anghel, 2020).Strategic sovereignty, which is the capacity to act independently, rely on one's resources in important strategic areas, and work with allies when necessary, is a capability that, if used wisely, can help (Howorth , 2018). Strategic sovereignty is a set of practical frameworks that an organization can use to determine the range of its impact by selecting the right strategy (Strikwerda & Rijnders, 2002). ...
The research aims to investigate the influence of intellectual capital (dependent variable) approaches on achieving Strategic sovereignty (independent variable). In line with the research objectives, the research problem was articulated through several questions: What are the levels of Strategic sovereignty and how much emphasis do leaders place on them? Additionally, the study examines the relationship and impact of intellectual capital on Strategic sovereignty. Analytical descriptive techniques were employed by researchers. They provided detailed descriptions of the main and secondary variables, and explored the connections and effects among the research variables. The research population consisted of leaders in soft drink companies located in the city of Erbil. A total of 96 questionnaires were distributed, with 92 of them being retrieved and utilized for the study. Hypotheses were tested using statistical techniques, specifically the computer application SPSS V.25The study yielded several significant findings. It revealed positive associations between intellectual capital and Strategic sovereignty at both macro and micro levels. Furthermore, at the macro level, the independent variable (intellectual capital) demonstrated a positive impact on the dependent variable (Strategic sovereignty) according to the study's indicators. The research also provided a set of recommendations, with a particular emphasis on soft drink companies in Erbil. It suggests that these companies should develop a clearly defined strategy outlining how they plan to nurture and leverage their intellectual capital. This strategy should encompass recruitment practices, employee development programs, knowledge management systems, and innovation initiatives. Additionally, encouraging cross-functional collaboration is essential for maximizing the utilization of intellectual capital. Establishing platforms for knowledge sharing and interdisciplinary projects can lead to synergies that drive innovation and confer a strategic advantage.
... En relación con las dependencias es importante tener en consideración las relaciones existentes entre ambos lados del Atlántico a través de la OTAN. En este sentido, la búsqueda de la autonomía estratégica iniciada con la Estrategia Global de la Unión Europea en 2016 genera lo que Howorth (2005) denominó el dilema de seguridad euro-atlántica, según el cual una elevada autonomía europea podría llegar a implicar cierto nivel de aislacionismo de los Estados Unidos, lo que posteriormente este mismo autor, en 2018, denominó una doble esquizofrenia, ya que a la vez que los Estados Unidos animaban a la Unión Europea a desarrollar sus capacidades militares, ello podría equilibrar la posición europea en relación con la estadounidense, lo cual reduciría el liderazgo internacional y la capacidad de penetración de sus sistemas de armas en el mercado europeo (Howorth, 2018). No obstante, llega a la conclusión de la necesidad de una relación equilibrada dentro de la OTAN, tal y como se acordó en la firma del Tratado de Washington. ...
La definición de autonomía estratégica aplicada a la UE tiene su origen en el ámbito de la seguridad y la defensa, aunque no se ha conseguido una definición clara y plenamente aceptada. En ella intervienen diversos tipos de factores que, unidos a las desiguales posiciones de los países de la UE, a las necesidades que se han mostrado obvias a partir de la pandemia y la guerra de Ucrania y a los impactos previsibles dentro del ámbito económico-industrial, suponen un conjunto de aspectos contrapuestos que no dan lugar a una perspectiva unívoca del tema. El impacto que la autonomía estratégica, tal y como se define aquí, puede tener en la base industrial y tecnológica de defensa europea y de los distintos países miembros, es aún una incógnita, aunque se pueden avanzar algunas posiciones y resultados.
... This makes increasing the intervention component of the CSDP enticing at a strategic level, especially given the reality that NATO's expeditionary era came to an end. By the time of the Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016) summits, NATO began to effectively abandon any idea of establishing new expeditionary forces and focused on creating a tripwire in Eastern Europe and establishing the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force to present a deterrent to direct Russian aggression against Central and Eastern European countries, taking valuable EU forces away from CSDP missions elsewhere (Howorth 2018;Zima 2018). NATO functions differently from the EU; as it is the key defensive institution against classical threats, it is not an organization built to manage hybrid or systemic threats from non-state actors. ...
As of 2021, the European Union (EU) is now a foundational part of Europe’s defense architecture, with programmes such as PESCO now enabling the EU to organise civil-military responses to crise and coordinate the defense-planning cycles of 25 European countries. This article asks why EU member states have opted to use the EU to enable their capabilities and manage ongoing security crises? In answering this question, the article uses a pluralistic reading, utilising realist and liberal-intergovernmentalist frameworks to assess complementary hypotheses for this cooperation. The second part assesses the state of the international system, concluding its increasing insecurity has prompted a collective awareness that a more strategic response to collective security is necessary. The third part evaluates the role of the political and economic balance of bargaining power between EU member states, assessing Germany, France, and Poland as case studies. The paper concludes briefly on the implications of this cooperation and the need for pluralistic readings of EU defense cooperation.
... Jak zauważyła Nicole Gnesotto (2018: 2), termin ten używano niemal jak mantrę w unijnych dokumentach dotyczących spraw bezpieczeństwa. Wywołało to wiele dyskusji na temat znaczenia tej koncepcji i jej prawdopodobnego wpływu na działania zewnętrzne UE (Howorth 2017a(Howorth , 2018Mauro 2018;Smith 2018;Heisbourg 2021;Pohl 2021). Autonomia strategiczna szła w parze z innymi wyrazistymi pojęciami, takimi jak władza geopolityczna i suwerenność europejska. ...
Ten artykuł jest zbiorem refleksji nad integracją europejską w okresie narastającej niepewności. Kryzys migracyjny, pandemia oraz rosyjska agresja na Ukrainę ujawniły podatność Unii Europejskiej na wstrząsy i zagrożenia, głównie o charakterze zewnętrznym. Podważyły wewnątrzunijną solidarność, obnażyły cynizm i egozim niektórych członków UE i ukazały daleko posuniętą zależność ekonomiczno-surowcową Unii Europejskiej. Tym samym uderzyły w ponowoczesny projekt integracji lansowany przez Komisję Europejską.
W artykule zawarto krytyczną analizę wybranych aspektów integracji europejskiej odnoszących się do zdeterminowanego racjami bezpieczeństwa dylematu tożsamości Unii Europejskiej jako podmiotu zbiorowej obrony Zachodu przed zagrożeniami pochodzącymi z zewnątrz. Teza postawiona w tym artykule głosi, iż slabnąca rola UE na arenie międzynarodowej, rosnące ryzyko niestabilności, a także zwiększona podatność na zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa są skutkiem zaniechań w ponadnarodowych procesach decyzyjnych, strachu przed odpowiedzialnością za obronę globalnej pozycji Zachodu oraz braku gotowości ze strony rządów i obywateli państw członkowskich UE do rewizji geostrategicznych wyznaczników tożsamości Unii w obliczu narastających napięć wewnętrznych i presji zewnętrznej.
This article presents some reflections on European integration in times of increasing uncertainty. The migration crisis, the pandemic and the Russian aggression against Ukraine have revealed the European Union’s vulnerability to shocks and threats, mainly of external provenience. They undermined intra-EU solidarity, exposed cynicism and egoism of some EU members, and showed the far-reaching economic and resource dependence of the European Union. Thereby, they undermined the postmodern integration project promoted by the European Commission. The article contains a critical analysis of selected aspects of European integration relating to the security-determined dilemma of identity of the European Union as a bridgehead of a collective defense of the West against external threats. The argument put forward in this article holds that the weakening role of the EU in the international arena, the growing risk of instability, as well as the increased vulnerability to security threats are the results of neglect in supranational decision-making processes, fear of responsibility for defending the global position of the West and the lack of readiness on the part of governments and citizens for a revision of the geostrategic determinants of the Union’s identity in the face of increasing internal tensions and external pressures.
... These three points of tension do not encompass the whole universe of areas where the notion of resilience as an ability to adapt and resilience as a retreat to core values come into conflict. For example, the debate about the EU's unilateral power to regulate global markets, known as the 'Brussels Effect' (Bradford, 2020), European geopolitical strength (Del Sarto, 2016), European sovereignty, and strategic autonomy (Howorth, 2018) point in a positive directionwith the EU potentially emerging as a more robust economic superpower. But that debate has yet to consider the reaction of other major economies both toward the EU and toward one-another. ...
The European Union’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic revealed changes and continuity in the structure and the functioning of the European project. In lieu of a conclusion to the Special Issue, this article discusses what those lessons tell us about how Europe responds to the following crisis. We compare European responses to the pandemic to those that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We observe more differences than similarities. The same actors do not always play the central role, solidarity among Europeans is sometimes more challenging to engineer, and the requirements to make the overall project more resilient can point in different directions. Such findings show that any argument that Europe is forged through crisis is unlikely to tell us much about what Europe is or where it may be headed. In that sense, the EU is a sui generis multi-level, multi-faceted actor that can change shape in response to events.
... Josep Borrell, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has echoed this line of thinking by putting forward a "Sinatra doctrine"according to which the EU would deal with geopolitical competition and competitors "in its own way" (Borrell 2020). A "European sovereignty" or "strategic autonomy" should ensure the EU's capacity to act independently and become more resilient in a range of areas, from defence, trade and industrial base to digital policy (Howorth 2018;European Parliament 2021a). ...
In reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese authorities have installed visa restrictions and strict quarantine rules to prevent foreigners from spreading new infections to the country. This has disrupted a trend of increasing European Union (EU)-China travel and socio-economic exchanges. EU citizens living in or travelling to China have had to deal with the consequences of Beijing’s so-called Zero-Covid strategy. In view of quasi-closed borders, many Europeans have given up on living in or travelling to China. Those who have stayed have come up with strategies of adaptation, while European-owned firms have reacted by adopting initiatives such as doing business online or localising staff. Overall, the Chinese visa restrictions have added a new dimension to the debate on asymmetries in EU-China relations.
... On the EU side, the response was uncertain, with elements of resistance and also of attempted reconciliation (for example on questions of economic sanctions). Where the Trump administration's unilateral actions effectively placed the EU in a position of dependency, for example on sanctions against Iran, one marked response by the Union was to emphasise the pursuit of "strategic autonomy," with particular reference to the US (see, for example, Fiott, 2018;Howorth, 2018;Youngs, 2021). Another EU response was to institutionalise its relationships with other "strategic partners," although this has not achieved unbroken success (Ferreira-Pereira & Smith, 2021). ...
This article focuses on the links between transatlantic relations—a structured array of markets, hierarchies, networks, ideas, and institutions—and broader elements of international structure and world order. It argues that the changing state of transatlantic relations reflects changes in the structure of the relations themselves, but also structural change in the global and domestic arenas and how such change shapes or reflects the actions of a wide variety of agents. The first part of the article briefly explores the importance of international structure in order to identify the global forces that shape the context for transatlantic relations. The article then examines the key mechanisms in transatlantic relations which interact to create forms of transatlantic order; these create spaces for a wide variety of agents, operating within broader elements of international and domestic structure, and the article illustrates this through the ways in which the EU’s “new agenda for EU–US relations” sought to shape transatlantic interactions during the first year of the Biden presidency. The article examines the implications of transatlantic responses to the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, and concludes that despite the move to enhanced EU–US cooperation in the short term, the interaction of structures, mechanisms, and actors will contribute to continuing differentiation of transatlantic relations, at least in the medium term, whatever the preferences of US and EU policy-makers.
... Likewise, Biscop argues that finding the right outlook and position in the great power competition will be one of the most pressing issues for the EU in the coming decades. The EU needs to build up its 'power to engage' in world politics (Biscop 2020: 4 The concept of strategic autonomy has been intensively discussed in the think-tank and academic community since the EUGS (see e.g., Helwig 2020Helwig , 2021Tocci 2021;Grevi 2020Grevi , 2019Anghel et al. 2020;Lippert et al. 2019;Franke and Varma 2019;Howorth 2018;Fiott 2018Fiott , 2021. Moreover, with the Covid 19 pandemic hitting Europe, discussions on strategic autonomy have steadily expanded (Governments of the Netherlands and Spain 2020). ...
In 2021, the European Union presented its new Indo-Pacific strategy, which outlines the Union's ambition to increase its interactions with the Indo-Pacific region in order to create partnerships to strengthen the so-called 'rules-based international order'. However, the Union's strategy also emphasises the intensifying competition that has been occurring in the Indo-Pacific in recent years due to geopolitical dynamics. This paper hence seeks to analyse the role of the European Union in the Indo-Pacific region through the lens of the Union's ambition to achieve the goal of European strategic autonomy. In the past few years, the European Union's ambition for strategic autonomy has become the foremost leitmotif for the Union. Consequently, this paper discusses and outlines the ambition of the European Union and analyses how it has fed into the work of building partnerships and greater connectivity with Asian states while responding to the increasingly Sino-US geopolitical competition in the region.
... EU Battlegroups, Eurocorps, European Gendarmerie Force). This has changed to a significant degree with the "America first" policy which created incentives for the EU to try to rekindle its quest for "strategic autonomy" [11]. ...
... And as NATO's primary role in EU defense is challenged by Emmanuel Macron, the question if the EU is able or want to stand alone as a security and defense actor arises. Strategic autonomy goes beyond EUGS call for deepening the EU-NATO partnership, but it does not necessarily contradict it (Howorth 2018). The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) counting 47 joint projects in 2019, the European Defense Fund (EDF), the European Peace Facility and the elaboration of the Strategic Compass (EEAS 2020) enhances politico-strategic direction and common culture for EU defense and security. ...
The region of the Eastern Mediterranean has played a major role in European Energy Security for more than a century initially as a major oil transit zone for exports from the Middle East and subsequently as a significant natural gas exporter in its own right. The region’s energy security evolution was always “bedeviled” by significant geopolitical risk which was endemic to the region and which led to very serious supply/transit crises that negatively affected both the European and the global economy while altering the regional balance of power. Since 2011 the partial retrenchment of US influence from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East created a power vacuum which several revisionist powers both from within and outside the region attempted to fill. Of these revisionisms the most dangerous to the region’s energy development and regional stability is the one promoted by Turkey's President Reccep Tayyip Erdogan. The paper tracks the evolution of Turkish revisionism as it challenged the interests of core regional players from the UAE, Egypt and Israel while focusing on the more recent developments vis-à-vis Cyprus and Greece. It also evaluates the importance of regional energy cooperation dynamics that currently exclude Turkey as a catalyst for the emergence of counter-coalitions to Erdogan’s neo-imperialism by focusing on the East Med Gas Pipeline project.
... And as NATO's primary role in EU defense is challenged by Emmanuel Macron, the question if the EU is able or want to stand alone as a security and defense actor arises. Strategic autonomy goes beyond EUGS call for deepening the EU-NATO partnership, but it does not necessarily contradict it (Howorth 2018). The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) counting 47 joint projects in 2019, the European Defense Fund (EDF), the European Peace Facility and the elaboration of the Strategic Compass (EEAS 2020) enhances politico-strategic direction and common culture for EU defense and security. ...
Mass migration through the Central Mediterranean route represents a challenge for the security of the European Union, Usually the EU defines itself as a normative foreign policy actor, but is it a valid self-definition in the case of tackling migration through the Central Mediterranean? The EU have been trying to handle migration with several civilian and military missions which pertain to different policy areas where different rules apply to decision making. So far reconciling the member states’ interest proved to be difficult, thus the EU faces internal challenges either regarding its naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea, or regarding the question of Libya. In this chapter we analyse Frontex operations Triton and Themis, and CSDP operations EUBAM Libya, EUNAVFOR MED Sophia and Irini. Our main focus is on examining whether the European Union’s communication and actions regarding these missions are in line, or a decoupling can be observed. We argue that normative aspirations of the Union have been side-lined by security and stability concerns, thus a light shift from normative power towards a pragmatist power can be observed in the case of the Central Mediterranean.
... Without a relatively clear answer to that question, it is almost impossible to know how to proceed with the organization and implementation of positive differentiation. In a number of recent publications (Howorth 2017(Howorth , 2018aHoworth 2019), I have provided my own answer to that question: CSDP should progressively merge with NATO; leadership in the Atlantic Alliance should progressively be transferred from the USA to the EU; the EU should eventually, through this form of US facilitated empowerment, achieve genuine "strategic autonomy" through positive differentiation between the EU and the USA, which, though sharing values and being solid allies, exist in very different geo-strategic contexts and by no means have identical interests. It is primarily through explicit differentiation between Europe and the USA that the European nation states can define their collective interests and thus move beyond the nation state. ...
This paper first assesses the salience of academic theories in the realm of security and defense policy, from the fields of both International Relations and European Studies. Theory is of relatively little assistance in understanding the phenomenon of a strictly—or even autonomously—European Union foreign and defence policy—in part precisely because of what I call negative differentiation. The second part homes in on the empirical reality of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In this particular policy area, differentiation has always been the norm, or the negative starting point—rather than a developing trend or a potential solution. The third part evaluates the current (post-2016) “re-launch” of CSDP and the widely discussed dynamic behind the EU’s quest for “strategic autonomy”. This section analyses the depth and sustainability behind what is widely seen as a new attempt either to break away from or to positively embrace differentiation and to engineer an unprecedented marshalling of the collective security and defense resources of the European Union.
... Without doubt, the security relationship between the EU and the US remains strong. As discussed in Howorth's article on NATO and the EU's common foreign and security policy (the CSDP), transatlantic relations 'will continue to exist as a meaningful entity in world politicsat least for the foreseeable future' (Howorth 2018). Most European states still rely on the US as their main security provider, and although perhaps for different reasons, legal considerations underline and unite their policies in both of our cases: In Ukraine the sovereignty principle, and in the South China sea the Law of the Seas. ...
Ties between the US and the EU rival those between any other pair of international actors. This Special Issue makes conceptual progress and empirical contributions in accounting for if and how EU-US relations have been impacted by a context of multiple crises and a parallel change in US policies. All the articles find strong evidence to suggest that EU-US relations are weakening. This is partly a consequence of the EU’s own, internal policies, as it becomes more unified and autonomous of the US in some areas, while fragmenting in others. Most importantly, it is a consequence of the two actors’ increasingly diverging perspectives and positions on international issues, institutions, norms and indeed the value of the transatlantic relationship as such. Although the long-term effects remain to be seen, it is likely that the cracks in the foundation of transatlantic relations will continue into the present and foreseeable future.
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RELATIONS WITH OTHER POWERS The notion of European Strategic Autonomy has become well established in the dictionary of terms used by the European Union to address key challenges in European external policy. Nevertheless, the term is still contested within the EU and the debate on this issue itself is widely considered ‘toxic’. The article aims to clarify the meaning of the idea of European Strategic Autonomy by presenting the main political contexts within which it functions, which are distinguished by the criterion of reference to Europe’s relations with the other powers in the international system: the United States, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, as well as in relation to the other countries. The article argues that the context in which the notion of strategic autonomy is interpreted influences its perception and assessment making it difficult to adopt a fixed definition. Nevertheless, as the article points out based on empirical research, including interviews with officials of European Union institutions in Brussels, a consensus is gradually forming in the European Union as to the interpretation of this concept, which is beginning to play an active role in shaping the EU’s external policy.
This study assesses European citizens' attitudes towards EU policies using data from the 98th Eurobarometer. The fuzzy hybrid TOPSIS methodology assesses support for five policies, ranging from military aid to economic sanctions against Ukraine. An ordered probit model analyses how 14 factors, such as age, political orientation, household finances and agreement that opposing Russia upholds European values, influence this support. The results highlight three key drivers of support: strong agreement that the EU defends European values, a positive image of the EU, and the perception of the invasion as a security threat. Conversely, opposition stems from disagreement with the defence of EU values and the security threat. These findings provide insights for EU policymakers and parliamentarians, offering guidance on how to align policy debates with citizens' perceptions of these policies.
This chapter investigates debates on European Strategic Autonomy (ESA), viewing ESA as the main response of the European Union and its members to the fragmentation of the Liberal International Order in security and defence. By tracing the evolution of EU and national approaches to three main strands of the debates (defence industry, crisis management, and relations with global powers), we argue that the lack of an EU-wide permissive consensus about the direction and applicability of ESA rendered this impracticable. A handful of EU actors believed this could be an effective answer but the majority of member states were less keen to breathe life into the idea: whereas lip service to a vague concept was acceptable, committing to its implementation was not.
This article explores the scope and evolution of the European transatlantic policy with the United States of America (USA). Our research questions are related to the number and content of the texts adopted by the European Parliament (EP) and the role of the EP and its Committees in shaping the European transatlantic policies. We examine which are the committees that lead and guide the EP transatlantic conclusions. Within this context, this research paper highlights the substance of the European Union (EU) and the USA relations over the last 25 years and the major areas in which the EU cooperates with the USA. We have built our research on the European Parliament since it has legislative authority in shaping and guiding EU’s external policy. Therefore, our study brings a new perspective to the current literature on transatlantic relations by assessing the EU-USA relations from the EP conclusions and adopted legal texts. A document and policy analysis are conducted between 1999 and 2024, to assess each of the last five Parliamentary Terms and through the entire current EU laws in force. We conclude that despite studies asserting the weakening of the EU-USA relations, EU’s relations have been consistent since 1999 and even increasing in the last decade, from technical and legal achievement, based on the quantitative and contentive analysis of our research.
Even though the need to improve European joint defence capacity has been on the agenda of both NATO and the EU, individually and in partnership for over a decade, it has not yet been fully achieved. The Russian invasion was a brutal reminder that Europe is still largely dependent on the US for its security. This added further momentum to the process of building up a stronger European defence capacity, which has already been ongoing for a decade. The EU’s adoption of the Strategic Compass in March 2022, shortly after the invasion, is crucial in this context. It had been under development for some time (since June 2020) but had to be rewritten due to the invasion. It was intended to represent a great leap forward, as it was to present an action plan towards 2030. Due to recent events, member states were more committed than ever to delivering joint defence capacity, and they sought to do so through greater flexibility, investing more and more efficiently, and cooperating more closely with partners.
The geopolitical situation makes Europe more committed and obliged than ever to build a stronger European capacity. Over the past 15 years, a series of different initiatives, at different levels and in different formats, have been launched with this in mind. A recurring question, however, has been whether these many different processes and initiatives result in a more fragmented and complicated European security structure, with unnecessary duplication as a result. Or whether they, through various cooperation agreements and coordination efforts, contribute to a more flexible and stronger European defence structure, where formal structures are less important than commitment to different initiatives. The aim of this chapter is to provide an answer.
This article compares the trends and theoretical positions found in the recent academic literature on the status and trajectory of transatlantic relations with the beliefs of 96 German and US foreign policy experts. The qualitative data are derived from open-ended in-depth interviews about the political, economic, and cultural factors that influence transatlantic cooperation and friction. Conducted in Berlin in 2011 and in Washington, D.C., in 2017, the interviews correspond with optimist and pessimist perceptions found in the academic literature and align roughly with realist,
respectively, liberal/institutionalist and constructivist theoretical positions in International Relations theory and left/right political leanings. The study concludes with suggestions about the prospects for transatlantic relations, and the methodological benefits of comparing beliefs of foreign policy actors with theoretical paradigms and trends in the academic literature.
Indo-Pacific is indeed a versatile region with vast geoeconomic and geopolitical advantages and potentials, with ASEAN at its center. Strategic engagement of countries whether to bandwagon or balance major power’s rivalries are pretty much a pertinent deliberation for the last and next decades to come as the global shifting is now moving towards the Indo-Pacific region. This paper employs qualitative analysis to answer the main contentions of: (1) how minilateralism affects Indo-Pacific, and what ASEAN-US role can be explored; and (2) does ASEAN-US matter and how it could actively find convergences in navigating forward in the rules-based region. The author suggests that looking west and being concerned the east or the other way around can be a sufficient strategy in constructing ASEAN-US engagement amid the rising minilateral groupings and concerns against the “crippled” ASEAN centrality since AUKUS and the recent developments in the region.
This article describes how Sweden developed a hybrid defence-industrial infrastructure with three prioritized ‘essential strategic interests’ pointing to parts of the domestic defence industry: ‘a partial strategic autonomy’. The article focuses on Sweden’s declared three essential security interests – combat aircraft capability; underwater capabilities; and integrity-critical parts of the command, control, communication and intelligence domain (C3I). The article finds that the possibilities and ways forward for the essential security interests vary, with a general trend towards more shared and increasingly partial autonomy. Six change factors are formulated as drivers towards Sweden’s partial strategic autonomy of today: Autonomy as a result of failed internationalization; Techno-nationalist perception of Sweden leading to industrial protectionism; Strategic choice; Corporate lobbying; Export incentives leading to political support of technologies; and Europeanization of the EU defence industry. Techno-nationalism and strategic choice are the factors with the most evident impact. The overall governance of the defence industry is clear on the priority of ensuring security of supply and a high degree of autonomy regarding the three essential security interests. Other parts of the defence industry operate under globalized and more competitive conditions. In order to apply increased economic rationality and strive for shared autonomy, Sweden must increase its engagement in multilateral arms collaboration.
This article provides an original analysis of the crisis in transatlantic relations during the Trump presidency by drawing on two theories of trust: Hoffman's work on trusting interstate relationships, focused on decision-makers' policies, and Keating and Ruzicka's work on hedging strategies. Hoffman conceptualizes interstate trust as when the trustees are expected to “do what is right” because of shared norms and values; we compare this fiduciary or moralistic approach with the predictive approach, which considers trust a strategic and rational choice made by state leaders with material interests and gains in mind. Applying this theoretical framework, we examine the impact of Trump's “America First” foreign policy on transatlantic relations, showing that there has been a pronounced shift from the fiduciary to the predictive form of trust, a development that challenges the very essence of transatlantic relations. Moreover, we also discuss the hedging initiatives adopted by the European allies in order to cope with this crisis of trust. The article concludes that in spite of periodic crises in the past, Trump's approach to allies and to transatlantic relations created a crisis of trust unlike any seen before, one which will not be overcome merely by a change of US president.
The Eastern Mediterranean has emerged as one of the new high priority regions for EU foreign and security policy and an acid test for EU's strategic autonomy. The monetization of hydrocarbon reserves discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean about a decade ago hit on the obstacles of the Cyprus problem, the crisis in Turkey’s relations with Egypt and Israel, the Syrian and the Libyan civil wars. The recent escalation of Greek-Turkish maritime disputes and the Cyprus problem in the Eastern Mediterranean occurred at a time the debate on EU ‘strategic autonomy’ was burgeoning. This paper is based on sources identifying the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ to explore how EU foreign policymaking has been tested in one of the most significant regional crises affecting key EU security and diplomatic interests. It also evaluates whether the goal of EU strategic autonomy, as raised in several public statements and policy documents of the European Union, has come any closer.
What is the impact of crisis on European Union (EU) integration? Exploring
continuity and change in EU policies and institutions, this Handbook takes
stock of how and in what way crisis influences the EU. Since its inception, the
EU integration project has been characterized by a mix of incremental change and integration spurts that usually have followed major crises. Understanding
EU crisis and the EU response is thus key also to our understanding of the
EU more generally, and the empirical findings and theoretical arguments will
have relevance for the EU integration literature beyond the EU’s immediate
responses to crises.
The chapter sheds light on the EU-Eastern Mediterranean complex relations highlighting the challenges and the dilemmas faced by the EU over time. Based on the EU actorness literature, the chapter explores the main ΕU foreign policy outcomes, namely diplomatic, economic, security and military responses developed within multilateral and bilateral arrangements, across policy sectors. Regional dynamics following the Arab uprisings, conflicts and the security and migration crises are also examined as crucial factors shifting EU priorities and policies. In this spectrum, these parameters are also significant changing factors not only for the EU foreign policy agenda but also for the EU’s own transformation from a regulatory power to a (geo)political Union, posing EU sovereignty and strategic autonomy at the centre of its agenda.
European Defence is in a new and formative phase in which the European Union’s long list of defence acronyms has steadily grown. One of the most noticeable new policy initiatives is the European Commission’s European Defence Fund (EDF). This article consequently investigates and outlines the establishment of the European Defence Fund and the European Commission’s new role within the field of security and defence through the lens of revised neofunctionalism. This article thus asks how and through what steps did the EDF come about; and secondly how can neofunctionalism explain the dynamics involved in the establishment of the European Defence Fund. The analysis uses a process-tracing method and draws on interviews with relevant policymakers and officials in Brussels as well as official EU documents. The conclusions argue that the ever-increasing involvement of the European Commission in a policy field close to national sovereignty is starting to blur the traditional dichotomy between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making. In this way, this study contributes to the growing literature on the weakening of intergovernmentalism within the EU security and defence policy field.
With wavering US support and Brexit unfolding, cooperation between Germany, the EU's economic powerhouse, and the United Kingdom, Western Europe's prime military power, becomes crucial for Europe's overall ability to deal with a resurgent Russia. Does institutional and normative disintegration between states, such as the Brexit process, weaken bilateral security cooperation? This article argues that such cooperation persists if both states continue to jointly perceive a third actor as threatening while regarding each other as useful and reliable when it comes to ameliorating this shared threat. The argument is tested on a case of intrinsic theoretical, historical, and political importance: British-German cooperation towards Russia before and after the 2016 Brexit referendum. The article finds, against a wide pessimist consensus to the contrary, that cooperation strengthened during the Brexit process. As the Ukraine crisis had caused converging threat perceptions since 2014, Brexit incentivised both sides to signal ongoing reliability to each other and, consequently, to view each other as more capable allies. The article combines qualitative comparisons and congruence analysis, drawing data from British, German and Russian primary sources in their respective original languages, including foreign and security policy documents as well as interviews with stakeholders involved in policy formation.
In confronting the EU with an unprecedented crisis, the coronavirus outbreak is testing the bloc's unity, but may also accelerate the construction of EU strategic autonomy, as the roadmap for recovery is implemented. Political will, still in the making, and the capacity to act are key prerequisites for achieving effective European strategic autonomy.
The EU is increasingly at risk of becoming a 'playground' for global powers in a world dominated by geopolitics. Building European strategic autonomy on a horizontal – cross-policy – basis would strengthen the EU's multilateral action and reduce dependence on external actors, to make the EU less vulnerable to external threats; while promoting a level playing field that benefits everyone. The EU could thus reap the full dividend of its integration and possibly benefit from greater economic gains.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/652096/EPRS_STU(2020)652096_EN.pdf
This Working Paper analyzes the current debate on EU strategic autonomy among European policymakers and think-tankers and evaluates it against the backdrop of the EU’s progress as a global actor in recent years.
To bring more clarity to the debate, the paper distinguishes between a conventional and a global perspective on strategic autonomy. While conventional strategic autonomy focuses narrowly on the EU’s dependencies on the US as a security provider, global strategic autonomy highlights the EU’s ability to advance a range of international policies based on its distinct values and interests.
The paper proposes three dimensions within which the capacity for EU strategic autonomy should be evaluated: institutional, material, and political. The EU has made progress in the development of its institutional framework and has also started to invest in its material resources. However, without advances in political autonomy – particularly concerning the convergence of European strategic cultures – the sovereign EU in global affairs project will be difficult to achieve.
Despite a growing “momentum” on European Union (EU) security and defence, there are no academic analyses that aim to systematically assess the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) in these strategic domains. This is surprising given that the HR/VP is one of the central actors in the complex institutional architecture of EU security and defence. To fill this gap in the scholarly literature and to contribute to a more fine-grained analysis of the two post-Lisbon Treaty HR/VPs, the article assesses Ashton and Mogherini’s mandates in these fields. This study is particularly relevant because the HR/VP’s hybrid institutional role may represent a unique analytical angle to investigate a formally intergovernmental sector, strongly shaped also by EU institutions’ authority over defence-industrial policy. Following these considerations, the article looks at how the two HR/VPs managed to navigate both the military and the defence-industrial dimensions of EU security and defence.
Książka została wydana w serii Krótkie wprowadzenie. Zawiera zwięzłą historię relacji Europy ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Akcent został położony na występujące współzależności: polityczne, militarne i gospodarcze; od przybycia pierwszych osadników po koniec kadencji Donalda Trumpa w 2020 r.
The book was published in the series A Very Short Introduction. It contains a concise history of European relations with the United States. It focuses on the existing interdependencies: political, military and economic; from the arrival of the first settlers till the end of Donald Trump's term in 2020.
With lingering uncertainty regarding U.S. support for NATO and the terms surrounding Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, the remaining EU-27 are taking steps to forge a closer defense union. In 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel endorsed the concept of a European army, thereby siding with her French counterpart Emmanuel Macron. Some academics believe that such sentiment marks the beginning of the Europeanization of European defense and security. This paper explores three questions: What is the ‘Europeanization of defense’? What might it mean for the future of transatlanticism? Should defense integration at the European level be considered a panacea or peril for transatlantic partnership? This paper argues that recently launched initiatives, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund, are stepping stones rather than evidence for tangible EU defense integration. However, that is not to suggest that European defense and security are not being Europeanized. There has been a discernible change in rhetoric which, in turn, reflects a shift in strategic thinking. Whether the Europeanization of European security and defense will widen or close the transatlantic rift depends on how it is designed and executed. Closer cooperation at the European level can give rise to smarter investment in defense, and thus contribute to fairer burden-sharing. At the same time, Europeanizing defense could lead to its duplication and fragmentation.
A recent wave of scholarly literature has argued forcibly that the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represents an attempt on the part of the EU to “balance” against the United States. According to such analyses, the EU is reacting to American global preeminence by building up its military capacities to enhance its own ability to play a significant, autonomous role in international affairs. This article takes issue with such claims. It points, first, to significant theoretical and methodological shortcomings inherent in the work of the “soft balancers.” Second, and more fundamentally, it subjects this work to careful empirical scrutiny and illustrates how the soft balancers have fundamentally misunderstood ESDP. Finally, it illustrates how such misinterpretations result from a failure to appreciate the profound impact that institutional structures wield over substantive outcomes in international security affairs.
Le Sommet de Varsovie pourrait marquer une régionalisation accrue de l’Otan concentrée sur la défense de l’Europe, alors que la PSDC, tournée vers l’extérieur du continent, pourrait de facto voir son rôle s’accroître. Il est urgent qu’une meilleure complémentarité s’établisse entre l’Otan et l’UE.
As a new and unpredictable administration takes power in Washington, the relationship that the United States will have with its European allies remains unclear. There is understandably concern on both sides of the Atlantic about what this change will mean for the US relationship with NATO and the security guarantees that have been in place for almost 70 years. These concerns are not without foundation: just days before his inauguration, President-elect Trump once again described NATO as ‘obsolete’. Contradictory statements made by Trump and his candidates for Secretary of Defense and State raise further questions about the direction of US security policy, as well as the country's priorities. The Harmel Report was precipitated in part by the approaching deadline of 1969 which caused NATO to rethink and redefine itself in light of changing realities. The incoming Trump administration is raising questions that again are exposing divisions among members of the Alliance which could prompt re-evaluation that could strengthen the institution by reaffirming its relevance in light of a resurgent Russia. Or the result could be to further the pattern whereby the United States pursues policies deemed to be in its own national interest at the expense of Europe, while simultaneously, the European countries develop their own policies, both individually and collectively, that minimize or exclude the United States. This article takes a historical perspective to explore the evolution of the trans-Atlantic relationship to the present and to speculate on what the past might tell us about the future.
There have been two critical moments in Europe’s tortuous attempts to generate a viable, collective, relatively autonomous, trans-national defence project: the first decade after World War II, and the early decades of the 21st century. In both cases, the main features of the project were similar and in both cases there was an implicit or even explicit symbiosis between European integration and defence integration. In both cases, the same underlying weaknesses in the project stymied progress. These involved disagreements between France and the United Kingdom over the nature of the project itself; American ambivalence; differences among the European member states over how to handle relations with Russia; and unresolved tensions between the European entity and its member states. In the earlier case, these challenges proved fatal to the project. In the later case, they risk nudging it towards irrelevance.
The Common Security and Defence Policy maps out how the EU– established primarily to be an economic organisation– can purposefully prepare for and apply the use of military force. In this insightful work, Per M. Norheim-Martinsen argues that, since the EU is not a state but nevertheless does embody some non-intergovernmental characteristics, neither EU studies nor strategic studies is sufficient for fully understanding the Policy itself. Combining the two fields, the author utilises the instrumentality and clarity of the strategic approach, while retaining an understanding of the unique character of the EU as a strategic actor. In so doing, he provides a fruitful conceptual framework for analysing the development of the CSDP, how it functions in practice and how it will continue to evolve in the face of the challenges which lie ahead. This book will appeal to scholars and advanced students of European studies, international relations and strategic studies.
This book offers an overview of the interface between European integration, transatlantic relations, and the 'rise of the rest' in the early 21st century.
U.S. policymakers debate how to wield American power; foreigners debate how to deal with it. Some make their peace with Washington and try to manipulate it; others try to oppose and undercut U.S. interests. The challenge for the United States is how to turn its material dominance into legitimate authority.
Trump and Sanders = NATO’s Perfect Storm
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