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The Professionalization of Cryptology in Sixteenth Century Venice1
Ioanna Iordanou, Oxford Brookes Business School
N.B. This is the post-print version of the slightly revised version of the article published in the
journal Enterprise and Society https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2018.10
Abstract
This article examines the evolution of cryptology as a business trait and a distinct, state-regulated
and controlled profession in sixteenth century Venice. It begins by briefly discussing the
systematic development of cryptology in the Renaissance. Following an examination of the
amateur use of codes and ciphers by members of the Venetian merchant and ruling class, and
subsequently by members of all layers of Venetian society, the article moves on to discuss the
professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice. This was premised on specialist
skills formation, a shared professional identity, and an emerging professional ethos. The article
explores a potential link between the amateur use of cryptology, especially as it had been
instigated by merchants in the form of merchant-style codes, and its professional use by the
Venetian authorities, and it adds the profession of the cifrista – the professional cipher secretary
– to the list of more “conventional” early modern professions.
In one of the most widely cited scholarly works on the historical development of cryptology,
David Kahn argued that the “growth of cryptology resulted directly from the flowering of
modern diplomacy.”2 While this contention remains the conventional wisdom, it does not
adequately explain the distinctive course that professional cryptology took in a commercial and
maritime empire like Renaissance Venice. There, the ruling class, who were actively engaged in
international trade,3 could not see a distinction between trade and politics, as political affairs
could affect one’s business and livelihood, and commercial pursuits could have diplomatic
implications.4 For this reason, protecting vital information though code-words and symbols was
not an uncommon commercial practice. Andrea Barbarigo, for instance, a renowned Venetian
merchant, already by the 1430s was using his own cipher for his confidential communication
with his business agent in the Levant.5 In the early 1500s, Andrea Gritti, a young merchant and
1 Research for this article was financially supported by the Business Archives Council, a British
Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant, and an Internal Small Grant offered by Oxford Brookes Business
School. I am grateful to Alex Bamji, Christopher Moran, Rosa Salzberg, and Richard Mohun for their input at
different stages of writing this article. My most sincere thanks are due to Professor Andrew Popp and the two
anonymous Reviewers for their constructive feedback and excellent guidance throughout the review process.
2 Kahn, The Codebreakers, 108.
3 See Romano, Patricians and Popolani and bibliography therein.
4 Sardella, Nouvelles, 90.
5 The cipher is in ASV, Archivio Grimani-Barbarigo, busta (hereafter b.) 4, Reg. 1, c.158 r.; See also, Lane, I
mercanti, Illustration 2. On Barbarigo, see Lane, Andrea Barbarigo.
1
future Doge of Venice, used commercial jargon as a code,6 in order to send intelligence to his
motherland from Constantinople.7 The Venetians had even coined a term for this encoding
approach, lettere mercantili, that is, “mercantile letters.”8 Yet, the same Venetian ruling class that
invented amateur ways of concealing trade secrets through “mercantile letters” prompted the
development of a fully-fledged, state controlled and regulated professional cryptology
department housed in the Doge’s Palace. What was the link between such commercial encryption
practices and the professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice?
In Renaissance Venice, business – that is trade and industry – and statecraft were blurringly
intertwined. Historical academic literature has overwhelmingly ignored any commercial origins
of the historical development of cryptology, focusing primarily on the gradual increase in
complexity and sophistication of ciphers, as they developed through the centuries. Indeed, in
over 1000 pages of his path-breaking book – a work of gargantuan extent, both in chronology
and geography – David Kahn offers a sweeping review of cryptology’s historical development
from ancient times to the present.9 In his discussion of the evolution of early modern cryptology,
however, Kahn overlooks a significant development of that period: the progressive
transformation of the discipline from an intellectual activity of a handful of gifted individuals in
the employ of Italian and European princes, into a state-controlled and regulated profession
premised on specialist skills formation by means of professional training.
More specifically, Kahn’s synthetic account of cryptology in the early modern era centres
on three distinct characteristics: cryptology as an emblem of the intellectual prowess of spirited
philomaths and polymaths who operated within the broader context of erudition that pervaded
the Renaissance period; cryptology as an instrument of statecraft, used by governments to protect
arcana imperii (the secrets of the state); and the gradual sophistication of early modern ciphers.10
Undoubtedly, the instrumentalization of cryptology for political imperatives intensified in the
period after the fifteenth century, that saw the systematic development of embassies and, by
extension, diplomacy.11 It is not accidental, therefore, that scholars who explored the
development of cryptology in that period, upon whose work Kahn built his own narrative,
focused on these particular aspects of cryptology.12 A fresh attempt to explore extant archival
6 A code is a method of altering the meaning of a message, while a cipher is a technique that hides the message by
changing the characters in which it is presented. See Kahn, The Codebreakers, xiii-xv.
7 Davis, “Shipping and Spying.” A code is a method of altering the meaning of a message, while a cipher is a
technique that hides the message by changing the characters in which it is presented. See Kahn, The Codebreakers,
xiii-xv.
8 See, for example, ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 9, cc.126v.-127r. (26 Jan. 1571).
9 Kahn, The Codebreakers.
10 See articles published in the journal Cryptologia.
11 See the classic work of Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy. For recent revisionist debates, see Lazzarini,
Communication; Lazzarini, “Renaissance Diplomacy,” in The Italian Renaissance State, eds. Gamberini and
Lazzarini; Frigo, “‘Small States’”, in Politics and Diplomacy, ed. Frigo; and Senatore, “Uno Mundo de Carta.”
12 Amongst the most comprehensive works on early modern cryptology are Cecchetti, “Le Scritture Occulte;”
Meister, Die Geheimschrift; Kahn, The Codebreakers, esp. chs. 3 and 4.
2
material, however, reveals an overlooked facet of the evolution of cryptology: its systematic
development into a distinct professional service.
Combining an analysis of early modern archival material with modern sociological
concepts and theorizations of professionalization and secrecy, and piecing together scattered
information emanating from the most renowned historical works on the subject, this article
revisits the history of early modern cryptology and reveals its professionalization, that is, its
systematic organization and development into a distinct professional service based on “cognitive
specialization.”13 This service was annexed to the Venetian ducal chancery, the civil service
organization that housed the Venetian state bureaucracy,14 and oversaw several cryptology
functions, including cryptography, cryptanalysis, deciphering and, astonishingly, the
development of a well-defined training and development regime for state cryptologists. As such,
this article adds the profession of the cifrista – the professional cipher secretary – to the list of
more “conventional” early modern professions, such as those of the priest, the lawyer, the doctor,
the secretary, the notary, the accountant, and, of course, the merchant.15
To this date, aside from a few scholarly accounts that reveal only certain aspects of its
history,16 no historian has attempted to reconstruct the full picture of the Venetian cryptology
service. In consequence, our understanding of the systematic professionalization of cryptology
by the Venetian authorities remains limited. Addressing this lacuna, this article reveals three
idiosyncratic characteristics that distinguish this service from some of the more rudimentary
cryptologic pursuits of other early modern states. Firstly, the gradual transformation of
cryptology from an intellectual pursuit into a state controlled and regulated profession that was
grounded on ammaestar,17 that is, the mastery of the “difficult and most significant science” of
cryptology through professional training and development.18 It was also based on mainstream
human resource practices, such as talent acquisition, recruitment and selection, and performance
appraisals, amongst others. Secondly, the social construction of the professional identity of the
cifrista that was premised on inter-generational favouritism and professional isolationism. And
thirdly, the development of an internal school of professional cryptology, set up for the
13 Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, 3.
14 The historiography on the Venetian ducal chancery is vast. For an overview, see De Vivo, “Ordering the
Archive;” De Vivo “Cœur de l'Etat.” On a fresh historiographical perspective on chanceries in late medieval and
early modern Italy, see De Vivo, Guidi, and Silvestri, eds., Archivi e archivisti.
15 Generally on “learned professions” and professionalization in the early modern period, see O’Day, The
Professions, 18-43. On professions in Renaissance Italy, see Biow, Doctors; On professional notaries in early
modern Venice, see Pedanis Fabris, “Veneta Auctoritate Notarius;” On the emergence of professional accounting,
see Goldthwaite, “The Practice.” The bibliography on professional merchants in the late medieval and early modern
period is vast. For emblematic case studies, see Lane, Andrea Barbarigo; Lane, I mercanti.
16 See, for example, Cecchetti, “Le Scritture;” Pasini, “Delle scritture;”; Preto, I servizi segreti.
17 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 19, cc. 18v.-19r. (30 July 1636).
18 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 14, c. 127r. (31 Aug. 1605).
3
professional training of specialist cryptologists and all other state secretaries whose professional
responsibilities entailed enciphering and deciphering official documents.
The article’s main contention is that it is this particular aspect of specialist skills formation
through continuous professional training, in combination with a nascent professional identity,
even an incipient professional ethos and philosophy, that signifies the emergence of a stand-alone
profession of cryptology in early modern Venice. This was clearly distinct from the widely
diffused, yet amateur use of codes and ciphers by members of all layers of Venetian society. The
idiosyncrasy of this amateur approach lied in the use of commercial jargon, as it was pioneered
by Venetian merchants, to protect secret communication. The article explores the suggestion that
the amateur use of codes as a mercantile custom, in combination with sixteenth century political
and economic value judgements may have influenced, even conditioned, the gradual
professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice.
The article starts by briefly introducing the broader socio-political context in which the
professional use of ciphers proliferated. It then examines the amateur use of codes and ciphers
primarily by members of the Venetian ruling class who were actively involved in international
trade, and consequently by members of all layers of Venetian society who, schooled in the city’s
mercantile traditions, used commercial jargon to camouflage clandestine communication.
Subsequently, the article discusses the systematic evolution and organization of a distinct
cryptology department, created, managed, and protected by the Venetian government. The article
concludes with some reflections on a potential link between the mercantile custom of the
amateur use of ciphers and the professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice.
The Professional Use of Ciphers in the Renaissance
The proliferation of the professional use of codes and ciphers started in the long Quattrocento,
the century that saw the methodical systemization of diplomatic activities, both in Italy and in
Europe.19 The gradual intellectualization of cryptology in that period, that steadily made its way
through the printing press, was instrumental in this proliferation. More specifically, the
publication of several cryptologic treatises and manuals penned by Renaissance polymaths,
including Leon Battista Alberti’s De componendis cifris (1466) and Johannes Trithemius’s
Polygraphia (1518),20 influenced significantly the transformation of cryptology from an esoteric
practice to an applied Scientia.21 Of great importance in this process was the publication of Cicco
Simonetta’s (1474) Regulae extraendis litteras zifferatas sive exempio.22
19 Lazzarini, Communication.
20 The work was only published in the vernacular in 1568.
21 On cryptology as an esoteric practice, see Jütte, The Age of Secrecy.
22 “Rules for deciphering enciphered documents without a key.” See Perret “Les règles.”
4
Simonetta, a longstanding state secretary in the duchy of Milan, one of the most
meticulously informed cities in the late medieval period, was one the first professional
cryptologists to be employed in state administration.23 Especially under Francesco Sforza, “the
‘signore di novelle’ par excellence,”24 an efficient network of intelligencers and diplomats
contributed to steady stream of information for political and diplomatic purposes.25 For this
reason, Milan pioneered the systematic use of clandestine modes of communication, upon which
overseas diplomatic missions were based.26 Simonetta was primarily responsible for the Milanese
secret chancery in the second half of the fifteenth century.27 Likely under his direction, the
numerous ciphers of the Milanese secret chancery were systematically ordered and classified for
the benefit of diplomats and military governors of the Sforza.28
Sophisticated ciphers for diplomatic purposes were in use in the Italian peninsula from the
beginning of the fifteenth century. Already in 1401, the dispatches from Mantua to the Mantuan
chancellor Simone de Crema were encrypted through multiple cipher representations, rendering
the task of codebreaking extremely arduous.29 At the dawn of the sixteenth century, the
professional operation of ciphers by specialist operatives was, in a way, formally sanctioned by
the emergence of the term cifrista, the professional cipher secretary. The term seems to have
been created in Venice,30 and half a century later it was widely used in Rome, where the office of
Cipher Secretary to the Pontiff was introduced in 1555. The Pope’s first recorded cipher
secretary was Triphon Benicio de Assisi.31 Still, it was Giovanni and Matteo Argenti, uncle and
nephew, who between them served five Popes from 1585 to 1591 and from 1591 to 1605
respectively, that lay claim to fame as Rome’s most renowned cipher secretaries in that period.32
Professional cipher secretaries were employed in several European princely courts,
especially those that made part of vast territorial states. Henry III and Henry IV of France found
their expert code-breaker in the mathematician and lawyer François Viète de la Bigotière (1540-
1603).33 Spain’s systemization of the professional use of ciphers took place primarily under the
reign of Philip II. Coded diplomatic correspondence was managed in the Despacho Universal, a
23 On Simonetta and cryptologists of the Milanese chancery, see Cerioni, La diplomazia Sforzesca; On state
secretaries in early modern Europe, see the essays in Dover, ed. Secretaries and Statecraft.
24 Lazzarini, Communication, 47.
25 Senatore, “Uno Mundo de Carta.”
26 Ibid.
27 Cerioni, La diplomazia Sforzesca, Vol. 1, xviii-xix.
28 Ibid., ix-xx.
29 Kahn, The Codebreakers, 107. On diplomacy in late medieval Mantua, see Frigo, “‘Small States’,” in Politics
and Diplomacy, ed. Frigo.
30 Preto, I servizi segreti.
31 Mollin, Codes, 58.
32 On Matteo Argenti, see Meister, Die Geheimschrift, 148-170; On Matteo Argenti’s codes, see Villain-Gandossi,
“Les dépêches chiffrées.”
33 Devos, Les chiffres, 29-30.
5
specialist branch of the Secreteria de Stato.34 Eventually, the emergence of Black chambers – the
secret rooms where professional cryptologic pursuits took place – from the seventeenth century
onwards, is suggestive of the systematization of the professional use of ciphers.35
While historiography has explored the professional use of ciphers in the early modern
period, the evolution of the discipline from an intellectual activity to a stand-alone and even
state-regulated profession has received less attention. Two reasons can account for this. Firstly,
the conventional portrayal of early modern bureaucracies as unsystematic and lacking
professional specialization.36 Yet, to overwhelmingly dismiss early modern state bureaucracies as
“unsystematic” because they did not display the high levels of rationality, maturity, and
sophistication of contemporary ones entails discounting tout court the value of our historical
understanding of more distant administrative practices on which nascent state bureaucracies were
premised throughout the early modern period.
Secondly, early modern codes and ciphers have been deemed rather unsophisticated – by
contemporary standards – to merit comprehensive study by historians.37 This contention,
however, fails to account for the systematic proliferation of Black Chambers in several areas of
central Europe from the seventeenth century onwards, or the widespread diffusion of cryptology
in eighteen century political practices.38 Surely, cryptology has historical origins and, in order to
investigate them, it is necessary to zoom out of the narrow focus on the level of complexity (or
simplicity) of early modern codes and ciphers, in order to explore the political and wider socio-
economic context in which they developed. In the following section, we start from the latter in
order to understand the socio-economic landscape in which clandestine written communication
proliferated in that period. For Venice, one of the most potent commercial powers in the early
modern world, the use of codes and ciphers seems to have been instigated, even sanctioned, by
merchants, primarily to conceal information that influenced their business affairs.
The Amateur Use of Codes and Ciphers in Early Modern Venice
As scattered archived information suggests, the use of encryption in the written communication
of businessmen such as merchants, bankers, and their agents was not uncommon in the medieval
and early modern period. Tomaso Spinelli, for example, the famed Florentine banker and patron
34 On Spanish ciphered correspondence, see Allaire, “Le Décodage,” in Correspondre, ed. Albert. On the ciphers of
Philip II, see Devos, Les chiffres; For an overview, see Couto, “Spying,” in Correspondence, eds. Bethencourt and
Egmond, 296-299.
35 The history of Black Chambers is substantial. Amongst others, see Vaillé, Le cabinet noir; De Leeuw, “The Black
Chamber.”
36 See, for example, Carter, The Western European Powers.
37 See, for instance, Buonafalce, “Bellaso’s Reciprocal Ciphers.”
38 De Leeuw, “Cryptology,” in The History, eds. De Leeuw and Bergstra, 331-332.
6
of Renaissance architecture, used a cipher to communicate business instructions to his brother,39
just like the Venetian merchant Andrea Barbarigo did with his business agent Andrea Dolcetto.40
Undeniably, the codes and ciphers used by these individuals were quite rudimentary in nature.
Yet, they are indicative of the need to protect information that was vital to their business affairs.
Cryptographic manuals published in that period assert the significance of cryptography for
merchants, reinforcing the idea that encryption was a significant mercantile custom. Opus
novum, one of the earliest cryptographic treatises to be published (1526), was, according to its
author, a book for merchants and anyone else who sought ancient and contemporary encryption
techniques.41 In it, Jacopo Silvestri proposed methods that could be easily deployed by merchants
and any men or women who wished to keep their letters, books, and accounts secret.42
Merchants’ use of codes and ciphers was not only intended to protect trade secrets; it
undergirded their diplomatic activities. Already from the medieval period, it was customary for
Italian merchants to be directly or indirectly involved in diplomatic and political affairs.43
Genoa’s idiosyncrasy, for example, as a major commercial centre with no territorial expansion
meant that diplomatic negotiations were conducted by mercantile and economic agents, while
official legates were solicited only for the most formal of occasions.44 Early diplomatic studies
attributed Italian merchants’ involvement with diplomacy to their dexterity in the art of
negotiation.45 Yet, the robust research tradition in Italian commercial networks has overlooked
the diplomatic role of merchants.46 Thus, further research is needed to shed more light on
mercantile diplomatic activities in the medieval and in the early modern period. Nevertheless,
Italian merchants’ undisputed diplomatic interventions were so prominent that, as Isabella
Lazzarini aptly put it, “If there was a lack of ambassadors, there was no lack of merchants.”47
In the case of Venice, a major commercial entrepôt with territorial expansion over several
areas of Northern Italy, the Adriatic, and the islands of the Levant, this contention holds great
merit. Venice’s territorial expansion necessitated the formal organization of the state’s diplomatic
representation by means of resident ambassadors.48 Still, there were times when ambassadors, or
39 Jacks and Caferro, The Spinelli of Florence.
40 Lane, Andrea Barbarigo.
41 Silvestri, Opus novum, 1526.
42 Ibid., fol. 13 r.
43 On the enmeshment of the commercial and diplomatic activities of Italian merchants in the late medieval period,
see Lazzarini, “I circuiti mercantili,” in Il governo dell’ economia, eds. Tanzini and Tognetti. Specifically on Italy
and the Iberian Peninsula, see the essays in Tanzini and Tognetti, eds., Il governo dell’economia. On the informative
nature of merchants’ written communication, see Trivellato, “Merchants’ Letters,” in Correspondence, eds.
Bethencourt and Egmond.
44 Shaw, “Genoa,” in The Italian Renaissance State, eds. Gamberini and Lazzarini.
45 See the classic work of Von Reumont, Della diplomazia.
46 See, for example, Sapori, Studi di storia economica; Melis, I mercanti italiani.
47 Lazzarini, Communication, 40.
48 On Venetian ambassadors, see Queller, The Office.
7
the lack of them, called for the diplomatic support of merchants.49 The political tribulations of the
late Quattrocento, for example, especially in terms of the tumultuous Ottoman-Venetian
relations, meant that Venice had to rely on her large merchant community in Constantinople for
both diplomatic representation and intelligence gathering. In the late 1490s, in particular, Venice
was left without a formal envoy in the Ottoman capital, as the Venetian ambassador had been
expelled from the city, having been discovered to spy for the Spanish.50 At that point in time, the
young merchant and future Doge of Venice Andrea Gritti took the reins of both commercial and
diplomatic negotiations. In 1497 he convinced the Sultan to overturn the embargo on grain
export that the Ottomans had imposed on Italian merchants in Constantinople.51 In 1503 he also
successfully negotiated the final details of a peace treaty between Venice and the Ottoman
Empire.52 His missives to the motherland were overflowing with intelligence on the size and
moves of the Ottoman fleet. To divert suspicion he coded his dispatches in commercial jargon
and presented them as business communication instead. Once he sent a letter informing the
authorities that new products were arriving in Venice from sea and land, meaning that the
Ottomans were preparing to attack with their fleet and army.53
The technique of substituting specific words with inconspicuous code-words was a widely
popular method of encoding called in parabula or the Cicero method.54 According to an
unpublished cryptologic treatise that the Council of Ten adopted as a training manual for their
professional cryptologists, the specific use of mercantile jargon that appeared innocuous to the
unsuspected reader had been in use for centuries.55 The Venetians, who were adept at
camouflaging information of political nature with commercial jargon, simply termed this
approach lettere mercantili. So extensive was the use of this cryptographic method amongst
Venetian merchants that the renowned papal cipher secretary Matteo Argenti went as far as to
attribute its development and diffusion to the Venetians who,56 as seasoned travellers and dealers
in both merchandise and news, had developed a flair for inventiveness in secret communication.
Eventually the Cicero method became widely used not only in Venice but in other parts of
Europe, including England and France.57 Writing from France, a fervent user of the Cicero
method was the famed Dalmatian printer and publisher Bonino di Boninis. Between 1494 and
1554, during the Italian Wars, Di Boninis acted as a spy for the Venetian authorities, working in
49 See, for example, Luzzatto, Studi di storia economica; Lane, I mercanti.
50 Davis, “Shipping and Spying.”
51 Sanudo, I diarii, vol. I, 508.
52 Lane, Venice.
53 Davis, “Shipping and Spying,” 101-102.
54 On the history of the in parabula method, see Couto, “Spying,” in Correspondence, eds. Bethencourt and
Egmond, 292-294; Strasser, Lingua universalis, 23-25.
55 ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, b. 1269, fols. 25v.-26r.
56 Meister, Die Geheimschrift, 92.
57 On instances of the Cicero method in English letters, see Daybell, The Material Letter, 152-158.
8
close collaboration with the Venetian ambassador in France.58 While stationed there, he sent
several encoded missives in the style of “mercantile letters” to Venice reporting on French
affairs. One of his letters informed the authorities of prices and dispatches of books from France,
which, in reality, meant news from that country.59
Di Boninis’s case suggests that a rather simple encoding technique that was primarily used
by merchants had started to spill over other layers of Venetian society beyond the merchant class,
to include foreigners who were either Venetian subjects, emanating from Venetian colonies, or
others living or trading within the Venetian state. The authorities took advantage of these
people’s expertise and, on several occasions, tasked them with clandestine missions. The well-
documented case of the Sephardic Jewish merchant Hayyim Saruk from Thessaloniki is a case in
point.60 In 1571, during an ongoing war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, the Venetian
authorities appointed Saruk to travel to Constantinople to spy on “the affairs, designs and
military equipment of the Turks.”61 For this purpose he was asked to produce a self-made
codebook made up of 184 code-words, in which he coded the Ottomans as “drugs”, people as
“money”, and, quite sardonically, the Pope as a “rabbi.”62 His compensation for this mission
reached the amount of 500 ducats for one year’s work,63 a staggering sum, if we take into
consideration that over half a century later, the starting salary of a professional cryptanalyst, that
had remained stagnant for nearly a century, was roughly fifty ducats annually.64
While emanating from different cultural and social backgrounds, Gritti, a genuine Venetian
nobleman and merchant, and Di Boninis and Saruk, two well-to-do foreigners who conducted
their business affairs in the Republic, were proficient in the use of merchant-style codes. Yet, the
Cicero method was not only reserved for the noble and the prosperous. So diffused had it become
by the sixteenth century, that it had reached the lowest echelons of Venetian society, which
comprised the mass of skilled and unskilled manual labourers.65 It seems that in a city where
pretty much everyone had a service to sell, modes of covert communication were used by
members of all strata of Venetian society, especially as part of espionage services rendered to the
Venetian government in exchange for benefits.66 Criminals and convicts were a consistent pool
from which the Venetian authorities drew information gatherers and amateur spies, primarily on
58 See for, example, ASV, CCX, Dispacci Ambasciatori, b. 9 (2 Feb. 1501); ibid., (30 Apr. 1501). On Bonino di
Boninis as an informer of the Venetians see Dalla Santa, “Il tipografo.”
59 Preto, I servizi segreti, 269.
60 On Saruk, see Arbel, Trading Nations, especially chapters 6 and 7.
61 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, filza (hereafter f.) 15 (23 Nov. 1571; 30 Dec. 1571).
62 Ibid.
63 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 9, c. 189v. (23 Nov 1571).; ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, f. 15, (23
Nov.; 30 Dec. 1571)
64 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 19, c. 18r.-v. (14 July 1636).
65 On Venetian social classes, see Romano, Patricians and Popolani.
66 See, for example, Iordanou, “What News on the Rialto?”
9
account of their audacious personalities,67 or due to their intent to have their punishment revoked,
or even simply because the government could coerce them into action.
One striking example of a banished felon turned secret agent is that of Giovanni Antonio
Barata. In the early 1570’s, at the break of a war with the Ottomans, the Venetian Republic was
desperate for information on military developments in the Ottoman capital. Accordingly, Barata
accepted to have his banishment revoked in exchange for travelling to Constantinople to spy on
the Turks. Importantly, he was ordered to report back to Venice by means of “mercantile letters.”
For this reason, he created and presented to the authorities a code-book that was made up of
terms commonly used by merchants.68 Conscious of his hazardous mission, the Venetian
authorities took his wife and young children under their wing while he was on duty, relocating
them from Milan to the Venetian city of Bergamo, and providing them with a monthly stipend,
which turned into a permanent yearly pension for his widow when, nearly one year later, Barata
was captured and decapitated in Constantinople.69
Undeniably, the various users of the Cicero method mentioned here came from different
cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. Yet, from Andrea Barbarigo and Andrea Gritti in the
fifteenth century, to Hayim Saruk and Antonio Barata in the sixteenth, it seems that, by the late
1500s, simple modes of encryption, through the substitution of specific words with
inconspicuous code-words or symbols, seems to have been diffused to all layers of Venetian
society, and used by people from all walks of life. This diffusion is manifest in an array of
contemporaneous publications, ranging from cheap-printed pamphlets and writing manuals,70 to
mathematically grounded cryptologic treatises. In 1546, for instance, the charlatan Leonardo
Furlano published a pamphlet on writing in cipher. His intended “readership,” according to his
work’s title, comprised every faithful Christian, including any illiterate individual who could
have the work recited at home or in the workshop.71
It is important to emphasise here that the use of merchant-style codes was a basic and
rather amateur mode of encryption. The choice of commercial jargon, especially in a commercial
state like Venice, does not seem to be fortuitous. While the absence of surviving records does not
allow for an accurate reconstruction of the amateur use of cryptology by the Venetian merchant
67 Preto, I servizi segreti, 247. On amateur agents and “diplomacy from below” in the early modern period, see
articles in Maartje van Gelder and Tijana Krstić, eds. “Cross-confessional Diplomacy.”
68 ASV, CCX, Lettere Secrete, f. 7 (17 Feb. 1571); ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 9, cc.126v.-127r. (26 Jan.
1571).
69 Ibid., c.198r. (15 Dec.1571).
70 For examples of contemporaneous writing manuals that referred to ciphers and were published in Venice, see
Furlano, Opera nova; Capaccio, Il secretario. For such publications published in other parts of Italy, see, for
instance, Fedeli Piccolomini, Della nuoua inuentione; Palatino, Libro nuovo. I am grateful to Alex Bamji and Rosa
Salzberg for sharing their relevant knowledge with me.
71 Salzberg, “The Word on the Street,” 341.
10
class and its diffusion to members of all social strata in Venice,72 the documented deployment of
such codes primarily by merchants, the undisputed mention of code-writing as an important
mercantile tool in contemporaneous cryptologic and writing manuals, even the use of the term
lettere mercantili by the Venetian authorities suggest that in an amateur fashion, cryptology had
become a mercantile custom in Venice.
Nevertheless, aside from amateur encoding by means of commercial jargon, sixteenth
century Venetians were idiosyncratic in their development of a fully-fledged, state controlled and
regulated professional cryptology department, housed in the Ducal palace, and tasked with the
cryptography and cryptanalysis of sophisticated substitution ciphers. To this day, no systematic
attempt has been made to investigate this process of professionalization of Venetian cryptology.
Exploring it against the context in which it evolved is a long overdue task that might enable us to
reconsider the distinctive course that professional cryptology took in sixteenth century Venice.
Before proceeding to this exploration, a brief discussion of the historical development of
professionalization is in order.
Professionalization in the Early Modern Era
Professionalization has been defined as the social process of organization of a trade or
occupation, based on “cognitive specialization.”73 This is distinct from professionalism, a
disciplinary device that “allows for control at a distance through the construction of ‘appropriate’
work identities and conducts.”74 In its fully developed form, professionalization has been
analysed and discussed by scholars as an outcome of the industrial and urban demands of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.75 The lack of institutional frameworks – aside from the
church or the university – within which professions developed in the early modern era can
account for sociologists’ attenuation of that period, when discussing professionalization.76 Yet, as
an emergent and dynamic phenomenon, professionalization – just like work organization and
management – was developing long before linguistic terms were coined to describe it, borne out
of the wider socio-political, intellectual, even religious context of the early modern period.77
In both qualitative and quantitative studies, sociologists and historians have produced a list
of the key characteristics of a profession. These include a sense of commitment; an appeal to
expertise; reliance on both theoretical knowledge and practical skills; a professional ethic;
72 The use of codes and ciphers by merchants and tradesmen is, to this day, largely unexplored. Specifically for
Venice, this can be attributed to the limited number of surviving merchants’ letters in the Venetian state archives. See
Mackenney, “Letters.”
73 Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, 3.
74 Fournier, “The Appeal to ‘Professionalism’,” 281.
75 Carr-Sanders, Professions; Larson, The Rise of Professionalism; O’Day, The Professions, 7.
76 Biow, Doctors, 11
77 O Day, The Professions, 14. See also, Malatesta, “Introduction,” in Society and the Professions, ed. Malatesta.
11
internal control and discipline; professional training and development; organization of work and,
stemming from the latter, a certain degree of autonomy in the workplace and a perceived esprit
de corps.78 Particular emphasis amongst these characteristics has been cast on the “rise of a
system of formal education” that “recognized and superseded apprenticeship.”79 It is important to
emphasize here that while several of these traits can be traced back to some early modern
professions, they stem, primarily, from nineteenth century professions, especially in the
Anglosphere,80 and are not entirely representative of professional traits in the preindustrial era.81
Studies on early modern professions have focused on two distinct categories: histories of
individual professions – primarily the “learned” professions, such as the clergy and lawyers; and
histories of societies with a focus on the learned professions.82 Especially in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the word “profession” was associated with a declaration of service – what
someone professed to offer – rather a distinct form of work organization. Yet, as certain
occupations gradually claimed knowledge, expertise, and monopoly, a tacit or more explicit
discourse on what exactly was professed developed.83 Sociologist Megali Larson identified two
primary characteristics of early modern professions: their inextricable link to social stratification
and a “liberal education” based on a combination of classical schooling and practical skills.84
More specifically, cognitive specialization was almost exclusively reserved for the literate
elites upon whom specialists relied for their professional existence.85 In this respect, the learned
professions entailed establishment and social standing.86 This trait was evident in the rise of the
medical profession,87 but also professions that rendered services to the state and the church, and
that were predominantly performed by an educated “elite”, as opposed to the mass of labourers.
As we shall see, the Venetian cipher secretaries were themselves an “elite” of servile
functionaries, emanating from the social class of the cittadini (citizens), the “secondary elite” in
the Venetian social hierarchy,88 placed immediately under the patriciate. The distinct
characteristic of those educated “elites” was service and commitment to the state (or the
church).89 This was their raison d'être that complemented their need to make a living.90
78 O’ Day, The Professions, 4.
79 Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, 4.
80 O’ Day, The Professions, 4.
81 Biow, Doctors, xii.
82 See O’Day, The Professions, 9-11, and bibliography therein.
83 Ibid., 13.
84 Ibid., 3.
85 Carr-Sanders, Professions.
86 O’ Day, The Professions.
87 See Freidson, Profession of Medicine.
88 Chambers and Pullan, Venice, 261. On Venetian citizens, Grubb, “Elite Citizens,” in Venice Reconsidered, eds.
Martin and Romano; Bellavitis, Identitè.
89 O’ Day called this underlying philosophy “Social Humanism, The Professions, 5
90 Ibid.
12
The Professionalization of Cryptology in Sixteenth Century Venice
Compared to the composite yet disparate independent espionage networks that most European
rulers relied upon for intelligence, Venice had created a centrally organized secret service. This
service was housed in the Ducal Palace, the headquarters of Venice’s political, diplomatic, and
intelligence activities, and was overseen by the Council of Ten, the exclusive committee
responsible for state security.91 As part of its covert operations, the Venetian secret service
created a full-blown cryptology department that was responsible for the production of ciphers for
the secret communication of Venetian authorities with overseas formal representatives, as well as
the successful cryptanalysis of the ciphers produced by the chanceries of foreign rulers.
The seed for the gradual professionalization of the Venetian cryptologic service was sown
by a single yet significant event, the appointment of Giovanni Soro as Venice’s official cipher
secretary in 1505.92 Our knowledge of Soro is fragmented and primarily derives from the daily
accounts of Marino Sanudo, the astute observer and chronicler of Venice in that period.
According to Sanudo, Soro enjoyed a fine reputation as one of Italy’s most accomplished
cryptanalysts. His remarkable ability to break multilingual ciphers was so great that he enjoyed
an unblemished reputation as an extraordinary professional code-maker and code-breaker.93 So
widely known was his eminence that even the Pope would frequently send him intercepted
letters, in the conviction that only he could crack the codes in which they were written. Soro
nearly always obliged.94 It was most probably due to his numerous accomplishments that Alvise
Borghi, his assistant and successor, called him “the father of this rarest of virtues.”95
Giovanni Soro served the Venetian Republic for nearly 40 years, until his death in 1543.96
During his career, he broke innumerable enemy ciphers for the Venetians, the Florentines, and
the Papal Court, amongst others.97 In 1539, he produced and presented to the Ten a cryptology
instruction manual with sections in Italian, Spanish and French, that was deemed by Borghi to be
more angelic than human in quality.98 The Venetian authorities acknowledged his excellence by
ensuring he was abundantly compensated for his services. As a result, they granted him several
91 On the central organization of Venice’s intelligence service, see Iordanou, “What News on the Rialto?” For an
overview of early modern Venice’s intelligence operations, see Preto, I servizi segreti.
92 On Soro, see Kahn, The Codebreakers, 109.
93 See, for instance, Sanudo, I Diarii, vol. 10, 231; Ibid, vol. 11, 393. On Venetian diarists and their use of
correspondence, see Neerfeld, «Historia per forma di diaria»; Infelise, “From Merchants’ Letters,” in
Correspondence, eds. Bethencourt and Egmond.
94 Sanudo, I diarii, vol. 10, 832; Ibid., vol. 38, 125; Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English
Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy (hereafter
CSPVen), vol. 2, lxxi.
95 “… padre di questa rarissima virtù,” ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, f. 7, n.d. (attributed to the year 1548).
96 Pasini, “Delle scritture,” 302.
97 While it is not clear why Soro was allowed to serve other courts, it is probable that the Venetian authorities did
not discourage him for diplomatic reasons.
98 Preto, I servizi segreti, 277.
13
pay rises and other concessions throughout his career.99 A year before he died, in 1542, the
authorities assigned him two assistants.100 From then on, the Ten kept a minimum of three
permanent cipher secretaries on the payroll.
The professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice was an emergent,
dynamic, and gradual process that comprised the formal appointment of Soro’s assistants.
Thereafter, a line of eminent cryptologists found themselves in the employ of the Council of Ten,
working in the secreto (the Venetian Black Chamber) on the top floor of Venice’s Ducal Palace.
Their work was conducted under strict laws of secrecy, the breach of which was subject to legal
sanctions, including the death penalty.101 When he died, Soro was succeeded by four cipher
secretaries: Alvise Borghi, Giambattista de Ludovici, an engineer named Giovanni, and Zuan
Francesco Marin,102 who was already working as a state secretary when he was chosen to join the
team of cifristi in 1544.103
Zuan Francesco Marin was the most distinguished of the four recruits. His ascent to
eminence commenced when he succeeded in cracking an extremely complex Spanish code.104
During his thirty-year career, he gradually rose from the ranks of secretario straordinario
(extraordinary secretary), the entry level position in a Venetian bureaucrat’s career, to a secretary
of the Council of Ten.105 This was the second highest ranking position in the hierarchy of the
Venetian Ducal Chancery, after the post of Cancellier Grande, the great chancellor. The latter
was the most important office open to members of the cittadini class, who could never aspire to
prohibitively high posts reserved for patricians, such as the position of the Doge.106 Marin
occupied the post of cifrista for nearly thirty years, during which he made a name for himself as
one of Venice’s most distinguished cryptanalysts, breaking countless ciphers in different
languages, and helping to forestall several state threats.107
Professional training and development
In the early 1570’s, Venice suffered a heavy blow by losing Cyprus, one of her most prized
strongholds in the Mediterranean, to the Ottomans, following earlier heavy losses of its
territories in the Peloponnese.108 Moreover, between 1575 and 1577 a devastating plague
99 Sanudo, I diarii, vol. 11, 232. See also, Preto, I servizi segreti, 141.
100 Kahn, The Codebreakers, 109.
101 See, for instance, ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 11, c. 158r.-158v. (23 May 1578).
102 CSPVen, vol. 2, lxxi.
103 Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana (BNM), Manoscritti Italiani (Mss. It.) Classe (cl.) VII 1667 (8459), Tabele
nominative e chronologiche dei Segretari della Cancelleria Ducale, folio (fol.) 6r.
104 CSPVen, vol. 2, lxxi.
105 BNM, Mss. It. cl. VII 1667 (8459), fol. 6r.
106 On the Cancellier Grande, see, Trebbi, “La cancelleria veneta.”
107 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 11, c. 90v. (21 Mar 1576).
108 Knapton, “Tra dominante e dominio,” in La Republica, eds. Cozzi, Knapton, and Scarabello, 222-223.
14
deprived the city of one quarter to one third of its population.109 In consequence, most probably
for contingency purposes, the Ten deemed it necessary to train and develop their professional
cryptologists. By that point, the Venetian cryptology service that had been in operation for nearly
three decades had reached a state of maturation that allowed it to display distinct
professionalization traits, such as specialist skills formation through systematic training. For this
reason, the Ten named Zuan Francesco Marin, their most eminent cryptologist, as the new
recruits’ trainer, due to his natural aptitude to cryptology and his tireless study of the subject.110
Marin, therefore, became the first known formal trainer in the Venetian school of professional
cryptology, an in-house training and development regime for novice professional cryptologists.
His appointment and consequent service as the school’s official instructor categorically refutes
contemporary scholarly contentions that no systematic “in-door” training and development for
state cryptologists existed prior to the eighteenth century.111 Moreover, it broadens and deepens
current debates in business history that portray systemised training and professional skills
formation as a nineteenth century phenomenon.112
As they were practically the custodians of the state’s most private secrets, the Venetian
cipher secretaries underwent a rigorous programme of training and development. This started
with an entrance examination aimed at determining their aptitude to codebreaking. Passing the
examination, the novice cipher secretaries would receive instruction in Latin and other languages
that were vital for the cryptologist’s trade, rhetoric, grammar and calligraphy. Importantly, they
were expected to study the works of the forefathers of cryptology, including those of Alberti,
Trithemius, and Giambattista Della Porta.113 The completion of their probation was confirmed
after they had passed a final, more rigorous examination, in which they were expected to break a
complex cipher without a key.114 This achievement also entailed a salary increase from four to a
maximum of ten ducts monthly.115 The Ten emphasized that training was vital, as the end goal
was not simply the ability to encipher, decipher, and break unknown codes but the cultivation of
deep theoretical and practical knowledge of the scientia of cryptology.116
Zuan Francesco Marin did not live long enough to complete his job of training the next
generation of Venetian cryptologists. He died in 1578, leaving the authorities at a loss as to how
they could fill this intellectual and professional vacuum, since most of his trainees were too
109 On the 1575-77 plague in Venice, see Preto, Peste e società. On a re-evaluation on the impact of the plague on
the Venetian society and economy, see Iordanou, “Pestilence.”
110 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 11, cc. 77v.-78r. (25 Jan. 1576).
111 Strasser, Lingua Universalis, 66, 249.
112 Larson, The Rise of Professionalism; Thelen, “Skill Formation,” in The Oxford Handbook, eds. Jones and
Zeitlin.
113 Preto, I servizi segreti, 271.
114 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 11, cc. 77 v.-78 v. (25 Jan. 1576)
115 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg, 14, c. 127 r.-v. (31 Aug. 1605); ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 15,
cc. 16 v.-17 r. (24 Oct. 1607).
116 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 19, c. 18 r.-v. (14 July 1636).
15
inexperienced to take up his role.117 Given the lack of a suitable replacement, the Ten deliberated
that what Marin was able to teach orally (con la sua voce) while still in life, he could do so
through his writings (con la sua scrittura) posthumously. For this reason, the Heads of the Ten
ordered that Marin’s voluminous writings were consigned to the state, indexed, and deposited in
a separate casket within their office, hermetically sealed with a key to be kept by the Ten. The
documents would be made available for consultation to the novice cipher secretaries, who were
instructed to pay particular attention to the scriptures relating to breaking ciphers. The cifristi
were granted permission to make copies of Marin’s documents in order to study them at their
leisure at home. Failure to keep these copies confidential entailed severe sanctions, including the
death penalty. For this reason, the cifristi were to maintain an inventory of their copies, to be
stored in a designated casket where all relevant state ciphers were kept.118
This autodidactic mode of training and professional development was deemed sufficient
for Zuan Francesco Marin’s team of cryptologists. But when, twenty years later, a fresh intake of
recruits entered the Venetian cryptology department, a new instructor was sought.119 This was
found in another eminent Venetian cryptologist, Girolamo Franceschi, who had initially been
recruited as a prodigy, due to an innovative cipher that he had invented, which was deemed
impossible to crack without a key.120 In 1596, twenty years into his service, Franceschi was
appointed to the role of the trainer of the next generation of Venetian cryptologists. Amongst his
nominated trainees was Piero Amadi, a state secretary who had displayed a natural adeptness at
ciphers.121 Piero was the son of Agostino Amadi, a Venetian citizen who, in 1588, wrote a
detailed cryptology manual entitled Delle Ziffre (On Ciphers). Delle Ziffre, which still survives in
the Venetian State Archives,122 is emblematic of the intellectual superiority of Venetian
cryptologists. In it, Amadi presented a myriad of ways for the production of ciphers in any
language imaginable, including Greek, Arabic, Latin, and even the language of the devil, for
which he provided practical examples.123 In his work he also detailed numerous deciphering
techniques and several recipes for the production of invisible ink. After his death, his wife
consigned the manuscript to the Ten, who were so impressed with its level of erudition that they
decided to adopt it as a training manual for their cryptologists, “so that our young secretaries,
who wish to be employed in such a noble profession in our service, can be instructed and
117 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 11, c. 158 r.-v. (23 May 1578).
118 Ibid.
119 Extant documents do not reveal why it took two decades to find a new trainer. From a chronological
perspective, the latter was appointed concurrently with the intake of new recruits. From this we can hypothesize that
Marin’s initial and posthumous training regime was deemed sufficient for his cohort of trainees but inadequate for
the new entrants to the service. It is evident that the trainer was internally recruited, since it took two decades to
develop the next cryptology instructor.
120 Ibid., c. 87 r. (29 Feb. 1576).
121 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 14, c. 7r.-v. (9 Sep. 1596).
122 ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, b. 1269.
123 Ibid., , c. 35 v.
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trained.”124 The delicate and critical nature of the book’s content is most probably the reason why
it never found its way into print.
In compensation for his work, the Ten offered Amadi’s two sons two concessions: a
monthly pension of ten ducats for life, to recompense for the poverty in which the family had
been reduced after the pater familias’s death;125 and the opportunity for employment in the
Venetian chancery upon completion of their fifteenth year of age, when a vacancy would be
made available. It was also deliberated that the two sons would not sit the customary entrance
examination that aspiring Senate secretaries were subjected to. Instead, they would have to
undergo the specialist entrance examination intended for aspiring cipher secretaries, in the hope
that at least one of them would have inherited their father’s natural aptitude to ciphers.126
This approach to the selection and recruitment of new cifristi denotes a rigid preference
towards inter-generational favouritism, that is, reserving specific state secretary positions for the
members of the family of already instated bureaucrats. This was an ordinary approach to
recruitment employed by the Council of Ten and the Great Chancellor, who oversaw recruitment
and internal promotions in the Venetian chancery.127
Recruitment and promotions: Inter-generational favouritism and professional isolationism
Just like several other services of state bureaucracy in Venice, the profession of the cifrista
was a family business, passed on from father to son, grand-son or nephew. The case of Zuan
Francesco Marin was emblematic of this hereditary practice. When, in the late 1570’s, the Ten
deliberated that Marin was to train the next generation of state cryptologists, they offered him the
opportunity to name two of the three new recruits. In response, Marin nominated his son Ferigo
and his nephew Alvise.128 The Ten granted Marin the right to nominate family members due to
his unmatched proficiency in code-breaking. In essence, they hoped that Marin’s descendants
might have inherited his natural talent and insatiable appetite for the study of cryptology.
More specifically, the Ten knew that Ferigo, Marin’s youngest son, had learnt the traits of
the trade almost by osmosis, having displayed glimpses of his father’s impressive “natural
inclination” (natural inclinatione) to cryptology from early own. In consequence, they
deliberated that he was the ideal candidate for the post of the trainee cifrista. Accordingly, Ferigo
was fast-tracked to the formal entry-level position of an extraordinary secretary without having
to sit the customary entrance examination.129 He was to serve in this capacity until the age of
124 “[...] si possono andar instruendo et allevando i gioveni della cancelleria nostra che vorrano impiegarsi in
profession cosi’ nobile per il nostro servitio.”ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 13, cc. 48r.-49 r. (10 March
1588).
125 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 13, c. 49r.-v. (16 March 1588).
126 Ibid.
127 De Vivo, “Cœur de l'Etat.”
128 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 11, cc. 77v.-78r. (25 Jan. 1576).
129 Ibid.
17
twenty, when he would be promoted to the next level in the Venetian civil service hierarchy, that
of an ordinary secretary (secretario ordinario). Five years after that promotion, granted that he
passed the formal examination of breaking an unknown cipher without a key, he would ascend to
the respectable position of a secretary of the Senate or of the Collegio.130
While Ferigo was accelerated to the post of trainee cipher secretary, his cousin Alvise
Marin had to wait for a year to be appointed.131 This is because, while the Ten would frequently
headhunt individuals recommended to them, there had to be an opening for a position, usually
ensuing from the death of an employee. Hence Alvise Marin’s one year wait for a chancery
vacancy.132 Once they made it into the system, the progression of both young men, as indeed
most novice recruits in the chancery, was steady but gradual. At the age of twenty Ferigo
assumed the role of secretario ordinario, which at that point was left vacant due to the death of
his brother, another Alvise.133 Several years after their appointment, and having long completed
their formal induction to the post of cipher secretary, both men assumed high level civil service
posts, Ferigo as Secretary of the Senate and Alvise as an ordinary secretary, having passed the
examination of breaking a polyalphabetic cipher without a key.134
Zuan Francesco Marin, his son Ferigo, and his nephew Alvise were not the only members
of the Marin family to have secured positions in the Venetian chancery. As family trees and
organizational charts of Venetian secretaries stored in the archives of St Mark’s Library in Venice
reveal, the Marin family had an established foothold in the Venetian chancery for generations.
This inter-generational employment trend started with the recruitment of Marin’s father, Alvise
Marin de Zuane, the founder of the Marin family, as a secretario extraordinario in 1497.135
Alvise’s brother also served the Venetian chancery as a state secretary between 1498 and 1515.136
Alvise’s sons, in turn, secured jobs in the Venetian state bureaucracy, as well. While his youngest
son Ferigo only managed to reach the first rank of secretario extraordinario in 1544,137 his eldest
son, Zuan Francesco Marin, enjoyed a long and successful career as one of the state’s most
eminent cryptologists, and eventually assumed the highest ranking state secretary position, that
of secretary of the Council of Ten.138 Zuan Francesco Marin managed to secure state service
positions for his three sons, Alvise, Zuane, and, as we have seen, Ferigo, whom Zuan Francesco
trained as a cifrista. Due to his success, Ferigo was also allowed to induct his own two sons,
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., c. 117v. (8 Jan. 1577).
132 Ibid., cc. 117v.-118r. (8 Jan. 1577).
133 Ibid., cc. 142r.-v. (23 Sep. 1577). See also BNM, Mss. It. cl. VII 1667 (8459), fol. 8r.-v.
134 ASV, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 13, cc. 61 v.-62 r. (22 Aug. 1589); Ibid., c. 81 r.-v. (29 Nov. 1590); Ibid., c. 82
r.-v. (23 January 1591).
135 BNM, Mss. It. cl. VII 1667 (8459), fol. 4v.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., fol. 6v.
138 Ibid., fol. 6r.
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Zuan Francesco and Antonio, into the Venetian chancery as state secretaries.139 Overall,
numerous descendants of the Marin family would occupy the posts of state secretary or cipher
secretary for generations.140
This inter-generational favouritism was not uncommon in the Venetian chancery.141 It was,
however, particularly pronounced in Venice’s cryptologic service, that was characterized by
professional isolationism. Several reasons have been postulated by scholars to account for this
tendency. The historian Filippo de Vivo offered two plausible explanations. The first is purely
financial. At a time when the Republic’s finances were depleted by continuous wars and the
secretaries’ salaries could not always be paid in full, the safeguarding of secretarial posts for
family members was a means of compensation and staff retention.142 The second reason is socio-
political. Nearly all state secretaries in Venice were recruited from the social class of the citizens,
who did not have political rights. To compensate for this, but importantly, to secure their loyalty,
the government reserved exclusive privileges for them, including civil service posts.143 In a
similar vein, Emrah Safa Gürkan argued that the Ten saw it as incumbent upon themselves to
provide for the family of deceased civil servants, hoping that their descendants would have
inherited their skills and talents.144 Inter-generational favouritism, then, was linked to loyalty,
skills, and knowledge transfer.
While these soundly argued contentions are plausible and merit serious consideration,
another explanation for this recruitment pattern ensues, if we consider the significance of secrecy
for such a specialist domain, and secrecy’s instrumentality in professional identity
construction.145 Historically, secrecy has been considered amongst the primary functional
responsibilities of secretaries. It is not accidental that well into the eighteenth century secretaries
were believed to be by definition keepers of secrets.146 Several scholars, erstwhile and
contemporary, have taken for granted the secrecy secretaries were bound by. Francesco
Sansovino, for instance, the versatile scholar and eulogist of Renaissance Venice, described
secretaries as those who “have eyes and mind, but not a tongue outside of counsel.”147 Historian
Douglas Biow called them “deferential, tight-lipped servants.”148 Few scholars, however, have
endeavoured to explain why and how secrecy was linked to secretaries’ development of
professional identity.
139 Ibid, fols. 4v.-10r. See, also, Gürkan, “Espionage,” 179-180.
140 Ibid., fols. 10r.-12v.; Preto, I servizi segreti, 276.
141 The bibliography on the secretaries of the Venetian chancery is vast. See, amongst others, Trebbi, “La
cancelleria;” Trebbi, “Il segretario;” Zannini, Burorocrazia; Galtarossa, Mandarini veneziani.
142 De Vivo, “Cœur de l'Etat,” 720-722.
143 De Vivo, Information, 51, fn. 31.
144 Gürkan, “Espionage,” 180.
145 Simmel, “The Sociology.”
146 See Biow, Doctors, esp. Chapter 6 for relevant bibliography.
147 Sansovino, L’ avvocato, 152.
148 Biow, Doctors, 22.
19
To explore this consideration further, some established social theorizations of secrecy must
be brought into the discussion. Secrecy, as a process, enables the creation of the boundary
between two separate entities, those in the know and the ignorant others. The exclusivity of
being in the know, compared to the ignorant others, can boost the sense of distinctive
inclusiveness in a group and, by extension, cement one’s identification with it.149 Additionally,
the social aspect of secrecy, that requires and promotes the conscious awareness of the group,
due to the intention of concealment and boundary construction, can enhance the process of group
identity creation. The sense of belonging that ensues – the feeling of “‘specialness’ in being a
lifelong member of a privileged inner circle,” as intelligence scholar Michael Herman describes
it150 – can potentially augment the need to protect and perpetuate secrecy, so as to maintain the
group. Secrecy, therefore, creates a dynamic relationship between its agents and becomes both
the condition and the consequence of the formation of group identity.151 By singling out these
professionals as the custodians of state secrets and reinforcing the distinctive significance of their
work with exclusive benefits, the government can be seen as engineering the social construction
of a professional identity that was premised on secrecy.152 In essence, by reserving specific
privileges such as civil service posts for these secretaries and their families in exchange for their
secrecy, the authorities managed to maintain their loyalty and continuous service; indeed, there is
no known case of betrayal of secrecy on the part of any Venetian cipher secretary who was privy
to what nowadays would be termed “classified” information. This is indicative of an emergent
professional ethos. In this respect, secrecy created an on-going relationship between state
secretaries and the authorities and became both the condition and the consequence of
professional identity formation and, by extension, loyalty.153
Corporate control and state regulation
By the time Ferigo Marin and Girolamo Franceschi had taken the reins of the Venetian
cryptology department, the discipline’s professionalization had reached a state of maturation that
rendered it a stand-alone professional service, controlled and regulated by the authorities. In the
late 1590s, the Ten even proposed the election of a committee of five delegates – all noblemen
with hereditary rights to statecraft – who were responsible for overseeing and making strategic
decisions on the state’s cipher policies. This included selecting the most effective cipher to be
used by the Venetian authorities and their diplomats.154 The role of the five-member committee
149 See Simmel, “The Sociology”, 497.
150 Herman, Intelligence Power.
151 Costas and Grey, “Bringing Secrecy;” Costas and Grey, Secrecy at Work.
152 Simmel, “The Sociology.”
153 Costas and Grey, “Bringing Secrecy;” Costas and Grey, Secrecy at Work.
154 See, for instance, ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 13, cc. 92v.-93r. (16 March 1592).
20
was particularly relevant when disagreements arose, especially with regard to the quality of in-
house produced ciphers, in which case they were asked to settle disputes and restore order.155
On the eve of the seventeenth century, the regulation of the Venetian cryptology service
became even more stringent. In 1605, for example, it came to the Ten’s attention that several of
the older cipher keys had gone missing and even ended up in the wrong hands. Accordingly, both
Ferigo Marin and Piero Amadi were summoned to a formal audience with the Heads of the Ten,
and ordered to set aside all cipher keys already used, and produce new ones that were to be
distributed to all state envoys. The Ten also deliberated that, for purposes of secrecy and security,
older keys no longer in use ought to be burnt from time to time. Importantly, Marin and Amadi
were instructed to create two books – one for the Venetian strongholds in the Mediterranean and
one for the Venetian colonies in the Italian mainland – in which they would clearly register all
ciphers and their keys, taking a note of the date and the person to which they had been
consigned, and the expected return date. Copies of these volumes were to be stored in secret
locations. The cifristi were also required to work with their doors hermetically closed and failure
to abide by this rule would result in the forfeit of one year’s salary.156
In the meantime, as Ferigo Marin’s health was deteriorating rapidly and none of the current
secretaries had produced sons who were inherently gifted in the art of cryptology, the Cancellier
Grande was ordered to recruit two more cipher secretaries under the pupillage and mentorship of
Franceschi and Amadi. Their monthly salary was set at four ducats, to be increased to eight or
even ten ducats upon completion of their two year probation. Indeed, in November of that year
two young secretaries were appointed, Giambattista Lionello and Ottavio Medici. When, after
two years of apprenticeship, they passed the exam of breaking a cipher without a key, their salary
increased to ten ducats monthly.157 And so, the Venetian cryptology service continued to train and
develop Venice’s professional cryptologists until the fall of the Republic, routinely reserving this
precious post for fathers and sons who demonstrated the ability to carry on the scientia di cavar
le cifre (the science of breaking codes) in a hereditary manner.158
It is important to emphasize at this stage that, by trying to restore the picture of early
modern Venice’s professional cryptology service, I do not intend to suggest Venice’s superiority
compared to other early modern states.159 While Venice’s precocity in the systematic
development of ciphers is generally acknowledged in the literature,160 my primary intention has
155 For an example, see ASV, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 14, c. 8r. (16 Sept. 1596).
156 Ibid., cc. 126r.- 127r. (31 Aug. 1605).
157 Ibid., c. 127r.-v. (31 Aug. 1605); ASV, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 15, cc. 16v.-17r. (24 Oct. 1607).
158 Pasini, “Delle scritture,” 309; Preto, I servizi segreti, 225.
159 Dejanira Couto mentions the existence of at least another trainer of cifristi in the sixteenth century, which
indicates the professionalization of cryptology in other Italian states, but does not substantiate her claim with any
archival or historiographical references. Couto, “Spying,” in Correspondence, eds. Bethencourt and Egmond, 289.
160 See, for example, Villain-Gandossi, “Les dépêches chiffrées; Kahn, The Codebreakers; Preto, I servizi segreti;
Couto, “Spying,” in Correspondence, eds. Bethencourt and Egmond.
21
been to shed light, not on the deft operation of ciphers by professionals as such, but on the
development of a distinct, stand-alone profession of cryptology, as it emerged and evolved in the
Doge’s Palace, the Venetian state’s political nucleus. Future scholarship might expose and
analyse the professionalization of cryptology in other early modern Italian and European states,
where codes and ciphers were produced and broken by professional cifristi.161
Final Reflections on Professionalization
The sixteenth century saw a gradual proliferation of professions primarily due to the urbanization
of Italian city states that increased the demand for professional expertise.162 Yet, the term
professione, as used in the early modern period is, to this day, a challenging one to define.163
According to Baldassare Castiglione’s Il libro del Cortegiano (1528), professione meant, among
other things, “intellectual labor within a culturally defined discipline, such as priesthood or the
law,” as well as “the product of any practice that required master-pupil training.”164 In short, it
was a “polysemic” term, denoting professing one’s faith, ideas, or doctrines; or an intellectual or
manual occupation.165 By the time Tommaso Garzoni (1549-1589) published his famous treatise
on “all professions of the world,”166 a distinct “professional mentalité” was giving rise to a whole
host of claims around professional identity and expertise.167
In relation to the professional cifrista, one could argue that his role was nothing more than
a mere subdivision of the established profession of the secretary,168 which entailed, not only the
routine tasks of writing, copying, and cataloguing documents, but, importantly, the “learned
rhetorical expertise” of performing such tasks.169 However, according to Andrew Abbott’s
structural and relational theory of professions, a specific body of work delegated by a profession
to a subordinate group can generate a new profession. This can happen as the newly delegated
body of work embraces novel technical and intellectual developments in order to generate new
knowledge.170 This is particularly applicable to the profession of the cifrista, whose expert
knowledge and deftness of ciphers, contingent upon specialist education and training, extended
beyond the customary intellectual errands of the professional secretary.
161 An excellent new volume that addresses the use and dissemination of cryptography in early modern Europe has
recently been edited by Rous and Muslow, eds., Geheime Post.
162 Biow, On the Importance, 39.
163 Abbott, The System of Professions, 318.
164 Biow, Doctors, 7.
165 Malatesta, “Introduction,” in Society and the Professions, ed. Malatesta; Biow, Doctors, 5-6.
166 Garzoni’s La piazza universale was first published in Venice in 1586.
167 McClure “The Artes and the Ars moriendi,” 95, 121.
168 In his list of established professions, Tommaso Garzoni discusses cifranti (not cifristi) within the broader
category of professional writers and scribes. Instead, cifristi are better suited to Garzoni’s description of
“Consiglieri, e Secretarii.” See Garzoni, La piazza universale, 182, 174.
169 Biow, Doctors, 4.
170 Abbott, The System of Professions.
22
Let us explore this proposition further. In the late 1540s, in his fervent petition to the
Venetian government for a promotion to the profession of cifrista, the Venetian state secretary
Alvise Borghi claimed that, while in other domains of intellectual activity the Ancients by far
surpassed contemporaries, the art of cryptology was an exception to this rule. This was because,
while several ingenious minds could invent secret ways of writing, the complexity of
professional cryptology meant that the employ of Princes was accessible to only a few genuine
professionals.171 For the Council of Ten, what separated the amateurs from the genuine
professionals was specialist skills formation by means of continuous professional training, which
was the prerequisite for employment when they sought individuals to enter the service as
professional cifristi; not talent. Talent and aptitude to cryptology were taken as a given. That was
the case for Ferigo Marin, who was expected to study under his father, and to continue to upskill
himself even after his second promotion to an ordinary secretary;172 similar was the case for
Piero Amadi, who was instructed by Girolamo Franceschi,173 as well as Giambattista Lionello
and Ottavio Medici, who were, in turn, trained by both Franceschi and Amadi.174 In other words,
a common educational process, combined with a shared professional identity, even an emerging
professional ethos and philosophy led to the development of a distinct, stand-alone profession of
cryptology in sixteenth century Venice.175
While these distinct traits of a sixteenth century profession are redolent of several of the
criteria that contemporary sociologists have postulated as key determinants for “modern”
professions, in my analysis I have intentionally refrained from examining the profession of the
cifrista against every single one of them. This is because the principles determining professions
and professionalization in the early modern period are “distinctly at odds with modern
sociological criteria.”176 Undeniably, some of these principles – such as appeal to expertise, work
organization, and internal discipline – are emergent in the early modern period. In our historical
reconstruction of early modern professions, however, we should not ignore the significance of “a
communal, self-authenticating discourse that both periodically defined and policed […] notion[s]
of a particular profession as a meaningful form of work.”177 In absence of documented self-
narratives of cifristi about their sense of professional identity and expertise, Alvise Borghi’s
notion of the profession of the cifrista, echoing the meaning ascribed to it by the very institution
that marshalled it into existence, the Council of Ten, offers such a discourse.
171 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, f. 7, n.d. (attributed by the archivist to the year 1548).
172 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 11, c. 45v. (25 Jan 1576); Ibid., Reg. 13, cc. 61v.-62r. (22 Aug. 1589).
173 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 14, c. 7r.-v (9 July 1596).
174 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 15, cc. 16v.-17r. (24 Oct. 1607).
175 On education, ethos, and professional philosophy as key characteristics of early modern professions, see O’Day,
The Professions.
176 Biow, Doctors, xii.
177 Ibid., 12.
23
Conclusion
Resembling the closed caste oligarchical structure of the Venetian government, Venice’s
professional cryptology service blossomed within an interdependent system of inter-generational
favouritism and professional isolationism. Both these attributes served to promote specialist
skills formation and familial specialization, with the purpose of safeguarding secrecy and the
construction of a distinct professional identity, even an incipient professional ethos and
philosophy. Moreover, Venice’s professional cryptology department flourished alongside a wider
diffusion of an amateur use of ciphers amongst a variety of members of the Venetian society,
including merchants. Was there a link between the two?
It is unquestionable that the professional use of ciphers in Venice proliferated in the wider
landscape of the systemization of diplomatic activities in the late medieval and early modern
period.178 From this perspective, there seems to be no direct link between the amateur use of
codes and ciphers, especially as it had been instigated by merchants in the form of merchant-
style codes, and the professional use of cryptology by “professionals of oral and written
communication” that were involved in public administration.179 A closer look at the users of
Venice’s cryptology service, however, might tell a different story.
Trade and industry, the cornerstones of the Venetian economy throughout the centuries, had
traditionally been premised on secrecy and efficient intelligence.180 Accordingly, Venetian
merchants were expected to be competent in secret communication, even if the latter was
achieved through simple means of encryption. The idiosyncrasy of Venetian merchants hinged on
the fact that the very individuals that came up with such basic techniques of concealing
information to protect commercial interests, such as Andrea Barbarigo, emanated from the
Venetian patriciate, the highest order in the Venetian social hierarchy that comprised the Venetian
ruling class. As such, Venetian patricians had their feet firmly planted in two overlapping worlds:
those of trade and politics.181 It is possible, therefore, that the patricians who prompted the
professionalization of cryptology within the Doge’s palace were the ones who had been schooled
in a tradition of concealing trade secrets through simple “mercantile letters.”
While historiography to date has not furnished firm evidence for this hypothesis to ripen
into certainty, this peculiarity of the Venetian ruling class, that accounts for the enmeshment of
trade, politics, and diplomacy in early modern Venice, can suggest that the professionalization of
cryptology in Venice could have been influenced, in a way, by this mercantile custom. If
178 Lazzarini, Communication; Lazzarini, “Renaissance Diplomacy,” in The Italian Renaissance State, eds.
Gamberini and Lazzarini; Senatore, “Uno Mundo de Carta.”
179 Lazzarini, Communication, 115, 202.
180 See, for example, Juárez Valero, Venecia.
181 On the patricians in early modern Venice, see Romano, Patricians and Popolani.
24
anything, it is not accidental that this professionalization process intensified between the 1540s
and 1570s, when the Venetians were fighting – both through warfare and diplomacy – to protect
some of their most prized commercial strongholds in the Levant, such as parts of the Morea and
the island of Cyprus.182 In this respect, while I do not wish to argue that the Venetian homo
oeconomicus, to use Frederic Lane’s term,183 directly interfered with the professionalization of
cryptology in Venice, mercantile customs, in combination with sixteenth century political and
economic value judgements, may have influenced its gradual proliferation. Accordingly, scholars
could pursue two future research avenues: firstly, the direct or indirect role of early modern
merchants in the diplomatic or political dealings of governments;184 and secondly, the hitherto
neglected professional development of clandestine practices as a distinct function of state
bureaucracies in order to protect economic, aside from political, interests.
With these thoughts in mind, one final question remains. What can the historical
reconstruction and exploration of the professional cryptology service of early modern Venice
confer to the historical study of management, organization, and business practices? Firstly, the
study of the systematic proliferation of the amateur use of ciphers by traders and merchants, both
for commercial and diplomatic purposes, can offer significant insights into an aspect of medieval
and early modern commercial activity that still remains largely unexplored and, thus, awaits
scholarly attention.185 Secondly, this case study demonstrates that traditional professional
practices that are associated with business and management, such as specialist skills training and
specialization, professional identity formation, and regulation came to assume their form in
unforeseen places, not only in Medieval and Renaissance marketplaces and early modern state
monopolies of overseas trade, but in burgeoning state bureaucracies, as well. Viewed from this
perspective, the remit of case studies that the medieval and early modern period can confer to the
disciplines of business and organizational history could potentially broaden, to include
managerial and business practices within state administration, in addition to more conventional
studies on, for instance, early modern accounting.186 In short, casting our scholarly gaze to the
early modern era will enable us to uncover a slender yet significant aspect of business and
organizational history that traces the origins of business and organizations in unlikely places,
such as churches, monasteries, agricultural estates and, of course, governments.187
182 See Arbel, “Venice’s Maritime Empire,” in Companion, ed. Dursteler.
183 Lane, Andrea Barbarigo, 5.
184 For post-industrial societies, Chernow, The House of Morgan; Hart, “Red, White, and ‘Big Blue’;” Sawyer,
“Manufacturing Germans.”
185 Lazzarini, Communication, 39-41.
186 See, for example, Lane, “Venture Accounting;” Goldthwaite, “The Practice.”
187 For examples, see Ruef and Harness, “Agrarian Origins;” Kieser, “From Asceticism to Administration;”
Ezzamel, “Work Organization.”
25
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