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Food Sovereignty in Africa: The Role of Producer Organisations

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Abstract

The 2007 Nyéléni conference in Mali has been a milestone in the past decade for food sovereignty mobilisation and recognition. It set a framework for the re-assessment of food policies and practices to promote sustainable food systems. Producer organisations, civil society and researchers have expanded the notions of food governance beyond the state and act through collective action and knowledge production for the promotion of sustainable food systems. Initial findings from secondary data on food sovereignty in Africa suggest that alliances employ diverse strategies-from progressive to radical approaches, and the prime language of their campaigns emerge out of specific regional and local contexts. In Africa, producer organisations have influenced policies for food sovereignty institutionalisation, yet there are several implementation challenges associated with lack of clarity and different institutional interpretation of the concept, societal transformation and the cunning nature of capitalist penetration. This suggests the need for more research that aim at bridging the gaps between principles and practice. This paper is a background and context essay to a doctoral dissertation on food sovereignty in Africa. The purpose is to contribute to discussions on food sovereignty research and contextualisation in Africa.
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Food Sovereignty in Africa: The Role of Producer Organisations
Adwoa Yeboah Gyapong
PhD Researcher
Erasmus University Rotterdam, ISS
Abstract
The 2007 Nyéléni conference in Mali has been a milestone in the past decade for food
sovereignty mobilisation and recognition. It set a framework for the re-assessment of food
policies and practices to promote sustainable food systems. Producer organisations, civil
society and researchers have expanded the notions of food governance beyond the state and
act through collective action and knowledge production for the promotion of sustainable food
systems. Initial findings from secondary data on food sovereignty in Africa suggest that
alliances employ diverse strategies- from progressive to radical approaches, and the prime
language of their campaigns emerge out of specific regional and local contexts. In Africa,
producer organisations have influenced policies for food sovereignty institutionalisation, yet
there are several implementation challenges associated with lack of clarity and different
institutional interpretation of the concept, societal transformation and the cunning nature of
capitalist penetration. This suggests the need for more research that aim at bridging the gaps
between principles and practice. This paper is a background and context essay to a doctoral
dissertation on food sovereignty in Africa. The purpose is to contribute to discussions on food
sovereignty research and contextualisation in Africa.
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Introduction
The call for food sovereignty has brought together numerous actors; peasant organisations,
NGOs, research institutions, think tanks and academics who work collectively and campaign
against the ills of globalization and corporate food regime. For critics of neoliberal
capitalism, the mobilization for food sovereignty has occurred as a means of transcending life
under capitalism (Figueroa, 2015). As posited by Akram-Lodhi (2015: 567), food sovereignty
is about building the power of the disadvantaged within the capitalist system by transcending
the social conditions and relations of capitalism and developing a post-capitalist agrarian and
non-agrarian alternatives. The strength of the movement lies in the fact that they are not just
taking defensive stances or reactive measures against neoliberalism but proposing
alternatives. They reframe and redefine mainstream discourses that commodify food, land,
and other resources in order to bring back their inherent cultural, social, ecological and
relational aspects. By doing so, they politicize food security to bring in issues on food
relations, and the politics of food access and control. Their demands transcend the rights of
peasants to broader issues of social and ecological justice thus opening up a wide political
space for action (McMichael, 2008). Through continuous campaigns and resistances, Vía
Campesina and its alliances seek to establish political legitimacy for food sovereignty at the
local, national and international levels.
In Africa, food sovereignty related activities have been on-going- by radical and/or
progressive organisations as well as other covert actions where there are no movements.
Agrarian scholars including Nora Mckeon, Michael Pimbert, Laroche Dupraz and Angele
Postolle among some others have in the recent past raised discussions on the movements for
food sovereignty in Africa. Nonetheless, relative to other geographical scopes such as Latin
America, critical food sovereignty studies in Africa is scanty. This is not unexpected due to
the fact the former has a more established base. However, as the movement spreads quickly
and gathers numerous alliances, it has become necessary that researchers open up to other
contexts so as to obtain broader perspectives on the practice of food sovereignty. The large
extent of diversity in terms of ethnicities and culture, histories, language, social
differentiation and politics, make Africa a region of key interest. In addition, because it
would be incorrect to assume that the movement in Africa is merely a replication of la Vía
Campesina which has been considerably studied. This paper provides an overview of
literature on food sovereignty alliances, initiatives and policies in Africa to identify research
gaps and to invite discussions on how to conduct research on food sovereignty in the African
Context. Much of the reference is centred on producer organisations in the Western and
Southern African contexts where peasant and civil society actions are predominant.
Producer Organisations and Food Sovereignty in Africa
Numerous organisations, networks and platforms at the national, regional and continent level
are actively engaged in the food sovereignty campaign and advocacy in Africa. Their
campaigns are shaped by their local or regional contexts and histories. The rise of food
sovereignty campaigns at the continent level is however recent albeit several organisations
that have been actively involved in agrarian justice related campaigns in the past years. At the
regional level five producer organisations are recognised. All of these networks seem to have
much interest in policy influence such as in the formulation of the Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) (Ojijo, Jakinda, & Annor-Frempong, 2013).
In West Africa, Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l’Afrique de
l’Ouest (ROPPA) is acknowledged by many as the most vibrant food sovereignty movement
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in Africa. Established in July 2000, at Cotonou, the network is made up of 13 national
producer organisations from West Africa including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire,
Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Ghana, Sierra Leone
and Liberia. Its founding members are from the Francophone and the Sahel, and it has its
head-quarters in Ouagadougou. ROPPA was birthed at a workshop that sought to address
political and climate related challenges faced by peasants. ROPPA considers itself as
representative of 45 million family farmers in West Africa (SWAC 2007; Dupraz & Postolle
2010). The institutional objectives of ROPPA are centred on 3 key themes: i) advocacy and
solidarity; ii) capacity training and development; and iii) regional and international level
partnerships. ROPPA seeks to ensure effective representation and recognition, policy
influence, and the sustainability of family farming and small-holder agriculture in West
Africa by defending the rights of peasants, adopting consensus building and transparency and
undertaking regular renewal of their mandates (ROPPA). ROPPA has been actively engaged
in food sovereignty and food security right upon its inception. It played key roles in regional
agricultural and trade policies and also international workshops, conference and campaigns
with support from Vía Campesina and other institutions. As a way of addressing the diverse
needs of different category peasants, it has dedicated consultation frameworks to women and
the youth.
In Central Africa, the Plateforme Sous-Régionale des Organisations Paysannes d’Afrique
Centrale (PROPAC) is the main regional network for food sovereignty. It is made up of 10
farmers’ organisations from the Economic Community of Central African States- Angola,
Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe. Its
establishment occurred in 2005, but like ROPPA, earlier workshops and discussions among
farmer organisations in the region traces back to 1998. The vision of PROPAC is ‘family
farming being enterprising, sustainable and modernized in order to ensure the economic,
social, cultural and ecological functions for food security and sovereignty.” The organisation
seeks to achieve this vision through capacity building, support to farmer and producers, the
implementation and evaluation of rural development policies, promotion of women's
leadership, and agricultural vocational training for the youth.
In Eastern and Southern Africa, there is the Eastern and Southern Africa small scale Farmers’
Forum (ESAFF). This organisation was birthed at the Small-Scale Farmers’ Convergence- a
parallel event at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South
Africa in August 2002. It was formed to give small farmers a voice on issues concerning
them (ESAFF, 2010). Its vision, mission and purpose are pivoted around the empowerment
of small scale farmers in policy development processes and practice at all levels for the
promotion of agroecological practices in the region
1
. In their 2014-2016 strategic plan, the
focus was to create a movement of rural small scale farmers to enhance their capacity in
advocacy and policy for sustainable agriculture (ESAFF, 2014). It is a movement of 530,000
small scale crop growers, livestock keepers and fisher folks and has its headquarters in
Tanzania (ESAFF, 2015). It is constituted of 13
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member countries each with one national
1
http://www.esaff.org/esaff_view.php?ID=1
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Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, South Africa, Malawi, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Lesotho,
Burundi, Madagascar, Seychelles and Mozambique.
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farmers’ representative as in the case of ROPPA. ESAFF also is an active member of the East
Africa Civil Society Forum (ESAFF, 2012, p. 2)
There are three other regional platforms which may have divided interests in food
sovereignty or does not explicitly show their position on food sovereignty. The Eastern
Africa Farmers Federation (EAFF) does not categorically indicate its support for food
sovereignty albeit its objectives align close to food sovereignty principles such as the ones of
family farming and agroecology. EAFF joined ROPPA and PROPAC in the preparation of
reports on family farming and sustainable development. However, Union Maghrébine des
Agriculteurs (UMAGRI) in North Africa, and the Southern African Confederation of
Agricultural Unions (SACAU) of Southern Africa seem to have divided interests. They
support peasants but also have considerable alignment with the key tenets of capitalism for
which food sovereignty activists resist. UMAGRI was for example a signatory to the
declaration of 2014 Year of Family Farming but its institutional objectives are a lot more
aligned to trade and investment in international markets. SACAU is also known to be in
support of GMO’s and large scale commercial agriculture and the union recognises farming
primarily as a business venture (Jacobs 2013; Greenberg 2013). Interestingly both UMAGRI
and SACAU draw peasant associations into their network, some of whom double as members
of La Vía Campesina.
Numerous grassroots and national producer organisations also exist in Africa. It is however
difficult to identify all of them and to determine their association with the food sovereignty
movements. It is however assumed that producer organisations in Africa that are members of
Vía Campesina support the course for food sovereignty. Compiled from the Vía Campesina
website, there are a total of 15 producer organisations that join in the food sovereignty
movement who represent farmers, landless people and peasants and support sustainable
agriculture and rural development. They represent all the African sub-regions with the
exception of North Africa. West African producer organisations constitute the majority
(seven out of fifteen). With the exception of the Zimbabwe Smallholder Farmer Forum
(ZIMSOFF), Landless Peoples Movement (LPM) of South Africa, and the Ecumenical
Association for Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development (ECASARD) of Ghana, the
remaining members also belong to their regional associations, i.e. ROPPA, PROPAC, EAAF,
and SACAU. In addition, there are other visible or well-known country level platforms that
are actively involved in the food sovereignty campaign. It could also be assumed that
organisational platforms of ROPPA and PROPAC who are not members of Vía Campesina
also support food sovereignty. Other national movements include Food Sovereignty Ghana-
membership is from Ghana and Ghanaians in the diaspora; the Right to Agrarian Reform for
Food Sovereignty Campaign (Food Sovereignty Campaign in South Africa) which seeks
urban and rural food sovereignty (Jacobs, 2013); the Surplus People’s Project (SPP) seeks
agrarian reforms that benefit people oppressed by Apartheid and colonialism, and the
Solidarity Economy Movement, a project under the Co-operative and Policy Alternative
Centre (COPAC) of South Africa which focuses on public awareness and the training of
activists for food sovereignty.
Continent wide, the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) is a Pan African
platform constituted of 25 networks and farmer organisations that support food sovereignty in
Africa. Its formation is a direct response against the new Green Revolution in Africa (Holt
Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). The members fall within the categories of regional producer
organisations, NGO’s, research centres and institutes, international social movements and
regional religious bodies. Launched in December 2011 at the Durban UN Framework
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Convention on Climate Change, AFSA seeks to be the continental platform for influencing
policies to ensure food sovereignty in Africa. Its vision is directed at promoting Africa’s
traditional knowledge systems; Africans controlling territories, livelihoods and governance
systems; and strengthening accountability of states and corporate power (AFSA, 2011). The
five regional producer networks have together established the Pan African Farmers’
Organisation (PAFO) to serve as continent wide platform for deliberations on agricultural
development.
Producer Organisations: Demands for Food Sovereignty
Productive Autonomy: Promotion of Small Scale Agroecology and Family Farming
Producer organisations pursue agroecology as their preferred agricultural practice because it
is founded on local knowledge, specific to local contexts, and promotes sustainable use of
natural resources to produce quality food. In East Africa for example, pastoralism does not
only contribute hugely to the national economies of countries like Kenya and Tanzania, but
also serves as a fall-back asset for families and individuals since livestock is usually traded in
exchange for cash in times of need. In West Africa, ROPPA calls for the promotion of family
farming not only because it contributes to over 70% of the regional food production but also
it is considered as farming system that has a great potential to contribute to the multi-
functionality of agriculture (Bélières et al. 2002; Toulmin & Gueye 2003; IPC et al. 2006).
ROPPA has channelled its actions mainly through the ‘Africa can feed itself campaign’ and
regional policy making processes. Although in the past they did not have adequate
organisational strength, they have developed over the years and their voice within debates
over agricultural policies can no longer be ignored (Johnson et al., 2008; ROPPA, 2014a). In
Senegal and Mali, family farming and food sovereignty have been explicitly included in their
national agricultural policies through the influence of their national platforms (SWAC
3
2007). This could also be attributed to the fact that the national platforms in these two
countries have considerable years of experience and also very active members of La via
Campesina; CNOP
4
in Mali serves as the regional secretariat for Via Campesina and CNRC
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of Senegal was a founding member of ROPPA. ROPPA has played a key role in shaping
national policies, the ECOWAS investment plan and agricultural policy as well as the
CAADP to make family farming integral (ECDPM, 2014; Mckeon, 2009). The vision of
ECOWAP for example is to promote growth of agriculture through an effective and efficient
system of family farming to ensure that food security benefits agricultural workers (Johnson
et al., 2008). ROPPA attributes its successes in regional policy making to its organisational
capacity and grassroots mobilisation as well as support from international development
partners of regional institutions such as ECOWAS.
Fair Trade and Restrictions: ROPPA
Trade has been a prime area of focus for ROPPA right from its establishment. Following the
West African context of dumping and food imports, ROPPA began its campaigns with the
goal of engaging with the rules of play in international trade in the region. The 2006 Niamey
call for Food Sovereignty of West Africa was centred on trade (ROPPA 2006). Unfair rules
of play and liberalization is seen to be the most fundamental cause of hunger and poverty in
West Africa (ROPPA, 2014b). ROPPA and its alliances are convinced that food sovereignty
will not be attained without adequate protection and therefore charged itself to ensure that
3
Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC)
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Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes (CNOP)
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Conseil National de Concertation et de Cooperation des Ruraux (CNCR)
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food sovereignty principles are integrated into the region’s agricultural and trade policies
(Mckeon, 2009). ROPPA has worked its way through to gain political legitimacy through
their inclusion in regional level political deliberations and policy making processes. It has
therefore played a key role in the formulation of regional level trade and agricultural policies.
ROPPA is widely acknowledged for its role in the ECOWAS Common External Tariff policy
and the formulation of additional tariff lines for sensitive products for which importation
stifles local production or promotes dumping (Dupraz & Postolle, 2013). After over 7 years
of deliberation on eligible products and their tariff percentage, an agreement has been made
on a 35% tariff on products including poultry, yoghurt, eggs, processed meat, cocoa powder
and chocolate, tomato paste and concentrate, soap and printed fabrics etc. (European
Commission 2014). ROPPA proposed the inclusion of rice on the list of sensitive products
and 50% tariff line. However, this could not be achieved given the role of rice as staple in
most countries and the political implication of its accessibility. ROPPA however considers
the outcome of their trade negotiations as good success and progress towards food
sovereignty in West Africa (Hollinger and Staatz, 2015).
In the early years of ROPPA, one of the key issues was that of a dwindling market for cotton
production by small scale farmers. ROPPA attributed this situation to two main factors. First,
cotton subsidies in the Global North has led to an oversupply thus reducing demand for the
produce of West African farmers. Second, privatization and large scale commercial
production was detrimental to the growth of small holders. As such ROPPA led the Big
Noise Petition at World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Cancun (2003) and in Hong Kong in
2005 (Koita, 2013). This brought together cotton farmers from Burkina Faso, Mali, Cote
d’Ivoire, Benin and Chad to demand the elimination of USA and EU cotton subsidies and
that of other food crops. After periods of resistances, ROPPA did not only gain international
recognition but also influenced the WTO to take some actions. A committee was set up to
address cotton specific issues in West Africa. As of now the issue of subsidies has not been
addressed adequately, but ROPPA continues to influence discussions in regional policy
debates.
The Right to Agrarian Reform for Sovereignty Campaign
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: South Africa
Producer organisations and food sovereignty movements in Southern Africa demands that
peasants have greater access and control over land. The Food Sovereignty Campaign (FSC),
established in 2008 is a movement of emerging farmers, poor farm dwellers/workers within
the Cape Region of South Africa (FSC 2010). It has its own dynamics and emerges out of
struggles to resist and abolish the racism, sexism and class oppression embedded in a State
facilitated neoliberal development (Jacobs, 2013; Wesso, 2009). The campaign for agrarian
reforms is therefore constructed within the framework of emancipation and freedom, and
considers the people as the prime agents of change. The FSC resists i) property rights given
under colonialism and Apartheid ii) market led land reforms, iii) export based commercial
agriculture, iv) land concentration and v) chemical industrial agriculture (Wesso, 2009). The
FSC calls for a more comprehensive agrarian reform and not just “land reform” in order to
address the multiple needs of peasants. The objectives of FSC are therefore built around
tackling the structural and systemic causes of hunger, advancing alternatives to sustain life
and climate crises, building stakeholder platforms and a food sovereignty alliance from below
to promote solidarity and unity amongst landless workers, small- scale farmers, farm workers
and the rural and urban working poor (Wesso 2009, p.14; FSC 2015a). Numerous avenues
have been employed to achieve these objectives. One of the ways is through land
occupations. The recourse to land occupation arises from a lack of adequate and rapid
6
Also, known as the Food Sovereignty Campaign (FSC)
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intervention by the state to address the issues of equitable access to land. Land occupation is
not a new practice in southern Africa. As indicated by Jacobs (2013), the FSC has drawn
positive lessons from the land occupation movement from Zimbabwe. For instance, in
Wesso's (2011) report, farmers’ associations in the Kareeberg and Loeriesfontein
municipalities in South Africa who have been victims of apartheid, colonial conquest and
segregation resolved to quit payment for municipal land on which they were farming. They
are just too angry. We talked, we wrote letters, we marched - now we are ready to take the
land. The municipality gives us no support and now they want to charge us these impossible
rents…’ (Eksteen of the Kareeberg in Wesso 2011 pg.1). The FSC supported the farmers’
association to overcome legal tensions involved in the process.
Local Practices and Knowledge Sharing Platforms and Capacity Building
Local knowledge plays a key role in food sovereignty. The 2007 Nyélini declaration places
indigenous knowledge and production systems as a central element in strengthening local
food systems. The Nyélini declaration recognises the collective, dynamic and diverse nature
of local knowledge in food production, medicinal purposes, and livestock rearing for the
sustainability of biodiversity, environment ecosystems and societies. For example, the FSC
emerged out of popular education on capitalism, land, and rights in the periods of 2006 and
2007 (Wesso, 2009). It has drawn out local and national education strategies for addressing
each identified food challenge to which they resist. A key strength in their plan is that the
strategies transcend conventional ‘production’ centred campaigns to include education
targeted at sensitizing consumers to enable them make informed choices. ROPPA in West
Africa has also instituted a periodic farmers’ university. The first edition which took place in
March 2014 brought together politicians, farmers’ leaders, technicians, women and youth for
purposes training, ideas and experience sharing. The Farmers’ University is also replicated at
the national levels and organised by the national platforms (ROPPA, 2014). The ROPPA
women’s college also organises periodic workshops for knowledge exchanges. All the above
measures seek to promote knowledge sharing for food sovereignty in Africa.
Institutionalization of Food Sovereignty in Mali & Senegal: The Role of Producer
Organisations
In Africa, Senegal and Mali have set the pace for the integration of food sovereignty
principles into their national policies. In 2004, the Senegalese Government passed the Loi
d’Orientation Agro-Sylvo Pastorale (LOASP)/ which has food sovereignty dimensions. The
policy serves as a twenty-year development framework which seeks to promote rural
development through the modernization of family farms and agricultural entrepreneurship.
The objective is to attain food security and eventually food sovereignty in the medium term
(République du Sénégal, 2004). Senegal’s policy however does not have food sovereignty
embedded in it as much as Mali does. In Mali, food sovereignty is integral to the 2006 Law
on Agricultural Orientation (LAO). The LAO lays down the groundwork for the
operationalisation of food sovereignty (Beauregard, 2009) and within it is the Agricultural
Development Policy. In the policy document, the definition of food sovereignty is not
different from that of Nyelini 2007. The policy specifically situates food sovereignty within
the context of a political choice, responsibility, sustainable food production, and farmers’
access to natural and economic resources. Food security is also defined in terms of quality
food availability and accessibility. It recognises food security as a dimension of food
sovereignty and therefore enshrines the right to food security within its food sovereignty
approach. The policy aims at building the national economy on the foundation of food
sovereignty for the well-being of its people. Article 55 of the policy states that ‘Food
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sovereignty is the guideline for all Agricultural policy development’. It seeks to create an
enabling environment for sustainable agriculture through family farming and agroecology.
The policy has a strategic vision of i) proactive promotion and modernization of family
farming and ii) structuring of an agro-sector industry and ii) integration into the West African
Economy (Replublique du Mali, 2006). The implementation of the law and policy is led by
the High Commission of Agriculture and the technical secretariat (Beauregard, 2009).
In both countries, producer organisations, particularly the CNCR of Senegal and the CNOP
of Mali have played vital roles in the formulation of these policies. The explicit reference to
food sovereignty in these policies to a large extent reflects the quality of their contributions.
In Senegal, through the lead of CNCR, farmer organisations were not mere participants of
consultative processes but even more, instrumental in calling for such law (Diouf, 2015)
7
.
The strength of CNCR lies in its leadership and representativeness as it works collectively
through 28 farmer organisations in Senegal to dialogue among several stakeholders on
agricultural strategies (Dupraz & Postolle, 2013; Pimbert, 2005). Similarly, in Mali, the state
put its confidence in CNOP. CNOP was given the responsibility to organise consultative
workshops at the provincial and national level (SWAC, 2007). CNOP used its position to
highlight specific points for inclusion which were considered. They include family farming
based agriculture for national economic growth, food safety and food grown for the well-
being of Malians (Beauregard, 2009). The participation and consideration of their demands
faced several setbacks. Conventional top down governance systems in both countries usually
made peasants passive participants in policy making (Dupraz & Postolle, 2013). Moreover, as
argued by many scholars, state interests and the people interests on development issues do
not always converge and as such tensions and resistances are bound to occur. In Mali,
Beauregard (2009, p.41) reports on what happened from the account of Mamadou Goita
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. An
extract is shown below
People debated everything at a grass roots level…… Then we prepared the first draft
of the new law and a memorandum for farmers... It was decided that food sovereignty
would be the key principle of our agricultural policy...We gave the document we had
prepared to the government….. We had allies in the National Assembly, who
monitored what was happening. And, in fact, that government did not present to the
Assembly the document we had given them. They had taken out some things and put in
others. Some deputies came to the CNOP and asked for original document and
checked it against the Bill the government had presented, which we called the
“genetically modified” copy of our document. In three days they found more than 300
alterations. They restored the original version and it was this document that was
debated in the assembly. When the bill was put to the vote in mid-2006, over 100
farmers’ representatives from different regions went to the assembly, and the Bill was
approved ……
In principle, the active involvement and the sacrifices of these producer organisations have
contributed to a better anchoring of rural realities into polices. Food sovereignty has become
a ‘non- expert’ language that is understood by peasants simply as ‘farming-friendly’ policies
(SWAC, 2007). As argued by SWAC (2007, p.33) the policies in themselves may not
7
In Diouf's (2015) paper, he details out extensively the consultation processes, the changes in participatory
processes put forward by CNCR, and how CNCR invested in educating its members to promote quality
contributions .
8
A Social Economist and a member of CNOP, secretary of ROPPA from 2011 to 2012 and A food sovereignty
Activist
9
represent drastic changes but ‘the “food sovereignty stamp” is a sign that they have been
strongly influenced by producer organisations. In Mali, groups were formed in communities
to explain the laws to the people so they understand how they can implement portions of the
agricultural policy at the community level (Beauregard, 2009). Literature on the impacts of
these policies is limited if not non-existent. There are however pockets of statements that
attribute some government actions to these peasants driven policies. In 2015, the state of
Senegal for the first time stopped potato and onion imports for four months because there
were adequate local production for consumers and there are long term strategies for local rice
production through intensification strategies (Rodale 2015). Dupraz & Postolle (2013, p.123)
also make mention of Mali’s 2008 Rice Initiative that sought to increase production by set
targets; and Senegal’s 2008 Great Offensive for Food and Abundance (GOANA) which also
aimed at ending food dependency. In Senegal, the government doubled funds to the
agricultural sector for seed supply, distribution and irrigation as well rural credit schemes and
the provision of fertilizer subsides to aid the implementation of the GOANA policy. (Arthur,
2012).
Tensions and Challenges Associated with the Implementation of Food Sovereignty
Concepts, Principles and Practice
There are different interpretations of food sovereignty among different interest groups which
sometimes make it quite unclear how it should be pursued even in a particular context. For
instance, in Africa, in national policies where food sovereignty is integrated, food security is
considered one of the means to food achieving food sovereignty (Bini, 2016; SWAC, 2007).
In the policies of Mali and Senegal for example, food sovereignty is presented as the broad
long term goal that requires some short-term food security measures. In states where there is
high dependence on imported staples like rice as a result of insufficient local production, they
show resistance to high tariff bands. Senegal for example imports over 90% of its rice. The
Senegal government is known to have resisted ROPPA’s demands for trade restriction and
high tariff band for imported rice for such reasons (Dupraz & Postolle, 2013). This
understanding of the food security- food sovereignty nexus translates into policies that
influences states to implement food sovereignty in a rather progressive way as compared to
the radical demands from producer organisations like ROPPA and the FSC. Given that
governments are directly accountable to their electorate (especially urban consumers) and
latently to international financial institutions, they most often pursue such radical concepts
rather slowly. This presents a big challenge to food sovereignty alliances and producer
organisations like ROPPA that appear radical in their demands on trade restrictions. It also
presents a challenge in terms how to frame the need for food security in the context of food
sovereignty without being taken over by hegemonic powers to propagate their neoliberal
agenda. Producer organisations are also challenged with unclear conceptual boundaries. For
example, ROPPA, neither frames family farming as subsistence agriculture nor takes an anti-
science position on agroecology (Pimbert 2007). Nonetheless, it is not clear what market
linkages are appropriate, how markets will be regulated, the model for modernisation of
family farms, and how small holders are to be integrated into capitalist production modes to
be compatible with food sovereignty principles.
Associations with Rival Networks: Individual or Collective Interests
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Producer organisations that support food sovereignty are sometimes found to be associated
with other rival networks. For example, the Coalition Paysanne de Madagascar (CPM)
9
and
the Mozambique União Nacional de Camponeses (UNAC) who are members of Vía
Campesina Africa also double as SACAU members. Apart from these two producer
organisations who per their association with Vía Campesina make them default supporters of
food sovereignty, there is a growing number of small holder member associations of
SACAU. Greenberg's (2013) profile of SACAU’s membership reveals a considerable share
of small holder organisations with land ownership ranging from less than 1 hectare to 3
hectares. SACAU aims to serve as a representative platform for farmer unions, commodity
associations and co-operatives operating at different scales. SACAU like Vía Campesina and
the food sovereignty movement believe in agriculture for development but the point of
disjuncture is that SACAU is productivity and business oriented and therefore supports large
scale industrial production, international trade and GM crops. This raises a number of
conceptual and empirical questions: i. do present day peasants wish to remain family
farmers? ii. what attracts peasant organisations to capitalist oriented unions? iii. to what
extent do small holders wish to be integrated into capitalist systems? iv. and what structural
issues influence their decisions to join these networks? It also raises the question of how Vía
Campesina selects its members and the commitment of its members towards food
sovereignty. Greenberg's (2013) research provides some answers to some questions in
relation to SACAU’s attraction. SACAU’s legitimacy is strengthened because it is
operationalized within existing national and regional policy frameworks, it attracts funding
and political support from mainstream international organisations such as the Gates
Foundation, IFAD etc. and they are founded on diversity. Members therefore join on the
premise of perceived opportunities available especially with funding and recognition among
other diverse interests. A question worth pondering about is the extent to which such rivalry
networks could influence food sovereignty or be shaped by it. Greenberg for example makes
mention of the fact that some UNAC members stated they received funding from SACAU for
their agroecological projects. Understanding the motives behind such actions for example
could go a long way to determine what it means for food sovereignty. Also, associations with
rivalry networks could have impacts on members’ commitments and contributions for the
promotion of food sovereignty.
Transcending Policy Formulation to Implementation
ROPPA, CNOP, CNCR and the Food Sovereignty Campaign are highly recognised for
lobbying for food sovereignty oriented agricultural policies, trade regulation policies and land
reforms. Nonetheless, several challenges impede their roles in policy. First, they have not
been able to influence much of national level policies. This has been attributed to the high
levels of domestic politics, urban bias ideologies of politicians and inadequate financial
mobilisation (Hollinger and Staatz, 2015; Mckeon, 2009). In countries where they have had
some influence i.e. Senegal and Mali, there has been slow rates of implementation and
sometimes deviation on the ground. There are accounts of lack of political power to resist
transnational corporations (Beauregard, 2009). In addition, the relationship that different
classes of small farmers would have with these corporations could also be determined by the
terms of inclusion. Furthermore, in Senegal, it is reported that the government accepted
almost all of the farmers’ proposals for the agricultural policy because the state did not
propose alternative suggestions at the negotiations, yet there are claims of inadequate
9
CPM is also a member of ESAFF which is an alliance member of Alliance for Food Sovereignty Africa
11
political will and lack of enforcement orders to accompany the law (Diouf, 2015). The
GOANA was supposed to be the special project towards food sovereignty as briefly touched
on in the preceding section, yet it is however reported that the GOANA, was expensive,
inefficient, targeted at attracting private foreign investments and upon its termination in 2012
there was little food security/sovereignty impacts (Hrabansky 2011; Dupraz & Postolle
2013). In both Senegal and Mali, the policies had technical limitations and lack of clarity on
the points of conjuncture with and disjuncture from capitalist modes. Diouf's (2015) study of
the Senegal LOASP policy highlights some of these issues. Below is an extract of one of his
interviewee’s comment about the policy:
We reached some rather shaky compromises. When I read the LOASP I feel that it contains
two overlapping visions of agriculture, and it’s not clear where its priorities lie. I think
people worked really hard to reach compromises, possibly telling themselves that they will be
able to do more when they get to the enforcement tools stage. But you can’t move forward in
situations like that because there’s too much confusion. You can’t design enforcement tools
that will help clarify the options in the core document if these options are ambiguous. If we
want enforcement tools, there have to be clear choices in the core document. If it doesn’t
specify where we want to go, we can’t define how we’re going to get there.”
Furthermore, even though nation states are responsible for their people’s food security/
sovereignty, regional policies also play a big role in the fulfilment of national policies. At the
regional level, where most policy efforts are directed, implementation has been slow as well.
In West Africa, ROPPA sees this as a major challenge to their efforts. The implementation of
the Regional Agricultural Policies (PAU and ECOWAP) has not only been slow, but also
consultations have been reduced and some funds were used for other purposes (regulating
high food prices) other than their original purpose of supporting farmers (Hollinger and
Staatz, 2015).
External Threats: The Green Revolution for Africa
African producer organisations, food sovereignty alliances and some scholars have expressed
scepticism about the increasing trend of neoliberal oriented food security projects in Africa.
They doubt even the food security motives of some of the big projects because many of them
are directed towards export markets. Some of the frequently mentioned projects/programmes
include the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN), World Economic
Forum’s ‘Grow Africa’ initiative, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
(GAFSP), the United States (US) government’s Feed the Future Initiative, and the Gates
Foundation and Alliances’ Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). What these projects have in
common is that they are driven by large scale commercial, mechanical and monocropping
farming systems, GMO friendly, facilitate land/resource grabs and land concentration,
support seed certification and privatisation, and therefore pose a threat to smallholder family
farming in Africa (AFSA, 2011; Beauregard, 2009; M. Margulis, McKeon, & Borras, 2013).
Activists and/or scholars perceive these projects as threats to the food sovereignty campaign
not only because they happen to have emerged amidst food sovereignty activism but also
because they are being woven through the state apparatus- national and regional policies, and
international agreements that do not always benefit peasants yet are masked under the themes
of poverty reduction, hunger elimination and nutrition improvement. African Governments
are also usually ‘obligated’ to set their international trade agreements to conform with such
policies in order to attract foreign direct private sector investments to carry out these projects
(AFSA, 2011; M. E. Margulis, 2012). Malawi has been the centre of most debates on the
12
NAFSN where it committed to giving private investors 200,000 hectares of land for large
scale commercial agriculture by 2008 and has already embraced GM crops and hybrid seeds
(Alliance for Food Sovereignty, 2012). Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are also changing laws and
creating ‘idle land’ database for international private investors under NAFSN (Crankshaw,
2015). This is not to say that the NAFSN is a mere imperial fiat because that line of argument
robs stakeholders of any agency. Rather, African governments are drawn into a complex web
of private- public partnerships, involving the configuration of a particular hegemonic bloc,
that operate via alliances and compromises, coercion and consent to maintain hegemony
(Crankshaw, 2015; Patel, Bezner Kerr, Shumba, & Dakishoni, 2014). Because the forces
opposing food sovereignty are hegemonic’ pervading and dominant they beg
confrontation not only where they touch down but also wherever they emanate (Roman-
Alcalá, 2016, p. 1395). Producer organisations and States are therefore threatened by these
forces which neutralise their efforts. The institutionalization of such projects become a threat
to activists’ enormous policy initiatives at the country and regional levels. Breaking the codes
of such systemic issues demand strong political legitimacy and even sometimes the
employment of violence.
Uninformed, Indifferent and ‘foreignizing’ Consumers
A major area of contention for food sovereignty proponents in Africa is consumer
10
food
preferences. First, food sovereignty as a concept and its activists are producer centric. As
such campaigns and advocacies have been geared towards rural-local food production and the
livelihoods of peasants. The food sovereignty ‘revolution’ is occurring in producer circles
and it is not even clear the extent to which (urban) consumers are represented in their
workshops, conferences and in policy making processes at the national and regional levels.
With consumers having superficial or limited knowledge on the food sovereignty, coupled
with high levels of urban poverty, there is a high possibility that many people would be
indifferent about food choices provided there is access. Apart from the lack of knowledge
that emanates from the movements’ inadequate attention to consumer issues, in many parts of
Africa especially West Africa, food
11
trade systems do not facilitate choice making- GM and
(in)organic food stuff. On the one hand, imported staples e.g. rice and sugar are usually
repackaged in smaller quantities by domestic importers who do not invest in detailed
labelling. On the other hand, unlike Southern Africa where supermarkets are key food (ready-
to-eat) sources, in West Africa, street food and open markets are more prominent and
affordable food sources for the masses. This informal system defies labelling and
transparency on semi processed foods like milled cereals and cooked food. Food sovereignty
concerned consumers could only resort to trusted network of traders.
Another major challenge for the operationalization of food sovereignty in Africa is the rising
trend of preference for foreign products. This even goes beyond food stuff to clothing,
building materials, music, and television programmes etc. In the Sahel region of West Africa,
foods like noodles that were unsuitable fifteen years ago have been adopted as part of the
normal diets and compete with other basic foodstuffs (SWAC, 2007). In Ghana, consumption
of ‘perfumed long grained white rice’ imported from Thailand, Vietnam and USA is a
privilege social status. Although it is reported that rice production has been increasing,
consumption patterns are more directed towards foreign staples (Angelucci, Asante-Poku, &
10
I do not characterize consumers as fundamentally distinct from producers, but just for the purpose of arguing
for a holistic approach
11
This relates more with semi processed food stuff. Consumers in rural areas are usually able to differentiate
between organic and inorganic that are bought in their raw state
13
Anaadumba, 2013). The locally produced rice in Ghana cannot even be considered as
substitutes of the imported rice as taste and quality
12
differ widely (Boansi & Favour, 2015;
SWAC, 2007). Similarly, it is becoming a fact that children growing in big cities like Accra,
may never get to have a taste of locally and organically reared poultry to even compare with
the bulk imported from china and Brazil. It is worth noting that the situation is however the
opposite in Burkina Faso where imported chicken is banned. In South Africa and Zimbabwe
for example, the increasing patronage of fast foods and supermarket products by urban
consumers also go a long way to perpetuate land concentration through large scale industrial
agriculture considered the main supplier of food to these markets.
This growing trend of westernised consumption patterns is an indication that capital is not
just a thing but working more in a process to penetrate and have domineering influence along
all the lines of commodity value chains- right from production through distribution to
consumption. As argued by Harvey, the existence of capital depends on this continuity.
Capital’s ability to control these commodity chains invariably makes it influential and give it
power to diffuse its control across various sectors of the economy- social, political, cultural
etc. As argued by Iles & Montenegro de Wit (2014, p.487) investors now function as self
annoited sovereigns who are freely reconfigurating their production across all spaces; they
have penetrated food culture though commercials, cheap refined and fast food which makes
food sovereignty’s ‘culturally appropriate and healthy food’ more or less insignificant to the
poor, hungry and busy urban consumer. ‘Confronting this many- headed beast’(Iles &
Montenegro de Wit, 2014) requires equal efforts in campaigns, advocacies, education and
resistances at multiple spaces. Producer organisations and movements in Africa would have
to transcend production spaces and identify all the relevant areas of capitals’ influence
(incuding peasant spaces) in order to cause some systemic or sructural changes. It also
implies better collaboration with all stakeholders and improvement in lobbying and
negotiations so as to develop new and renewed mechanisms for control over capital’s forms
and flow (Roman-Alcalá, 2016).
Conclusion
Amidst all the conceptual and implementation challenges, there are great prospects for the
food sovereignty in Africa. Findings from this review show that in the past decade and more,
producer organisations together with other civil society groups have played key roles to
influence food policies in Africa. What is interesting to note is that, in many of the reports
and campaigns, they suggest alternatives to what they resist. They are not merely
romanticizing food sovereignty. In addition, it is also evident that the food sovereignty
movement in Africa is shaped by their regional or societal contexts. It would be very
incorrect to assume that the movement in Africa merely replicates the Vía Campesina
principles. It is manifested in ROPPA’s lead in the 2006 West Africa Food Sovereignty
Declaration. Similarly, the scope of emphasis for many of the movements is premised on
their historical and economic backgrounds; ROPPA’s emphasis on trade restrictions
emanates from the high level of imports and dumping in West Africa, and the centrality of
land reforms in Food Sovereignty Campaign of South Africa also emerges from their
historical context of Apartheid and land concentrations. For the several challenges identified,
they also open doors for further research. Research that assesses and compares collective and
individual interests within and across diverse food sovereignty mobilisations in Africa is
12
The best quality produced in Ghana is said to be a grade 5; imported ones are mainly grade 1 and 2 USAID
2009
14
needed to understand their politics, agency, dynamics, legitimacy and impacts. In addition, in
Africa, food sovereignty has to be constructed and implemented in a context of strained state
society relations, institutionally facilitated neoliberal development, increasing urbanization,
food insecurity, changes in consumption patterns, and agrarian transformations thus
suggesting that food sovereignty related research engage with these issues.
15
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... Nonetheless, numerous organizations, networks, and platforms at national, regional, and continent levels are engaged in food sovereignty related campaigns and advocacy. Their campaigns are not mere replications of the La Via Campesina principles but are often shaped by their local or regional contexts and histories (Gyapong, 2017). For example, whereas land reform is central to the Food Sovereignty Campaign (FSC) in southern Africa due to their history of class and racial oppression (Wesso, 2009), the West African campaign is critical of free trade and thus, calls for equitable integration of smallholders into global markets. ...
... Nonetheless, numerous organizations, networks, and platforms at national, regional, and continent levels are engaged in food sovereignty related campaigns and advocacy. Their campaigns are not mere replications of the La Via Campesina principles but are often shaped by their local or regional contexts and histories (Gyapong, 2017). For example, whereas land reform is central to the Food Sovereignty Campaign (FSC) in southern Africa due to their history of class and racial oppression (Wesso, 2009), the West African campaign is critical of free trade and thus, calls for equitable integration of smallholders into global markets. ...
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This thesis examines how transnational advocacy networks operate across local, national, regional and international arenas. It takes a close look at the nature of peasant resistance and civil society in Mali, and explores how these interact with campaign and advocacy activities of Northern-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The central argument of this thesis is that these encounters have strengthened an elite, while marginalising alternative perspectives. This has happened through the collision of actors’ diverse interests, through competition between distinct framings of debate, and through differences in modes of political participation which reflect the power dynamics of the political arenas in which actors are rooted. The thesis is informed by the results of qualitative fieldwork research, which was carried out, mainly in Mali, between 2006 and 2008. By identifying the nature of connections and disconnections between actors at multiple levels, the thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of transnational civil society action.
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Rural social movements and urban food activists have sought to build food sovereignty because it has the potential to be the foundation of an alternative food system, transcending the deep-seated social, economic and ecological contradictions of the global food economy. However, continuing to build food sovereignty requires changes to global and local food systems that have to be undertaken in the messy reality of the present. This article therefore presents a series of wide-ranging, politically challenging but ultimately feasible interventions that are necessary but not sufficient conditions for its realisation.