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Are UK Cannabis Policies Evidence
Based?
A Research Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree
of Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Politics with Business Management
Abstract
This research paper examines to what extent the most recent policies around cannabis
in the UK, namely declassification in 2004 and reclassification of cannabis in 2009
under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 lack Evidence-Based Policy-Making. In doing it
will first look at the history of cannabis and analyse the formation of first international
drug control under the US Leadership which established UN Drug Conventions 1961,
1971 and 1988 and their impact on UK’s domestic cannabis policies as a signatory
state. This will allow us to understand the origins of UK’s current prohibition on
cannabis. Secondly, the research paper will focus on the recent amendments on
cannabis classification in the UK which will be analysed through the framework
suggested by Head (2008) ‘Three Lenses of Evidence-Based Policy’. This will
demonstrate us that not only does scientific-knowledge exist within the Evidence-
Based Policy but practical implementation and most importantly political knowledge as
well. Having identified the extent to which these types of knowledge exists within
domestic cannabis policies in the UK, we will reach the conclusion that alterations
which took place on the classification of cannabis in 2009 show lack scientific
knowledge but can still be considered Evidence-Based Policy.
Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 5!
An overview of the existing literature on Evidence-Based Policy-Making and
Cannabis Policies at UN and UK Level: ...................................................................... 7!
Methodology and Introduction to the Concepts: ........................................................ 10!
Use of Terms: ........................................................................................................ 13!
1.!Historical Background and International Drug Control Systems for Cannabis ... 14!
1.1.!The Casual Acceptance and Use of Cannabis and Industrial Hemp in World
History: ................................................................................................................... 16!
1.2.!The Start of Cannabis Prohibition in the US: ............................................... 19!
1.3.!The Emergence of the First International Drug Control System for Cannabis
in the Early 20th Century and the US influence ..................................................... 22!
1.4.!The United Nations Drug Control Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 and
its Influence on UK Cannabis Laws: ...................................................................... 27!
2.!UK Cannabis Classification: Science, Politics or Both? ..................................... 30!
2.1.!Scientific Knowledge: ................................................................................... 30!
2.2.!The Use of the Precautionary Principle Within Scientific Knowledge: ......... 33!
2.3.!Political Knowledge and Precautionary Principle ......................................... 36!
2.4.!Debate on Declassification: .......................................................................... 37!
2.5.!Debate on Reclassification: .......................................................................... 39!
3.!Conclusion: Summary of Findings and Implications for Future Research ......... 42!
4.!Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 44!
5
Introduction
Cannabis is the most widely used illicit drug in the world (Boggs, 2016:19). Salient
discussions around the plant’s benefits and harms have been going on since the early
20th century. While these ongoing discussions, which take place on both national and
international governance level, revolve around cannabis’ recreational and medicinal
use, legislation has generally assumed there is zero benefit. This is no longer the case,
so this paper assumes a wider debate and liberalisation of legislations in this area
would be a positive way forward in the UK. “There is conclusive evidence that cannabis
is effective for the treatment of chronic pain, antiemetics in the treatment of
chemotherapy-induces nausea and vomiting and for improving patient-reported
multiple sclerosis spasticity symptoms” (The National Academies of Science,
Engineering and Medicine, 2017). Although we have seen a few states taking more
open and tolerant approaches towards cannabis laws such as The Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain and The United States (on the state level), these exceptions have
not yet influenced the rest of the world to revise their policies.
Today, the possibility of universal cannabis legalisation is unlikely due to lack of
scientific knowledge in policy making, within Evidence-Based Policy (EBP) or
Evidence-Based Policy-Making methodology (EBPM), which has seldom been
accurately utilised by governments of individual states such as the UK. In the UK,
partly in light of UN Treaty Obligations, the relationship with cannabis throughout the
20th century has been a hostile one, which has catalysed current prohibition of
cannabis in the UK. The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, (MDA) was an action taken in line
with the commitments of UN International Drug Conventions which the UK had signed
up to. Broadly, MDA developed a classification system which ranks each drug
according to the duration and cost of penalties for possession and supply.
6
The authority of amending or adding new drugs onto the system belongs to the Home
Secretary (Bean, 2014:255). Most currently on the subject of legalisation, there is an
ongoing bill on medical legalisation of cannabis at the UK Parliament which was
introduced in October 2017 by Labour MP Paul Flynn (The House of Commons, 2018).
The second reading is due on July 2018 however; it is very unlikely that the UK
Parliament will approve as its cannabis policies which has been continuously
prohibitionist with no inclination towards more leniency apart from the short-lived
declassification of cannabis under the Blair Government in 2004, subsequently
reversed in 2009. Furthermore, the obstinacy of the UK government to revise cannabis
policies was also evident in 2002 in the answer given to the House of Commons Home
Affairs Committee which had initially attempted to open discussions with the UN’s
Central Narcotic Drug Commission on the prospect of global legalisation or
decriminalisation of controlled drugs: “We will not legalise or regulate the use of any
presently illegal drugs. Nor does the Government envisage any circumstances in
which it would do so” (House of Commons 2002:10). Not only did this reply reiterate
the UK’s prohibitionist position towards cannabis as well as other drugs controlled at
state level, but it also showed UK’s consensus with its UN Treaty Obligations on an
intergovernmental level. This stance by the UK Government is unlikely to change in
the short-term. Opportunities to debate the medicalization of the drug and for scientific
research to be conducted are limited. Although we recognise the fact that legalisation
is a long and uneasy process and unlikely to happen in the UK, it is still important to
identify the pathways to it. In the UK therefore, we must shift our attention from the
legalisation debate to the classification debate, which is the dominant and only piece
of law we can analyse regarding cannabis under the MDA, where declassification of
cannabis in 2004 could be interpreted as an incremental move for legalisation. This
7
declassification was later reversed in 2009. The declassification and reclassification
of cannabis, which represents the only piece of solid regulation from which we can
draw lessons for future reference, sets the central research question for this
dissertation: ‘To what extent is cannabis classification in the UK a product of Evidence-
Based Policy-Making?’. The essay is divided into two main chapters. The first chapter
is composed of a historical analysis of cannabis regulations through lenses of
intergovernmental governance operated under UN Drug Conventions as well as US
influence, determining to what extent UK’s treaty obligations to UN Drug Conventions
have impacted UK policy choices towards cannabis domestically. Following this, the
second chapter will provide an assessment of a specific turnaround in cannabis
classification policy in the UK; the decision to reclassify cannabis from Class C to B in
2009. We will focus on the rationale for the Government’s major U-turn. The policy
change will be evaluated according to ‘Three Lenses of Evidence-Based Policy’ (EBP),
a framework developed by Head (2008). This chapter will demonstrate whether the
policy has been enacted in manner consistent with the scientific evidence provided by
government advisory bodies, was purely driven by political imperatives and
implementation knowledge or a combination of both. By doing so it will also identify
the limitations within both scientific and political knowledge which are often shaped
under the influence of Precautionary Principle. Overall, this research will explore to
what extent, both on international governance and state levels, cannabis regulations
in the UK have demonstrated a lack of EBP.
An overview of the existing literature on Evidence-Based Policy-Making and
Cannabis Policies at UN and UK Level
The purpose of this section is to present an overview of the surrounding literature that
is applicable to the debate over the use of evidence on UK cannabis policies. To what
8
extent do the recent cannabis policies of the UK Government exhibit EBPM? Do the
International Treaties to which UK remains signatory impact the prohibitionist stance
on domestic cannabis policies or do current domestic regulations of the UK adhere to
Head’s (2008) ‘Three Lenses of EBP’? Finally, what is the impact of the Precautionary
Principle on EBPM? Looking at the questions which will be answered throughout our
research, it is important to note that the existing literature concerning our research
question “are UK Cannabis Policies Evidence-Based?” is diverse, categorised within
three distinct groups, that have overlap. Firstly, the origin of EBPM and the
surrounding debates are worth noting: “It was clear from the early speeches on Tony
Blair and his famous phrase, ‘what matters is what works’, that the Labour government
at the time was committed to EBPM” (Bennet and Halloway, 2010:411). Parkhurst
argues that “[e]vidence matters for public policymaking” and this is simply because
“more rigorous or more widespread use of evidence could avoid unnecessary harms
and help achieve important social policy goals” (2017:4). In other words, “[e]vidence
tells us what works” (Ibid.,4). Historically, EBPM “gaine[d] currency under the Blair
administrations since 1997 [and] it was intended to signify the entry of a government
with a modernising mandate, committed to replacing ideologically-driven politics with
rational decision making” (Sutcliffe and Court, 2005:3). Accordingly, the rhetoric of
‘what works’ as a catch-phrase was first voiced by the Labour Government under the
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s leadership in 1997, as well as by his Education and
Employment Secretary, David Blunkett, who served as Home Secretary between 2001
and 2004. It is important to recognise that EBPM was restored in the UK as a part of
the Labour Government’s political strategy, which involved “the modernisation of
government and the wider apparatus of the state” showing a devotion to the belief that
“policy-making should be evidence-based rather than based on unsupported opinion
9
[which] is difficult to refute” (Wells, 2004:1). Yet, there are reasons to treat the Blair
administration’s adoption of EBPM with scepticism. MacGregor thinks that although
the New Labour’s drug strategy initially appeared to be EBPM centred, with the
increasing state subsidy for research funding alongside introduction of new treatment
programs, the strategy was, in reality, micromanaged by the drug lobby (2013:227).
Furthermore, the expansion of drug treatment services and the praise of its cost-
effectiveness was aimed to appeal the Treasury. This was divisive in nature since it
only targeted users of class A drugs with a stigmatisation of ‘problem drug users’ (Ibid.,
227). During this period, there were arguments for and against the popular
assumptions made during New Labour’s reliance on EBPM for its drug strategy, yet,
to find out how much of it was scientifically-backed and applicable to domestic
cannabis regulations in the UK, we need a clear framework to measure it. Therefore,
we identify various frameworks of EBPM used by different authors, with subtle
differences in their modelling, yet all agree on one common argument about the
EBPM: “Policy makers say that while research (scientific knowledge) is often
interesting and helpful … it most often ‘informs’ policy, rather than providing a clear
steel for action” (Nutley et al. 2007:37). The overwhelmingly technical problem-solving
of EBPM is criticised in Parkhurst (2017:25), where instrumental and comprehensive
use of EBPM is distinguished by the arguments given by Cairney referring to EBP
process as “a situation which rests on a large number of rather unrealistic assumptions
about who is involved, what they represent and the best way to make policy” (cited in
Parkhurst, 2017:25). Furthermore, Rutter looks at barriers to uptake of EBPM from
supply and demand sides arguing that the problem lies on the side of the latter where
many political decisions are driven by values – and that sometimes the evidence-
driven answer brings significant political risk. This is evident in “the dominance of the
10
policy culture at the top of Whitehall [where] there is little demand for the rigorous sort
of management information […] so the generalist culture of policy making underplays
the use and usefulness of analysis in helping make better policy” (2012:29). Secondly,
concerning UK Treaty Obligations on cannabis regulations, there is one shared view
in the literature expressed in Room et al. (2010), Bean (2014) and Pakes and
Silverstone (2012), that the UK’s development of national cannabis regulations stems
from its relationship with transnational modes of governance operating within the
framework of the UN. These modes will be used for our analysis of UK domestic
cannabis regulations. Thus thirdly, we identify a very rich literature review on the
debates on classification of cannabis and the UK Government’s decision to change
the classification from B to C in 2004 and from C to B in 2009. Authors like David Nutt
(2009, 2010, 2015), May et al. (2007) and Shiner (2015) collectively disapprove the
current classification system under MDA and offer further critique on the upgrade of
the legal status of cannabis in 2009. Furthermore, there exists a myriad of Home
Office, Advisory Council on Misuse of Drugs Act Reports as well as independent
inquiry reports published by political think-tanks like Beckley Foundation, Transform
and British Medical Association (primary sources) which will be used accordingly to
strengthen qualitative arguments made in the secondary sources (journal articles).
Consequently, in this paper, the domestic cannabis laws in the UK, along with
conditionalities of UN Treaties will be discussed according to ‘Three Lenses of EBP’
by Head (2008).
Methodology and Introduction to the Concepts
As a reference point for this essay, it is useful to define EBPM. Amongst other
scholars, we select the definition given by Head who describes EBPM as most recent
11
form of contemporary policy making: “[T]he latest movement in modern public policy
is thus the latest version of the search for usable and relevant knowledge” (2008:2).
Here, it is important to highlight his use of words ‘usable and relevant’ to describe the
kind of knowledge EBP incorporates. We can argue that the knowledge acquired
through EBPM is neither fully rational nor entirely scientific but has to be timely and
pragmatic. In other words, although EBPM aims to address and resolve predicaments
which may occur throughout the policy cycle, while encouraging the use of a
systematic method based on the principle that scientific evidence should be almost
primary in terms of reaching the end policy decision, this is maybe overstated (Ibid.,
2). In a fully-rational world, scientific evidence can be utilised in order to precisely
diagnose the policy problem as well as to discover its causal linkages to other public
policy areas which would undoubtedly lead science-backed policy outcomes.
However, recognising the lack of science-backed diagnosis within contemporary
policy problems, Lindblom (1959) introduces his concept of ‘Muddling Through’,
offering the view that in the realm of policy making, policymakers are exposed to social
objectives and political ideologies which do not necessarily share the same interest as
the researcher’s scientific evidence in government advisory committees (1959:81).
Recognising this helps us to understand that the socio-political environment in which
EBPM operates is not fully rational, therefore the model’s aspiration “to produce
knowledge require[s] fine-tuning programs and constructing guidelines and tool kits
for dealing with [a] known problem” such as cannabis (Edwards and Evans, 2011:2).
We should not expect EBPM to use science-backed evidence to its best ability - which
in reality never happens (Head, 2008:2). In acknowledging this, Head creates a
framework called the ‘Three Lenses of Evidence-Based Policy’ which outlines three
kinds of main knowledge in EBPM and ranks them according to their varying levels of
12
influence on decision making. These three types of knowledge are namely a) scientific
knowledge; which is the sum of both quantitative and qualitative research carried out
advisory committees b) practical implementation knowledge; which is concerned with
the risk management of decision making in public policy carried out and most
importantly, c) political knowledge; which “inheres primarily in politicians, parties,
organised groups and the public affair media” which hold a much higher force of
persuasion and impact on the policy outcome than others (Head, 2008: 4-5). In the
context of cannabis regulations in the UK, scientific knowledge comes from the
Government funded advisory committee, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs
(ACMD). Practical implementation knowledge occurs within the Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) and political knowledge originates from the governing party,
their mandate and approaches to existing laws which have been implemented by
previous governments plus UN Treaty Conventions. According to the Prime Minister’s
Strategy Unit, Treaty Obligations are monitored by a UK Government checklist when
it comes to evaluate the suitability of a policy (cited in Sutcliffe and Court, 2005:16). In
our analysis, implementation knowledge will be amalgamated within political
knowledge due to similarities in the stance. By applying this framework to UK domestic
cannabis regulations, we expect to see a shared pro-prohibition stance between
practical implementation knowledge (police agencies) and political knowledge (the
Government) except for the case of declassification of cannabis in 2004, when the
police believed the government was wrong in downgrading the status of cannabis
(May et al., 2007:8). Also, there is an enduring rift between researchers, whose
scientific evidence has always taken an anti-prohibition stance. This was obvious “in
the final months of 2009, when the relationship between the scientific and policy-
making communities became newsworthy after a high-profile dispute between the
13
Home Secretary and some members of the main scientific advisory group on illicit
drugs policy, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD)” (Monaghan et al.,
2012:176). From what it is being described here, it is therefore almost certain that all
EBPM is unavoidably an instance of the ‘Muddling Through” where all three types of
knowledge coexist, yet political knowledge supersedes the scientific one (Head, 2008)
which takes us to the conclusion that “[d]espite these positive developments [the use
of EBPM since 1997’s], there [still] remains a gap between aspiration and practice”
which will prove itself evident in current cannabis regulations in the UK (Rutter,
2012:6). Throughout the essay, we will analyse UK cannabis regulations through
‘Three Lenses of EBP’.
Use of Terms
To clarify the typology, although this essay recognises that both the terms cannabis
and marijuana are referred to in the existing literature interchangeably, this essay will
only use the word cannabis to refer to marijuana throughout the analysis, except for
direct in-text citation. Furthermore, this essay will be using the Sawler et al’s (2015)
definition to avoid the confusion between cannabis and hemp. “Types of cannabis,
which contain high amounts of the psychoactive cannabinoid tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC), are used for medical and as a recreational drug” versus “[h]emp types [which]
are grown for the production of seed and fibre, and [contain] low amounts of THC”.
For Sawler et al. “[a]s both public opinion and legislation in many countries shifts
towards recognising cannabis as a plant of medical and agricultural value, the genetic
characterization of [cannabis] and hemp becomes increasingly important for both
clinical research and crop improvement efforts” (2015:2). In other words, cannabis is
used to describe the plant which generally contains higher THC levels and is utilised
14
for medicinal and recreational purposes, whereas hemp, which in appearance in
nearly identical to cannabis, is bred typically for industrial uses. This will be discussed
in more depth in first section of first chapter of our analysis.
1. Historical Background and International Drug Control Systems for
Cannabis
According to Pakes and Silverstone “In the UK the relationship between the state and
[intergovernmental] modes of governance is a key narrative which provides the context
for national legislative developments on cannabis” (2012:21). This chapter accordingly
reviews the UK’s Treaty Obligations through an analysis of historical perspectives on
cannabis regulations at the intergovernmental level. Moreover, it looks at the US’ role
in the war against cannabis, which has had significant impact on the attitudes towards
cannabis around the globe, on both an international and domestic level. According to
Room et al. although cannabis “is used by an estimated 4% of the global adult
population, that is, 166 million people out of an estimated population of 200 million
illegal drug users” and “it therefore constitutes roughly 80% of the illegal drug market”
worldwide, it “has only ever held a relatively marginal position in international drug
policy discussions” (Room et at., 2010 vii) at the UN level. To understand the legacy
of cannabis prohibition in the UK would be difficult without careful consideration of the
history of cannabis prohibition around the world, as well as the US arbitrary power at
the intergovernmental level of decision making as “[d]rug policy in Britain, similar to
other countries, began to be developed following American initiatives during this part
of the twentieth century” (Acevedo and Common, 2006:402). It is important to
understand the historical context as “simply reading an international protocol’s charter
without understanding the historical circumstances that generated their configuration
15
can lead to errant understandings about what an entity (United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime and its conventions) can do or is designed to do” (McAllister cited in
Collins, 2012:13). By looking at the trajectory of prohibitionist cannabis policies both
within the US under federal law and on the UN level, it will be then possible to identify
the implications of the obligations the UK inherited from the organs of international
regime. By complying with UN Drug Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988, Britain was
required as a signatory state to first illegitimatise the use of both recreational and
medical use and scientific research on cannabis then completely ban the production,
distribution, possession or purchase of cannabis and treat it as a criminal offense
under its domestic laws (Room et al., 2010:7-8) which “serve as the three pillars of the
current global drug control regime” (McAllister cited in Collins, 2012:12). Considering
the scope of these international laws enacted by the UN, the UK’s lack of capacity and
therefore proactivity to reform its cannabis policies are said to be held back as a result
of its treaty commitments (Room et al., 2010:8). This approach enables us to
understand the conditionalities of international treaties, the power of which are often
overlooked when it comes to the consideration of domestic cannabis laws as opposed
treaties around other salient issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As
Acevedo and Common claim “[w]hether the studies are […] limited to one country (The
UK in this case), the stress is on the identification of constellations of national or sub-
national state agencies, politicians, interest groups and political parties”,
acknowledging that an increasing number of political areas are now determined at the
international level (2006:399). These international laws, in the form of antiquated drug
treaty provisions in this case, explicitly block attempts by domestic states to pursue
less prohibitive cannabis regulations. Considering that the historical context is mainly
characterised by the UK’s Treaty Obligations to UN Drug Conventions, as well as
16
American influence, this chapter will focus on sections 1.1 The Casual Acceptance
and Use of Cannabis and Hemp in World History; 1.2 The Start of Cannabis
Prohibition in the US; 1.3 The Emergence of the First International Drug Control
System for Cannabis in the Early 20th Century and the US Influence; and finally 1.4
The United Nations Drug Control Conventions and its Influence on UK cannabis laws
“where cannabis was incorporated into the global prohibitive regime” (Walsh, 2009).
By analysing the historical perspectives on cannabis regulations, this chapter will show
the direct correlation between the UK’s current attitude towards cannabis (Home
Office, 2017) within its drug regulatory system and the International Drug Control
System. Understanding these historical dynamics is crucial in order to test our
hypothesis which is that there is a lack of scientific knowledge in EBPM on UK
cannabis legislations as a result of lack of scientific knowledge in EBP at the
intergovernmental level. The historical context helps us to grasp the current struggles
for legalisation of cannabis in the UK through a deep analysis of the following set of
changes on attitudes towards cannabis at both individual state and intergovernmental
level (Mills, 2013:2). As Mills asserts, these controversies on the drug’s prohibition are
vital as they can reveal how current positions of the UK on cannabis regulations have
been arrived at and “can show how well founded they are” (2013:2).
1.1. The Casual Acceptance and Use of Cannabis and Industrial Hemp in World
History
Cannabis use dates back more than five thousand years (Boggs, 2016:189) and has
been used by different civilisations throughout history – from the Far East to central
Asia, from Europe to North America in various forms such as recreational, medicinal,
as well as industrial (Newton, 2013:16-25). Much of what we know about the plant
17
today comes from 16th century BC Chinese agricultural manuscripts which mention
its medicinal and recreational benefits, as well as its function as a fundamental crop in
the form of hemp (Newton, 2013:21). For instance, cannabis oil acted as a remedy for
a range of illnesses such as malaria, nausea, depression and skin problems;
anaesthetic usage of cannabis for surgical procedures was also amongst the first
medicinal experimentation of the substance on humans in China. This is not to say
that the psychoactive effects of the herb were not recognised. Li cites “that the
stupefying effect of the hemp plant (cannabis) was commonly known from extremely
early times” (cited in Newton, 2013:24). According to Newton, Chinese practitioners
believed that the plant was able to give the user an access to the world of spirits,
representing a form of escape from the unpleasant routine of everyday life or “a
window to the sacred” (2013:52). The plant also played similar roles in other states
such as in Indian social life, where the appreciation for smoking cannabis was shown
by groups of people during social occasions such as weddings (Newton, 2013:27). In
the West, during the colonial era between the 16-18th century, cannabis gained
popularity in parallel to hemp in the British Empire. Hemp, the industrial strain of
cannabis described earlier, was utilised for shipbuilding in Europe, where the plant
was the key substance for the production of sails and ropes during the colonial era
(Newton, 2013:34). In the UK, medicinal benefits of cannabis were discovered
following significant scientific studies conducted by physicians such as Thomas
Clouston, who was nominated for the Forthergillian Gold Medal of the Medical Society
of London in 1870 for revealing cannabis’ higher efficacy in the treatment of the insane
in comparison to opium (Berridge, 1988:57). As an example of cannabis’ medical
capacity, it was referred by the Royal Family itself, as Val Curran and Warburton cites:
“cannabis tincture was prescribed to Queen Victoria for period pains and during
18
childbirth” (2015:3). This demonstrated a considerable medical interest in cannabis
from early on in the UK, although it was not yet scientifically backed. On the other side
of the Atlantic, hemp was used from early 17th century in the British Colonies of North
America, where the plant was an agricultural commodity. Controlling hemp production
in North America was crucial for the continuation of British Empire’s colonial success,
as a large ship in British Navy required 80 tons of Hemp to be used in sail and rope
which could be only achieved through a mandatory devotion of a portion of land by
farmers and landowners in North America. However, US Independence from Britain in
1976 proved that Britain’s mandate for its colonies in America was counterproductive
as American Colonies “ended up using [hemp] for their own military and industrial
growth against the British Empire” (UK Hemp Association, 2017). Finally, throughout
the 19th century, hemp production steadily increased due to technological
advancements in machinery in North America. Hemp was heavily used for the
production of a range of consumer products such as food, construction products,
textiles and fuel until the Marijuana Tax Act defined hemp as a narcotic drug in 1937
which terminated hemp production (Johnson, 2017:12). Yet, the interest on industrial
hemp production amongst single crop grower farmers such as tobacco and wheat has
been revitalised in 1990’s with “an increasing number of state legislatures began to
consider a variety of initiatives related to industrial hemp” (Ibid.,14). More recently,
with the enactment of the Agricultural Act of 2014 by Obama Government, further
federal restrictions on industrial hemp production were removed, meaning that any
states that have already legalised its manufacture under their state law could now
conduct scientific research on the benefits of cultivating it (Johnson, 2017:15). In the
UK, “[t]he ban on hemp cultivation, imposed in 1971 under the Misuse of Drugs Act,
was finally overturned in 1993” (Kelly, 2006:1). Having analysed the history of
19
cannabis and hemp, this section demonstrated that both strains have followed very
different trajectories around the world. Hemp “experienced a long, steady increased
rise in political economic importance over the centuries before 1850”, most notably
during the British Colonial time, as well as playing a key role in America’s
independence from Britain in 1776, yet faced “a remarkably swift decline from 1930’s
until 1990’s in the world’s previous and new Anglo-Saxon hegemon, however
recovered itself as an industrial commodity in the 21st century” (Duvall, 2014:88). In
contrast, it can be argued that “[c]annabis has experienced nearly the opposite
historical trajectory” (Ibid., 88), in the sense that the emergence of international
concerns over cannabis lasted nearly two centuries and the problematic character of
the legal status of cannabis around the world still has not been reformed. Overall, this
section has set the foundations for further debates on the emulation of cannabis laws
of the US by the UK and how the former influences the latter through global
governance if not directly. In the words of Acevedo and Common: “Drug policy in
Britain […] began to be developed following American initiatives during the first part of
the twentieth century” (2006:402). The following section will analyse how British
cannabis policy is better understood if it is studied in an international context which its
principles can be traced back to American politics.
1.2. The Start of Cannabis Prohibition in the US
“Cannabis is by far the most widely used illegal drug and therefore [it is not
unsurprising that, it has been] the mainstay of the War on Drugs” (Room et al., 2010:
vii). This section is aimed at distinguishing the historical arbitrary position of US
amongst other nations and its hegemonic influence on other states in the context of
the War on Drugs and UN Conventions, which were “were most strongly supported by
the US Government since 1971, when President Richard Nixon described the abuse
20
of illicit drugs as public enemy number one” (Wood et al., 2009:989). By defining the
US influence, we will have complied Acevedo and Common’s argument on the
significance of studying the UK’s domestic cannabis policies both through the world
cannabis history and its relationship with America: “In fact, drug policy must be studied
in an international context, and its principles must be traced back to American socio-
politics” (2006:402). Looking at the US case retrospectively, the first prohibition of
cannabis was initiated by the state of Massachusetts in 1911, followed by ten states
which banned recreational cannabis use. This was consolidated under the Harrison
Act, which served as the very first model for drug regulation on federal level, although
it did not mention cannabis (Newton, 2013:310). However, the acceleration of banning
recreational cannabis by individual states required an overarching federal state law –
the Marijuana Tax Act, which was passed by the Congress in 1937. This aimed at
imposing “registration and reporting requirements and a tax on growers, sellers and
buyers of marijuana” (Eddy, 2010:2). Not only did the act ban cannabis, but it also
banned the plantation of hemp due to the incorrect assumption that hemp contained
high THC levels. This ceased the agricultural production of hemp in the US and is
historically significant since the crop was an important source of revenue for the US
Economy. The decision taken by the Congress on the Marijuana Tax Act 1937 seems
to have stemmed from the lack of knowledge about hemp’s familial relationship with
cannabis and the lack of understanding of the breeds’ chemical structures. According
to Professor David Nutt (2015) and Monaghan et al. (2012), the Marijuana Tax Act
and subsequent prohibition of cannabis is an example of one of the first instances
involving both the Precautionary Principle and therefore lack of EBPM. Here, it would
be appropriate to define the Precautionary Principle within the context of illicit drugs
by Nutt (2010): “As a principle, it is based on the supposition that since there are
21
assumed to be no benefits of “illegal” drugs then banning the will have no downside
or “disbenefits” with the anticipated result that the banning of them will be beneficial to
society and to users”. This maxim is mainly used to guide public policy making by
policy architects who demonstrate a risk-averse approach to policy making under the
excuse of taking the necessary precautions to protect public health. In essence, “if
you’re not sure about a drug harm, rank it high, make all drugs class [the same] and
get rid of the problem” (Nutt, 2015:8) which is regularly invoked when debating the UK
classification of cannabis which is the subject of Chapter 2. This was evident, within,
the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937 case, where the act was approved despite the American
Medical Association’s (AMA) protests to banning scientific research on the plant’s
potential use for medical value: “[t]he medical profession and pharmacologists should
be left to develop the use of this drug if they see fit” (Eddy, 2010:3). As a result, the
act “required all medicinal products containing marijuana to be withdrawn from the
market and [led] to marijuana’s removal, in 1941, from the National Formulary and the
Unites States Pharmacopeia, in which it has been listed for almost a century” (Ibid.,
3). The US was a frontrunner in prohibiting cannabis domestically, which turned into
the micromanagement of drug policies on the international cannabis control regime.
The US initiated the International Opium Commission in Shanghai in 1909 which was
in fact the first international conference to discuss the world’s narcotic problems. This
meeting “largely end[ed] in discords but [led] to [the] 1912 Opium Convention” where
an opium trade ban was enacted for the very first time as a part of the treaty of
Versailles (Collins, 2012:8). This validates the presence of the US’s lobby to classify
cannabis as a narcotic and abolish its worldwide trade from the beginning of
international drug control yet its recommendations being rejected due to the unknown
negative effects of the drug on users. Blatantly, the US used its power to persuade the
22
League of Nations to terminate non-medical use and scientific research of cannabis
during 1925 Geneva Conventions. However, when this failed in negotiations, the US
quit the convention without signing it (Ibid., 8). Nevertheless, the anti-cannabis agenda
found itself revitalised in following international conventions starting with 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This section demonstrates that the US established
itself as a frontrunner in the war against cannabis, spreading its anti-cannabis views
to the international stage for the very first time and with a consistent effort to ban its
trade which proved real in 1961: “[p]rimarily under urging from the US, cannabis was
included in the strictest prohibition regime category in the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs” (Room et al. 2010:7). This decision, taken on the basis that cannabis
had no medical value and therefore it should be prohibited for all purposes of
recreational and medical use, emulating the exactly same rhetoric being used two
decades previously for the US Marijuana Tax Act 1937.
1.3. The Emergence of the First International Drug Control System for Cannabis in
the Early 20th Century and the US influence
Having observed the ancient history of hemp and cannabis in the first section and
tracing back to the beginning of cannabis prohibition in the US, this has shown that
the relationship states had with cannabis has significantly changed in the early 20th
century (Galliher and Walker, 1977). This is especially apparent when casual cannabis
use declined from early 20th century onwards with international concerns over the
drug’s narcotic abuse (Newton, 2013:54). Bean frames the issue when he says “since
1912 the problem of drug addiction has been seen to require an international response
and that position remains” (2014:234). Furthermore, Newton asserts that “[u]ntil the
1930’s concerns about the risk posed by dangerous drugs in the United States – as in
the rest of world focused almost entirely on cocaine and opiates; cannabis was rarely
23
mentioned” (2013:57). This illustrates how concerns about the potential harm to
individuals caused by the use of mind-altering substances and the dangers posed to
society did not primarily concentrate on cannabis, due to lack of scientific evidence.
Finally, in 1925 governments around the world turned to cannabis during the
International Opium Conference. (Newton, 2013:54). Although Western countries
failed to produce evidence regarding the impact of cannabis, some developing states
voiced their concerns. While incremental support existed on the side of US about
banning the cannabis trade, “some impressively forceful rhetoric on the part of
Egyptian representatives seem[ed] to have been enough to convince most of the case
against the drug” (Mills cited in Collins, 2012:25). Their concerns were in regard to the
negative mental health implications of cannabis smoking in Egypt, which was also
backed by Greece and Turkey. According to Kendell, the role of the Egyptian
government and its senior delegate, Dr El Guindy, was immense in terms of
influencing the Convention’s decision to bring cannabis under international control
(2003:147). Dr Guindy had depicted cannabis as a dangerous narcotic1 due to its
addictive nature, stating “that it was a potent cause not only of intellectual and physical
decline but of insanity” and relating 30 to 60 percent of all cases of insanity in Egypt
to cannabis smoking (Ibid.,147). Evaluating this scenario reiterates David Nutt’s (2015)
and Monaghan et al’s (2012) claims on the Precautionary Principle and the lack of
EBPM. Here it is clear that even from the very start of formation of international laws
around cannabis, results were derived from specific prejudices belonging to politicians
of participatory countries. These prejudices were seldom supported by statistical data
and even if they were, the data was provided from a single organisation – the Egyptian
According to the 1961 UN Drug Convention, cannabis plant and its products have been described as
"narcotic drugs" (UN, 1972).1
24
Lunacy Department. This department was established by John Warnock, who was
appointed to Egypt from Britain to reform the Abbasiya Mental Hospital in Cairo in
1895 where “he drafted laws on mental illness in Egypt and created [this] new
Department dedicated to Lunacy” (Mills cited in Collins, 2012:26). The evidence he
provided to Egyptian Delegates appeared to lack proper scientific evidence due to the
barriers Warnock faced during the conduct of his research on cannabis induced mental
health problems. The limitations on his research included “problems of translation,
deliberate misinformation, communicating with staff and a reliance on guess work”
(Ibid., 26). “In short, his method of establishing that an individual at his hospital was a
cannabis user was suspect and conclusions he drew about cannabis use were based
on the small sample of all Egypt’s users that had ended up his hospital” (Mills cited in
Collins, 2012:26) which rendered the research highly unrepresentative. Despite this,
his so-called evidence was accepted by the Egyptian Delegates and used in a slightly
exaggerated form in the Conference of 1925 (Ibid., 27). Not dissimilarly, Kendell
criticises the unfounded allegations made by the Egyptian Delegates on cannabis and
examines the inconsistency between the statistics being presented by the Egyptian
Delegates and the findings of the annual report of the Abbacy Hospital “This dramatic
claim that 30-60% of all cases of insanity in Egypt were attributable to hashish
(cannabis) was not supported by the statistics by [the government of Egypt]” whereas
“[t]he annual report of the Abbacy Hospital for 1920-21 records 715 admissions, of
which only 19 (2.7%) were attributed to hashish, considerably less than the 48
attributed to alcohol” (2003:149). Although this report had been marketed as the only
scientific evidence of its time, in fact, there was an alternative called the Indian Hemp
Drugs Commission Report of 1895. This 3,281 page study, commissioned by the UK
Parliament in India, pioneered the only scientific study of its kind of its time. According
25
to Rolles and Murkin, the report presented itself as “a remarkably detailed and
nuanced policy analysis” of a feasible cannabis policy which shows similarities with
contemporary harm reduction and depenalisation policy models of today (2016:217).
It is then quite surprising to see how such an advanced report for its own time, was
not even featured “in the deliberations of the 1925 Geneva Opium Convention,
remaining unmentioned by the UK representative” and how “[d]iscussions were
instead driven by a hard-line Egyptian delegate who “caused a stir among other
delegates with little or no domestic knowledge of the drug” with his contested claims
(Rolles and Murkin, 2016: 218). The International Opium Conference of 1925,
sponsored by the League of Nations and held in Geneva, decided to prohibit the
exportation of cannabis to countries where the drug was considered illicit (Kendell,
2003). In fact, the US never signed it, firstly because it was not a member at that time,
but more importantly because “US Delegates thought that the conference’s attitudes
about the approach to the control of drugs was too lenient, certainly more lenient than
the policies being developed at home” (Newton, 2013:56).
Although cannabis was included as a controlled substance in the aftermath of the
International Opium Convention of 1925, and despite the strong Egyptian push for a
total prohibition, the conference only toughened cannabis trade laws around the world,
through requiring an official import certificate of supply for the exporting country to the
country of import and prohibiting exports to countries where the drug was illegal under
domestic laws (Bewley-Taylor et al., 2014:12). However, one can certainly claim that
these first international control measures against cannabis in turn elicited national
control measures in various countries. “The Geneva Convention was […] notable in
bringing cannabis under international control, and restrictions were implemented in
Britain with the 1928 Dangerous Drugs Act” (BMA, 2013:89). Despite showing
26
accordance with the collective effort of League of Nations on the causality of cannabis
use, the 1928 Act’s prohibition of cannabis in the UK functioned only to limit the
recreational use of cannabis, meaning that medicinal cannabis prescription by doctors
as a treatment was still allowed, persisting until the 1971, MDA. Overall, it can be
concluded that “cannabis was included in the 1925 Geneva Opium Convention, mainly
as a result of international political manoeuvring between post-colonial Egypt […] and
Great Britain” (Duvall, 2014:115) yet US tacit support on the Convention should not be
underestimated.
This is especially apparent in considering the level of anti-cannabis concerns in the
US, starting in 1920’s with incremental enactments of state level bans which
culminated in the federal prohibition of cannabis in 1937 as discussed in the previous
section. This section has provided an overview of the first intentional drug control
system, focusing on states such as the US and Egypt who played key roles in terms
of setting the pivotal debates on cannabis prohibition on transnational governance.
The decision making in the first international drug control system which banned the
trade of cannabis, modelled insufficient EBP partly because of the inconsistent and
scientifically unattainable nature of the rationales given for the prohibition by the
Egyptian Delegates where political prejudice twisted scientific evidence in the form of
Precautionary Principle. Although 1925 was a strong starting point for the cannabis
prohibition on global governance level, it was symbolic if not reflected in the setting of
domestic policy as a full prohibition. Having examined first international precedents,
the next section will look at consecutive UN Drug Conventions which had practical
imperatives on the UK’s domestic cannabis laws.
27
1.4. The United Nations Drug Control Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 and its
Influence on UK Cannabis Laws
“Cannabis remained an uneasy presence in the international drugs regulatory system
for the next three decades” and was finally gained momentum again in 1961 after
being “ignored in deliberations at the League of Nations and later the United Nations”
(Mills cited in Collins, 2012:28). The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961
classified cannabis as Schedule I and IV and this required signatories to “prohibit the
production, manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession of or use of any
such drug except for amounts which may be necessary for medical or scientific
research only” (UN, 1972:16). As a Schedule I drug, cannabis was listed “as a
substance the properties of which give rise to dependence and which presents a
serious risk of abuse” and alongside with Schedule IV it was placed “among the most
dangerous substances, including heroin, by virtue of the associated risks of abuse, its
particularly harmful characteristics and its extremely limited medical or therapeutic
value” (Bewley-Taylor et al., 2014:19). Also, this classification did not only remain
within the limits of a UN but was made effective by the signatories of the convention
on cannabis policies at a state level. In 1970, the US Assistant Secretary of Health
recommended cannabis’s classification as a Schedule I, the same as heroin and LSD,
due to “the considerable void in [their] knowledge of the plant and effects of the active
drug contained in it” (Baron, 2015:886). This classification was accepted as the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 1970 rendering all potential
research illegal under US federal law, which is still valid today. This inspired the UK to
emulate the law with the introduction of the MDA in 1971 in the UK. This was a sign of
the UK’s commitment to the Convention where transnational policy was indeed turned
into domestic policy (Val Curran and Warburton, 2015:3). “Prohibition derive[d] in part
28
from Britain being a signatory to the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the requirements of which are to control the
possession, manufacture and import of certain drugs, although each country has some
latitude as to how it goes about things” (Bean, 2014:234). According to the
Transnational Institute’s Report “[c]urrent tensions arise from the decision to place
cannabis under strict control as part of the bedrock of the contemporary regime, the
1961 Single Convention”, however, “this decision, taken more than 50 years ago, had
very little to do with consideration of the available scientific evidence concerning
relative health risks” (2016:4). Whilst identifying the lack of EBP, the Report indicates
that:
“Remarkably, the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Expert
Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD), the body charged by the
1961 and 1971 Conventions with the scientific and medical review of
scheduling proposals, has never engaged in a formal review of
cannabis’ place within the Convention. As the Committee itself noted
in 2014, “Cannabis […] has not been scientifically reviewed by the
Expert Committee since the review by the Health Committee of the
League of Nations in 1935” (2016:4).
The limitations of EBPM on international drug control regime is addressed by Room
et al. which still is an ongoing problem at a UN level. A notable instance of this is the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime rejection in 2007 of WHO’s
recommendation to reschedule THC as Schedule IV (the least restrictive schedule)
with an excuse of it would “send a wrong signal and create a tension with the 1961
Convention” (Room et al. 2010:11). At the end, WHO’s recommendation was
amended to Schedule III, yet was still pended for further reconsiderations by the WHO
29
in discussion with the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). From what has been
discussed so far, it is clear that those in charge of international drug control regime set
the foundations for a system that did allow science-backed knowledge to thrive,
however instead operated through a multi levelled but incoherent bureaucracy:
“Bureaucracies are also hard to kill. They have built in constituencies
and budgets, and the capacity to generate political support if an
existential threat materialises” and they “tend to do what they are
created to do and not something else. Therefore, one of the reasons
that those wishing to reform or liberalise drug policy often find
themselves frustrated is because there are relatively few assets
devoted to prevention, intervention, and treatment (McAllister cited in
Collins, 2012:12).
Overall, understanding the 1961 Single Convention, alongside with the following
conventions in 1971 and 1988, definitely fosters a deeper understanding of the
trajectory of cannabis regulations around the world, as well as in the UK context, as
far as this paper is concerned. As asserted in “A framework for a regulated market for
cannabis in the UK”, it is possible to say that these three consecutive UN drug
conventions that the UK adopted caused substantial obstacles against a prospective
implementation of a modernised regulation model for cannabis in the UK which we still
suffer from today (Barratt, 2016:31). In other words, “the present international treaties
have inhibited depenalization and prevented more thorough reforms of national
cannabis regimes” (Room et al., 2010:153). Through this analysis we reach the
conclusion that “the story of cannabis and the British has been shaped by the wider
history of twentieth century Britain” (Mills, 2013:2). All the “current positions among
both those that advocate consumption and those that insist on control have been
30
formed by the prejudices, misconceptions, and the politics of the past”, heavily
influenced by UN Conventions (Ibid.,2).
2. UK Cannabis Classification: Science, Politics or Both?
2.1. Scientific Knowledge
“The assumption that scientific evidence of any kind feeds directly into both practice
and policy has long been questioned by both academics and practitioners” (Oakley,
2012:268) which takes us the first component of ‘Three Lenses of EBP’: the use of
scientific evidence in EBP (Head, 2008). Head describes scientific forms of knowledge
as a research-backed evidence which “primarily comprise the work of professionals
trained in systematic approaches to gathering and analysing information” (2008:6). In
the UK cannabis regulations context, we can argue this has been realised through
establishment of government-sponsored committees or sub-committees (working
groups) and their amalgamation and presentation of evidence to governments via
reports. As far as Taylor argues, the start of advisory committee dates back to 1950s
- 1960’s on an adhoc basis called the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence
(ACDD) in 1967 which then in 1971 “was reconfigured as a statutory body and
renamed the Advisory Council on Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) [whose] remit was to keep
under review drugs, being misused, or likely to be misused and to advise on measures
to prevent misuse or to deal with associated problems” (2016: 130). This reconstitution
of former ad hoc committees stemmed from the need to formalise the previous
informal research networks and to establish permanent expert committees to guide
the government on its drug regulations. In other words, EBPM emerged from “the idea
that there could be a rational relationship between research and policy [which] was
high on agenda” in the 1970s (Taylor, 2016:130) and was a catalyst for formalisation
31
of these government-sponsored commissions. By no means were these committees
initially planned to solely concern themselves with cannabis, however the salience of
the topic, combined with an increasing panic around the substance use, the unknowns
about the drug, as well as the timing of a newly imposed 1965 Dangerous Drugs Act
in the UK, put cannabis in the same category as heroin. This raised concerns regarding
the legitimacy of the law which prioritised cannabis in the agenda of ACDD. This was
the most evident when “[t]he attention of ACDD was first drawn to cannabis when the
Vice-chancellor of Oxford University, concerned about the drug use among Oxford
students, wrote to the then Home Secretary […] asking for a national enquiry” and the
rising drug convictions rate from “four convictions and four customs seizures in 1945”
to “3,393 convictions and 87 seizures in 1967” (Oakley, 2012:269). A few years after,
when it came to ACMD, according to Taylor, “cannabis was initially a major feature of
the ACMD’s work and this was for re-opening talks about medicalization which would
consequently sponsor the needed scientific research” (2016:130). Despite having
different motives, both committees and their working groups aimed at providing the
government with the best scientific evidence possible, in order to drive better results
in policy making on cannabis. Yet, there remains scepticism on the practicality of these
reports, regardless of the accuracy of the scientific evidence they presented. Oakley
claims that “[t]here has been a little academic evaluation of the relationship between
such bodies and policy outcomes” (2012:268). Taking Oakley’s commentary on the
use of committees into account, we speculate that the existing relationship between
the government commissions and policy making is incompatible, due to the
reoccurring tensions. Here it is crucial to differentiate first between the lack of
unanimity amongst committee members (researchers) and secondly the rift within
researchers and politicians. As has been argued throughout this paper, these tensions
32
stemmed from the application of Precautionary Principle from both parties. The former
chairman of ACMD, Nutt stated that the Precautionary Principle “distort[s] the value of
evidence and therefore I think it could and probably does, devalue evidence” (2009:8).
So in the same vein as Nutt, it could be suggested the Precautionary Principle is not
solely limited to political knowledge within EBPM but extends to scientific knowledge
as well. Within the legalisation debate, if we were to revisit the five major positions as
prohibition, decriminalisation, harm reduction, medicalization and finally legalisation
(Bean, 2014: 224-240) amongst all, prohibition would be merely the position where
precaution prevails, which “reflects current government policy where legal controls
prohibit the possession, sale and cultivation of [cannabis]” (Bean, 2014:234). As
mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, Britain’s prohibitionist laws around cannabis arise from
it being a signatory member of the UN Treaties. These requirements remain, and the
UK must regulate the possession, manufacture and importation of certain drugs,
including cannabis which is detrimental to the research of any medical benefits (Baron,
2015:886). Revisiting the argument that the UK’s Treaty Obligations had a significant
impact on its domestic cannabis prohibition, Bean suggests that “[i]ndeed, the
problems posed by drug use are worldwide and probably beyond the capacity of any
individual nation state to take effective unilateral action” (2014:234). So far, being
signatory to UN Drug Treaties has only allowed for the UK to reach often muddled
assumptions on the lack of medical benefit of the substance. Nutt asserts that this is
also an instance of Precautionary Principle, whereby politicians take decisions about
muddling through, aiming to avoid making serious errors as much as possible. Nutt
explains the drawbacks of the decisions taken in light of Precautionary Principle on
society as follows:
33
“The argument goes like this: if we are unsure of the risks of harms
of drug then it is safer to ban it as a precaution rather than wait until
harms become apparent. As a principle, it is based on the supposition
that since they are assumed to be no benefits of “illegal” drugs then
banning them will have no downside of “disbenefits” with the
anticipated result that the banning of them will be beneficial to society
and to users” (2010).
Although the definition of the ‘Precautionary Principle’ given by Nutt seems to be
referring to its contemporary existence within drug laws in the UK, (which falls into the
category political knowledge) historically we see a consistent pattern of use of the
Precautionary Principle within government advisory reports as well. Accordingly, the
next section will show us the application of the Precautionary Principle within scientific
knowledge.
2.2. The Use of the Precautionary Principle Within Scientific Knowledge
The Precautionary Principle is a tool of political knowledge and thus has seldom
occurred throughout the trajectory of the development of government advisory bodies
on cannabis. However, Monaghan et al. disagrees with this assertion that
“[s]sometimes it is the scientists who attempt to promote precaution and sometimes is
the politicians who prefer to sit in wait of evidence” (2012:176). First, looking at the
precautionary bias within scientific knowledge, it is plausible to make the case that it
stems from the diversity of professional backgrounds as Head suggests “there is
seldom consensus among social scientists on the nature of problems, the causes of
trends and relationships, and the best approach for solutions” (2008: 6). Taylor
observes this problem within the first two reports created by the Working Group on
34
cannabis (WGC) in 1973 and 1975, which were meant to catalyse the discussions
around re-medicalization of cannabis by advising the ACMD. All talks on the
medicalization of cannabis had been long halted upon the enactment of MDA in 1971.
However, both of these interim reports demonstrated imbalances of opinions due to
the diverse views on cannabis expressed by committee members amongst
themselves (Taylor, 2016:131). This began when JDP Graham, a clinical psychologist,
contributor to The Wootton Report and committee member associated with the first
report, “drew attention to the possible uses of cannabis in asthma and for cancer
patients”, he was ultimately taking a more benign view of cannabis and advocating for
its therapeutic aspects (Taylor, 2016:131).
By contrast, Griffith Edward, the Director of the Addiction Research Unit at the Institute
of Psychiatry “was against liberalisation and highlighted the potential harms of
cannabis” (Ibid.,131). That is “[i]n Edward’s view the uncertainty over harms
necessitated the retention of the Precautionary Principle and [thus] justified the
maintenance of the legal status quo” which was the classification of cannabis as a
class B drug in MDA 1971 (Ibid., 131). This shows the extent to which the role
Precautionary Principle plays in EBPM disengaging researchers from evidence. The
lack of agreement within the committee continued to prevail and as a result “[t]he
second interim report of 1975 recommended that there be no changes to the law in
light of uncertainty over long-term clinical and social effects, but [yet] it was
accompanied by a minority report by Searchfield which favoured liberalization” (Taylor,
2016:131). This proved that from the creation of the committee working groups, (which
had the aim of enhancing and strengthen the quality of the research on cannabis) the
apparent discernible opinion differences between researchers represented the lack of
unanimity and this was also reflected upon their interim reports demonstrating a high
35
level of “uncertainty and the inability of WGG Committee” (Ibid., 131). It was only in
1979, that the WGG Committee first showed consensus on the need for downgrading
cannabis from Class B to Class C and from Schedule I of the Regulations to Schedule
II, yet the government rejected the proposal. It was clear that the lack of unity within
the committee translated into an obvious weakness and proved ineffective in terms of
convincing the government to initiate a change on rigid cannabis regulations.
Furthermore, this “[s]cientific uncertainty meant that the evidence was open to
interpretation and policy imperatives differed for each member” (Taylor, 2016:132). To
put it simply, “[t]he different professional backgrounds of the members meant that
WGC’s reports lay mixed messages and different approaches, to both scientific
evidence on cannabis and what to do with such evidence” (2016:130). The example
given about the lack of convergence on opinions surrounding cannabis laws further
proves Head’s claims about the intrinsic issues within scientific knowledge of EBM.
He asserts “various scientific disciplines […] may offer complementary or sometimes
competing perspectives on complex issues” such as cannabis here which we identified
undermining the quality and the presentation of evidence being produced in the
committee reports (2008:6). However, “[w]hilst recommendations were ultimately
rejected by the government, cannabis harms were called into question and the WGC,
adopted a more relaxed attitude to cannabis” (Taylor, 2016:131). Although so far we
have looked at the negativities of the Precautionary Principle and the ineptness of the
committees, its application was not completely counterproductive. The most
successful example of this being the declassification of cannabis in 2004, in light of
recommendations by The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD). The
Labour Home Secretary showed its keenness to the best use of scientific knowledge,
which contributed to the buzzwords of the party mandate. As we can see this was one
36
case where ACMD revealed a consensus on further consideration of cannabis
classification under MDA, which was finally accepted by the Government.
2.3. Political Knowledge and Precautionary Principle
For Head “[p]olicy, seen through the political lens, is about persuasion and support
rather than about objective veracity” (2008:5). Considering the truth within this claim
makes us argue that “[e]ven when policy decisions relate to areas that are highly
technical and scientific there is little evidence that technical arguments necessarily
have much direct impact on decisions made. Unsurprisingly, then, society appears to
be guided more by politics than by science, and politics is more about the art of the
possible or generally acceptable than what is rational or might work best “(Nutley and
Webb cited in Davies et al., 2000: 13-14). To sum up, taken from this perspective “in
the context of illicit drugs policy (cannabis), it has been argued that the use of evidence
has often been in a ‘politically opportune’ moment, used to shape particular agendas,
despite the rhetoric of evidence-based drug policy” which made ‘what works’ the
mantra of New Labour from 1997 until today (Ritter and Lancaster, 2013:461). As
Macgregor highlights although “the public statement of government, scientists and
pressure groups commonly make reference to the adopting evidence-based or
evidence-informed approach to policy making” in reality “the debate about how we
address the challenges of mind-altering drugs is polarised, with an added emotional
and moral aspect that is not seen in most other policy areas” (2013:225). For Nutt, this
is where political knowledge seems to be dependent on the Precautionary Principle.
He urged politicians to consider this when he asked the question in 2009: “Another
key question we have to address as a society is whether our attitude to drugs is driven
because of their harms, or are we engaging in a moral debate?” (cited in Bean,
2014:256). This was openly admitted by the Home Secretary Alan Smith that their
37
approach was more on the moral basis than scientific evidence. Overall, the
precaution was the core of risk averse political knowledge, which proved itself powerful
during reclassification debates sparked in 2006. The early talks about a
reconsideration of classification of cannabis have initiated first in early January 2006
by the Home Secretary Charles Clarke who decided not to change the status of the
drug on the basis ACMD's reconsiderations in 2005. These claimed that the
advantages associated with the declassification of cannabis since 2004 were mainly
based on the substantial time saving (269,327 hours) of police officers in one year
(May et al., 2007:51). However, the considerations to reverse the declassification was
revitalised in 2007 after Brown took over from Blair. Brown had already chosen his
prohibitionist side on the debate as he announced that the Home Secretary Jacqui
Smith was reconsidering the return of cannabis from Class C to B during his Prime
Minister's Questions. Having discussed the characteristics of scientific and political
knowledge within the context of UK domestic cannabis laws as well as to what extent
they are driven from Precautionary Principle, we will now analyse to what extent the
rationales behind declassification in 2004 and reclassification in 2009 include both
types of knowledge.
2.4. Debate on Declassification
In 2004, Cannabis and related products were downgraded from Class B to Class C
under the Home Secretary David Blunkett. “In March 2002, the Council recommended
that all cannabis products be reclassified from Class B to Class C. The Home
Secretary accepted the Council's advice and the legislative changes came into force
on 29 January 2004" (ACMD, 2005:6). “The decision to downgrade cannabis came as
something of a surprise” as “controlled substances are rarely reclassified in this way,
and the political climate was not conducive to such a change” (Shiner, 2015:696). The
38
ultimate goal of this policy change was to make the economic resources and time that
had been devoted to policing cannabis available to policing and treatment of more
harmful drugs, through decreasing the possession penalties (May et al., 2007:9). More
importantly, according to the ACMD, 2005 Report "[a]though cannabis is harmful, its
harmfulness does not equate to that of other Class B substances either at the level of
the individual or of society" (ACMD, 2005:20). The Government also placed a
significant emphasis on the claim that declassification would reallocate the existing
police resources to tackle with more harmful drugs (Shiner, 2015: 698). As a result,
“nationally reclassification is likely to have saved the 43 forces of England and Wales
just over 3.5 million pounds” (May et al., 2007:10) alongside with a massive decrease
in Class B seizures from 84,495 in 2003 to 6,696 in 2004 (Bean, 2014:17). Although
the empirical data presented by the government seemed the decision taken was a
legitimate one, it is still debatable especially “whether savings on this scale are being
redirected to address Class A drug problems” as initially promised say May et al.
(2007:10).
To emphasise and repeat the earlier point on the scepticism of the level of scientific
knowledge impacting EBP (Head, 2008) we argue that the decision to downgrade
cannabis was not purely technocratic. As claimed in Young et al. policy “decisions are
less about projected consequences and more process and legitimatisation” as “politics
is about shaping interpretations and expressing preferences” which makes the role of
advisory committees and their scientific evidence more of a facilitator for the wider
public debate on the issue rather than solving the problem (2002:218). Coming from
this point, we now look at the political aspects of the decision behind declassification
in 2002. Shiner explains first “Labour won the elections [of 2001] with a massive
parliamentary majority which meant it could be less risk averse” on a highly
39
contradictory policy area such as drugs (2015:697). Secondly, prior to elections, the
Police Foundation – an independent think-tank which specialises in policing and crime
reduction submitted an Independent Inquiry into MDA, the summary of their
recommendation is as follows: “Cannabis should be moved from Schedule I to
Schedule II of the MDA Regulations thereby permitting supply and possession [as well
as research] for medical purposes” and “Cannabis should be transferred from Class B
to Class C of Schedule II of the MDA “ (Police Foundation, 2000: 115).
Although this report was based on scientific knowledge, its findings were political as
can be seen by the Labour Government postponing it until after the general election.
Furthermore, there was surprising support from both liberal and conservative media
outlets such as Daily Mail on the recommendations of the Inquiry: “Despite this paper’s
instinctive reservations over a more relaxed approach to softer drugs’ there should be
[…] a rational examination of the issues and a mature and serious national debate’”
(Daily Mail cited Shiner, 2015:697); there was also commentary on the Guardian which
indicated that cannabis “is a subject which interests a large number of ordinary people
and an open and mature debate could help re-engage many, particularly the young,
in the political process” (Tempest, 2001). The report also created a new opportunity
for Lib-Dems to reiterate their pro-decriminalisation stance on cannabis (The Times,
2000). To sum up, the debate on declassification of cannabis demonstrated a mix of
both scientific and political knowledge.
2.5. Debate on Reclassification
Downgrading cannabis seemed promising but was ephemeral since it was reverted in
2009, reclassified as a class B controlled drug under the Brown Government, despite
the ACMD's persistence that its class C status should be preserved (ACMD, 2008:7).
40
Cannabis possession, in its revised class, can result in a sentence of up to five years,
and up to fourteen years for supply or production with an unlimited fine. The stimuli
behind the reclassification was the increasing cannabis-induced mental health issues
resulting from “the use and availability of increased strengths of the drug, commonly
known as "skunk" which as the higher level of … (THC)" (Home Office, 2009:1). In this
section, we argue that although the declassification of cannabis policy in 2004 showed
characteristics of both scientific and political knowledge within EBPM, the policy U-
turn in 2009 is more politically driven with a dash of implementation knowledge by the
police.
Political history shows us that in the UK, the Government’s behaviour has not always
been consistent with the scientific advice given by the advisory committees’ persistent
recommendations in reports which find unsuitability with the category which cannabis
is placed. This can be seen in the following examples: ACMD 2008 Report suggests
“[f]urther research is required into the pattern of the use of cannabis, dependency and
the resulting physical and physiological complications, particularly to assess how
users react to more potent forms” yet still concluded that “Cannabis should remain a
Class C drug” (2008:37,39); the ACMD 2005 Report reflects: “Although it is
unquestionably harmful, its harmfulness does not equate to that of other Class B
substances either at the level of the individual or of society” thus “The Council does
not advise that the classification of cannabis-containing products should be changed
on the basis of the results of recent research into the effects on the development of
mental illness” (2005:18); the ACMD 2002 Report concludes that "[t]he council
believes that the current classification of cannabis (Class B as in 2002) is
disproportionate in relation to both to its inherent toxicity and to that of other
substances such as amphetamines that are currently within class B" (2002:1). Lastly,
41
The Wootton 1968 report indicates that “there [was] no evidence that [the activity of
using cannabis] [was] causing violent crime or aggressive anti-social behaviour, or is
producing in otherwise people conditions of dependence or psychosis” (ACDD, 1968)
which criticized the categorisation of cannabis which was put under the same category
as heroin upon UK’s agreement to 1961 UN Single Act Convention which echoes the
argument made in Chapter 1 regarding UK Treaty Obligations which plays a direct role
in domestic policymaking as it did in this instance.
To sum up, all the advisory reports above since 1968 display a common view on
cannabis which is that scientific research found “no evidence that serious physical or
(psychological) dangers were directly associated with the smoking of cannabis, or that
cannabis posed a greater personal or social danger than alcohol” (Oakley, 2012:269).
These examples justify the claim that the insignificance of harms - physically or
mentally attributed to the use of cannabis was not only limited to the 2008 case, but
rather was consistently included in the central argument of the reports. However, this
was seldom taken into consideration in the decision making of policy architects,
demonstrating a lack of scientific knowledge.
Secondly, when it comes to justifying the existence of political and practical
implementation knowledge, we share the arguments made by Shiner: first “although
this reversal was officially attributed to concerns about stronger strains of cannabis
and ‘binge smoking’, it was rumoured that Brown agreed to it in return for the political
support of Paul Dacre, editor of the Daily Mail, at a time when public opinion was
turning against the Government” and secondly; “moving cannabis back to Class B was
a largely symbolic gesture given that ACPO’s guidance on cannabis warnings
remained unchanged” during previous administration” (2015:703).
42
And thirdly, “The advice of the ACMD that cannabis should remain in Class C was not
heeded on this occasion and its Chair, Professor David Nutt, was sacked on the
grounds that he had gone beyond his remit of providing scientific advice to lobbying
for a change of policy” (Ibid., 703). This example revisits the statement previously
made by Monaghan et al. (2012) which talked previously about the everlasting rift
between researchers who take the anti-prohibition stance and the politicians. In
conclusion, the utilisation and interpretation of evidence by politicians in the case of
reclassification reveals itself short of scientific knowledge and undermined by the
political conundrum.
3. Conclusion: Summary of Findings and Implications for Future Research
This research project investigated to what extent domestic cannabis regulations in the
UK are evidence-based.
To do so, the first chapter explored the impact on UK domestic cannabis laws from its
Treaty Obligations and historic cannabis prohibition internationally. Throughout the
analysis, the Muddling Through model as well as the Precautionary Principle were
used to demonstrate the lack of science-backed evidence within the decisions taken
at these conventions. We also identified attempts by the US to impose its cannabis
prohibition onto intergovernmental drug control. This can be seen from the first Opium
Convention in 1912, where US faced resistance by the international committee on the
prohibition of cannabis, through to the 1925 Geneva convention where it was
overshadowed by Egyptian leadership and onwards throughout the War on Drugs in
the 1970s. Drug Conventions between 1961 and 1988 saw US anti-cannabis
ideologies realised on national levels of signatory states. These were watershed
moments on the international cannabis control scene; as they completely banned
43
cannabis’ recreational and medical use. The international initiatives were ensured
domestically in the MDA 1971 by the UK.
Looking at the exertion of power of UN Treaty Obligations on the UK, the second
chapter, using ‘Three Lenses of EBP’ by Head (2008), and with the consideration of
the Precautionary Principle, demonstrates a comprehensive analysis of the UK’s most
recent and only classification changes made under MDA; cannabis downgrade in 2004
from B to C, and the reversal in 2009. Arguments could be put forward that while we
first hypothesised the decision behind declassification to be science-backed, the
media influence, the postponement of law until after the election, as well as the support
from opposition parties showed us that the influence of political knowledge was
strongly present in the decision making, if not completely overriding the scientific
knowledge provided by ACMD reports.
By contrast, the reclassification decision proved itself to be more political and practical
implementation knowledge driven. The sacking of the chairman of ACMD David Nutt
was a reaction from the Home Secretary to the increasing media and ACPO concerns
regarding the cannabis-induced mental health issues which laid the blame onto the
previous downgraded status of cannabis. Overall the reversal of cannabis status in
2009 was a by-product of UK’s long anti-cannabis stance. In conclusion, this research
paper showed that while the role UN Drug Conventions plays is integral to future UK
cannabis policy, EBP is not completely absent. Despite the impact that was depicted
under the mantra ‘what works’ of the New Labour in 1997, Head’s ‘Three Lenses of
Evidence-Based Policy’ (2008) justifies that EBP is not solely limited to scientific
knowledge but practical implementation and most importantly political knowledge. This
suggests the alterations which took place on the status of cannabis did lack scientific
44
knowledge but can still be considered EBP, based on upon the discussions in this
paper.
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