ArticlePDF Available

Argumentation and Aggression: About Maps and Poems in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

Authors:

Abstract and Figures

Argumentation as a function of human communication, and aggression as a feature of communicative behaviour, seem to be contrary to each other. Argumentation should be understood as the regulation of dissent based on rational arguments, whereas aggression can be seen as the manifestation and intensification of dissent. But the boundaries between rationality and irrationality, as well as between the regulation and the manifestation of dissent are often vague. Therefore, not only hate speech but also seemingly rational argumentation can be motivated by aggression and can lead to aggression. In the present study, this intertwinedness of argumentation and aggression is shown in the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, where we can find the use of aggressive theses, reasons, and aggressive arguments in different semiotic and textual expressions: not only in political statements, but also in poetry and in multimodal forms like political maps. Combining argumentation theory with a case study of aggressive argumentation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the paper presents several forms of intertwinedness of argumentation and aggression. The research is mainly based on maps as a type of popular geopolitics, in which the aggressive thesis of the non-existence of Ukraine is provided. The study also considers the poeto-political war around Anastasiia Dmytruk’s poem “Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami” (“Never ever we will be brothers”). Responses to Dmytruk’s thesis provoke not only disagreement but also negative and positive-negative agreement, which means that the opponent agrees with the thesis but rejects the reasons of the argument, or s/he agrees with the thesis and the reasons but evaluates them in a contradictory way. Whereas the analysis of maps shows mainly the performing of aggressive theses, the analysis of the poeto-political war highlights how reasons are provided in an aggressive communication frame.
Content may be subject to copyright.
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018) DOI: https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus418
Argumentation and Aggression: About Maps and
Poems in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict
1
Holger Kuße
Technische Universität Dresden, Institute of Slavonic Studies
Abstract: Argumentation as a function of human communication, and aggression as
a feature of communicative behaviour, seem to be contrary to each other.
Argumentation should be understood as the regulation of dissent based on rational
arguments, whereas aggression can be seen as the manifestation and intensification
of dissent. But the boundaries between rationality and irrationality, as well as
between the regulation and the manifestation of dissent are often vague. Therefore,
not only hate speech but also seemingly rational argumentation can be motivated by
aggression and can lead to aggression. In the present study, this intertwinedness of
argumentation and aggression is shown in the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict,
where we can find the use of aggressive theses, reasons, and aggressive arguments
in different semiotic and textual expressions: not only in political statements, but also
in poetry and in multimodal forms like political maps. Combining argumentation
theory with a case study of aggressive argumentation in the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict, the paper presents several forms of intertwinedness of argumentation and
aggression. The research is mainly based on maps as a type of popular geopolitics, in
which the aggressive thesis of the non-existence of Ukraine is provided. The study
also considers the poeto-political war around Anastasiia Dmytruk’s poem “Nikogda
my ne budem brat'iami” (“Never ever we will be brothers). Responses to Dmytruks
thesis provoke not only disagreement but also negative and positive-negative
agreement, which means that the opponent agrees with the thesis but rejects the
reasons of the argument, or s/he agrees with the thesis and the reasons but evaluates
them in a contradictory way. Whereas the analysis of maps shows mainly the
performing of aggressive theses, the analysis of the poeto-political war highlights
how reasons are provided in an aggressive communication frame.
Keywords: argumentation, argument, aggression, aggressive argumentation,
Russian-Ukrainian conflict, political maps, Anastasiia Dmytruk, political poetry.
1
This research is based on a lecture on April 5, 2018, co-organized by the Canadian
Institute of Ukrainian Studies and the Department of Modern Languages and Cultural
Studies at the University of Alberta. It was carried out in the framework of the
trilateral international project: “Aggression and Argumentation. Conflict Discourses
and Their Linguistic Negotiations” (“Aggression und Argumentation.
Konfliktdiskurse und ihre sprachliche Verhandlung”) supported by the German
funder of basic research Volkswagen Stiftung. I thank Alla Nedashkivska for her
commentaries and corrections.
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
38
1. ABOUT THE INTERTWINEDNESS OF ARGUMENTATION AND AGGRESSION
hat are the relations between argumentation and aggression? To what
degree do they overlap, or do they overlap at all? On the one hand, it
is easy to identify contradictions between argumentation and
aggression. Argumentation for instance is rational, and it attempts to be “a
very logical way of discussing or debating an idea” (“Argumentation”). On
the contrary, aggression is emotional and irrational. Argumentation should
be dialogical, whereas aggression is rather monological. Argumentation is
open-ended. Aggression is based on firm opinions. Last, argumentation is a
“special sort of disagreement-regulating mechanism, while aggression is a
manifestation of dissent and hostility (van Eemeren et al. 25). On the other
hand, there is evidence for the agonal character of argumentation and for
arguments based on aggression. It is probably no coincidence that the best-
known conceptual metaphor in Lakoff and Johnsons famous book
Metaphors We Live by is ARGUMENT IS WAR. Actively used linguistic
metaphors, cited by Lakoff and Johnson, instantiate this concept:
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
Ive never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments. (4)
A couple of years before Lakoff and Johnson, Norwegian philosopher Arne
Naess called argumentation a tug of war and illustrated it by a central, strong
line, with some longer and some shorter lines beside it, that symbolize
different reasons for contradictory positions: F0 and Not-F0, illustrated in
Figure 1. (The drawing can be found in the complete German translation
from Norwegian, but not in the shortened English version.)
Figure 1: Argumentation as a tug of war by Arne Naess (Naess 148)
W
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
39
Discussions in which pro- and counter-arguments are provided are not
necessarily aggressive, but they can be, and often are, even if they are not
characterized by metaphors like those in Lakoff and Johnson’s influential
study. The first form of the intertwinedness of argumentation and
aggression can be seen in the justification of aggression by argument. The
second is when argumentation itself becomes an act of aggression. This is,
for instance, the case when someone tends to destroy a consensus with the
intention to destroy the social harmony of a community. Third, arguments
can be intrinsically aggressive, for instance when they feature intentional
fallacies, degrading nominations, demeaning predications, and suggestive
claims that lead to hostility.
In the following study, I show how argumentation and aggression can be
intertwined in aggressive communication. This intertwinedness can be seen
not only in prosaic statements, but also in poetry and other creative forms,
as well as in multimodal texts in which written text and visualization are
related to each other. The study combines the development of a theory of the
intertwinedness of aggression and argumentation with a case study of
aggressive argumentation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In any political
and military conflict, in addition to the official political discourse, there are
popular forms of argumentative and aggressive communication. Political
poetry and unofficial maps are among such texts. In the present study, maps
are investigated as multimodal arguments. The examples analyzed are taken
from a number of Internet sites representing Russian nationalist, that is,
clearly anti-Ukrainian, positions. Specifically, http://geopolitica.ru and
http://stanislavs.org are in focus. Poeto-political texts illustrate clearly how
aggression and argumentation can be intertwined in ways where aggression
is openly expressed, justified, or more or less covered by seemingly friendly
theses and reasons. The chosen examples are Anastasiia Dmytruks poem
“Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami” (Never ever we will be brothers) and
responses it has received. These texts are found on popular Russian sites
such as http://stihi.ru, which articulate widespread opinions about the
Ukrainian crisis and reasons related to it.
In multimodal texts, which have been widely investigated during the last
decade (examples are Forceville, Klug and Stöckl, Kress, Kress and van
Leeuwen, LeVin and Scollon, Morozova), the image can represent a word or
an expression or it can be a metaphor. The written text can give the image a
surprise meaning, and the meaning of the written text can be formulated in
the context of the image. From the argumentation theory perspective, these
interrelations can be seen as complex arguments in which written text and
visualization correspond to each other as thesis, reason, and consequence
(conclusion). This is the case in advertising as well as in special textual forms
such as maps, which I investigate below. In what follows, I demonstrate how
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
40
multimodal texts embody argument structures, using an example of political
advertising related to the Crimean referendum in March 2014.
Before the Crimean referendum (March 16, 2014), an election poster
outed the illegal and aggressive character of the annexation, as seen in Figure
2. It showed two maps of Crimea: on the left side the peninsula is coloured
deeply red with a swastika on it covered by barbed wire. On the right-side
Crimea has the colours of the Russian flag. The header of the poster
contained the phrase On March 16 we will choose either or,while the
alternative conjunction or (Russ. ili), positioned at the bottom between the
two pictures of Crimea, signifies occupied by fascists or liberated by
Russia.
Figure 2: Election poster for the Crimean referendum (March 16, 2014)
2
The Crimean election poster in Figure 2 is a clear example of an aggressive
argument; here, two visualizations represent the thesis that a Ukrainian
Crimea would be a fascist prison. This absurd allegation was nothing less
than a crude defamation of Ukraine and all who did not support the
connection of Crimea to Russia. But waste phrases and defamations do not
constitute arguments. The poster displayed an argument because of its
appellative intention. The alternative between fascism and Russia instead of
Ukraine and Russia provided a simple reason to vote for Russia.
The propaganda displayed in Figure 2 did not remain without an
answer. On the satirical site Politota, where one can find many political
cartoons, memos, and comments, a satirical interpretation of the poster was
2
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C7AdqGsXEAEUFL2.jpg. Accessed 6 May 6 2018.
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
41
published in 2014. In this particular figure, both maps of Crimea are in
Russian colours and covered by swastika and barbed wire (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Manipulated election poster for the Crimean referendum (March 16,
2014
3
2. THE ARGUMENTATION SCHEME
In his 1972 book, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach,
philosopher Sir Raimund Karl Popper (1902-94) expanded the Organon
model of his teacher Karl Bühler (1879-1963) with the argumentative
function. In Bühler’s model (1934), a distinction is drawn between the
expressive function, the conative (i.e., appealing) function, and the
representation function as the fundamental linguistic functions, the last of
which can be found only in human communication and not in the
communicative behaviour of animals (xxvi, 28-33). In contrast to the
Organon model’s representative function, which is descriptive and therefore
features the idea of “truth (as distinct from falsity),” Popper saw the idea of
“argumentative use of language, in critical discussion” in “validity (as distinct
from invalidity)” (237). A representative claim achieves its goal, when it is
understood and taken as true by its recipients, whereas an argument needs
to be appreciated as being valid, i.e., it is distinguished by a valid reason as a
3
http://polit.reactor.cc/post/1221306. Accessed 6 May 2018.
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
42
meaningful claim or appeal. In his extension of Bühler’s model, Popper
thought first about scientific argumentation and second about everyday
communication. However, especially in current communication and in
persuasive discourses, like politics, validity does not automatically imply
that an argument will be convincing, and arguments that reach their goal to
convince the audience are not always valid. On the one hand, reasons can be
accepted, but nevertheless rejected due to counter-reasons which seem
more substantial to an opponent. On the other hand, valid arguments should
not contain fallacies, lies, defamation, slander, or libel, but as we see in the
example of the Crimean election poster from 2014, these “forbidden”
features are broadly used in propaganda and other kinds of persuasive
communication, like political rhetoric or commercial advertising. Such
differences in argumentation were already seen and described by Aristotle
in his The Art of Rhetoric, where the logical form of syllogism is distinguished
from the less strict enthymeme which Aristotle calls “rhetorical syllogism”
(Book I, part 2; see also Kuße, Konjunktionale Koordination 324-28). In
enthymemic arguments, premises can be valid, or better to say plausible, and
therefore convincing to communication participants even if they do not
conform to the strict criteria of validity, i.e., truthfulness of the given
reason(s), rationality of the argument, and logical coherence between
premises and conclusion(s). In the case of the Crimean election poster, the
rhetorical force is based on the alternative structure with its unambiguous
evaluation and historical allusions to World War II, where Ukrainian
patriots, namely the so called Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), temporarily
collaborated with the German Nazi regime. This allusion could give the
visualized argument not only plausibility for some recipients, but also could
provoke hostile feelings of fear and anger against Ukrainians. As the ensuing
referendum showed, such propagandistic argumentation was very effective.
One could argue that the infamous poster does not contain any argument,
but only brutal libel, and that it must be seen as a kind of visual hate speech,
but such clear distinction of argument and non-argument seems to me too
easy. In enthymemic rhetoric, where reasons are based on meanings rather
than on knowledge, the border between legitimate plausibility and
illegitimate manipulation is hard to ascertain.
In order for a complex statement to be called an argument, some formal
elements are required, as Figure 4 illustrates. First, there has to be a question
in dispute, a Quaestio, followed by a thesis to which the argument’s
conclusion should correspond. The thesis has to be supported by a reason
that leads to the conclusion. The connection between reason and conclusion
has to be distinguished with an inference-licensing rule (to borrow the term
from Hitchcock 81-95) which makes a claim in favour of the conclusion
reasonable. For instance, the inference-licensing rule of the Crimean poster
(Figure 2) could be formulated as follows: “If we want to avoid fascism in
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
43
Crimea, we have to vote for Russia.The question of whether the inference-
licensing rule is plausible, and the argument therefore becomes convincing,
depends somewhat on the audience.
Figure 4: Quaestio-inference-licensing rule-scheme (Kuße,
Kulturwissenschaftliche Linguistik 94; Kusse 98)
QUAESTIO
REASON
THESIS
CONCLUSION
INFERENCE-LICENSING RULE
In addition to the relativity of their validity, enthymemic arguments are
distinguished by a lack of completeness of all premises and conclusions. In
everyday communication and in rhetorical persuasive argumentation, the
thesis, the conclusion, or the reason can represent the entire argumentation,
because the participants understand not the expressed information but the
implied information, which makes the argument complete. In the argument
of the Crimean poster, the reason to vote for the connection to Russia is
provided by the thesis that otherwise Crimea would be occupied by fascists.
Aggressive argumentation like the Crimean poster in Figure 2 is
performed by aggressive theses, but it can also be distinguished by
aggressive reasons. In the following two sections, which represent the focus
of the current study, the objectives are to demonstrate both the aggressive
theses and the aggressive reasons. In section 3, I present examples for the
thesis “Ukraine does not exist which is often visualized by pseudo-political
maps. In section 4, aggressive reasons for and counter-reasons against the
thesis “Never ever we will be brothers” are demonstrated. This is the title of
the poem mentioned above by Dmytruk, published on YouTube and
Facebook in 2014. This poem generated a political poetry war with a
multitude of aggressive reasons concerning the differences between
Ukrainians and Russians, worthy of investigation.
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
44
3. AGGRESSIVE THESES
Probably the most aggressive thesis within the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is
the assertion that Ukraine does not really exist, and the contemporary
Ukrainian state is a historical accident. Sometimes this thesis about the non-
existence of Ukraine is openly expressed, while at other times it is implicated
in wider considerations about the fate and the future of Ukraine and its
relations with other countries, mainly with Russia. Already in the 1990s,
Russian ultranationalists such as Aleksandr Dugin and the right-wing clown
in Russian politics, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, openly denied the right of Ukraine
to exist as a sovereign state (cf. Uffelmann 265). In the Russian talk show
Voskresnyi vecher s Vladimirom Solov'evym (Sunday Evening with Vladimir
Solov'ev) on July 10, 2017, Zhirinovskii divided Ukraine in at least two pieces
and added it to different geopolitical spheres: the north-west to the Western
hemisphere, and the south to Russia, as depicted in Example 1 below:
Example 1: Результат я вижу один: северо-западная Украина пусть
Львов, НАТО, ЕС, кто угодно. Юг—это наше от Донбасса до Тирасполя.
I see one result: the north-west of Ukraine be it Lvov, NATO, EU, whoever it
is. The souththats ours from the Donbass to Tiraspol.
4
Zhirinovskii is known for his directness and for his lack of political respect
and diplomatic prudence, as seen in Example 1. In contrast, Vladimir Putin
provides similar ideas but in a more implicit and hidden manner. This is
demonstrated in his speech on March 18, 2014, two days after the Crimean
referendum. Consider Example 2:
Example 2: После революции большевики по разным соображениям,
пусть Бог им будет судья, включили в состав Украинской союзной
республики значительные территории исторического юга России. Это
было сделано без учёта национального состава жителей, и сегодня это
современный юго-восток Украины. (Obrashchenie”)
After the revolution, the Bolsheviks, for a number of reasons may God
judge them added large sections of the historical South of Russia to the
Republic of Ukraine. This was done with no consideration for the ethnic
make-up of the population, and today these areas form the South-East of
Ukraine. (“Address”)
In Example 2, the Russian president hinted that the contemporary borders
of Ukraine do not correspond to the ethnic affiliation of its inhabitants
because they are no more than the result of a hardly comprehensible
4
Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
45
administrative act during the post-revolutionary period in the twentieth
century. The status quo of the Ukrainian state is implicitly marked as an evil,
because even God is invoked by the speaker in view of the Bolsheviks
decision. A month later, in his TV show Priamaia liniia s Vladimirom Putinym
(Direct Line with Vladimir Putin), the president repeated the unspoken thesis
about the false borders using the colonial term Novorossiia, from the time
of Catherine II, to characterize the supposed original territorial ownership
of the south-east of Ukraine (“Priamaia”). Using such terms and indicating
them as historical information as Putin did, is not yet an open justification of
a future invasion. The hidden rhetoric provides a thesis about the
irregularity of the Ukrainian borders and presents for the large audience
ready moral reasons to justify an annexation of nearly half of current
Ukraine.
Nothing is easier to visualize than the fragmentation of a country.
Especially in popular geopolitics, a map provides a simplified view of
political geography in which an alternative political reality seems to be real
(cf. Uffelmann; Dodds). The map expresses a thesis about what is the case, or
what should be the case. On sites with anti-Ukrainian positions, numerous
fictive maps circulate, on which Ukraine is reduced to a small territory or has
even completely vanished. One thesis behind those maps is expressed in an
English post on the site http://stanislavs.org (from Feb. 27, 2016). This post
is titled How Malorossiia Was Turned into the Patch-quilt of Discord That
Is Ukraine.’” On the map illustrated in Figure 5, Ukraine is reduced to the
territory of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the middle of the seventeenth
century. All other territories are indicated as being “added” in several
periods, the last being “added” in 1954.
Figure 5: Map at http://stanislavs.org/category/ukraine-russia/page/2/
(Accessed 22 Mar. 2018)
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
46
In Figure 5 the information about years and territories is not without
historical background, but the changes of borders and the history of country
unification is not specific for Ukraine (for instance, German history
demonstrates a similar case of shifting borders and changing geopolitical
situations). The map presents the aggressive thesis that there is no Ukraine
except for a small yellow band left and right of the Dnipro. Therefore,
important facts of Ukrainian history, such as the founding of the Ukrainian
National Republic in 1917, are ignored. It is unclear what “added in 1654-
1917could mean. Clearly, these questions are not of interest to the author,
who openly expressed his intention to provide and prove a thesis of the non-
existence of an original Ukraine. He comments on his map as follows:
Example 3: This map shows how the size of Ukraine changed through
history. NOTE! What is shown here in yellow as Ukraine in 1654 was in
fact the territory of the Zaporozhie Cossacks (Zaporozhskie Kazaki). There
was no country or territory called Ukraine before Lenin and Bolsheviks
created the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the USSR. (“How
Malorossiia”)
On other maps similar to the one in Figure 6, Ukraine is reduced to a
minimum in the far west of the contemporary state
(https://www.geopolitica.ru site, subtitled with the slogan “Carthago
delanda est”).
Figure 6: Map at https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/there-are-no-valid-
arguments-against-liberation-novorossia (Accessed 5 Feb. 2018)
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
47
Using historical names like Malorussia (Малороссия) and Novorussia
(Новороссия) and the misleading term Subcarpathian Russia (which does
not indicate a territory of Russians but of the ethnic Rusyns), the map in
Figure 6 again provides a thesis of the irregularity, if not the non-existence,
of Ukraine. This thesis could be used as a reason to justify the annihilation of
Ukraine by military force. A similar aim is voiced in the related article by
Nicholas Nicholaides titled There Are No Valid Arguments against a
Liberation of Novorossia. The author combines the proposed country
fragmentation with further political implications. The title entails the
presumption that something like Novorossiia exists (and therefore Ukraine
does not exist) and has to be liberated. It is then perhaps not surprising that
the author calls the Ukrainian government the “Kiev Nazi junta,a group that
supposedly occupied Novorossiia and should be kicked out of the country.
Another hostile example of political fragmentation in which Ukraine
looks wider than it does in Figure 6, but is nevertheless separated from
Novorossiia, is a map found on http://LiveJournal.com (Figure 7). It was
placed on the website by a user with the nickname arcktick on March 15,
2014.
Figure 7: Map at https://arcktick.livejournal.com/15240.html (Accessed 21
Mar. 2018)
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
48
On the map in Figure 7, Crimea belongs to the Russian Federation.
Novorossiia is an independent state, but on the legend it is written “possible
within Russia. With respect to the separated state Galicia, the legend
suggests “possible within Ukraine.Moreover, the colouring of Galicia does
not match the colours of the historical flag of the Principality of Galicia-
Volhynia (blue and yellow as in present day Ukraine), but is marked in the
colours of the UPA, i.e., the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in World War II. The
chosen emblem for Galicia is the Halych coat of arms that shows a jackdaw
(or a raven). This signification of the fictive western Ukrainian state Galicia
has some degrading implications. These implications can be found in a
comment from another user of LiveJournal. On April 30, 2014, Stella VL
commented about the Halych coat of arms in Example 4:
Example 4: You will laugh, but this is the emblem of Galicia! What kind of
little small people are you, when on your emblem, you portray a crow (an
angry one ) (in Russian; see Figure 8).
Figure 8: Halych coat of arms at
https://www.liveinternet.ru/users/2458238/post322966915 (Accessed 21
Mar. 2018)
In Example 4 and Figure 8, the text represents an open hate speech attack.
The image in Figure 8 is followed by some commentaries: “Они и живут, как
вороньё,” literally translated as: “They also live like swarms of crows,
which metaphorically means “They are vultures. This accusation is
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
49
connected to the renaissance of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainian
nationalists before and during World War II, who was convicted as a war
criminal in Russia. In the commentary to Figure 8, not only Galicians, but
Ukrainians supporting the Euromaidan are metaphorically accused of
following “the gangs of Bandera”: “the heads of the Bandera gang already
begin to fly” (“начинают головы уже лететь бандеровской своры”).
Ukraine is now not only fragmented geographically, but the regions are
related to different political orientations, among which the west is created
as a fascist space. This is already indicated by the colours of the UPA flag. It
cannot be denied that in present Ukraine, especially in the western parts,
there is a certain degree of nostalgia toward the UPA. Furthermore, as in
other European countries, and not least in Russia, right-wing parties
penetrate the political scene. However, there is an implied universal
quantifier in a defamatory map (Figure 7). In understanding maps as
multimodal texts, the colouring of Galicia can be interpreted as a statement
that suggests that all Galicians support UPA-nostalgia or even the Right
Sector (Pravyi Sektor).
The colouring of different parts of a map can be even more defamatory.
On a map from the website http://stanislavs.org in Figure 9, Galicia is
covered by the Nazi flag with the swastika.
Figure 9: Map at http://stanislavs.org/category/ukraine-russia/page/2/
(Accessed 22 Mar. 2018)
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
50
The accusation of fascism directly leads to the legitimation of war and
suggests that the putative Ukrainian fascist is now seen anywhere in
Ukraine. On the site http://e-news.su with the hashtag
#SaveDonbassPeopleFromKievNazisArmy, on February 9, 2015, the map
shown in Figure 10 was posted. On this map, the fascist UPA-wolf is kicked
out of Novorossiia by a military boot with the Russian flag on it. The slogan
on the bottom says in Russian: “There is no place for Nazis in our country.
Figure 10: Map at http://www.e-news.su/in-ukraine/45935-za-chto-voyuet-
donbass.html (Accessed 5 Feb. 2018)
In Figure 10, the thesis of the non-existence of a real Ukraine in its
contemporary borders is openly combined with the segregation of good and
evil and the condemnation of Ukrainians as fascists or supporters of fascism.
The indication that the boot is a Russian one demonstrates that the war in
Donbass is not only a civil war, but rather a Russian-Ukrainian war.
As we see in Figures 5-10, the thesis “Ukraine does not exist” has
variations. The first variant sees Ukraine as an artificial construct without a
historical right to exist. Another variant looks at Ukraine as a territory
occupied by fascists and in need of liberation. In both of these variants, the
consequence is the annihilation of the contemporary Ukrainian state. This
does not automatically mean that the authors of such suggestions deny all
Ukrainian peculiarities. In the article “Za chto voiuet Donbass” by Eduard
Birov (on the site http://www.e-news.su/), some folkloristic features are
accepted, but the website suggests that Ukraine should be incorporated into
the so-called Russian world (russkii mir) without any political
independence. The talk is about the geographic Ukraine, not the political
Ukraine, the latter which should in the authors perspectives no longer exist.
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
51
Example 5: Географическая Украина, освобожденная от русофобской
пропаганды, может и должна оставаться частью русского мира при
определенном фольклорном региональном своеобразии. (Birov)
The geographic Ukraine, which is liberated from Russophobe propaganda,
can and must remain as a part of the Russian world with some folkloristic
regional peculiarities.
However, on other sites even the cultural specifics of Ukraine are denied. For
instance, specifically radical hatred against Ukraine is provided in the
following example:
Example 6: На Украине нет единого народа, отдельного от народа
остальной Руси, он существует лишь в конституции, подразумевая
формальное гражданство.
(http://tribunalkrim.narod.ru/new/frankenshtein.htm. Accessed 22 Mar.
2018)
There are no united people in the [sic.] Ukraine, that is different from the
other Rus'. It exists only in the constitution, in the understanding of a formal
citizenship.
In Example 6, even the preposition na (on/in), normally used with regions
and territories, instead of the preposition v (in), used with countries,
signifies a denial of Ukraine’s status as a sovereign country and state,
promoting Ukraine as a geographic region within an empire. Therefore, the
signification is translated as in the Ukraine. The author in Example 6 uses
the historical term Rus' in the sense of “Russian world” but with an allusion
to the Kyivan Rus' in the Middle Ages, in which indeed the difference
between Ukrainians and Russians did not exist. On the site
http://geopolitica.ru, a similar position is held. In this example, the
statement is even more defaming:
Example 7: There is no “Ukrainian people.There are the fascists in the
West and the Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Novorossia.
(Nicholaides)
The maps in Figures 5-7 and 9-10 and the commentaries cited in
Examples 3 and 5-7, imply the thesis that Ukraine does not exist by dividing
the map of the contemporary state into historically and ideologically
disconnected parts. The thesis can stand as a suggestion without further
argumentation, but mostly it leads to reasons why such a thesis should be
afforded. This is illustrated in the cited article How Malorossia Was Turned
into the Patch-quilt of Discord That Is Ukraine,’ where these reasons are
performed as pseudo-historical critiques (see Figure 5, Example 3).
However, in such texts, the arguments are circular for the most part. The
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
52
various theses of the non-existence of Ukraine are provided through fictive
political maps that represent the borders and the inner structure of the
imagined fragmentation of the Ukrainian state. These maps fulfill a double
function. They are visualizations of the thesis on the one hand, and a kind of
proof of what Ukraine looks like, on the other. This is especially the case
when the territories are related to political camps: to the putative fascism in
the west and to the Russian world in the east.
The maps perform a circular argument in which the thesis is provided
by the visualization and at the same time proved by it: What you see on the
map, is what you find in reality. This circularity works because of the
performative power of maps. They not only represent political realities, they
can provide such realities. Whether they do so, depends on the legal status
of the person or institution responsible for the map. Like a performative
speech act, a map reflects reality only when the producer wants it to and has
the power to achieve this. Fictive maps can lead to conflict about the status
of Ukraine, and more important, can be used as justification or even
legitimation of civil war and Russian invasions. The underlying inference-
licensing rule of such justification is easy to formulate and can be very
convincing. It can be expressed in the following conditional formula: When
a territory is occupied by fascists, it should be liberated. The author of the
pamphlet There Are No Valid Arguments against a Liberation of
Novorossia on http://geopolitica.ru (see Example 7 above) expresses this
kind of argument quite bluntly when he rejects reasons against a Russian
invasion in the so-called Novorossiia:
Example 8: “It is a trap to get Russia to war”—No! The trap is to fool Russia
not to intervene, because if Russia intervenes the Kiev junta will fall and
Russia and Novorossia will win quickly. So the trap is to scare Russia not to
intervene. (Nicholaides)
The debate of Novorossiia and the maps dividing Ukraine into several parts
arose after the Revolution of Dignity and during the annexation of Crimea,
mostly in 2014. These events seem to be already historicthe project of
Novorossiia failed, and a broader Russian invasion did not take place (about
Novorossiia cf. Suslov). But the debate itself and the performance of
aggressive theses through maps could be reactivated at any moment, as long
as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continues.
The conflict is related to Russian-Ukrainian relations and the ideologies
that are constructed around them. One can see different perspectives of
them: from hostility to brotherhood or even the assumption that Ukrainians
and Russians should be seen as one people. The last position is the official
standpoint of the Russian president Vladimir Putin, who several times in
speeches and interviews underlined the close brotherhood and the unity of
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
53
Ukrainians and Russians. In a long interview with Oliver Stone, Putin claimed
that Ukrainians and Russians are nearly the same.
Example 9: Я уже много раз говорил и хочу повторить еще много раз: я
глубоко убежден, что украинский и русский народ—близкие
родственники, это практически одно и то же. Что касается языковых
особенностей, культурных особенностей, исторических
особенностей, это, безусловно, требует уважения и, кстати говоря,
всегда уважалось в рамках единой страны. (Stoun 231)
On many occasions I’ve said that and I’d like to reiterate. I’m deeply
convinced that the Ukrainian people and the Russian people are not simply
close relatives. They are almost the same. As for the language, the culture,
the history, each certainly has to be treated with respect. And even when
we were one single country, we treated them with respect (Stone 192-93).
In Example 9, the seemingly friendly assertion of Russian-Ukrainian
brotherhood shows Ukraine as a geographic space with some regional
specificities, but not as a politically and culturally independent unity. In the
following section, the aggressive reasoning in the political poetics of
Dmytruk that reacts against the ideology of brotherhood and the responses
of her opponents is analyzed.
4. AGGRESSIVE REASONS
A striking example of the accumulation of aggressive reasons in favour of an
already aggressive thesis is the Russian-language poem “Nikogda my ne
budem brat'iami” (“Never ever we will be brothers”) by the young Ukrainian
poetess Anastasiia Dmytruk, published on March 10, 2014, on her Facebook
site and after that performed on YouTube. The thesis of the title is easy to
understand as a rejection of the rhetoric of familiarity and brotherhood from
the Russian side, namely from Putin. The poem is structured in antitheses
with clear axiological distinctions. In this poem, portrayed in Example 10,
Ukrainians are characterized as young, free, revolutionary, and
democratically thinking people, whereas the Russians are accused of being
totalitarian, frightened, unfree, and obsolete.
Example 10: Никогда мы не будем братьями!
Ни по родине, ни по матери.
Духа нет у вас быть свободными—
нам не стать с вами даже сводными. (Dmytruk)
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
54
Never ever we will be brothers
neither by motherland, nor by mothers.
You have no guts to be free
we won’t even become step-siblings.
5
Dmytruk’s poem has a very clear structure. In Example 10, after the
formulation of the thesis Never ever we will be brothersnot by
motherland, not by mothers,a cascade of antithetical reasons follows,
Ukrainians being the We and Russians being the You. These reasons have
different contents, but the oppositions good and bad and freedom and
submission are expressed or implied in every sentence. Furthermore, as
Example 11 illustrates, the Russian side is accused not only of using a false
metaphoric sense of brotherhood but also of pretending to be superior, i.e.,
of being the big brother in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship.
Example 11: Вы себя окрестили “старшими”—
нам бы младшими, да не вашими.
Вас так много, а, жаль, безликие.
Вы огромные, мы—великие.
You baptized yourself as “elders”—
we are fine with being younger, but not being yours.
You are so many, but, unfortunately, faceless.
You are enormous, weare great.
The following verses in Example 12 illustrate the stereotyped worldview of
Dmytruks poem expressed in polar values. Silence, tsarism, and submission
are the main values of Russians, whereas Ukrainians are ready for an
uprising, for supporting democracy, and do not fear even Molotov cocktails.
Example 12: У вас дома “молчанье—золото,”
а у нас жгут коктейли Молотова,
да, у нас в сердце кровь горячая,
что ж вы нам за “родня” незрячая?
[…]
Вам шлют новые указания—
а у нас тут огни восстания.
У вас Царь, у нас—Демократия.
Никогда мы не будем братьями.
At your home, “silence is golden,
At our home, Molotov cocktails are being burnt.
Indeed, the blood is hot in our hearts,
5
My translation. See also the translation by Andrey Kneller at
https://www.facebook.com/knellera/posts/290782174430944 (Accessed 17 Aug.
2018).
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
55
what kind of blind relatives are you to us?
[…]
You are being sent new orders,
and we have the flames of uprising here.
You have the Tsar, we have Democracy.
Never ever we will be brothers.
The unambiguous polarized oppositions with their hostility against all who
do not belong to the We-group, i.e., to the supporters of the Euromaidan,
provoked responses that are no less aggressive. In a very short time a “viral
poeto-political discourse” (“ein viraler poetopolitischer Diskurs”) arose
(Stahl 444). On http://stihi.ru, directly after Dmytruk’s “Never ever we will
be brothers, a poem followed, entitled We Are not Brothers of Bandera
Mugs (“My ne brat'ia banderovskim rozham”).
Example 13: МЫ НЕ БРАТЬЯ БАНДЕРОВСКИМ РОЖАМ
(Песня. Автор и исполнитель в ролике не указаны)
Мы не братья бандеровским рожам,
мы не братья убийцам людей,
чьи дела и поступки безбожны,
кто носитель фашистских идей. […]
(https://www.stihi.ru/2015/11/09/4971) (Accessed 10 Dec. 2017)
WE ARE NO BROTHERS OF BANDERA MUGS
(Song. Author and performer are not named in the clip.)
We are not brothers of Bandera mugs,
We are not brothers of assassins,
Whose acts and behaviour are godless,
Who are carriers of fascist ideas.
This poetic answer can be characterized as a negative agreement, which
means that the thesis of Dmytruks initial poem is accepted, but the reasons
Dmytruk gave are rejected and opposed by contrary reasons. The negative
agreement can be paraphrased as follows: “I agree with the thesis, but the
reasons are faulty and should be replaced by axiological contradictory
theses.In his poem “Otvet ukrainskoi devochke Naste Dmitruk na ee stikhi
‘Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami’” (“Answer to the Ukrainian Girl Nastia
Dmytruk and Her Poem Never ever we will be brothers’”), Iurii Loza, a
Russian singer and song writer accuses Dmytruk and her followers of having
no inner family relations. Again, Ukrainians are accused of being fascists,
even from birth. As Example 14 demonstrates, there is a negative agreement
with Dmytruks thesis.
Example 14: Вас растили, наверное, не матери,
И не с сестрами, и не с братьями,
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
56
Вам фашистскую, черную свастику
При рождении дарили каратели.
С детства вам забивали головы
Профашистскими “супер-героями,”
Вот и жжете коктейли вы Молотова,
А не учите Правду истории... (“Stikh-otvet”)
You, probably, weren’t raised by mothers,
You grew up with no sisters, nor brothers.
A fascist black swastika
The punishers gave to you at your birth.
Since birth they hammered into your heads
Pro-fascist “super heroes.
Thus you burn Molotov cocktails
And do not study the Truth of history...
The next accusation and argumentwhy Dmytruk’s reasons should be
recognized as faulty, although the thesis is rightbelongs to a negative
stereotype of Ukrainians that has persisted since the time of Ivan Mazepa
(1639-1709) and his rebellion against Peter I (see Kappeler 63-66). As
illustrated in Example 15, this negative stereotype is: Ukrainians are traitors.
Example 15: Вы давно свои земли продали!
Вы и предков своих тупо предали. (“Stikh-otvet”)
Long ago you sold your lands!
And you stupidly have betrayed your ancestors.
The accusation in Example 15 is related to the dignity of the Soviet veterans
of World War II who were allegedly betrayed by the Euromaidan. After the
accusation of betrayal illustrated in Example 15, other allegations are
attested. These are that supporters of the Maidan actually do not love
Ukraine, and they are not real Ukrainians by blood. They are Nazis and
consequently cannot be brothers to the writers We-Group. Example 16 is
another clear illustration of such negative agreement.
Example 16: Украину вы вовсе не любите!
[]
Никогда вы не будете братьями!
Нам—нацисты—враги беспородные,
И не смейте себя, предатели,
Называть Украинцами кровными. (“Stikh-otvet”)
You do not love Ukraine at all!
[]
You will never be brothers!
Nazis for us are underbred enemies,
And you, traitors, do not allow yourselves
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
57
To be called native Ukrainians by blood.
Here, similarly to the maps that divide Ukraine into several parts with
fascists in the west and Novorussians in the east (as shown in Figures 5-7
and 9-10 above), the Ukrainians are distributed into good Ukrainians and
bad Ukrainians or real Ukrainians and fake Ukrainians.
By the opposition of a real and good Ukraine and a bad and wrong one,
the negative agreement with Dmytruk can be directly formulated in the
manner of the fictive political maps (Figures 5-7 and 9-10). One author,
Roman Dikusar, who is currently a chairman of the youth parliament of
Sevastopol, uses the opposition in his response Brat'ia navsegda
(“Brothers Forever”). In contrast to previous examples, he does not
formulate a negative agreement, but directly disagrees with Dmytruk, as
shown in Example 17 below:
Example 17: Кто был нам братом—братом и остался
[]
Как всегда стали бок-о-бок
Крым и братский нам юго-восток. (Dikusar)
That who used to be our brotherremained our brother
[]
As it used to be, now are side by side,
Crimea and our brethren South-East.
Iurii Efremenko, an important member of Molodaia Gvardiia (The Young
Guard), the youth organization of the party Edinaia Rossia (United Russia),
shot a YouTube video with the title “Sevastopol'skii otvet na stikh ‘Nikogda
my ne budem brat'iami’” (“Sevastopol’s Response to the Poem ‘Never ever
we will be brothers’”). Consider Example 18:
Example 18: Мы всегда с вами будем братьями
И по родине, и по матери. (Efremenko)
We will always be brothers
By both, the fatherland and the mother.
In Example 18, the disagreement with Dmytruks thesis is formulated
directly: We will always be brothers. The negation ni … ni (neither [a],
nor [b]) in Example 10 presented above, is now rendered by the double
confirmation in the Russian syntactic construction i … I (both, [a]and
[b]).
Another author, Anna Gaidukova, similarly argues that “We, i.e.,
Ukrainians and Russians, will be brothers forever. She manages an Internet
shop entitled Nostal'giia” (“Nostalgia”), where she offers woollen dresses of
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
58
her own production. The poem is posted on http://www.liveinternet.ru.
Consider Example 19:
Example 19: Да навеки мы будем братьями,
И по Родине и по Матери,
И по Батюшке и по разуму […] (Gaidukova)
We will always be brothers, indeed,
By both, the Motherland and by Mother,
By Father, and by Wisdom […]
The poem is characterized by some pathetic and archaic, namely church
Slavonic, forms. These are the beginning of the verse with da (which can
be translated into yes, but is rather a pathetic introducing particle),
naveki (forever) and the expression batiushka which should be
translated as father, but means in a narrow sense priest. As shown in
Example 20, the poem culminates in an emphatic appeal for unity in an
attempt to reach a sense of invincibility.
Example 20: Наши крови и судьбы единые,
Мы в ЕДИНСТВЕ НЕПОБЕДИМЫЕ!!! (Gaidukova)
Our bloods and destinies are one,
In UNITY WE ARE INVINCIBLE!!!
In Example 20, the author displays her strong conviction that Russians and
Ukrainians have close ties as “brothers along many angles. Example 20
demonstrates the importance of the value of unity as a reason for
disagreeing with Dmytruk. The choice of capital letters, as well as the three
exclamation marks strengthen this reason. Additionally, the already cited
poem by Dikusar implores for the unity of Ukrainians and Russians, which is
demonstrated in Example 21:
Example 21: Много нас на земле родимой,
сто народов в семье единой,
в чём-то разные, чем-то похожи,
нас никто разделить не может!
В чём завидовать вам, несчастным?
Вы—осколок страны прекрасной
самый красивый и дорогой—
сейчас с протянутой рукой.
There are many of us in our dear land,
Hundred of peoples united in a single family,
Differing in certain things, similar in certain ways,
No one can divide us!
Why should we be jealous of you, the unfortunate people?
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
59
You are the splinter of a wonderful country,
That is the most beautiful and dear,
But now is like a beggar.
In Example 21, Dikusar formulates his disagreement with Dmytruk’s thesis
and gives some circular reasons in the following way: We are united
because no one can divide us and vice versa. All others who do not want to
join the brotherhood are seen as the starving beggars of a formerly beautiful
country.
There is a third type of response, which is between negative agreement
and disagreement. This is the positive-negative agreement, in which the
opponent agrees with both the thesis and the reasons, but s/he evaluates the
reasons in a different, mostly contradictory way. Example 22 illustrates the
argument:
Example 22: Да, у нас дома “молчание—золото,
Для чего нам смеси убийства,—молотова?
Когда надо у нас душа горячая,
А сегодня, за Вас, плачем мы.
Ненавижу я эту братию
Что именует себя демократией
У “царя” без жертв все обходится,
А у вас? На каждого пуля находится! (Efremenko)
Yes, at our homes silence is golden
Why do we need any murder substancesMolotov cocktails?
When it is needed, our soul is spirited,
But today, we are crying for You.
I hate this brotherhood,
that entitles itself democracy.
Under the tsar, all goes on without victims.
And what do you have? There is a bullet for everyone.
In Example 22, the positively connoted Molotov cocktail in Dmytruk’s poem
is taken by Efremenko as a sign of chaos and destruction. It serves as proof
for the widespread meaning that the Maidan was an eruption of madness. In
this frame, tsarism is presented as a guarantee for peace. This is in contrast
to the negative connotation of tsarism in the earlier Example 10.
Example 23 is another instance of positive-negative agreement in
response to Dmytruk, in which tsarism is positively evaluated:
Example 23: Лучше с Царем, чем с Псевдодемократией. (Dikusar)
It is better with the Tsar than with Pseudo-democracy.
Relatively, Dikusar agrees with Dmytruk’s claim “You baptized yourself as
the elders(“Вы себя окрестили старшими”), but as Example 24 shows,
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
60
Dikusar sees this status of the elder, or the big brother, as a positive value,
obtained not from ones self but from history:
Example 24: Мы свободу свою отстояли—
у дедов на груди медали.
Старшими нас окрестила история,
необъятной страны территорию
отстоял в бою, в чистом поле
мужик русский, на то божья воля.
We defended our freedom
There are medals on the breasts of our grandfathers.
The history baptized us as elders.
The territory of the vast country
the Russian muzhik defended in the battle, on the clear field.
That’s the God’s will.
In Example 24 the author creates a heroic image of the past, namely the
victory in World War II, and focuses on the concept of the strong fellow
(muzhik) as a Russian ideal. Thereby he performs a positive-negative
agreement with Dmytruks thesis that there is no brotherhood between
Ukrainians, i.e., supporters of the Maidan, and Russians. In his poetical
arguing, the reason lies in entirely different ideals and values, but what is
negatively evaluated in Dmytruks hymn to the Maidan is now evaluated as
a positive ideal.
There are mainly three types of argumentative responses to Dmytruk:
the negative agreement, the disagreement, and the positive-negative
agreement. In all forms, one particular reason appears. This reason suggests
the division of Ukraine into antagonistic and axiological polar mental spaces.
There is the good Ukraine on one side and the bad Ukraine on the other.
A very clear distinction in this manner is articulated in the poem by
Gaidukova:
Example 25: Украина—Страна разная...
Украина Шевченко—Великая!
Украина Бандеры—безликая,
Украина майдана—продажная,
Украина Шахтеров—отважная!
Ukraine is a diverse country…
Shevchenko’s Ukraine is great!
Bandera’s Ukraine is faceless,
Maidan’s Ukraine is venal,
Shakhter’s Ukraine is brave!
In Example 25, the good Ukraine is opposed to the bad Ukraine (in
Gaidukova’s view). The name of the famous nineteenth-century Ukrainian
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
61
writer, Taras Shevchenko, stands for the good Ukraine. The name of Bandera
represents the bad Ukraine. Bad is also the Maidan Ukraine, in contrast to
the Donbas, the home of the shakhters, which literarily means miners,
representing the concept of strong fellows. Through these oppositions the
author creates a specific type of enemy, a type that could be observed in
other examples and semiotic forms. In the present study, these enemies
were particularly visible in the maps analyzed above. The enemy is often a
stranger, because estrangement easily leads to uncertainty and anxiety (cf.
Marchenko and Kurbatov). But in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the
inner Ukrainian antagonisms, the enemy is not the stranger. On the basis of
the ideology of brotherhood, and as a result of dividing the world into at least
two antagonistic camps, the West and the East, the enemy on the fictive
political maps, in official political communication and no less in political
poetry, is the brother who wants to live and exist separately, who follows his
own ideas and the like. The thesis not with me is automatically understood
as against me.” Such a thesis most likely constitutes the essence of the
conflict, which is directly connected to a fear of plurality. In eastern
European countries, and others, this plurality has arisen around the last
decade.
5. CONCLUSION
Using various texts tied to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the study
shows how aggression and argumentation can be intertwined. The
intertwinedness begins with an argumentation thesis, which is followed by
aggressive reasons. In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, aggressive arguments
are provided in several semiotic formsnot only in official political
communication, but also in the drawing of political maps in the frame of
popular geopolitics, as well as in poetry. Furthermore, varieties of the
realization of the inference-rule licensing scheme in Figure 4 have been
shown. Theses sometimes represent an already implicit argumentation
scheme, but there are also arguments in which reasons are explicitly given
and the thesis is sometimes expressed, sometimes presumed. This is the case
in the poeto-political war that was provoked by Dmytruk’s poem Never ever
we will be brothers. The poetic responses can be classified as negative
agreement, disagreement, and positive-negative agreement. What most of
the responses to Dmytruk and the presented unofficial maps have in
common is a special way of making enemies. The enemy is not the stranger,
but the other who wants to be the other.
Holger Kuße
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
62
Works Cited
Address by President of the Russian Federation.” President of Russia, 18 Mar. 2014,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. Accessed 10 July 2017.
“Argumentation.” Vocabulary.com Dictionary,
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/argumentation. Accessed 6 Sept.
2018.
Aristotle. The Art of Rhetoric. Translation and index by W. Rhys Roberts, Megaphone
eBooks, 2008.
http://www.wendelberger.com/downloads/Aristotle_Rhetoric.pdf. Accessed 7
Sept. 2018.
Birov, Eduard. “Za chto voiuet Donbass. E-news, 9 Feb. 2015, http://www.e-
news.su/in-ukraine/45935-za-chto-voyuet-donbass.html. Accessed 5 Feb.
2018.
Bühler, Karl. Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. G. Fischer, 1934.
Dikusar, Roman. “Brat'ia navsegda.” Stikhi.ru,
http://www.stihi.ru/2016/10/02/4553. Accessed 26 Mar. 2018.
Dmytruk, Anastasiia. “Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami.” Facebook, 10 Mar. 2014,
https://www.facebook.com/anastasiyadmytruk/. Accessed 10 Aug. 2018.
---. “Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami.” YouTube, 19 Mar. 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qv97YeC563Y. Accessed 8 Sept. 2018.
Dodds, Klaus. Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford UP, 2007.
Efremenko, Iurii. “Sevastopol'skii otvet na stikh ‘Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami.’”
YouTube, 19 Apr. 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2INmW5-ugkk.
Accessed 26 Mar. 2018.
Forceville, Charles J. Multimodal Metaphor. De Gruyter, 2009.
---. Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor. Handbuch Sprache im multimodalen
Kontext, edited by Nina-Maria Klug and Hartmut Stöckl, De Gruyter, 2016, pp.
241-60.
Gaidukova, Anna. “Moi otvetna stikhi Nasti Dmitruk Nikogda my ne budem
brat'iami.’” LiveInternet, 21 Apr. 2014,
https://www.liveinternet.ru/users/4110034/post321935781/. Accessed 26
Mar. 2018.
Hitchcock, David. On Reasoning and Argument: Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical
Thinking. Springer International Publishing, 2017.
“How Malorossiia Was Turned into the Patch-quilt of Discord That Is ‘Ukraine.’”
Nemo’s Realms, 27 Feb. 2016, http://stanislavs.org/category/ukraine-
russia/page/2/. Accessed 22 Mar. 2018.
Kappeler, Andreas. Ungleiche Brüder. Russen und Ukrainer. Vom Mittelalter zur
Gegenwart. C.H. Beck, 2017.
Klug, Nina-Maria, and Hartmut Stöckl, editors. Handbuch Sprache im multimodalen
Kontext. De Gruyter, 2016.
Kress, Gunther. Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Contemporary
Communication. Routledge, 2010.
Kress, Gunther, and Theo Van Leeuwen. Multimodal Discourse: The Modes and Media
of Contemporary Communication. Bloomsbury Academic, 2001.
Argumentation and Aggression
© 2018 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume V, No. 2 (2018)
63
Kuße, Holger. Konjunktionale Koordination in Predigten und politischen Reden.
Dargestellt an Belegen aus dem Russischen. Otto Sagner, 1998.
---. Kulturwissenschaftliche Linguistik. Eine Einführung. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
2012.
Kusse, Khol'ger. Kul'turovedcheskaia lingvistika: Vvedenie. Izdatel'stvo Kazanskogo
Universiteta, 2016.
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live by. U of Chicago P, 1980.
LeVine, Philip, and Ron Scollon, editors. Discourse & Technology: Multimodal
Discourse Analysis. Georgetown UP, 2004.
Marchenko, Alla, and Sergiy Kurbatov. Constructing the Enemy-Other in Social
Media: Facebook as a Particular Battlefield during the Ukrainian Crisis. Eurasia
2.0. Russian Geopolitics in the Age of New Media, edited by Mark Bassin and
Mikhail Suslov, 2016, pp. 225-45.
Morozova, Olena. “Monomodal and Multimodal Instantiations of Conceptual
Metaphors of Brexit. Lege artis: Language Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow. The
Journal of University of SS Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, vol. II, no. 2, De Gruyter
Open, Dec. 2017, pp. 250-83. DOI: 10.1515/lart-2017-0017 ISSN 2453-8035
Naess, Arne. Kommunikation und Argumentation. Eine Einführung in die angewandte
Semantik. Translated by Armin von Stechow, Scriptor Verlag, 1975.
Nicholaides, Nicholas. “There Are No Valid Arguments against a Liberation of
Novorossia.” Geopolitika.ru, 10 Jan. 2018,
https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/there-are-no-valid-arguments-against-
liberation-novorossia. Accessed 5 Feb. 2018.
“Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii.” Prezident Rossii, 18 Mar. 2014,
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. Accessed 10 July 2017.
Popper, Sir Raimund Karl. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Clarendon
Press / Oxford UP, 1972.
Priamaia liniia s Vladimirom Putinym.” Prezident Rossii, 17 Apr. 2014,
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796. Accessed 22 Mar. 2018.
Stahl, Henrieke. “Poesie als politische Partizipation: Der virale poetologische Diskurs
um Anastasija Dmitruks Videogedicht 'Nikogda my ne budem brat’jami’ auf
YouTube. Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie, vol. 71, 2015, pp. 441-77.
“Stikh-otvet Iuriia Lozy.” LiveInternet, 14 Aug. 2015,
https://www.liveinternet.ru/users/5358879/post321210249/. Accessed 26
Mar. 2018.
Stone, Oliver. The Putin Interviews: Oliver Stone Interviews Vladimir Putin. Skyhorse
Publishing, 2017.
Stoun (Stone), Oliver. Interv'iu s Vladimirom Putinym. Al'pina Publisher, 2017.
Suslov, Mikhail. “The Production of ‘Novorossiya:’ A Territorial Brand in Public
Debates. Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 69, 2017, pp. 202-21.
Uffelmann, Dirk. The Imagined Geolinguistics of Ukraine. Eurasia 2.0. Russian
Geopolitics in the Age of New Media, edited by Mark Bassin and Mikhail Suslov,
Lexington Books, 2016, pp. 249-73.
van Eemeren, Frans H., et al. Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse. The U of
Alabama P, 1993.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Book
This book brings together in one place David Hitchcock’s most significant published articles on reasoning and argument. In seven new chapters he updates his thinking in the light of subsequent scholarship. Collectively, the papers articulate a distinctive position in the philosophy of argumentation. Among other things, the author: • develops an account of “material consequence” that permits evaluation of inferences without problematic postulation of unstated premises. • updates his recursive definition of argument that accommodates chaining and embedding of arguments and allows any type of illocutionary act to be a conclusion. • advances a general theory of relevance. • provides comprehensive frameworks for evaluating inferences in reasoning by analogy, means-end reasoning, and appeals to considerations or criteria. • argues that none of the forms of arguing ad hominem is a fallacy. • describes proven methods of teaching critical thinking effectively. For more information, see <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-319-53562-3>.
Article
The 21st century is awash with ever more mixed and remixed images, writing, layout, sound, gesture, speech, and 3D objects. Multimodality looks beyond language and examines these multiple modes of communication and meaning making. Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication represents a long-awaited and much anticipated addition to the study of multimodality from the scholar who pioneered and continues to play a decisive role in shaping the field. Written in an accessible manner and illustrated with a wealth of photos and illustrations to clearly demonstrate the points made, Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication deliberately sets out to locate communication in the everyday, covering topics and issues not usually discussed in books of this kind, from traffic signs to mobile phones. In this book, Gunther Kress presents a contemporary, distinctive and widely applicable approach to communication. He provides the framework necessary for understanding the attempt to bring all modes of meaning-making together under one unified theoretical roof. This exploration of an increasingly vital area of language and communication studies will be of interest to advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students in the fields of English language and applied linguistics, media and communication studies and education.
by President of the Russian Federation
by President of the Russian Federation." President of Russia, 18 Mar. 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. Accessed 10 July 2017. "Argumentation." Vocabulary.com Dictionary, https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/argumentation. Accessed 6 Sept.
Za chto voiuet Donbass
  • Eduard Birov
Birov, Eduard. "Za chto voiuet Donbass." E-news, 9 Feb. 2015, http://www.enews.su/in-ukraine/45935-za-chto-voyuet-donbass.html. Accessed 5 Feb. 2018.
Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami
  • Anastasiia Dmytruk
Dmytruk, Anastasiia. "Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami." Facebook, 10 Mar. 2014, https://www.facebook.com/anastasiyadmytruk/. Accessed 10 Aug. 2018. ---. "Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami." YouTube, 19 Mar. 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qv97YeC563Y. Accessed 8 Sept. 2018.
Sevastopol'skii otvet na stikh 'Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami
  • Klaus Dodds
Dodds, Klaus. Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford UP, 2007. Efremenko, Iurii. "Sevastopol'skii otvet na stikh 'Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami.'" YouTube, 19 Apr. 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2INmW5-ugkk. Accessed 26 Mar. 2018.
Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor
  • Charles J Forceville
  • Metaphor
  • De
  • Gruyter
Forceville, Charles J. Multimodal Metaphor. De Gruyter, 2009. ---. "Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor." Handbuch Sprache im multimodalen Kontext, edited by Nina-Maria Klug and Hartmut Stöckl, De Gruyter, 2016, pp. 241-60.