Vote or Party Strategy? Understanding the Electoral Success of Ethnic Minorities in Brussels

Abstract

European democracies have grown ethnically diverse in the recent years. Still, ethnic minority groups remain underrepresented in politics in general. Despite the theoretical argument asserting that ethnic minorities should perform better in systems allowing voters to cast intraparty preferences, empirical studies bring mixed results. In particular, scholars highlight the role of both parties and voters in explaining the electoral success or failure of ethnic minority candidates. Using data on regional elections between 1995 and 2014 in Brussels, our study shows that even though parties have made gradual efforts to include ethnic minorities on their lists, voters appear to be an important force behind the election of ethnic minorities in Brussels. We find variations according to party ideology, with socialist and -to a lesser extent- Christian democratic party's candidates benefiting the most from preferential voting. However, the positive impact of preference votes seems to decrease overtime, as parties themselves become more inclusive and tend to allocate more realistic positions to their ethnic minority candidates in recent elections.

Full text

Vote or Party Strategy? Understanding the Electoral Success of
Ethnic Minorities in Brussels
Chloé Janssen (VUB)
Régis Dandoy (Waseda University)
Silvia Erzeel (VUB)
To cite this article: Janssen, C., Dandoy, R., & Erzeel, S. (2017). Het electorale succes van
etnische minderheden in Brussel: de rol van kiezers en partijen. Res Publica, 59(4), 389-412.
Abstract:
European democracies have grown ethnically diverse in the recent years. Still, ethnic minority
groups remain underrepresented in politics in general. Despite the theoretical argument
asserting that ethnic minorities should perform better in systems allowing voters to cast
intraparty preferences, empirical studies bring mixed results. In particular, scholars highlight
the role of both parties and voters in explaining the electoral success or failure of ethnic
minority candidates. Using data on regional elections between 1995 and 2014 in Brussels, our
study shows that even though parties have made gradual efforts to include ethnic minorities on
their lists, voters appear to be an important force behind the election of ethnic minorities in
Brussels. We find variations according to party ideology, with socialist and –to a lesser extent-
Christian democratic party’s candidates benefiting the most from preferential voting. However,
the positive impact of preference votes seems to decrease overtime, as parties themselves
become more inclusive and tend to allocate more realistic positions to their ethnic minority
candidates in recent elections.
Keywords: Brussels – electoral system – ethnic minorities – political representation

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1. Introduction
European societies have grown ethnically diverse in recent decades as a result of international
migration processes, but ethnic minorities often remain an underrepresented group in politics.
In explaining the limited numbers of ethnic minorities in politics, scholars have often focused
on the impact of state structures and citizenship regimes (a.o. Koopmans et al, 2005) and civic
infrastructures (a.o. Jacobs & Tillie, 2004). A growing body of work however now also points
to the role played by the political opportunity structure, in particular the electoral system
(Moser, 2008; Togeby, 2008). One hypothesis that has received considerable attention in that
respect, is that ethnic minorities do best under electoral rules that combine proportional
representation and preferential voting (Togeby, 2008). Proportional representation is expected
to foster diversity by providing parties with incentives to balance candidate lists in socio-
demographic terms, while preferential voting is assumed to create opportunities for ethnic
mobilization among voters and stimulate the practice of ethnic-based voting (e.g. Togeby,
2008; Teney et al, 2010; Jacobs et al 2013).
However, despite these theoretical arguments, empirical studies show somewhat mixed
results. While in Denmark a combination of PR rules and preferential voting contributed
extensively to ethnic minorities’ success in local politics (Togeby, 2008), in Sweden the
numerical presence of ethnic minorities in politics remained low despite similar favourable
conditions (Dancygier et al, 2015). Such mixed results show that electoral rules can indeed
create opportunities for enhanced representation, but cannot offer any guarantees. Actual
outcomes depend on how specific actors – political parties and voters in particular – engage
with these rules and give meaning to them. Political parties, through their crucial role in
candidate recruitment and selection, act as gatekeepers and/or facilitators of ethnic minorities’
representation. Voters in addition can decide to support or reject ethnic minority candidate(s)
and hence influence ethnic minorities’ electoral score.
Because more research is needed to understand how and when PR rules with
preferential voting contribute to the electoral success of ethnic minorities, this article will
examine another (non-Scandinavian) case, namely the Brussels capital region of Belgium.
Much like other West European countries, Belgium, and its Brussels capital region in
particular, has witnessed an increase in the ethnic diversity of its population and of its political
class. Currently about 25 per cent of the members of the Brussels regional assembly are of
ethnic origin; a percentage that reflects the proportion of ethnic minorities in the population.
This article therefore takes a closer look at the electoral success of ethnic minorities in Brussels

2
and explores how political opportunities generated by the electoral system, political parties and
voter strategies have contributed to these results.
In order to answer the research questions, this article will analyze original data on the
electoral scores of ethnic minority candidates competing in regional elections in Brussels from
1995 until the most recent election of 2014. By taking this over-time perspective, we want to
trace back the political representation of ethnic minorities over a period of 20 years, while
controlling for broader changes in the political and societal context such as changes in
citizenship regulations. The focus on regional elections is furthermore interesting because it
complements existing research in Belgium that has often focused more on the local or
national/federal level than on the regional level (Celis, Eelbode & Wauters, 2013; Teney et al,
2010; but see: Jacobs, 2000 for an important exception). The situation in the Brussels Capital
Region in particular deserves more attention because the region is characterized by a highly
diverse population, creating specific political and electoral opportunities for ethnic minorities.
As recent debates about the political integration of ethnic minorities in Belgium focus almost
exclusively on non-EU minorities, in particular the Moroccans, Turks and Congolese in
Brussels, our study will also focus on these minorities.
In what follows, we first discuss the existing literature on the political representation of
ethnic minorities in Belgium and Brussels. This is followed by a description of the data in a
methods section. Then we present and discuss the findings themselves. In the final section, we
return to the conclusion of the results.
2. Ethnic minorities in Belgium/Brussels
Of the three regions in Belgium, the Brussels Capital Region has the most diversified
population. Since 1991, about 30 per cent of the population in Brussels has a foreign
nationality, compared to 5 to 10 per cent on average in Flanders and Wallonia. European
citizens remain the largest immigrant group, especially so after the enlargement of the
European Union and the accession of new Eastern European member states (see also Figure
1). Turkish and African residents constitute the major extra-European groups of foreigners in
Brussels, with Moroccan citizens accounting for more than half of the African group. Several
changes made to citizenship regulations however have facilitated the attribution and acquisition
of the Belgian nationality for third and second generation immigrants in the 1990s and for
foreign residents in 2001. The impossibility to keep track of these new Belgian citizens and
their children makes it overall difficult to estimate the actual proportion of citizens with an

3
immigrant background in Brussels. Nevertheless, the presence of so many foreign nationals
from specific communities clearly illustrates the cultural and ethnic diversity of the Brussels
region.
Figure 1. Major nationality groups in Brussels, 1991 to 2015 (INS, 2017).
Although the first Belgians of ethnic origin started to appear on candidate lists from the late
1980s onwards (Bousetta & Bernès, 2007), the political integration of ethnic minorities became
particularly salient in the 1990s when the issue of granting migrants local voting rights was put
on the table. Especially in the bilingual Brussels region, migrant voting rights were heavily
debated between French-speaking and Flemish political parties, because it was believed that
voting rights for immigrants (especially non-EU immigrants) could endanger the already
fragile balance of power between Flemish and Francophone parties (Jacobs, 2000). The
Maastricht Treaty first instituted the right to vote for European citizens in local elections from
1995 onwards. In 2004, non-EU immigrants who had been Belgian residents for five years
were also granted voting rights for local elections. Changes in voting rights, as well as changes
in citizenship regulations, have progressively changed the composition of the electorate in
Belgium. Citizens of immigrant origin are now an important electoral group in Belgium and
(especially) in Brussels.
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Turkey Europe incl. border countries
Africa incl. Morocco Foreign population

4
Given these societal and political evolutions, research on the political involvement of
ethnic minorities in Belgium has continued to grow at a fast pace in recent years. Many studies
have paid attention to patterns of political participation of ethnic minorities by examining the
determinants and varieties of immigrant associational life and the impact of local
enfranchisement (a.o. Jacobs, 2000; Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2004). Compared to
studies of political participation, research on the political representation of ethnic minorities
has taken a slower started, mainly because until recently the number of ethnic minorities in
formal politics remained (very) low. However, alongside the gradual integration of ethnic
minorities in the formal political arena, research on the political representation of ethnic
minorities has also gained more ground in recent years.
Studies of political representation have on the one hand explored the actions undertaken
by political parties to recruit and select ethnic minority candidates, as well as their openness
and responsiveness towards newcomers in politics (Jacobs, 2000; Celis, Eelbode & Wauters,
2013; Celis & Erzeel, 2017). Recent studies show that parties have made efforts to include
candidates with an ethnic minority background on candidate lists (Celis & Erzeel, 2013).
Especially Brussels has observed an increase in the number of ethnic minority candidates over
the years, partly because of this increased interest of political parties to include ethnic minority
candidates in order to attract more voters (Eelbode, Wauters, Celis, & Devos, 2013; Teney,
Jacobs, Rea, & Delwit, 2010). Because ethnic minorities make up a very large part of the
Brussels electorate, parties who win the immigrant vote can indeed win the elections.
However, this attention paid by parties has not (yet) led to the adoption of concrete and
binding measures aimed at removing structural barriers for ethnic minorities in politics, such
as quotas or target numbers (Celis et al, 2014). According to Celis, Eelbode and Wauters
(2013), parties merely take ‘window-dressing’ measures, aimed at giving a platform to ethnic
minorities without actually sharing power with them. Even in Brussels, parties find it more
important to balance candidate lists in terms of gender than in terms of ethnicity (De Winter et
al, 2013). This makes it uncertain that party strategies can really account for the electoral
success of ethnic minorities.
Next to the role of political parties, a more limited number of studies have explored the
‘voter side’ of political representation by studying voting patterns of ethnic minorities. Looking
at party preferences, Eelbode et al (2013) found that ethnic minority voters in Ghent and
Antwerp were more likely to support a leftist party than a rightist party. This finding was not
confirmed in Brussels, where Teney et al (2010) concluded that the support of ethnic minority
voters for leftist parties was not that straightforward and that important variations existed

5
across ethnic identities. Research on candidate preferences however remains scarce and few
studies have looked into the role of ethnicity in preference voting. Teney’s et al’s (2010) stands
out as an important exception. Focusing on preferential voting for ethnic minority candidates
at the occasion of the 2006 local election in Brussels, the authors identified patterns of both
‘ethnic voting’ and ‘symbolic voting’. Although ethnic minority candidates drew
disproportionately from the support of voters of their own communities (i.e. ethnic voting),
there was also a group of (ethnic majority) voters who deliberately cast votes for ethnic
minority candidates as a ‘symbolic’ gesture in favor of diversity (i.e. symbolic voting) (Teney
et al, 2010). Teney et al’s study of local politics offers some empirical proof for the fact that
preferential voting shapes the electoral success of ethnic minority candidates in Brussels, which
is in line with the findings of Togeby (2008) in Denmark, but more research is needed in order
to understand to what extent and how preference voting plays a role.
The dual focus on voters and parties is needed in Belgium’s flexible list system. Belgian
voters can cast a vote for the entire list (= list vote), or vote for one or several candidates on
the same list (= preference votes). Both list votes and preferential votes influence the allocation
of seats between candidates. Candidates with enough preferential votes to exceed a particular
‘threshold’ are elected, notwithstanding their position on the list. For candidates not attaining
this threshold (often the majority of candidates), the order in which they appear on the list
influences their chance of getting elected. Those with positions higher on the list take
advantage of list votes, which are allocated to candidates in the order in which they appear on
the list and are added to their preferential votes. Given the partial impact of the list vote,
preferential voting does not have a full effect. Over the years, Belgium has witnessed various
electoral reforms with the intention to increase the importance of preference votes. Since 1995,
voters can cast multiple preference votes while it was limited to a single one until then. In 2002,
the impact of the list order was reduced by two to the advantage of preferential votes (Wauters,
Weekers, and Maddens, 2010). Despite these changes however, the top-list positions are still
the safest and candidates on these positions almost always get elected. A minority of candidates
manage to get elected ‘out of order’ and the original ranking as decided by parties usually
determines who gets the seats (Bouhon, Reuchamps & Dodeigne, 2012).
In this regard, Karvonen rightly categorizes the preferential voting system in Belgium
as weak (2004: 208). But even if their preference votes only rarely directly lead to their
election, candidates get indirectly rewarded for their personal electoral score. Indeed, a
candidate who was popular in the last election (i.e. who got a high amount of preference votes)

6
is more likely to get a higher position on the list in the next election (André, Depauw, Shugart,
& Chytilek, 2015; Crisp, Olivella, Malecki, & Sher, 2013).
3. Methodology
In order to answer our research questions, we composed a dataset of all candidates that
participated in the Brussels regional elections from 1995 to 2014. We collected information on
the ethnic background of the candidates, their party affiliation, their position on the list, the
number of preference votes they received, and whether or not they got elected. In order to keep
the study feasible, we have limited our analysis to effective candidates who ran on lists of
‘winner parties’ i.e. parties that won a least one seat in a given election, resulting in a total of
2.903 candidates. Parties that did not get any seat as well as substitute candidates were removed
from the dataset.
Data were collected from 1995 to 2014, because this allowed us to map the evolution
of ethnic minorities’ electoral success over time, while taking into account the role of social
and institutional changes in Brussels. Several important changes took place between 1999 and
2004. The Brussels parliament, which originally had a single electoral district of 75 seats,
increased its number of seats to 89 in 2004 and – more significantly – introduced reserved seats
according to language. French-speaking voters elect 72 French-speaking regional MPs while
Dutch-speaking voters elect 17 Dutch-speaking regional MPs. Moreover, the impact of the list
order was reduced by two in 2002 (i.e. the devolution of the list vote), which increased the
impact of preferential voting on the allocation of seats between candidates. Migrant voting
rights were furthermore introduced in 2004 at the local level, which raised public awareness
on the need to integrate ethnic minorities in politics. Our comparison over time should always
be interpreted against the backdrop of these changes.
In our analysis of the political representation of ethnic minorities, we focus exclusively
on the political representation of non-EU ethnic minorities, because recent debates about the
political integration of ethnic minorities in Belgium focus almost exclusively on non-EU
minorities, in particular the Moroccans, Turks and Congolese
1
. The coding of the ‘ethnic
background’ variable is a complex process since we do not dispose of much official
information on the candidates’ personal backgrounds, apart from their name, address, gender
1
One of the conditions for being candidate in the Brussels regional elections is the Belgian nationality.
However, this does not prevent candidates to also hold another nationality, such as Moroccan or Turkish.

7
birthdate and occupation. Our proxy for identifying candidates of ethnic origin is therefore
based on an onomastic procedure, i.e. an analysis of their family name and first name (see also
Celis & Erzeel 2013). The distinctive first name / last name method is often used as an efficient
way to identify members of ethnic (minority) groups in similar studies in other countries or
contexts (see e.g. Black, 2008; Bloemraad, 2013).
Three independent coders classified all candidates in different categories based on the
origin of their name. In very few cases of doubt or disagreement between coders, we looked
up the picture of those candidates on the available campaign websites and materials. Yet, if
more detailed information on the ethnic background of well-known candidates in larger parties
is accessible in the most recent elections, the same does not apply for less-known candidates
especially in older elections, so we could not use this technique for all the candidates.
In addition, we collected data on the number of preference votes and the list position of
obtained by each candidate. Candidates’ list position gives us information on parties’ efforts to
enhance the representation of ethnic minorities, especially if they are placed on realistic list
positions. The realistic position variable has been calculated on the basis of the number of seats
won by a party list (‘party magnitude’) in the previous election (PM-1). The candidate is
considered to be on a realistic position if his/her initial position is lower or equal (in terms of
numbers) to PM-1. The number of preference votes is an aggregated measure at the district
level
2
.
In the final section of the analysis, we are interested in the electoral process itself, i.e.
in the interplay between parties, candidates, and voters. We present data on how candidates
managed to disturb the list order. First, we compare the initial position candidates had on the
list to the final position candidates would have had according to their personal score only,
leaving aside list vote devolution. This allows us to assess how preference votes play a role in
the ability of candidates to move up or down the list. Second, we consider how preference votes
influence the official election results, by analyzing the link between the eligible position and
the effective election. Compared to the ‘realistic’ position that was calculated on a PM-1 basis,
we define the ‘eligible’ position on the basis of the actual number of seats won by the party at
the moment of the election (PM-0) (see section 4.4 for an explanation of the purpose of that
distinction). We examine the ethnic background of candidates who did not occupy an eligible
position but did get elected anyway, and of candidates who did not get elected while they were
2
Hence, we cannot conduct any individual-level analysis with regard to how and why voters might use
preference votes and whether this is linked to ethnic or symbolic voting.

8
on an eligible position. This allows us to put into perspective the actual score of a party with
the electoral success or failure of ethnic minority candidates.
We present the results of our analysis by election year to highlight the evolution over
time. We also present the results by party family in order to determine how party ideology
shapes the representation of ethnic minorities in the Brussels Parliament.
4. Empirical results
4.1.The representation of ethnic minorities
As a first step in the analysis, the percentages of ethnic minorities among the elected MPs and
among the effective candidates are compared over time. Roughly 17.8 per cent of the elected
MPs and 13.4 per cent of the candidates in the period between 1995 and 2014 had an ethnic
minority (i.e. Turkish, Moroccan or Congolese) background.
The findings in Table 1 reveal that the presence of ethnic minorities in the Brussels
parliament was rather low in 1995 but has strongly increased over the years. In 1995, only 5
per cent of the elected MPs had an ethnic minority background. This percentage doubled in
1999, when ethnic minorities occupied 11 per cents of the seats in the Brussels parliament.
Subsequent increases in ethnic minorities’ presence followed in 2004 and 2009, when the share
of ethnic minority representatives amounted to 20 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. In the
most recent term (2014), the presence of ethnic minorities seems to have stabilized and ethnic
minorities make up roughly one fourth of the elected MPs.
If we furthermore compare the percentage of ethnic minorities among the elected MPs
to their percentage among the effective candidates in Table 1, we see that until 2004, the
percentage of ethnic minority MPs has always been higher than the percentage of ethnic
minority candidates. This means that ethnic minorities, especially in the earlier legislative
terms, were better represented than could have been expected based on their presence on
candidate lists. The electoral success of ethnic minorities can be the result of two phenomena:
either ethnic minority candidates occupied a large amount of the realistic positions on party
lists, or they received a large amount of preference votes which allowed them to get elected
out of order. The following sections of the paper (4.2 and 4.3) will investigate both possibilities
in more detail.

9
Table 1. The ethnic background of elected MPs and effective candidates in the Brussels
parliament, over time
Year
Ethnic
background
Elected MPs
N (%)
Candidates
N (%)
1995
Ethnic minority
4 (5%)
18 (2.4%)
Non-EM
71 (95%)
730 (97.6%)
Total
75 (100%)
148 (100%)
1999
Ethnic minority
8 (11%)
55 (7%)
Non-EM
67 (89%)
731 (93%)
Total
75 (100%)
786 (100%)
2004
Ethnic minority
18 (20%)
68 (15.3%)
Non-EM
71 (80%)
377 (84.7%)
Total
89 (100%)
445 (100%)
2009
Ethnic minority
22 (25%)
99 (25.4%)
Non-EM
67 (75%)
291 (74.6%)
Total
89 (100%)
390 (100%)
2014
Ethnic minority
22 (25%)
148 (27.7%)
Non-EM
67 (75%)
386 (72.3%)
Total
89 (100%)
534 (100%)
Total
Ethnic minority
74 (18%)
388 (13.4%)
Non-EM
343 (82%)
2.515 (86.6%)
Total
417 (100%)
2.903 (100%)
Note: percentages are column percentages by year. Non-EM means ‘non-ethnic minorities’.
However, we first take a closer look at the presence of ethnic minority candidates and MPs
among the different party families in Figure 2. Previous studies show that most ethnic
minorities have traditionally been elected by socialist parties in Belgium (Celis, Eelbode &
Wauters, 2013; Van Hauwaert et al, forthcoming). These findings are also confirmed for the
Brussels case. Together with far-left parties, socialist parties present the highest percentage of
ethnic minorities among their candidates and elected representatives. Christian democratic
parties and green parties nominate slightly less candidates compared to the socialist and far-
left parties, and have substantially less ethnic minorities among their elected MPs. Right-wing
parties such as the liberal parties and regionalist parties host a small number of ethnic minority
candidates and MPs, which is also in line with other (inter)national studies (Celis & Erzeel,
2013; Mügge, 2016). The radical right has no ethnic minorities among its candidates or
representatives.

10
If we again compare the percentage of ethnic minority candidates to the percentage of
ethnic minority MPs, we notice that only in socialist and far-left parties the percentage of ethnic
minority MPs is higher than the percentage of ethnic minority candidates. In other parties, it is
the same or lower.
Although Figure 2 presents the general results per party family, it is important to notice
that the Brussels electoral arena is divided into a Flemish and Francophone arena. When we
analyze the results for the Flemish and Francophone parties separately (not shown here), we
find that the results in Figure 2 hold for both language groups. Even if we compare the parties
over time, the tendency remains the same, and becomes even stronger in the most recent
elections.
Figure 2. Number of ethnic minority candidates and ethnic minority MPs among candidates
and elected candidates for each party family (in percentages)
Note: EM means ‘ethnic minority’.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Far-left
Socialist
Green
Christian-Democratic
Liberal
Regionalist
Far-right
% EM candidates among all candidates
% EM elected among elected candidates

11
4.2.The role of candidate lists
As mentioned above, the electoral chances of candidates in Belgium’s flexible list system are
to an important extent shaped by the list order. The list order is to a large extent determined by
national and regional party leaders. In order to consider parties’ role in the electoral success of
ethnic minorities, we therefore analyze in Figure 3 to what extent parties nominate ethnic
minorities for realistic positions on the list. The results reveal that ethnic minorities have
gradually obtained more realistic list positions over time. Until 1999, parties offered less than
10 per cent of the realistic positions to ethnic minority candidates. In the most recent elections,
ethnic minorities gained a larger proportion of the realistic positions, up to 22.4 per cent in
2009 and 23.1 per cent in 2014.
However, in order to assess whether parties contributed to the electoral success of
ethnic minorities, we have to compare for each year the percentage of candidates occupying
realistic list positions (in Figure 3) to the actual percentage of elected MPs (as displayed in
Table 1). The results are quite revealing. In every legislative term up until 2009, ethnic
minorities obtained a larger proportion of the seats in the Brussels parliament than we could
have expected based on their proportion of realistic positions. For instance, in 1999 ethnic
minorities obtained about 8 per cent of the realistic list positions and 11 per cent of the seats in
parliament. In 2004, a threshold of 20 per cent elected ethnic minority representatives was
reached, despite the fact that ethnic minorities (only) received 15.8 per cent of the realistic list
positions. Only in 2014, the share of ethnic minorities among the elected representatives
proportionally reflects their share among the candidates occupying realistic list positions.
Overall, we conclude that the electoral success of ethnic minorities cannot be attributed to party
efforts (alone), especially in earlier years. On the contrary, if the allocation of seats would have
been based solely on list order, the numerical integration of ethnic minorities would have
followed a slower track.
These findings confirm our initial expectations that political parties are not the driving
forces behind the increased ethnic diversity in Belgian politics. Parties seemingly take a ‘wait-
and-see’ attitude: before committing to selecting (a high number of) ethnic minorities, they
first need proof that selecting ethnic minorities offers electoral advantages.
Differences between party families furthermore occur, as shown in Figure 4. The
socialist party represent the largest percentage of ethnic minorities on realistic positions,
closely followed by Christian democratic and green parties. The right-wing liberal and
regionalist parties have the lowest percentage of ethnic minorities on realistic list positions,

12
which might explain why they also have the lowest number of ethnic minorities among the
elected representatives.
Figure 3. Percentage of candidates occupying a realistic position on the list according to their
ethnic background, over time
Note: EMC means ‘ethnic minority candidates’.
Figure 4. Percentage of candidates occupying a realistic position on the list according to their
ethnic background, by party family
Note: The radical right party family was not included because it did not have a single ethnic
minority candidate during the period considered. EMC means ‘ethnic minority candidates’.
0
20
40
60
80
100
non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC
1995 1999 2004 2009 2014
Candidates occupying a realistic position
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC
non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC
Far-left Socialist Green
Christian-Democratic Liberal Regionalist
Candidates occupying a realistic position

13
4.3.The role of preferential voting
Next, we consider the role of voters, by assessing the impact of preferential voting. In Brussels,
more than 70 per cent of the voters use preference votes rather than list votes, which means
that preference votes are a key element for understanding election results.
Table 2 first gives an overview of the average amount of preference votes obtained by
effective candidates, by ethnic background and election year. On average, an individual
candidate in the Brussels regional elections receives 1090 preference votes. This number
nevertheless largely varies across candidates. In 2004, for instance, Charles Picqué (PS)
received 59.216 preference votes. Overall, very few candidates receive more than 10.000
preference votes, since the vote is rather fragmented in these elections, given the high number
of parties and candidates. Table 2 furthermore shows a clear positive trend in the amount of
preference votes cast: since 1995, the average amount of preference votes for all candidates
has steadily increased, reaching a peak in 2004 and 2009, and (slightly) decreasing again in
2014. The increase in 2004 coincides with the 2002 electoral reforms, in particular the
reduction of the impact of the list order by two to the advantage of preferential votes (Wauters,
Weekers, and Maddens, 2010). Although we cannot assume that the electoral reforms have had
any mechanical effects on the number of preferential votes cast in the next elections, it is
possible that they have encouraged voters to take advantage of the new system and cast (more)
votes for their preferred candidates (Wauters, 2014).
When we consider the ethnic background of candidates, it is clear that ethnic minorities
initially attracted a higher amount of preference votes than other candidates (in 1995, 1999 and
2004). This trend confirms Teney et al’s (2010) earlier study showing that ethnic minority
candidates attract more preference votes in ethnically diverse contexts where they can take
advantage of ethnic mobilization. The advantage of ethnic minority candidates however
disappears in the last two elections. In 2009 and 2014, the average amount of preference votes
obtained by ethnic minorities roughly equals the amount of preference votes gained by non-
ethnic minorities. Based on our current dataset, we cannot offer any conclusive reasons for why
this shift occurred. One possibility – namely, that this shift occurred because ethnic minorities
received fewer ‘visible’ positions on candidate lists – should be rejected because the results in
Figure 3 in the previous section showed an increase in the number of ethnic minorities
occupying realistic list positions in recent years. Another possibility is that the advantage of a
system of preferential voting disappears once the numerical presence of ethnic minorities in
politics starts to increase. Ethnic mobilization might prove to be a successful strategy for ethnic

14
minorities especially when they are newcomers in politics because their ethnic background
offers them a competitive advantage. However, this competitive advantage might disappear
once more ethnic minorities gain access to parliament, because more (well-known) ethnic
minority candidates are competing for votes and might need to divide preference votes between
them.
Table 2. Average amount of preference votes by ethnic background and election year
Elections
Ethnic background
Average amount of preference
votes
1995
Ethnic minority
788
Non-EM
585
Total
589
1999
Ethnic minority
1115
Non-EM
706
Total
735
2004
Ethnic minority
1811
Non-EM
1511
Total
1557
2009
Ethnic minority
1859
Non-EM
1911
Total
1898
2014
Ethnic minority
1397
Non-EM
1311
Total
1335
Total
Ethnic minority
1519
Non-EM
1024
Total
1090
Note: Non-EM means ‘non-ethnic minority’
Figure 5 furthermore reveals a lot of variation in the average amount of preference votes
between parties. On socialist and Christian democratic party lists, ethnic minority candidates
obtained more preference votes than non-ethnic minority candidates. In other party families,
ethnic minority candidates received either an equal amount (green, far left, regionalist) or fewer
preference votes (liberal) compared to non-ethnic minority candidates. Especially on liberal
party lists, ethnic minority candidates received only a small proportion of the realistic list
positions (see Figure 4), which might also explain why these candidates obtained a smaller
amount of preference votes.

15
Figure 5. Average amount of preference votes by ethnic background and party family
Note: The radical right party family was not included because it did not have a single ethnic
minority representative during the period considered. EMC means ‘ethnic minority
candidates’.
4.4.The election process
The next question is whether preference votes also allow candidates to disturb the list order. In
order to answer this question, we compare the initial position candidates had on the list to the
position they would have been elected in if results were only based on personal scores. Figure
6 first shows how both ethnic minority and non-ethnic minority candidates fare in the elections,
more precisely how many of them moved up the list, down the list or maintained the same list
position. The results are clear: ethnic minorities are more likely to move up the list compared
to non-ethnic minorities, indicating that minority candidates generally do better in terms of
preference votes than other candidates.
Figure 7 nevertheless reveals important differences between party families. Ethnic
minorities in socialist and -to a lesser extent- far-left parties take the most advantage of their
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC
non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC non-EMC EMC
Far-left Socialist Green
Christian-Democratic Liberal Regionalist
Preference votes

16
preference votes to move up the list. In both party families, more than 60 per cent of the ethnic
minority candidates is able to get a higher list position as a result of a high level of voter
support. This is also the case for about half of the ethnic minority candidates on Christian
democratic and green party lists. In liberal and regionalist parties, on the other hand, the
majority of ethnic minority candidates actually move down the list when only preference votes
are taken into account. Overall, Figure 7 indicates that levels of voter support are higher for
ethnic minority candidates on leftist lists.
Figure 6. Candidates disturbing the list order (without the devolution effect), by ethnic
background and year
Note: EMC means ethnic minority candidates.
0.2 .4 .6 .8 1
0.2 .4 .6 .8 1 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
EMC
non-EMC
EMC
non-EMC
EMC
non-EMC
EMC
non-EMC
EMC
non-EMC
1995 1999 2004
2009 2014
Equal
Higher
Lower

17
Figure 7. Candidates disturbing the list order (without the devolution effect), by ethnic
background and party family
Note: Radical right party family not included because not a single elected EMC during the
period considered. EMC means ethnic minority candidates.
Figures 6 and 7 show how preference votes play a role in the ability of candidates to move up
or down the list. However, if we want to consider how preference votes in the end shape the
election results, we have to take into account the effect of the devolution of list votes –i.e. the
fact that for determining the final ranking of candidates and for calculating which candidates
obtain a seat, list votes are added to preference votes. Table 3 therefore compares the proportion
of ethnic minority candidates who would have been elected without the devolution effect to
those who were actually elected. We can see that the devolution of list votes slightly
disadvantages ethnic minority candidates. Between 1995 and 2014, 14 ethnic minority
candidates did not get elected due to the devolution effect, but would have been if there was
no devolution of list votes. Six ethnic minority candidates took advantage of the devolution
effect: they got elected while they would not have been elected if their election would have
relied solely on preference votes. Out of the 14 ethnic minority candidates who were not elected
but would have been without the devolution effect, 10 come from a socialist list and 4 from a
0.2 .4 .6 .8 1 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
EMC
non-EMC
EMC
non-EMC
EMC
non-EMC
EMC
non-EMC
EMC
non-EMC
EMC
non-EMC
Far-left Socialist Green
Christian-Democratic Liberal Regionalist
Equal Higher Lower

18
green list. On the contrary, 5 out of the 6 ethnic minority candidates who seemed to benefit
from the devolution effect come from a liberal list (and one from a socialist list).
Table 3. Comparison between the numbers of ethnic minority candidates who were actually
elected and their potential numbers without the devolution effect.
Election
Would have been elected without
the devolution effect
NO
YES
1995
Actually elected
NO
13
1
YES
0
4
1999
Actually elected
NO
41
6
YES
1
7
2004
Actually elected
NO
49
1
YES
1
17
2009
Actually elected
NO
74
3
YES
2
20
2014
Actually elected
NO
123
3
YES
2
20
Total
Actually elected
NO
300
14
YES
6
68
Similar conclusions can be drawn from Table 4. Table 4 displays the number and percentage
of candidates who were elected without having obtained an eligible list position in the first
place. While we focused on realistic positions in the second section, and measured them on the
basis of the party magnitude in the previous election (PM-1), we believe that the number of
seats allocated to a party in the current election is the best measure to capture how the election
process itself plays a role in the electoral success or failure of ethnic minority candidates. Using
realistic positions measured on a PM-1 basis doesn’t allow us to know with certainty whether
the electoral success of ethnic minority candidates is linked to the amount of preference votes
received by candidates, or to the positions candidates had on the list. Indeed, it could be biased
by the fact that their success is simply linked to the electoral success or failure of the party list
itself. What we want to know here is which process steers the allocation of seats to ethnic
minority candidates, considering the number of seats allocated to the party in a specific election
(PM-0). In order to distinguish between PM-1 and PM-0, we call eligible positions those
positions measured on a PM-0 basis. We see from Table 4 that the percentage of candidates
who were elected without being on an eligible position is every election year higher for ethnic

19
minorities than for other candidates. Between 1995 and 2014, 32 per cent of the ethnic minority
candidates got elected despite having occupied a non-eligible list position, compared to only
15 per cent of the other candidates. Hence, ethnic minorities benefit from preferential voting.
But party family again plays a crucial role here. All the ethnic minority candidates who
were elected without having obtained an eligible list position came from socialist parties,
except in 2009 and 2014 where respectively one out of seven and two out of five came from a
Christian democratic list. This reconfirms the conditional effect of preferential voting. Only
for socialist parties, and to a lesser extent Christian democratic parties, did preferential voting
have a real positive effect on the election of ethnic minority candidates. In other parties, it did
not play a role at all, or it played a negative role. This is clear if we compare two categories of
candidates in Figure 8: (1) candidates who did not occupy an eligible position but did get
elected anyway – meaning that they managed to breach the list order thanks to a good personal
score, and (2) candidates who occupied an eligible position but did not get elected – meaning
that they did not got elected while the party ‘wanted’ them to get elected. Figure 8 displays the
proportion of candidates belonging to each category by party family and over time. It is clear
that preference voting especially helped candidates on socialist lists to breach the list order and
get elected. In most recent years, preference votes were also conducive to the electoral success
of Christian democratic parties. However, in other parties, preference voting did not benefit
ethnic minority candidates. On the contrary, on several occasions, ethnic minority candidates
were not elected, despite having occupied eligible list positions. In those cases, the system of
preference voting benefitted ethnic majority candidates, who were able to get elected by
‘jumping over’ ethnic minorities initially positioned higher on the list.
Table 4. Link between position on the list and preference votes, by candidates’ ethnic
background and year
Year
Ethnic background
No eligible position, yet
elected
N (%)
Total elected
N (%)
1995
Ethnic minority
2 (50%)
4 (100%)
Non-EM
5 (7%)
71 (100%)
Total
7 (9%)
75 (100%)
1999
Ethnic minority
2 (25%)
8 (100%)
Non-EM
3 (5%)
67 (100%)
Total
5 (7%)
75 (100%)
2004
Ethnic minority
8 (44%)
18 (100%)
Non-EM
19 (27%)
71 (100%)

20
Total
27 (30%)
89 (100%)
2009
Ethnic minority
7 (32%)
22 (100%)
Non-EM
14 (21%)
67 (100%)
Total
21 (24%)
89 (100%)
2014
Ethnic minority
5 (23%)
22 (100%)
Non-EM
10 (15%)
67 (100%)
Total
15 (17%)
89 (100%)
Total
Ethnic minority
24 (32%)
74 (100%)
Non-EM
51 (15%)
343 (100%)
Total
75 (18%)
417 (100%)
Note: percentages are row percentages. Non-EM means non-ethnic minority.
Figure 8. The link between occupying an eligible position and being elected for ethnic minority
candidates, by year and party family
Note: EP means ‘eligible position’.
0.1 .2 .3 .4
0.1 .2 .3 .4
Regionalist
Liberal
Christian-Democratic
Green
Socialist
Far-left
Regionalist
Liberal
Christian-Democratic
Green
Socialist
Far-left
Regionalist
Liberal
Christian-Democratic
Green
Socialist
Far-left
Regionalist
Liberal
Christian-Democratic
Green
Socialist
Far-left
Regionalist
Liberal
Christian-Democratic
Green
Socialist
Far-left
1995 1999
2004 2009
2014
Elected, not EP
EP, not elected

21
5. Discussion and conclusion
What can in the end explain the electoral success of ethnic minorities in the Brussels regional
parliament: is it voter behavior or party strategies? Our results show that, even though parties
have made gradual efforts to include ethnic minorities on candidate lists and on realistic list
positions, voters appear to be an important force behind the election of ethnic minorities in
Brussels. Overall, ethnic minorities were able to attract a higher number of preference votes
than other candidates, which allowed them to move up the list and (sometimes) get elected out
of order. At the same time, however, we cannot generalize these findings to all party families
and to all legislative terms.
One important finding is that especially ethnic minorities in socialist parties, and to a
lesser extent Christian democratic parties, take advantage of the system of preferential voting.
The positive effect of preferential voting was far from obvious in other parties, even in other
left-wing parties such as the greens, where ethnic minorities were unable to attract a high
number of preference votes despite having received a substantial share of the eligible list
positions. In this latter case, the election of ethnic minorities was not due to voters, but mainly
the result of party efforts. Further research should investigate how differences between party
families can be explained and to what extent ethnic-based voting shapes patterns of preferential
voting.
Another interesting finding is that the role of parties and voters in the promotion of
ethnic minorities changed over time. Whereas the initial success of ethnic minorities (1995-
2004) was primarily due to voter behavior, parties substantially increased the percentage of
ethnic minorities on realistic list positions in the most recent period, while the advantage of
ethnic minorities in terms of preference votes seemed to disappear. Hence, in the most recent
elections, the electoral success of ethnic minorities should be linked to both party strategy and
voter behavior. It is difficult to explain based on our current dataset why these changes over
time occur; future research should try to sort this out by conducting in-depth interviews with
parties and voters.
The timescale of our analysis furthermore allowed us to make some assertions about
the role played by institutions. The electoral system in Belgium has moved from a more closed-
list system to a more open-list system in the mid-2000s. In most cases, list vote devolution only
secures the two or three candidates on a list (Renwick & Pilet, 2016). As a consequence, the
system gets more open as party magnitude increases. As district magnitude is high in Brussels
(75 seats until 1999, then 89), party magnitude is high too and parties usually win much more

22
than 3 seats. Crucial in this instance is that voters make actual use of their opportunity to cast
preference votes, considering that preferential voting is optional in Belgium (Bergh &
Bjørklund, 2003; Togeby, 2008). Our study suggests that the flexible-list system in Brussels
produces similar positive results as open-list systems do and this is especially beneficial to
ethnic minority candidates. At the same time, we found also that more ethnic minority
candidates would have been elected if the system was really fully-open.
Although our focus in this article was on the impact of the electoral system, it should
be clear that levels of ethnic minority representation cannot be attributed to features of the
electoral system alone. Changes in citizenship regulations and voting rights in the mid 2000s
drastically changed the ethnic constellation of the electorate in Brussels and resulted in a strong
politicization of ethnicity. Parties have responded to these changes. The number of ethnic
minorities nominated as (top-list) candidates among this group strongly increased from 2004
onwards. Following up on socialist and green parties, other parties gradually included them on
their list, with the exception of the radical right party. What Martiniello and Hily (1998: 129)
called a ‘moral obligation’ to nominate candidates progressively turned into what we can call
a ‘moral obligation’ to elect candidates as the number of ethnic minority candidates on realistic
positions increased over time. What remains unclear, however, is how social and institutional
changes that took place in the mid 2000s have influenced voter strategies. Is preference voting
particularly conducive to the election of ethnic minorities when they are newcomers in politics,
and will this competitive advantage disappear once more ethnic minorities enter the elected
assemblies? This is yet another question that deserves more attention in future research.

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