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September 2018
SDN/18/05
I M F S T A F F D I S C
U S S I O N N O T
E
Women in Finance:
A Case for Closing Gaps
Ratna Sahay, Martin Čihák, and other IMF Staff
DISCLAIMER: Staff Discussion Notes showcase policy-related analysis and research being developed by
IMF staff members and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed
in Staff Discussion Notes are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF,
its Executive Board, or IMF management.
©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution
WOMEN IN FINANCE
2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Women in Finance: A Case for Closing Gaps
Monetary and Capital Markets Department
with inputs from other departments1
Prepared by Ratna Sahay, Martin Čihák, and other IMF Staff
Authorized for distribution by Tobias Adrian
DISCLAIMER: Staff Discussion Notes showcase policy-related analysis and research being
developed by IMF staff members and are published to elicit comments and to encourage
debate. The views expressed in Staff Discussion Notes are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
JEL Classification Numbers:
G30, G34, J16
Keywords:
gender, banking, financial inclusion, financial stability,
economic growth, bank supervision, boards of directors
Authors’ Email Addresses:
RSahay@imf.org, MCihak@imf.org
1 The authors acknowledge important contributions from previous co-authors Papa N’Diaye, Adolfo Barajas, Srobona
Mitra, Annette Kyobe, Yen Nian Mooi, and Seyed Reza Yousefi. The sections on financial services providers and
supervisors draw on Sahay and others (2015) and Sahay and others (2017). The section on users of financial services
draws largely on the analysis conducted by the FAS team of the IMF’s Statistics Department and would not be
possible without efforts by colleagues in the World Bank’s Global Findex team. The authors also want to thank,
without implicating, members of the IMF’s Executive Board and many IMF colleagues for useful comments and
suggestions.
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 5
INTRODUCTION _________________________________________________________________________________ 6
WOMEN AS USERS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES __________________________________________________ 8
WOMEN AS PROVIDERS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES ___________________________________________ 13
A. Literature Review _____________________________________________________________________________ 13
B. Four Hypotheses: Why Gender May Matter ___________________________________________________ 14
C. Stylized Facts _________________________________________________________________________________ 15
D. Empirical Methodology _______________________________________________________________________ 17
E. Empirical Results ______________________________________________________________________________ 19
WOMEN AS FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISORS ______________________________________________ 22
A. Conceptual Discussion and Stylized Facts _____________________________________________________ 22
B. Estimation Approach __________________________________________________________________________ 24
C. Estimation Results ____________________________________________________________________________ 25
CONCLUSIONS _________________________________________________________________________________ 27
ANNEX I. DATA ON WOMEN USERS OF FINANCE ____________________________________________ 29
ANNEX II. DATA ON WOMEN LEADERS IN FINANCE _________________________________________ 31
REFERENCES ____________________________________________________________________________________ 39
TABLES
1. Women’s Roles in Finance _____________________________________________________________________ 6
2. Share of Women on Bank Boards versus Bank Stability _______________________________________ 20
3. Supervisory Quality and the Share of Women on Supervisory Boards _________________________ 26
4. Distance-to-Distress and the Share of Women on Supervisory Boards ________________________ 26
FIGURES
1. Gender Gap in Account Ownership, 2017 ______________________________________________________ 8
2. Shares of Female Depositors and Borrowers by Region, 2016 _________________________________ 10
3. Shares of Female Borrowers and Depositors Over Time and Across Countries ________________ 10
4. Credit Extension, Gender, and Bank Stability __________________________________________________ 12
5. Women on Bank Boards of Directors, Distribution of Observations ___________________________ 16
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
6. Women on Bank Boards of Directors, by Region and Type ____________________________________ 17
7. Women Leaders in Supervision Agencies, Averages by GDP per capita, 2015 _________________ 23
8. Women Leaders in Supervision Agencies, Regional Averages, 2015 ___________________________ 23
9. Women Leaders in Supervision Agencies, Regional Averages, 1999–2017 ____________________ 24
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study analyzes the intersection of gender and finance, examining women’s roles not only as
users of financial services but also as leaders in financial institutions and financial supervision
agencies.
Gender gaps persist in access to and the use of finance. Financial inclusion is a major challenge
regardless of gender, and efforts are needed to address it for the entire population. Nonetheless,
the global gender gap is very persistent, meaning that women still account for the majority of the
financially excluded worldwide, and gaps remain very large in some regions. While financial inclusion
is an important goal in itself, new evidence suggests that greater inclusion of women as users of
financial services has generally positive macroeconomic outcomes as well. Greater access to and use
of accounts for financial transactions, savings, and insurance can help increase long-term
macroeconomic growth. In line with results observed for financial inclusion more broadly, the
marginal benefits for economic growth wane as financial depth increases, and the evidence suggests
that there are potential risks when borrowing grows without supervisory safeguards.
The paper studies the large gaps between the representation of men and women in leadership
positions in banks and in banking-supervision agencies worldwide. It finds that, shockingly, women
accounted for less than 2 percent of financial institutions’ chief executive officers and less than 20
percent of executive board members. Contrary to common perceptions, many low- and middle-
income countries have a higher share of women on bank boards and banking-supervision agency
boards compared with advanced economies. Econometric analysis suggests that, controlling for
relevant bank- and country-specific factors, the presence of women as well as a higher share of
women on bank boards appears associated with greater financial resilience. This study also finds
that a higher share of women on boards of banking-supervision agencies is associated with greater
bank stability. This evidence strengthens the case for closing the gender gaps in leadership positions
in finance.
Further research is needed on the causal links, to identify specific mechanisms through which these
stability benefits are achieved, and to understand the conditions that have facilitated or hindered
the entry of women into leadership roles in banks and supervision agencies.
This note underscores the need for better data to monitor gender gaps in finance. Improved
measurement will help researchers better understand the drivers of these gaps and their effects on
financial stability and other variables. It will also help in better designing policies to address those
gaps.
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
INTRODUCTION
1. There are several dimensions to examining women’s roles in finance. This note focuses
on three roles—as users of financial services, as leaders in the sector providing financial services, and
as financial sector regulators and supervisors. Table 1 captures the three dimensions schematically.
Table 1. Women’s Roles in Finance
Role
Use
Provision
Regulation
Definition of
inclusion?
Traditional definition
(“access to and use of
financial services”)
Equitable access to
leadership roles (board
members, chief
executive officers)
Equitable access to
leadership roles as
regulators and
supervisors
Gaps documented? Demand-side surveys for
2011, 2014, and 2017;
first supply-side data
published in 2018
Less well
documented
Not well
documented
Effects quantified? Estimates by Sahay and
others (2015) updated
and expanded here
Sahay and others
(2017), updated and
expanded here
Sahay and others
(2017), updated and
expanded here
Source: Authors.
2. Gender gaps persist in access to and in the use of financial services. Financial inclusion is
a major challenge regardless of gender, and efforts are needed to address it for the entire
population. This said, sizeable gaps remain between women’s and men’s financial inclusion. For
example, the latest data from the 2017 Global Findex survey (https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/)
indicate that, of the 1.7 billion of unbanked adults globally, 56 percent are women, and in
developing economies, women remain 9 percentage points more likely to be unbanked than men.
Data from the IMF’s annual Financial Access Survey, discussed in more detail next section, show that
the average share of female depositors and borrowers in 2016 was around 40 percent. Underlying
these global numbers is a large regional variation, whereby gender gaps are small in some regions
but sizeable in others.
3. Compared with the available talent pool, women’s share in leadership positions in
finance is low. Women hold less than 20 percent of board seats of banks and banking-supervision
agencies worldwide. More starkly, women represent less than 2 percent of bank chief executive
officers (CEOs). This contrasts sharply with the supply of women with relevant degrees. For example,
women represent about 30 percent of economics graduates and about 50 percent of graduates in
business and the social sciences (Credit Suisse 2014). These shares vary across countries, but the
finding that women leaders in finance account for a disproportionally low share of the available
talent pool is universal.
4. There is growing evidence of a “glass ceiling” in finance, but the impact on financial-
sector performance is not well studied. The present study provides new evidence. The existing
research is fragmented, focusing on certain aspects of risk taking or on specific countries. To explore
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7
the link between financial stability and gender more thoroughly, this study puts together a
comprehensive data set on the banking sector, its characteristics, and its performance, as well as on
the share of women on the boards of directors, covering 72 countries from 2001 to 2013. The paper
also presents a new data set on the share of women on banking-supervision agency boards across
115 countries from 1999 to 2017 to explore a new question: is the share of women on banking-
supervision agency boards associated with banking outcomes, such as stability?
5. Using data that have only recently become available from the IMF’s Financial Access
Survey, and compiling comprehensive data sets from new sources, this paper presents four
main findings. First, in addition to the low shares of women leaders in banking, this study finds that
there is a fair degree of heterogeneity across bank types. The share of women on bank boards is
relatively higher in savings banks and lower in investment banks, bank holding companies, and
securities firms. Second, contrary to common perceptions, the data show that many low- and
middle-income countries have a higher share of women on bank boards and banking-supervision
agency boards compared with advanced economies. Third, the paper presents new results
suggesting that more women on bank boards are positively linked with bank stability, through
higher capital buffers, controlling for other relevant factors. Higher shares of women on banking-
supervision boards also appears to be associated with higher bank stability and higher profitability.
Finally, greater inclusion of women as users, providers, and supervisors of financial services would
have benefits beyond addressing gender inequality. Narrowing the gender gaps would foster
greater stability and resilience in the banking system, enhance economic growth, and contribute to
more effective monetary and fiscal policy.
6. These findings reinforce the need to address inclusion and stability as part of an
integrated policy approach. As pointed out by Lagarde (2016), despite evidence of benefits to
individuals and society as a whole, financial inclusion often proceeds on an isolated track—more
social policy than macro policy. It is critical to avoid such a “silo mentality.” Financial inclusion—
including greater access to and use of financial services by women—is an integral part of inclusive
growth strategies and should be closely integrated into macroeconomic and financial policies. When
financial systems become more inclusive, they help broaden financial markets and can make
monetary policy more effective. By bringing more sections of the population into the formal
sector—such as including more women—tax and expenditure effects of fiscal policy can be
broadened.
7. There are some qualifications to the results presented in this paper. While it explores
qualitatively possible links to understand why bank stability might improve with a higher share of
women on the boards of banks and banking-supervision agencies, it does not identify the precise
channels through which bank stability is enhanced. In addition, given the paucity of the data on
women leaders—more than 80 percent of observations of banks have less than 20 percent
representation of women on their boards—statistical tests were able to provide only limited insights.
Thus, this paper provides an initial exploration of the observable links, given the data constraints.
8. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses women
as users of financial services. The following section provides evidence on women as leaders in the
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
financial sector as bank board members and CEOs. The next section examines the role of women as
financial-sector supervisors and regulators. The final section concludes the paper.
WOMEN AS USERS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
9. Demand-side surveys suggest that, despite significant progress in some countries,
global gender gaps in access to
and use of financial services are
closing slowly at best. The World
Bank’s Global Findex survey shows
that the gap in account ownership
in developing economies has
remained essentially unchanged
at 9 percentage points from 2011
to 2017. Of the 1.7 billion
unbanked adults, 56 percent are
women. Within this aggregate
picture, large variations occur
across regions and countries. For
example, the Middle East and
North Africa region has the
largest gender gaps: 52 percent of
men in the region have an
account, compared with only 35
percent of women. A comparison
across countries reveals that, in
India, account ownership grew by 50 percent, and the gender gap fell from 20 percentage points to
6 percentage points in six years. Indonesia saw equitable growth in account ownership among men
and women: the overall share of adults with an account grew from 20 percent in 2011 to 49 percent
in 2017. But in Bangladesh, 65 percent of men have an account compared with only 36 percent of
women, pulling down the overall account ownership rate to 50 percent. Similarly, in Algeria, 56
percent of men have an account but only 29 percent of women do, pulling the overall rate of
account ownership down to 43 percent. In comparison, for example, Bolivia’s account ownership
rate is almost the same between men and women, at about 55 percent (Figure 1). And China,
Colombia, India, Kenya, and Mexico show reduced gaps in the 2017 survey. For a further summary of
the latest Global Findex survey results, see Demirgüç-Kunt and others (2018).
10. Recent studies based on the Global Findex survey shed light on the drivers of gender
gaps. In particular, Deléchat and others (2018) find that factors such as legal discrimination against
women explain why women are less likely than men to have a bank account.
11. Access to mobile phones and the internet holds promise for expanding financial
inclusion, but gender gaps have remained. According to the 2017 Gallup World Poll, 74 percent
Figure 1. Gender Gap in Account Ownership, 2017
Sources: Global Findex 2017; and authors’ calculations.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
share of adults with an account (men)
share of adults with an account
(women)
Algeria
Bolivia
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9
of women in developing economies own a mobile phone, compared with 84 percent of men.
Globally, 42 percent of adults (1.85 billion) have internet access, but the ratio is only 39 percent for
women compared with 45 percent for men. In Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, India, Nigeria, Uzbekistan,
and Zimbabwe, men are roughly twice as likely as women to have internet access. Reflecting these
gaps, only 17 percent of developing economy women used a mobile phone or the internet to access
an account in 2017, compared with 21 percent of men (Global Findex).
12. The gender gap also means that accessing funds during an emergency is harder for
women. The 2017 Gallup World Poll/Global Findex show that women are 11 percentage points less
likely than men to come up with emergency funds (equivalent to 1/20 of gross national per capita
income).
13. Supply-side data on women’s use of finance have become available only in 2018
(Annex I). As part of its commitment to support financial inclusion, the IMF publishes an annual
Financial Access Survey, a high-quality financial inclusion database with a global reach. Unlike
demand-side surveys, the data set is based on administrative sources—such as national central bank
and other statistical authorities—and is derived from provider-side information. The 2016 Financial
Access Survey included a pilot to capture the financial access gender data gap. The pilot, which
included the participation of 28 countries, revealed that, in almost half of the participating
economies, financial service providers had access to their customers’ gender information. An
expanded pilot in 2017 invited all of the IMF’s country members to report the gender breakdown of
their commercial banks’ depositors and borrowers. The results of the expanded pilot were published
in March 2018 (IMF 2018). Gender disaggregated data has been mainstreamed in the Financial
Access Survey in 2018, and the number of countries reporting gender disaggregated data has been
rising over time.
14. Two-thirds of the countries reporting gender-disaggregated data provided historical
series, which bodes well for increasing awareness, performing analysis, and informing
policymaking. The results illustrate the increasing availability of data on gender-related financial
access in the past four years. This trend may reflect awareness, in several countries, of gender
inequality and the need to gather better data to inform policies that boost women’s economic
participation (IMF 2018).
15. The expanded pilot also highlighted variations in the financial access gender gap,
which in turn could be useful in identifying factors for closing the gap. While the average share
of female depositors and borrowers for gender-disaggregated reporting countries in 2016 was
about 40 percent, the data also revealed noticeable cross-country differences in levels (Figure 2).
Differences also appear in country trends. For example, there is a steady closing of gender gaps in
Chile and Malaysia from 2012 to 2016 (Figure 3, left panel). Initiatives such as Malaysia’s Women
Entrepreneur Financing Program and Chile’s Simplified Deposit Accounts (requiring only a form of
national identification to open an account) could explain the rapid closing of the gender gap (IMF
2018). The data also illustrate the linkages across access to different types of financial services; for
example, the use of deposit accounts allows women to build a financial track record, which can
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
provide a helpful stepping stone in accessing other financial services, such as credit (Figure 3, right
panel).
Figure 2. Shares of Female Depositors and Borrowers by Region, 2016
Source: IMF 2018, calculations based on 2017 Financial Access Survey pilot on gender-disaggregated data.
Figure 3. Shares of Female Borrowers and Depositors over Time and across Countries
Source: IMF 2018, calculations based on 2017 Financial Access Survey pilot on gender-disaggregated data.
16. Unfortunately, there are gaps between policy intentions and available data. The survey
of national financial inclusion strategies shows that as of the end of 2017, more than 60 countries
have made public commitments to achieve headline financial inclusion objectives. These strategies
typically encompass increasing access to and the use of financial services by women. However,
authorities in less than half of the economies had collected gender-decomposed administrative data
on financial services, reflecting a lack of data from financial service providers on their customers’
y = 1.21x -0.16
R² = 0.86
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0% 20% 40% 60%
female borrowers
female depositors
0
10
20
30
40
50
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Emerging and
Developing Asia
Emerging and
Developing
Europe
Middle East,
North Africa,
Afghanistan, and
Pakistan
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
Percent
Share of female depositors
Share of
female borrowers
38%
39%
40%
41%
42%
43%
44%
45%
46%
47%
48%
49%
50%
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Poland
Chile
Malaysia
Costa Rica
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11
gender information. To some extent, demand-side surveys can fill in the gaps in administrative data
and provide a complementary picture of the drivers of gender gaps.
17. Turning to the effects of financial inclusion, at the micro level, there is growing
evidence of benefits to increasing women’s access. Mounting evidence shows that financially
empowered women are more likely to improve their family’s welfare (Sanyal 2014). Financial services
help women shape household spending decisions, make investments, and manage economic risk.
Specifically, access to insurance helped women farmers in Burkina Faso and Senegal increase yields
and better manage food security (Delavallade and others 2015). Women in the Philippines who used
a savings account reported greater control over household decisions and increased spending on
items they needed, such as washing machines and kitchen appliances (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2009).
In Kenya, women merchants who received a basic account invested more in their businesses (Dupas
and Robinson 2013). Women-headed households in Nepal spent 20 percent more on education and
15 percent more on meat and fish after receiving a savings account (Prina 2015). More broadly,
surveys of the micro literature suggest that women’s financial inclusion might enhance the growth-
promoting potential of finance, help reduce income inequality, and benefit the next generation by
improving the health and education of children.
18. At the macro level, recent studies point to positive implications of financial inclusion.
Sahay and others (2015) found that households’ access to finance has a strong positive relationship
with overall economic growth. The study further showed that the relationship between financial
depth (the volume of financial services) and growth is bell-shaped, suggesting that there is a trade-
off between growth and depth at higher levels of depth. However, there is no trade-off between
growth and higher levels of financial access; in other words, economic growth always rises with
financial access. Greater access of firms and households to various banking services leads to higher
growth. Importantly for the current study, when the Sahay and others (2015) regressions are re-run
with gender-decomposed data, the same results are obtained for increasing women users of these
services. Aslan and others (2017) found that inequality in financial access is significantly related to
income inequality, beyond factors previously identified in the literature. IMF (2016) suggests that the
association between gender equality in financial inclusion and income equality may be due to an
effect of financial inclusion on female labor force participation: an account at a financial institution
provides women with a place outside the home to store money safely, and access to borrowing
enables women to start a business, contributing to increases in entrepreneurship and self-
employment.
19. At the same time, higher financial inclusion affects stability and could entail trade-offs
when credit is extended without strong supervision—even when the credit goes to women.
Recent IMF staff analysis (Sahay and others 2015) finds that the relationship between the share of
borrowers in adult population and bank stability rises initially and then falls as the number of
borrowers increases. The good news is that better supervision helps enormously in reducing this
trade-off (Figure 4). Importantly for the current study, re-running the regression analysis with the
gender-decomposed data shows that the relationship is statistically the same for men and women.
Given that there are less women borrowers than men (9 percent of women worldwide borrowed
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12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
from financial institutions in 2017, compared with 12 percent of men), an increase in the share of
women borrowers is more likely to be associated with an increase in financial stability, as illustrated
in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Credit Extension, Gender, and Bank Stability
The association between credit extension and stability depends on the quality of supervision;
the effect of having more borrowers is statistically the same for men and women.
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: The black line shows the estimated distance-to-distress (“z-score”), updating the regression described in
Sahay and others (2015), but testing for the separate effect of women borrowers. The dependent variable captures
banks’ distance-to-distress (buffers against shocks to earnings). Basel Core Principles (BCP) is the quality of bank
supervision, approximated by the degree of compliance with the Basel Core Principles. The estimated values
correspond to country observations for the number of borrowers and the sample average for controls and BCP
scores. The green and red lines show the estimated value of growth volatility for the same dependent variable and
the sample average for controls, but with the upper and lower bound of BCP scores, respectively. The chart is
plotted using the latest available data.
0
10
20
30
40
0200 400 600 800 1,000
Financial stability
Stronger, high-quality regulation
and supervision
can have major payoffs
High Basel Core Principles
Average Basel Core
Principles
Borrowers per 1,000 adults (women)
Low Basel Core Principles
Women borrowers,
sample average
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WOMEN AS PROVIDERS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
A. Literature Review
20. Numerous studies have highlighted the small share of women in senior corporate
management. Female representation in senior positions in the government and the private sector is
low across countries and industries (International Labour Organization 2015; Catalyst 2014; Credit
Suisse 2012, 2014; Elborgh-Woytek and others 2013; and Wolfers 2006). Post and Byron (2015) and
Pletzer and others (2015) offer meta-analyses of the general research on corporate boards and
company performance. The meta-regressions suggest that female board representation is positively
related to accounting returns, and that this relationship is more positive in countries with stronger
shareholder protections, perhaps because shareholder protections motivate boards to use the
different knowledge, experience, and values that each member brings.
21. For the financial sector, some studies suggest that companies with more women board
members have higher profitability and better stock-price performance (Credit Suisse 2012;
Catalyst 2014; Christiansen and others 2016). The performance of funds that are majority-owned by
women has outpaced the financial industry since 2007, returning 6 percent in 2013 compared with a
loss of 1.1 percent for the industry (Rothstein Kass Institute 2013). Several pension funds in the
United States have mandates to invest in funds run by women, a decision motivated by diversity
considerations (Catalyst 2014) as well as by business considerations. Much of the relevant literature
focuses on women as leaders, but there is also some evidence on women more broadly as financial
services providers. Using data for a commercial bank in Albania, Beck, Behr, and Guettler (2013)
found that loans screened by female loan officers were less likely to turn problematic, and this effect
cannot be explained by borrower or loan officer selection or differences in screening, work load, and
experience. The results provide suggestive evidence for female loan officers' capacity to build trust
relationships with borrowers.
22. Previous studies also suggest that female executives may be more cautious than male
executives in making corporate decisions. For example, Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2016), for a
broad corporate sample, find that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile
earnings, and a higher chance of survival than otherwise similar firms run by male CEOs.
Additionally, transitions from male to female CEOs are associated with significant reductions in
corporate risk-taking. Huang and Kisgen (2013), using a U.S. corporate sample, find that male
executives undertake more acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives.
Acquisitions and debt issues made by firms with female executives have announcement returns
higher than those made by male executives. Female executives place wider bounds on earnings
estimates and are more likely to exercise stock options early, which the authors interpret to mean
that men show relative overconfidence compared with women. Other studies show that greater
board diversity is associated with higher meeting attendance and better monitoring; also, female
board directors are found to be more diligent monitors and to demand more audit efforts than male
directors (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2012).
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
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23. A firm that has more men on its board may take more risks for reasons that are not
related to the risk appetites of men versus women. To the extent that managing high-risk firms
involves longer working hours and less flexible schedules, women might disproportionately self-
select into low-risk firms to be better able to fulfill the child-rearing and household responsibilities
that they often disproportionately carry (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010). Differences in the
structure of compensation and incentives may also explain the association between gender and the
risk taking of firms. In particular, low-risk firms may be more likely to offer fixed-pay contracts and
may be more likely to attract female executives (Bandiera and others 2011). But our meta-analysis of
existing studies does not suggest that lower gender gaps necessarily means lower risk taking.
Indeed, Adams and Ragunathan (2013) and Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) found that gender
diversity in US and German banks, respectively, was related to more risk taking around the global
financial crisis.
B. Four Hypotheses: Why Gender May Matter
24. Based on the conceptual discussion and review of the existing literature, four
hypotheses could be offered on how more gender-balanced boards may be linked to higher
financial stability. These include (1) higher risk management skills of female financial executives
compared with their male peers; (2) discriminatory selection practices that result in more qualified
women making it onto the board; (3) diversity in thought that might result in better financial
decisions; and (4) selection bias, by which better-managed—and, therefore, less risky—institutions
also tend to attract and retain more women leaders.
25. The first hypothesis is that women possess traits more consistent with better
management of risks in financial institutions. In a global survey, PEW (2014) found that 29
percent of people thought that women would do a “better job” of running a large bank or other
financial institution, 19 percent thought that men would do a better job, and 52 percent were
agnostic. Experimental studies of differences in choices and preferences between men and women
tend to find that women are more risk averse than men (see, for example, Croson and Gneezy 2009).
Neuroeconomic studies attribute such differences in risk aversion largely to gender differences in
the levels of the hormone testosterone: for example, Sapienza, Zingales, and Maestripieri (2009) find
no difference in risk aversion between men and women with comparable levels of testosterone.
However, surveys of the experimental literature highlight that individual study results depend
heavily on the situation and elicitation method (Niederle 2014) and are less significant when
adjusted for overlaps among studies (Nelson 2015). Moreover, the finding that women tend to be
more risk averse than men may not necessarily translate to professional populations, such as board
members and CEOs in financial institutions. Indeed, surveys among corporate directors (for instance,
Adams and Funk 2012) suggest that female directors may be slightly more risk loving (less risk
averse) than male directors. And finally, being more risk averse does not necessarily translate to
having better risk management skills, and vice versa. While the literature points to a strong
association between testosterone levels and risky behaviors, such as alcohol use and gambling,
there is a lack of consistent evidence on links to financial risk management skills. Our meta-analysis
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 15
of the empirical literature finds that evidence on the “innate traits” hypothesis for the financial sector
is mixed.
26. The second hypothesis is that, because of discriminatory hiring decisions, male
applicants are more likely to be selected for bank leadership positions, controlling for
qualifications. This hiring bias toward men implies that women who get hired tend to have higher
qualifications than men, and that their performance on the board is likely to be of a higher quality
on average. Thus, bank boards with higher shares of women will be of higher quality—and that fact,
in turn, would result in better financial stability outcomes. If such hiring biases exist, a greater share
of women in leadership roles may be associated with higher financial stability, even if there are no
general differences in risk management skills between men and women.
27. The third hypothesis is that there is a diversity factor, whereby mixed-gender boards
perform better than all-male boards because of the benefits of a multiplicity of views. Female
directors could bring different perspectives and experiences into the boardroom, which helps
improve the quality of board decisions and enhance the legitimacy of firm practices (Hillman,
Shropshire, and Cannella 2007). Gender-diverse boards could also partially offset weak corporate
governance (Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2012).
28. The fourth hypothesis is that selection bias can play a role, where less gender-biased
hiring practices are correlated with other better management practices that contribute to
stability. Here, it is not the presence of women per se that improves stability; rather, higher
presence of women is an indicator that the environment and decision-making process in these
banks is more conducive to good practices.
29. A finding of a positive association between gender balance on boards in banks and
higher banking stability is more likely to be linked to all but the first hypothesis. As already
noted, evidence on the first hypothesis, related to differential risk-taking behavior, is mixed. In what
follows, the stylized facts are explored and then the evidence relating the share of women on bank
and banking-supervision boards to bank stability is presented. One of the empirical exercises
attempts to control for the last hypothesis (selection bias), for which more detailed data are
available.
C. Stylized Facts
30. The data set on women leaders in finance builds on IMF (2014), updating and
expanding the data compiled by Sahay and others (2017). The underlying data are institution-
by-institution board characteristics for more than 800 banks in 72 countries from 2001 to 2013. The
data set is available online together with this paper.
31. About half of the banks in the sample are from the United States; about 20 percent are
from Europe; and the rest are from Asia, the Americas, and Africa. The Middle East is
conspicuous by its absence—both because of a lack of data and the low representation of women in
top positions. Although the sample of banks is not necessarily representative of each domestic
©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution
WOMEN IN FINANCE
16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
banking system, in many instances the total bank assets cover a substantial share of GDP. For
example, the sample includes one-quarter of assets of banks in the United States (corresponding to
about 95 percent of the country's GDP) and one-fifth of Polish bank assets (some 15 percent of
GDP).
32. The data confirm that the women’s share of leadership positions in the banking sector
is low globally, with only 2 percent of women serving as CEOs. Only 15 banks out of almost 800
in 72 countries in the sample had women CEOs in 2013. Women hold less than 20 percent of bank
board seats in 80 percent of the cases (Figure 6). Only 4 percent of observations have shares greater
than 30 percent.
33. The gaps remain large across geographical regions, country income levels, and types
of financial institutions (Figure 5). Based on data for 2013, the highest share in the sample is for
sub-Saharan Africa, while the lowest is for Latin America and the Caribbean, with the advanced
economies between those two extremes. Among types of banks, women’s board participation is
highest in savings banks, at more than 45 percent. Data for nonbank financial services companies,
including firms in new or emerging financial technologies (“FinTech”), show that the ratios of women
leaders in those companies are even lower than those for banks. It may seem paradoxical that the
new technologies—which hold much promise for broadening access to and use of financial services,
including by women—have themselves relatively higher gender gaps in leadership positions.
34. On a positive note, board participation of women has been growing in many regions
and in various types of banks (Figure 6). In East Asia, the average representation rose from 2
percent in 2001 to 14 percent in 2013. In Europe and Central Asia, it increased from about 4 percent
Figure 5. Women on Bank Boards of Directors, Distribution of Observations
Sources: BoardEx; and authors’ calculations.
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 17
to 18 percent over the same period. The share in Latin America, by contrast, has not changed
significantly. Across types of banks, the share almost doubled in savings banks, which already had a
higher share of women than other types of banks.
Figure 6. Women on Bank Boards of Directors, by Region and Type
(in percent of total board members)
Sources: BoardEx; and authors’ calculations.
D. Empirical Methodology
35. To examine the relationship between the share of women on bank boards and bank
stability, regressions are estimated in the following form:
=0+1ℎ +2+
εit
(1)
• The dependent variable is bank’s distance-to-distress, also known as the z-score (Zit). Distance-
to-distress is defined as the buffers that banks have (capital to assets plus return on assets),
scaled by their volatility of returns (standard deviation of return on assets). Higher distance-to-
distress means that banks’ buffers are higher relative to volatility of their earnings. The book-
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
18 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
value distance-to-distress is calculated from balance sheet data from Bankscope, which is a
standard measure used in the literature (see, for example, Čihák and others 2012; IMF 2014; and
Sahay and others 2015). As a robustness check, the study also used other stability indicators,
such market value-based distance-to-distress (following IMF 2014). Market value-based
measures can provide more up-to-date information, but they require that bank securities are
traded in well-functioning markets (in this case, the sample size is reduced by two thirds).
• To gain insight into the components of distance-to-distress, equation (1) is re-estimated using
return on assets, capital to assets, and volatility of profits as dependent variables. The
nonperforming loans ratio is used as another alternative dependent variable.
36. The independent variable of interest is share of women, defined as a fraction of board
members on the bank’s board of directors. Other independent variables included are as follows:
• Board characteristics: board financial experience—the effect of financial experience on stability—
could go either way, but the analysis in IMF (2014) found that board members with financial
experience are generally more comfortable with the bank taking more risk. This variable is
measured by the average (across directors) of the fraction of individual directors’ financial-sector
experience to their total professional experience. Other measures of board experience, such as
the total time spent on the board by the directors, yielded similar results.
• Other board characteristics that have a bearing on bank risk: The IMF (2014) found that the
independence of the board members from bank management (board independence) and the
existence of a risk committee enhanced stability, whereas including the chief risk officer on the
board and paying a higher fraction of the compensation of the board members as salary or fixed
pay (in smaller banks) were seen to increase risk.
• Country- and bank-level controls: Log GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, to
control for the country’s economic development; growth in GDP per capita to control for cyclical
developments; bank assets to GDP to control for the systemic importance of the bank in the
country; the nonperforming loans ratio to control for the level of nonperforming loans as a share
of total gross loans; and year fixed effects to control for common global cyclical characteristics.
Some specifications include year*country fixed effects to capture country time trends (Annex II).
37. The study tested for the relationship between the share of women and bank stability.
As a starting point, pooled data were examined, with regressions run to account for variations across
observations. The pooled controls for various bank-specific, country-specific, and cyclical
characteristics, and, in some specifications, included year effects to control for common conditions—
such as the global financial crisis—that could have affected the stability of all the banks in the
sample within a year. Separate regressions were estimated for 2008 and 2009 to examine if banks
with more women on bank boards fared differently during the crisis, controlling for other
characteristics. Other regressions highlighted the differences in results for the whole sample vis-à-vis
various subsamples. Lagged distance-to-distress was also added to account for persistence in bank
stability.
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E. Empirical Results
38. The estimation results show that boards with higher shares of women are associated
with better measures of bank stability (Table 2). These results control for other board
characteristics, bank size, country growth rates, and unobserved bank-level fixed effects. The
relationship is identified both when running pooled regressions (first two columns) and when
including a separate intercept for each bank type (third column). With bank fixed effects included,
the coefficient representing the association between the share of women and the distance-to-
distress continues to hold. Regarding the three components of the distance-to-distress —the
capital-asset ratio, return on assets, and the volatility of return on assets—pooled regressions with
separate intercepts for bank type show that the share of women on bank boards is associated with
higher profitability (Annex II). It seems then that higher profitability plays a key role in increasing the
distance-to-distress; for a similar capital ratio and even with higher volatility, the measured buffers
are greater. In addition, the share of women is negatively related to the nonperforming loan ratio.
The robustness of the results was also tested by truncating the sample. Thus, there is evidence that
banks with a higher share of women board members are generally more stable, and that an increase
in the share of women is also associated with an increase in measured bank stability.
39. The coefficient on the share of women is economically meaningful. To illustrate the
economic importance of the estimated coefficient, it is useful to consider the improvements in
banking stability since the global financial crisis. In the sample used in this paper, we observe that
average distance-to-distress has increased by about 8 since 2008. Based on the estimates in Table 2,
one would expect the same difference in distance-to-distress if women’s share were higher by 0.10,
keeping everything else constant. In other words, a 10 percentage point difference in women’s share
in bank boards would be associated with higher financial stability, similar in magnitude to the
improvements observed since the 2008 crisis. Such an increase would, by itself, not necessarily
address all weaknesses in the financial system, but it would be a meaningful improvement in
stability.
40. The results suggest that the presence of women on boards may be a distinguishing
feature of bank stability. Regressions were also run, in which the explanatory variable was a
dummy variable for whether the board included at least one woman. The results also supported the
positive relationship between the presence of women on boards and greater stability. All other
characteristics being equal, a bank with female representation on its board would have on average a
greater distance-to-distress.
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 21
41. As a robustness check, the study focused on the crisis years of 2008 and 2009, in which
the distance-to-distress suffered its greatest reduction, and found that higher shares of
women on bank boards in 2008 increased stability. Cross-section regressions were first run for
each of the two years, and then pooled over the two-year period. Banks with a greater share of
women were more stable in 2008, after controlling for various bank-specific and country-specific
characteristics. The coefficient is still positive, but not statistically significant, for 2009 (Annex II).
42. Further robustness tests included examining more homogenous subsamples of banks
to reduce the possibility that results are driven by outliers. Indeed, results for distance-to-
distress continue to hold when the regressions are estimated separately the subsets of US and non-
US banks. Results are also similar when only the subsamples of commercial banks and bank holding
companies are used (Annex II).
43. Finally, “propensity score matching” suggests that the association between lower
gender gaps and financial stability holds even when addressing the selection bias. Gender
balance in the boardroom could be endogenous for the reasons noted earlier: good management
practices that result in better financial stability outcomes could have been also responsible for better
human-resource management and, therefore, greater gender balance on boards. Thus, the
outcomes could reflect selection bias. To address the issue, propensity score matching was used to
estimate the probability of having a board with 50 percent women, based on observable
characteristics such as bank size and financial experience of the board (following Abadie and Imbens
2011). Using these probabilities, or propensity scores, the study constructed a statistical control
group with similar characteristics, but for a board with no women on it. It then calculated an average
treatment effect as the mean difference of stability outcomes between “gender-balanced boards”
(50–50 group) and “no-female” boards (0–100 group). A limitation of this study was that in the
sample, less than 5 percent of banks were in the 50–50 group (and no banks in the sample had
women-only boards). Nonetheless, the study was able to control for selection bias using various
metrics for matching and finding that boards with a 50 percent share of women would have higher
distance-to-distress on average than those with no women (Annex II). The bottom line of this
analysis is that it provides evidence against the sample bias hypothesis.
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
22 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
WOMEN AS FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISORS
A. Conceptual Discussion and Stylized Facts
44. In principle, the four hypotheses about why gender can matter in financial-sector
supervision are similar to those for bank boards. First, women might possess traits that lead to
better supervision of risks in financial institutions. Second, due to discriminatory hiring decisions,
male applicants may be more likely to be selected for supervisory-board positions, controlling for
qualifications, leading to a higher average quality of women who are hired. Third, mixed-gender
boards may perform better than all-male boards due to the benefits of a multiplicity of views. And
fourth, less gender-biased hiring practices may be correlated with other supervisory practices and
other features of the institutional framework that contribute to stability. With a higher quality of
supervision, one could expect a more robust financial sector. A finding of a positive association
between gender balance on boards of banking-supervision agencies and higher banking stability
could be related to any of these four hypotheses.
45. Analyzing a new data set created for 115 countries shows that the share of women on
governing boards of banking-supervision agencies is low.2 The share of women on banking-
supervision boards is low—about 17 percent on average in 2015—with the poorest countries
exhibiting the highest shares. It is interesting that there is not a positive relationship between the
share of women on banking-supervision boards and the country’s (or the region’s) level of income
(Figure 7). In fact, supervisory boards in poorer countries tended to have more women. For instance,
women account for more than 60 percent of board members in the Kingdom of Eswatini, while the
share in the United States is at 13 percent. Averages across quartiles of GDP per capita show that
the poorest countries have the highest shares. The shares are below 20 percent in most regions
(Figure 8). Shares of women in supervision agency leadership have increased marginally in the post-
crisis period, with emerging markets and developing economies showing relatively larger increases
than advanced economies (Figure 9). However, the shares are still low, and an analysis of annual
data does not suggest a sustained trend toward closing the gaps, with many countries even showing
wider gaps in recent years. Interestingly, countries that made faster progress in closing gender gaps
among finance users also tend to show more progress on closing gaps in supervisory leadership
positions. But data limitations do not allow us to analyze causality between these two aspects of
inclusion.
2 This new data set updates and expands on Sahay and others (2017) to cover the 1999–2017 period (instead of 2011
and 2015). The data set is derived from information in Central Banking Publications (1999–2013) and on regulatory
agencies websites. See Annex III for summary statistics.
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Figure 7. Women Leaders in Supervision Agencies, Averages by GDP per Capita, 2015
Sources: International Financial Statistics, IMF; Supervision agency websites; and authors’ calculations.
Figure 8. Women Leaders in Supervision Agencies, Regional Averages, 2015
Sources: Supervision agency websites (https://www.bis.org/regauth.htm?m=2%7C269); and authors’ calculations.
©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution
WOMEN IN FINANCE
24 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Figure 9. Women Leaders in Supervision Agencies, Regional Averages, 1999–2017
(percent)
Sources: Central Banking Publications (1999–2013); Supervisory websites listed on
https://www.bis.org/regauth.htm?m=2%7C269 for 2015, 2016, and 2017; and authors’ calculations.
B. Estimation Approach
46. The study tested whether a higher share of women on banking-supervision boards is
associated with a higher quality of supervision and overall banking stability. It ran two sets of
cross-country regressions with robust standard errors. The first set of regressions related the share
of women directors on banking-supervision boards to the quality of banking supervision. The
second set looked at the relationship between the share of women directors and banking stability.
47. The first specification followed Čihák and Tieman (2008) to model cross-country
variations in supervisory quality. The regressions were estimated for 2011, for which the largest
number of countries could be covered with the data set:
,2011 =0+1ℎ,2011 +2,2011+ 3,2011+ 4,2011 +,2011 (2)
Yi are dependent variables capturing supervisory quality: (1) supervisory powers, Suppow, given to
supervisors by existing laws, published for 2011 (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2013); (2) stringency in
loan loss provisions, prov (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2013); (3) the quality of supervision measured by
performance on Basel Core Principles (BCPs); and (4) the set of BCPs related to financial inclusion,
BCP_fincl (Sahay and others 2015). The model includes as controls GDP per capita, indexes for
financial institutions depth and financial institution access to proxy for the features of development
of the financial sector (Sahay and others 2015) being supervised, and governance indicators (voice
and accountability, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law) from the Kaufman, Kraay,
19% 20% 22% 20%
22%
26%
23% 24%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Low-Income Emerging Advanced Overall
1999-2008
2009-2017
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 25
and Mastruzzi (2010) database (Annex III provides details on data sources). Estimation results of
equation 2 with three measures of supervisory quality are reported in Table 3.
48. The second set of regressions tested whether the share of women was associated with
bank stability outcomes, controlling for supervisory quality and other determinants.
,2011 =0+1ℎ,2011 +2,2011+ 3,2011+ 4,2011 +,2011 (3)
Zi are country-specific bank-stability outcomes given by distance-to-distress (“z-score”). The
distance-to-distress is calculated as the average for 2011–13 to illustrate that the initial set of
institutional conditions prevailing in 2011 could have a bearing on subsequent financial stability.
,2011is the financial institution access for country i in 2011, and ,2011 is the per capita
GDP for country i in 2011. To account for cyclical conditions, the nonperforming loan ratio and the
square of GDP growth are added in one of the specifications (Table 4).
C. Estimation Results
49. A higher share of women on supervisory boards is associated with greater banking
sector stability. The share of women on boards of supervision agencies did not have a significant
impact on the quality of regulation and supervision. The coefficients on all four measures of
supervisory quality (Suppow, Prov, BCP_fincl, and BCP) were not significant (Table 3). However, a
higher share of women in bank supervision boards appears associated with greater banking sector
stability (Table 4). This result holds after controlling for supervisory quality, the level of access to and
depth of financial institutions, and other governance indicators. Even after adding a measure of
economic stability (square of GDP growth) and financial stability (nonperforming loans ratio), the
share of women was positively associated with the distance-to-distress. The fit of the regressions,
however, was weaker than those for banking leaders.
50. The weaker association may reflect the relatively less direct role of regulators and
supervisors. Much of the regulatory and supervisory framework is driven by broader legal and
institutional constraints, rather than the share of women leaders in supervisory boards. Moreover,
the role of regulators and supervisors in the financial sector is relatively indirect: they help create a
framework for financial sector’s activities, but they do not actively provide financial services or
operate financial institutions. That likely explains the relatively weaker results for regulatory and
supervisory leaders.
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
26 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Table 3. Supervisory Quality and the Share of Women on Supervisory Boards
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Note: Results of equation 2 estimations with four measures of supervisory quality. Annex II describes the variables.
***, **, and“* denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Table 4. Distance-to-Distress and the Share of Women on Supervisory Boards
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Note: The table reports estimation results for equation 3. Annex Table A8 explains the variables. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
zzzzz
Share of Women 11.8* 12.2* 14.1* 15.5* 24.5**
GDPPC 0.0001** 0.0002 0.0003***
FIA 4.93 5.87 4.76 5.05
FID -0.19
KKMreg -3.71 -1.35 0.11
KKMpol -0.93 -1.04
KKMcor -0.72 -3.41
KKMvoa -1.78 0.29
Supervis ory q uality
BCP_finc l -0.074 -0.69
Suppow 7.8
BCP 0.55
NPL r atio -0.46
Square of GDP growth -0.10**
Cons tant 13.7 12.3 10.82 -0.05 7.34
Numbe r o f Co untries 58 57 57 51 46
R
2
0.04 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.18
Dependent Variable
BCP BCP_fincl Suppow Pro v
Share of Women 1.21 0.63 1.07 0.51
GDPPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
FIA -0.91 -3.72 0.75 0.07
FID -1.97 -9.82* -0.19 -0.33
KKMvoa 0.1 0.22 0.40 -0.16
KKMreg -1.43 -2.73 -0.01 -0.08
KKMcor -0.45 -1.20 -0.37 0. 30
KKMlaw 2.02 6. 4 1.13 -0.04
KKMeff -1.69 -5.22 -1.3* -0.16
Cons tant 12.32*** 40.2*** 0.75 0.19
Numbe r o f Co untrie s 57 57 45 35
R
2
0.53 0.44 0.20 0.12
Dependent Variable
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 27
CONCLUSIONS
51. This paper examined the role of women in finance across three dimensions—as users
of finance, as providers of finance, and as supervisors of finance. Using new data sets, it
presented stylized facts about women as users of finance as well as women leaders in finance. It
then provided evidence on gender and resilience of the banking sector.
52. The study highlights that gender gaps in finance are persistent and are especially large
for leadership roles. Across regions, less than 20 percent of the boards of directors in banks are
women, and less than 2 percent of banks had women CEOs (starkly contrasting with gender
statistics of university graduates). Similarly, in bank-supervisory and regulatory agencies, the share
of women on boards of directors is low. Interestingly, this share is not related to the income levels of
countries.
53. This analysis suggests that lower gaps in the representation of women in bank
leadership roles is associated with greater bank stability. Banks with higher shares of women
leaders had higher capital buffers, lower nonperforming loans, and higher distance to distress (“z-
scores”). These results hold even after controlling for factors such as bank size, GDP per capita,
experience of board members, and other board and country characteristics.
54. There are four reasons why a higher share of women on bank and supervisory boards
contribute to higher financial stability. First, women may be better risk managers than men.
Second, discriminatory hiring practices may mean that the few women who do make it to the
executive level are exceptionally well qualified. Third, having more women in executive positions
contributes to diversity of thought, which leads to better decisions. And fourth, institutions that tend
to attract and select female executives may be better-managed in the first place. Empirical support
for the first hypothesis is mixed at best, and the tests in this study—including the propensity score
matching—allow us to eliminate the fourth hypothesis. The results give some credence to the
second and third hypotheses. Based on evidence in this note and related literature, the observed
higher stability is therefore likely due to the beneficial effects of greater diversity of views and due
to discriminatory hiring practices that lead to hiring better qualified or more experienced women
than men.
55. More broadly, the findings strengthen the case for financial inclusion for women to
enhance economic growth, reduce income inequality and foster financial stability. Further
research will allow us to draw stronger causal links, discerning which of the possible hypotheses
could be driving the results. A related question worth exploring is why some countries and some
institutions do place more women in leadership roles in finance.
56. The paper makes the case for compiling better data to monitor and understand
gender gaps in finance; it also illustrates how the IMF is taking a leadership role in this area.
Regarding data on women as users of finance, the IMF has committed itself to continue to work with
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WOMEN IN FINANCE
28 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
country authorities to improve data availability via the Financial Access Survey. To facilitate that, the
IMF launched the Data for Decisions Fund, a multi-partner trust fund to enable capacity
development and to broaden the availability of data to monitor the Sustainable Development Goals.
The IMF plans to make the gender-disaggregated financial access information an integral, standard
part of the Financial Access Survey in the future (IMF 2018) and to disseminate this information in its
official training courses on financial development and financial inclusion. Moreover, accompanying
this study is a data set of women leaders in finance that can be expanded and updated in the future.
57. The study also advocates the need for macroeconomic policymaking to integrate
financial inclusion and stability to ensure better economic and financial outcomes. Despite
evidence of benefits to individuals and society, financial inclusion often proceeds on a separate
track, more as a means to address social goals than mainstream macroeconomic goals. It is critical
to avoid such a “silo mentality,” as there appears to be a case for financial inclusion for women—
including greater access to and use of financial services by women—to enhance economic growth,
reduce income inequality, and preserve financial stability. When financial systems become more
inclusive, they help broaden financial markets and could well make monetary, fiscal,
macroprudential, and macrostructural policies more effective.
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ANNEX I. DATA ON WOMEN USERS OF FINANCE
The IMF’s Financial Access Survey
The Financial Access Survey is an annual survey managed by the IMF’s Statistics Department and
funded by donors. The Financial Access Survey collects and disseminates comparable time-series
data on the geographical outreach and use of basic financial services provided by resident financial
corporations to resident customers in a country. Outreach of financial services is approximated by
evaluating financial institutions’ branch network, the availability of ATMs, and the number of agent
outlets for mobile money providers. Use is measured for three key financial services: deposits, loans,
and insurance. The Financial Access Survey provides data for households and small and medium
enterprises. The survey contains 180 time series and 65 indicators for 189 countries spanning more
than 10 years. A key feature of the data set is that it is based on administrative sources, such as
national central bank and other statistical authorities, and it is derived from provider-side
information.
The 2016 Financial Access Survey included a pilot to capture the financial access gender data gap.
The pilot, which included the participation of 28 countries, revealed that in almost half of the
participating economies, financial service providers had access to their customers’ gender
information. An expanded pilot in 2017 invited all the IMF country members to report the gender
breakdown of their commercial banks’ depositors and borrowers. This time, 27 countries provided
information on this breakdown from 2004 to 2016 (annex figure). The results of the expanded pilot
were published on the Financial Access Survey website in March 2018 (IMF 2018). In 2018, gender-
disaggregated data were mainstreamed into the survey. The 2018 round has nine series and 12
indicators disaggregated by gender.
Annex Figure. Countries Reporting Gender-Disaggregated Financial Access Data, 2004–16
Source: IMF 2018, calculations based on 2017 Financial Access Survey pilot on gender-disaggregated data.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Number of countries reporting
data on female depositors
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Number of countries reporting
data on female borrowers
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30 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
The World Bank’s Global Findex
The Global Findex database complements the Financial Access Survey by compiling demand-side
data on how adults save, borrow, make payments, and manage risk. Launched with funding from the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the database has been published every three years since 2011. The
data are collected in partnership with Gallup, Inc., through nationally representative surveys of about
150,000 adults in 144 economies. The survey was carried out over the 2017 calendar year by Gallup,
Inc., as part of its Gallup World Poll, which since 2005 has annually conducted surveys of
approximately 1,000 people in each of more than 160 economies and in more than 150 languages,
using randomly selected, nationally representative samples. The target population is the entire
civilian, noninstitutionalized population age 15 and older. For a summary of the data and key
findings, see Demirgüç-Kunt and others (2018). The Global Findex offers decompositions by
individual characteristics, including gender, age, income, employment, living area (urban versus
rural), and education level.
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ANNEX II. DATA ON WOMEN LEADERS IN FINANCE
Note: The data set on women leaders in finance is an updated and expanded version of the earlier
data compiled by Sahay and others (2017). The data set is made available online with this paper.
Table A1. Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
Indicator Name
Description
Data Source
Dependent variables
Distance-to-distress (Z-score)
Sum of capital to assets and
return on assets, divided by
standard deviation of return on
assets. Sign switched so that
higher values mean higher risk.
Bankscope
NPL
nonperforming loan ratio (in
percent)
Bankscope
Daily equity return volatility
Higher values mean higher risk.
Thomson Reuters Datastream
Weekly equity return volatility
Higher values mean higher risk.
Thomson Reuters Datastream
Explanatory variables
Share of women
The share of women directors on
bank boards
BoardEx
Financial experience
Average of independent board
members’ financial experience as
a share of their total professional
experiences
BoardEx
Board experience
Total number of years that all the
board members have spent on
the board
BoardEx
Board independence
Share of independent board
members
BoardEx
Chief risk officer (CRO) on board
Dummy = 1 if the CRO is a board
member.
BoardEx
Risk committee
Dummy = 1 if there is a board
risk committee.
BoardEx
Salary
Share of salary in total CEO
compensation
BoardEx
Total bank assets
Total bank assets to GDP
Bankscope; IMF World Economic
Outlook (WEO) database
Log GDP per capita (adjusted
for purchasing power parity)
Log GDP per capita (adjusted for
purchasing power parity)
WEO database
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Table A2. Association between the Share of Women on Bank Boards and Bank Stability
When the Share of Women Is 20 Percent or Less
(82 percent of observations, 2003–13)
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Table A3. Association between the Share of Women on Bank Boards and Bank Stability
When Share of Women Is 30 Percent or Less
(96 percent of observations, 2003–13)
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Table A4. Subsample Robustness: US and Commercial Banks
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Table A5. Bank Stability in Bank Boards with 50 percent vs. 0 percent of Women:
Nearest Neighbor Matching Average Treatment Effects
Notes: Nearest neighbor matching is used to find the average treatment effects. Different metrics are used for
matching. The logit regressions in the first stage in column (1) are based on time on board, financial experience of
the board members, nationality mix, and CRO on board of the banks.
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Table A6. Association between the Share of Women on Bank Boards and
Bank Stability Components (Full Sample: 2003–13)
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Table A7. Association between the Share of Women on Bank Boards and Bank Stability
(2008 and 2009)
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Table A8. Share of Women in Supervisory Agencies and Bank Stability: Data Sources
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