Microexpressions Are Not the Best Way to Catch a Liar

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OPINION
published: 20 September 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01672
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1672
Edited by:
Wenfeng Chen,
Renmin University of China, China
Reviewed by:
Chris N. H. Street,
University of Huddersfield,
United Kingdom
Cristina Scarpazza,
Università degli Studi di Padova, Italy
*Correspondence:
Judee K. Burgoon
judee@email.arizona.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Emotion Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 21 June 2018
Accepted: 20 August 2018
Published: 20 September 2018
Citation:
Burgoon JK (2018) Microexpressions
Are Not the Best Way to Catch a Liar.
Front. Psychol. 9:1672.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01672
Microexpressions Are Not the Best
Way to Catch a Liar
Judee K. Burgoon*
Center for the Management of Information, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States
Keywords: lying, deception, deception detection, microexpression, emotion, social signals, rigidity
Microexpressions are lauded as a valid and reliable means of catching liars (see Porter and ten
Brinke, 2010). However, there are many reasons to question what I will call microexpression theory
(MET).
For MET to be supported, several propositions must hold true: One, deception produces
internal negative emotional experiences. Two, these internal experiences have associated outward
expressions, including microexpressions. Three, microexpressions are uncontrollable. Four, these
expressions are reliable and valid indicators of deception. Five, microexpressions occur frequently
enough to be detectable. Six, detected microexpressions successfully distinguish truth from
deception. Let me address each of these propositions in turn. I will then offer an alternative theory
accounting for truth versus deception indicators under multiple circumstances.
DOES DECEPTION PRODUCE NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL
EXPERIENCES?
During this discussion, I distinguish among emotional experiences, emotional expressions, and
felt emotions. Emotional experiences are internal events, not measured directly but inferred
from measurable physiological states, and labeled as emotional expressions. Felt emotions are
an individual’s subjective reporting of one’s state. Another important distinction is between
macro- [>0.5 s; see (Yan et al., 2013)] and microexpressions. Most of the research on emotions
during deception examines macro displays rather than fleeting microexpressions (e.g., DePaulo
et al., 2003; Warren et al., 2009; Okubo et al., 2012; ten Brinke et al., 2012). Ability to predict
deception from the former does not equal ability to predict deception from the latter.
So, yes, deception can produce the prototypical negative felt emotions of guilt, shame, sadness,
and fear; but it can also produce positive emotions of relief, enjoyment, pleasure, and what is called
duping delight—pleasure at succeeding with one’s lies (Ekman and Friesen, 1969). Additionally,
prevaricators may experience arousal alone, without a felt emotion, or a blend of emotions,
producing complex displays that range from non-aroused to highly aroused and unpleasant to
pleasant (Burgoon et al., 1989). If stakes are low, liars may not experience any particular emotion,
making them indistinguishable behaviorally from truth-tellers (Hartwig and Bond, 2011).
DO DECEPTION-INSTIGATED EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES HAVE
ASSOCIATED OUTWARD DISPLAYS?
The Ekman Facial Action Coding System (FACS) specifies particular Action Units (AUs) of
the face that are associated with each emotion. For example, fear entails seven different facial
muscle movements. However, as Barrett (2006) concluded, felt emotions lack a one-to-one
correspondence with emotional expressions; there are no unique and specific somatovisceral
changes that correspond to specific emotional expressions. Put another way, a single felt emotion
can give rise to multiple expressions, and multiple felt emotions can give rise to the same expression.

Burgoon Microexpressions Not Best
For example, felt fear can be displayed as anxiety, anger,
contempt, or surprise. An experiment intending to examine the
coherence between subjective emotions and prototypical AUs
for fear showed participants the iconic scene from the movie
The Shining of axe-wielding Jack Nicholson about to attack his
terrified wife hiding in the bathroom (Fernández-Dols et al.,
1997). Of 14 participants reporting exclusively disgust and 2,
fear, only 1 and 2, respectively, showed the AUs associated with
those felt emotions. Of 11 reporting surprise, none displayed
the prototypical display. This study offered strong demonstration
that felt and expressed emotions are often not aligned. Elsewhere,
both a frustrating task and a delightful one elicited smiling from
participants (Hoque et al., 2012).
Only at the risk of false positives, then, can one infer backward
from observed displays that the sender is lying. Put differently,
deception does not reliably produce negative emotions and
negative emotions do not reliably signal deception.
ARE DECEPTION-INSTIGATED
MICROEXPRESSIONS
UNCONTROLLABLE?
Some are. But they appear to be partial or longer than the
traditional definition of a microexpression. In an investigation
of countermeasures, Hurley and Frank (2011) found that liars
could not completely inhibit eyebrow or lip corner movement
despite instructions to do so during a mock crime interrogation.
In a comprehensive analysis of 78 public pleas for the return of
missing children, deceivers failed to simulate sadness and grief
to the degree truthful pleaders did and they leaked displays of
happiness (ten Brinke et al., 2012). These, however, were full
emotional expressions lasting nearly a second or longer. The
microexpressions did not differ between truth and deception.
The analysis of 1,711 expressions revealed that high-intensity
emotions were harder to conceal than low-intensity ones during
masking. There were no cases of complete microexpressions
(simultaneously present in the upper and lower face), and only
25% of the participants displayed the partial expressions (Porter
et al., 2012).
Other expressions, such as the eyebrow flash or contempt, are
inherently social, voluntary, and controllable (Grammer et al.,
1988). As social signals, they are responsive to context. This is
a central reason why microexpressions are a poor telltale sign of
lying, because they can be masked, minimized, exaggerated, or
neutralized, especially during deception (Ekman, 2009). Masking
involves disguising felt emotions, as in replacing fear with a show
of defiance. Minimizing involves suppressing the intensity of an
expression. Exaggeration entails intensifying an expression, as in
dialing up a display of surprise when accused of a transgression.
Neutralizing entails concealing a felt emotion by eliminating its
outward expression entirely.
This management of facial expressions follows what Ekman
and Friesen (1969) labeled display rules. Cultures designate what
emotions are appropriate, sanctioned, or punished if displayed;
how such displays should appear; and the consequences of
their display. This designation of social signals during deception
has received considerable scholarly attention (Driskell et al.,
2012). Buller and Burgoon (1994, 1997) labeled such regulation
of deception expressions as strategic communication. Their
argument, bolstered by numerous investigations, is that much of
our nonverbal behavioral repertoire is manageable and managed.
More broadly, because facial expressions are part of a
social signal system, they fulfill a variety of functions beyond
simply revealing one’s internal emotional reactions (e.g., Buck,
1991; Chovil, 1991; Buck et al., 1992; Barrett, 2006). During
social interaction, individuals purposely regulate and withhold
expressions of felt emotions, and they enact expressions of
emotions they do not feel. “Emotional expressions, then, can
be used purposely in deception to communicate symbolically
information that has very little to do with the communicators’
felt emotions” (Buller and Burgoon, 1994, p. 387).
HOW RELIABLE AND VALID ARE
MICROEXPRESSIONS AS INDICATORS OF
DECEPTION?
High stakes circumstances may prompt some leakage, though
not necessarily of microexpressions. ten Brinke and Porter (2012)
found that liars pleading for the return of their missing children
displayed more upper face surprise and lower face happiness
than truthful pleaders, making these expressions candidates for
detecting deception. “The ‘grief’ muscles (corrugator supercilii,
depressor anguli oris) were more often contracted in the faces
of genuine than deceptive pleaders. Subtle contraction of the
zygomatic major (masking smiles) and full contraction of the
frontalis (failed attempts to appear sad) muscles were more
commonly identified in the faces of deceptive pleaders” [(ten
Brinke et al., 2012), p. 411].
Contrariwise, Pentland et al. (2015) found during a Concealed
Information Test (CIT) that deceptive (guilty) respondents
exhibited less contempt and more intense smiles than truthful
(innocent) respondents. Contempt and less intense smiling
would be expected of liars, not truth-tellers. Numerous studies
have found that deceivers often show appeasement or fake
smiles that can be mistaken as signals of pleasure, comfort,
or enjoyment. In their experiment comparing cheaters (who
lied) with cooperators (who were truthful), Okubo et al. (2012)
concluded that, “cheater detection based on the processing
of negative facial expressions can be thwarted by a posed or
fake smile, which cheaters put on with higher intensity than
cooperators” (p. 217).
These patterns would result in false positives. Thus, some
expressions like smiling are not uniquely associated with
deception, and some emotional expressions—both micro and
macro—can be associated with either truth or deception.
DO MICROEXPRESSIONS OCCUR WITH
ENOUGH REGULARITY TO BE
DETECTABLE?
False negatives are commonplace. In one of the very few
investigations of microexpression frequency, Porter and
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Burgoon Microexpressions Not Best
ten Brinke (2008) coded 700 high-stakes genuine and
falsified emotional expressions and found only 2% were
microexpressions. Their subsequent analysis of these high-stakes
pleadings found only six instances of microexpressions among
deceivers and slightly more (8) among genuine pleaders (ten
Brinke and Porter, 2012), obviating the role of microexpressions
as sufficiently frequent or exclusive to catch deception. Legions
of law enforcement personnel and airport security Behavioral
Detection Officers have been trained to look for microexpressions
as “telltale” signs of nefarious intent. However, testimony to the
U.S. Congress revealed that only 0.6% out of 61,000 passenger
referrals to law enforcement in 2011 and 2012 resulted in arrests
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), and a 2017
ACLU report concluded the behavioral observation approach
was based on biased, weak, and junk science (Cushing, 2017).
DO DETECTED MICROEXPRESSIONS
SUCCESSFULLY DISTINGUISH TRUTH
FROM DECEPTION?
Recent empirical results are not encouraging. Porter et al. (2012)
found that untrained observers were unable to distinguish truth
from deception. In particular, they could not distinguish sadness,
fear or disgust—all emotions thought to be associated with
deception. Pentland et al. (2015) found during a CIT that
deceivers’ and truth-tellers’ smiling intensity was essentially the
same on target questions and only differed on neutral questions.
Between-subjects classification accuracy was below 56%. These
kinds of results led my colleagues and me to seek an alternative
approach.
ALTERNATIVE THEORY: THE RIGIDITY
EFFECT
An alternative hypothesis that offers a reliable and valid
set of indicators is what has been called the rigidity effect
(RE). RE postulates that extemporaneous deception under high
stakes leads to an initial freeze response. In interpersonal
deception theory (IDT), Buller and Burgoon (1996) (Burgoon,
2014, 2015a,b; see also Burgoon et al., 2014) argued that
deceivers attempt to manage their nonverbal behavior and
overall image so as to appear credible (strategic communication)
while simultaneously attempting to control behaviors that are
detrimental to their performance (non-strategic behavior). If
efforts to appear natural, expressive, and relaxed are overridden
by attempts to suppress signs of discomfiture, the overcontrol will
backfire.
Early research focused on gestural and postural activity.
Zuckerman et al. (1981) theorized that contrary to the stereotype
of liars being fidgety and nervous during an interview, liars
may adopt a stiff, wooden posture due to overcontrol. Several
experiments confirmed that deceivers reduced their gestural,
foot, and overall kinesic animation relative to truthtellers (e.g.,
Buller and Aune, 1987; DePaulo et al., 2003; Caso et al.,
2006; Mullin, 2012), suggestive of participants seeking to limit
incriminating behaviors.
As automated measurement advanced, more investigations
pursued dynamic ocular and facial displays of emotion. These,
too, showed the RE pattern of depressed activity. Studies of blink
rates regularly found inhibition of blinking during deception
(Leal and Vrij, 2008). Hurley and Frank (2011) found that
suppressing a given facial emotion during deception resulted in
suppressing all facial expressions. Pentland et al. (2014, 2015,
2016) and Pentland and Zhang (2016) found deceivers reduced
several emotion-relevant face and head movements.
Two experiments (Pentland et al., 2017) tested the RE
directly with videotapes from high-stakes experiments in
which emotional and microexpressions were captured with
the Computer Expression Recognition Toolkit. In the first
experiment, guilty subjects completing a CIT (which controls
for cognitive load) showed far less variance in four deception-
relevant emotions (disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise) than
did innocent subjects when responding to target questions. In
the second experiment, which measured variance in 10 facial
movements, the guilty (deceivers) showed REs on 8 during
presentation of target images. In a separate test (Twyman et al.,
2015), rigidity persisted despite participants being asked to
employ countermeasures to offset it.
CAUSAL MECHANISMS
A question that needs to be resolved is the causal mechanisms
that produce the RE. Does it reflect an involuntary reflex and
defensive reaction associated with flight or fight (Twyman et al.,
2015), a cessation of activity due to too much demand on
cognitive resources and working memory (ten Brinke and Porter,
2012; Sporer, 2016), a temporary orientation response while
absorbing contextual information (Le Poire and Burgoon, 1996),
or intentional behavioral control and impression management
(Grazioli et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2009; Twyman et al., 2011)?
Sporer (2013, 2016) and Twyman et al. (2014) nicely articulates
these alternatives. If the inhibition of movement1is temporary
while the deceiver decides how to respond, it may better reflect
an adaptive response in line with IDT that is only evident if
there is sufficient time for dynamics to be observed (Duran
et al., 2013). (This would make rigidity a misnomer.) As already
noted, immobility also is affected by distressful emotions (e.g.,
fear, anxiety, shame) and grave consequences (e.g., physical
pain, financial loss, imprisonment) and by opportunities and
cognitive resources for preparation. Speculatively, it can be
hypothesized that degree of behavioral inhibition will be positively
related to one’s emotional distress and the severity of the stakes
involved and inversely related to opportunity to plan and adapt
responses.
Needed are experiments that tease out these effects and
identify significant moderators. Methods like the cognitive
interview [(Köhnken et al., 1999; Vrij, 2015); but cf. (Levine
et al., 2018)] to induce higher cognitive load may further test
cognitive resources, and the Twyman et al. (2015) experiments
1This is not to be confused with Darwin’s inhibition hypothesis that deceivers
fail to inhibit some emotional aspects—leakage—while also failing to adequately
simulate other aspects of genuine emotional expressions.
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Burgoon Microexpressions Not Best
employing various countermeasures may control and test
alternative influences articulated in Burgoon (2015a,b). The
increased complexity despite reduced displacement found by
Duran et al. (2013) also forecasts the importance of dynamic as
well as static facets of emotions.
SUMMARY
The time has come to look beyond fleeting, infrequent and
minuscule emotional expressions to movements themselves and
not to their presence but their absence. Deception produces
positive as well as negative emotional experiences and sometimes
no emotions at all. Felt emotions do not have a one-to-one
correspondence to outward expressions, and microexpressions
are especially rare, leading to false negatives and false positives.
Discerning initial rigidity and temporal patterning of facial
behavior may greatly increase the viability of facial movements
in catching a liar.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and
approved it for publication.
FUNDING
Preparation of this editorial was sponsored, in part, by the Army
Research Office and was accomplished under Grant Number
W911NF-16-1-0342. The views and conclusions contained in this
document are those of the author and should not be interpreted
as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied,
of the Army Research Office or the U.S. Government. The U.S.
Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints
for Government purposes notwithstanding any copyright
notation herein.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author thanks David Buller for his early collaboration on
deception and emotion, the U. S. Air Force Office of Scientific
Research and the U. S. National Science Foundation for their
support of the foundational work on interpersonal deception
theory, and Jay Nunamaker and the cadre of exceptional graduate
students at the University of Arizona for their contributions
to the research program on automated detection of deception.
Special acknowledgment goes to Nathan Twyman and Steve
Pentland for their elaboration and pursuit of the rigidity effect.
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Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was
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be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
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Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1672